HINDU PHILOSOPHY

POPULARLY EXPLAINED.

THE HETERODOX SYSTEMS.

BY

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PREFACE.

The following Prospectus issued will serve the purposes of a Preface:

"Upwards of three years ago my book on the Orthodox Systems of Hindu Philosophy was published in America by a very respectable firm, under the auspices mainly of the Punjab Tract Society, which bought five hundred copies for circulation in this country. The book was favorably reviewed both in America and here, and Mr. Hooper, a Sanscrit scholar and an expert, wrote an appreciative article on it, representing it as "more complete" than either Dr. Banerjea's *Dialogues* or Father Goreh's *Refutation*. Considering the nature of the subjects treated of in the Book, it has had, I have been assured by Mr. Raha, a fair sale, and if the copies instead of being deposited in one centre had been distributed to the various Depositories in India a larger sale might have been ensured.

The short Preface to the book concludes with a promise on my part to bring out a Companion Volume of the same size on the Heterodox Systems. This promise I am now in a position to fulfil. I have during the last three years been studying these systems—consulting all the sources available to the English reader—and I have written articles on them; and some of these have, from time to time, appeared in the Calcutta Review and the Indian Evangelical Review. The
Editor of the latter, who reviewed the first volume appreciatively, and is anxious to see the second published, and who is very generously willing to accord to me all the help he can, has spoken both privately, and in a short notice he recently took in the *Indian Christian Herald* of the forthcoming volume, of these articles in kind and encouraging terms. The companion volume is to consist, besides an introductory chapter presenting the characteristic features of Hindu Heterodoxy, of four chapters on Buddha and his Philosophy, two chapters on Jainaism, one chapter on the Charvaka Epicurism, one on the Pseudo-Theism of the schools of Ramanuja and Ramananda, one on Kabir and his creed, and two on Guru Nanak and his creed, and an article on Esoteric Buddhism to be added as a supplement.

"It is my intention to bring out the volume in a neat, attractive form; but I cannot do so without material assistance from the Tract Societies in India; and the object of the prospectus is to solicit the help I stand in need of. I may mention that the Punjab Tract Society has again come to my help with a generous offer to buy 200 copies at Rs. 2-8 per copy. For this liberal offer, as well as for the help accorded to me on the first occasion, I am mainly indebted to the venerable Missionary, Mr. Clark, of Amritsar.

"The Calcutta Tract Society has also kindly offered to purchase 100 copies at the fixed rate. If the reponsibility of purchase and sale were thus distributed, and not centered in one Society, and publicity given, a fair circulation might be anticipated.

"I have to add that my object in these publications is two-fold, to counteract the growing tendency of the educated intellect of the country to an exaggerated admiration o
Oriental thought, and to place within reach of my fellow-laborers in the Lord such books of reference as may help them in the prosecution of their work.”

The author has only to add that as the following chapters had to appear in the shape of Review and Newspaper Articles, it has been impossible to avoid what the reader may be prone to represent as tiresome repetitions. Nor does he regret these, as the principle of line upon line, precept upon precept, ought to be realized in all publications intended to benefit his educated countrymen.

Ram Chandra Bose.
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SUPPLEMENT.

ESOTERIC BUDDHISM.
HINDU HETERODOXY.

CHAPTER I.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF HETERODOX PHILOSOPHY IN INDIA.

Buddha originated Heterodox Philosophy in India not long after the scheme called Orthodox had been elaborated by Kapila, the founder of the Sankhya School and the father of Hindu Philosophy in general. All attempts to establish the priority of Buddha to Kapila, or to prove that the Sankhya scheme is merely an offshoot of Buddhistic philosophy have signally failed; and the current belief with reference to the relation subsisting between them maintains its sway unchecked. Buddha is generally, almost universally, looked upon and represented as a follower of Kapila, not a thorough-paced devotee, but a naughty disciple, who saw through or detected the fallacies by which the Master's speculations had been marred, and laid the foundation of a scheme certainly more consistent and less objectionable. The multitudinous souls posited by Kapila, and reduced to non-entities by a series of definitions which left them nothing but what is called pure being or what Herbert Spencer calls potential existence, were set aside, and his dualism was transformed into materialistic monism. In effecting this change, the great founder of Buddhism, not merely tried to reduce a cumbrous scheme to something like simplicity and consistency, but laid the foundation of a
HINDU HETERODOXY.

school, to which the varied lines of heterodox philosophy, which have flourished and decayed on Indian soil, ought to be, if they have not been, traced.

The two main lines of thought, orthodox and heterodox, originated almost contemporaneously, in the same age and under similar circumstances, the latter springing into existence perhaps immediately, certainly not long after, the appearance of the former on the stage of speculation. But they cannot justly be represented as having run on paralleled to each other since their inception in times immemorial down to the present age. On the contrary they ought to be described as having converged towards each other, met and kissed each other, and again diverged from each other to meet again in what may be called a sea of concessions and compromises. The heterodox scheme marched forward in a line, independent indeed but tending towards assimilation with the more dominant system, till in the Middle Ages a union was effected or a compromise made in consequence of a reaction against absolute scepticism. But the united stream flowed on only to diverge once more into independent and rival currents, and to meet finally in one common expanse of thought. The analogy that most naturally suggests itself to the mind while engaged in contemplating the onward march of philosophic thought in our country is that of two broad streams flowing towards each other through a wide tract of territory, meeting and moving majestically in a united volume of water through another region by no means so large, and finally diverging into separate currents to discharge their separate masses of waters in one and the same ocean.

The two lines of thought have many more points of contact than of divergence; indeed their agreement is real and differ-
ence shadowy. It is desirable to show first wherein they agree, and then to proceed to an enumeration of their features of disagreement. They agree in their (1) local idiosyncrasy, (2) their form or drapery, (3) their method of reasoning or statement, (4) their basis and object, (5) their superstructure of thought and speculation, (6) their cyclic development, and (7) the goal in which they ultimately meet. These features of agreement, which bespeak essential unity, ought to be treated of seriatim, before attention is called to the distinction which is on the whole a distinction without a difference. But a preliminary remark or two on what may be called the cast of intellect disclosed in Hindu philosophy may be ventured on, if only to remove the erroneous impressions current in and out of the country.

The Hindu intellect, like the Hindu nation, has been alternately made the subject of indiscriminate praise and undiscerning censure. By some it has been lifted up to the skies and represented as the very type of penetration and perspicacity; while by others it has been denounced as incorrigibly dull and stupid; just as the Hindu people have themselves been represented by some as eminently civilised and stigmatized by others as scarcely above the savage state. The varieties of races and conditions of life noticeable on the wide surface of a country, admittedly one of the largest and most populous in the world, account for the varieties of representations to which our national characteristics, looked at from various standpoints, have given birth. The prevailing tendency, however, under clouds of glowing eulogy and scathing censure, or of misrepresentations either on the right or on the wrong side, is to represent the Hindu intellect, properly so called, as unusually acute and penetrating. Max Muller calls the Hindus "a nation of philo-
sophers," and Dr. Duff "a race of dialecticians;" but the meaning concealed beneath these grandiloquent phrases is not undiscernible. Both these great men combine with innumerable others, both great and small, in representing the Hindus as a highly intellectual people; and they are on the whole right. The amount so to speak of intellect, which has survived the millenniums of crushing despotism and degrading superstition through which the country has passed, is surprisingly large, and its present achievements under a superior system of culture are by no means so contemptible as they have been represented by professional detractors. The nation has shown receptivity; if not originality, enough to justify the calm confidence with which it looks forward to its future progress under the guidance of the most advanced people on the surface of the globe.

It has not, however, been clearly noticed that the literature of the Hindus discloses as in a mirror two distinct types of intellectual development, that of the rhapsodist and that of the logician. The Rishis of primitive Rigveda times were no thinkers, no reasoners; and amid the dangers by which they were surrounded and the discomforts to which their predatory life exposed them, they would have laughed immoderately at the idea of being engaged in any controversy other than the stern one of the battle-field, the controversy resonant of the clangor of arms and the rattle of chariot wheels. Grammar, rhetoric, logic and philosophy were scarcely named amongst them, and if named, were treated with the supreme contempt with which the proud warrior regards all conflicts other than those of a military campaign or a guerilla onslaught. But though above such mean things as literature and science the good Rishis could not possibly be above the crying necessities of their uncer-
tain mode of life; and as they had been early taught to personify natural powers into recognized deities they gave vent to their devotion to these, or rather to their own felt wants, in "psalms and hymns and spiritual songs," incoherent indeed, but fervid and impassioned. They could not reason, but they could rhapsodize, and did rhapsodize with a vengeance, and their example has been followed, not only by bards and song-makers but even by philosophers and reformers of religion. Kabir for instance was a rhapsodist of a type loftier than that of the Rig Veda. Such was Nanak, and such were those of Nanak's disciples whose effusions make the Granth one of the most unreadable of books. And such, let us add, was the late Babu Keshab Chunder Sen whose impassioned eloquence was marred by incoherence of thought and feebleness of reasoning, and who invariably rhapsodised when called upon to argue.

One peculiarity of such a class of minds is their gullibility. Mahomed was nothing more than a rhapsodist during at least the first period of his career; and it is possible, nay probable, that in his hours of solitary meditation he was deluded into a firm belief in his assumed supernatural call or commission; though the admirable sagacity he subsequently displayed both as a warrior and as a statesman might argue a little cunning intermixed with a conviction on the whole fanatical. Reformers like Kabir and Nanak, with minds untrained and ill-regulated, prone to rhapsodize and unaccustomed to nice, philosophical distinctions, could not but be victimised by crude notions and fanatical beliefs; and there is not the slightest reason for refusing to credit them with a large measure of sincerity, not however unmixed with a deal of low cunning. And Babu Keshub Chunder Sen's life showed a mixture of these two traits of character
often seen united in different proportions in the history of enthusiasm. Charges of wholesale imposture need not be brought against all the founders of Hindu sects, as their mental constitution, which unfitted them for that process of induction without which truth in any department of knowledge is unattainable, combined with the traditions they imbibed to render them peculiarly susceptible to the illusive influences of religious fanatacism.

But many of our ancient and mediæval philosophers were representatives of another and higher order of mind. They had an intellect keen and argumentative, and their writings are fitted to raise the puzzling question, so well put by Lord Macaulay, viz., how men, who reason so closely and so consecutively from assumed premises fail so miserably to see the utter groundlessness of the assumptions on which their ably-conducted arguments are based. The most conspicuous among these philosophers was Sankara Acharya, whose abilities as a controversialist are unmatched, and whose famous commentaries, though disfigured by the glaring defects of a cumbrous system of logic, are master-pieces of close reasoning. The ancient philosophers of the country were, if the existing Sutras are regarded as a correct index to the cast of intellect possessed by them, something more than mere rhapsodists. They were philosophers in the proper sense of the term, men who stood on a platform above the low ambitions and grovelling activities of life, and strove amid privations and discomforts to enquire into the deep meaning of the world in which they lived; and whose complete failure to solve the great problems by which their minds were monopolised resulted from their temerity in laying aside the philosophy of common sense and adopting vicious modes of investigation and reasoning. They were original
thinkers, and their followers of the mediæval and post-medæval ages have been imitators and copyists. But even these master minds were not free from the heat of fanaticism, such as disqualified them for a rigid analysis of facts, a clear recognition of distinctions, a view broad and comprehensive, an investigation calm and persevering, a thorough sifting of evidence, and a cautions building up of generalizations, in a word for all those processes of research and reasoning which are the basis of reliable science. And the moral traditions they were influenced by did not oppose any tendency they might have to spread what they thought was true, by means which could not but appear to them questionable, if not morally reprehensible.

We have thus enlarged upon the intellectual peculiarities of the Hindu race with a view simply to emphasize our need, not generally recognized, of a higher order of intellect. It is true that we have as a people shown a measure of receptivity which all impartial observers cannot but pronounce admirable; and it is true that in the sphere of speculative thought we have displayed a deal of penetration, acuteness and logical acumen. But we have evinced throughout the long, long, almost interminably long period of our national existence a pitiable inaptitude for every kind of intellectual work demanding patient research, calm investigation and cautious generalization. We have speculated and dogmatized, but we have miserably failed in our attempts to ascertain and classify facts and look into their significance through what may be called the eye-glass of an accurate process of reasoning. And even now, while the young men brought up in our Colleges are expert reasoners and adepts in special pleading, they appear sadly unfit for all those slow processes of investigation and reasoning to which the triumphs of
science, and the multiplication of the conveniences and superfluities of life resulting therefrom, are to be traced. The country has had enough of poetic and speculative intellect, and what it needs now to enable it to march alongside of the foremost nations of the world is a little of that cast of mind which may be called scientific.

1. Under the head of the idiosyncracy of Hindu philosophy that on which the greatest stress ought to be laid is its characteristic dreaminess. The Hindus are the most dreamy people on the surface of the globe; and the literature of no other country, as great as theirs confessedly is, appears at first sight so full of day-dreams as the Hindu literature does. The Hindu geographer does not travel, does not explore, does not survey; he simply sits down, and, perhaps under the influence of an extra dose of "the exhilarating Soma-juice" dreams of a central mountain of a height greater than that of the sun, moon and stars, and circular oceans of curd and clarified butter. The Hindu historian does not examine documents, coins and monuments, does not investigate historical facts, weigh evidence, balance probabilities, scatter the chaff to the winds, and gather the wheat in his garner, he simply sits down and dreams of a monster monkey who flies through the atmosphere with huge mountains resting on the hairs of his body, and constructs thereby a durable bridge across an arm of an interminable ocean. The Hindu biographer ignores the separating line between history and fable, invents prodigious and fantastic stories, and converts even historical personages into mythical or fabulous heroes. The Hindu anatomist does not dissect, does not anatomize, does not examine the contents of the human body; he simply dreams of component parts which have no existence, multiplies almost indefinitely the number of arteries and veins, and speaks coolly of a passagge
through which "the atomic soul" effects its ingress and egress. The Hindu scientists, in general, barring exceptions which only prove the rule, set aside both inductive and deductive processes, and present their day-dreams and nightmares as facts of accurate knowledge. And the result is a literature of the most grotesque and fantastic type so demoralizing in its tendency that the statesmen and philanthropists who, like Macaulay and Duff, opposed the current of Orientalism set in motion by doctrinaries and sentimentalists, and eloquently advocated the introduction and diffusion of Western culture, ought to be regarded as the best friends the country ever had.

From this national proclivity to dreaminess Hindu philosophy has by no means been protected or kept aloof. Not only are its ontological portions characterized by flightiness and extravagance, but its psychological and physiological portions are fraught with dreams and phantoms. Modern ontology, which evolves creation out of monads or fiery mists or some inscrutable and unknowable energy, or which makes this world of physical entities dependent on an assumed world of spiritual realities, or which converts all perceptible objects into objective manifestations or pantomimic shows of an abstraction like order, intelligence or thought is dreamy enough; but modern psychology is compelled to bow to that scientific method which is the glory of the century. Hindu ontology, which posits a self-evolving material or spiritual substance as the primordial form, or which brings entity out of nonentity or creation out of an eternal void, is not more fanciful or capricious than modern ontology; but Hindu psychology and physiology are in wildness and extravagance even ahead of the Hindu science of being and becoming. The Hindu metaphysician does not analyze the facts of consciousness or enquire into
the laws of thought, does not classify sensations, perceptions, conceptions and judgments and cautiously proceed to an investigation of the principles which regulate the elaboration of thought and processes of reasoning;—he simply speaks of the mind as an accidental and mischievous adjunct of the soul, and shows how its complete extinction may be brought about by austerity and meditation. And as to Hindu physiology, why it is nothing but a tissue of dreams of the wildest order!

In its fantastic nature the heterodox philosophy of India is not behind, is perhaps a few steps in advance of the scheme called orthodox. Specimens of the characteristic recklessness and temerity with which dreams are presented as facts, and whims and crotchets as reliable generalizations, will be presented in the succeeding papers, specially in the one which immediately follows this. But here one may be culled from among the many with which the philosophical treatises of the Southern type of Buddhism translated by Spence Hardy bristle. In the portion of his "Manual" entitled "the Ontology of Buddhism," and under the heading "Reproduction" we are treated to the following theory of propagation:—"There are nine ways in which conception may be produced. 1. In the usual manner. 2. By the simple attrition of two bodies of different sexes. 3. By umbilical attrition. 4. By looking steadfastly in the face of a man. 5. By the use of flowers and perfumes, that have previously been in the possession of a man. 6. By eating the food left by a man. 7. By putting on or using the garments that have been worn by a man. 8. By the season or time, as in periods of great heat living beings are rapidly produced. 9. By listening wantonly to the sweet voice of a man." This is simply an expansion
of the orthodox notion alluded to by Wilson in the words quoted as a footnote by Hardy:—"Before the time of the patriarch Daksha, living creatures were variously propagated by the will, by sight, by touch, and by the influence of religious austerities."

2. Heterodox Philosophy again agrees with the Orthodox scheme, not only in its dreaminess, but in its style and phraselogy. It is mystical in the sense of being dark and scarcely intelligible. The Sutra-form, or that of stating philosophical maxims in short, sententious, elliptical and therefore enigmatical aphorisms, is common to both the schemes; and the incongruous metaphors and far-fetched analogies in which they both abound add to the mystification for which they are famous. Even the verses in which doctrines are stated by such rhapsodists as Kabir and Nanak are constructed on what may be called the aphoristic principle; and like the Sutras they have called heaps of commentaries and jarring interpretations into existence. But what makes the sayings of Hindu philosophy in general unutterably dark and muddy, is their incoherence and essential falsehood. They are to us unconnected rhapsodies, and the principle of unification, such as may lead to their being built up into coherent systems, does not in reality exist, or exists only in the inventive imagination or rather fancy of men who, like the New Dispensationists, pretend to be able to discover a link of connection between the teachings of Christ and those of Nanak, or who like Mr. Cotton sees in Comptism the latest development of Christianity!

It is desirable before passing on to the third head of discourse to rebut the fallacy which leads superficial thinkers to see depth and profundity where nothing is noticeable but
mystifying falsehood. Truth is transparent and falsehood dark. The reason is obvious. The human mind is so constituted that when truth is presented in appropriate language, its congruity and innate excellence are at once recognized; but when falsehood is arrayed in a garb of mystifying phraseology reason of course cannot trace any line of beauty or even intelligibility in it. When Hegel for instance represents the Absolute as equal to nothing, and then unites these two nonentities, the absolute and the nothing to which it is equal, into a positive entity, he flies above the level of human comprehension, not because he is too profound to be appreciated, but simply because he talks unmitigated nonsense. The ravings of insanity are not understood because they are unconnected, meaningless and absurd; and it were a task unnecessary as well as tedious to attempt a serious analysis of them with a view to an exposure of their incoherence and contradictoriness. But what is set aside as useless and even foolish in the case of ordinary mad men has to be done in the case of those whom much learning hath made mad; and therefore book after book has been written to prove that Hegel's scheme has not a particle of sense in it. Nowhere outside of Bedlams do we meet with such a mass of insane utterances as in the writings of the Hindu schools, both heterodox and orthodox; but they are dignified by the name of philosophy; and consequently the student has to wade through them, and set forth their absurdity by a rigid process of analysis or anatomization!

3. Now we come to their method of reasoning and statement. The two recognized modes of reasoning, the deductive and the inductive, are presumptuously cast aside by the Hindu philosopher as processes which ought not to be allowed to
hamper thought in its soaring flights. Some philosophers, such as those of the Idealistic Schools of Modern Germany, reason downwards from the unseen to the seen, from the general to the particular, from the simple to the complex, the unconditioned to the conditioned, the absolute to the relative. They point to an abstraction as the primal source of existence, and evolve its multitudinous subjective and objective forms from it through a synthetic process or to adopt the well-known words of Herbert Spencer through a series of differentiations gradually and slowly effected by the laws of evolution. Others of realistic tendencies pursue a method the very reverse of this, and proceed from the known to the unknown, from the finite to the infinite, from the things which we can grasp and classify to the principles which are neither cognizable by the senses nor on the whole thoroughly intelligible to the mind. They study facts, classify them into groups, ascertain their points of similarity and dissimilarity, observe their coincidences, sequences and transformations, and obtain from what Mill calls a complete induction an insight into the occult principles, the motive powers behind the shifting panorama of nature. The one party of philosophers look upon our belief in the Being of Beings as intuitive; while by the other it is represented as the highest generalization of science. At first sight both these processes of reasoning are seen utilized within the compass of Hindu philosophy; but in reality they are set aside. The method of reasoning and statement resorted to may be designated or characterized, in contradistinction to these, as dogmatic. The Hindu Philosopher of either of the two clusters of schools, orthodox and heterodox, claims prophetic functions, pretends to either miraculous insight or preternatural intercourse with superior beings, and brings
out his excogitations as revelations to be implicitly believed in; not as results of philosophic enquiry to be tested by the ordinary appliances of the logical science. He is the Guru, heaven-appointed or self-raised teacher, and his utterances must be accepted as divine revelations; while all sorts of woes are pronounced upon those impious wretches who have the audacity to call in question a jot or tittle of his sayings!

The insight claimed by the Hindu philosopher is not what is ordinarily called intuition, or even the extraordinary innate intelligence with which some men are according to Schelling gifted. It may justly be called an intuition acquired, not innate and connate, an intuition attained after innumerable cycles of transmigration, each loaded with merit acquired by virtue and inferior stages of meditation, and all tending to enlarge indefinitely its *quantum* till the accumulated mass is exhausted with its fruits under the spell of the higher stages of meditation. The intuition thus acquired renders the perfected saint omniscient, and whatever of truth or fact he is pleased to give expression to ought therefore to be accepted with unquestioning faith. The claim to omniscience is not so emphatically or unequivocally advanced in the orthodox as in the heterodox schools; but it is nevertheless the basis, implied or expressed, of the disclosures of Hindu philosophy in general; and on this sure corner-stone its right to implicit trust is avowedly made to rest. In Hindu schools we have to deal with religion rather than what is ordinarily called philosophy, or religion enveloped in physical and metaphysical speculations, as will appear when we consider the next point of the discourse; viz—

4. Their basis and object. The basis of these rival schemes of thought has already been indicated, viz., pure dogmatism, not logic or reasoning of any kind, sound or
unsound. The Hindu philosopher is the prophet of his age, and his "I say" has in the country among particular classes, if not all, the significance which "Thus saith the Lord" of the Hebrew prophet had among the Jews. And his aim is moral rather than speculative. He recognizes the fact of human sorrow and points to the way in which it can in his opinion be removed. He may deny the existence of God or convert Him by a process of definition into a nonentity, he may deny the very existence of a soul to be saved, and he may laugh at all revelation but his own; but he is more practical than the optimist who refuses to recognize the existence of evil in the world. Pain, pain, pain—that is his starting-point,—pain in the womb before man is born, pain at the time of his birth, pain at every step of his life, pain in old age, and unutterable pain when the spirit and the body, or the material components of man part. The Hindu philosopher goes to the extreme of pessimism, sees nothing but pain in life, and like Rachel weeping for her children refuses to be comforted. And his scheme of thought is suggested or dogmatically set forth as a panacea for this universal evil. It is called philosophy because in ancient times philosophy included every branch of knowledge, secular and religious; and what Jardine says in his "Elements of Psychology" of the teaching of the Greek schools may with even greater emphasis be said of that of the Hindu schools:—"In the early history of philosophy, the different departments of the study were not clearly distinguished from one another. In the writings of the Grecian philosophers, there were frequently collected together, in a confused manner, discussions on psychological, cosmological, theological, ethical and logical questions; and a greater or less confusion of subjects that ought to be separately examined may be found through-
out the whole history of philosophy.” The main lines of thought in Hindu philosophy are ontological and cosmological, but these are subordinated or made subservient to the moral purpose of saving humanity from sin and misery; and therefore Hindu philosophy or rather polymathy is religion, not merely a scheme of speculative thought, or a heterogeneous conglomerate of various branches of knowledge.

5. Now we come to the essential as well as structural similarity evidently subsisting between the rival schemes of thought. Hindu philosophy, both orthodox and heterodox, consists in its essence of what in Hindu phraseology is called Voidism or in modern phraseology, Nihilism. A substance is doubtless posited by almost every one of its varied schemes, by some a material and by others a spiritual substance; and at first sight something rather than nothing appears as the substratum of existence in its multitudinous forms. But the substance posited is substance per se, substance devoid of attributes material and immaterial, a mere abstraction and therefore a non-entity. On the background of this eternal and inconceivable void a sort of theism is in some schools made to rise; but the emergent deity, who is described as Sarguna or with quality, and to whom the functions of creation, preservation and destruction are ascribed, springs self-evolved out of what in reality is nothing, and after playing his part on the stage of existence which is nothing, sinks into nothing. His existence is phenomenal, not real, and he is justly called an illusion, the illusorily-conceived Father of lies and Deceiver of mankind. Therefore the theistic notions by which the dark outlines of Hindu philosophy are apparently mitigated are false like the moral principles manufactured according to Comptism by society for its convenience, and like these they subserve
an ephemeral purpose. Nay they are unequivocally declared to be falsely assumed steps through which the mind rises to a proper knowledge of the infinite nothing! These may therefore be set aside as fictitious and the underlying outlines restored to their original darkness. Disentangled from its garniture of pompous phraseology, from its paraphernalia of what is appropriately called its “false attribution,” or from the network of its superfluous and incongruous adjuncts, Hindu Philosophy in general is nothing more or less than Absolute Nihilism, nothing evolved out of nothing and finally reabsorbed into nothing! Such is the “sublime Asiatic philosophy” on which our educated countrymen felicitate themselves, and for which their acuteness is praised all the world over!

6. With reference to the lines of development through which Hindu philosophy may be traced back to its original source, the question may be raised, what law of evolution is applicable to them? The position, that evolution invariably proceeds in one line of progressive development from the theological to the metaphysical, and from the metaphysical to the scientific era in individual cases, as well as in such corporate life as is implied in the existence of races, nations, clans and septs, is now generally abandoned as untenable; and evolution backward as well as forward, retrogressive as well as progressive is recognized. There is another species of evolution postulated to explain phenomena which seem to laugh at the ordinary laws of sequence, evolution saltative, or evolution by broad leaps, if not by fits and starts. Which of these laws is applicable to the growth of Hindu philosophy? That growth can hardly be called progressive, as transition from materialism to pantheism, from substance per se assumed to be material to substance per se assumed to be
spiritual is in reality no progress. Nor for the same reason can it be represented as retrogressive. Nor can the theory of saltative evolution be pressed into service in explaining it, as the appearance of every one of its schemes can be accounted for by a reference simply to the current traditions of the age which gave it birth or simply witnessed its birth. But assuming progress where in reality there is no such thing, we may represent the development of Hindu philosophy, or philosophy in general, as cyclic, materialism sublimated into pantheism and pantheism precipitated into materialism. Confining our attention to the orthodox schools we see the rank materialism of Kapila, materialism clothed in dualistic phraseology, gradually refined into the pantheism of the Vedantic School; but when the highest arc of evolution had been reached a career downward was realized or a tendency to revert to the original normal type manifested. This tendency had its course in various extra-school lines of development; but in the schools it was checked by an eclecticism, quasi-material and quasi-spiritual, in which the broad lines of thought met in a mongrel scheme, and the influence of which has been omnipotent ever since its inception in perhaps the Second Century of the Christian era.

Heterodox philosophy, like the scheme called orthodox, has shown its energy in its "spawn abundant" of sects; but the majority by far of these are too numerous and too insignificant to be formally noticed. The progress of thought in the main schools may be indicated in a few words. The materialism of Buddha, that is the materialism of Kapila disentangled from its dualistic phraseology, is its starting-point, as has been more than once set forth; but it was sublimated under the guidance of the founder of Jainism into a sort of hylozoism, with a strong leaning towards
pantheism. Then came a scheme nihilistic in theory and Epicurean in practice, to call into existence by the principle of reaction the varied forms of pantheistic theism in which the two rival lines met. But the eclecticism originally elaborated in the Swetaswara Upanishad and the Bhagvat-Gita, and revived in the quasi-theistic movement of the Middle Ages, could not possibly stop where its halting place had been fixed by its originators. An alien creed appeared on the stage of Indian history with the language of hostility rather than amity, the language of war rather than peace, on its lips, and an attempt towards a reconciliation with Mahomedanism was initiated in the vicinity of the most sacred of Hindu shrines by Kabir, and matured in the Punjab by Nanak. Babu Keshab Chunder Sen followed the Quixotic policy of these reformers and kindly offered terms of peace to Christianity under the banner of the New Dispensation!

7. And lastly the goal in which both the schemes meet is a form of patheism akin to boidism and the assumed necessity of absolute annihilation as the terminus of human hopes and human aspirations. The essence of Hindu philosophy is nihilism, and the goal towards which its devotees are brought through a long course of superfluous or perfectly unnecessary discipline can not but be annihilation. Nirvana is the summon-bonum of all the schools of Hindu thought, and in whatever sense the term is used, either as unconscious existence, or as reversion to the original substance per se, or as absorption into a deity who is favored with existence indeed, but who is mercilessly shorn of every thing fitted to convert existence from nothing into something, it is annihilation; and the peans sung and the hosannas shouted in its praise are all thrown away!

Thus it appears that the two rival schemes or series of
schemes agree, not only in their broad outlines, but in their very essence of essence. Why then is a line of distinction drawn, the one honored as orthodox and the other stigmatized as heterodox. Our reply is—a stratagem, a clever manœuvre, a dexterous subterfuge, a trick of philosophic leger-demain! The orthodox schools elaborated their schemes of thought under the shade of the Vedas, while the heterodox schools had the audacity to question more or less thoroughly their authority. The one set paid some decent respect to these ancient Scriptures, while doing all in their power to bring them into contempt, but the other set were less cautious and conservative in the expression of their opinion as to their paramount authority. Buddha and Mahavira spoke at first contemptuously of the Vedas; but ultimately found it convenient to represent the law they propagated as concealed therein beneath foreign accretions. The Charvaka school of gross Epicurism did not show any vacillation in its denunciations of these hoary Scriptures; and the theistic schools of Mediæval times showed a tendency to return to the superstitious homage paid them by the nation at large, though even each of these never scrupled to place the sayings of its Gura or founder above their utterances. And lastly, Kabir and his successors placed the national scriptures in the same category with the Koran, and the other sacred books of the Mussulmans, and pretended to find the essence of their teaching in these, if not in all the Bibles of the world. A conciliatory policy, such as that of the New Dispensation, is a very old one in the country!

There is scarcely a religion on the surface of the globe which has developed into such a grotesque medley of jarring sects and conflicting doctrines as Hinduism. There is scarcely a scheme of thought, in the republic of philosophy falsely so
called, which may not be found concealed beneath the obstrusive externalism of the national faith; and no system of speculation can be named incapable of assimilation to or incorporation with it. It is like a giant of monstrous proportions seated under the shadow of a rock with his mouth wide open, and ready to swallow anything and everything that comes in its way; and it is on account of its many-sidedness suited to human nature in many, if not all, its phases of development. Men of every species of temperament, phlegmatic, melancholic, choleric or sanguine, may find in this prodigious heap of beliefs and principles much to satisfy the varied wants of their dissimilar natures; and the only class repelled by it are those who think and reason! But its endless varieties of phases do not laugh at all attempts at classification. As the national faith now stands, it may very appropriately be described as having a subjective and an objective element, and as inculcating an esoteric and an exoteric devotion. Its body is polytheism but its soul is pantheism; and its body has most naturally grown out of its soul, as according to some schemes of thought materiality grows out of spirituality. Pantheism converts every thing into God, and thereby sanctions and pampers elemental worship, hero-worship, and every species of worship, from that of the stars over our heads down to that of the particles of dust under our feet. The national polytheism, therefore, is not merely an accidental appendage of, but is an outgrowth from the national pantheism. And both the soul and body of Hinduism are very liberal in the New Dispensation sense of the term. The national pantheism swallows, can not but swallow every species of philosophic thought, as its basis substance per se may be variously represented as spiritual, materialistic or nihilistic, the universal spirit, the primordial matter, or the
self-evolving nothing! And the national polytheism is fitted to indefinitely multiply its gods and goddesses, to expand its pantheon both by the creation of new gods and the transference from foreign sources of existing divinities. What wonder then that the national faith in all its entireness is a hydra-headed monster!

But Hinduism is many-sided, not only in the sphere of its beliefs but in that of its practices, not only in its credenda but in its agenda. It inculcates an exoteric and an esoteric devotion, a lower and a higher worship. Its lower worship consists in punctilious conformity to the minutiae of a ritual, which has been expanding along with its pantheon, and which is a conglomerate of endless varieties of symbols of devotion borrowed from endless varieties of creeds; but its higher worship effloresces into ascetic seclusion, thoughtless meditation and insensible repose, and the lower worship, though essentially different from the higher, is represented as preparatory thereto and consequently an element of one entire consistent scheme of devotion. Hinduism may justly be set forth as a species of religious insanity both in theory and in practice; but there is some approach to method in its madness!

There is properly speaking no such thing as heterodoxy in India, as Hindu orthodoxy is flexible and accommodating enough to offer its shelter to schemes of thought, not only divergent from one another, but antagonistic in spirit and letter to its most cherished principles. Buddha, for instance, was regarded, and from its own standpoint justly, as an arch-heretic, and its champions declared a war of extermination against his scheme, and did not rest till the God-denying philosophy, mis-called religion, was driven out of its own home, and compelled to find refuge in foreign lands. But even Buddha was in time added as an incarnation to the
calendar of its great gods; and the principle involved in his apotheosis, or transformation from the father of heresy into an incarnate deity is subversive of all moral distinctions. Vishnu, it is emphatically said, became incarnate in the person of Buddha to seduce the world from the path of religion and virtue, and plunge it into the abyss of infidelity and vice! It is superfluous to affirm after this that Hinduism in its inferior stages is worship of brute force, and in its higher stages it is "silent admiration" of nothing!

Theism in the proper sense of the term, or belief in a Personal God of infinite holiness appeared to the Hindu intellect to involve contradictions similar to those pointed out in the following short extract from Mansel's small treatise entitled "Methaphysics":—"But that which consists with the finite cannot be itself positively conceived as the infinite; otherwise the Infinite and the finite together must be conceived as greater than the Infinite. Nor yet can the finite be conceived as merged in the Infinite; for this would be to conceive myself as existing and not existing at the same time. In like manner, it is impossible to conceive infinite moral nature: for each moral attribute, as co-existing with others, limits and is limited by the rest; and the very conception of morality implies law and law is itself a limitation." The fallacies lurking beneath these words are so glaring that we cannot possibly account for the obtuseness which an intellect calm and philosophical, like that of Mansel, shows in allowing itself to be victimized by them. The Infinite is conceived as an all-diffusive, all-comprehensive material substance, not spiritual being, capable of existence along with other spiritual beings, and varied forms of material existence. The word 'infinite' may justly be applied both to the Being of God and to His attributes. God is indeed infinite
in Being, as well as in each of the varied excellencies which constitute His Character or Personality. What is meant when God is represented as infinite in Being? Not certainly an existence which may be described as an all-diffusive, attenuated substance like monads or nebulae or fiery mist or star dust. Not certainly an existence which cannot run parallel to other existences, but must needs swallow them and incorporate them with its own substance. When God is said to be infinite in Being the meaning simply is that God’s existence, when separated from His attributes, which by the way cannot be done in reality and scarcely in thought, is underived, unbeginning, unending, self-supporting existence. His essence is spiritual, and our material notions of inpenetrability and divisibility are not at all applicable to it; and consequently the impossibility of its co-existence with other essences is merely an imaginary thing, a fiction of philosophy. And Mansel’s arithmetical process by which the finite is added to the infinite, and a sum greater than the infinite is brought out, or the finite is set forth as a part only of the whole called infinite, is based on the fallacy of confounding material with spiritual conceptions.

Again every species of limitation is considered as a defect, derogatory to the Infinite. Granted that the divine attributes, though infinite, limit one another in the sense of being distinct from one another and constituting a grand and glorious whole; what then? Is this a species of limitation unworthy of God? When we describe God as good, we necessarily limit Him so far as to separate Him from what is bad by an ineffaceable line of distinction. But the limitation involved in the process has been recognized by the instinct of humanity as an excellency worthy of God, not certainly as a defect to be pondered till the idea of the Infinite being the
Creator and sustainer of the universe vanishes into thin air. There is a tendency manifested in some quarters to imagine or posit sharp lines of distinction between the attributes of God, and some Christian theologians have gone so far as to suppose a temporary antagonism between His justice and His mercy changed after a good deal of parley into a permanent reconciliation. But the divine attributes may be represented as different from one another, and in a sense limiting one another, but such limitation is not a defect calculated to mar our conception of the Infinite. The same may be said of the limitation between self and not-self, between matter and mind, between different forms of mental and material existence.

It is true that every predication implies a limitation in one important sense. What we predicate of God cannot but be separated from what we do not or cannot predicate of God. When for instance unerring wisdom is ascribed to God the ascription necessarily involves the negation of folly in His nature; and when unlimited power is predicated of Him the predication necessarily throws limited power out of calculation. When His existence is described as underived and self-sustained, conditioned existence cannot be predicated of Him; and when His attributes are declared infinite, He is separated from every type of finite quality. But these necessary distinctions do not detract a jot or tittle either from the infinitude of His being or from the infinitude of His power, wisdom and holiness. And therefore in our ordinary theistic conceptions there is no necessity whatever for our casting aside reason and abandoning ourselves to blind faith, or for our believing that to be congruous which reason pronounces self-contradictory. Certainly there are in connection with the divine existence mysteries which we can neither
grasp nor unfold; but as these transcend the highest flights of human conception, reason cannot sit in judgment on them, or enlarge either on their congruity or on their incongruity; and it is because ideas of the crudest kind have been formed of things incomprehensible to us, and therefore beyond the sphere of reason that contradictions have been noticed where there are none, and shipwreck has been made of the fundamental truths of religion!

Herbert Spencer in his "First Principles" presents long extracts from Mansel's "Limits of Religious Thought" in support of his own theory of religious nescience; but he forgets that as poor theologians are not bound to accept Mansel's definitions of the terms Absolute, First Cause and Infinite, they may smile at the contradictions Mansel deduces from his own conceptions of what appears to common sense both congruous and reasonable.

The Hindu philosopher thought that the Infinite must include all modes of existence, conditioned and unconditioned, relative and absolute, must be exclusively neither wise nor foolish, neither good nor bad, neither mighty nor impotent. But even the Hindu intellect could not but see the absurdity of making God the centre of all contradictions, and therefore He was thrown out of power, quality and relation, and His noticeable and undefinable modes of existence were denounced as fictitious and illusory. Pure being or existence per se was not only the Ultima Thule of its speculation, but the only reality, if reality such existence can be called, it could take notice of beneath a world of deceptive phenomena.

But the Hindu philosopher had peculiar ways of stating his difficulty in looking upon God as the Creator and Preserver of the Universe. God to be God must be in his
opinion thoroughly passionless and passive; and to conceive Him as manifesting a desire and passing from blissful inaction into the fearful whirl of an active life is to rob Him of His Godhead. But it is plain that He could not be the Creator of the Universe without being moved by a desire to create, and without being compelled by such desire to act. Now a being enslaved by a preponderant desire and coerced, as it were, out of its normal state of passivity cannot be God. Besides why should a Being who has no felt want think of putting forth His energy in creative acts. Did God stand in need of something, a world or a universe of worlds to complete His happiness? If not, why should He be charged with the folly of calling into existence what He did not want? And finally how could God act without a body? Shall we by our gratuitous assumptions ascribe form to the Formless one? The mediaeval philosophers made Him the Creator by investing Him with a body; but they saved their reputation for philosophic acuteness by converting the Creator into an intermediate link between the absolute and the relative. Creative power is in all Indian schools uniformly lodged in a thing or being other than God, or in some unconscious, automatic impulse of His essence; and so far as He Himself is conceived as the primal existence, every scheme of philosophy, atheism, Pseudo-theism, or pantheism, somethingism or nothingism, may claim Him as its hero!

Again the Hindu philosopher had in the matter of creation precisely the difficulty stated by Spinoza in these words:—

"The doctrine destroys the perfection of God, for if God acts for an end He necessarily desires something of which He is deprived. And although theologians and metaphysician distinguish between an end pursued by indigence and an end
possessed by assimilation, they yet avow that God has made all for Himself, and not for the things he was to create, seeing it was impossible before creation to assign any other end for the action of God than God Himself; and in this way they are forced to admit that all the objects that God proposed to Himself, while arranging certain means to attain them, God had been at one time without, and had desired to possess them."

The growing tendency among educated natives to look back to the past history of our country with exaggerated veneration, or to speak of our past achievements in the region of literature and philosophy in terms of fulsome eulogy, would be a good sign if it was accompanied with a corresponding desire to secure an insight thereinto by careful study and patient research. Our decided conviction is that if they were simply to sit down and read the books on which they lavish what Dr. Chalmers calls the idolatry of their praise, their retrospective veneration would give place to sheer disgust; and their Quixotic schemes of reformation brought about by an indigenous or Oriental renaissance would be scattered to the winds. But unhappily they have the knack, of which men of education should be ashamed, of immoderately praising things they know nothing about, or of looking into past realities through the eye-glass of prejudice, if not of morbid sentimentalism, prepared by parties engaged in whitewashing what would, if presented in its naked ghastliness, create a revulsion of feeling. An attempt is now being made to explain away the repulsive features of the wellknown character of Krishna, and present the God of Vrindabana, whose flirtations stink in the nostrils of all sensible men, as a model of purity and holiness. The amount of glazing needed in the process is scarcely
enough to explain away the monstrosities of Oriental literature, and present it so as to be inherently fitted to evoke sentiments of admiration and justify paeans of praise. That there are some good things, some flights of thought which may justly be called sublime, in it no man, woman, or child has ever or will ever deny; but these lie buried under heaps of rubbish which it needs a world of trouble to clear away; and such good things, moreover, may be found amid such surroundings in the literatures of nations or peoples whom we are apt to regard with supercilious contempt. Let our educated countrymen only study what they are never tired of speaking of in glowing terms of panegyric; and the conclusion will be irresistibly forced on their minds that their only chance of rise in the scale of civilization hinges on the wide diffusion of that literature by which their own minds are being trained, and especially of that religion to which all that is grand and elevating therein is to be traced!
CHAPTER II.

BUDDHA AS A MAN.

The immense popularity, attained in recent years by Buddhism, is one of the queerest freaks of the nineteenth century. That system of religion is associated with a body of science ludicrously false, a mythology grotesque and wild, a philosophy fanciful and dreamy, and a morality austere and sombre. It is, therefore, at war with the dominant traditions, the characteristic tendencies, and the approved principles of the age; and yet in spite of all this, it is rising in public estimation more than almost any scheme of thought or principle that can be named.

If any feature of the age may be characterized as distinctive and differentiating, it is admittedly its appreciation of correct, and contempt of false science. Scarcely any system of religion can be named, which is more thoroughly saturated with false science than Buddhism. That religion has incorporated with its substance, or transferred to its documents, almost wholesale, the tissue of puerility and absurdity which has in our benighted country been mistaken for science. Its geography is an edition, scarcely revised and improved, of the fictitious geography embedded in Hindu literature; and like its elder sister or mother, it speaks of world-systems, mountain-ranges, continents and oceans—all clustering around a mountain-peak higher than the sun, moon and stars—which have no existence whatever apart from the dreams of a diseased imagination. Its geology or physiology is of a piece with its geographical fictions, fraught with the wildest flights of the most ill-cultured,
A proper appreciation of history, in conjunction with a supreme contempt for legendary lore, is one of the characteristic tendencies of the age. No system of religion shows more contempt of history and greater appreciation of fable than Buddhism. Its mythology is in wildness and extravagance scarcely surpassed by that embodied in the sacred literature of the Hindus, confessedly the most imaginative and dreamy people on the surface of the globe. Like their mythological lore, it speaks of untold ages of past history which never existed, of innumerable orders of ethereal beings and infernal monsters which are mere creations of a diseased imagination, of gods who clear millions of miles across land or water or through atmospheric spaces in the twinkling of an eye, of frightful goblins who when excited lift up huge mountains and hurl them at their enemies, of birds and snakes of portentous size and fearful proportions.

The following is a description of an Asura or giant given
in the records already alluded to:—"Rahu is 76,800 miles high; 13,200 miles broad across the shoulders; his brow measures 800 miles; his mouth is 3,200 miles in size and 4,800 miles deep; the palm of his hand is 5,600 miles in size; the joints of the fingers 800 miles; the sole of his foot 12,000 miles; from his elbow to the tip of his fingers is 19,200 miles; and with one finger he can cover the sun or moon, so as to obscure their light." Our enlightened age represents Christ as mistaken because He spoke of angels; but its veneration for Buddhism grows apace, although its angelology and demonology are characterized by an extravagance to which the history of wild fiction scarcely affords a parallel!

Our vaunted age though propitious to a scientific classification of the varied faculties, powers and susceptibilities of the mind is apt to look down on metaphysical or ontological speculation with supreme contempt. But Buddhism has intimately associated with it a body of such speculation forming the substratum or ground-work of its moral teaching and religious exhortation. All creation is traced to quasi-metaphysical or quasi-physical phantasms, such as Avidya or Ignorance, Karma or Work, Ahankara or Universal Ego, Yisna or Lust of Life. Confining our attention for the time-being to one of these inconceivable entities or non-entities, Karma, what marvels are ascribed to it! According to Buddhism man is a congeries of material properties, which are disintegrated and dispersed as soon as he dies; but the subtle power emanating from his Karma, or the aggregate work he has performed in an almost endless series of transmigrations, stands in the way of his perishing for good. This non-descript force conjures up conglomerate after conglomerate of new elements and qualifies each to receive
merited reward and condign punishment, and thus prolongs his existence, without however perpetuating his personality! But the chain is not everlasting as it ends in the annihilation from which it originally arose. Can anything prejudice a scheme of thought in these days of positive science more than such assumptions and such absurdities? And yet in spite of these, Buddhism is becoming popular!

And lastly a scheme of morality at variance with the materialistic tendencies of the age, or its intense love of present enjoyment, is sure to be held at a discount in the most advanced countries of the world. But Buddhism admittedly presents only such a scheme of morality. Based on its assumed doctrine of the impermanence of all things, it scowls upon all carnal pleasure, however innocent or legitimate, depreciates domestic life and esthetic culture, inculcates self-immolation in the literal sense of the term, and recommends ascetic seclusion as the only condition favorable to growth in virtue. A large code, moreover, of dietic rules and sumptuary laws is framed to enthrall the devotee, or circumscribe the sphere of his lawful liberty. And, to crown all, we have in Buddhistic records, precept upon precept fitted to substitute for the feverish activity of civilized life, the spirit of passive contemplation and insensible repose. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to explain why people immersed in the business or pleasure of life should fall in love with a morality so unsocial and unearthly!

The immense popularity of Buddhism is, therefore, a phenomenon which at first sight it is hard to explain. But a close examination of some of the collateral tendencies of the age may lead to a rational explanation of this, as of every other freak, of the nineteenth century.

The growing popularity of Buddhism should in the first
place be traced to the charm thrown around it by learned orientalists. These scholars have a disease similar to what is ascribed to biographers by Lord Macaulay, viz., that of bestowing indiscriminate praise. They devote years of patient toil to the study of oriental literature, and they most naturally develop a partiality for it; and like a fond mother they refuse to see in their pet child, defects and imperfections, freaks of thought and vagaries of speculation, which are too patent to be overlooked by the public eye. And where the faults of diction and sentiment are too obvious to be overlooked even by them, inclination or love leads to varieties of attempts on their part to explain them away, whitewash them, or even to render them plausible by means of specious theories. And besides they are guided by a disposition, more kindly than just, to give prominence to the features which take in civilised lands, throwing those which are repulsive into the background. Buddhism has doubtless some features of excellence along with, or concealed in, a mass of puerility and absurdity; and these have been disentangled, sifted, and presented in an attractive garb. And superficial readers and thinkers, who study any subject with the precipitancy with which they write short business notes, are apt to look upon such features as the head and soul of a living scheme of thought, not the accidental appanage of a system rotten to the very core. Some heavy books, and a great many light ones, have of late been written on the subject; and these have contributed to extend the popularity of Buddhism by a presentation of views more or less one-sided, and an incorporation with its substance of ideas and sentiments, which, though in vogue in civilised countries, are entirely foreign to its genius and tendency.

Buddhism, moreover, has been popularized by a class of
doctrinaires, who look upon it as fitted to uphold a pet theory of theirs, viz, the theory of development as applied to the religious history of the world. These theorists are opposed, heart and soul, to a supernatural revelation; and they are anxious to prove that Christianity has been evolved from pre-existing types and tendencies of religious thought. They imagine that they have discovered the missing link between the pure monotheism of Christianity and the gross polytheism of non-Christian lands in Buddhism, in which they pretend to discover the germs of the characteristic ideas of our holy religion. And they have been sedulously spreading, by means of able but one-sided publications, a knowledge of the bright features of a system, which, presented in all its entirety, would be a centre of repulsion rather than attraction.

And lastly, the infidel world in general has seized this system as a weapon which may in its opinion be effectively directed against Christianity. The champions of the varied forms of infidelity may not regard the system with real, in contradistinction to feigned, sympathy or admiration. Nay they may laugh in their sleeves at its growing popularity; but the opportunity afforded by it of a new base of hostile operations is too good to be thrown away unimproved!

It is our intention in this and three succeeding papers to show that the exuberance of admiration and praise lavished on Buddhism in these days is misplaced. We maintain, and hope to be able to prove, that the great founder of this system, Buddha presents in some respects a grand, but, all things considered, a sadly mutilated character, and that he was egregiously mistaken both as a moralist and as a philosopher.

"There is sad stuff," said King George III. "in Shakes-
peare: but one would be stoned for saying so." Our determination to represent Buddha, as he was, not as the hero of a mass of romantic literature, nor as the idol set up in these days on the throne of morbid sentimentalism and theoretic admiration, is sure to lead to our being stigmatized as exceedingly bigoted; but we have counted the cost. And, therefore, let us in this paper boldly call attention to Buddha as a man.

The main features of the career of this great reformer are so well-known in these days, that even a cursory recapitulation may justly be represented as superfluous and uncalled-for. But a brief sketch of his life or career ought to be presented as the text of the few remarks we have to make on its glaring defects, as well as its characteristic excellencies. It is a fact, now universally admitted, that the existing records of his life, whether Northern or Southern—whether Nepalese or Chinese or Ceylonese, or Burmese or Siamese—are so interlarded with or overridden by mythological extravagance that the kernel of fact—to adopt phrases made popular by Strauss—can scarcely be extricated from the husk of grotesque fiction. But there are a few points in which these varied treatises, written in different places and under diverse circumstances, are agreed; and these may be presented—indeed have been presented—as the groundwork of a life which modern criticism would relegate to the region of mythology and fable.

Between five and six hundred years, according to a system of chronology received on insufficient grounds, before the birth of Christ, Sakya, who afterwards became the Buddha or fully enlightened, was born of royal parentage in the city of Kapila-vastu, about a hundred miles north-east of Benares. Nothing almost is known about his early life, his
childhood and youth, besides the fact that his royal father, Suddhodana, warned by a body of astrologers met in solemn conclave, not only brought him up in regal pomp and luxury but strove hard to keep him out of sights fitted to nourish the noticeable pensiveness of his disposition. He certainly was educated as a prince under the best of masters; but the existing biographies present no glimpse of his mode of education, or of the peculiar powers of head and heart developed under its influence. But the reproach universally accepted of his love of retirement, and consequent aversion to the martial adventures and sports of his race, makes it plain that in the midst of luxurious repose he was melancholy and sad. He was early married, according to some accounts, to one, but according to others, successively to three wives; and his mode of life indicates a wavering between voluptuous self-indulgence, marred perhaps by no vice in the generally accepted sense of the term, and meditative pensiveness.

When about thirty, he noticed, despite the precautionary measures adopted by his father, human sorrow in some of its most impressive forms, and the trains of thought suggested gave a new turn to his life. In the accounts given of what is called his "Great Renunciation" the supernatural element is presented in profusion; and the help of an invisible spirit, a philosophic charioteer and a conscious horse is resorted to. On three different occasions, as he goes out of his well-guarded palace in quest of pleasure, he sees three tangible forms of human suffering conjured up by angelic influence, an infirm and shrivelled old man bending under the weight of years, a sick person with a swollen body and contracted limbs giving vent to his distress in tears and groans, and lastly a corpse, in process of putrefaction, borne by four men in mournful state. These sights gave strength
to his melancholy musings, and they were further strengthend, when on a fourth occasion he was driving out, by the sight of an ascetic walking slowly in all the dignity of serene thought and conscious peace. Informed by his learned charioteer of the secret of the felicity depicted on the countenance of the devotee, he makes up his mind to renounce the world with all its pleasures, and seek the tranquility of ascetic seclusion.

While in this frame of mind he was seated on the banks of a stream in one of his public gardens, he heard of the birth of his first-born and only son, and immediately proceeded towards the palace, resolved, however, not to allow this new tie to stand in his way. The auspicious event had thrown the city of Kapila-vastu into rapturous joy, and as he passed through it he was everywhere received with demonstrations of welcome, such as might have shaken a purpose less firm than his; and the congratulations showered down on him, as he entered the palace, were even more thrilling. He resolved to see his child once, when the inmates were asleep, and then march forward, determined to seek in hermit solitude a remedy for his own, and for human sorrow. A deep sleep, brought on by supernatural power, overtook the princess, her maids of honor, and all appointed to guard the grand apartment and the ponderous gate. His object was accomplished—he gazed lovingly on the sleeping mother and the bright babe, stole out of the palace with his faithful charioteer, mounted his horse, who, conscious of the honor that awaited him as the bearer of the future Buddha, galloped faster than the rushing wind, and rode on and on, till he reached a safe retreat. Here he alighted, cut his luxuriant hair with his own sword, exchanged his royal robes for the yellow garments of an ascetic, affectionately took leave of his human companion, and his scarcely less human horse,
and moved on, consumed as it were by a noble sorrow and a noble purpose. The charioteer Chhana wept bitterly, and the horse dropped down dead on the ground, to rise as a deva in some ethereal region!

Thus clad and equipped he marched forward, alone and absorbed in thought, towards Rajagriha, the capital of a kingdom, then considered great, in the eastern valley of the Ganges; but he had not gone far ere he was called upon to encounter and overcome strong temptations thrown in his way by Mara, the Satan of Buddhistic mythology. A worldwide empire, accompanied with all the splendour and luxury this world could offer, was assured him on condition of his giving up his toilsome search; but the tempting offer was rejected with perfect indifference, if not with utter scorn. But though foiled on this occasion, the temper did not abandon him; but continued, it is said, with him, "cleaving to him like a shadow," and scrupulously improving every opportunity afforded of thwarting his noble scheme.

Rajagriha was surrounded by hills and forests, in the seclusion of which solitary mendicants, and even small groups of hermits, might be seen engaged in meditation or in the practice of mortification and penance, their object being solution of the problems of existence, and repose for their restless souls. Congeniality of spirit, as well as community of aim induced Sakya Sinha to resort successively to a few of these recluses for instruction and counsel; but finding that they had nothing in the shape of true knowledge to impart, he determined to work out, alone and unassisted, the great problem that so deeply engaged his thoughts. In this resolution he was encouraged by five ascetics, who became his disciples, and who placed their services at his disposal. With these new companions he
retired to the forest called Uruvela, and devoted himself, heart and soul, to the practice of austerity for nearly six years, abstaining from every species of solid or wholesome food, and subjecting his body to every species of consecrated torture. This course of self-mortification had its anticipated result, and the enthusiastic sufferer was brought to the verge of the grave, but not a step nearer the solution of his great problem. Disappointed and chagrined, he gave up his devotion to penance to the disgust of his ascetic followers, who now forsook him, bathed in a sacred river, partook of some delicious food served by a female devotee, and walked to, and sat under the famous Bodh or Bo-tree near Gya to complete the work begun and carried on under so many disheartening circumstances.

But when his budding wisdom was about to burst into a full-blown flower, his arch-enemy, Mara, made a desperate effort to oppose his complete emancipation from error and disquietude. He appeared on the scene, with his terrific army of horrid monsters, determined to disturb his serene contemplation; and his repeated attacks are described with a profusion of imagery such as is never found anywhere outside the pale of oriental literature. The elements were let loose upon him, clouds surcharged with lightning lowered and thundered over his head, storms and tempests howled and roared, rain fell in dashing torrents; and when these disturbing forces disappeared, the malice of the enemy caused frightful conflagrations to rage around the devotee about to be beatified, and when all nature thrown into wild commotion had spent its rage in vain, the monster host hurled at him, not only their barbed arrows, but huge trees and even lofty hills lifted up by their demoniac strength. But the missiles fell as soft flowers on and around him. As a last
resource the charming daughters of the temple to show a reaction to their blandishments. What reaction was then transfigured,—his body assumed a golden color, his face glowed with the light of indwelling peace, and his eyes beamed with compassion and benevolence.

He arose, bathed and refreshed himself, and, after a momentary struggle with a rising desire to evade the irksome duty of preaching the truth he had found, marched towards Benares, and arriving at "the Deer-Park" in the vicinity of the holy city, he preached his first sermon in the hearing of his five recusant disciples, and innumerable companies of heavenly spirits. The result was the conversion of his human and angelic hearers. His fame was noised abroad, and he succeeded during the first few years of his public career in gathering a band of earnest Missionaries around him; and with their help he preached his religion called the Law through the length and breadth of a large tract of territory in Northern India, gathered converts from both the sexes, and all classes and orders of people, organised societies of retired mendicants, secured property in the shape of groves and gardens in the vicinity of flourishing cities and towns, and made all necessary arrangements for the progressive development of a system of religion or morality destined to spread far and wide in Asia.

He lived about fifty years after his full enlightenment under the Bo-tree, and these years were seasons of unremitting toil as well as peaceful enjoyment. He lived in retirement, along with a company of chosen disciples, in sequestered groves, apart from the din of city life, and
retired to the rural townships and villages; and as a heart and soul to enquirers who resorted to him for instruction, audiences gathered around him in the private food and houses to which he was invited. His mode of tor was simple, and his activity was of the oriental type, even and calm, not feverish and boisterous. He spent the greater part of the year in travelling on foot from place to place, preaching constantly and doing all the good in his power in season and out of season; and he spent the rainy season, the four months between June and October, in a resting place, improving it, however, by delivering some of his long discourses, and framing rules and regulations for the permanent guidance of his Order. His death occurred at Kusinagara, graphically described in the *Maha-Pari-nibbana sutta* recently translated by Rhys Davids. This small treatise is a narrative, written in a highly artificial style, as all narratives in connection with the rise of Buddhism are, of a journey of three months' duration undertaken by Buddha from Rajagriha to Kusinagara; and it shows that the last days of the reformer were spent in efforts to mature and consolidate the great work of his life, and to exhort the most favored of his disciples to industry and perseverance in the discharge of their duties.

Such is a brief sketch, by no means very reliable, of the life of Buddha, as exhumed from the heaps of rubbish under which it lies buried in the existing records! That he was one of the loftiest characters, perhaps the loftiest character matured in the dim twilight of natural religion, or apart from regions blessed with the light of revelation, is universally admitted. But such praise appears feeble and tame to his modern panegyrist, who would represent him as a perfect model of virtue, and even place him on a par with
the Lord Jesus Christ. Nay, there are so show a reaction thinkers in our country who would even indulgence. What reformer above the prophet of Nazareth as mere rigor of character. But setting aside their opinions, the recoil noticeable in some quarters to hold up the two characters of equal excellence ought certainly to be represented as occupying the foremost place among the vagaries and extravagancies of the age.

The author of the most charming English poem on the life of Buddha, Edwin Arnold—who, as he often speaks of dark-eyed Indian maids being captivated by the fascinating exterior of "the Light of Asia," may justly be accused of carrying into sacred subjects the frivolity for which Renan's Life of Christ, is condemned by all sensible men—expresses his enthusiastic admiration of the reformer's character in the words:—"More than a third of mankind therefore, owe their moral and religious ideas to this illustrious prince, whose personality though imperfectly revealed in the existing sources of information, cannot but appear the highest, the holiest, the most beneficent, with one exception, in the history of thought. Discordant in frequent particulars, and sorely overlaid by corruptions, inventions and misconceptions, the Buddhistical books yet agree in one point of recording nothing—no single act or word—which mars the perfect purity and tenderness of this Indian teacher, who united the truest princely qualities with the intellect of a sage, and the passionate devotion of a martyr." That this is extravagant praise may be easily shown by a simple reference to the wide gulf that separates the character of our Lord from that of Buddha.

Believing as we do in the Supreme Divinity of Christ, we are most unwilling to place Him, even for the sake of argument, in juxtaposition with a mere human teacher, however
retired to the forest and spread his fame may have been, and veneration his name may now evoke. But food, in the camp of the enemy and we accept it. And so for the benefit of those of our men who may have been misled by reckless commendation, we would institute a comparison between the two characters, and set forth the impassable chasm between the one and the other.

(1) And first let us observe that, while Buddha is a myth, Christ is an historical character. Every event in the life of the India reformer, his birth, his renunciation, his transfiguration, his preaching, his death, is related at tedious length, and in a highly artificial and poetic style; and when we pass from the embellishment, the exaggeration and the pure fiction heaped upon his life in the existing records on to the majestic simplicity of the Gospel narratives, we cannot help feeling that we are moving from the region of legend and fable to that of reliable history. As a specimen of the high-wrought, turgid style in which the existing biographies are written, we give Asvaghosha's description of Buddha's countenance when he made up his mind to seek Nirvana, as translated by Beal, and presented in his "Buddhism in China:"—"His body as a peak of the golden mountain, his shoulder like the elephant, his voice like the spring thunder, his deep blue eye like that of the king of oxen, his mind full of religious thought, his face bright as the full moon, his step like that of the Lion King."

Add to this what Wilson, as quoted by Spence Hardy in his "Legends and Theories of the Buddhists," says regarding Buddha's birth:—"In a paper I published many years ago in the 'Calcutta Quarterly Magazine,' I gave a list of thirteen different dates, collected by a Tibetan author, and a
dozen others might be easily added, thento show a reaction 2,420 to 543 B.C. They may, however, ulgence. What under two heads, that of the Northern Buddhist one rigor of and that of the Southern Buddhist for his death B. C a recoil.

The difference, then, between the character of Chris. that of Buddha is that, while the one was depicted exactly as it appeared by contemporary biographers, the other owes a great deal of its charm to that retrospective veneration or mythopoeic spirit which presents the heroes of a bygone age shorn of their real defects, and adorned with chaplets of imaginary virtues.

(2) Again Buddha’s boyhood and youth were spent amid that langour of satiety against which his subsequent life may justly be represented as a natural reaction. His father, anxious to defeat what appeared to him the gloomy element in the prophecy uttered by his astrological advisers, brought him up in a well-guarded palace of luxury after the fashion in which Dr. Johnson’s imaginary hero, Rasselas, was brought up; and the existing records make it plain that, for a time at least, he oscillated between varied acts of self-indulgence and the melancholy broodings by which such acts are invariably followed in the case of a man of lofty thought and pensive disposition, such as he was. The restlessness he discovered amid the voluptuous enjoyment of his palace, and during the period of his eager search for a remedy for the evils of life, bespeaks some degree of self-indulgence, though on the whole of what is ordinarily called an innocent character. His great temptation when about to be transfigured, tells the same tale.

To show this, let us accept the explanation of Christ’s temptation given in Ecce Homo. Christ after His baptism became suddenly conscious of the possession of supernatural
retired to the forbids tempted by the Evil One to employ heart and soul in service. His temptation, then, proceeded, years, absolute or deed of His past life, not from a wrong food, cherished or even a right thought cherished to an improper extent, not from an element of His nature weakened by undue indulgence, but from a consciousness suddenly and unexpectedly realized in His mind. Buddha's temptation, on the contrary, barring the fictitious account of external violence by which it is overlaid, indicated a weakness in his nature generated by undue self-indulgence. It appeared in the shape of beautiful women endeavouring by meretricious tricks to draw him towards a renewed indulgence of the erotic passions which had once clamoured, and clamoured not in vain, for gratification, but which were now held in check, not certainly immolated, by the severity of self-oblivious contemplation. As an address to an element of his nature weakened by self-indulgence, it was an index to the vitiating influences of the life of voluptuous ease he had spent in his father's palace.

Buddha's entire attitude towards women indicated the same superinduced weakness. This will have to be treated of at some length when his unsocial code of morality is analyzed and sifted. Suffice it to remark here that he carefully avoided, and taught his followers to avoid with scrupulous care, any thing and every thing approximating to a pleasant intercourse between the sexes. His own conduct, in conjunction with the rules devised by him to make his disciples averse to friendly contact with the members of the softer sex, indicated in him an abiding fear, which cannot be accounted for except on the supposition of previous self-indulgence on his part.

And lastly the eagerness with which he rushed to the
extreme of self-mortification is fitted to show a reaction against the other extreme, that of self-indulgence. What could so easily have driven him to the extreme rigor of penance, as a settled dissatisfaction with luxury, a recoil from voluptuousness, a disgust with satiety?

(3) But even setting aside the conclusion sustained by these reasonings, the fact remains that Buddha was restless under his paternal roof, and that his escape therefrom was prompted by a desire to seek peace, first for himself, and then for the whole world. He is, indeed, represented in some records to have said to his faithful charioteer, Chhana, that he sought “no personal gain or profit,” and that he sought “solely the benefit of men.” But as no one could, according to his belief, be happy without the four truths he found under the Bo-tree, his indwelling disquietude so long as he was not in possession of them, is a corollary from his entire scheme of thought and teaching. Besides in the Maha-Parinibbanna sutta or the “Book of the Great Decease”—translated along with other Sutras by Rhys Davids and published in vol. XI of “Sacred Books of the East”—he confesses his own miserable wanderings in these words:

“There the Blessed One addressed the brethren and said: ‘It is through not understanding and grasping four truths, O Brethren, that we have had to run so long in this weary path of transmigration—both you and I.’

Now what does the restlessness of a human soul imply? The presence therein of some disturbing element in the shape of error and sin. A soul free from the slightest touch of error and sin cannot possibly be restless; or, to express the same truth in another form, a soul in perfect possession of truth and holiness, or of truth rightly apprehended by the mind and properly assimilated by the heart, cannot but be calm
and restful. The moment we recognize some degree of perturbation in the heart of Buddha, we ascribe to him some degree of intellectual obtuseness or moral perversity. What a difference in this and other respects between the first portion of Buddha's life and that of Christ! In our Lord we see a holy childhood naturally developing into a holy youth, and that again into a holy manhood. As a child, He might not have been omniscient, or even gifted with a miraculous precocity or an extraordinary measure of erudition; but He had all the knowledge, all the purity and all the holiness needed to constitute spotless, perfect childhood. As a young man he was in possession of all the objective truth and all the subjective excellencies of head and heart needed to constitute immaculate, perfect youth. During the long years he spent under His paternal roof, as during the period of His public career, he lacked nothing necessary to make him an ideal of virtue,—no consciousness of imperfection troubled him for a moment, no feeling of unsatisfied intellectual or moral want oppressed him, no act of undue self-indulgence clouded His judgment or disquieted His heart. Perfect knowledge ruled His mind, and perfect holiness, accompanied with uninterrupted sunshine, reigned in His heart.

(4.) The way again, in which Buddha stole away from his well-guarded palace indicates on his part a want of manliness in marked contrast to the moral courage he showed when on a subsequent occasion he revisited his native city, and in the yellow garb of a mendicant went from house to house begging within the very environs of his father's palace. The treatise on the "Manliness of Christ" written by the well-known author of "Tom Brown's School Days" is marred, as almost all modern versions of His life are, by
fanciful explanations of the most objectionable character of some features of His unique career; but it is eminently fitted to show that on no occasion, great or small, did our Lord evince the slightest approach to unmanliness or weakness.

(5) Again his sudden rush to and recoil from the extreme of self-mortification and penance constitute an irrefragable argument, not only against the purity of his early life, but against his balance of mind and force of character. Had his intellect or character been sufficiently well balanced, he would not have spent six live-long years in adopting and abandoning, one after another, a few, if not many erroneous methods of arriving at truth. In contrast to this, we do not find in the Life of our Lord a single mistake entertained and forsaken, a single step made and retraced, a single experiment tried and then thrown up as useless.

(6) Again the hesitation Buddha showed in admitting women to his order, a hesitation removed by arguments brought to bear on it by one of his most favored disciples, bespeaks a weakness, the like of which the world has failed to discover in Christ. No excitement and no hesitation were ever manifested by our Lord during the entire period of His Life, not even during the time when His enemies tried to decoy him into an unguarded expression by an array of searching questions, and when failing in this they subjected him to a series of irritating annoyances and cruel persecutions.

(7) But that which shows the greatest flaw both in Buddha's mental constitution and in his moral nature, is the atheistic or agnostic conclusion at which he arrived. His atheism was, in Professor Blackie's phraseology, the atheism of reaction, not the atheism which springs from defective
intellect, excessive depravity or want of reverence. The
tissue of wild speculation indulged by the philosophers of
his time whenever the subject of the origin of the world was
on the tapis, could not, of course, satisfy his inquisitive and
earnest mind; but instead of being brought down by a
natural reaction to the fundamental truth written, as it were,
on the tablets of his own heart, and buried beneath heaps of
rubbish in popular belief, he allowed himself to be driven by
an unnatural reaction to the extreme of atheism or nescience.
Such a revulsion of thought and feeling is an indication of
an obliquity of disposition as well as an erratic move of the
mind. And the man, who passed through a variety of ex-
tremes, and who ultimately settled down into atheistic dis-
belief or agnostic nescience, is represented by Blackie in his
"Natural History of Atheism" as "a rare, exceptional, and
altogether transcendental incarnation of moral perfection."
It is this species of morbid sentimentalism that is killing the
Church in these days!

Buddha can be held up as an ideal of ascetic self-control,
not of any virtue or excellency above it. He was always
calm and self-possessed; and he never betrayed the slightest
freak of appetite or passion. Nor is this to be very much
wondered at, inasmuch as his virtues were displayed under
the shade, so to speak, of monastic seclusion, not in a furnace
of trial. He was universally honored as a self-sacrificing,
self-controlling devotee, and never persecuted in the proper
sense of the term. The recorded persecutions to which he
is said to have been exposed are really not worthy of men-
tion. His father-in-law curses him for abandoning his
daughter, but he is instantaneously swallowed up by the
earth like Dathan and Abiram. A hunter in a fit of dis-
appointment attempts to shoot him, but an angel stands
between the aggressor and the accomplishment of his vile purpose. Dewadatta, the Judas of Buddistic records, attempts more than once to assassinate him, but all his attempts are foiled by some one or other fortunate circumstance. The Ceylonese records translated by Spence Hardy—which are assigned by Rhys Davids to so late a date as the twelfth century of our era—present a detailed account of an attempt to arrest him more systematically made: but the aggressors are all destroyed in the twinkling of an eye by his supernatural power.

Far from being oppressed and persecuted, Buddha was in reality honored, and that universally. He was invited along with his disciples, oftener to the mansions of the rich than to the hovels of the poor; and wherever he had his meal, "sweet rice and cakes" delicately cooked and respectfully served were as a rule placed before him. Once only we read of his having partaken somewhat freely of a dish of pork and his death is said to have been hastened by what to a Hindu would scarcely be forbidden food, as the flesh was that of a wild boar, not of a filthy pig. And besides kings and noblemen, princesses and ladies of rank moved in all the blaze of gold and purple, each followed by a grand retinue of gaudily dressed retainers, towards the sequestered monasteries blessed with his presence, to hold religious conversation with him, to hear the law expounded, to have their troubles removed by sage counsel, or simply to pay him homage.

Buddha's freedom from persecution in conjunction with the honor in which he was held may at first sight appear an inexplicable phenomenon. But a known idiosyncrasy of the Hindu faith offers the required explanation. Hinduism has a popular and a philosophical side, and under its shade two, or two sets of antagonistic and mutually destructive principle
exist and even flourish side by side with each other. Its popular side favours a rank growth of idolatrous worship, ritual punctiliousness and caste exclusiveness; but its philosophy nourishes sentiments and traditions opposed to its garb of externalism and ceremonialism, and fitted to set forth its entire structure as a house divided against itself. Even now in our various cities, towns and villages, as well as in spots more secluded, small groups of philosophers or ascetics may be seen indulging in philosophical vagaries, and opposing in theory, as well as in practice, one and all the principles enshrined in popular Hinduism. These ascetics, called by various names in different parts of the country, represent varieties of views ranging between monastic self-immolation and Epicurean self-indulgence; but they all concur in pouring contempt by their theory and their practice on the caste rules held sacred by the masses,—they laugh at their idolatrous worship, satirize their ceremonial observances, and openly speak of them as fools who must rise to transcendental ideas through the stair-case of sensible types and gross forms. But notwithstanding their attitude of known hostility to the popular faith, they are so long as they confine their opposition to the sphere of harmless sarcasm, and not allow it to culminate in the spirit of earnest and aggressive propagandism, not merely left unmolested, but even honored as demi-gods. The early Buddhists merely formed an association similar to the many flourishing now under the shade of the national faith; and they were honored, and continued to be honored, till the interests of that faith were endangered by their missionary zeal and unparalleled success.

One noticeable weakness in Buddha's character was the absence of that just abhorrence of error which leads to active and aggressive opposition thereto, or the want of that
earnest love of truth which appears in a scheme of bold and unshrinking propagandism. He certainly did spread his peculiar views, but he ensured their propagation by measures too conciliatory to secure the approbation of a heart burning with love of truth and missionary zeal; and the means he employed were conversations held or discourses delivered in the quietude of private homes or sequestered monasteries; not the public preaching, the earnest visitation, and the aggressive itinerancy so evidently fitted to stir up opposition and stimulate malice. He, therefore, rarely had a mob to face, questions to answer in the teeth of excited opponents, explanations to give with what may be called the well-grounded dread of persecution; unwelcome truths to declare in the hearing of persons ready to hail their exposition with destructive missiles; and he never opposed popular aspirations and sacerdotal hypocrisy with the terrible earnestness with which the Lord Jesus Christ denounced the respectable self-righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees, and the gross Messianic views of the populace. And the consequence is that while Christ had to show His miraculous balance of character in a furnace of trial heated seven times, the virtues of Buddha flourished under circumstances exceedingly favourable to their growth.

Buddha was an ascetic, and may justly be held up as a model of ascetic self-control and self-sacrifice. But he cannot be held up as a model of domestic virtue. He shunned intercourse with society on principle, and represented social pleasure as a dangerous thing, to be scrupulously avoided by aspirants for contemplative repose, if not by mankind at large. He never honored with his presence, during the entire period of his public career, a wedding as Christ did; he was never on terms of benign and holy friendship with any member
of the female sex, as Christ was with Mary and Martha; and he never took up children in his arms and blessed them as Christ did. Nay the social virtues were held at a discount both by him and his chosen followers; and when they tolerated them, they did so in consequence of the weakness and ignorance of mankind at large who could not see their enthralling influence as clearly as they did.

But was not Buddha an exemplar or ideal of universal love? Such love has been ascribed to him by all classes of writers, and with emphasis by Rhys Davids whose views of the system he has mastered more perhaps than any other Englishman are in accord on the whole with orthodox views of Christianity. But it is not perceived, at least generally, that universal love indicates, according to Buddha's teaching, an inferior stage of self-culture, and is therefore a thing to be suppressed by meditation, rather than fed and nourished. This point will have to be made clear when the ethics of Buddhism are examined; and here nothing more is needed than what may be called a premature exposure of an error into which so reliable an authority as Rhys Davids has fallen. In his small, but very valuable treatise on Buddhism, he speaks of the four stages of the path marked out before Initiates, if not all Buddhists, as those "whose gate is purity and whose goal is love." But even his own definition of Nirvana, as well as the mass of solid reasoning he brings forward in support thereof, is really if not apparently fitted to show that the "goal" of this path is, not merely the extinction of sensation, but the extinction of desire in general, benevolent or malevolent,—extinction of thought and feeling and volition, or self-annihilation in the literal sense of the term. And consequently, if Buddha was an example of universal love, he was such by a happy inconsistency; and his
principles required that he should cast it off as one of the
many bonds from which emancipation is to be worked out by
self-destructive meditation.

But granting, for argument's sake, that Buddha was a per-
fected model of social and domestic virtue, as well as of ascetic
repose, of universal love as well as of complete self-mastery,
he was after all a Half-Ideal. He could not possibly have
been, and he was admittedly not, an ideal of godliness and
piety. The religious portion of his nature, his longing for
the infinite, his instinct of worship, his sense of dependence
on a higher power for self-culture and self-improvement, his
sense of guilt evinced in penitential confessions of sin and
groanings for deliverance, these and other cognate elements
of his soul were not only not cultivated, but thoroughly sup-
pressed. And consequently the character he presents, though
glorious in some respects, is on the whole mutilated. In him
we notice a one-sided development, the development of the
lower accompanied with a complete or all but complete, ex-
tinction of the higher instincts of human nature. And, there-
fore, he cannot possibly be held up as a perfect pattern of
virtue, for the virtue, which overlooks or ignores our duty
towards our Creator, is not merely deficient, but positively
vicious.

To emphasize one point, Buddha cannot be represented as
a model of worship, of prayer and sweet communion with
God. He never prayed during the entire period of his pub-
lic career. In the records translated by Beal, he is said to
have "invoked the Buddhas of former ages" and looked up
to the stars before beginning his career as an ascetic refor-
mer; but this prayer, of which the other records make no
mention, was, if it really was offered, his last prayer, if not
the first and the last. The Ceylonese records, translated by
Hardy, and the Burmese records, translated by Bigandet, describe graphically his mode of life, or the way in which he spent his days and his nights; and nothing at first sight can be more pleasant than his quiet round of daily occupations. He gets up early in the morning, spends his first and freshest hours in meditation, then goes out in his canonical robes with his bowl in his hand to beg his daily bread, returns, and spends the intervening hours till midnight in exhorting his disciples, holding conversation with human enquirers, and instructing angelic spirits. And if his meditations were of a religious character, and included prayer to God and communion with divine things, a better mode of life could hardly be presented as worthy of imitation. But Buddha only meditated on "the aspirated and expirated breath," and on the world at large "to see what being or beings should be caught in the net of truth during the day." His hours of solitary contemplation were not enlivened by a single outbreathing of the soul in prayer, a single exercise or elevation of devotional feeling, a single aspiration after union with God and heavenly things. What a contrast between his life and that of Christ, whose days were spent in acts of humanitarian benevolence, and whose nights were spent, frequently, in sweet communion with his Heavenly Father,—Who amid the multifarious demands of active philanthropy never neglected His duty to God. Christ, therefore was a model not merely of the enthusiasm of humanity, but of the enthusiasm of piety also—a complete, stainless, glorious pattern of character!

But in reality Buddha was less than even a Half-Ideal, not even a complete pattern of mundane virtue. Universal compassion, love or benevolence has indeed been ascribed to him not only by materialists and agnostics, but even by
writers of theistic tendencies and Christian belief. But one all-important question has not been looked in the face. Can universal love exist side by side with the gloom and the chill of atheistic negation or agnostic nescience? Could a person, who systematically strove to extinguish the religious side of his nature, ignored God, and cut himself off from divine help, develop himself into an ideal of that love, which in the regenerated soul appears as an effect of a higher passion, love to God? Again some mixture of enthusiasm and cunning should, even in accordance with the approved principles of modern criticism, be ascribed to him. He is said by all the existing accounts to have claimed omniscience, and a perfect knowledge of each of the different stages of transmigratory existence through which he himself and the people around him had passed. This claim enters into the texture of Buddha's life as thoroughly as Christ's claim to Divinity enters into His, and cannot therefore be thrown aside without a violent wrench. How does modern science allow this claim on the part of the Indian reformer? If not, how can it explain his persistent advancement of it except on the supposition of wild fanaticism on his part accompanied with some degree of "pious fraud?"

What Buddha in reality was a model of, is clearly and ably set forth in Professor Blackie's "Natural History of Atheism." That versatile writer, after having spoken of Buddha as "a Godman," "an Incarnation" and "a Prophet." after having lifted him up to the skies, states the conclusion of the whole matter in these words:—"Whatever we know not about Buddha, one thing certainly we do know, that he commenced with being a licentious person and voluptuary, and ended in the character of a mendicant monk; and succeeded—as indeed Brahminism did in a considerable measure before him—in impressing this ridiculous type of an unnatural and
unsocial sanctity as a model for human admiration from the Ganges to the Amoor."

But here sentimentalism steps in, and berates us for criticizing harshly the character of an earnest man who struggled for truth amid the twilight or gloom of heathen error, and who nobly followed the dictates of his conscience as far as it was enlightened. Certainly an anxious enquirer or even an honest doubter has a right to claim, and never claims in vain our sympathy and even admiration; but when such a person assumes prophetical functions, and propagates with oracular assurance a religion essentially false, a religion calculated to lead multitudes of human beings into the abyss of error, dégradation and misery, such right on his part must be disallowed by all sensible men. So long as Babu Keshab Chunder Sen, for instance, assumed the attitude of a humble and anxious enquirer after truth, he could reasonably claim, and had the warm sympathy of all right-minded men; but when he set up the banner of the New Dispensation, issued proclamations and manifestoes in the name of God, and challenged belief in his vagaries with prophetical or oracular assurance, the best explanation that could be offered by his best friends is couched in the words uttered by Max Muller in the hearing of the writer in the course of a private conversation in his own house at Oxford: "Poor fellow! he was not in his right mind during the last few years of his life." So long as Buddha prosecuted amid bodily torture and mental agony, his toilsome search for truth, he could not but be an object of the deepest sympathy, profoundest respect and the highest admiration. But when he grasped as truth a palpable error, assumed the omniscience of the Deity, and preached, in supercession of existing forms of thought and faith, a religion destined to draw countless myriads of people during ages
untold away from loyalty to truth, and to the God of truth, the kindest thing we can say of him is that he was not in his right mind.

A current story, often related by both young and old persons in private conversation, is full of meaning. A man drawn away from truth by false teaching was brought before Yama, the Indian Pluto, and sentenced, after a proper trial, to fifty stripes; and when these were being inflicted with due solemnity, his teacher stood before the august tribunal. The judge inflicted upon him double punishment, fifty stripes for living in error, and fifty more for leading the first man astray. In this, and other current stories of the sort, there is a vein of justice and sound sense which modern sentimentalists would do well to pause and consider.

That Buddha was a grand personality, perhaps the grandest raised in an atmosphere of imperfect knowledge and erroneous views, is readily admitted. But far from being a stainless example of moral perfection, he was an example of defective moral consciousness, of one-sided development and monastic virtue; and in him we cannot help discerning an intellect majestic, but by no means sufficiently well-balanced, a spirit lofty, but not thoroughly emancipated from prevailing error, a heart inclined to some maxims of moral rectitude but separated from the vital principle of all true morality, and a character grand indeed in some respects, but sadly mutilated. And so far as a union of the varied elements of a well-balanced, or fully developed moral character is concerned, the least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he!
CHAPTER III.

BUDDHA AS A MORALIST.

Was not Buddha something more than a moralist? Was he not the founder of a religion of widespread sway and paramount influence on one, if not all, the continents of the world? Ought not his position as the originator of a new faith to have precedence of his position as a moral teacher? Why not speak of him first as a reformer of religion, and then as a reformer of morals? Our reply to these and other questions of the sort is, that Buddhism, as taught and promulgated by its founder, was a morality, rather than a religion. The main ingredients of religion, with, perhaps one exception, did not enter into its texture, or constitute its essence.

Buddhism, as originally taught by Buddha himself, did not present, as every religion in the proper sense of the term does, and is moreover expected to do, a supreme object of worship, or objects of worship, supra-ordinate, co-ordinate or subordinate. It did not initiate or sanction sensible forms of worship; and it was not associated with those elements of an established ritual, without which a positive religion can neither maintain its sway nor exercise its influence. It ignored the religious side of man's nature almost in toto; his sense of dependence on a higher power; his instinct of worship, and his irrepressible longing for the infinite. The only features of his religious nature it availed itself of, or utilized, were his hopes of future reward and his fears of future punishment; and on these it worked through the great doctrine of metempsychosis which it borrowed from Hinduism, and considerably modified. A system without a god or gods.
prescribed forms of worship and ceremonial observances, may be the centre of a mighty influence; but it should on no account be dignified by the appellation of religion. Dissociated as Buddhism admittedly was, during at least the life-time of its founder, from all, or almost all, the characteristic elements of a system of religious faith, it was in its original type a morality—a morality based on a philosophy—but not a religion.

Buddhism, however, became a religion, not long, if not immediately after its author's death; and it thereby demonstrated the futility of every effort systematically or spasmodically put forward to taboo theology or extinguish the religious nature of man. Buddha preached, if he did not lay the foundation of, a system of rank atheism or agnosticism, but his ashes had scarcely become cold, ere his creed of chilling negation or agnostic nescience was transformed into a positive faith by an act of apotheosis by no means unnatural. The preacher of absolute scepticism in matters of religion was himself changed into a god, and worshipped as an incarnation. The places he frequented, his favorite haunts, became sacred spots of pilgrim devotion; his footprints were traced and adored, and the supposititious remnants of his cremated body, gave rise to a complicated system of relic-worship, and as the system spread—extended its sway from province to province and country to country—its propensity to worship developed into a craze; and diverse and conflicting forms of devotion were borrowed, along with shapeless masses of ceremonial observance, without discrimination, from the varied systems with which it allied itself and incorporated with its substance, till its original type was lost beneath heaps of foreign and heterogeneous accretions.

The successive changes through which Buddhism passed in
its gradual transformation from a scheme of austere morality into a shapeless conglomerate of conflicting creeds and jarring forms of worship, cannot be indicated with anything like historical accuracy. But it may justly be assumed that the idea of a roll of prophets terminating, at least temporarily, in Buddha, did enter into its original conception. The prayer he is said to have offered to "all the Buddhas" at the threshold of his career of investigation and reform, is an index to his faith, that a succession of revered teachers had risen and flourished before his own era. Again, when remonstrated with by his father on account of the disgrace which, in the father's opinion, the son was bringing upon his royal race by begging in the very heart of Kapilavastu, Buddha is reported to have answered thus:—"You and your family may claim descent from kings; my descent is from the prophets (Buddhas) of old, and they, begging their food, have always lived on alms." Add to this the fact that in becoming an ascetic, he did not originate and exemplify a new idea, but followed, on the contrary, an example set by a monk of dignified gait and peaceful countenance walking before his own eyes, and the conclusion becomes irresistible, that he believed in an prophetic succession, of which he represented himself as a link.

This germinal idea of the system was gradually expanded and sublimated, and it led to a rank outgrowth of philosophy and mysticism, as well as of legend and fable. But in its original form it could not have been materially different from what Buddha himself is reported in Tevigga-Sutta to have said, in these words:—"Know, Vasettha, that (from time to time) a Tathagata is born into the world, a fully-enlightened one, blessed and worthy, abounding in wisdom and goodness, happy, with knowledge of the world unsurpassed, as a
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guide to erring mortals, a teacher of gods and men, a Blessed Buddha.” It is to be noted here that if the Buddhas spoken of in this extract had been represented as sent by God, and not as self-raised and self-consituted prophets, the root idea of Baboo Keshab Chunder Sen’s New Dispensation, the idea of a roll of prophets, each rising with the flag of a fresh economy to resuscitate religious and moral earnestness at a time of general degeneracy, would have been noticeable therein.

This galaxy of prophets became objects of worship in the Buddhist Church, but not perhaps till Buddha himself had been made a centre or goal of supreme devotion. The claims which Buddha is said to have advanced, could not but lead to his apotheosis amongst the undiscerning masses of his disciples, while the discerning few had every reason to foster an act of worship from which they themselves were to reap a harvest of personal gain. In the Maha-Parinibbana-Sutta, he is reported to have said thus of himself:—

“What, then, Ananda, is this mirror of truth? It is the consciousness that the elect disciple is in this world possessed of faith in the Buddha—believing the Blessed one to be the Holy one, the Fully-enlightened one, wise, upright, happy, world-knowing, supreme, the bridler of men’s wayward hearts, the teacher of gods and men, the Blessed Buddha.”

In other self-laudatory declarations in this book, he calls himself “The Light of the World”; “The Eye of the World”; not only “the Blessed one” but the “Happy one.” The books recently translated by Rhys Davids literally abound with such expressions of commendation or reverence. In the Tevigga-Sutta we have this eulogium pronounced:—

“Now regarding that venerable Gautama, such is the high reputation that has been noised abroad, that he is said to be a fully enlightened one, blessed and worthy, abounding in
The Buddhistic rage for worship did not spend itself on Buddha and his illustrious predecessors. The Dharma, or the Law, though only an abstraction, became in process of time, an object of worship, as well as each and every one of the prophets by whom it had been from time to time promulgated. Buddha, while representing himself as a frail mortal, destined to play his part and disappear for ever, and while speaking of his approaching death in terms of pathetic import, held up the Law as an abiding principle, without beginning, without ending, everlasting and inscrutable. In one of his last discourses he is reported to have spoken thus:—"After my Nirvana ye ought to reverence and obey the Law; receive it as your master, or as a light shining in the darkness, or as as a precious jewel—the Law that I have given, this ye ought to obey and follow carefully, regarding it in no way different from myself." This extract is found in Beal's "Buddhism in China," and reminds one of several such sayings in the Maha-Parinibbana-Sutta. Bigandet begins his chapter on the precepts with these words "Our author, in a truly philosophical spirit, at first puts to himself the three following questions: What is the origin of the Law? What is man, the subject of the Law? What is the individual who is the promulgator of the Law? The three questions he answers in the following manner: 1st, all that exists is divided into two distinct parts, the things which are liable to change and obey the principle of unstability, such as matter, its modifications, and all beings which have a cause; and those which are eternal and warrantable, that is to say, the precepts of the Law and Nirvana."
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This conception of the moral law is materially different from what is ventilated in these days by our modern agnostics, who look upon it as a sort of mechanism of expediency, manufactured for the convenience of society, and therefore changeable as the accidents of social life are, and in whose opinion, what is virtue in a particular age, or under a particular sky, may be vice under altered circumstances. The Law, according to Buddhism, is based on the eternal fitness of things, and the ground of its obligation is, not a divine authoritative proclamation, but its promulgation by a self-raised or self-constituted teacher. The Law, according to Buddhist belief, is our only guide, and when on account of our systematic disobedience thereto, it is buried under heaps of error, a Buddha appears to revive it, and re-establish its prestige and influence.

But not only was the Law, but the Sangha, or the Assembly of mendicants or priests, converted into an object of worship. The Buddhist confession of faith, as given by Hardy in his "Legends and Theories of the Buddhists," runs thus:—

Buddhan saranan gachchami. I take refuge in Buddha.
Dhamman saranan gachchami. I take refuge in the Law.
Sanghan saranan gachchami. I take refuge in the Priesthood.

The same is given in the Dhammapada in these words:—

"The disciples of Gaudama are always well awake. Their thoughts are day and night set on Buddha."

"The disciples of Gaudama are always well awake. Their thoughts, day and night, are always set on the Law."

"The disciples of Gaudama are always well awake. Their thoughts, day and night, are always set on the Church" (the Sangha or Assembly.)
Thus a system of atheism became, almost immediately after the death of its founder, a system of polytheism; no worship became worship of a great teacher, an abstraction, and a whole host of lazy, filthy, vicious mendicants!

But the process of apotheosis did not stop here. Buddhism carried out a conciliatory foreign as well as a wise domestic policy. It not merely gave an impetus to the religious instincts of its followers by drawing them, in spite of its essential principle of atheism, towards a solemn adoration of its recognised trinity of the Buddha, the Dharma and the Sangha; but it conciliated the religious beliefs of the country by grafting upon its own system a great deal of its current philosophy, and sanctioning thereby its idolatrous worship. It received, with open arms, the pantheistic speculations of our Indian philosophers, and represented "all the Buddhas" as emanations from a primal spirit, which is called Adi-Buddha. Being the absolute and the unconditioned, this all diffusive spirit cannot maintain direct intercourse with created beings or things; and an intermediate agency, consisting of Dhyani Buddhas, their Bodhisatwas, and human Buddhas was called into existence; and the present era of the present Kalpa, or the long period intervening between the commencement and destruction of one mundane system, was placed under the special charge of the Bodhisatwa, called Avalokitesvara, who is called the "All-sided one," and who appears in varieties of forms to instruct and console men.

In chapter xxiv of "Saddharna-Pundirika," translated by H. Kern, and published in Max Muller's series of "Sacred Books of the East," we have a glimpse presented to us of the mode of teaching, adopted by this emergent deity, in these words:—

"Again the Bodhisatwa Mahasatwa Akshayamati said to
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the Lord: How, O Lord, is it that the Bodhisatwa Mahasatwa Avalokitesvara frequents this Saha-world? And how does he preach the Law? And which is the range of the skillfulness of the Bodhisatwa Mahasatwa Avalokitesvara? So asked, the Lord replied to the Bodhisatwa Mahasatwa Akshayamati. In some worlds, young man of good family, the Bodhisatwa Mahasatwa Avalokitesvara preaches the Law to creatures in the shape of a Buddha; in others he does so in the shape of a Bodhisatwa. To some beings he shows the Law in the shape of a Pratyeka-Buddha; to others again under that of Brahma, Indra and Gandharva. To those who are to be converted by a goblin, he preaches the Law assuming the shape of a goblin; to those who are to be converted by Isvara, he preaches the Law in the shape of Isvara; to those who are to be converted by Mahesvara, he preaches assuming the shape of Mahesvara. To those who are to be converted by a Chakravartin, he shows the Law assuming the shape of a Chakravartin; to those who are to be converted by an imp, he shows the Law under the shape of an imp; to those who are to be converted by a Senapati, he preaches in the shape of a Senapati; to those who are to be converted by assuming a Brahman, he preaches in the shape of a Brahman; to those who are to be converted by Vagrapani, he preaches in the shape of Vagrapani.”

This extract shows how adroitly Buddhism was mixed up with the prevailing philosophy and superstitions of India, the series of approximations or advances by which it completed its amalgamation with Hinduism. The same accommodating policy was pursued in all the countries, small or great, in which this Protean system spread; and it was, therefore, as a religion intermingled with every form of faith professed in Asia, from flighty transcendentalism
down to grovelling superstition, that it succeeded in propagating itself. The propagation of Buddhism has been invested with the significance attached to the early promulgation of Christianity; but it has been overlooked, that while our holy religion fought its way to victory and ascendancy, through obstinate opposition stirred up by its avowed and uncompromising antagonism to the prevalent forms of faith, Buddhism spread itself by losing its idiosyncrasy, allying itself with opposing creeds, and steadily carrying out a policy of suicidal compromise and concession. A flexible creed in conjunction with a lax accommodating principle of propagandism is the secret of the success of all philosophico-moral creeds, from Buddhism and other cognate systems of the ancient world, down to Brahmoism and other cognate systems of these days!

This brief sketch of the tortuous way in which Buddhism developed into a religion or rather a farrago of conflicting faiths, may be denounced as having but a remote and shadowy connection with the subject of this paper; but its importance will be admitted by those who look upon it as an argument, discursive indeed but not the less conclusive, in favor of our position, that Buddhism, as originally preached by its founder, was a morality, rather than a religion. Even Max Muller represents the revolution it initiated, if not accomplished, during the lifetime of its author, as a social and moral, rather than a religious revolution. Its tone was like that of theosophy in these days: a tone of conciliation and tolerance, nay, even of praise and flattery; but as it had not a religion fitted to stir up the natural hostility of the human heart to things heavenly and divine in its way, its career was thoroughly consistent with its professions. It called attention to a new or revived scheme
of social regeneration, which might work its wonders under cover, so to speak, of every shade of theological belief, or every form of religious practice.

But we now come to our text—Buddha as a moralist. The scheme of morality propounded by Buddha has, like his character, been made the subject of indiscriminate extravagant eulogy. Max Muller thus speaks of it in his essay on Buddhism in the first volume of his "Chips from a German Workshop":—"The most important element of the Buddhist reform has always been its social and moral code, not its metaphysical theories. That moral code taken by itself is one of the most perfect which the world has ever known." Edwin Arnold in his poetic-prose, or prose demanding as much license as poetry, thus speaks of Buddha's doctrine:—"In point of age, therefore, most other creeds are youthful compared with this venerable religion, which has in it the eternity of a universal hope, the immortality of a boundless love, an indestructible element of faith in final good, and the proudest assertion ever made of human freedom."

From this lofty table-land of glowing panegyric let us come down to the sobriety of tone and nicety of discrimination with which the moral teaching of Buddha is praised by writers like Hardy and Bigandet. Beal in his translation of the Dhammapada thus records the opinion of the former:—

"Mr. Spence Hardy has observed that a collection might be made from the precepts of this work, that in the purity of its ethics could scarcely be equalled from any other heathen author." The latter observes in his preface to the first edition of his work "The Legend of Gandama":—

"Though based upon capital and revolting errors, Buddhism teaches a surprising number of the finest precepts and
purest moral truths. From the abyss of its almost unfathomable darkness, it sends forth rays of the brightest hue."

We occupy the lower of these two platforms of commendation, and we hope to prove in this paper that the morality taught by Buddha is, not merely imperfect as his character, but essentially monastic, and therefore unsocial and unearthly. But one or two points in connection with his teaching ought to be noticed before we present our array of quotations and proofs in favor of this assertion.

And the first of these is indicated by the question—What was Buddha’s attitude towards the caste system which was being organized and solidified in his age? Did he declare a war of extermination against the growing monster, and substitute for it the grand doctrine of the essential unity and brotherhood of man? At first sight it would seem that he did. The Buddhist account of the fall of man is fitted to set forth the essential unity of the race. At the commencement of the present collocation of things or the mundane system, the Brahmans of ethereal regions came down, when the fruits of their work had been exhausted, and appeared on the stage of human history, "produced by apparitional birth." They were sinless and happy; they subsisted without food, and their bodies, free from the germs of disease and death, were radiant with a supernal glory, such as rendered the creation of a centre of light—such as the sun or the moon—unnecessary. But one of these blessed individuals ate in an evil hour a little of "a peculiar substance like the scum that arises upon the surface of boiled milk," which had appeared on the surface of the globe. The others followed his example, and the whole set fell, and lost the peculiar radiance of their ethereal bodies, and became subject to disease
and death. Then they assembled to create the sun, moon and the five planets to illuminate the world by day and by night; and this they were enabled to do "by their united Karma." They began, moreover, to eat with different degrees of avidity other terrene productions, and thus introduced that variety of colors which has been a perennial source of race antagonism and class animosity in this world. Then arose amongst them squabbles and fights, to obviate which they made one of their number their king, and called him Kshatriya, "and his descendants retained the same appellation." To suppress, however, the crimes which were still committed, the caste of Brahmans was organized, the word Brahman meaning, according to the atheistic interpretation of Buddhist documents, "suppressors." And finally those who were "skilful in arts" formed the Vaisya caste, and those who were "addicted to hunting" constituted the Sudra caste. The essential difference implied in the evolution of the castes from the higher and lower portions of the Divine Body, or the higher and lower elements of the Divine Substance, is denied in this account presented in Hardy’s "Manual of Buddhism."

Again, in some of the utterances ascribed to Buddha, caste-distinction is not recognized, but declared to be incompatible with the spirit of his faith. "As the four rivers which fall in the Ganges lose their names as soon as they mingle their waters with the holy river, so all who believe in Buddha cease to be Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Vaisyas and Sudras." Again—"Between a Brahman and man of another caste, there is not the same difference as between gold and a stone, or between light and darkness. The Brahman is born of a woman, so is the Chandala. If the Brahman is dead, he is left as a thing impure, like the other castes. Where is the difference?"
Quotations, moreover, may be multiplied to show that Buddha, in his dispensation of rewards and punishments within the precincts of his Order or Church, was guided by a scrupulous regard to what constitutes essential, in contradistinction to accidental difference.

But it ought not to be forgotten that Buddha did not fight a crusade against the caste rules of the country—he only set his face against their introduction into his own Order. Nay, his lay-disciples were left in caste chains, as well as in varieties of other chains, unmolested or intact. The spirit of cautious opposition, not uncompromising antagonism, by which he was animated, is revived in the Brahmo Church, where, while the ordinary members are at liberty to conform to caste rules and wear cast badges, the initiates are required to cast them aside.

Nor ought it to be forgotten that in setting aside caste-distinctions within the precincts of a monastic order, Buddha did not oppose or rise above the ancient traditions of the country. Since the beginning of days, the mendicant orders in India have been organized on principles looked upon as positively dangerous within the framework of general society; and the foremost of these principles is non-recognition of caste-rules and distinctions. The phenomenon of small coteries of recluses professing sceptical principles and laughing at established institutions, under the shade and with even the consent of the national faith, has never been rare in this country.

In his opposition to the caste-system Buddha, as a recluse, was no innovator. Perhaps his opposition was partial, not wholesale, directed against the growing ascendency of the Brahmanical caste, with which his own caste was evidently competing, or rather, contending for supremacy. He often
represented his own caste as superior to the sacerdotal, and he sanctioned some degree of caste-pride when he placed the Buddhahood beyond the aspirations and attainments of any but a member of the first two castes. Our authority for this statement is Hardy, who, in his "Legends and Theories of the Buddhists" says—"We can scarcely think that one who set himself so strongly against the pretensions of caste, would render to it the greatest homage in his power, by declaring that the Buddhas are always born of the two highest castes, the Kshatriya and the Brahman."

The second point worthy of notice is indicated in the question—What was Buddha's source of revelation? His source of revelation was intuition, rather than the Veda, which he repudiated on the ground on which the New Testament is set aside by Mussulmans, viz., the corruption of the text by interpolation and expurgation. He could not, of course, look upon it as a divine revelation tampered with by profane hands; but he was disposed to identify the essence of it with that Law, the eternity and immutability of which he maintained, and which he discovered, not by a careful study of the book and a rigid application thereto of the approved canons of criticism, but by meditation. Max Muller identifies Buddha with the mystics of our own and other lands, who professed to see God in a state of elevation and ecstasy to which they had been raised by subjective meditation; but surely there is no ground for such identification. Buddha certainly claimed immediate cognition of the principles of his Dharma, and estatic vision of etherial and even infernal spirits; but he never professed to see a being whose existence he did not believe in, and the current theory regarding whom he was disposed to throw beyond the pale of scientific investigation into the region of inscrutable mysteries. He sometimes
spoke of Brahma or Sakra, and professed to hold intercourse with him; Brahma was, in his opinion, merely the king of the heavens, who had begun to live and was destined to die; not the eternal, unchangeable Being called God. Brahma moreover, was represented by him as inferior to himself in knowledge, power, and approximation to the blessed state of Nirvana!

His entire system was evolved from his inner consciousness; and if he had only confined himself to moral teaching, and left history, chronology and science intact, as well as theology, his position would have been unassailable, to a great extent, if not completely. But he claimed universal knowledge, and evolved scientific, as well as moral truths from his inner consciousness; and the result was, that he combined with maxims of pure morality, errors the most grotesque and extravagant. Read the following explanation of "a mighty earthquake," given in Maha-Parinibhana-Sutta:

"Eight are the proximate, eight the remote causes, Ananda, for the appearance of a mighty earthquake."

"What are the eight?"

"This earth, Ananda, is established on water, the water on wind, and the wind rests upon space. And at such a time, Ananda, as the mighty winds blow, the waters are shaken by the mighty winds as they blow, and by the moving water the earth is shaken. These are the first causes, proximate and remote, of the appearance of a mighty earthquake."

Then follow a specific statement of the ways in which earthquakes are produced, by beings endowed with supernatural powers, by meditation, and of the times and seasons when they must occur, such as the birth of a Buddha, his attainment of Buddhahood, his death, &c.
BUDDHA AS A MORALIST.

Read also the following explanation of an eclipse of the moon given by Buddha himself in the Sanyutia, Nikaya, Saha Gatha Wagga, and translated by Hardy:—"Thus I heard. Bhagawa was living in Swathi, in the garden Anatha Pindako. At that time the Moon-God was seized by the Asura Rahu. Then the Moon-God, remembering Buddha, spake this stanza: 'Adoration to thee, great Buddha! Thou art free from all impurities. I am distressed. Become thou a refuge to me.'"

What would have been the attitude of the modern world if any thing answering to a mistake like this had escaped the lips of our Lord and his apostles? How many heads would have shaken! How many fingers stretched forth in derision; and how many tongues let loose!

One point more, and our preparatory discourse is over. Buddha's method of teaching morality is simple and dignified, and reminds one of that adopted by our Lord. Like Christ, Buddha looked upon nature as a granary of symbolism, and brought out of its rich stores a beautiful array of imagery, or a garland of analogies fitted to illustrate the truths he had to teach; and like Christ, he looked upon the most ordinary events, or the driest details of life, as fraught with parabolic significance. Buddha scarcely saw a thing which he did not present as an apt emblem of a feature of the great truth he preached. A blazing fire reminded him of the lust which burns within the human heart; a dashing torrent suggested to his mind the headlong precipitancy with which man rushes to destruction; a solid rock typified the constancy of the firm believer, and a still lake spoke to him of the sweet tranquility of a soul emancipated from the raging thirst of life. He could not see an elephant guarding or failing to guard his trunk, without calling attention to.
the necessity of guarding the human tongue; he could not see an umbrella spread without calling upon wandering man to take refuge in himself and the Law. He could not smell the sweet odour of a flower without speaking of the fragrance of virtue; he could not hear the melody of sweet-singing birds without emphasizing the harmony of an emancipated spirit. Like all great men, he looked at nature with the eye of a poet; and if he had not been entangled in the net of metaphysical subleties, he would have seen the power of God, where he actually saw nothing but the operation of blind force.

His parables have been praised, and compared to those uttered by Christ. But the interval that separates them cannot be better presented, than by simply transcribing a couple of Buddha's parables, one from Davids' little volume on Buddhism, and the other from Tevigga Sutta. "The first is the parable of the Sower."

"In another of these stories which is before us, in three versions, from the Pali, Sinhalese, and Burmese respectively, we find the processes of agriculture worked out into an elaborate allegory. A wealthy Brahman, named Bharadvaja, was holding his harvest home when the Teacher comes and stands by with his bowl. Some of the people went up and paid him reverence, but the Brahman was angry, and said, 'Sraman (i.e., mendicant,) I plough and sow, and having ploughed and sown, I eat; it would be better if you were, in like manner, to plough and sow, and then you would have food to eat'?"

"'O Brahman,' was the answer, 'I too plough and sow, and having ploughed and sown, I eat.'"

"'You say you are a husbandman; but we see no signs of it,' said the Brahman. 'Where are your bullocks and the seed and the plough?"
"Then the Teacher answered, 'Faith is the seed I sow, and good works are as the rain that fertilizes it; wisdom and modesty are the parts of the plough, and my mind is the guiding rein. I lay hold of the handle of the law; earnestness is the goad I use; and diligence is my draught ox. Thus this ploughing is ploughed, destroying the weeds of delusion. The harvest that it yields is the amrodria fruit of Nirvana, and by this ploughing all sorrow ends.'"

The following is taken from Tevigga-Sutta, and is entitled by the translator thus—"Man in Love."

"Just, Vasettha, as if a man should say, 'How I long for, how I love the most beautiful woman in this land!'

"And people should ask him" 'Well! good friend! This most beautiful woman in the land whom you thus love and long for, do you know whether that beautiful woman is a noble lady or a Brahman woman or of the trader class or a Sudra?'

"But when so asked, he should answer 'No.'

"And when people should ask him, 'Well good friend! this most beautiful woman in all the land, whom you so love and long for, do you know what the name of that beautiful woman is, or what is her family name, or whether she be tall or short, dark or of medium complexion, black or fair, or in what village or town or city she dwells?'

"But when so asked, he should answer 'No.'

"And then people should say to him, 'So then, good friend, whom you know not, neither have seen, her do you love and long for?'

"And then, when so asked, he should answer, 'Yes.'

"Now what think you, Vasettha? would it not turn out that being so, that the talk of that man was foolish talk?
"In sooth, Gotama, it would turn out, that being so, that the talk of that man was foolish talk?"

So far as the mere setting of Buddha's parables is concerned, some of them may be placed even above the parabolic utterances of our Lord; but in clearness of diction, naturalness of analogy, range of thought, and depth of meaning, they are decidedly behind these. And besides a parable like that of the lost sheep, or the lost piece of silver, or of the prodigal son, human genius has never been able to conceive in thought or clothe in language!

Now, adverting to the morality proper of Buddha, a demarcating line ought to be drawn between its essential elements and its accidental appanage, before its real merit or demerit can be discovered and set forth. And it is because learned writers on the subject have failed to emphasize this distinction, that they have spoken in extravagant terms of praise of a scheme of morality which is, in its essence, nothing more or less than gloomy and repulsive monasticism.

The external appendage of the morality taught by Buddha is the moral code framed for the regulation of the domestic life and affairs of his innumerable lay-disciples. There is nothing very remarkable in that code, nothing fitted to set forth originality of thought, grandeur of conception, or energy of expression; and there is something in it savouring of puerility and nonsense, if not naked absurdity. But the code may nevertheless be justly pronounced humane and benificent. The relative duties of domestic and social life are indicated with categorical conciseness of thought and expression; and the virtues of patience under trial, forbearance towards adversaries, and benevolence towards all, are taught and enforced. The only defect in it is its failure to discriminate between principles and rules, and its inclusion
in a summary of moral principles of what is properly placed under the head of sumptuary regulations. For instance, the relative duties of husband and wife are thus summarized:—

The Husband should cherish his Wife,

1. By treating her with respect.
2. By treating her with kindness.
3. By being faithful to her.
4. By causing her to be honored by others.
5. By giving her suitable ornaments and clothes.

The Wife should show her affection for her Husband,

1. She orders his household aright.
2. She is hospitable to his kinsmen and friends.
3. She is a chaste wife.
4. She is a thrifty house-keeper.
5. She shows skill and diligence in all she has to do.

All this reads like a statement of rules rather than of principles. The New Testament determines these and other reciprocal duties, in such directions as these:—"Husbands love your wives," "Wives be obedient to your husbands;" and it raises the ideal of married life by holding it up as a symbolic representation of the mystical union between the Church and her Lord.

Again, parents are directed, not merely to give their children a suitable education, and to look after their morals, but to "provide them which suitable wives or husbands," and "give them their inheritance" Pupils are directed to honor their teachers by (1) "rising in their presence" (2) "ministering to them;" (4) "obeying them;" (4) "supplying their wants," as well as paying proper attention to their instruction.

The directions laid down for the treatment of servants or
perhaps slaves, are worthy of being reproduced at a time when maltreatment of servants is the rule, not the exception in our country.

The Master should provide for the welfare of his dependents.
1. By apportioning work to them according to their strength.
2. By supplying suitable food and wages.
3. By tending them in sickness.
4. By sharing with them unusual delicacies.
5. By now and then granting them holidays.

But it is not at all necessary to set forth the praiseworthy features of this outer court of Buddhist morality, this code intended for persons who are called Buddhists only by courtesy, and who are entirely outside the pale of the salvation or deliverance preached by Buddha. An inferior species of salvation is, doubtless, allowed them, according to immemorial usage; but from deliverance from the evils of existence, from disease, and death and sorrow, they are almost as thoroughly debarred as those who look upon Buddha as an impostor, and his system as a sham and a delusion. Family life, according to every principle of Buddhistic Philosophy, is a hindrance, the most effectual conceivable, to growth in self-mastery and self-extinction, the virtues fitted to pave the devotee's way to Nirvana. In the Tevigga Sutta we have this emphatic declaration:—"A householder, or one of his children, or a man of inferior birth in any class, listens to that truth. On hearing the truth he has faith in the Tathagata (Buddha), and when he has acquired that faith he thus considers with himself.—'Full of hindrances is household life, a path defiled by passion, free as the air is the life of him who has renounced all worldly things. How difficult is it for the man who dwells at home to live the higher life in all its fullness, in all its purity, in all
its bright perfection! Let me then cut off my hair and beard; let me clothe myself in the orange-colored robes, and let me go forth from a household life into the homeless state!—Then, before long, forsaking his portion of wealth, be it great or be it small; forsaking his circle of relatives, be they many or be they few, he cuts off his hair and beard, he clothes himself in the orange-colored robes, and he goes forth from the household life into the homeless state."

The paragraph following, shows that the devotee becomes happy only in this stereotyped way, that is by renouncing family life, in imitation of the example set by Buddha himself, and practising the rigid rules of the Order. In the same book we are told that between "the Brahmans in possession of wives and wealth" and the "Brahman who has none of these things," there cannot be any "agreement or likeness."

In the *Saddharma-Pundarika*, two young princes are introduced as addressing their mother in this strain.—"Allow us, oh mother, to go forth from home and to embrace the houseless life; ay, we will become ascetics, for, rare to be met with is a Tathagata." Instances of this description may be multiplied almost *ad-infinitum*.

Again, the members of the Order are not merely directed to look upon family life as dangerous, but to scrupulously abstain from sensuous pleasures, though of the most innocent kind. They are directed to look upon the senses as a "chain," a drag on spiritual life, of which the best thing they can do is to get rid unreservedly and entirely. In *Tevigga-Sutta* we have this principle indicated in the following bits of a long dialogue, reported between Buddha himself and Vasettha:—

"In the same way, Vasettha, there are five things leading
to lust, which are called in the Discipline of the Noble One a 'chain' and a 'bond.'

"What are the five?"

"Forms perceptible to the eye; desirable, agreeable, pleasant, attractive forms, that are accompanied by lust and cause delights. Sounds of the same kind perceptible to the ear. Odors of the same kind perceptible to the nose. Tastes of the same kind perceptible to the tongue. Substances of the same kind perceptible to the body by touch. These five things predisposing to passion are called in the Discipline of the Noble One, a 'chain' and a 'bond.'"

But not only are the senses to be shaken off as encumbrances, but the entire body itself is to be considered a prison-house, and depreciated. In the Ketokhila-Sutta (as translated by Rhys Davids in vol. xi of "Sacred Book of the East") we have this statement:—"And further, O Bhikkus, when a brother has not got rid of the passion for a body, has not got rid of the desire after a body, has not got rid of the attention to a body, has not got rid of the thirst for a body, has not got rid of the fever of a body, has not got rid of the craving after a body."

"Whatsoever brother, O Bhikkus, has not got rid of the passion for a body, has not got rid of the desire after a body, has not got rid of the attraction to a body, has not got rid of the fever of a body, his mind does not incline to zeal, exertion, perseverance, and struggle."

And they are required to obey rigidly the following ten commandments, the Buddhist's Decalogue:—

1. Not to take life.
2. Not to take that which has not been given.
3. Not to commit fornication.
4. Not to speak falsely.
5. Not to take intoxicating drinks.
6. Not to eat after midday.
7. Not to attend theatrical amusements, nor to adorn the body with flowers and perfumes.
8. Not to sleep on any soft material, beyond a mat spread on the ground.
9. Not to use high seats and couches.
10. Not to wear gold or silver.

What an odd mixture of the sublime and the ridiculous! A few eternal and immutable principles of rectitude placed in juxtaposition with rules factitious and even childish!

But let us confine our attention to the first five, which are represented as par excellence the precepts of Buddhism. Each of them is guarded by a network of casuistical interpretations and rules, and two of them, at least, are carried to a preposterous length; while the last ought to come under the heading of sumptuary laws rather than of moral principles. The command 'not to kill' includes not only human beings, but all kinds of animals, and even varied forms of life; as the virtuous man is described as one, who not only keeps aloof from what the modern world calls deliberate murder, but drinks filtered water to avoid the possibility of killing little insects, and never dreams of destroying even a herb!

The third precept militates, not only against what is now understood by adultery and fornication, but, as regards the Order, the members of which have to take, like Jesuit Missionaries, the vows of chastity, poverty and obedience, sexual intercourse of every description, legitimate or illegitimate. The male members of the Order were not merely to be misogynist, but in a sense misogynist: they were to scrupulously shun all intercourse with females, and regard
them as venomous reptiles, sure, when encouraged, to bite them to spiritual death. Buddha's directions with reference to such intercourse are thus given in the *Maha-Parinibbana-Sutta*:

"'How are we to conduct ourselves, Lord, with regard to womankind.'

'Don't see them, Ananda.'

'But if we should see them, what are we to do?'

'Abstain from speech, Ananda.'

'But if they should speak to us, Lord, what are we to do?'

'Keep wide awake, Ananda.'"

Buddha, though disposed to raise women a little, and though persuaded by friendly counsel and reasoning (but, as he contended, against his better judgment) to favor their admission to the Order, could not emancipate himself from current views about them and looked upon the slightest approximation to a pleasant intercourse between the sexes as fraught with danger. The progressive women of the day, who are willing to repeat the creed, "There is no-God and Harriet Martineau is his prophet," and who stand up for the complete obliteration of all distinction between the sexes, ought to look into the position woman occupies in Buddhistic records before praising Buddhism. Here is a statement of the reason why Rucha "was only a woman."

—(Hardy's Manual.)

"Fourteen births, previously, she was a nobleman, but an adulterer. In the next birth she was again a noble, through the power of previous merit, and gave much alms. But when she died, she had to leave the merit thus acquired like a mine of wealth hidden in the ground, and for her previous demerit she was born in the Romra hill, where she remained 2880 Kotis of years. She was next born a
vigorous ram in the country called Bheunaka; so powerful, that the shepherds taking it by the feur-feet, threw it on the ground, and deprived it of its virility; which was the punishment of her former deeds. Again she was a monkey and a draught bullock, in both of which births she had to suffer the same punishment, and was then born among savages, and was neither a male nor female. After this she was the devi of Sakra; then the wife of a libertine; and last of all, the daughter of the king.” This good lady was anxious to cancel her past guilt by good deeds, so as to be born a man, and thereby come within the precincts of the complete rest of Nirvana!

But the greatest of the five crimes prohibited by the five precepts is drinking. One of the records translated by Hardy thus speaks of this crime:—“Of the five crimes, the taking of life, theft, adultery, lying, drinking, the last is the worst. Though a man be ever so wise, when he drinks he becomes foolish, and like an idiot; and it is the cause of all other sins. For this reason it is the greater crime.” The crime, however, appears in different degrees of intensity or heinousness. The same record says:—“When only so much toddy is drunk as can be held in the palm of the hand, it is a minor offence; it is a greater when as much is drunk as can be held in both hands; and a greater still, when so much is drunk that all things appear to be turning round.”

Surely the country is indebted to Buddhism for one great revolution. Dr. Banerjea speaks, in one of his well-known works, of the Aryan schism, the schism which led to the ultimate disseverance of the two kindred races or peoples, the Aryans and the Iranians. The cause of this big squabble was drink. The Iranians, who abhorred drink, separated themselves from the Aryans who loved drink. But the
intervening ages have completely turned the tables so that to-day the Hindus are a wine-hating, and the Parsees a wine-loving people—barring, of course, the results of the encouragement given to the red-eyed goddess by modern civilization with its never-ending stream of brandy and soda-water. This salutary revolution was accomplished by the impetuous and undiscerning earnestness with which Buddha and his followers placed drinking among the prohibitions or, as a great divine, calls the "shalt-nots" of the moral law. Muhammad was guilty of similar weakness when he included "fleeing from the battle-field" in the category of his "great sins" (gunah-kabira), in the category of deadly sins like murder, adultery and theft.

We believe that the champions of Teetotalism in these days, whose number happily is daily increasing, are destined to accomplish, in civilized but wine-cursed lands, a revolution as grand, and as decidedly fraught with beneficent results as that initiated in our country by Buddhism. But if these leaders of a good cause were led by blind zeal to add a clause to the Decalogue to the effect—Thou shalt not drink wine or spirits, we should be disposed to repeat the well-known verse: "If any man shall add unto these things, God shall add unto him the plagues that are written in this book."

But are not the minor defects of the Buddhistic code of morals to be forgiven and forgotten in view of the fact that it inculcates and enforces universal benevolence? Buddhism is certainly overladen with fiction, superstition and error; but does not its animating spirit of boundless love make amends for whatever of absurdity may have been associated with, or heaped upon it? Rhys Davids in his "Buddhism" concludes his brief but graphic sketch of the defects as well as excellencies of the system with these words:—"Thus it
was, that while most of the superstition and folly which had encrusted the ancient faith was repudiated and ignored, its beauty, and poetry, and truth were first ennobled and spiritualized, and then made subservient to that life of self-control, wisdom and universal charity, which Gautama declared to be the highest aim and the highest happiness of man." This great authority emphasizes the fact, that Buddhism grasps and upholds the correct principle of overcoming evil by good both in our own selves, and in our intercourse with our fellow-men or fellow-creatures in general. The faults of thought and disposition, whatever they may be, whether of an aggravated or of a venial type, can be corrected only by a careful and scrupulous cultivation of the opposite virtues. For instance, pride can be gradually mortified, and ultimately extinguished by, thoughts of, longings for, and earnest seekings after humility; hatred can be removed from the human heart only when it is chased out of it by love.

Buddha certainly commanded his followers to emancipate themselves from the prevailing faults of their character by a sedulous cultivation of the opposite virtues; they are exhorted to mature in their hearts the virtues of compassion, sympathy and love, by meditating on the sorrows of humanity. The true follower of Buddistic principles is described in these verses in Tevijga-Sutta:

"And he lets his mind pervade one quarter of the world with thoughts of Love, and so the second, and so the third, and so the fourth. And thus the whole world, above, below, around, and everywhere, does he continue to pervade with a heart of love far-reaching, grown great, and beyond measure.

"Just Vasettha, as a mighty trumpeter, makes himself heard—and that without difficulty—in all the four directions;
even so of all things that have shape or life, there is not one that he passes by or leaves aside, but regards them all with mind set free and deep-felt love.’ ”

On this feature of Buddhistic morality we have two or three remarks to make: Our first remark is, that universal love cannot be generated in the way indicated. We cannot possibly meditate or school ourselves into universal love, or produce it in our hearts by self-control or self-exertion. Buddha laid the axe to the very root of virtue, when he cut it off from its source of vitality, viz., divine grace, and made its growth contingent on human exertions. He rang the death-knell of morality, when, after alluding to his approaching death in pathetic language, he exhorted his disciples in these words:—(Maha-Parinibbana-Sutta.)

“Therefore, O Ananda, be ye lamps unto yourselves. Be ye a refuge unto yourselves. Betake yourselves to no external refuge. Hold fast to the truth as a lamp. Hold fast as a refuge to the truth. Look not for refuge to any one besides yourselves.”

“My age is now full ripe, my life draws to its close.
I leave you, I depart relying on myself alone!
Be earnest then, Oh Brethren, holy, full of thought!
Be steadfast in resolve! keep watch o'er your own heart!
Who wearies not, but holds fast to this truth and law,
Shall cross this sea of life, shall make an end of grief.”

Virtue, in the proper sense of the term, virtue of which the vital principle is love, is the resultant of two coincident and co-operative forces, divine grace unfolding, nourishing, invigorating and fructifying human exertion. But Buddha cast overboard the main factor, and literally killed morality; though, as a branch retains its verdure for a time even after its separation from the parent stock, it gave signs of life in his day, and for a short period after his death. Buddha appears in the existing records as a type of sympathy,
compassion and love,—but the representation should be traced to posthumous veneration and mythoepic spirit. If it could be proved that Buddha actually claimed to have succeeded in schooling himself into universal love by self-restraint and meditation, we should be compelled, by philosophic or argumentative fairness, to impugn his veracity, as we are when we have to face his claim to universal knowledge, or insight into his supposed past stages of existence!

Our second remark is, that self-dependence or self-sufficiency, which may be represented as the pre-condition, if not essence of virtue according to Buddhistic belief, cannot co-exist with universal love. Self-control or self-mastery when attained by self-exertion cannot but beget pride, while the humility, without which universal love cannot exist, presupposes self-abasement, not self-glorification, self-loathing, not self-sufficiency.

And lastly the aim of Buddha's moral teaching is not universal love, but perfect equanimity, a mind inclined neither towards virtue nor towards vice, neither towards love nor towards hatred. If universal love is inculcated and enjoined, it is also represented as an inferior thing, to be cast aside before the goal of insensible repose is reached. Read the following verses of the *Dhammapada* as translated by Max Muller:

"Let no one ever look for what is pleasant or unpleasant. Not to see what is pleasasat is pain; and it is pain to see what is unpleasant."

"Let therefore no man love anything. Loss of the beloved is evil. Those who love nothing and hate nothing, have no fetters."

"From love comes grief; from love comes fear. He who is free from love knows neither grief nor fear."
The aim of Buddha's self-renunciation, in the grosser sense of the term, that is renunciation of the splendors and pleasures of life, self-control and self-mastery, was *self-deliverance from pain*, an object too selfish to foster in his heart any disposition like genuine philanthropy or disinterested benevolence. Whatever enthusiasm of humanity he showed is to be traced, like the vaunted humanitarianism of modern Comptists, to intensity of intellectual conviction, rather than of moral feeling!

Edwin Arnold sees in Buddhism "the eternity of universal hope," "the immortality of a boundless love," "an indistructible element of faith in final good," and "the proudest assertion ever made of human freedom." We have shown that in Buddhism we find perfect quiescence, stolid equanimity, passionless lethargy, and complete extinction of intellectual energy and moral earnestness, instead of "boundless love." In the next two papers we hope to show that "the hope" fostered by Buddhism is gloomy, paralyzing, deadening despair, and that the "final good" anticipated by well-read Buddhists is *annihilation*, or at least extinction of thought, feeling and consciousness. The panegyrist is right in representing Buddhism as "the proudest assertion ever made of human freedom." According to this system, man is his own Saviour, and all his help comes from within, not a particle from without. The late Pandit Dya Nand Saraswati used to say, that if man could sin of his own accord, he could also save himself from sin by the strength of his unaided will; and the modern disciples of Buddha are unanimous in upholding this principle of self-evolution. But experience gives the lie to this principle, and consequently Buddhistic morality, if judged by the precise standard of experimental science, would be found wanting!
CHAPTER IV

BUDDHA AS A PHILOSOPHER.

Did Buddha teach a philosophy? Some of his modern panegyrists have been led by a line of a priori reasoning to the conclusion, that he never did. Buddha was in their opinion the greatest teacher that ever lived, and he consummated the greatest moral revolution that ever was accomplished. Could such a man, with so great a work before him, waste his energy and fritter away his resources in fruitless researches, carried rashly into the region of enigmas and mysteries, dreams and hallucinations, ghosts and phantasms? Speculations of a flighty and fruitless stamp might be indulged in by men who had a dreamy intellect and nothing of importance to do; but a man with Buddha’s practical turn of mind, and earnest purpose, could not possibly nullify himself by deliberately getting entangled in the mazes of metaphysical subtleties and ontological riddles. But such reasonings, however cogent and conclusive they may appear to some minds, cannot materially influence persons, who do not admit the premises, and who cannot therefore be expected to accept the conclusion. We do not admit that Buddha was so far above the platform of thought and feeling occupied by the philosophers and reformers of his age, that the idea of his going astray in the direction indicated is inadmissible.

But questions like this cannot be settled either way by mere a priori reasonings. To the law and to the testimony—that must be our motto. It is our duty, agreeable or disagreeable, to present Buddha just as he appears in the
existing records, or the biographies and the hortatory and doctrinal treatises which have survived the wreck of time, and have the prestige of being universally held up as original sources. Nothing is more unsatisfactory than to evolve out of our inner consciousness a Buddha of stainless beauty, pure spirit and lofty thought, a Buddha whose appearance fascinates "dark-eyed" maidens, and whose grandeur of character and purpose generates enthusiastic devotion in the coldest of hearts. These records are doubtless overladen with extravagancies of the wildest stamp, and a little sifting work fitted to give consistency and shape to the underlying vein of historic truth is allowable; but no amount of exegetical or critical fairness can justify our going beyond them in quest of virtues they do not disclose, or truths and facts they positively contradict. The records bring the reformer forward not only as an ascetic of lofty but mutilated character, not only as a moralist of sublime but one-sided sentiments, but as a philosopher of the national or dreamy type!

Besides mere a priori reasoning is fitted, if only the records are accepted, when the necessary work of pruning has been done, to show that Buddha could not but have taught a philosophy. Buddha flourished at a time when a man could not possibly have succeeded as a reformer of morals without being backed, as it were, by a scheme of philosophic thought. Philosophy was regarded, not merely as a thing fitted to invigorate the intellect and expand the heart, but a sort of panacea for all the evils of life. Philosophy held the lofty position of religion, and the welfare of society in general, not merely of individual thinkers, was looked upon and represented as dependent on the solution of some at least of its abstruse problems. The devotees, who renounced
family life and forsook society, retired to sequestered spots more to ponder and set at rest the problems of life, than to acquire a store of supererogatory merit by the practice of austerity and penance. Buddha was not evidently above current traditions; and even if he had been, he would have found it necessary to secure general acceptance to his scheme of reform by allying it to, or rather amalgamating it with, a system of speculative thought.

Again, to rob Buddha’s ethical system of its philosophical basis, is to leave it without a foundation. The beautiful morality of the New Testament is based on its sublime Theology—on the grand doctrine of the Incarnation and the Atonement. Take away this doctrine, or the main features of the life and death of Christ, and Christian morality loses its unifying principle, its vitalizing power, its electrifying influence, and its inspiring example,—its most glorious associations and its strongest motives. In a similar manner the sombre morality of Buddhistic records is based on the subtle philosophy embedded in them,—on the doctrine, for instance, of impermanence, of existence as an evil *per se*, and release therefrom as the highest good. Take away this doctrinal basis and the main features of the life of Buddha, and his ethical scheme loses its principle of life, coherence, and practical efficacy, as well as its historical associations and standing model.

Buddha, therefore, stands before us as a philosopher, as well as a moral reformer. And it is because he was a philosopher, he was looked upon not only as a moralist, but as a religious reformer also, for in India, if not all the world over, philosophy was in his age religion, and religion philosophy.

But Buddha should be brought forward, not only as a philosopher, but the father of that species of philosophy, which has
been characterised as *heterodox* in India. Dr. Banerjea in his admirable "Dialogues," represents Buddha as the father of Hindu philosophy in general, both orthodox and heterodox. According to his ably expressed views, it was Buddha who drew the attention of Indian thinkers away from the creature comforts of life, of which they were passionately fond, towards the great problems of life and death; and the learned doctor unhesitatingly maintains that the characteristic ideas of Hindu philosophy, the ideas of *mukti* or deliverance from the evils of existence, and *Maya* or cosmothetic illusion, were first conceived and introduced into Hindu literature by him.

Dr. Banerjea's reasons for broaching an opinion so unique, so obviously at variance with the received or approved one, may be briefly stated thus: It is an undeniable fact, that the Rishis of the Rig Veda period were absorbed in the avocations and pleasures of life so completely, that they could not but appear incapable of thoughts fitted to satisfy the higher longings of the spirit. The prayers they offered were almost all intended to bring down upon them showers of earthly blessings, and rarely rose above the platform of material enjoyments, such as may be secured by wealth and honor, increase of flocks and herds, agricultural prosperity and pastoral abundance, martial triumph and plenitude of plunder. The military exploits and other occupations into which their oldest records afford an insight, indisputably indicate on their part an intense longing for the tangible blessings of this life, and a deliberate neglect of, if not aversion to, the pure and hallowing influences of divine grace. The temper of mind, disclosed in the picture presented of their sayings and doings in the Rig Veda, is also obviously inconsistent with that spirit of inquisitive earnestness to which philosophical speculations and researches are to be traced; while
scarcely a line occurs in this hoary record calculated to show that they ever cared to look beyond the narrow horizon of earthly enjoyments or allow themselves to be bothered by the abstruse problems and the inscrutable mysteries of life.

Nor did the age of the *Brahmanas*, the period when the simple ceremonies of the Rig Veda gave place to a complicated and pompous ritual, see any restraints imposed on the secular ambition of the Rishis. On the contrary, their wordliness grew in strength and intensity in proportion as their circumstances improved, the dangers before them disappeared, and they were lured on by the tempting prizes of a career of prosperity. They became in time thoroughly secularized, and their desires and aspirations rarely, if ever, extended beyond the contracted sphere of the pleasures and occupations of this life.

Amongst a people so thoroughly absorbed in secularity, how could, Dr. Banerjea asks, thoughts fitted to stir up the spirit of self-denial and self-renunciation arise? How could such a theory as *Maya*, with its representations calculated to throw over the realities of creation the veil of illusion and nothingness, arise in minds bent on looking upon this life as the all-in-all? How, again, could the Hindu idea of *Mukti*, with its renunciation of family-life, abandonment of worldly pleasure, retirement to hermit solitude, practice of penance, and intensity of contemplation, be conceived by persons who longed for nothing higher than domestic felicity accompanied with plenitude of wealth, honor, ease and comfort?

This line of reasoning would be perfectly irrefragable and conclusive, if it could be proved that Buddha was the first man in India who made himself an example of philosophic loftiness of thought and sentiment. But it is impossible to explain how a man of Dr. Banerjea's penetrating intellect
failed to notice the series of facts which are brought into bold relief in the existing records, and which militate most obviously and thoroughly against such an assumption. It is a matter of fact that Buddha himself referred to a long roll of prophets who had taught his distinctive doctrine before his day, and represented himself as only a link in a chain which knows neither beginning nor end. This may be an after-thought foisted in the original records, but the early prevalence of such an idea precludes the possibility of his being held up as the first example of ascetic self-renunciation and contemplative repose realized in the country. Nor should it be forgotten that according to the most reliable authorities, the Buddhistic and Jaina types of asceticism were but copies of what may emphatically be called the Hindu type, the model set forth in records like Baudhiana, recently translated and published in connection with Max Muller's series of "Sacred Books of the East."

Again it was the example of an ascetic of dignified gait and serene countenance that brought Buddha's wavering mind to the decision to which his career as a reformer should be traced. He is, moreover, said to have placed himself, though only for a season, under the teaching of one recluse philosopher after another, and held long conversations with a few of the acknowledged teachers of monastic philosophy. And besides his greatest opponents throughout the entire period of his public career were bands of philosophers, of whose leaning towards austerity, more rigorous than what was practised by his followers, he had to show the fruitlessness by elaborate trains of thought and reasoning. These facts make it plain that asceticism, and the meditation associated therewith, were growing into popularity when Buddha began and carried on his career of reform.
It is desirable to mention here that the recluse philosophers, who gave Buddha and his immediate followers the greatest trouble, were called Tirthakas; and some glimpses of their beliefs, and specially of their modus operandi are presented in the Ceylonese records translated by Hardy. These seem to have formed a sect, or rather a group of sects, the members of which literally out-Heroded Herod. Some of these, under the guidance of a leader named Parana-Kasyapa, appeared perfectly naked, like the Adamites of Christendom, maintaining the principle involved in the following declaration of their chief:—"Clothes are for the covering of shame: shame is the effect of sin; I am a rahat, and as I am free from evil desire, I know no shame." Some, under the guidance of Ajitakasakambata, appeared in hairy garments, and with close-shaven heads, maintaining that "it is an equal sin to kill a fish and to eat its flesh; that to destroy a creeping plant and to take life is an equal crime." A third party, under the leadership of Kakudasatya, "taught that when cold water is drunk many creatures are destroyed, and that, therefore, warm water is to be used, whether for the washing of the feet or any other purpose." A fourth sect "taught that we shall all appear in the next birth as we are now; whosoever is now great or mean, a man or a deva, a biped, a quadruped, without feet or with one foot, will be exactly the same in the new birth." A fifth party followed a leader who said that he was without sin, and that if any one had any doubt on that subject whatever, he might come to him, and he would explain it. The picture drawn of these sects, marred, though it doubtless is by the painter wilfully, is vivid enough to show that they were stricter than Buddhists in their loyalty to ascetic principle, more Pharisaic in their professions, wilder in their flights of
thought and belief; and that, though split into sects holding diverse opinions, they were unanimous in their opposition to Buddhism. In these delineations, moreover, we see some of the characteristic principles of Jainaism, not only in a germinal but in a fully developed form.

The means employed by the champions of this rival school of philosophy were not all fair. They carried on discussions with him, propounded questions, proposed difficulties, and tried by arguments to demonstrate the reasonableness of their own position, and the absurdity of that of their antagonists. Thus far, their *modus operandi* was thoroughly fair and unobjectionable. But they had recourse to very questionable, or rather reprehensible expedients, to compass their end. They tried to bring Buddha and his followers into disrepute by circulating slanders, wilfully misrepresenting theirs doctrines, and artfully drawing away many of those by whom these reformers were revered and venerated as heaven-sent teachers. Nay, they carried their malignity to a preposterous length. They induced a female devotee of their to accuse Buddha himself of incontinence in the presence of his followers, pretending to be *enciente*; but her wiles were disclosed by supernatural influence, and she was dragged through flames of fire down into the lowest hell, *Avitchi*;—a fate shared in by four other persons, Devadatta, the Judas Iscariot of Buddhist legends, who was the founder of a sect stricter than Buddha's, Devadatta's father, Suprabuddha, a nobleman who is said to have violated the chastity of a priestess, and the man "who reviled Buddha for seven days."

Even barring the fact that schools of ascetic philosophy, not perhaps in a state of maturity of organization, had existed before the public appearance of Buddha, and did exist
side by side with that of which he laid the foundation, the noticeable points of contact between his scheme of thought and that of Kapila, the acknowledged founder of the Sankhya school, suggest a question of great importance. The main features of the cosmogony and soteriology presented in the following passage in the sanyutta, as translated by Gogerly, and published years ago in the Ceylon Friend, cannot but show the similarity, if not identity, of the two systems:

"On account of ignorance," said Buddha, "merit and demerit are produced, on account of merit and demerit consciousness; on account of consciousness body and mind; on account of body and mind, six organs of sense; on account of six organs of sense, touch (or contact); on account of contact, desire; on account of desire, sensation (of pleasure and pain); on account of sensation, cleaving (or clinging to existing objects); on account of clinging to existing objects renewed existence (or reproduction after death); on account of reproduction of existence, birth; on account of birth, decay, death, sorrow, crying, pain, disgust, and passionate discontent. Thus is produced the complete body of sorrow. From the complete separation from, and cessation of, ignorance, is cessation of merit and demerit; from the cessation of merit and demerit is the cessation of consciousness; from the cessation of consciousness the cessation of (the existence of) body and mind; from the cessation of (the existence of) body and mind is the cessation of (the production of) the six organs; from the cessation of (the production of) the six organs is the cessation of touch; from the cessation of touch is the cessation of desire; from the cessation of desire is the cessation of (pleasurable or painful) sensation; from the cessation of sensation, is the cessation of cleaving to
existing objects; from the cessation of cleaving to existing objects, is the cessation of a reproduction of existence; from the cessation of a reproduction of existence, is the cessation of birth; from the cessation of birth, is the cessation of decay. Thus this whole body of sorrow ceases to exist."

This concatenation of potencies, and what may be called possibilities, is somewhat differently set forth in Suddharama-Pundarica recently translated by Kern. In speaking of the teaching of a former Tathagata, Buddha says:—"He moreover extensively set forth how the series of causes and effects is evolved, (and said) it is thus: Monks! from ignorance proceed conceptions (or fancies); from conceptions proceeds understanding (consciousness); from understanding, name and form; from name and form, the six senses; from the six senses proceed contact; from contact, sensation; from sensation proceeds longing; from longing proceeds striving; from striving, as cause, issues existence, from existence, birth; from birth, old age, mourning, lamentation, sorrow, dismay and despondency. So originates this mass of misery. From the suppression of ignorance results the suppression of conceptions," and so on, till we come to the extinction of "the whole mass of misery."

In these extracts some of the categories of the Sankhya system are mentioned, and the Sankhya account of bondage and liberation is presented with some variation of nomenclature, but without much material difference. And the question naturally arises—who was the originator of these ideas, Kapila or Buddha? Dr. Banerjea maintains, in contravention of the received opinion, that Buddha was the originator, not Kapila, whose speculations he traces to a period posterior not only to the advent of that reformer, but also to that of the founder specially of the Nayaya School, Gautama. But
although he sets aside the received opinion, he very adroitly transfers the burden of proof to his opponents. This, we maintain, is illogical, inasmuch as the person who opposes current views, and ventilates fresh opinions in supercession thereof, is bound by every principle of correct reasoning, to bring forward proofs of a cogent and conclusive stamp in support of his new position.

It is conceded, on all hands, that the question raised cannot be settled with chronological accuracy by evidence of a conclusive nature. But some importance should be attached to a line of a priori reasoning, which may be advanced in favor of the position gainsaid or controverted by the learned doctor. We, of course, set aside as valueless the tradition, that the city of Kapila-Vastu derived its name from Kapila, who is said to have practised austerity and abandoned himself to meditation on the identical spot on which that royal city was subsequently built. But we maintain that scepticism moves gradually, by slow steps, not per saltum. Infidelity appears at first in its milder forms, and progresses step by step, till its tone of modesty gives place to oracular assurance, and it itself is swallowed up in absolute scepticism. The history of the progress of infidelity in England and other European countries corroborates this assertion. The mild form of Theism ushered into England by Lord Herbert of Cherbury passed through developments more and more malignant, and ultimately degenerated into rank atheism under the guidance of reckless thinkers like Hume. The mild form of rationalism introduced into Germany by Semler degenerated through one line of development into the ribaldry of the Wolfenbuttel Fragments, and through another into the ingenious but fanciful theories of Paulus, Schenkel and Strauss. Infidelity in India pursued, it may safely be
assumed, a similar course. It appeared at first in its milder forms, grew in cumulative malignity, and ultimately degenerated into rank scepticism. Now, Buddhism represents a stage of scepticism decidedly more advanced than Sankhya philosophy. The Sankhya philosopher paid some reverence or homage, though perhaps ostensibly, to the canonical scriptures of the country, the sacred Vedas; and his attitude towards the hierarchical orders and current superstitions was one of mild tolerance, not of avowed hostility. Buddha, however, boldly set aside these scriptures as documents corrupt to the very core, and assumed an attitude decidedly more hostile towards the established priesthood, and the rites and ceremonies maintained by them more for their own benefit, than for that of the masses by whom they were looked up to as demi-gods. His scepticism, therefore, may on a priori grounds, be justly represented as a later development.

Whether the question raised is susceptible of solution or not, one thing is certain that Buddha was the father of those types of speculative philosophy, which have been branded as heterodox in the country. An attempt has indeed been made to represent Buddhism as an offshoot of Jainism; but the attempt has collapsed so thoroughly, that a bare allusion to it is enough. "The good old ways" have maintained their ascendency, and recent criticism has failed to check what may be called the public propensity to hold up Kapila as the father of orthodox, and Buddha as the father of heterodox philosophy in India.

It is strange that while Buddha has been presented in recent publications in a variety of aspects, as a lofty character, a pure model, a deep thinker, a moralist, a reformer, a poet, and a speaker of engaging mien, sweet thought and
fascinating power, his position as the founder of a line of schools of philosophy, of a free thought type, has been ignored. Perhaps, this has been done deliberately. The weakest point in Buddha’s teaching is his philosophy; and till it is studiously concealed behind the veil, or thrown into the background, nothing like an enthusiastic admiration of his career of reform can possibly be evoked. Buddha’s character presents some features of undoubted excellence, and his morality is not without some maxims of a lofty character eminently calculated to alleviate its general gloom. But Buddha’s philosophy is a tissue of unmitigated nonsense, and the less said about it by his admirers, the better!

To get to the bottom of Buddhistic philosophy, we have to go back to the four truths he is said to have discovered after a long period of meditation under the celebrated Bo-tree. These truths have been variously stated by various writers; but the statement of these fundamentals presented in Rhys Davids’ little volume entitled “Buddhism” is fitter, more complete, more comprehensive than any other which has fallen under our notice. That statement runs thus:—

“That (those events which are distinctive of individual existence, such as birth, the fine Skandhas, decay, disease, death) and (those which bring forcibly into the mind the sense of separate existence, such as) contact with disagreeable objects, separation from pleasant ones, unfulfilled desire of possession, are precisely those states which are full of suffering or sorrow.

2. “The kind of craving excitements, which follows sensation, and causes the delusion of self and the lust of life—creating either delight in the objects that present themselves, or an eager desire to supply a felt want—this eager, yearning thirst (Trishna, Pali Tanha) growing into
sensuality, desire of future life, or love of the world, is the origin of all suffering.

3. "Sorrow and suffering will be overcome, extinguished if this 'thirst' be quenched, this lust of life destroyed. He who overcomes the contemptible thirst (difficult to be conquered in this world), sufferings fall off from him, like drops from a lotus-leaf.

4. "To accomplish this end there is only one way—the 'noble path' of a virtuous and thoughtful life: 'enter on this path and make an end of sorrow: verily, the path has been preached by me, who have found out how to quench the darts of grief. You yourselves must make the efforts: the Buddhas are only preachers: the thoughtful, who enter the path, are freed from the bondage of the deceiver Mara.' And this means of salvation is not a mere admonition to 'be good.' It is worked out into detail, and expressed in the Eight Divisions and four Stages.'

These fundamental conclusions arrived at by Buddha after so much trouble, are errors rather than truths. The first states a patent fact with obvious exaggeration; and may, therefore, be held up as an example of hasty, inaccurate, and unauthorized generalization. There is no doubt a great deal of sorrow in the world, and not a little of it proceeds from the causes mentioned. The optimism, which refuses to recognize its existence, and represents it as nothing but good, incipient happiness or joy in embryo, simply plays with the hard facts of life. But while the optimist view should be set aside as inconsistent with experience or the obvious teachings of empirical philosophy, the pessimism which sees nothing but suffering in nature, should also be avoided. Buddha, however, adopted the pessimist view with eagerness, and preached it with melancholy enthusiasm.
Life was to him one long, unbroken, uninterrupted tissue of sorrow and misery, without a single ray of real joy to flicker through its terrific gloom. Did he ignore the varieties of things in nature eminently fitted to minister to our comfort and enhance our enjoyment? Did he fail to recognize the emotions of the human heart, which, when properly developed and properly applied, might prove copious, if not perennial, sources of delight and felicity to us? He was certainly aware—how could he not be?—of the existence of objects out of, and feelings in, man fitted to subserve the obvious design of nature to make him as comfortable and happy as under his present circumstances he can be. But in his opinion the fleeting pleasures he may derive from separation from disagreeable, and contact with agreeable objects, do not deserve the name of pleasures;—they are so evanescent, so illusory, so deceptive; nor did he look upon the nobler enjoyments ensured by a proper culture of the higher elements of human nature as deserving of the name. The pleasures of life are in his opinion to be as scrupulously avoided as its pains, and that because they, besides being short-lived and fleeting, are accompanied with and followed by sorrow and suffering. **No joy in life**—is his motto.

But did not Buddha speak of a sliding scale of heavens representing different degrees of bliss more or less pure and unalloyed? He certainly did, but the promised enjoyment in all these regions being terminable, and accompanied with some degrees of sorrow when not self-oblivious, it was never represented by him as desirable, except as a species of training needed by minds of a grosser mould. Even such bliss, though admittedly so much sublimer than what is attainable in this vale of tears, and so much more durable, is after all bliss improperly so called. Life has no sunny spot in it,
here or elsewhere, no tinge of joy properly so called, nothing to mitigate its gloom in the opinion of men, who have extinguished all carnality of thought and feeling within themselves by meditation on its sorrows! This melancholy conclusion we look upon as essentially erroneous, the upshot of a dyspeptic, morose, cynical view of things, not the outgrowth of a healthy, calm, philosophical view.

The second of Buddha's fundamental conclusions traces human sorrow to a wrong source, "the delusion of self and the lust of life." Our sorrows proceed from an improper development and misapplication of the varied elements of our nature, not certainly from our unavoidable self-consciousness and instinctive love of existence. We flee under the influence of what may be called an indwelling demon from things calculated to make us happy, and eagerly run after those which cannot but make us miserable; and therefore the sorrows of life ought to be traced to this centrifugal tendency of our corrupt nature, not certainly to our inherent and indestructible love of life!

The third conception involves an impossibility. The sorrows of life are happily terminable, but not certainly in the way indicated. The lust of life is indestructible, under present, if not under all conceivable varieties of circumstances, and if the destruction of sorrow were dependent on its extinction, despair and despondency would be our portion. The fourth conception, the proposed remedy, should now be taken into consideration. That remedy is the Noble Path, the Eight-fold Path, emphatically called the Middle Path. Does not Buddha in calling the path of virtue the Middle Path seem to have anticipated the Aristotelian definition of virtue? Aristotle defined virtue as the golden mean between opposite extremes, or rather between excess and defect; and
he showed the appositeness or accuracy of his definition by specifying not a few of the well-known virtues, and setting forth, in case of each of them, an aberration on the side of excess, as well as on the side of defect. Does not Buddha seem to have pitched upon this happy medium in his middle path long before Aristotle was born? Several recent writers are of opinion that he did, although they do not conjure up the shade of Aristotle for invidious comparison. Beal, in his small volume on "Buddhism in China," thus describes what he calls "his method:"—"The method was in the use of moderation, neither asceticism on one hand, nor license on the other."

If the middle path were indeed the golden mean between opposite extremes, the line where defect ends, and beyond which excess begins, the praise lavished upon it would be well deserved. We maintain that the greatest glory of Christianity is the steadiness with which it invariably steers a middle course between the Scylla of defect and the Charibdis of excess. Christ was himself an example of a character thoroughly well-balanced, and He trod what might be called the Middle Path between the attitudinarianism of the Phari-sees and the latitudinarianism of the Sadducees; between John the Baptist, in whom the prophetic spirit of earnest asceticism culminated, and Judas Iscariot, in whom intense and all-absorbing secularity appeared in a form of treachery, perhaps not so mean as people generally suppose, inasmuch as according to DeQuincey, whose speculations on the subject are worthy of sober thought, his object in betraying his Master was to hasten his anticipated assumption of royalty authority and functions, and the rise in consequence of the Apostles, and of himself as of one them, in dignity and wealth.
The religion of Christ may also be described as the golden mean between opposite extremes. It steers a middle course between rationalism and superstition; between spiritualism and formalism; between what has been called the inwardness of religion and its outwardness; between this-worldliness and "other-worldliness," as well as between asceticism and libertinism. And if Buddhism could be proved equally cautious in avoiding extremes, its resemblance to our religion in this respect would be apparent, and its excellence in consequence indisputable. But the fact unhappily is that Buddhism, after perhaps a period of vacillation, settled down into a system of gloomy monasticism; and its middle path is the via media not between ascetism and license, but between domestic life and penance and self-torture. Let us hear what Dhamma-Kakka-Ppanattana-Sutta, or the foundation of the kingdom of righteousness or the wheel of the Law—translated by Rhys Davids, and presented along with other translations in Vol. XI of Sacred Books of the East—says about the middle path:

"There are two extremes, oh Bhikshus, which the man who has given up the world ought not to follow; the habitual practice, on the one hand, of those things whose attraction depends upon the passions, and specially of sensuality—a low and pagan way (of seeking satisfaction) unworthy, unprofitable and fit only for the worldly-minded and the habitual practice, on the other hand, of asceticism (self-mortification) which is painful, unworthy and unprofitable.

"There is a middle path, on Bhikshus, avoiding these two extremes, discovered by the Tathagata, a path which opens the eyes, and bestows understanding, which leads to peace of mind, to the higher wisdom, to full enlightenment, to Nirvana."
These extracts are transcribed from Buddha’s first sermon delivered, when “the blessed one was staying at Benares at the hermitage called Migadaya” in the hearing of his first five followers. In them the middle path is marked out only for those who “have given up the world,” that is, who have renounced family-life and betaken themselves to monastic seclusion; and the only warning protest it lifts up is directed against the varieties of self-inflicted tortures, which were represented as indispensably necessary to growth in virtue. This path has eight members and four stages. The members are thus set forth in the record already named:

“Now this, oh Bhiksus, is the noble truth concerning the way which leads to the destruction of sorrow. Verily, it is this noble eight-fold path, that is to say,—

1 Right views | 5 Right livelihood
2 Right aspirations | 6 Right effort
3 Right speech | 7 Right mindfulness
4 Right conduct | 8 Right contemplation.”

This is an ascending series, of which every succeeding link is connected with the preceding as an effect is related to its cause. Right views lead to right aspirations, and these successively to right speech, right conduct, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and the last and greatest of Buddhist attainments, right contemplation. Right views, therefore, are the basis, and if they are properly so-called, the superstructure stands on a rocky foundation; but if they are errors, rather than truths, the building stands on a sandy foundation. The question, therefore, arises, are the views called right, really right? To settle this problem, let us raise another question. Of what are the views pronounced right presented? The answer is, first of the Universe,
then of man, then of the Law, then of the Promul- 
gator of the Law, and lastly of Nirvana, the end of the 
Law.

The corner-stone of the Buddhistic view of the universe 
is the doctrine of impermanence. This doctrine stands in 
bold relief from Buddhistic writings, being the one doctrine 
on which the greatest stress is laid, and which is presented 
in a variety of forms, illustrated by a variety of analogies, 
and brought home to individual conviction by a variety of 
arguments. Some of the passages in which it is set forth 
are given below:—

"So long as the brethren shall exercise themselves in the 
seven-fold perception due to earnest thought, that is to say, 
the perception of impermanence, of non-individuality, of 
corruption, of the danger of sin, of sanctification, of purity 
of heart, of Nirvana, so long may the brethren be ex-
pected not to decline but to prosper"—(Mahaparimbbanna- 
Sutta).

"But the spirits who are free from passion hear it, calm 
and self-possessed, mindful of the saying which begins 'im-
permanent, indeed, are all component things.' How then is it 
possible (whereas anything whatever, when born, brought 
into being, and organized, contains within itself the inherent 
necessity of dissolution); how then is it possible that such a 
being should not be dissolved? No such condition can 
exist."—(Mahaparibbanna-Sutta.)

"When the blessed one died, Sakka, the king of the gods, 
at the moment of his passing away from existence, uttered 
this stanza:—

'They are transient all, each being's parts and powers, 
Growth is their nature and decay. 
They are produced, they are dissolved again: 
And then is best when they have sunk to rest.'

(Mahaparinibbinna-Sutta.)
Thus spoke the blessed one, and when the happy one had thus spoken, once again, the Teacher said:

'How transient are all component things
Growth is their nature and decay.
They are produced, they are dissolved again:
And then is best when they have sunk to rest:
(Maha-Sudassana).

In a Jatak story, given by Rhys Davids in his introduction to Maha-Sudassana-Sutta, these lines are thus explained:

"In these verses the words 'how transient are all component things!' mean, dear, lady Subhada, wheresoever and by whatsoever causes made or come together, compounds,—that is all existing things,—all these compounds are impermanence itself. For of these form is impermanent, reason is impermanent, the (mental) eye is impermanent, the qualities are impermanent. And whatever treasure there be, conscious or unconscious, that is transitory. Understand, therefore, 'how transient are component things!'

And why? 'Growth is their nature and decay.' These all have the inherent quality of coming into (individual) existence, and have also the inherent quality of growing old; or (in other words,) their very nature is to come into existence and to be broken up. Therefore, should it be understood, they are impermanent.

"And since they are impermanent, when 'they are produced, they are dissolved again.' Having come into existence, having reached a state, they are surely dissolved. For all these things come into existence taking an individual form, and are dissolved, being broken up. To them as soon as there is birth, there is what is called a state; as soon as there is a state, there is what is called disintegration.... Thus, are all compounds, having attained to the three characteristic marks (of impermanency, of pain, and of want of any abiding principles), subject in this way and that way, to
dissolution. All these component things, therefore, without exception, are impermanent, momentary, despicable, unstable, disintegrating, trembling, quaking, unlasting, sure to depart, only for a time, and without substance;—as temporary as a phantom, as the mirage or as foam.

"How then in these, dear lady Subhada, is there any sign of ease? Understand rather that 'then is best, when they have sunk to rest,' but their sinking to rest, their cessation comes from the cessation of the whole round (of life), and is the same as Nirvana. That, and this are one. And hence there is no such thing as ease."

These extracts suggest some questions of grave importance, to which we shall revert after presenting a quotation from the Dhammapada as translated by Beal. The very first chapter of this sacred book of the Buddhist is entitled "Impermanence," and presents some incidents, or rather fables, in support of the doctrine. The chapter begins thus:

"Whatever exists, is without endurance. And hence the terms 'flourishing' and 'decaying.' A man is born, and then he dies. Oh the happiness of escaping this condition! for the life of man is but as the earthen vessels made in a potter's mill; formed with such care, they are all destined to destruction.

"As the waters of a river hasten on, and flow away, and once gone, never return, such is the life of man. That which is gone knows not any return."

Let us now state the questions suggested categorically, and endeavour, by a careful analysis of these citations, to answer them.

The very first question suggested is, does Buddha present what is called the atomic view of creation? All the objects of Nature are represented throughout the entire compass of
Buddhist literature as component things, compounds or aggregates; and the representation cannot but suggest the question, of what are they composed? Or what are their constituent elements? It is not enough to say that the visible and tangible objects of Nature are composed of the substances regarded as elemental in ancient times, viz., the earth, water, air, fire and ether. The descriptions embodied in the above extracts, and many others which may be presented, would be meaningless, if each of these were not held up as a component thing or compound. The ultimate powers of nature are therefore not these aggregates, but the constitutive and constituent elements of these so-called elements. What are these ultimates, these subtle powers, which assume such varieties of forms, pass through so many transformations, and present indications of such plastic energy and ceaseless activity? Are they atoms of the same configuration, equal size and equal measure of inherent potentiality? Or, are they of various shapes and powers like the different kinds of atoms described in Hindu literature as aqueous, igneous, terrene, or aerial? Again, how do they move—horizontally or perpendicularly? And, lastly, how do they combine, integrate, and disintegrate—by an external pressure communicated to them or by an erratic move on the part of some of them? These questions cannot be settled except by an unwarrantable move on the part of the investigator from what is written to what is not written, or a jump from the sure platform of documentary evidence into the uncertainty and wildness of unrestrained conjecture. But it is plain that an interminable mass of atomic subsistences, monads or nebulae or star-dust or fiery mist, must be presupposed to make the descriptions given of component things coherent, consistent or rational.
The second question refers to the comprehensiveness of what is, in one of these quotations, called "the round of life." What does this round embrace? Does it only comprehend the vast chain of living organisms on the surface of the globe, perceptible or inferrable, beginning with the lowest, and ascending in a scale beautifully graduated up to man, the apex of creation in this nether world? Or, does it extend beyond its confines and embrace the varied objects of what is called inanimate creation? It certainly includes matter, both organized and unorganized, things animate and inanimate. "Things" and "beings" are used interchangeably in these and other passages, and no such difference as is involved in the possession or non-possession of what is understood by life, is indicated. All things, those which are said to be with, as well as those which are said to be without life, are described as having sprung into formal existence, as flourishing on its vast theatre and vanishing into non-existence precisely in the same manner, that is, by a process of integration and disintegration. And, what is still more to the point, they all, without exception, present "the three marks" of impermanence, pain, and want of any abiding principle. According to the Buddhist scheme of thought every object in nature is instinct with life, and there is no such form of existence as a lifeless thing. And, therefore, in Buddhist countries, like China, the lifeless objects of Nature are represented and looked upon as having "spirits" concealed in them, "spirits" with which communication may be maintained in specified conditions, and from which adequate help may be sought and obtained. Every mountain or hill, river or rivulet, tree or plant, fruit or flower,—nay, every particle of matter, visible or invisible, has within it, discoverable by the spirit within us, though not seen by the bodily
eye, a genius conscious of power, and ready under special circumstances to extend its help to human beings in trouble. Where is the theory of the unity and continuity of life worked out more thoroughly than within the circumference of Buddhistic belief and practice?

An all-diffusive, all-comprehensive mass of matter, each particle of which is instinct with life, being the ultima thule of Buddhist metaphysics, what definition of matter must be posited or presupposed to give shape and consistency to the scheme? Obviously the ordinary definition, that which represents matter as inert or dead, would be inadmissible, as inconsistent with its whole texture of thought and speculation; and recourse must be had to the definition now made fashionable by a certain class of scientists, viz., that by which "the lump-theory" is hissed off the stage, and matter is represented as a sort of mystic energy, which appears in varieties of forms more or less evanescent. That this definition of matter was consciously adopted and categorically stated by Buddha, is not affirmed. His scheme represented materialism of the grosser sort; but some approach towards the refined view of matter insisted on by men like Professor Tyndall, was certainly made by him; and his followers have had the wisdom or unwisdom to push it to its legitimate consequences, by looking upon every particle of matter as a conscious ego, and ushering in the beliefs and devotions incident to the lowest types of fetishism.

Again, the question arises, what is meant by "the cessation of the whole round of life?"—cessation of form or cessation of substance? decomposition or disintegration into the original mass of chaotic matter, or such annihilation of matter as leaves no residuum behind, but an infinite void. This question will come up for discussion under a separate
heading, and need not detain us here: suffice it to say, that extracts presented plainly indicate a cessation of formal, rather than of substantial existence. A broad line of demarcation is drawn between compounds or component things and simple substance; and disintegration, dissolution, or cessation, is distinctly predicated of the aggregates, not of the underlying, shapeless, crude material, whatever that may be.

But it should be noted here that "the round of life," which ends in cessation of form, rather than of substance, extends far and wide beyond the horizon of this world. It includes, not merely all things animate and inanimate, all matter organized or unorganized in this world, but the interminable chain of substances running through the ascending scale of heavens and the descending scale of hells posited in Buddhist literature. There are, according to Buddhistic belief, five hells, occupied by different orders of evil spirits, and no less than twenty-two heavens,—the six regions of Nats reserved for those who have not yet had all vestige of concupiscence swept away from their hearts, and sixteen superior heavens rising one above another in a perpendicular line, the first twelve for the entertainment of embodied saints who have made progress through the inferior degrees of meditation, and the last four for that of disembodied spirits, who have gone through its superior stages. These disembodied spirits, though cut off from attachment to the earth and its concerns, have forms potentially existing in them, and therefore they cannot be ranked with those who have gone out of formal existence, and been engulfed in Nirvana. Bigandet is right in tracing this eschatology to the influence of Hindu philosophy on Buddhist literature; but there is no ground for maintaining that no portion of it formed
part and parcel of original Buddhism. Now the innumerable orders of beings occupying these abodes of bliss and misery, from Sekra or Brahma, the king of the heavens, down to the five spirits consigned to the lowest hell during the lifetime of the reformer, and others doomed to the same fate ever since, are included in this immense, all-embracing, all-comprehending round of life, which rises like a mighty wave from the surface of unformed matter, sweeps onwards according to unalterable laws, and ultimately dies on its bosom, leaving it in its original, shapeless, confused mass. Here we have the modern theory of evolution and involution, not merely adumbrated, but sketched out in all its fulness!

And now we come to the last of the questions suggested by the extracts presented. Are the varied types of formal existence noticeable in this world and the other regions of bliss and misery posited, mere illusions? If so, in what sense? They are in one of these extracts described as "temporary as a phantom, as the mirage or as foam." They are in almost innumerable passages represented as illusory, phantom-like, deceptive and tantalizing. But the question is, are they represented as unsubstantial in the sense of being nothing more than deceptive phenomena? Or, in Vedantic phraseology, are they represented as the illusory creations of Maya? Dr. Banerjea's assumption of the priority of Buddhism to every system of philosophic thought in India rests on Buddhistic representations of the illusory nature of all forms of existence; and he emphatically expresses the opinion that such representations would be meaningless, unless the Maya theory of the Vedantic schools were regarded as constituting their groundwork. Nay, he goes further and maintains that the Hindu philosophers of Vedantic proclivities borrowed their ideas of Maya, as well
as Mukti, from Buddhism. There is, however, no ground whatever for this belief. Component things are indeed represented in Buddhist records as illusory; but their illusoriness proceeds, not from their unsubstantial, immaterial character, but simply from their momentariness or evanescence. They appear as if they were destined to live for ever, but they are in reality shortlived, temporary, evanescent; and the appearance of permanance they present is therefore justly characterized as illusive. They are said to be contemptible, because they are not durable; and they are held up as things to be deprecated, avoided, shunned, literally fled from, because they inflict, and cannot but inflict pain and sorrow. But surely their non-substantiality is nowhere maintained within the compass of Buddhist literature, excepting the portion which is admittedly of later growth.

It is not denied that the Maya theory may be reasoned out of Buddha's speculations about name and form (nām and rupā); but no proof whatever is adducible in support of the assertion, that the theory in question was elaborated by Buddha in the form in which it has swayed the national mind for ages untold; and consequently the charge of plagiarism, preferred against Hindu philosophy by the learned author of "Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy," has yet to be substantiated.

The speculations embodied in Buddhist philosophy about man, the law, the promulgator of the law, and Nirvana, the end proposed by the law, must be reserved for another section, this having reached its prescribed limit. A detailed study of the philosophical aspects of Buddhism will not be deemed unimportant by those, who look upon that system, not only as the centre of a mighty revolution, but as the fountain of several schemes of philosophic thought, which
have run on alongside of, and ultimately merged in specu-
lations deemed orthodox in the country.

This paper, however, ought not to be concluded before a
reference is made to the extent to which the doctrine of
impermanence is carried in Buddhist records of later growth;
that extent is shewn by a term with which the word im-
permanences is used interchangeably, \textit{viz.}, momentariness.
Forms according to these have fluxional, not permanent
existence, and they change momentarily as “a bank of
cloud,” and consequently if a durable substrate were not
posited, there would be no such thing as substantial unity
under formal variety, and all that would remain would be
a succession of separate existences, each lasting for a mo-
ment, and vanishing into nonentity before its successor.
That an absurd theory like this did spring from Buddhistic
philosophy is a fact; but it is plain that Buddha himself did
not mean, when insisting on his theory of transitoriness or
impermanence, any thing more than what is understood in
these days by the terms co-existences, successions and trans-
mutations of material phenomena. When, however, this
theory is made to embrace spirits, as well as material forms,
and carried to the length of atheistic denial of a Ruling
Spirit, unchangeable in power, wisdom and holiness, who will
stand up and pronounce it correct? So far as the corner-
stone of Buddhistic philosophy is concerned, the belauded
“right views” are \textit{wrong}!
CHAPTER V.

BUDDHA AS A PHILOSOPHER CONTINUED.

The main feature of Buddhistic philosophy is, as has already been indicated, the Doctrine of Impermanence, a doctrine of universal applicability—applicable, as it is, to every type of formal existence, from the king of the highest heavens, Sakra or Brahma, down to the tiniest form of unorganized matter. The doctrine is, therefore, applicable to man, who is not only the summit of creation in this world, but who is a connecting link between the various orders of intelligences, higher and lower, inhabiting the regions of bliss above, and those of misery below it.

The whole texture of the Buddhistic system of speculative thought is obviously bizarre, but no portion of it is more so than its anthropology. A resume of what it says about man might justly be considered, even when presented with studied brevity, and shorn moreover of its most repellent features, both prolix and tedious; but the unreasonableness of the veneration or adulation lavished on the system cannot be set forth without a reference to details, which are sure to be denounced as rubbish of the coarsest kind.

Man, according to this system of philosophy, occupies a prominent place among things represented as "component," and, therefore, doomed to decay and dissolution. Man consists of five Skandhas or material aggregates, viz., (1) Rupa or material properties or attributes; (2) Vadana or Sensations; (3) Sanna or abstract ideas; (4) Sankhara or Tendencies or Potentialities; and (5) Vinnana or Thought or Reason. The original words have been differently translated
by different authors, but we have adopted Rhys Davids' renderings as improvements upon those of his predecessors.

I.—The material properties are twenty-eight in number; and they are thus classified by the above named orientalist:

Four elements;—earth, water, fire, air.
Five organs of sense;—eye, ear, nose, tongue, body.
Five attributes of matter;—form, sound, smell, taste, substance.
Two distinctions of sex;—male, female.
Three essential conditions;—thought, vitality, space.
Two means of communication;—gesture and speech.
Seven qualities of living bodies;—buoyancy, elasticity, power of adaptation, power of aggregation, duration, decay, change.

A few quotations from Hardy's translations as embodied in the portion of his "Manual of Buddhism" entitled—"The Ontology of Buddhism," will make the classification clear, as well as set forth the irresistible tendency of all oriental philosophy to present dreams of the wildest kind as facts of science!

For instance, it is distinctly affirmed that the four elements mentioned are to be found unmixed in the different component parts of the body. Twenty of these parts are formed of the first of these elements, earth, viz., "the hair of the head, the hair of the body, the nails, the teeth, the skin, the flesh, the veins, the bones, the marrow, the kidneys, the heart, the liver, the abdomen, the spleen, the lungs, the intestines, the lower intestines, the stomach, the fæces, and the brain." Of water it is said—"The parts of the body that are formed of this element are twelve in number, viz., bile, phlegm, pus, blood, sweat, fat, tears, serum, saliva, mucus, the oil that lubricates the joints, and urine." Regarding fire we have the scientific statement—"There are four kinds of fire in the body, viz., the fire that prevents it from putrifying, as salt prevents the corruption of flesh; the fire arising from sorrow, that causes the body to waste away as if it were burnt, the fire that produces decay and infirmity; and
the fire in the stomach that consumes the food." Six different kinds of wind in the body are alluded to:—" that (which) ascends from the two feet to the head, and causes vomiting, hiccough, &c.;" " that (which) descends from the head to the two feet, and expels the feces and urine;" " the inspired and expired breath;" the wind "in the stomach and abdomen exterior to the intestines;" the wind " within the intestines;" " that (which) pervades the whole body, being conveyed in vessels like the veins, and imparts the power by which the hand or foot, or any other member is moved." The Vedantic philosophy presents a similar variety of airs; while the following sentiments may be evolved from the existing records of the Logical schools:—"The element of earth may be distinguished by its smell; water by its taste; fire by its light; and wind by its sound. Thus one element is perceived by the nose, another by the tongue, another by the eye, and the fourth by the ear."

The second class in the enumeration, the five organs of senses have really nothing good in them, and are sources of nothing but mischief. They have the following certificate given them:—"As the naga (Serpent) alligator, bird, dog, or jackal goes to the ant’s nest, the water, the sky, the village, or the country, in search of food; so the five senses go out after the various objects that are suited to their particular nature. The eye is like a serpent in an ant-hill; the ear is like an alligator lurking in a hole or cave filled with water; the nose like a bird flying through the air to catch flies; the tongue, ready for all flavors that are presented to it, is like a dog watching for offal at the door of the kitchen or some other part of the village; and the body, gratified by that with which it comes in contact,
is like a jackal feeding with delight on a putrid carcass." That the senses, when properly regulated and controlled, might prove sources of pure and elevating delight was ignored, not only by the ancient philosophers of our country, but by ancient philosophy in general.

The third set, called attributes of matter are material evolutes, subtle forms, somewhat, if not precisely, like the tenuous powers of sense in Sankhya philosophy. The word "form" is used for "the power of sight," or simply sight, as it is called in the records of that philosophy; and the word substance, as meaning "the powers of contact" or touch. The fourth set consist of manhood and womanhood; two distinctive material powers rather than abstractions.

In the fifth set, the word "thought" stands for the heart which is believed to be the seat of thought; the word "vitality" for what is called the vital force; and the word "space" for the "nine apertures, vacuties or spaces of the body;—the orifices of the ears, the nostrils, the mouth, the throat, the orifices whence proceed the feces and the urine, the stomach and the intestines."

"Gesture" in the sixth class means the power of making our thoughts known by signs, and "speech" the power of speech—both material evolutes.

And the last class consist of subtle material powers and these are intelligible enough to render comment superfluous.

II.—The second class of aggregates are thus specified by Rhys Davids:—"The sensations (vedana) are divided into six classes, according as they are received immediately by each of the five senses, or sixthly by the mind (through memory); and further into eighteen classes, as each of these six classes may be agreeable, disagreeable, or indifferent." It ought
to be noted here that the sensations are regarded more as material evolutes issuing from the senses, when these come in contact with their appropriate objects, than as states of the mind occasioned either by these objects themselves, or by the nerve vibrations caused by them in the various organs of sense.

III.—The same authority thus characterizes the third aggregate or abstract ideas:—These (sanna) "are divided into six classes corresponding to the six classes of sensations; for instance the ideas blue, a tree, are classed under sight, the idea sweetness under taste, and so on." They are also material evolutes, subtler than sensation.

IV.—The fourth aggregate, Sankhara or potentialities, consists of no less than fifty-two different classes or sub-divisions. It is not necessary to enumerate them all; but it is desirable to refer to some features of this aggregate as fitted to set forth the want of precision and cohesiveness by which all classifications in oriental philosophy are characterized. Several of the sub-divisions in the foregoing aggregates are repeated here; but nothing is distinctly said to indicate such diversity of meaning as may justify the repetition. Again, moral principles and material properties are jumbled together without any discrimination whatever; and the procedure in such unwarrantable admixture can be justified only, when the Buddhistic non-recognition of any distinction between matter and mind is taken into consideration. And lastly the vocabulary pressed into service is as decidedly devoid of precision and accuracy as the classification itself, words or terms being used as significative of tempers of the mind which indicate nothing more than its particular acts, such as "investigation" for the power of investigation, and "effort" for the power to put forth efforts.
BUDDHA AS A PHILOSOPHER.

This enumeration, as well as the whole set of which it is a unit or link, makes it plain that the Buddhistic philosophy is undiluted empiricism, inasmuch as it involves the negation of innate ideas, and traces all our thoughts, feelings and volitions to external objects, or rather to a conjunction of external objects with internal powers. The first eight items of this enumeration prove this to a demonstration. As given by Rhys Davids in his small volume entitled "Buddhism" they are—

1. Contact (Phassa).
2. The Resulting Sensation (Vedana).
3. Abstract Ideas formed on sensation (Sanna).
4. Thought (the regrouping of ideas) (Chetana).
5. Reflection turning these groups over and over (Munasikara).
6. Memory (Sati).
7. Vitality (Jivitindriga).
8. Individuality (Ekaggata).

Here it is to be noticed that all those processes, which are generally represented as mental, and two principles, which are looked upon as simple and undiscoverable and abiding in what is called their onflow, are the results of impressions made by external objects. The series begins with contact, which means the conjunction of an organ of sense with one of its appropriate objects. The sensation necessarily follows as soon as the conjunction is realized; and it gives birth to an abstract idea or a series of abstract ideas, evolved by a mental process necessitated by it. Then come, by a similar process, proper classifications of these ideal units; and then comes the operation of their being revolved in, and impressed upon the mind; and ultimately memory appears to revive them when needed, or when influenced by the law of contiguity or association.

Thus far the series proceeds rationally. But the puzzling question rises, how is vitality, vital force, or the principle of life, to be regarded as the product of these mental operations?
And how individuality, the abiding substrate of these operations? To settle these questions let us fall back upon what is said about these two principles in Hardy's translations already laid under contribution:—"Jivitindriya (vitality), that which is the principle of life, sustaining the co-existent, incorporeal faculties, as water sustains the lotus. Ekaggata (individuality), that which is the centre of the phassa and other faculties of discrimination, uniting them together, and causing them to be one, as when a King surrounded by a numerous army, goes to war, he alone is the centre and guide of the whole host." From these statements it would appear that the terms "vitality" and "individuality" were employed to indicate substances or forces, rather than ideas. The context, however, proves that ideas are represented, rather than the subtle force we understand by vitality, and the essence which is the ground-work of individuality, and that these being after all material evolutes, may be described as tenuous substances.

Our idea of life in the first place, or our settled belief in our existence, proceeds from the mental operations detailed, the operations which begin with contact and terminate in memory. Do we not see here the celebrated enthymeme of Descartes, *cogito ergo sum* anticipated, and the truth maintained, that our consciousness of thought in the most comprehensive sense of the term,—as inclusive of all varieties of mental states, thinking, feeling and willing—necessarily leads to a belief in our existence. And our notion of individuality springs from such belief, as we cannot but differentiate ourselves as thinking beings from others into whose thinking we obtain an insight through external signs and gestures, as well as spoken words, in which unseen ideas are incarnated; and from those in whom or which we can
recognize nothing like a process of thought. These two ideas then are the basis of egoism, or the notion "I." This notion, however, is inaccurate, except in a vulgar sense, according to Buddha's philosophy; and, therefore, this duad of ideas, though implanted in the mind naturally by its own processes, is an illusion to be cast off. The illusion itself, as a material evolute, may be a thin particle of matter, and justly represented as substantial in its constitution, though unsubstantial as regards the beliefs and promises it engenders and holds out.

That we should have in this aggregate such mental affections as "steadfastness," "joy," "indifference," "stupidity" and "intelligence," "covetousness and content," "fear and rashness," "shame and shamelessness," "hatred and affection," might be expected; but who would expect to find among the potentialities of the mind such things as "repose of body and mind," "elasticity of body and mind," "dexterity of body and mind," "straightness of body and mind"? The Indian devotee sees nothing but congruity in this heterogenous mixture, because, in his opinion, body and soul not merely interpenetrate and interact on each other, but constitute one essence, or are one and the same thing. And he naturally endeavours to ensure by corporeal exercises, or mere external appliances, elasticity, pliancy or softness to his body, believing that the corresponding changes in his mind must necessarily follow!

V. The fifth or last aggregate is called "thought" or "reason" by Rhys Davids, but "consciousness" by Spence Hardy. In this group we find multifarious mental states associated with merit or demerit, and such rarities as eye-consciousness, "in the eye about the size of a louse's head;" ear-consciousness, "in shape like a thin copper ring, or
like a lock of copper colored curled hair, or a finger covered with rings;" *tongue-consciousness* "in the tongue, like the petal of a water lily in appearance;" and *body-consciousness*, the appearance and size of which are not indicated. The varied elements of this group are no less than eighty-nine in number.

With reference to these aggregates which jointly constitute all that is in man, his tripartite or—to adopt a theological term—trichotomous nature, or body, soul, and spirit, it should never be forgotten that they are, with all their constituent elements, both impermanent and fluxional. Their evanescence is set forth in the following string of figures translated by Hardy:—"The Rupaskandhas are like a mass of foam that gradually forms and vanishes. The Vedanaskandhas are like a bubble dancing upon the surface of the water. The Sanna-skhandhas are like the uncertain mirage that appears in the sunshine. The Sankhara-skandhas are like the plantain tree without firmness and solidity. And the Vinnana-skandhas are like a spectre or magical illusion. In this manner is declared the impermanence of the five skandhas."

Here it is desirable to raise and dispose of a question: Does the Buddhistic scheme of thought point to an abiding principle by which these aggregates, with all their component elements, are unified or gathered into a personal unity? Is a unitary subject of physical vitality, intellectual energy, and moral earnestness assumed as the permanent substrate of these groups, or in plainer terms, did Buddha uphold our instinctive belief in the existence of the human soul? Our answer, and that of all who have studied the system carefully cannot but be—No.

Buddhism in the first place deprecates all speculation on
the subject as irrelevant to the duties of life, and, therefore, useless and pernicious. In the Sabhasava-sutta,—one of the original documents translated by Rhys Davids and presented in Vol. XI. of "Sacred Books of the East"—a broad line of demarcation is drawn between "the things which ought not to be considered" and "those things which should be considered," and all questions about the existence of "a self" are classed with the former. The following passage may be brought forward in support of this assertion:

"Unwisely doth he consider thus:—

"Have I existed during the ages that are past or have I not? What was I during the ages that are past? How was I during the ages that are past? Having been what, what did I become during the ages that are past? Shall I exist during the ages of the future or shall I not? What shall I be during the ages of the future? How shall I be during the ages of the future? Having been what, what shall I become during the ages of the future?

Or he debates within himself as to the present. Do I, after all exist, or am I not? How am I? This is a being; whence now did it come, and whither will it go?

In him, thus unwisely considering, there springs up one or other of the (absurd) notions.

As something true and real he gets the notion, "I have a self!"
As something true and real he gets the notion, "I have not a self!"
As something true and real he gets the notion, "By myself, I am conscious of myself!"
As something true and real he gets the notion, "By myself, I am conscious of my non-self."

Or again he gets the notion, "This soul of mine can be perceived, it has experienced the result of good and bad actions committed here and there: now this soul of mine is permanent, lasting, eternal, has the inherent quality of never changing, and will continue for ever and ever!"
"This brethren, is called the walking in delusion, the jungle of delusion, the wilderness of delusion; the puppet-show of delusion, the writhing of delusion, the fetter of delusion.

"Bound, brethren, with this fetter of delusion, the ignorant, unconverted man becomes not freed from birth, decay and death, from sorrows, lamentations, pains and griefs, and from expedients (sacrifices, &c.,)—he does not become free, I say, from pain."

This passage gives the lie to the assertion that Buddha was the first person to set the example of philosophical meditation in India, inasmuch as the great problems of existence, which he simply deprecated, were in his age earnestly discussed by many lofty intellects. It also proves that he earnestly dissuaded his followers from getting entangled in the controversies afloat by representing these as not merely useless but fitted to neutralize the great object of life—delivery from pain.

Did Buddha, then relegate the important question of the existence of the soul to the region of the unknowable? No: He positively asserted the non-existence of the soul, and represented belief in its existence as a delusion from which deliverance ought to be secured. In the document quoted above, we have the wise devotee depicted in these words:—"He considers, "This is suffering." He considers, "this is the origin of suffering." He considers, "this is the cessation of suffering." He considers, "This the way which leads to the cessation of suffering." And from him thus considering, the three fetters fall away—the delusion of self, hesitation, and dependence on rites and ceremonies."

In the concluding Appendix of Hardy's "Legends and Theories of the Buddhists," the author presents some extracts
from the writings of the Rev. D. J. Gogerly, whose phraseology he admittedly adopts in his dissertation on Buddhistic philosophy. Regarding this well-known author, Hardy says—"The rare powers of mind possessed by my gifted predecessor and lamented friend, were never seen to greater advantage than when seeking to unravel the intricate web of Buddhist metaphysics. His discoveries took the priests by surprise; but there are none of authority who now dispute his conclusions." One or two quotations from the writings of an author so deservedly praised will show the emphasis and authority with which Buddha denied the existence of the soul. Says he:

"But Buddha denies the existence of a soul, or any thing concerning which a man may say, this is (1) myself; and (2) states that what by accommodation may be called the man is ever fluctuating, never at two given periods the same, although not properly different. Of this peculiar doctrine of identity I will endeavour to give a brief explanation. The following is a close translation of part of a discourse in the Sanyutto division (of Sutta Pitaka). "The soul, Priests, is variously considered by some recluses and Brahmins; but they all regard it as united to the five Skandhas, or with one of the five. What are the five? The sensual and unlearned man considers—(1) body to be the soul, or (2) that the soul possesses corporiety, or (3) that body emanates from the soul, or (4) that the soul resides in the body. Or they regard (5) sensation to be the soul, or (6) that the soul possesses sensation, or (7) that sensation emanates from the soul, or (8) that the soul besides in the sensations. Or they regard (9) perception to be the soul, &c. Or they regard (13) thought to be the soul, &c. Or they regard (17) consciousness to be the soul, &c., (making twenty opinions). In consequence of these
considerations they come to the conclusion, 'I am' (asmi). Now, priests, I am is the state of having the soul. The five organs (indriyan), namely, the organ of the eye, or the ear, of the nose, of the tongue and of the body are conceived (in the womb or otherwise). There is consciousness (mano); there is dhamma (the three skandhas of sensation, perception and thought); there is the base of wisdom (wijja dhatu). The unlearned and sensual man being affected by the sensations resulting from ignorance, thinks 'I am,' 'this is I.' But concerning these the learned disciple of Buddha being separated from ignorance, and obtaining wisdom, does not think 'I am,' or 'this is I.'

The same author quotes an approved formula in the original, and translates it (verbatim) thus:—"Body, priests, is impermanent; is anything impermanent, that is sorrow (substantially and naturally so); is any thing sorrow, that is not the soul (not atta, the self); is anything not the self, (i. e., rupa bedana, &c., &c.) that is not mine, I am not it, it is not my soul."

The learned author concludes his argument with these words:—"In a discourse addressed to a person named Sona, he (Buddha), is if possible, more definite; he says, If there be any organized form, sensation, perception, thought, or consciousness, past, future or present, internal, or external, remote or proximate, of all it should be clearly or distinctly known:—This is not mine, I am not it, it is not to me a soul. The learned disciple of Buddha understanding this is weaned from attachment to body, sensation, perception thought and consciousness"—The Ceylon Friend, Vol. II, No. 5.

Again dialogues are presented in Buddhist philosophical treatises eminently fitted to set fourth the Buddhist negation of soul or self. The conversations between Milinda alias
Menander, the Greek king of Sagala in the Punjab, and Nāgasena, a Buddhist priest, begin with what has been cited by every writer on Buddhism as a demonstration of Buddha's assumption of the non-existence of the soul. The king mentions successively the varied component parts of the priest's body, and enquires if each of these is Nāgasena. The reply being in the negative, the king exclaims—"Then I do not see Nāgasena. Nāgasena is a mere sound without any meaning. You have spoken an untruth. There is no Nāgasena." The priest philosopher retorts by enumerating the varied component parts of the chariot in which the king acknowledges to have come, and enquiring if each of these is the chariot. The King's answer of course is negative, and the priest exclaims:—"Then I see no chariot; it is only a sound, a name." The King admits his error, and the conclusion to which he is brought by the philosophic interlocutor, is pithily expressed in these words:—"As the various parts, the different adjuncts of a vehicle, form, when united, that which is called a chariot; so, when the five skandhas are united in one aggregate or body, they constitute that which is called a being, or living existence."

Hardy presents, as an interlude, a dialogue between Buddha himself and a Tīruttaka philosopher named Sachaka, which the latter begins with these words:—"But you, Sir, deny that there is an atma (soul), that the being possesses a self; you say that the five skandhas are anatma (without a soul,) unreal, without a self." Buddha brings forward in reply an argument based on the alleged powerlessness of the entity called the soul, its admitted inability to change our external form, to prove "that the five skandhas are not the atma, the self and that they exist without an atma."

This portion of the subject ought not to be concluded
without a reference to the evils which, according to Buddhism, the popular belief in the existence of the human soul engenders. It is in short the source of all that variety of sorrow and degradation, under which human beings groan, and from which the way of deliverance is pointed out by this system of faith. From the extracts embodied in the chapter "On the soul" by Beal in his "Buddhism in China," let the following words be quoted:—"This thought of self gives rise to all the sorrows which bind the world as with cords; but having found there is no "I" that can be bound, then all these bonds are removed."

The legitimate deduction from Buddha's negation of the soul would obviously be set forth in the well-known word, death is "the be-all and end-all" of human existence. But such is by no means the case. Buddha was no more able to emancipate himself from the current belief in the doctrine of metempsychosis than the modern speculator is able to free himself from the influence of the modern belief in evolution. The doctrine to which all the great schools of ancient Hindu philosophy, whether atheistic, theistic or pantheistic, whether monistic, dualistic or trialistic, gave prominence, which colored and fashioned every scheme of speculative thought that prevailed in our country in primitive or prehistoric times, dominated the mind of our moral philosopher as thoroughly as belief in the Divinity of our Lord influences and controls the thought and life of the orthodox believer in Christianity. Buddha had to explain the existence of the accumulated load of sorrow which he made it the business of his life to remove; and he had to account for those inequalities of life which the greatest philosophers have been apt to represent as unsolvable problems or inexplicable enigmas. And he most naturally adopted the explanation involved or embodied in the doctrine of transmigration
But he was penetrating enough to perceive, that he could not transfer the doctrine in its existing form without producing a wrench in his own system of thought; and consequently it was made to undergo a process of modification or metamorphosis, and thereby brought into harmony and correlation with the body of philosophic truth he promulgated. Transmigration in his system cannot possibly mean successive migrations of an abiding self from one material organisation to another, the existence of the soul being emphatically denied; it means a series of new creations, rather than a series of translations from body to body. When man dies, the skandhas or aggregates of which he is composed, disintegrate, and are dispersed, and so far as his individuality is concerned, he ceases to be. But the work that he has done, not only during the period of the existence terminated by his death, but during the entire cycle of the existences connected with it, his karma, abides. And this stern, inflexible deity creates another set of skandhas, a new man so to speak, to exhaust its fruits, good or bad, or to receive its reward or punishment. One or two extracts from Hardy's translations will make this manifest—

Again, the king said to Nagasena: "What is it that is conceived?" Nagasena replied, "These two: nama and rupa." Milinda: 'Are the same nama and rupa that are conceived here, or in the present birth, conceived elsewhere, or in another birth?' Nagasena: "No: this nama and rupa acquires karma, whether it be good or bad: and by means of this karma, another nama and rupa is produced." Milinda: "Then, if the same nama and rupa is not again produced, or conceived, that being is delivered from the consequences of sinful action." Nagasena: "How so? if there be no future birth (that is, if Nirvana be attained) there is deliverance;
but if their be a future birth, deliverance from the consequences of sinful action does not necessarily follow. Thus a man steals a number of mangos, and takes them away; but he is seized by the owner, who brings him before the king, and says, ‘sir, this man has stolen my mangos.’ But the robber replies, ‘I have not stolen his mangos; the mango he set in the ground was one; these mangos are other and different to that; I do not deserve to be punished.’

‘Now, your Majesty, would this plea be valid: would no punishment be deserved?’ Milinda: ‘he would certainly deserve punishment.” Nagasena: ‘Why?’ Milinda: ‘Because, whatever he may say, the mangos he stole were the products of the mango originally set by the man from whom they were stolen, and therefore punishment ought to be inflicted.’ Nagasena: ‘In like manner, by means of the karma produced by this nama and rupa, another nama and rupa is caused; there is therefore no deliverance (in this way) from the consequences of sinful action.”

The second extract explains the terms nama and rupa:—

“The King said to Nagasena, ‘you have spoken of nama and rupa; what is the meaning of these terms?’ The priest replied, ‘that which has magnitude is rupa; nama is the exceedingly subtle faculty that exercises thought.’

Milinda, How is it that nama and rupa are never produced separately?’ Nagasena: ‘They are connected with each other like the flower and perfume. And in this way: if no germ be formed in the fowl no egg is produced; in the ovarium of the fowl there is the germ and the shell, and these two are united to each other; their production is contemporaneous. In like manner, if there be no nama, there is no rupa; they are consociate; their existence is coeval; they accompany each other (as o the species but not as to the individual) during infinitude.”
No philosophical definition of karma is given anywhere in Buddhist literature, though modern writers of a particular class have attempted what their ancient prototypes considered it superfluous to do. But all modern attempts to define it as inclusive of something more or less than the retributive influence or force emanating from the accumulated work done in all the series of lives united by it, in the case of a series of individuals created by it, are signal failures. Karma is after all a metaphysical entity; and it is worthy of consideration that even materialism of the grossest type cannot do without subsistences, or forces which ought to be relegated to the region of that science which the champions of Comptism would gladly see tabooed or proscribed. Karma discloses or unfolds what may be called its nature in passages like the following:

"There has been laid up by Kunda the smith, a karma redounding to length of life, redounding to good birth, redounding to good fortune, redounding to good fame, redounding to the inheritance of heaven, and of sovereign power" (Mahaparinibana.)

"If a Bhikkhu should desire, brethren, to see with pure and heavenly vision surpassing that of men beings as they pass from one stage of existence and take form in others; beings base or noble, good-looking or ill-famed, happy or miserable, according to the karma they inherit—(if he should desire to be able to say)—"These beings, reverend sirs, by their bad conduct in action, by their bad conduct in word, by their bad conduct in thought, by their evil-speaking of the noble ones, by their adhesion to false doctrines or by their acquiring the karma of false doctrine, have been re-born on the dissolution of the body after death, in some unhappy state of suffering or woe. These beings, reverend sirs, by their good conduct
in action, by their good conduct in word, by their good conduct in thought, by their not speaking evil of the noble ones, by their adhesion to right doctrine, by their acquiring the karma of right doctrine, have been re-born on the dissolution of the body after death, into some happy state and heaven;"—**

But karma in the case of an individual, if not in the case of the species, is by no means a permanent entity. It is exhausted when its fruits are exhausted; and the series of creations it commences and carries on, is consummated and brought to an end. The creator dies, creation ceases, and existence is terminated in non-existence or annihilation! This is *Nirvana*. Regarding the meaning of this term a controversy more or less animated has been waged among oriental scholars, as well as among laymen. Some have represented it as meaning nothing less than complete cessation of being, with extinction of sentient life, absolute non-existence, perfect annihilation; while others have held it up as significative of a state of meditative repose, perfect serenity of thought and feeling, imperturbable stillness in the contemplation of realities loftier than this world can present, and even uninterrupted communion with God and divine things, while it is worthy of remark that texts and passages can be quoted by the score in support of either of these two interpretations. It is not necessary to prove this by chapter and verse, or to select and present texts first in support of the annihilistic interpretation, and then of that which represents the state of Nirvana as simply a state of quiescence or serene repose compassed or brought on by the complete abstraction of the mind from the things of this world, and its concentration on "things above." It is not at all difficult to prove that both the parties are at one and the same time both right and wrong.
They are right in the selection and presentation of the passages behind which either of the debating parties is entrenched, and they are right in holding either party their own construction. But they are wrong in not noticing a distinction prominently brought forward in Buddhist speculations and statements on the subject. There are two conditions or states indicated by the term Nirvana, a preparatory state and a final state; and passages are somewhat promiscuously heaped together in praise of either of these two conditions. There is a Nirvana attainable in this life, called by Hindu philosophers jivan-mukti, and this is certainly a state of imperturbable repose, unruffled serenity, complete stillness of thought and feeling, perfect quietism. But this state is not the sumnum bonum Buddhist devotees are in quest of, though its necessary precondition, the sumnum bonum is the Nirvana which means the complete extinction of sentient life, the putting out, as the etymology of the word indicates, of the lamp of consciousness, and physical and moral being, annihilation.

We find this opinion, formed after a careful study of Hindu philosophy in which both these states play so important a part, and after a careful collation of the numerous texts affecting both sides of the question, confirmed in a passage quoted from Abhidammathaka Sangaha by Spence Hardy in his treatise entitled—"The Legends and Theories of the Buddhists." It runs thus:—"Nibhana or Nirvana is perceived by means of the knowledge derived from the four paths (leading to itself) which are denominated lokottara, preeminently excellent. To the four paths it is attached. It is called Nirvana, because it is free from vana, attachment or desire. This is one view of it. It is divided into two sections, sawupadisesa and anupadisesa. It is also sun-yata, void; animitta, unreal; and apani-hita, unexpectant,
passionless. Upadisesa signifies the five skandhas, and it is so called because only the five skandhas are left, without any attachments or desire. It is said to be sawupadisesa, as having the five skandhas. It may be said of the Rahat, that he has attained the Nirvana, though he still lives. He, who is anupadisesa has not the five skandhas. This is the state of the Buddhas, and of all who are free from the five skandhas. The great rishis, who are free from vana, desire, call that Nirvana, which is achutan, that from which there is no going, (no transmigration); achchantana, that which has no boundary (neither birth nor death); asankhtana, that which is not affected by cause or effect; anuttara, that to which there is nothing superior; and padan, that which has nothing to excel it as an advantage."

Writers like Hardy and Bigandate are right when they affirm that Buddha’s system of thought leads us by miserable logic to the conclusion that Nirvana is annihilation. According to Buddhistic philosophy, existence and pain are inseparable, just as according to varied ancient schemes of thought and speculation, in and out of the country, matter and sin are inseparable. The great object of Buddhism as a creed, or the sumnum bonum to which it calls upon its followers to aspire is complete deliverance from pain. But such deliverance cannot, according to the hypothesis on which the entire system is based, be attained so long as existence maintains its ground. Non-existence, therefore, must be the highest aim of all the privation, sacrifices and toils through which the Buddhist devotee is called upon to pass. Again, according to Buddhism, Karma is, properly speaking, the creator of man. Karma, as defined in Buddhistic literature, cannot be eternal. As an influence, or law, or power emanating from human actions, it must have had a
beginning, and the question how the first man, whose actions called this demon into existence, came into being, is perhaps designedly kept unsettled in Buddhistic literature. The question of the origin of the human species is properly speaking set aside, but the present existence of every man is unequivocally traced to his Karma which, when he dies and his component aggregates are dispersed, brings a new set into existence or creates a new man to exhaust its fruits. These however, are terminable, and, when after a long series of transmigrations, they are exhausted, the omnific principle dies and fresh creation comes to an end. The individual, therefore, sinks into non-existence or annihilation.

This argument may be put in another form. Buddha denies most emphatically the existence of a permanent self or soul. Man, according to his accredited teaching, is nothing more than a conglomerate of material aggregates which are disintegrated and dispersed when he dies. But as long as his Karma lives, new sets of aggregates are grouped, and in a loose sense, he is revived. But Karma is neither beginning-less nor endless, and so in process of time the monster dies. The last set of aggregates which have the satisfaction of killing Karma by dint of virtue and meditation are also decomposed and dispersed; and when this consummation is realised nothing remains. Annihilation is the goal towards which the system necessarily leads, if not drives man.

There is an a priori objection to this view of the sumnum bonum of Buddhism, which ought to be stated and rebutted. It is nowhere presented with greater ability and, we must add, flippancy than in a passage in Blackie's "Natural History of Atheism." The passage runs thus:—"We have given these passages at length that the reader may perceive how far from true their assertion is who tell us that the
Buddhist finds his highest bliss in the prospect of annihilation. People ought to have thought ten times before they allowed themselves to father on the founder of a great popular religion any such absurdity. Had Buddha really, like the ancient Hebrews, meant to ignore a future life in the enunciation of his law, he would simply have said nothing about it; but he never would have come forward, inducing men to become his disciples by proclaiming—

"O sin-laden creatures, and miserable mortals, attend carefully. I, Buddha, am now revealed, ready to open the gates of annihilation to all flesh."

The objection is based on the admitted impossibility of rendering a religion with so chilling and paralyzing a doctrine popular; but the parties, by whom it is triumphantly brought forward as subversive of the annihilistic view of Nirvana, overlook a point of the greatest importance. Buddhism, like Hinduism, has, as has already been shown, a popular and a philosophical side; and its great doctrine of annihilation appears half concealed or scarcely visible behind an elongated series of heavens and hells eminently fitted to work upon the hopes and fears of the popular mind. The sumnum bonum of Buddhism, as also of Hinduism, is studiously kept in the background, while the uninitiated multitudes or masses are attracted towards it by all that is eminently fitted to appeal to their moral sense, gratify their prurient fancy, and call into vigorous play their undiscerning religious susceptibilities. The doctrine is unfolded only in the presence of the initiated few; and the history of the world proves, that the naked absurdity of a theory is no bar to its acceptance by men, who allow themselves to be carried with their hands and feet bound by the spirit of wild speculation. If a number of speculators and lazy mendicants could be persuaded that they could not
possibly get rid of pain without in the first place getting rid of existence, they would gladly hail annihilation as the highest good, the greatest of blessings!

The question how a system of religion, which poured contempt on some of the irrepressible moral instincts of humanity—denying the truth of all truth, the existence of a God—became popular, and extended far and wide, cannot be set at rest except by a reference to its dual nature, its accommodation to popular fancies and traditions on the one hand, and its inculcation of a peculiarly intricate philosophy on the other. Nay, it might be, like Hinduism, appropriately represented as many-sided system, fitted to attract the imaginative by its romantic literature, the devout by its imposing ritual, the ascetic by its systematized monasticism, and the inquistive by its recondite philosophy.

But here the question must he raised—Was Buddha atheistic or simply agonistic in his principles? Rhys Davids calls him "the great agnostic of Asia," and the majority by far of the writers who have dabbled with Buddhist literature have represented him, with emphasis, as one of the earliest champions, if not father, of agnostic philosophy. We have in these papers used the terms agnosticism and atheism as interchangeable, and have not scrupled to represent our hero now as an agnostic and then as an atheist. But our decided conviction is, that his attitude was that of rank atheism. He doubtless did at times occupy the modest standpoint of an agnostic philosopher by deprecating all enquiry or investigation about the soul and about God; but when he claimed omniscience, he advanced a great many steps beyond that position. There was nothing of which he could properly be representend as ignorant, and his assumed agnosis became omnignosis. Foster's argument against atheism, as contradistinguished
from agnosticism, is too well known to need reproduction. Man cannot, with philosophical fairness, say there is no God. He has not searched every nook and corner of the universe. He has not examined every link in the succession of events which bridge the chasm of past eternity; and his foresight is too limited to admit of his having a perfect knowledge of those which are to be unfolded during the endless ages of the eternity before him. Nor does he know all the orders of being in the universe, all varieties of powers and agencies and forces and laws. His stupendous ignorance can only justify in his case the modest assertion that he does not find traces of God's existence within the narrow range of his limited experience. But such ignorance was removed in the case of Buddha by meditation, and he knew every thing. He had searched every nook and corner of the universe, and found no God anywhere. His eyes had ranged over the amplitudes, so to speak, of the past and the future eternity, and found no traces of a God. He had cultivated a sort of personal acquaintance with all orders of beings and agencies in the universe, and was sure that no one of these was God. He had, therefore, a perfect right to deny, with philosophical fairness, the existence of a God. A man, says Foster, must be a God to be able to deny the existence of a God;—Buddha was a God, and when he said he had not discovered anywhere the traces of a God, the conclusion is irresistible—

THERE IS NO GOD.

Such are the "Right Views" of the universe, of man, his constitution, and his prospects with which the Buddhistic devotee begins his career of reform, and from these, as the lowest step of the ladder of progress, he rises, through the successive steps of right feelings, right words, right behaviour, right mode of livelihood, right exertion, and right memory,
up to the highest—right meditation and tranquility. The dissertations on meditation embodied in Buddhist literature are not materially different from those intertwined with Yoga philosophy; and its earthly fruits are the same according to both these systems of thought, as will appear from the following extract from Akankheyya Sutta:—“If a Bhikkhu should desire, brethren, to exercise one by one each of the different iddhis (powers), being one to become multiform, being multiform to become one; to become visible, or to become invisible; to go without being stopped to the further side of a wall or a fence, or a mountain, as if through the air; to penetrate up and down through solid ground as if through water; to walk on the water without dividing it, as if on solid ground; to travel cross-legged through the sky like the birds on wing; to touch and feel with the hand even the sun and moon, mighty and powerful though they be; and to reach in the body up to even the heaven of Brahma; let him then fulfil all righteousness, let him be devoted to that quietude of heart which springs from within, let him not drive back the ecstasy of contemplation, let him look through things, let him be much alone.”.

It is desirable to indicate, before we conclude, the place the Buddhistic scheme of thought occupies among the philosophical or scientific isms of the day—How is the system to be characterized? Shall we call it nihilism, or materialism, or pantheism, or illusionism? It is a matter of fact that four distinctive schools of philosophy sprang from Buddhism. These are indicated thus in the paper in the Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha entitled "the Baudha System":—“These same Buddhas discuss the highest end of man from four standpoints, celebrated under the designations of Madhyamika, Yogachara, Santrantika, and Vaibhashika. These
Buddhists adopt respectively the doctrines of universal void (nihilism) an external void (subjective idealism), the inferrability of external objects (representationism) and the perceptibility of external objects (presentationism).” Of these four schemes of speculation, that indicated by the term nihilism or universal voidism has been traced by many thoughtful writers, such as the author of the well-known and excellent book entitled “Christ and Other Masters,” directly to Buddha himself. And, in a very important point of the view, they are right. Buddha seems at times to posit an eternal, abiding substance, of which the objects of creation are represented as transient or illusory modes or forms; but at times he speaks as if he believed in nothing but an eternal void as the \textit{ultima thule} of his system. And even when he speaks of the glories of creation as issuing out of, and being again merged into, something abiding as a permanent substrate, the underlying substance is left indeterminate and undefined, insomuch that it is absolutely impossible to discriminate between the entity and nonentity. His system may be justly represented as an off-shoot of the Sankhya school of the atheistic type; but the trinitarian ultimate of that school, its \textit{Prakriti}, consisting of the “cords,” sattva, rajas and tamas held in equipoise, is thrown into the background, if not positively repudiated in his scheme; and no clue can be discovered to what he thought of the ultimates or ultimate of creation. It may, however, be safely assumed that his mind oscillated between nihilism and a species of materialism, and that it ultimately settled down into the latter form of philosophic speculation.

Our task is done. We have in this series of papers proved that Buddha presented a lofty but mutilated character, and that both as a moralist and as a philosopher, he was
egregiously mistaken. The corrollary from this thesis is, that the incense of praise lavished on him and his system in these days is, on the whole, thrown away. The most preposterous conclusion of modern times is that which represents Christianity as an evolution from Buddhism, inasmuch as it is tantamount to the paradox, that optimism is an offshoot of, not a recoil from, or a reaction against pessimism. The different points of contrast between the two systems are nowhere presented so exhaustively within a narrow compass, as in the following words transcribed from Bishop Titcomb's excellent little treatise entitled "Short chapters on Buddhism";—

Buddhism is the religion of despair, Christianity of hope. Buddhism is the religion of self-dependence; Christianity of self-distrust. The more Buddhism is followed conscientiously, the more must it foster pride. The more Christianity is followed conscientiously, the more it must produce humility. Buddhism by its philosophical culture, removes man more and more from humanity; Christianity, the more it is cultivated, makes a man the more akin to humanity, Buddhism flourishes only in Asia; Christianity is flourishing in all quarters of the globe. Buddhism has no power of assimilating itself to the progress of modern cultivation; Christianity has the power of assimilating itself to every condition of society; and of making progress alike with barbarous nations as with the most educated and admired."
CHAPTER VI.

JAINAISM AND ITS FOUNDER.

The inquisitive spirit of the age is happily not confined to researches in the sphere of nature, or to investigations into the laws and forces which, when properly utilized, might multiply the conveniences and adornments of life; but it goes out of the narrow circle of earthly comforts and superfluities, and embraces truths and facts fitted to throw light on the great destiny of the human soul. In no age of the history of the world has religion, in all its phases, been so eagerly seized as a subject of intense study as in this era of materialistic aims and activities. The religions of the world are furnishing topics of investigation and research, as attractive and fascinating in some quarters as the latent powers of steam and electricity are to persons, who avowedly aim at nothing higher than multiplying the facilities of locomotion and intercommunication. Who can describe the ardour with which the literature associated with every form of faith is being exhumed, analyzed, and thoroughly sifted in the days, or the critical acumen brought, along with linguistic attainments of the highest order, to bear on the interpretation of sacred legends and traditions? Not only are religions which are alive, but even those which have had their sway and been gathered to the fathers, nay, the religious beliefs of races which have, like the Aztecs of Mexico, become utterly extinct, regarded with keen interest, and studied with marvellous application and zeal. And the flood of light thrown on several of the numerous types of faith, by which the religious life of the world has been moulded
and fashioned, is scarcely less astonishing than the boasted discoveries and inventions by which our temporal welfare has been enhanced.

It is by no means affirmed or insinuated that the intensity of application, displayed within the confines of the sacred lore of the world, is all of a golden hue or pure type. The greater portion of it by far proceeds from an earthly source, a desire to lower the prestige of religion, a desire to class it with the varieties of educational and political forces at work within the bounds of society, rather than to recognize its unique position as the guiding and controlling agency to which all others are subservient. It is neither possible nor desirable to enumerate or specify the varieties of motives to which the modern enthusiasm of sacred study is to be traced; but some of the more prominent incentives may be indicated. Some are evidently impelled by no motive higher than that of having their pet theory of religious progression from fetishism to monotheism corroborated by the sacred literature of the world, and of demonstrating the uselessness in this era of scientific advancement of the exploded fictions of a theological age, such as God, an immutable law of righteousness, heaven, hell, &c. Others are actuated by a desire to trace that filiation of religious ideas with which the origin and development of the Christian faith may be connected as an effect is with its cause, and thereby to eliminate the supernatural from the sphere of human belief. Others again are prone to discover in the few principles of morality, embedded in every form of faith, a bond of union by which the conflicting religious beliefs of mankind may all be merged into one homogeneous and symmetrical system. And yet others are bent on constructing a religious science, fitted to trace the natural development of religious faith from the
primitive times, when men thought as children and ascribed every striking natural phenomenon to some spirit-force, down to the glorious age when the varieties of gods and goddesses created by infantile fancy and childish fear are giving place to the inexorable laws of nature. It is a relief to turn from this motley crew of theorists and doctrinaires to the many who, while recognizing an essential distinction between a supernatural revelation slowly and gradually matured into a perfect type, and mere man-invented religions, discover, even in the latter, traces of a primitive revelation granted to our first parents and their immediate descendents by God himself.

But how varioussoever may be the motives noticeable behind the veil, the enthusiasm with which the religious beliefs of humanity are now being analyzed and scrutinized, is not without a deep significance. The age of theology has not passed away, and its so-called fictions have not been shelved. Religion is, even in the nineteenth century, a power, in the presence of which the spirit of the world is not quite at ease, a power brought out so prominently in the inner life of society as well as in its noticeable movements, that complete self-stultification is the result of all attempts to ignore it. It is all very good to praise, laud, and extol the triumphs of science, to talk glibly of the laws of nature by which creation is governed, and of the physical vigor and mental peace ensured to us by a life of harmonious co-operation with them. It is all very good to talk of this world as the only sphere with which we have to do, and of the innumerable varieties of convenience and comfort sure to be scattered broad-cast around us by our exclusive devotion to its concerns. But the instinct of humanity pierces through the veil of sophistry arrayed
in favor of such a course by worldly wisdom, and discovers
in the recesses of the human heart longings and yearnings,
which the secularity of the age, with all its trophies, cannot
satisfy, and which irresistibly go out in quest of something
above the region of human science and earthly ambitions.
Theology has a seat, firm and immovable, down in the
depths of the human heart and human society, and the
world instinctively laughs when some champions of self-
sufficiency are led by a palpable aberration of thought and
feeling to evince a disposition to taboo it. In spite of the
balderdash and bagatelle indulged in by not a few giddy
thinkers, religion maintains its sway so far as to lead people
bent on secular pursuits to devote years of patient toil and
earnest thought to studies fitted to disclose the grand secret
of its undisputed ascendency in human counsels and human
affairs.

It is, moreover, a significant fact,—a fact bearing directly
on the task before us—that the spirit of religious investiga-
tion, which is so productive in these days, does not confine
itself to what may be called stars of first magnitude in
the firmament of sacred truth. Not only are the promi-
nent religions of the world, but even those which occupy a
very subordinate place, being brought under that sifting
process by which the wheat in each of them is separated
from the chaff. \( \text{Jainaism occupies a very inferior place} \)
among the religious developments of the world. It is
professed by only a very small fraction of the over-grown
population of the country, and its influence is derived, not
from its numerical strength, not from the scattered vestiges
of its bygone or present triumph, but from the social
status of some classes of its followers. In the last census
report we have the following notice of these as a body:—
The wealth of many of their community gives them a social importance greater than would result from their mere numbers. Of what their actual number may be, it is unfortunately impossible to form any exact estimate, as in the census returns they are confounded with the Buddhists.” But even including the Indian Buddhists, their number is by no means large, relatively or even absolutely; while the wealth and influence represented by their community are attributable to their Jewish propensity to trade, carried on with dogged persistency, and resulting in fortunes often unscrupulously made. Their religious principles are opposed to agriculture, the tilling of the ground implying the taking of life in its most rudimentary forms; but yet, as Quakerism has been compelled to bow to the fashions of the age, the number of those who amongst them take to this prohibited method of earning one’s livelihood is increasing day by day. Let it, moreover be added that as Jainism has never overleaped the borders of the land of its birth, its foreign influence is nil; while the ascendency it has maintained in its own home, so to speak, has, from the very beginning, been of the most limited type.

But Jainism, though admittedly a religion of small proportions and very limited influence, has not been left in the shade by the inquisitive spirit of the age and its archæological research. It has engaged the attention of scholars, and evoked interest beyond the circle of mere antiquarians, almost ever since the beginning of the century; but it must be confessed that the literature available to the English reader is neither extensive nor varied. The pioneer in this line of investigation was Major C. MacKenzie, who ‘collected’ “An Account of the Jainas” ‘from vžiest of this sect,’ at Mudgeri in Southern India, had it
translated by 'Canally Boria, Brahmin,' and had the translation inserted, along with some extracts from his journal, in the ninth volume of the *Asiatic Researches*. The paper is valuable as a sketch of the present beliefs and practices of the Jainas of Southern India, but perfectly useless as a contribution to the results of antiquarian research. It presents a list of the twenty-four deified mortals worshipped by them, and traces the origin of their faith to the first, rather than the last, of these called by it "Vrishabhanath," *alias* Rishabha. It settles the great problem of the age of its inception, by which orientalists are now being puzzled, by the oracular announcement that when this great hero laid its foundation, "there existed five sects, *viz*;—(1) Sankhya, (2) Saugata, (3) Charvaka, (4) Yoga, (5) Mimansa." It dwells upon the manners and customs of its followers, the ceremonies they perform, the ablutions by which they are expected to purify themselves daily, the rigid conformity of their habits of life to Hindu institutions, except in the case of rites observed in honor of the dead, the laxity allowed in their marriage regulations, and the dietetic rules strictly adhered to. The 'principal tenets' of their religion are presented in the following sentence, 'translated from a stanza of their books':—

"The Jainas should abstain from the following things, *viz*., eating at night, slaying any animal; eating the fruits of those trees that give milk, pumpkins, young bamboo plants; tasting honey, flesh; taking the wealth of others; taking by force a married woman; eating flowers, butter, cheese; and worshipping the gods of other religions;—to abandon entirely he above-mentioned is to be a proper Jaina."

The account closes with some observations on the philosophical side of the Jaina faith; and these are both incoherent
and self-contradictory. The only proof admitted is perception, and as God cannot possibly be seen, His existence in heaven, if not His existence in general, is emphatically denied. But at the same time the deified mortals worshipped are represented as incarnations of God, who is described in the following stanza.—

"He has a likeness and no likeness; he may be compared to an image of crystal. He has eight good qualities, and is exempt from eight evil qualities. He is all-wise, all seeing; the father or the origin of all, enjoying eternal bliss; without name, without relation or beginning; infinite; indescribable."

The account adds:—"The eight evil qualities, from which the nature of God is exempt, are ignorance, mental blindness, pain incident to nature, the distinction of names, of tribe, delusion, mortality, dependence." The good qualities are the negations of these, not positive virtues or excellencies. These philosophical ideas were evidently grafted on Jainism when Vedantic notions were preponderant enough to influence the sects in general, Buddhism not excepted.

The same volume of the "Researches" or "Transactions," viz., Vol. IX., contains two papers embodying information 'received' by Doctor F. Buchanan 'from Charucirti Acharya' the "chief pontiff" of the Jainas at 'Belligola in Mysore.' They, together with the extracts from the Doctor's journals inserted, are useless, except as indices to the current beliefs of the Jainas, and as pictures of their present usages and customs. Much of the information elicited by Major Mackenzie is reproduced in these papers, such as the division of the Jainas into four castes; permission of exogamy in the case of males under peculiar circumstances, and its absolute prohibition in the case of females; the supreme homage paid to the beatified spirits, of whom there were twenty-four in
the past age, and there have been twenty-four in the present, and there are to be twenty-four in the coming age; the inferior worship paid to the national gods, of whom Indra or Sakra is considered the chief; the total rejection of the Vedas, with the reverence shown for Yoga philosophy and Yoga austerities; and the main distinction between the householders (srefakas), who live very nearly as the surrounding Hindu castes, and the ascetics (yatis), who are more faithful to the Jaina creed, and carry in their practices some of its essential principles to a ludicrous length. The chronology presented, and some of the legends embodied, which by the way were evidently invented when the Jaina religion was opposed by Ramanuja, the great founder of the Vaishnava sect in Southern India, are the peculiar features of the information elicited by Doctor Buchanan. The animosity of the Jainas to the Buddhists is set forth in the following passage:—

"The Arhats are frequently confounded by the Brahmins who follow the Vedas with the Saugatas, or worshippers of Buddha; but this arises from the pride of ignorance. So far are the Arhats from acknowledging Buddha as their teacher that they do not think he is now even a devata; but allege that he is undergoing various low metamorphoses as a punishment for his errors."

The golden age of the world's history, when men of prodigious dimensions lived for untold ages on ambrosial fruits hanging in rich clusters on celestial trees, without toil and anxiety, is depicted, and the gradual deterioration of man in stature, longevity, and means of subsistence, is traced to the degenerate times when labor became a necessity, and Vrishabhanath became 'incarnate' and taught the use of 'the sword' and 'letters,' besides 'agriculture,' 'commerce,' and 'attendance on cattle.
The paper which follows these in the volume of the *Transactions* referred to is from the pen of the eminent orientalist A. T. Colebrooke, and is like his other writings of a most valuable kind, whether it is regarded from an antiquarian or philosophical point of view, or simply looked upon as a picture of current beliefs and practices. But before we attempt an analysis of this able paper, reproduced in the third volume of the celebrated author's essays, recently published under the editorial guidance of Professor Cowell, a reference seems desirable to Mr. Nesfield's article entitled, "The Jainas of Upper India," in a very recent number of the *Indian Review* (Dec. 1884); especially as the sketch presented therein is by no means materially different from the pictures drawn in the papers already alluded to. The Jainas of upper India imitate their Southern brethren in observing caste rules, performing Hindu ceremonies, going through Hindu purifications, and worshipping the national gods and goddesses, in subordination to the twenty-four Jins or deified mortals, whose pre-eminence being acknowledged, there is nothing to limit the Jaina proclivity to devotional exercises.

Mr. Nesfield not merely dwells on the points of contact between the two systems, but gives prominence to two main points of divergence. The first is a festival peculiar to the Jainas, and based on principles exclusive enough to debar Hindus of all classes from participation therein. This festival is called the Ratha Jatra, and consists in "yoking a large wooden chariot, built two or three storeys high, to a pair of elephants and making them draw it seven times round a large earthen mound, on which idols of the Jins or deified saints have been previously placed for worship." It is observed now and then by a very wealthy devotee, who by feasting,
for about a month, hosts of his co-religionists, fetched from various parts of the country, the most distant not excepted, and conciliating the public by largesses and gifts, raises himself to the position of a Jaina 'Lion' or chief through what may be called a royal 'ladder,' that is, a ladder other than that of austerity and meditation. Even this ceremony though guarded by so thick a wall of exclusiveness, is fitted to show the preponderance of Hindu ideas within the circumference of Jaina beliefs and practices; inasmuch as the notion of paving the way to ecclesiastical honor, as well as to Nirvana, by means of costly feasts and munificent donations and presents, is more characteristically Hindu than Jaina. The other point of difference is the immolation, where practicable, of a Brahmin boy as an essential element of the ceremony performed when a new Jaina temple has to be dedicated and formally opened for service. Mr. Nesfield looks upon this custom as fitted to give prominence to "the old antipathy between the Jaina and the Brahmin priests"; but it may be simply a homage to current Brahminic superstitions, among which that of ensuring the prosperity of a new temple by mingling the blood of a Brahmin victim of fair exterior and tender years with its consecration ceremonies occupies no mean place, and the more so, as the doctrine of sacrifice in all its forms is abhorrent to Jaina consciousness and sensibility. "The cardinal maxim," in Mr. Nesfield's own words, of the Jaina code of morals, is summed up in a single sutra or aphorism, "Ahinsa parama dharma—regard for life is the highest virtue."

Here it is desirable to take notice of a mistake into which Mr. Nesfield falls when he represents Jainism as "drifting back into the older creed of Brahminism from which it at first receded with so much acrimony." The truth is that,
like Buddhism, Jainism allowed great latitude of belief and practice among its lay disciples from the very beginning, contenting itself with the embodiment of its creed in all its entirety in a fraternity of monks separated from mere professors by broad lines of distinction, both in the articles of faith and in the rules of external observance. The srevakas or householders, who professed the Jaina creed, were only called upon to add to their distinctive Hindu beliefs and observances, a firm faith in the pre-eminent sanctity of the deified heroes, and the practice of worshipping their images, not to renounce, in the proper sense of the term, one religion and embrace another essentially different from it; while the yatis, or the mendicant class, had to conform to the rigid rules of the Jaina faith by a complete sequestration from the ties and pleasures of domestic life and thorough abandonment to ascetic penance and contemplation. Jainism was, in the case of the mass of its followers, simply a new feature added to the popular faith, and it has ever since its inception been simply vibrating between the superstitions of the country and the rigid monastic faith and discipline of the elect or the initiated champions of its unsocial creed. It is, therefore, not more thoroughly in alliance with Hinduism now than it was in days gone by; though rules devised to meet exigencies, such as that prohibiting the worship of "the gods of other religions," have at times made the lines of difference broader than they were when it was first preached.

Now we come to the paper of Colebrooke's referred to, a paper based, not only upon hear-say reports made by priests, whose knowledge does not perhaps extend beyond the circle of the modern phases of Jainism, but upon a work of great authority among the Jainas, and upon a vocabulary of synonymous terms, called Abhidhana-Chintaman.
by a learned Jaina named Hemchandra-Acharya. Of the former, called *Kalpa Sutra*, recently translated, notice will have to be taken by and by; but an insight ought here to be presented into the contents of the latter, with the help of the great orientalist named. He says:—

"The Abhidhana-Chintamani, a vocabulary of synonymous terms, by Hemchandra-Acharya, is divided into six chapters (*Khandas*), the contents of which are thus stated in the author's preface:—'The superior deities (Devadhi-devas) are noticed in the first chapter; the gods (devas) in the second; men in the third; beings furnished with one or more senses in the fourth; the infernal regions in the fifth; and terms of general use in the sixth.' 'The earth,' observes the author, 'water, fire, air, and trees have a single organ or sense (indriya); worms, ants, spiders, and the like have two, three, or four senses; elephants, peacocks, fish, and other beings moving on the earth, in the sky or in water, are furnished with five senses; and so are gods and men and the inhabitants of hell.'"

The picture presented by Colebrooke of the present state of the Jaina faith is not materially different from those embodied in the works of his predecessors; but the great orientalist does something more than merely enlarge on its modern phases. With the help of the materials at his disposal or of the books he was the first to lay under contribution, he goes back to the origin of the system, presents short biographical sketches of the mythical heroes who are said to have preceded the two apparently historical characters associated with its inception, gives a detailed account of the life of the asectic who ought to be represented as its founder, offers an insight into its grotesque chronology and geography, and dwells on the distinctive features of its fanciful philosophy. And it may be
represented as a strange coincidence of results that Colebrooke arrives at the same conclusion, with reference to the filliation of the system to pre-existing types of thought, which is to-day upheld by the highest authority on the subject, Hermann Jacobi, the translator of those of the Jaina Sutras which have already appeared in an English garb. His conclusion is set forth in these words:—"It appears, from the concurrent results of all the enquiries which have been made, that the Jainas constitute a sect of the Hindus, differing, indeed, from the rest, in some very important tenets; but following in other respects a similar practice, and maintaining like opinions and observances."

Passing over a paper or two of minor importance, we come to H. H. Wilson's very valuable paper on Jainism, which originally appeared in the seventeenth volume of the Asiatic Researches, and which has been reproduced, along with his short sketches of the Hindu sects, in one of the well-known volumes of his works. Wilson's authorities are more numerous than those of Colebrooke, and his information as regards the contents of the sacred literature of the Jainas, and as regards the birth-stories associated with the founder is more extensive; though as to the philosophy of the system and its outward observances very little of much consequence is added to what had already been gathered by his predecessors. His researches, along with those of Colebrooke, will have to be pressed into service when some of the problems regarding the inception of the Jaina faith are discussed; but we cannot dismiss him here without presenting his somewhat exaggerated view of its importance and influence as embodied in the following extract:—

"Its professors are to be found in every province of Hindustan, collected chiefly in towns, where, as merchants and
bankers, they usually form a very opulent portion of the community. In Calcutta there are said to be five hundred families; but they are much more numerous at Murshedabad. In Behar they have been estimated at between three and four hundred families. They are in some numbers in Benares, but become more numerous ascending the Doab. It is, however, to the westward that they abound; the provinces of Mewar and Marwar being apparently the cradle of the sect. They are also numerous in Guzerat, in the upper part of the Malabar Coast, and are scattered throughout the Peninsula. They form, in fact, a very large, and from their wealth and influence, a most important division of the population of India.”

To this short list of authorities must be added the last, up to date, and in some respects the greatest, Hermann Jacobi, who has placed by means of accurate translations, a very small, fragmentary portion of the sacred literature of the Jainas at the disposal of the English reader, and who is now evidently engaged in completing a work, the first instalment of which appears in Vol. XXII of the “Sacred Books of the East.” The volume embodies a faithful translation of the Acharanga Sutra, one of the sacred books bearing, as the title indicates, on the demeanour of Jaina ascetics, and a translation equally faithful of the Kalpa Sutra, utilized both by Colebrooke and Wilson. To the translations, placed for the first time within the reach of the English reader, is prefixed a scholarly introduction in which the vexed questions regarding the origin of Jainism, and the antiquity of the sacred literature associated with it, are discussed with a depth of knowledge and grasp of thought rarely seen outside the pale of German authorship.

It is our intention to present first the biography of the
founder of the Jaina faith, as sketched in the Kalpa Sutra, and then bring forward discussions fitted to throw light on the age in which he flourished, and on the types of thought from which he derived his inspiration.

A word about the Kalpa Sutra, the treatise from which mainly, if not solely, is derived the information to be presented in our biographical sketches, ought in the first place to be said. The name of its author it is not at all difficult to ascertain, as it is in black and white exactly where it ought to be looked for; but the important question, When did Bhadrabahu, to whose authorship it is traced by common consent, live and flourish? cannot so easily be solved. According to Wilson he was a contemporary of Hemchandra, the author of the vocabulary already referred to, and lived in the twelfth century; but according to the learned translator, Jacobi, the book itself "has been held in high esteem among the Jainas for more than a thousand years," and consequently its author must have flourished about four centuries earlier than the date assigned to the composition of Abhidhana-Chintamani. But the reasons for the conclusions arrived at by these two great authors respectively are not categorically stated; and, therefore, the conclusions may justly be classed with such results of learned research as are based on mere guess-work. Jacobi maintains that the Kalpa Sutra consists of different parts which, like the different parts of the Rig-Veda, present such varieties of style and language as are indicative of different periods of composition, and consequently of what may be called a plurality of authorship. Again Weber, several of whose remarks are presented and combated in Jacobi's masterly introduction, maintains that the largest portion by far of the work, the detailed biography of Mahavira
was written, not by Bhadrabahu, whose name is attached to the treatise, but by Devarddhi who completed the redaction of the sacred books included in the Siddhanta. All such diversity of opinion is a proof that the authorship and composition of many of the ancient works or documents now being unearthed and translated are involved in enigmas which cannot be unriddled, and that the best thing the learned can do, under the circumstances, is to avoid all appearance of dogmatic or oracular confidence in their deliverances.

Some idea of the style in which the book is written in the original, may be formed after a careful perusal of the translation, which is almost verbatim. To say that the Kalpa Sutra is written in a high-wrought, poetical style, is but a very tame way of indicating the wildness of its thought and expression, and the grotesqueness of its language and imagery. All the extravagancies of oriental diction are gathered into one focus within its narrow circumference, the inflated forms of expression, the unnatural flights of thought, the incongruous metaphors, the far-fetched allegories, the tiresome repetitions, the poverty of thought, the feebleness of description, and the puerility of aim and purpose. But that which makes the perusal of even this small treatise an irksome duty, rather than a pleasure is its monotony, or the deplorable want of variety in its forms of expression and imagery. Every princess or noble lady introduced walks, "neither hasty nor trembling, with a quick and even gait like that of the royal swan." and addresses "with kind, pleasing, amiable, tender, illustrious, beautiful, lucky, blest, auspicious, fortunate, heart-going, heart-easing, well-measured, sweet, and soft words." Every Kshatriya prince or chieftain brought on the stage is "the
lord and chief of men, a bull and a lion among men shining with excellent lustre and glory, lovely to behold like the moon emerging from the great white cloud in the midst of the flock of the plants, and of brilliant stars and asterisms"; and displays his "undefeated knighthood" in a profusion of finery and jewellery, with which his person is adorned after he has gone through such gymnastic exercises as jumping, wrestling, fencing, and fighting. The servants, as well as their mistresses, always listen to royal commands, "glad, pleased, joyful in their minds, delighted, extremely enraptured, with a heart widening under the influence of happiness, with the hairs of their bodies all erect in their pores ** joining the palms of their hands." The dwelling-houses, the chairs of state, the palankins, the throngs of spectators, and whatever else is portrayed, are described in some stereotyped phrases, which recur so often that the translator has contented himself with referring to preceding descriptions where they have to be reproduced by a faithful rendering of the original!

The goddess Sri, who appears on the scene on four different occasions, is on each clad in the following tissue of similes and metaphors—"Her firmly paced feet resembled golden tortoises, and her dyed, fleshy, convex, thin, red, smooth nails were set in swelling muscles. Her hands and feet were like the leaves of the lotus, and her fingers and toes soft and excellent; her round and well-formed legs were adorned with the Kuruvindavarta (a kind of ornament), and her knees with dimples. Her fleshy thighs resembled the proboscis of an excellent elephant, and her lovely broad hips were encircled by a golden zone. Her large and beautiful belly was adorned by a circular navel, and contained a lovely row of hairs (black) as collyrium, bees or clouds, straight, even, continuous,
thin, admirable, handsome, soft and downy. Her waist, which contained the threefolds, could be encompassed with one hand ** The pure cup-like pair of her breasts sparkled, encircled by a garland of kunda flowers, in which glittered a string of flowers ** Her lovely eyes were large and pure like the water lily. She sprinkled about the sap from two lotus flowers, which she held in her splendid hands, and gracefully fanned herself. Her glossy, black, thick, smooth hair hung down in a braid." The asterisks indicate the omission of the jewellery department, "the united beauties and charms" of which "were only subservient to the loveliness of her face." In all descriptions of female or even male beauty, though graphic to the extent of prolixity and tediousness, no glimpse whatever is presented of the delicate powers, susceptibilities or workings of the indwelling spirit!

From the external drapery we come to what may be called the inner life of the book. Its contents are indicated by the title given it,—Lives of the Jainas. It presents a detailed account of the life of Mahavira, and short biographies of Parsva, his immediate predecessor, and of the first and last of the giants or monsters, whose line terminates in these two beings of human proportions. It has a short chapter of chronology to give the reader an insight into the prodigious length of each of the periods intervening between the appearances of the monsters, and one in which a body of rules is presented for the guidance of mendicants. It also presents a list of Mahavira’s immediate disciples, those specially by whom colleges were organised and classes taught for the purpose of systematising and perpetuating his oral instructions. It may, therefore, be represented as a treatise carefully got up to present glimpses of both the Brobdignaggian and human portions of the history of Jainaism down to a period, by no
means very remote; and its basis is gross fiction, and the legends incorporated with documents like the Acharanga Sutra regarding Mahavira and his immediate predecessor.

An insight ought to be presented into the fabulous period of Jaina history and chronology, the period of monsters compared with whom the inhabitants of Brobdignag, who 'are ordinarily as tall as church steeples,' are as dwarfs. And this cannot be done better or more neatly than in the following extracts from Colebrooke's paper:

"The ages and periods which have been more than once alluded to in the foregoing accounts of the Jainas, are briefly explained in Hemchandra's vocabulary. In the second chapter, which relates to the heavens and the gods, &c., the author speaking of time, observes, that it is distinguished into Avasarpini and Utsarpini, adding that the whole period is completed by twenty kotis of kotis of sagara or 2,000,000,000,000,000 'oceans' of years. I do not find that he any where explains the space of time denominated sagara or 'ocean.' But I understand it to be an extravagant estimate of the time which would elapse before a vast cavity, filled with chopped hairs, could be emptied, at the rate of one piece of hair in a century: the time requisite to empty such a cavity, measured by a yojana every way is a palya; and that repeated ten kotis of kotis of times is a sagara (1,000,000,000,000,000 palyas—one sagara).

"Each one of the periods above-mentioned is stated by Hemchandra as comprising six aras; the names and duration of which agree with the information communicated by Major Mackenzie. In the one, or the declining period, they pass from extreme felicity (ekanta sukha), through intermediate gradations, to extreme misery (ekanta dukha). In the other, or rising period, they ascend in the same order
from misery to felicity. During the three first ages of one period, mortals lived for one, two or three palyas; their stature was one, two or three leagues; and they subsisted on the fruits of miraculous trees, which yielded spontaneously food, apparel, ornaments, garlands, habitation, nurture, light, musical instruments, and household utensils. In the fourth age, men lived ten millions of years; and their stature was five hundred poles; in the fifth age, the life of man is a hundred years, and the limit of his stature seven cubits; in the sixth, he is reduced to sixteen years, and the height of one cubit. In the next period, this succession of ages is reversed, and afterwards, they re-commence as before."

Here we have the untold ages, the periods of progression or cycles of development, rendered so familiar to us by the speculations of the champions of evolution; but the process is reversed, as we have, instead of minute forms of life slowly matured into its higher types, monsters of more than Herculean proportions and enormous longevity gradually shrinking into human beings of ordinary stature and the allotted span of life, nay, into Liliputians of stature and life a great deal below the human average.

It may not be amiss to mention here, that the idea of beings of monstrous proportions shrinking into the average noticeable among human beings, which forms so prominent a feature of the 'revelations' embodied in Mr. Sinnett's "Esotaric Buddhism," is borrowed from Jainia, rather than from Buddhistic records.

The Jainas worship a very large army or a host innumerable of deified mortals, as the Buddhists do; but the most conspicuous place or chief rank among these is allotted to twenty-four "Liberated Ones" who are par-excellence the
HINDU HETERODOXY.

gods of their idolatry. The images of these, each presented in a posture of contemplative repose, with a peculiar distinguishing mark, and a complexion differing from that of most, if not all others, are seen standing in the cloisters of their temples, the principal one occupying the central pedestal; and Jaina devotees go round worshipping them precisely in the way in which idols are adored by the orthodox followers of the Hindu faith. These twenty-four deified mortals being the foremost objects of their worship, or occupying the highest place in their pantheon, their sacred books are full of legends of, and references to their adventures. Twenty-two of these belong to the fabulous period of Brobdignaggian monsters, and short biographies of the first and last of these are presented in the Kalpa Sutra. Colebrooke presents brief biographical sketches of all the twenty-two; and a brief reference to his accounts is needed to open our eyes to the process of downward evolution indicated in the theogony of the Jainas.

The prophetic succession begins with Rishabha, whose pre-eminence or priority, in order of time, if not of merit, is set forth by such appellations as the First King, the First Mendicant, the First Jin, and the First Tirthankara. His biography, as given in the Kalpa Sutra, is typical, and begins with his voluntary descent from an aerial region of heavenly bliss, and his incarnation in the shape of an embryo "in the womb of Marudevi, wife of the partriarch Nabhi." The highly favored wife has a number of auspicious omens or visions in a dream, and has them interpreted to her satisfaction and joy by her wise husband. "In the first month of summer, in the first fortnight, the dark fortnight of Chaitra," Marudevi, "perfectly healthy herself, gave birth to a perfectly healthy boy." In process of time the little one
develops into "a clever young man of great beauty, controlling (his senses), lucky, and modest." He lives "two millions of former years as a prince, and six millions three hundred thousand former years as a king." A 'former year' is much longer than an ordinary twelve-month, and, therefore, the millions must be multiplied before these primitive calculations can be made to dovetail with our own. His long reign is a golden epoch of dawning civilization, and he is represented as teaching "for the benefit of the people, the seventy-two sciences, of which writing is the first, arithmetic the most important, and the knowledge of omens the last; the sixty-four accomplishments of women, the hundred arts and the three occupations of men." But when the allotted season of his secular activities is over, he divides his kingdom among his hundred sons, giving a portion to each, goes out of his metropolis under a favorable conjunction of heavenly bodies, followed by a procession of gods, men, and asuras, observes the usual fast, takes the tonsure, and enters 'the state of houselessness.'

Disentangling himself from the toils of family life, he devotes a thousand years to the practice of penance, and that high species of meditation of which he himself is both the subject and the object, and ultimately attains, under a tree, in an auspicious moment indicated by another favourable conjunction of heavenly bodies,—"in a squatting position with joined heels, exposing himself to the heat of the sun, after fasting two and a half days without drinking water, being engaged in deep meditation"—"the highest knowledge and intuition, called kevala, which is infinite, supreme, unobstructed, unimpeded complete and full." He lives ninety-nine thousand 'former years' as a perfected saint and religious teacher, and when his 'four-fold karma' is exhausted,
he dies, "after fasting six and a half days without drinking water," on the summit of a mountain.

His life covers a period of 8,400,000 years, and his stature, not given in the Kalpa Sutra, is 500 poles (dhanus.) His biography is, mutatis mutandis, the biography of each of the remaining twenty-one heroes, the difference being mainly in stature and longevity which come down through a descending series to 15 poles and 10,000 years (ordinary) in the case of Nimi, son of Vijaya by Vipra, the twenty-first. The last hero of the set is Nemi alias Arishtanemi, son of King Samudra Vijaya by his queen Sina, who lives "three centuries as a prince, fifty-four days in a state inferior to perfection, something less than seven centuries as a Sramana, a thousand years on the whole."

This period of prodigious fable must be set aside as unworthy of a place in all sober disquisitions on the origin of the Jaina faith. If Rishabha were regarded as its founder, its remote antiquity would be thrown beyond the confines of legitimate doubt, and the discussions into which the learned have been drawn as regards its position in relation to Buddhism in the order of time, not of merit, would be both superfluous and uncalled-for. He and the inferior giants with whom he is associated, must be set aside as creations of fabulous consciousness, together with the interminably long periods in which the scene of their inconceivable activities and adventures is laid. And, therefore, the honor of originating the system must vibrate between the last two heroes—Parsva Nath and Mahavira—who, though characters flourishing in a period of mythical uncertainty, come within the range of human possibilities, and may, by a transition by no means unnatural, be brought within the pale of hazy, not reliable history.
JAINAISM AND ITS FOUNDER.

Parsva Nath, called emphatically 'the people's favourite' was born in the city of Benares of royal parents, his father Asvasena being the king of Benares, and his mother Vama, the queen. The essential features of his career are not materially different from those of each of his twenty-two monstrous predecessors, his life being of the same cast, though its duration, together with his stature, is within the pale of human possibility. The king of heaven and a long train of gods and asuras assist at his birth or rather re-incarnation, follow him in a grand procession when, after thirty years of family life, he quits the world, takes the tonsure, and becomes a candidate for perfect knowledge, gather around him with intense joy when after eighty-three days of penance he is transfigured under a Dhatalu tree, watch over him when for nearly seventy years he goes about making converts, organizing schools, and giving instructions for the consolidation of his newly-promulgated system of faith and practice, and attend him when, after exhausting his karma, he vanishes into nirvana on the summit of Summeta at the ripe age of one hundred. He does not seem to have carried penance to the preposterous length noticeable in the career of his successor, Mahavira, and the easy-going Jainas, the Setambaras, who wear clothes and live more like ordinary mortals than their rivals, the Digambaras, who go about naked, look up to him as the founder of their denomination or sect. But he cannot properly be represented as the founder of the system itself, which in all its entirety has a greater affinity with the sombre, Digambara, phase of asceticism than with the milder type he is said to have originated. Parsva Nath may be represented as a reformer before the reformation, a connecting link between the milder Buddhistic and the sterner Jaina type of asceticism; and his
immense popularity among certain classes of Jainas can be easily accounted for, though it is by no means fitted to invest him with the supreme dignity of the founder of their faith.

The founder was decidedly Mahavira, and into his biography, such as is presented in the Acharanga and Kalpa Sutras, some insight ought to be given, before the vexed question of his relation to Buddha can be properly discussed and set at rest. The main features of his life are typified in that of his prototypes. No less than four sections of the Kalpa Sutra, or about thirty-four pages of bombast of the most fulsome type, are devoted to an account of his birth. Having passed through various births, and distinguished himself on the stage of history as a grandson of Rishabha, the first Tirthankara, as a prince of Rajagriha, as a Chakravarti or universal monarch, and as an ascetic, he was raised to the highest heavens, and anointed king of the gods. But when his allotted season of fruition was over, he came down from his blissful abode, and took the form of "an embryo in the womb of Devananda," the wife of a Brahmin named Rishabhadatta dwelling "in the Brahmanical part of the town Kundagrama" not far, according to Rhys Davids, from Patna. But though gladdened by an auspicious dream, which was properly interpreted by her husband, this lady was not destined to appear as the mother of the last Jin; as Sakra, the king of the gods, who has a long paragraph of high-sounding epithets accorded to him, anxious to obviate the solecism of a Tirthankara emanating from a Brahmin family, removed the foetus from her womb to that of a Kshatriya princess named Trisala, the wife of Siddharta, who dwelt "in the Kshatriya part" of the same town. This lady also dreamed and saw "a fine enormous elephant," "a tame
lucky bull,” “a handsome, handsomely-shaped, playful lion,” “the goddess Sri,” and other objects of auspicious significance. Her husband being informed of the occurrence, convened an assembly of interpreters, by whom he was assured that the new-born babe was destined, according to the teaching of their “dream books,” to be either a universal monarch or an Arhat. Then followed a season of universal wailing and lamentation, because the child, unwilling to give any trouble to the mother, ceased to move in the womb, and its perfect quiescence was mistaken for death. But the season of mourning was brought to an end by the child ceasing to be over-anxious about the comfort of its mother; and public rejoicings, such as had never been witnessed in that town, gave it once more a festal appearance. In process of time ‘the fruit of the womb’ appeared in the shape of a beautiful and perfectly healthy boy, and a season of feasting and merry-making proclaimed with a flourish of trumpets, literally as well as figuratively, his glorious advent. The gods hovered around the scene from the first in bright hosts, and showered down on the favoured parents rich streams of gold and silver, jewels and gems, purple and scarlet, all of surpassing brilliance and incalculable price. Thus, enriched by an irony of fate, as the best years of the child’s life were to be a standing protest against the profusion of wealth poured down, the parents called him Vardhamana, the Increasing One. In a word all the extravagance of diction and description, all the impropriety, the inconsistency the monstrosity of thought and idea noticeable in the time-hallowed biographies of Buddha, is heaped up in this account. And, what is worse, there is scarcely a particle of pure gold beneath these heaps of rubbish. For instance, no glimpse is presented of the way in which Mahavira’s boyhood and
youth were spent, of the traditions or social influences under which his budding manhood was matured, of the mental aptitudes, predilections and tendencies evinced by him during the preparatory portion of his life, or of the educational process under which these were unfolded. All that we know is that he got married and led the life of a householder as long as his parents were alive, and that after their death he became an ascetic, or entered the houseless state.

But the transition in the case of Mahavira was effected in a manner very different from that of Buddha's escape from domestic bondage. He did not sneak away when his relations were plunged into a profound sleep by supernatural influence; nor did he stand in need of sharp contrasts between visible and tangible forms of disease and distress on one side and sweet serenity of thought and feeling on the other, to convince him of the necessity and beauty of ascetic seclusion. Before, even, "he had adopted the life of a householder, he possessed supreme, unlimited, unimpeded knowledge and intuition." His omniscience enabled him to perceive "that the time of his renunciation had come," and when he publicly expressed his determination to act as the promptings of the hour suggested, his relations and dependants were overwhelmed with joy, to which they gave utterance in a hymn of praise, beginning with the words:—"Victory, victory to the gladdener of the world!" He left home and the city of his birth and residence in a splendidly decorated palankin, followed, not only by unseen heavenly spirits, but by the entire body of his subjects, the 'whole seraglio' not excepted; and he marched forward in imperial state, "gazed on by a circle of thousands of eyes, praised by a circle of thousands of mouths, extolled by a circle of thousands of hearts." He parted with his brilliant
retinue when "he reached the excellent Asoka tree," under
the shade of which he "took off his ornaments, garlands
and finery with his own hands" and "plucked out his hair
in five handfuls." Then under a propitious conjunction of
the moon with the asterism Uttraphalymic, he fasted "two
and a half days without drinking water, put on a divine
robe, and, quite alone, nobody else being present, he tore
out his hair, and leaving the house, entered the state of
houselessness."

For about thirteen years he lived as a houseless ascetic,
an anchorite of the most rigid school, a religious mendicant
of an austere and even repulsive appearance, but of a calm,
imperturbable mind. The last lecture of the first book
of the Acharanga-Sutra is a detailed description of the way
in which he spent these long years of self-chosen if not
self-inflicted penance. For a year and a month he allowed
his body to be shielded by "the divine robe" given him
by the king of the gods; but at the expiry of this period he
threw it aside as an encumbrance both physical and moral.
He lived on the coarsest kind of food, fasting so often,
and on some occasions so long, that he is said to have fasted
eleven years out of the twelve and half he spent in seeking
the quietude of kevalship. He abstained, not only from
flesh and delicious food in general, but even from such
medicine as might benefit his worn-out body, from "purgas-
tives and emetics"; and as to "bathing, shampooing and
cleaning of the teeth," he never thought of luxuries so
unbecoming his position as "a naked, world-relinquishing,
houseless sage." He exposed his bare body to cold in
winter and heat in summer, while torrents of rain were
allowed in vain to spend their rage on him in autumn. He
was paritcularly scrupulous in the matter of drink, abstaining
entirely from cold water for fear of destroying minute living beings, and drinking even warm water very sparingly,—for long periods not at all. He lodged as a rule in retired places in the vicinity of cities and towns, but sometimes in workshops, travellers' halls, garden-houses, and even in grave-yards; and he slept on the bare ground, allowing all sorts of living creatures, flies, gnats, &c., to "crawl about" and "feed upon" his body and cause "manifold pains." Besides all this he had to brave cruel persecution in many places, not only such rebuffs as are embodied in such expressions as "get away from here," but such tortures as might proceed from the application of "a stick, the fist, the lance," and from hurtful missiles, such as "a fruit, a clod, a potsherd." Moreover, he "was bitten by the dogs," and even "torn by the dogs." But he bore patiently and meekly the pains and tortures inflicted upon him, observed the most stringent rules of his order with the most scrupulous care, and continued in contemplation, which no species of molestation could interrupt, till he grew in saving knowledge, and the indifference, apathy and impassibility in which its ends. He recognised the subtile principle of life hidden in "the earth-bodies, and water-bodies, and fire-bodies, and wind-bodies, and lichens, seeds, spirits." He grew in apathy till he became "indifferent alike to the smell of oture and of sandal, to straw and jewels, dirt and gold, pleasure and pain, attracted neither to this world nor to that beyond, desiring neither life nor death." And ultimately by meditating on a square piece of ground, on the tip of his nose, and on his inner self, he "reached" under a sal tree "in a squatting position with joined heels," "the highest knowledge and intuition called kevala, which is infinite, supreme, unobstructed, unimpeded, complete, and
full." This blessed consummation was realized "when the moon was in conjunction with the asterism Uttraphalguni"—a conjunction realized at the great critical moments of the life of an Arhat—and amid the congratulations and shouts of gods and holy men.

The extent and comprehensiveness of the knowledge thus attained is set forth in the following sentence:—"When the venerable ascetic Mahavira had become a Jin and Arhat, he was a kevalin, omniscient and comprehending all objects; he knew and saw all conditions of the world, of gods, men and demons, whence they came, whither they go, whether they are born as men or animals, or become gods or hell-beings, the ideas, the thoughts of their minds, the food, doings and desires, the open and secret deeds of all the living beings in the world, what they thought, spoke or did at any moment." What wonder that such inconsistencies or discrepancies as the one involved in the hero being described as possessed of such knowledge before his sequestration from family-life, and again as rising to it after a prolonged disciplinary process, should be left, unnoticed in a tissue of wild fable like the Kalpa Sutra!

The interesting period intervening between Mahavira's attainment of kevalship and his death or entrance into Nirvana is left in the shade, as his early days, his budding youth and manhood. Wilson presents a few facts culled from other sources. Mahavira's fame as an ascetic and philosopher of the most rigid school was noised abroad specially in Behar, and some learned Brahmins came to him determined to defeat him in argument. But there unuttered objections were stated and refuted by the hero, and they became the first fruits and early propagators of the Jaina faith. The number of these first converts, called Gandharas
or heads of schools, is eleven, and the most prominent among them are Indrabhuti or Gautama, Agnibuti and Vagubhuti, three brothers of Brahmin parentage, of whom the first doubted the existence of life, the second that of Karma, and the third the dualism involved in the body being represented as separate from life. Vyakta comes next with a firm belief in the non-existence of elementary matter, and he is followed by Sudharma, who has a peculiar notion about transmigration and Mandita, who does not understand the precise meaning of the words "bondage" and "liberation," and so on, till we come to the eleventh, who needs proofs to shake off his scepticism about Nirvana.

These were only the first-fruits, the community of Mahavir’s followers, consisting at the time of his death of 14,000 Sramanas, 36,000 nuns, 159,000 lay votaries, 318,000 female lay votaries, 300 sages who knew the fourteen Purvas, that is, were profoundly versed in a branch of the sacred literature, 13,000 sages versed in another branch, 700 kevalins, and so on. A list of successes is presented on this vast scale in each of the other biographies presented in the Kalpa Sutra; and the schedules add to its apparent fabulous uncertainty.

Mahavira travelled after his attainment of supreme knowledge from place to place, specially in the districts of Behar and Allahabad, preaching his creed and laying the foundation, with the help of kings and noblemen, of his church. And when about thirty years of such peaceful labor had passed away, he died, at a place called Papa or Pappuri not far from Rajagriha, at the ripe age of sixty-two,—“died, went off, quitted the world, cut asunder the ties of birth, old age and death, became a Sidha, a Buddha, a Mukta, a maker of the end (to all misery), finally liberated, freed from all pains.” Many
wonderful events occurred at the time of his death, but these we must pass over, emphasizing the fact, that he was cremated by Sakra and his divine attendants, who retained his unburnt teeth, nails, &c., as relics to be worshipped then and there, as well as in future ages by a people professing absolute atheism! No theory can annihilate the human instinct of worship!

Now we come to the important problem, that of the age in which Mahavira lived and flourished, and of the position of his creed in relation to that of Buddha. The theories proposed by the learned for its solution may be indicated by means of the three words, priority, simultaneity and posteriority.

Some learned men are of opinion that Mahavira preached and matured his creed before the appearance of Buddha as an independent religious teacher, and that consequently Buddhism is simply an off-shoot of Jainaism. This opinion was entertained and broached by the pioneers whose researches first called public attention to the then newly and even now but partially opened field of Jaina literature; and the ground on which it was based is the fact that the foremost of Mahavira's disciples was Buddha, who was confounded with Sakya Sinha, the princely reformer of kapila-vastu. But Wilson points out the main difference, that while the Jaina Buddha was a Brahmin, the founder of Buddhism was of the military caste. The term Buddha or fully-enlightened was generic, and was applied to Jaina as well as to Buddhist saints, if not to prominent ascetics of the Hindu school also. Again it may be alleged that Buddha found Jainaism in existence during the live-long years, he spent in search of saving truth, as he came in contact with and imitated ascetics of the Mahavira stamp, recluses who went about stark naked,
exposing their bodies to every species of consecrated torture. But the fact should not be overlooked that asceticism of the most austere stamp flourished under the shade of the national faith long before the appearance of these and other heterodox creeds, and that the Jaina type was but a facsimile of what was matured in Hindu schools. The recent translation of Baudhayana, the Hindu code of ascetic morals, under the auspices of professor Max Müller, makes it plain that the vows and rules of monastic seclusion embedded in Buddhistic and Jaina records may justly be stigmatized as plagiarisms; as they were transferred without acknowledgment from Hindu sources. The position that Jainaism is the parent system from which Buddhism derives its origin and motive force cannot possibly be substantiated, and is, therefore, now being almost universally abandoned.

The second theory is that according to which Mahavira was a contemporary of Buddha, and that his creed originated and flourished side by side with Buddhism. The points of resemblance between the two systems are emphasized indeed, but traced to the precedent Hindu ideas with which both the systems are saturated, not to any relation subsisting between them similar to that between a creditor and a debtor. The points of divergence are insisted on as decisive of independence of origin and growth, if not of an essential difference of genius and tendency. This view has its ablest advocate in Hermann Jacobi, the translator of the Jaina Sutras, those of them, we mean, which have appeared in an English garb; and his arguments are based on certain references to Jaina devotees in Buddhistic records, and on the linguistic peculiarities of the sacred books of the Jainas. Buddha is said in some of the biographies extant to have actually encountered the Jainas, called Niganthas, and their chief, called Nataputt
in his journeys, but legends about his success in converting some prominent members of their sect, manufactured, nobody knows when, are by no means enough of themselves to sustain the first part of Jacobi's proposition, "that Jainaism had an origin independent from Buddhism, that it had a development of its own, and did not largely borrow from the rival sect." Nor do the peculiarities of style and diction noticeable, according to him, in Jaina records, support the conclusion, they being fitted only to prove that these were penned about the time when the oldest of the existing records of Buddhism were composed. Even granting this fact, which has been gainsaid by scholars as decidedly entitled to a hearing as Jacobi, a broad margin is left for the rise of a schism in the Buddhist church, and its complete secession therefrom and consequent assumption of an attitude of independence before the invention of writing enabled either of the hostile creeds to give a permanent shape to its principles in black and white. The second part of Jacobi's proposition, "that both Jainaism and Buddhism owed to the Brahmins, specially the Sannyasis, the ground-work of their philosophy, ethics and cosmogony," is admitted by all, and needs no proof.

And now we come to the third theory, that of posteriority and indebtedness, that according to which Jainaism was an off-shoot of Buddhism, but separated from it, and eventually arrayed against it by a revival of that spirit of extremism, to coin a significant term, from which it was a re-action. In essentials the two systems stand on the same platform. They both repudiate the authority of the Veda, enjoin the worship of deified mortals, and oppose the taking of life even for sacrificial purposes. They both represent transmigration as the evil of evils, and point to the path of ascetic
contemplation as the only path of escape from its bitter bondage.

But in Jainism these characteristic ideas show an advance from an incipient to a stage of maturity. Buddhism couches its rejection of the authority of the Vedas in ambiguous language, and plainly affirms that if it had not been tampered with by the Brahmins, the law preached by Buddha would have been found in it in all its entireness. It further maintains that its own characteristic principles may be discovered in the Veda beneath the interpolations heaped upon its sacred page by cunning priests. But so far as our knowledge goes, the attitude of Jainism towards the Veda is more decided, and its rejection less vacillating. As to the worship of beatified mortals it is certainly more systematic in Jainism than it is in Buddhism. The latter system talks of the propriety of worshipping the great predecessors of Buddha along with him, but its followers concentrate their devotion on him, as he or his relics alone appear in their temples in symbolic or image form.

It is in his image or his relics that they worship his predecessors, successors, and an entire fraternity of glorified mortals. But one cannot enter a large Jaina temple without being assured that full justice is done to the Jainas who preceded Mahavira, if not to those who are to succeed him in the age of Liliputian development before us. Supreme worship is given, not only to the image of the last of the Tirthankaras, or those who have crossed the ocean of life, but each of his predecessors is represented by an image which has its own share of it. Besides, in the fabulous tales grouping around these heroes, there is a noticeable advance in grotesqueness and extravagance, a fact insisted on both by Colebrooke and Wilson as determinative of the posteriority of Jainism.
Again, the prohibition against the taking of life is carried to a much greater length by Jainaism, and the water strainer and the fan of the Jaina priest are improvements upon the primitive practice of the Buddhists. And lastly, there is admittedly a marked advance in Jaina types of asceticism towards austerity and rigor. Asceticism moves in cycles, as human philosophy does, and the milder form, to which Buddha was brought by the law of re-action, could not but be changed to its original type of rigidity and repulsiveness under the influence of another re-actionary move. To all this may be added the fact, that the species of hylozoism, which is the vital element of Jaina philosophy, is the legitimate outcome of the gross materialistic speculations of Kapila and Buddha. Judging a priori, or on the principle of filiation and growth of ideas, or even on the principle of their cyclic development, we cannot help looking upon the Jaina system as a naughty child of Buddhism, carrying its principles to lengths preposterous in the opinion of its followers, and thereby sowing the seeds of reciprocal and implacable hostility. *

It must be candidly admitted that the relative position of these systems, or the position of either in relation to the other, cannot but remain an open question at present, and conclusions sustained by mere a priori reasonings, ought not to be presented with oracular confidence. It may, however, be maintained that something like a consensus of opinion is in favor of the theory which establishes the posteriority of Jainaism, and that arguments recently brought forward to effect its explosion are by no means conclusive.

Mahavira's character, as delineated in the records alluded

* The Agin Purana (see I. E. R. vol. viii. p. 488) makes Jainaism the later.
to, is much more balanced, though much less amiable, than that of Buddha. The founder of Jainism did not oscillate between extremes as the founder of Buddhism confessedly did,—did not pass from the height of self-indulgence to the height of self-mortification, and then settle down in an intermediate stage of moderate asceticism. He was doubtless an extremist, but he consistently, or with dogged persistency attached himself to one extreme, and never did swing backwards and forwards between the two. His mother's dreams were construed into the identical prophecy which filled the mind of Buddha's father with gloomy forebodings, and led to special measures being resorted to of a remedial character to counteract the ascetic tendency of his son's mind and spirit. The astrologers and dream-interpreters, invited by Mahavira's father, declared in solemn conclave that the child to be born was destined to be either a Universal Monarch or an ascetic; but yet he does not seem to have been brought up in a secluded palace of luxury amid influences sure to breed and foster the spirit of self-indulgence. On the contrary he looked forward in the early days of his life to his eventual emancipation from the bondage of family-life with calm confidence, and quietly prepared himself for it. And yet he did not rush forward, or resort to unworthy measures to hasten the consummation of his wishes, but had the wisdom and patience to wait till the death of his parents had paved his way thereto. And then with the consent of his royal brother and other relations and parents, and amid the plaudits of a host of attendants and well-wishers ringing in his ears, he exchanged the comforts of home-life for the mortifications and penances of the life of an anchorite. And in his chosen path he proceeded as far as his conscience led him, undeterred by difficulties and dangers
formidable enough to have discouraged and crushed a spirit less resolute than his, till the goal looked forward to with bright anticipations was reached. And he, moreover, displayed his courage and equanimity amid persecutions sharper than any to which Buddha was ever subjected. There was in his case not merely a steadiness of purpose but a consistency of belief, a continuity of procedure not noticeable in that of Buddha, and, therefore, his character appears proportionately more evenly balanced.

And even in compassion, Mahavira appears to have excelled his more successful and therefore better-known prototype. Even in his natal state, he thought of his mother's troubles, and tried to shield her from them till the quiescence into which he had forced himself for the purpose was misconstrued and became a source of groundless anxiety and sorrow. And so long as his parents were alive he had respect for their feelings deep enough to dissuade him from a course sure to prove to them a source of poignant grief; and if his wife was alive at the time when the final step was taken, her consent seems to have been previously secured. Add to all this the fact, that he carried his tenderness in the matter of taking life or paining any living creature, however minute, to a length greater even than that in vogue among Buddha and his associates and followers. Had he only been less unsocial, more genial in his disposition and less taciturn, or in other words, had he not carried his ascetism too far in the direction of rigor and austerity his popularity would have been as great as that of his predecessor Parsva Nath or that of Buddha himself.

In these days Mahavira is scarcely known in places where Buddha is a favored object of worship, both spiritual and
esthetic; and had he been as widely known in Christendom, at least, he would have been represented as a monster where his prototype is never mentioned except in terms of glowing eulogy. And this arises mainly on account of the magnifying glass through which the virtues of Buddha are beheld. Buddha is represented as the very incarnation of universal love and benevolence. His life, however, shows that whatever of genuine benevolence he possessed, evaporated in soothing verbiage instead of appearing in tangible deeds. He lived as great ascetics generally have done in this country, enriched his own order by grants received from all classes of wealthy people, even courtesans not excepted; had monasteries and adjacent lands bequeathed to him on account of the pious fraud involved in such bequests being represented, systematically and unequivocally, as the highest acts of religious merit; and consolidated the work of his hands by varieties of means on the whole fair. But in the existing biographies we do in vain look for instances of giving as well as of receiving, deeds as well as words of benevolence, acts of mercy for the benefit of all, whether in his church or out of its pale,—acts such as may remind us of the miracles of mercy standing out in bold relief from the Gospel page!

We cannot conclude without referring to the question now and then raised in Mission circles, viz., why, when Buddha and Mahavira succeeded in raising up bands of ascetic propagandists and sending them forth to preach their unsocial creeds, Missionaries cannot do so? The solution of this problem is in a nutshell. Buddha and Mahavira were themselves models of asceticism, bright examples to, and self-sacrificing leaders of the bands raised up by them and exhorted only to follow them. Had they come down from
their princely style of living, and occupied permanently a platform of respectability and comfort noticeably above that of their followers, referring to the sacrifice already made as all that could legitimately be expected of them, and representing any further sacrifice on their part as sure to endanger their lives, their efforts would have failed as signally as those of paid Missionaries in the same direction have done. The master must lead, not only exhort, and if the few Missionaries, who stand up for asceticism cannot encourage it by example, as well as by precept, the less they talk of it the better!
CHAPTER VII.

JAINAISM CONTINUED

Theology, according to Dr. Chalmers, is the most voluminous of the sciences. The great divine in making this remark did not evidently look beyond the pale of the Christian Church, but was irresistibly moved by the magnitude of the body of divinity he had, as a Professor of Theology, to study to venture an assertion, the accuracy of which could not, even when thus narrowed, be called in question. The theological literature of the Church of Christ is of gigantic proportions, more prodigious by far than that to which the boasted physical science of the age has given birth. Who can form an adequate idea of the vastness of the heap of disquisitions piled up in Christendom with a view to set forth the harmony between Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility, between the absolutism of the decrees of God and the freedom of human volitions? Who can study and master the theories that have clustered around the Person and Work of Christ, or number the books which have been written in support of each of them? It needs an age to acquire a thorough knowledge of the varieties of speculations, explanations and illustrations resorted to by master minds to unfold and elucidate the mystery hanging over the threefold distinction in the Personality of the Godhead or the two-fold nature of Christ. Each of the doctrines of our faith, recondite or simple, has given rise to discussions and controversies which are endless, and which the student of theology cannot contemplate except with an overwhelming sense of the unutterable vastness of the task before him.
And when the entire body of literature which has grown around the standards and symbols of the Church is thought of, St. John's well-known words about the impossibility of "the world" containing the books written, lose much of their hyperbolical character. Christendom has not gone crazy after the conveniences and comforts of this life so far as to be oblivious of the imperious claims of theological study and research.

The non-Christian world has prosecuted those studies, now represented as useless, with an equal amount of earnestness, zeal and enthusiasm. It has evolved innumerable systems of theology, not from a revelation progressive in its history but ultimately completed, written and sealed, but from the volume of nature and human consciousness, as well as from the traditions in which the religious truths supernaturally communicated to our first parents and their immediate descendants lie embedded. And it has, moreover, gathered around each of them a body of literature, more or less vast, more or less profound, more or less elevating or degrading. The number of sects into which the Church has been split since the time when the Apostles lifted up the banner of one God, one Mediator and one Faith, can scarcely be ascertained or counted; but the creeds which have prevailed in different parts of the world since the evil hour, when the spotless innocence of Eden gave place to guilt, and the light within man was changed into darkness, baffle all calculation by their multitudinousness and endless variety of forms, colours and shades! And the heaps of literature associated with these systematized results of human attempts to find out God would, if placed one above another, be stratified into a mountain of Himalayan height and proportion.
How little of these prodigious masses of sacred literature is known, even to the most gifted antiquary and linguist! Max Müller, in his small but valuable treatise on the "Science of Religion," refers to the volumes of literature, associated with a few only of the prominent religions of the world, to set forth the littleness of what may be called the sacred knowledge, of which the most learned scholars of the age can boast. A very small portion, for instance, of the literature of Buddhism has been analyzed and sifted, while the larger portion by far remains as a sort of linguistic or literary terra-incognita. The same may be said of every other religion as prominent as it has been, while of many of the religions which have disappeared from the stage of history, scarcely anything is known besides their names. Again, the prominent religions have been few and far between, and may be ranked with the Upper Ten Thousand, who represent only an infinitesimal portion of the population of a country. Of the masses of religious beliefs which have waxed and waned during the millenniums, of which the history of the world has to take cognizance, our knowledge does not rise above zero. To talk of building up a science of religion on a basis of reliable generalizations is premature; and even Max Muller, the most ardent devotee of such an undertaking, has no alternative but to enlarge on its hopelessness!

Jainism does not occupy a prominent place among the religions of the world, its sway being acknowledged within narrow and circumscribed limits. Yet it has a body of literature in Sanscrit and in the Vernaculars, such as may damp the zeal of the most ardent student of the science of religion. It has its Angas, its Upangas, its Purvas, its Purans, its didactic, doctrinal, philosophical, historical
and legendary lore, forming in its entirety a literature of formidable proportions and forbidding aspect. Wilson in his paper on Jainaism, originally inserted in Vol. xvii. of the "Researches" or "Transactions" of the Asiatic Society, presents a long list of works on it, which were in his "possession" or "in the library of the Sanscrit College of Calcutta," but at the same time affirms that as every place where it maintains an ascendency has its own documents in the Vernacular, an exhaustive list cannot possibly be presented. They are all classed under the two heads, Agamas and Siddantas which are to the Jainas "what the Vedas are to the Brahmanical Hindus." As to the Agamas the Digambara sects are said to have eight, while the Svetambaras have according to some forty-five, but according to others eighty-four Siddhantas. On the enumeration presented in the Abhidhana-Chintamani of Hem-Chundra, Wilson makes the following remarks:

"The author of the Abhidhana-Chintamani, a useful vocabulary, Hem-Chundra, is well known as a zealous and able propagator of the Jaina doctrines in the twelfth century. He was no doubt well versed in the peculiarity of the system which he taught, and may be regarded as a safe guide. In his vocabulary he specifies what appear to be the Jaina Scriptures, at least in the estimation of the Svetambara sect, to which he belonged, and in a valuable commentary on his own work, he has further particularized the works named in his text. From this it appears that the principal authorities of a sacred character were termed Angas, and were eleven in number, or with a supplementary division, twelve. They are thus enumerated and described—Acharanga, a book teaching sacred observances after the practice of Vashistha, and other saints; Sutrakritangam,
a work on acts imposed by positive precepts; \textit{Sthana-gam}, on the organs in which life abides, or the ten acts essential to purity; \textit{Samavagangam}, on the hundred \textit{Padartha}s or categories; \textit{Bhagavatyangam}, on the ritual or rules for worship; \textit{Jayatadhermakathu}, an account of the acquisition of knowledge by holy personages; \textit{Upasakulasa}, rules for the conduct of Srevakas or secular Jainas, apparently in ten lectures; \textit{Antaksiddasa}, on the actions of the \textit{Tirthankaras} in ten lectures; \textit{Anuttaropopatikadhara}, on the principal or final births of the Tirthankaras in ten lectures; \textit{Prasnavyakaranam}, grammar of questions, probably on the code of the Jainas; and \textit{Vipakasentam}, on the fruits or consequences of actions.

"With these are connected inferior \textit{Angas} or \textit{Upangas}, the names of which are not specified, whilst the \textit{Drishtabuda}, the twelfth \textit{anga}, which seems to be a supplementary authority, is divided into five portions, entitled \textit{Pariherrma}, on moral acts; \textit{Sutra}, precepts for conduct and life; \textit{Purvanuyaga}, on the doctrines and practice of the \textit{Tirthankaras} before attaining perfection; \textit{Purnagata}, on the same after perfection; and \textit{Chulika}, on doctrines and practice not comprised in the two preceding.

"These different works profess to be derived from the oral instructions of Mahavira himself to his disciples, specially to Gautama; but besides these a class of works is enumerated by Hem-Chandra, entitled \textit{Purvas}, because they were drawn up by the \textit{Gandharas} before the \textit{Angas}. There are fourteen of them treating of the chief tenets of the sect, apparently sometimes controversially, as the \textit{Astipravada}, the doctrine of existence or non-existence; \textit{Jnyanaprabada}, the doctrine of holy knowledge; \textit{Satyapravada}, discussion of truth; \textit{Atmaprada} investigation of spirit;
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Pranavogu, the nature of corporeal life; Kriyavisala, consequences of acts and others. They are held to be the works of Mahaviras Ganas, or of that Tirthankara and his predecessors, or to have emanated from them originally, although committed to writing by other hands. Some of them still exist, it appears, although in general their places have been assumed by a list of more recent composition.”

Of this body of literature the only portion placed within reach of the English reader is the Acharanga-Sutra, which consists of two books, each divided into a number of lectures, each of which again is sub-divided into a number of lessons. The first book is divided into eight lectures, the last of which, entitled “the Pillow of Righteousness,” is a graphic description of the difficulties, privations, mortifications, penances, and persecutions through which Mahavira passed before the summit of his wishes was reached, or before his attainment of supreme knowledge. The other lectures are fraught with moral maxims, and the philosophical principles associated with them, and are therefore very valuable to the student of Jaina ethics and philosophy. The Second Book is by no means equally valuable, as it is a repertory of rules and regulations for the guidance of religious mendicants rather than a redaction or digest of principles and maxims. It consists of four parts, the first of which treats of such subjects as “Begging of Food,” “Begging for a Couch,” “Walking,” “Modes of Speech,” “Begging of Clothes,” &c., and is a tissue of minute rules and directions as to the way in which these functions of asceticism are to be discharged. The second part is a supplement to the first, and emphasizes these rules and directions, as well as adds others specially with a view to extinguish in the ascetic all tendency to the enjoyments
derivable from a proper cultivation of the esthetic element of his complex self. The third part, entitled "the Clauses," is a short biographical sketch of "the venerable ascetic Mahavira,"—one of the legends which form the basis of the account presented in the Kalpa-Sutra—followed by a detailed statement of the five vows which the devotee has to take before he passes from the condition of a householder into the blessed state of houselessness. The fourth and the last part is only a very short chapter on "Liberation," and sets forth the happy condition of the emancipated mortal, his release from family bonds, his equanimity in the midst of persecutions, his insensitivity to pleasure and pain, his scrupulous regard to life in all its manifestations, his perfect victory over sensuality, even in its most refined forms, his correct knowledge, complete self-control, and unutterable quiescence.

It may be affirmed, and with some degree of justice too, that a treatise like the Acharanga-Sutra, a mere repertory of moral maxims and factitious rules and regulations, cannot furnish materials for a paper on Jaina philosophy. Our reply is that it does not and that it does,—does not state the principles of Jaina philosophy with directness and categorical precision, but does offer in a round about, indirect way a clue to them. To illustrate this, let us refer to the relation between the doctrines and the moral precepts of Christianity. The ethical principles of the new Testament, and even rules and regulations of a local importance and of a temporary character, are based on its sublime doctrine, insomuch that the principles are deducible from the doctrines, and the doctrines are inferrable from the principles. Given the doctrines of Christianity, the broad features of Christian morality may be deduced as corollaries therefrom.
Again, given the principles of Christian morality, the doctrinal theology of the Church may be inferred therefrom. In a similar manner the Buddhistic or Jaina philosophy is closely and inseparably intertwined with the Buddhistic or Jaina morality. Given the moral precepts in either case, the philosophy related to them may be inferred. Again, given the philosophy, the precepts may be deduced.

The Acharanga-Sutra is an ethical treatise, and is replete with moral maxims and precepts, as well as with rules and regulations. By carefully studying these and grasping their meaning and significance, we can form some idea of the philosophy which is their substratum. Besides the original material embodied in this book, we have a valuable synopsis of Jaina philosophy drawn out by a master-hand. The paper entitled "the Arhat System" in the Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha, translated by Professor Cowell, is a categorical statement of the main principles of Jaina philosophy, and throws a flood of light on the esoteric meaning of the principles embodied in the Acharanga-Sutra. With the help of these two treatises, as well as that of the dissertations in Wilson’s and Colebrook’s papers on the subject, we shall present an analysis of the ethical and philosophical systems connected with Jainism, showing at the same time the points of identity and difference between them and those associated with Buddhism.

And let us begin with the Tirthankaras, the deified mortals worshipped in the Jaina temples, and regarded by all the followers of the Jaina creed, lay and clerical, as the communicators of supreme knowledge. They are each called by various significant names, such as Jagatprabhu, Lord of the world; Adhisvara, the Supreme Lord; Devadhideva, God of gods; Tirthankara, one who has crossed over the
ocean of life; *Kevalin*, Possessor of Supreme Knowledge; *Arhat*, one who is entitled to the worship of both gods and men; *Jina*, One who has conquered the senses; *Mahavira*, the Great Conqueror. And such expletives, as "Liberated Ones," "Liberated," "Noble Ones," "Flood-crossing Sages," "Great Heroes," "Revered Ones," "Knowledge-endowed Great Heroes," "Prophets," "Seers," "the Wise Ones," and "the Highest Ones," are honorific titles without which they are never referred to. They occupy the highest niches in the pantheon of the Jainas, and are regarded by all classes as supreme objects of devotion. But an inferior kind of worship is paid to various orders of gods and goddesses, who are represented, not only as subordinate to them, but fellow-worshippers of human beings in their devotion to them. These orders include the whole of the national pantheon, as well as the distinguished members, if not the whole, of the monastic fraternity, and leave, besides, a broad margin for the creation of new gods and goddesses, as well as for the transference of existing ones from foreign systems of faith. In this respect there is no difference between Jainism and Buddhism, as both these systems give a free and full scope to human propensity to idolatry, while denying in unequivocal language the existence of the Supreme Ruler of the universe!

As to the knowledge possessed by these adored teachers, it is emphatically declared to be boundless, all-comprehensive, co-extensive with infinite space, and coeval with the endless ages of eternity, both past and future. The comprehensiveness of their knowledge is set forth by such strings of expletives as "infinite, supreme, unobstructed, unimpeded, complete and full." Mahavira, when beatified, "knew and saw all conditions of the world of gods, men and
demons,” and was searcher of hearts, as he had a thorough knowledge, not only of “all living beings in the whole world” but of “the thoughts of their minds,” their “desires” and their “open and secret deeds.” His knowledge of every thing existent was thorough, not partial; unlimited, not circumscribed; absolute, not relative. The principle is laid down with unmistakable certainty:—“He who knows one thing, knows all things; and he who knows all things, knows one thing.” Here the theory of continuity or that of the co-ordination of all forms of existence, regarded by modern science either as organized or unorganized, is upheld in all its entirety. One single truth or one single fact is co-ordinated with or co-related to all truths and all facts; and it is in consequence impossible to have a thorough knowledge of one reality without a thorough knowledge of the endless chains of realities with which it is intimately connected, and by which its full significance is set forth. All things are united or rather unified by an all pervading chain of interdependence and interpenetration and interaction, and there is no such thing as a reality independent of the system or organism of which it is a part, or of any portion or portions thereof. To know a thing thoroughly is not only to know it as it is in itself, but to grasp the varied relations in which it stands to the whole system of things, or to have a thorough knowledge, not only of it, but its environment. And therefore complete knowledge of one thing presupposes complete knowledge of all things or omniscience. The great teachers knew every thing in its multifarious relations, as well as its antecedents and consequents, causes and tendencies; and there was no such thing as mere relativity in their knowledge.

Their knowledge was knowledge _perse_, as they saw
things, not only as they appear in certain conditions or under certain circumstances, but as they are in themselves; and consequently the problem of quiddities and essences, which has puzzled philosophers in all ages and countries was solved by them. Their insight, moreover, was intuitive, not racionative, obtained immediately and directly, not through a process of reasoning more or less elaborate. The "revered teacher" is one who "knows and sees with quick discernment," whose source of knowledge is "innate intelligence," who is said to have been "calm" when he "got intuition," and who can grasp "the meaning," not only of realities, but even of "dreams" "with his own innate intellect and intuition." In a word all the elements or functions of omniscience are ascribed to those beatified teachers, and their knowledge is again and again declared to be limitless and all-comprehensive.

Was this all-penetrating, all-comprehensive, boundless knowledge, an element of their nature, connate and innate, born with them and inseparable from them? Or was it an attainment secured by a long course of painful discipline? There are some passages in the biographical legends extant which might justify our looking upon it as an essence, not an accident, an inseparable excellence of their nature, not an ornament superadded. But as these statements are at variance with the entire drift of these narratives, as well as with their sequel, they may be set aside as among the instances of inconsistency by which these are disfigured. There is no royal road to this, any more than to other species of knowledge, or rather to this sublimest height of knowledge. The blessed ones rose to this apex of intelligence after innumerable ages of preparation, in innumerable births, and through numberless courses of discipline. But setting aside their prepara-
tion in their previous stages of existence, a few points in their disciplinary process in this life ought to be emphasized.

And the first is their voluntary separation from the duties and trials of family life. Family life, called or included in Sansara, is represented, with the greatest emphasis, as an insuperable obstacle in the way of liberation, and women as the very parent source of all evil. Mahavira in his very first sermon, given in Wilson's paper, thus speaks of them, and of family-life in general:—"Associate not with women, for it is the destruction of life, let the wise observe continence, which binds them to the Supreme. Be not encumbered with a family, for by the anxiety it involves, the person, not separated from it, falls like an ox too heavily laden." It is perhaps difficult to ascertain what is meant by the word "Supreme" in the extract; but as Mahavira's teaching is thoroughly atheistic, we may rest assured that God is not meant. In the Acharanga-Sutra we have utterances like the following;—"The world is greatly troubled by women. They (viz, men) forsooth say, 'These are the vessels (of happiness.)' But this leads them to pain, to delusion, to death to hell, to birth as hell-beings or brute beasts" (p. 21.) "Avoid gaiety not delighting in creatures, (i. e., women), having the highest intuition, keeping off from sinful acts" (p. 31.) "He who is clever, should not seek after sexual intercourse" (p. 42). Regarding Mahavira, it is said:—"Knowing (and renouncing) the female sex in mixed gathering places; he meditated, finding his way himself: I do not lead a worldly life." p. 80). Again "Practising the sinless abstinence from killing, he did no acts, neither himself nor with the assistance of others; he to whom women were known as the causes of all sinful acts, he saw (the true state of the world)" (p. 81).
Texts of this description may be multiplied almost ad infinitum, but further evidence is not needed. At page 63 there is a quotation evidently from an earlier work running thus—"By the Brahman, the wise Mahavira, three vows have been enjoined." These are specified by Jacobi thus in a foot note:—"(1) to kill no living being, (2) to speak no untruth, (3) to abstain from forbidden things (theft and sexual pleasures)." But the vows taken by the devotee when he enters the state of houselessness are properly speaking five; and the fourth of these runs thus:—"I renounce all sexual pleasures either with gods or men or animals. I shall not give way to sensuality, &c." In explanation of this vow, it is said that a Nirgrantha "does not continually discuss topics relating to women," "does not regard and contemplate the lovely forms of women," "does not recall to his mind the pleasures and amusements he formerly had with women," "does not eat and drink too much," abstaining from "liquors" and "highly seasoned dishes," "does not occupy a bed or couch affected (belonging to or close by) women, animals, eunuchs." In a word every precaution is taken to avoid the slightest intercourse with women, as well as to curb, restrain and annihilate all tendency to voluptuousness and sensuality.

These Revered Ones not only emancipated themselves from the bondage of domestic life, but spent years in the practice of austerity and penance. It is indeed said of Mahavira that he bore with equanimity the sufferings to which he was exposed by others, avoiding the folly of inflicting pains on himself. This may be true as regards particular kinds of corporeal pains and tortures; but that he passed through a course of discipline including self-inflicted mortifications and penances appears from the following
statement at page 255: "The Venerable Ascetic Mahavira belonged to the Kasyapa Gotra. His three names have thus been recorded: by his parents he was called Vardhaman; because he is devoid of love and hate, he is called Sramana (i.e. Ascetic); because he stands fast in the midst of dangers and fears, patiently bears hardships and calamities, adheres to the chosen rules of penance, is wise, indifferent to pleasure and pain, rich in control, and gifted with fortitude, the name Venerable Ascetic Mahavira has been given him by the gods." The "rules of penance" are not given with categorical precision in the Acharanga-Sutra; but from incidental references to them some idea of their rigidness may be formed. It seems that temporary penances were prescribed as a sort of atonement for short-comings and backslidings. At page 48 we have these words:—

"Sometimes, though a monk be endowed with virtue, and walks in righteousness, living beings, coming in contact with his body, will be killed. (If this happens through mere carelessness) then he will get his punishment in this life: but if it was done contrary to the rules, he should repent of it, and do penance for it. Thus, he who knows the sacred love, recommends penance combined with watchfulness." Again "when strongly vexed by the influence of the senses, he should eat bad food, mortify himself, stand upright, wander from village to village, take no food at all, withdraw his mind from women." The reason of the concluding bit of direction is given in the foregoing paragraph:—"The greatest temptation in this world are women." Penance should be practised even in eating, for at page 7, we have this direction:—"A male or female mendicant eating food, &c., should not shift (the morsel) from the left jaw to the right jaw, nor from the right jaw to the left jaw,
to get a fuller taste of it, not caring for the taste (of it),—aspiring to freedom from bonds. Penance suits him.” The sentiment in the last sentence appears in various other connections, and cannot but be taken to mean that penance in the case of the devotee is an inseparable element, to be practised, not merely occasionally in atonement of particular sins and shortcomings, but steadily and uninterruptedly throughout the entire period of discipline.

But one main feature of the penance prescribed is fasting, or the observance of long and protracted periods of fasting. With reference to Mahavira’s fasts, already alluded to, Wilson has these remarks:—“The whole of the time expended by him in these preparatory exercises was twelve years and six months, and of this he fasted nearly eleven years. His various fasts are particularised with great minuteness, as one of six months, nine of four months each, twelve of one month, and seventy-two of half a month each, making altogether ten years, and three hundred and forty-nine days.” But these long continued fasts culminated in the case of the devotee in one called “the religious death.” At page 72 of the Acharanga-Sutra this is referred to in these words:—“Then”—that is after having retired to a secluded and clean spot—“he should then and there effect (the religious death called) itvara.” The reference is in terms so vague that no idea of this culminating fast can be formed. Nor do the following words of Jacobi throw much light upon it:—“Itvara or ingitamarana consists in starving oneself, while keeping within a limited space. A religious death is usually permitted only to those who have during twelve years undergone preparatory penance, consisting chiefly in protracted periods of fast.” It seems the death connected with the fast was not literal, and
meant only a season of starvation spent in a cell or secluded place of dimensions too small to permit freedom of motion in the case of the limbs or anything like natural relaxation of muscles and nerves.

Another question ought to be raised and disposed of before attention is called to the glorious fruit of this course of toilsome and painful discipline. Did the preparatory career possess a negative, as well as positive element? or was the devotee called upon to abandon one course as well as adopt another? Certainly, he was called upon to forsake all acts regarded as sinful; and the greatest of these is according to the system killing. A few quotations will show that the most serious offence of which the devotee can be guilty lies in the direction of murder. "A heretic professes to cure (the love of pleasure) while he kills, cuts, strikes, destroys, chases away, resolves to do what has not been done before," (p. 25.) "He always conforms to all knowledge and renunciation; the hero is not polluted by the sin of killing. He is a wise man who perfectly knows the non-killing, who searches after the liberation of the bound," (p. 27.) "Examining karma, and the root of karma, viz., killing, examining (it), and adopting its contrary, he (a wise man) is not seen by both ends" (love and hate,) (p. 29.) "He should not kill, nor cause others to kill, nor consent to the killing of others," (p. 31.) "This is the doctrine of the Seer who does not injure living beings, and has put an end (to acts and to sansara)" (p. 33.) "In this (the religion of the Jainas) the cause of the fool's fall has been declared (to depend) on color (that is all perceptions of the senses) (and killing)" (p. 46.) "Nay, we abhor those who give pain to their bodies. Knowing this, a wise man should not cause this or any other pain (to any creatures),'
When crawling animals or such as live on high or below,—feed on his flesh and blood, he should neither kill them nor rub (the wound)," (p. 5).

Almost every page of the book embodies some instruction or other, in the form of a command, a prohibition, an exhortation or a warning, against killing or the many acts of injury which culminate in killing; while the innumerable directions given as to the ways in which the devotee should avoid injuring even the minutest forms of life visible or invisible, real or imaginary, while sitting or lying down, eating or drinking, going out or coming in, are fitted to set forth a scrupulous regard to life, such as savours of something even worse than morbid sentimentalism. The very first of the five vows of asceticism runs thus:—"I renounce all killing of living beings, whether subtle or gross, whether movable or immovable. Nor shall I myself kill living beings (nor cause others to do it, nor consent to it.) As long as I live, I confess and blame, repent and exempt myself of these sins in the thrice-threefold way (that is acting, commanding, consenting either in the past or the present or the future) in mind, speech or body," (p. 202.) To preserve himself from this sin of sins, a Nirgrantha "is careful in his walk," "searches into his mind," "searches into his speech," "careful in laying down his utensil of begging," "eats and drinks after inspecting his food and drink."

The vow relative to intercourse with women, or prohibitory of vices coming under the head of adultery, has already been alluded to. The other three vows ought not to be passed over unnoticed, as they have reference to certain sins which the devotee must carefully avoid. The third has reference to stealing, and runs thus:—"I renounce all taking of anything not given, either in a village or a town
or a wood, either of little or of much, of small or great, of living or lifeless things, I shall neither take myself what is not given, nor cause others to take it, nor consent to their taking it, &c.’’ The second vow, which shows that Asiatic habits of lying have been begotten and matured by ages of tyranny, runs thus:—"I renounce all vices of lying speech (arising) from anger, or greed, or fear, or mirth. I shall neither myself speak lies, nor cause others to speak lies, nor consent to the speaking of lies by others, &c.’’ The fifth or last vow implies the annihilation, not the regulation of the senses, the extinction of man’s emotional and sensational nature. It runs thus:—"I renounce all attachments, whether little or much, small or great, living or lifeless; neither shall I myself form such attachment nor cause others to do so, nor consent to their doing so, &c.’’ This lays an interdict on all ‘‘agreeable and disagreeable sounds,’’ ‘‘agreeable and disagreeable forms or colors,’’ ‘‘agreeable and disagreeable smells,’’ ‘‘agreeable and disagreeable tastes’’ and ‘‘agreeable and disagreeable touches.’’

The body has no mercy shown it either in this system or any other system of ancient philosophy, barring those of a gross, Epicurean character. ‘‘The body’’ is said to be ‘‘of a fragile nature’’ ‘‘unstable, transient, uneternal, increasing and decreasing, of a changeable nature,’’ and we are required to ‘‘perceive this as its true character.’’ Thus far all is right. But we have this command given at page 46:—"Fight with this (your body)! why should you fight with anything else.’’ And at page 47 we have these very likely ancient sayings quoted:—‘‘A sage acquiring sagedom should subdue his body.’’ ‘‘The heroes who look at everything with indifference eat mean and rough (food, &c.)’’ The body must be systematically mortified, and separated as
completely as possible, from the varieties of natural objects which minister to its comfort.

But it is to be observed that ascetism of itself does not, and cannot lead the devotee up to the summit of his wishes. Asceticism is only a preparatory step, by no means the last, of the ladder crowned with supreme knowledge. The painful discipline through which the devotee passes has for its object the subjugation of the body, or the extinction, as far as that is attainable, of man's animal and esthetic nature; but a higher discipline is needed to realise the same consummation in his mental nature. His restless and vagrant thought must be disciplined,—separated by diverse expedients from the varieties of objects that tend to draw it outwards, drawn gradually backwards through regions more and more circumscribed as they recede towards its ultimate goal, and finally confined within itself! The disciplinary process needed to compass this end is meditation. The beatified spirits or the deified heroes had to move forward to this, the last stage of their preparation. They had to give themselves unreservedly to intense meditation in a secluded place under the shade of an unbrageous tree. Meditation has its stages, rising in its intensity from where it is easily disturbed to where its imperturbability all the powers of heaven, earth and hell cannot jointly overcome; and these heroes had to rise slowly, and in a toilsome manner, from its lower to its higher steps. They strive first of all to curb the natural vagrancy of their thought by fixing it on circumscribed spaces more and more narrowed, on a circle or a square, or a parallelogram or a triangle, till it can with the greatest ease be concentrated on a point in space or on the tip of the devotee's nose, or on the imagined centre of the crown of his head. And when thought under such dis-
cipline loses its outward tendency, and draws its powers inwards, "as the tortoise its limbs," it is caused to feed upon itself; and then we have the glorious consummation, the threefold distinction between thought, its subject and object wiped out, and nothing left but thought. The thinker dies, to all intents and purposes, if not literally, and the object of thought remains unrecognized, and the devotee is absorbed in thought which is still as the tranquil lake, quiescent as inert matter, and imperturbable as death itself. The Revered Ones had to rise gradually, and by resorting to varieties of expedients, from what in Yoga philosophy is called "seeded" meditation, that is where the threefold distinction between thought, its subject and object is recognized, to that which is "seedless."

The state thus attained is called passionlessness, and a few verses ought to be quoted to show what it is. At page 34 we have the following concatenation of principles considered as wrong set forth:—"He who knows wrath, knows pride; he who knows pride, knows deceit; he who knows deceit, knows greed; he who knows greed, knows love: he who knows love, knows hate; he who knows hate, knows delusion; he who knows delusion, knows conception," and so on the chain passes to "birth," "death," "hell," "animal existence" and "pain." A wise man is exhorted to "avoid wrath, pride, deceit, greed, love, hate, delusion, conception, birth, death, hell, animal existence, and pain." At pages 66 and 67, the wise man is said to be one "who has no desires," and who "proceeds securely (on the road to final liberation) after having cut off both (love and hate)." At page 75, he does not "long for life, nor wish for death," and he is to "yearn after neither life nor death." And at page 212 he is thus described:—"not desiring this or the
next world, the learned one is not measured by the qualities of love." Add to this the fact, alluded to in the previous paper, that Mahavira raised himself by dint of meditation above the polarities of nature, so as not to be affected by heat or cold, light or darkness, storm or calm, &c., above esthetic distinctions, so as to be "indifferent alike to the smell of ordure and of sandal," and above attachments, as he desired "neither life nor death," neither "this world" nor "that beyond."

In this state of passionlessness, when the heart is free from all bias, good or bad, and the intellect is calm and tranquil, true knowledge is attained. True knowledge has five stages, or is said to be "fivefold;" but before an insight is presented into its nature, it is desirable to pause and set forth the points of similarity between this course of discipline and that recommended in the Buddhist records. The two systems are properly speaking identical, barring the excess of rigor attaching to the course pursued by Jaina ascetics. Buddhism, like Jainism, inculcates the worship of deified mortals standing at the head of its pantheon of devotees passing through the higher stages of ascetic culture, as well as of divinities borrowed from foreign sources; and these objects of the highest worship had to raise themselves to their pre-eminent position by a course of penance and meditation. They had to forsake the comforts of domestic life, subdue their bodies by fasts and vigils, draw their minds away from objects of sense, concentrate their thought on their own selves, and thereby attain the true knowledge which is a stepping stone to complete liberation. Buddha, however, did not attach, when his eyes were opened, such undue importance to mortification and penance; and discouraged nudity, dirt, maceration of the body and excessive
self-torture; nor did he allow his disciples to carry their scruples about taking life to the ridiculous length of abstaining from cold water, narrowly inspecting the food before eating, and carefully sweeping the floor before laying down. Buddha recoiled from the extreme of rigor noticeable in the practice of Hindu Gymnosophists, and introduced a milder form of asceticism; and his vast popularity is due to his success in humanising his system to a great extent. He resembled Parsva Nath in his ascetic proclivities, rather than Mahavira; but his object was the same, and his method not materially different. And they both, viz., Buddha and Mahavira, were themselves incarnations of the ethical systems of which they were respectively the founders, in so much that their lives are mirrors in which their moral teaching and the philosophy associated with it are clearly reflected, just as the morality taught by Christ is embodied in His life and character. They both avoided the gross inconsistency of requiring a sacrifice which they themselves were unwilling to make, a fact to be carefully noted by the few Missionaries who, while retaining stipends and refined habits of life, recommend asceticism in the case of their native helpers!

Regarding the five stages of knowledge we have the following utterances in the paper in the Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha:—

"This knowledge is five-fold as divided into mati, sruta, avadhi, manas-paryaya, and Kevala; as it has been said "Mati, sruta, avadhi, manas-paryaya and kevala these are knowledge." The meaning of this is as follows:—

"1. Mati is that by which one cognizes an object through the operation of the senses and the mind, all obstructions of knowledge being abolished.
"2. *Sruta* is the clear knowledge produced by *mati*, all the obstructions of knowledge being abolished.

"3. *Avadhi* is the knowledge of special objects caused by the abolition of the hindrances, which is effected by "right, intuition," &c.

"4. *Manus-parayaya* is the clear definite knowledge of another's thoughts, produced by the abolition of all the obstructions of knowledge caused by the veil of envy.

"5. *Kevala* is that pure unalloyed knowledge, for the sake of which ascetics practise various kinds of penance."

The first is nothing more than perception, which occurs according to an established principle of Hindu logic when there is a literal conjunction of the object perceived, the sense through which it is cognized, and the percipient mind, and when the mind is literally transformed into the object perceived. The second perhaps refers to the knowledge *per se* of the thing perceived, that is the knowledge of it as it is, not merely as it appears. The third is an approach to omniscience, and involves knowledge of any special event occurring without or beyond the range of our sense-perceptions, or of an object lying outside the reach of the senses. Sakra is said most distinctly to have ascertained the exact time of the birth of Mahavira in the womb of his Brahman mother, its locality and surroundings, by the species of knowledge called *avadhi*. This species of knowledge then implies complete knowledge of all external things or objective realities, whether they lie within or without the reach of the senses of the percipient agent, and is therefore in antithesis to the fourth species enumerated, which involves a knowledge of the secret thoughts of men, as well as of realities too subtle to be perceived by the senses, such as invisible spirits, gods, demons and monsters, inaudible sounds, &c. And the
last in its lower stages includes the knowledge of the categories, and in its higher, perfect stillness of thought with that species of absolute knowledge which is properly described as absolute ignorance. The obstructions to right knowledge, called *avarana*, are all notions, illusions, prejudices and prepossessions by which the judgment is warped or clouded.

The toilsome way in which the deified mortals raised themselves to such unlimited knowledge, as constituted them infallible teachers and propagators of a new faith, having been indicated, the question ought to be raised—What did they teach? They in the first place revived a law which is eternal, immutable, universally obligatory, likely at times to be partially ignored, marred and distorted in a world full of vice and wickedness, but destined nevertheless to live and reign for ever. This law is alluded to in various places and connections in the Acharanga-Sutra; and wherever referred to it is spoken of in terms expressive of deep reverence. It is called "the law," "the sacred lore," "the truth," "the unparalleled wisdom," "the road to liberation," "the doctrine of renunciation," "the creed," "the highest doctrine," "a safe refuge," "the faith," &c.

It has existed, like the constituent elements or ultimate powers of nature, from eternity, and has from time to time been proclaimed authoritatively by "an eternal succession of teachers." Its authority is derived, not from any Being to whom the moral world ought to look up as the Author of its order, or as its Law-giver and Law-enforcer, not from what is ordinarily understood by revelation, not from any connection it may have with the Veda, the canonicity of which is denied, but from the eternal fitness of things, and from the testimony of the deified teachers. It is moreover self-evident
and its excellence is perceived in proportion as it is reduced to practice. Faith in it is the highest virtue, and scepticism about it or a disposition to question its congruity, excellence and obligatoriness is the most heinous offence. The first source of bondage, which is the antithesis of liberation, is said to be "false intuition," and this is thus described in a passage in the \textit{Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha} :—"False intuition" is two-fold, either innate from one's natural character, as when one disbelieves Jaina doctrines from the influence of former evil actions, irrespectively of another's teaching,—or derived, when learned by another's teaching." The believer in the law is called the wise man, while the unbeliever is invariably stigmatised as "the fool," and the abusive epithets which the Brahmans and the Buddhists draw down upon themselves are directed against them solely on account of their folly in questioning the authority of Mahavira, and withholding faith from his version of the law!

The theory of an eternal succession of worlds appearing and disappearing according to a fixed law of evolution and involution, and even that of an eternal succession of great teachers inspired by science and philosophy, or by knowledge profounder than what falls to the lot of ordinary mortals, may be accepted by modern thinkers. But the idea of an eternal moral law, a law, not manufactured by society to meet its passing exigencies, but abiding in all ages as a permanent and immutable entity, a law, moreover, invariably obligatory, not merely of temporary and local importance and influence, must be repugnant to the most cherished susceptibilities in some quarters in these days.

The resemblance between such systems as ancient Buddhism and Jainaism on one hand, and modern Comptism on the other is too marked to be unnoticed, and the points of
similarity have been dwelt upon *ad nauseam*; but sufficient prominence has scarcely been given to the points of dissimilarity and divergence. The main point of difference lies in the conception of the law associated with Buddhism or Jainism. Not a fruit of empiricism, born of experience, tested and modified by experience, created by society for its convenience and depending on its breath for existence, the moral law was regarded as a sovereign, ruling principle, associated with the eternal fitness of things, not at all depending on the contingencies of life, without beginning, without end, sacred and unchangeable, obligatory in all ages and under all circumstances, and backed by sanctions of an awful character, promises and threatenings to be realised with unerring certitude.

This idea of the law once admitted, the atheism with which it is associated appears supremely absurd. For what is law but an expression of order, the sequence of events either in the physical or in the moral world? The law of laws in the universe is, therefore not a cause, but simply an effect, eternal neither in the order of time, nor even in the order of thought. The law implies the law-giver or law-maintainer as thoroughly and as indisputably as an effect implies a cause. But perhaps the law was regarded as a motive power, a moral force, rather than a simple expression of order, but even this view of the matter, by no means congruous, implies a moral agent. Modern Comptism is more consistent in rejecting an immutable law of rectitude, along with the Creator and Moral-Governor, than ancient Buddhism was in retaining the law, while at the same time bowing the Law-giver off the stage!

The law, as taught either by Buddha himself or by Mahâvîra, is two-fold, or has two stages, one for the laity and
clergy, and one for the clergy or rather fraternity of ascetics alone, one for the Sravakas and Yatis and one for the Yatis alone. The purely ethical portion of it, consisting of prohibitions against murder, theft, adultery and mendacity, is for all the followers of the system; while its voluminous code of vexatious rules and regulations affecting every department of life, its ordinary and extraordinary duties, is intended only for those, who, after leading the life of decent householders or decent members of families or communities, pass into the state of houselessness, or become religious mendicants. The mistake by which the system is marred is the inversion of the relative importance of its two parts, as it places the particular above the universal, the durable above the evanescent, the factitious above the natural. The eternal principles of morality are held to be inferior in importance and tendency to a host of galling rules framed to circumscribe the sphere of allowable or legitimate independence of action. It should rather be affirmed that an element essentially wrong is made to overshadow and cripple that which is proper and of vital importance. Add to this the fact that the whole, the ethical and the monastic portion, is subordinated to such knowledge as is of no consequence whatever in matters affecting our moral well-being. The ethical portion of this mongrel code is simply a stepping-stone to the ascetic element; but its high-pressure asceticism is not the goal, is simply a gateway leading to a higher attainment. Knowledge of an occult stamp is the topmost step of the ladder, the *summun bonum*, the highest attainment which precedes complete salvation, which properly means complete cessation of life.

In all this we see a reproduction in somewhat altered phraseology of the theory of salvation elaborated in the
Upanishads, the duties of the Karma-Kand leading up to the Gyan-Kand, devotional exercises leading up to meditation, and that to self-knowledge, and that to self-annihilation in the proper sense of the term! Sufficient prominence has not been given to the fact that both Buddha and Mahavira were borrowers more than original thinkers; and that in their systems much of what is regarded as sacred lore in connection with the national faith appears in new garments.

In the paper in the Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha the path of liberation is thus indicated:—"The well-known triad, called the three gems, right intuition, &c., are thus described in the Paramagamasara (which is devoted to the exposition of the doctrines of the Arhats) — 'Right intuition, right knowledge, right conduct are the path of liberation.' " Here the order is inverted except in the case of those who accept the teaching of the Jins, and proceed from causes to effects. The Jins themselves, however, acquired right intuition by a laborious process, by beginning with right conduct, and rising through the five stages of knowledge up to that which is the immediate pre-requisite for salvation. And even in the case of the followers of the system, intellectual knowledge cannot be changed into spiritual discernment, except by a course of discipline similar in every respect to what was pursued with painful perseverance by the teachers themselves. This will appear when what is said in the same paper about right intuition is taken into consideration:—"When the meaning of the predicaments, the soul, &c., has been declared by an Arhat in exact accordance with their reality, absolute faith in the teaching, i.e., the entire absence of any contrary idea, is "right intuition." And to this effect runs the Tattvartha-Sutra,—"Faith in the predicaments is right intuition," or as another definition gives it 'Acquiescence in the
predicaments declared by a Jin is called "right faith"; it is produced either by natural character or by the Guru's instruction.' Here the expression 'natural character' means merit required by right conduct and right knowledge either in a previous or in the present stage of existence.

It may be stated after all that the three elements of the triad are inseparable, except in thought, as they are initiated and matured together, just like justification and sanctification according to the theology of the Church universal, and they jointly lead to liberation, as stated in the following sentence:—"These three, right intuition, right knowledge and right conduct, when united, produce liberation, but not severally, just as in the case of an elixir, it is knowledge of what it is, faith in its virtues, and the actual application of the medicine united, which produce the elixir's effect but not severally."

Right intuition being faith in the predicaments, the question arises, what are these? Here we have the reply:—"Here we may say concisely that the tattvas or predicaments are two, jiva and ajiva: the soul, jiva, is pure intelligence; the non-soul, ajiva, is pure non-intelligence." Here is a dualism affirmed with emphasis, and without any equivocation. The existence of a permanent entity distinct from matter, though never appearing apart from it, is clearly indicated, and this emphatic admission is the greatest point of difference between Buddhistic and Jaina philosophy. Buddhism is properly speaking materialistic monism, the converse of Vedanlic philosophy which upholds a monism of a purely spiritual character. Buddhism denies any entity in man besides material aggregates, a permanent subject of thought, feeling and volition, a life or soul or self. Jainaism cancels this negation, and firmly upholds the doctrine of
Life, called also self, and this is brought out even in an ethical treatise like the Acharanga-Sutra. At page 39 we have this utterance:—"Thus thoroughly knowing karma, observing the commandment, wise, unattached (to the world), recognising thy Self as one, subdue the body, chastise thyself, weaken thy Self: 'just as fire consumes wood.'" And at page 50, we have a clearer statement:—"The Self is the knower (or experiencer), and the knower is the Self. That through which one knows is the Self. With regard to this (to know) it (the Self) is established. Such is he who maintains the right doctrine of Self." The sentence 'That through which one knows is Self,' make self an instrument of knowledge, not its subject. But this is one of those inaccurate forms of expression of which Hindu philosophy cannot be expected to get rid in its rhapsodical utterances!

*Jiva* occupies in Jaina philosophy the place which souls occupy in the Sankhya scheme of thought; and the question ought to be settled—are lives according to this system multitudinous as souls are according to the Sankhya system? Or, in other words, is the theory of universal life pervading every form of existence, organised or unorganized, propounded in Jaina Schools? Wilson inclines to the opinion that it is, as he speaks of "*jiva* or the living and sentient principle as existing in various forms, but specially reducible to two classes, those with, and those without mobility." Jacobi, the translator of the Acharanga and Kalpa Sutras, denies this, and speaks of lives corresponding to the *Atmas* or souls of the orthodox system, rather than of Life corresponding to the universal spirit or soul of Vedantic speculators. Jacobi, however, points to an ambiguous sentence in support of his views; while Wilson in his paper
brings forward what may be construed into a proof in the very first sermon of Mahavira given in it. The sermon begins with these words:—"The world is without bounds, like a formidable ocean; its cause is karma, which is the seed of the tree. The being jiva invested with body, but devoid of judgment, goes like a well-sinker, ever down-wards, by the acts it performs, whilst the embodied being, which has attained purity, goes ever upwards, by its own acts, like the builder of a palace." In this passage the principle called jiva appears as assuming bodies, sometimes sinking into its lowest forms of misery and shame by its own misdeeds, and sometimes rising into its highest forms by dint of virtue and merit; but the words, it must be confessed, are susceptible of a construction in favor of Jacobi's view. Perhaps the idea of lives innumerable, conterminous and all-pervading, was first broached, only to be subsequently unified into one Universal Life by the spirit of generalization stirred up when the system passed through its incipient stages, and grew into maturity.

The most prominent characteristic of jiva is its pervasiveness. Jacobi in his elaborate introduction makes a remark for which it were to be wished he had quoted proper authority. He says:—"But the Jainas fully concur in the Brahmanic theory of the Atman, with only this difference, that they ascribe to the Atmas a limited space, while the Brahmans of the Nyaya, Sankhya and Vaiseshika schools contend the Atmas are ce-extensive with the universe." It is admitted that jiva animates every form of existence, animate or inanimate in common parlance, visible or invisible, complex or simple, and unless a circumambient or rather surrounding vacuum were posited, a limit to its pervasiveness would be inconceivable, and the difference
pointed out by Jacobi would be a difference without a distinction! Be that as it may, one thing is indisputable that Life according to the system co-exists with every type of existence, organized or unorganized, gigantic or minute. That "beings called minute" have life in them, or penetrating their bodies will not of course be denied. These are in the Acharanga-Sutra divided into eight classes viz., "those who are produced, 1, from eggs (birds &c.,) 2, from a fetus (as elephants, &c.), 3, from a fetus with an enveloping membrane (as cows, buffaloes, &c.), 4, from fluids (as worms, &c.), 5, from sweat (bugs, bees, &c.), 6 by coagulation (as locusts, ants, &c.), 7, from sprouts (as butterflies, wagtails, &c.), 8, by regeneration (men, gods, hell beings). (p. 11). But not only do those, but things called inanimate have life. At page 80 Mahavira's scrupulous regard to life is thus expressed:—"Thoroughly knowing the earth-bodies, and water-bodies, and fire-bodies and wind-bodies, the lichens, seeds and sprouts, he comprehended that they are, if narrowly inspected, imbued with life, and avoided to injure them; he the great Hero."

The Second Lesson of Lecture I. of Book I. is simply a warning against injuring earth-bodies, and some of the burning words with which it concludes are these:—"He who injures these (earth-bodies) does not comprehend and renounce sinful actions." In the following Lesson (or Lesson Third) we have the following emphatic statement:—"He who denies the world (of water-bodies) denies the self; and he who denies the self, denies the world of (water-bodies)." The same affirmation is reproduced in Lesson Fourth with reference to fire-bodies, while in Lesson Seventh or the concluding Lesson of the First Book it is said:—"He who injures these (wind-bodies) does not comprehend and
renounce the sinful acts. The two concluding sentences of this Lesson embody a prohibition of injury to the six kinds of life into which existence in all its multifarious forms is divided, viz., animals, plants, earth-bodies, fire-bodies, water-bodies, and wind-bodies. They run thus:—

"Knowing them a wise man should not act sinfully towards the aggregate of six (kinds of) lives, or cause others to act so, nor allow others to act so. He who knows these causes of sin relating to the aggregate of the six (kinds of) lives, is called a reward-knowing sage."

Another characteristic of Lives or souls is intelligence, which is not an accident, but a constitutive element, or rather the only element of which a particular soul is composed; as appears from the following words:—"Intelligence (Chaitanya) is common to all souls, and is the real nature of the soul viewed as Parinata (or as it is in itself.)" The life is therefore described as the "knower" or "experiencer," very likely in the sense attached to these words in the Sankhya School, that is in the sense of unconscious susceptibility to impressions communicated through the internal organ of the body, viz., the mind. The life or soul passes through various states in its upward move to liberation, the lowest of which being the state in which the effects of past actions continue, and new actions arise "exerting an inherent influence on the future;" and the highest being the state in which there is "the absolute abolition of actions and their effects." The soul, therefore, passes through successive stages of happiness and unhappiness intertwined till it rises to the unalloyed felicity of liberation. But these varying states are really "apparent," and do not in the slightest degree affect its "innate condition," which is "pure intelligence." The
student of Hindu philosophy cannot think of what is said about Lives or jivas in the paper on the “Arhat system” in the Sarva-Darsana Sangraha without being reminded of the descriptions of souls in the Sankhya Sutras; and as souls in these, Lives are divided into two classes, the “mundane” and the “released,” those still in bondage and those liberated and beatified. With reference, however, to the mundane Lives, a division into classes is spoken of such as is peculiar to the Jaina system, a division into those with “the internal sense,” which gives them “the power of apprehension, talking, acting, and receiving instruction,” and those without the aforesaid organ and the concomitant power. These last are again sub-divided into two classes, the “locomotive” and “the immovable”—the former including all living creatures, that is, creatures regarded as animate by mankind at large, and the latter including plants and the elements, earth, water, fire and air. This division may justly he regarded as peculiar to the Jaina system, but the Sankhya scheme of thought by representing souls as not merely conterminous, but pervasive, and Prakriti also as pervasive, assumes their mutual interpenetration, and necessarily leads to the Jaina conclusion!

The second predicament is Ajiva or non-life or non-soul, and includes whatever the universe contains apart from jiva or life. Its attributes can hardly be indentified with the well-known attributes of matter, impenetrability, divisibility, and inertia; but its ultimates are atoms. The characteristics of Life dwelt upon are enough to set fourth the points of difference between the two categories, and a detailed description of the differentiating attributes of the second is not needed. Ajiva is the antithesis of jiva, and when these two predicaments are contrasted, the
result is Intelligence placed in opposition to non-intelligence; but it will be shown that as the one is as inert as the other, and intelligence in the one is tantamount to non-intelligence in the other, the difference between the two realities is after all nil. Meanwhile it is desirable to raise the question—what is meant by such expressions as "earth-bodies," "water-bodies," "fire-bodies," and "wind-bodies"? Are these identical with the terrestrial, aqueous, igneous and aerial atoms of the Logical Schools of Hindu philosophy? Or are they aggregates rather than ultimates, conglomerates of atoms rather than atoms themselves? Jacobi maintains that they are aggregates, not atoms; and an ambiguous passage in the paper in the Sarva-Dursana Sangraha seems to favor the assumption. At any rate they are reducible to atoms; and the thing to be specially noted is that every atom has either a particle or mode of life in it; and consequently the philosophy associated with Jainism has with some degree of justice been called Hylozoism.

But a rigid analysis of the Jaina philosophy throws almost an insuperable obstacle in the way of such an expression being applied, there being after all very little difference between life as sketched in Jaina books and the non-life with which it is inseparably associated or in which it inheres. Life is not the formative principle of matter, not an organising power, not a force. The organising principle is to be sought beyond the categories in the unseen power which is the originating and guiding principle of evolution, viz., karma. This appears from the opening sentence of the first sermon of Mahavira given in extenso by Wilson:—"The world is without bounds, like a formidable ocean; its cause is karma, which is as the seed of the tree." And that is the reason why the two categories mentioned did not
appear enough to sensible Jaina philosophers, and three other categories were in process of time added to them, viz., Dharma, Adharma (called also punya and papa) and akasa or pudgala. Now it is well known that Dharma and Adharma, merit and demerit are effects not causes, the fruits of karma, and the two may be justly represented as interchangeable with it, while the third, either akasa, or ether, or pudgala, or body, may be included in the second predicament, ajiva. The other categories which are at times added, viz. Asrava, the influence of the senses or "the impulse to action," Bandha, the bondage of false intuition or sin, sarvara, or "that by which the influence of past actions is stopped from entering into the soul," nirjvara, the exhaustion of the fruit of past actions, and Mokaha, liberation, are all connected with and may be merged in karma. Karma is, then, the only category that has to be added, and it has precedence of the other two. In the Acharanga-Sutra it is distinctly said that "the condition of living beings arises from karma." But in all that is said about the precedence of karma, and its originative power, we have the schoolboy puzzle revived, whether the hen existed before the egg, or the egg existed before the hen? How could karma exist before the doer? How could a principle which is admittedly an effect be eternal? If eternal in the sense of being without beginning, the question arises, is it annihilable? Books like the Acharanga-Sutra are replete with exhortations and appeals, having for their object the destruction of karma. At page 30, we have the following exhortation:—"Manifold indeed appear sinful actions: therefore prove constant to truth. Delighting in it, a wise man destroys all karma." At page 32 we have these words:—"He whose karma has ceased and conduct is right, who
recognizes the truth (stated above) and destroys sinfulness, &c.” The sentiment is repeated in a hundred other connections, and heroes, such as Mahavira, were not beati-

fied till their karma with all its effects had been “exhausted.” Karma is, like non-discrimination of the Sankhya School, beginningless but annihilable, not endless; and so universalism is the type of the salvation preached by the Jaina philosopher, a time is coming when this formative principle will cease to live and act. What will be the result? Not only will the present stage of existence come to an end, but, the evolving principle being extinguished “the eternal succession of worlds and teachers” will come to an end, and nothing will remain but inert matter and inert life! Is Jainaism prepared to accept this conclusion? No. Therefore the best way of describing the philosophy associated with it is to call it hylozoism, and transfer the motive power from karma to what is called Life.

One other important question remains to be settled before the paper is brought to a close. What is Nirvana according to the system under considerati...n? Or in what condition are the heroes existing, if they are existing at all? The reply is given at page 52 of the Acharanga Sutra in these words:—

“The liberated” is not long; nor small, nor round nor triangular, nor quadrangular nor circular; he is not black nor blue, nor red, nor green, nor white; neither of good nor bad smell, nor bitter, nor pungent, nor astringent, nor sweet; neither rough nor soft; neither heavy nor light; neither cold nor hot; neither harsh nor smooth; he is without body, without resurrection, without contact (of matter); he is not feminine, nor masculine, nor neuter; he perceives, he knows, but there is no analogy (whereby to know the nature of the liberated soul); its essence is without form; there is no
condition of the unconditioned. There is no sound, no color, no smell, no taste, no touch—nothing of that kind.” Here we have a string of negations, and the only affirmative element in the description identifies the liberated soul with the first of the categories enumerated and enlarged upon. The liberated spirit is indeterminate and undefinable, unconditioned and absolute, mysterious and inscrutable; and the only thing knowable about it is that it “perceives or knows.” But even its perception and knowledge are of a stamp so different from that of the ideas conjured up in our minds by these words, that they ought to be represented as above the level of our comprehension. This mysterious predicate, called in the case of Life, ‘intelligence,’ is beyond the confines of human experience or human cognizance, as perception without a recognized distinction between the percipient subject, and the perceived object, or knowledge without the three-fold distinction between the knowing subject, the known object and the abstraction called knowledge, is to us inconceivable.

The description given of the first predicament, jiva, identifies it with the second ajiva, excepting in one point. Both are pervasive or all diffusive, and, if the theory of Universal Life appearing in various modes be abandoned, both are atomic and multitudinous. Again both the categories are passive, the motive power inhering in an entity different from them both, an entity which in this system performs the functions assigned to Prakriti in the Sankhya School. The only difference between them is that, while the one has intelligence or is intelligence, the other is not. But if intelligence as defined is, after all, tantamount to non-intelligence, we have here a difference without a distinction. The liberated soul and life are identical, and the liberation attained by a human being after years of penance and meditation ensure
his being emancipated from contact with matter, and mingled with jiva or Life. But as both matter and Life are pervasive or all-diffusive, emancipation from contact is inconceivable; and the ultimate conclusion to which we are brought is that the individual soul inheres, after emancipation from formal existence, in an individual atom, till the interval between one stage of existence and its successor is completed and it is forced by an unseen and undefinable power into a chain of new forms: and so on ad infinitum!

The reader will notice many inconsistencies in our exposition of the philosophy, on the background of which the austere morality of Jainism rises; but it is to be hoped that they will be traced to their proper source, viz., its incoherent and self-contradictory character. The Hindu intellect is acute indeed, but it has defects such as tend to mar its attempts at constructing systems of philosophy. It lacks breadth of view, and what may be called the power of systematization. It penetrates the subject on which it is for the time-being concentrated with an insight that may properly be represented as marvellous, but it fails to take a comprehensive view of the varieties of topics with which it is correlated, or of the varieties of questions which must be settled ere a particular view is placed on the solid basis of complete induction. The great thinkers of the philosophic age of Indian history followed in their speculations the example set, according to Max Muller, by the Rishis of the Rig Veda period in their practical devotions. These, while engaged in worshipping or propitiating by sacrifices and libations one member of their pantheon of limited dimensions, forgot the existence of the others, and raised the object of their present worship to the position of the Supreme Deity, ascribing attributes and powers inconsistent
with what the devotee had previously given in succession to several other gods. Hence in the Rig Veda hymnology it is difficult to ascertain the relative position of any of the gods adored and praised, while the inconsistencies and contradictions in the descriptions attempted of their several or distinctive attributes are both numerous and glaring. The philosophers had the same intellectual defect, and were betrayed into similar inconsistencies in their speculations. They fixed their attention on one of the entities they had posited, and were so thoroughly absorbed in it that they forgot the assumed existence of the others, and attributed to it properties inconsistent with what had already been ascribed to one or other of the entities co-ordinated with it. In the Sankhya philosophy, for instance, some of the distinctive functions given to Prakriti, the self-evolving ultimate, are also ascribed to the principle called ignorance or non-discrimination; and it is by no means manifest how both souls and matter, being by hypothesis all-diffusive and all-pervasive, liberation of the former from contact with the latter, can be considered as a possibility. But barring such inconsistencies we may represent the system as dualistic based on the two assumed entities, eternal matter and eternal souls, the former active, the latter passive, and, in a sense to us inconceivable, intelligent. The Jaina scheme of thought is a reproduction in a somewhat modified phraseology of the Sankhya philosophy, the lives of the one system taking the place of the souls of the other, the active principle remaining the same; while both the systems make salvation dependent on knowledge of the predicaments assumed, or rather of the distinction, eternal as well as essential, between soul and non-soul, rather than on knowledge of God, and His everlasting and unchangeable love!
CHAPTER VIII.

THE CHAVAKA SYSTEM OR INDIAN EPICURISM.

The cycle of development through which our ancient and modern philosophy has passed may be traced in the ancient Greek Schools in one respect and in the modern French Schools in another. The principal traits or aspects of speculative thought in the Pre-Socratic period of Greek philosophy were revived and matured in the varied Schools organized after the greatest philosopher of ancient Greece had infused new life into it. Plato in his idealism revived the pure "Being" of the Eleatic School, and Aristotle reproduced the constant, ceaseless "Becoming" of Heraclitus in his speculations about potentiality and actuality; while their bolder successors dragged the resuscitated tendencies of unsubstantial theories into the abyss of unrestrained Epicurism!

Plato’s ideal theory is, according to eminent Greek scholars, characterized by inconsistencies, such as preclude the possibility of its being held up as a coherent scheme of thought; and different versions of it have been presented by different writers, each fortified by a string of quotations from the acute, and yet charming Dialogues of the great philosopher. But opinion seems to be gravitating towards the conclusion that he maintained a sort of dualism, and did not go the length of representing the varied objects of nature as ‘non-beent’ or illusory. But his followers carried his principles to their legitimate issues, and the result was idealism of the purest type. The existence of the world of perceptible realities was stoutly denied, and a long chain of ideas, each
depending for its existence on the one immediately above it, was described as the substrate of the phenomena of nature. But this ascending series of ideas could not be represented as either beginningless or endless;—it sprung from and terminated in the everlasting idea which exists by its own power, and is therefore absolute and unconditioned. This originative idea, the idea of ideas, is the real basis of the phantasmagoria of nature, the noumenon beneath its deceptive phenomena. Do we not see in this one form at least of the pantheism elaborated and explained in the Upanishads?

But Plato's subjectivism gave place in time to Aristotle's objectivism in some quarters at least. The question raised by the great Stagirite is—Has this idea of ideas, the "pure being" of the Eleatic School revived under a different color, any existence apart from the forms in which it appears? And his reply is negative. The idea is simply a potentiality perpetually moving into actuality, a being, if being it may be called, in ceaseless process of becoming. But the potentiality in actuality, the being in becoming, or the noumenon in phenomena, if an idea, is not a force; and it can not therefore be the causal basis of the variety of forms in which it appears. These, therefore, must be traced to something behind the phantasmagoria of nature in which it appears, to some power or force by which potentiality is perpetually moved into actuality, the being caught into the ceaseless whirl of becoming. This primal force has been called actuosity, and creation is by the Aristotelian system traced to this un-beginning and unending power. The idea of Plato becomes under the manipulation of Aristotle what in modern phraseology is called inscrutable force; and in its altered shape we may see the Prakriti of the Sankhya School.
Zeno, the founder of the Stoic School advanced a step further. He protested against the dualism of Aristotle and lifted up the banner of materialistic monism. Why, said he, separate the formative principle from form, force from matter, actuosity from actuality? Why look for an entity behind that ceaseless process of becoming to which the ever-shifting phenomena of nature are to be traced? Why, in plainer terms, seek a God apart from the material substance of the world? The existence of matter is undeniable—all the senses combine with reason and common sense in proving it. Matter, moreover, appears to us, not in its unchangeable essence, but in its endless varieties of shifting forms, in its coincidences, successions and transmutations of phenomena—\textit{to adopt phraseology cannonized in these days.} The question forces itself upon us—what is the cause of the ceaseless change of form in which the essence called matter or the potentiality of Aristotle manifests itself? That cause is inherent in it, its life and soul. Matter has an active and a passive principle, a negative and a positive pole, its evershifting phenomena and the hidden energy to which they are to be traced. The formative principle in matter is God, and matter itself is simply the passive material on which he works. God is the soul of the world and the world is the body of God. Barring the theistic phraseology in which the speculations of the Stoics were couched, more from deference to current traditions than from intensity of conviction, in their system of thought we see the characteristic tendencies of the Jaina scheme.

Epicurus threw aside the mock theism of former schools, revived the atomic theory of Democritus, and stoutly maintained the possibility of satisfactorily explaining the phenomena of nature without having recourse to anything like
divine intervention. Given space and atoms of particular form, magnitude and weight as abiding entities, the entire creation can be evolved according to fixed laws immanent in these ultimates, and a trifling accident causing a little irregularity in their motion, and leading to collisions. Such being the case there is no room in his system for the superfluous hypothesis of a God, and matter and force, the passive material and the active force inherent therein, are the ultimate principles of which human science can take cognizance, and beyond which it can not go. But popular prejudices must be humoured and as they are in favor of idolatry a pantheon must be created. And therefore gods floating in the atmospheric or spatial interstices between the worlds are posited, as existent indeed, but without any control whatever over mundane or human affairs. This system has a nearer affinity with the materialistic speculations of our country with Buddhism and Jainism, than its predecessors; and if the Gods posited were in the state described in the Acharanga Sutra as Nirvana, the resemblance would be almost complete.

With reference to these systems it ought to be observed that each of them had a practical aim and a grand moral purpose. The mantle of Socratas had fallen on these champions, and mere speculation, such as that in which the mental powers of the sophists had been squandered away before their day, was denounced by them as unworthy of true philosophy. Even Epicurus, whose name has been given by the suffrage of mankind at large to unrestrained license in morals, shrank with instinctive horror from such flights of thoughts as had no bearing whatever on the business of life, and the well-being of human beings. He divided knowledge, according to established practice, into logic, physics and ethics; but he
took care to subordinate the first two branches to the third, and held up the moral elevation of mankind as the grand aim of all philosophy. He certainly did represent pleasure as the ultimate aim of life, the *summum-bonum*; but the pleasure he pointed to as the goal of human efforts is not the momentary pleasure ensured by the reckless and unrestrained gratification of our passions and appetites, but the permanent and sublime enjoyment which flows from well regulated thought and chastened feeling. Nor did he set any value on the mere feeling of pleasure; his object being to secure by a disciplinary process the philosophic tranquillity, the serenity and imperturbability of mind without which true knowledge is not attainable. And if he only had carried the discipline he prescribed, and himself reduced it to practice to the length of through-going asceticism, a perfect coincidence would have been realised between his method of self-culture and that resorted to by the followers of Buddha and Mahavira in our own country. He, like these Indian reformers, recognized a moral law, and described pleasure of a serene and permanent stamp as the outcome of scrupulous and whole-hearted obedience thereto.

But his followers very naturally overstepped the limits he had prescribed, and plunged into the abyss of unchecked licentiousness both in theory and practice. They clearly saw his mistake in at once recognizing a moral law, and sapping its foundations by denying the existence of the Being from whom it derives its authority and obligatoriness. He had thrown away the fiction, as he thought, of a moral Governor of the universe, and they threw away the fiction, as they imagined, of a moral order and a moral law; and on his principles they were consistent. It is a great mistake, a mistake into which some learned theologians of the Church
have fallen, to trace the immutable Law of Rectitude to the eternal fitness of things, or to an abstraction or reality subsisting apart from the Lawgiver and Ruler of the Universe. The principles of rectitude may exist independently of God, and the Sovereign of the Universe may as a moral agent be subject to them. But constituted as human beings are, they cannot be made to see their congruity by such vague terms as the eternal fitness of things, nor can they be persuaded to pay homage to them in practical life, in spite of the clamours of their passions and appetites, by phrases pompous, indeed, but to them, without any definite meaning. He can not possibly trace them beyond the character of God, and they would lose their practical efficacy, so far as we human beings are concerned, if they were not embodied in positive divine commandments, and backed by promises of reward and threats of punishment resting on the rock of the revealed word of God. The Epicureans properly so called, that is the followers of Epicurus who pushed Epicurean philosophy to its legitimate consequences, laughed at the idea of a Law without a Law-giver, or an order without a Governor, and they cast overboard, consistently with the maxims promulgated by their Teacher, the Godless morality he had preached. And they preached rank atheism and unrestricted license, and dragged, both by precept and by example, a multitude of light hearts and giddy heads into the mire of gross sensuality.

The Charvakas did in India what had been done in Greece by not a few of the followers of Epicurus. The unknown authors of the Upanishads had given prominence to a species of idealism somewhat similar to that elaborated by Plato in Greece, and at the same time had upheld the popular belief in the canonicity or the divine original of the
Vedas. Kapila, the founder of the Sankhya school, had converted their vein of subjective speculation into an apparent dualism, but real materialism; but while preaching agnosticism in theology he had striven to uphold the morals of the nation by leaving the authority of those scriptures intact. Buddha had revived in altered phraseology some of the tendencies of his school, had carried his agnosticism to rank atheism by representing himself in the height of his presumption as omniscient, and had substituted a law of his own creation for what had been left inviolate by his predecessors to prop up the sinking cause of public morals. He had been followed in this very line of reform by a man of austerer principles and gloomier temperament, but ready like him to claim omniscence, deny God, attack and repudiate the canonicity of the Vedas, and preach a law of his own invention in support of rigid virtue among the masses of his followers, and of sombre asceticism among the initiated disciples. Every thing had been given up but the law, and its authority was made dependent on the assumed omniscence of mortals of like passions with ourselves. The Charvakas appeared on the scene to laugh at this assumption, and cast the law thus brought into existence overboard! And under the guidance of boasted philosophy the popular faith was first sublimated into pantheism and then precipitated into the mire of gross Epicurism.

But another line of development or evolution brought the Charvakas to their Epicurean theory of life, and for its analogue we must turn a chapter of French Philosophy. The Empiricism, of which Locke is said to have been the founder, found in the congenial soil of France all that was necessary to accelerate its growth; and it very soon degenerated into Epicurean license. The first person to adopt this theory
and effect its transplantation to French soil was Abbe de Condillac, who discarded one of the two sources of knowledge pointed out by Locke, *viz* reflection, and retaining perception, the other source, built upon it a system of materialistic speculation. But he was an earnest man, and he left theology and ethics intact, and did not allow his questionable philosophy to interfere with the grand moral object of life. But his successors did not fail to notice his inconsistency, and they pushed his materialism to the extreme at which he himself would have shuddered. Helvetius did not formally cancel the better portion of his scheme of thought; but he did not scruple to represent self-love or self-interest as the sole spring of action, and self-gratification as the object of life. Voltaire came next with the besom of destruction in his hand, and arrayed the gigantic powers of his brilliant wit and versatile intellect against every system of positive religion, but even he found it convenient to pay some homage, simulated or genuine, to the fashionable deism of his day and generation. He was followed by Diderot, who with D' Alembert originated the famous philosophical Encyclopædia, and oscillated between deism and atheism, advocating the first in the first part of his career, and standing for the second towards its close. But the vacillation he displayed was converted into what may be called the certainty of unbelief by La Mettrie, who discarded all belief in the existence of a God, and propounded absolute materialism, or materialism dissociated from theology and morals. And the finishing-stroke was given in the well-known production "*Systeme de-la-Nature*" regarding the authorship of which there is some doubt. And so the empiricism of Locke degenerated, in a congenial soil and a corrupt atmosphere, into gross Epicurism!
A similar deterioration is noticeable in the main lines of Indian philosophy. The subjective intuitionism of the most prominent of the Upanishad Schools was thrown aside by Kapila, who laid the foundation of Indian empiricism by insisting on three sources of knowledge, to the exclusion of others, viz., Perception, Inference and Revelation, called by him Testimony. But the last of his admitted sources was thrown aside by his successor, Buddha, as inconsistent with the entire drift and scope of his philosophy, and the remaining two were retained both by the founder of Buddhism and the founder of Jainism. These two thinkers substituted a law of righteousness and ascetic self-sacrifice for the revelation assumed by previous schools; but this they were said to have discovered by virtue of an intuition which may be represented as derivative, an intuition flowing out of enlarged powers of perception acquired by dint of austerity and meditation. The Charvakas cast overboard both inference and the intuitional faculty, derived but not original, and made all attainable knowledge dependent on simple perception alone. And the result was—they were speedily drawn into the abyss of Epicurean self-indulgence!

But the Jainas prepared or paved the way for Charvaka Epicurism in another way. They not only maintained agnosticism in theology, but ushered in the reign of universal scepticism. This will appear from the paper on their system in the Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha:

"Here the Jainas everywhere introduce their favorite logic called Supta-bhangi-Naya or the system of the seven paralogisms, "may be, it is," "may be, it is not," "may be, it is and it is not," "may be it is not predictable," "may be, it is and yet not predictable," "may be, it is not and
not predicable,” “may be, it is and it is not and not predicable.” All this Anantavirya has thus laid down:

"1. When you wish to establish a thing, the proper course is to say, “may be, it is ;” when you wish to deny it ‘may be, it is not.’

"2. When you desire to establish each in turn, let your procedure likewise embrace both; when you wish to establish both at once, let it be declared ‘indescribable’ from the impossibility to describe it.

"3. The fifth process is enjoined when you wish to establish the first as well as its indescribability, when the second as well as its indescribability, the occasion for the sixth process arises.

"4. The seventh is required when all three characters are to be employed simultaneously.”

These paralogisms grow from the attitude of modest doubt to universal scepticism. When the existence of a thing is to be affirmed or denied, the use of a “perhaps” or “may be” is recommended, because a tone of certainty in the enunciation of a proposition, positive or negative, is not justified by a science, which has more to do with phenomena than with realities. Besides our knowledge is so uncertain that we ought not to hesitate to accept a statement involving a contradiction in terms, to affirm for instance that a thing exists and does not exist at one and the same time, on account, we suppose, of our ignorance of the thing in itself and of the distinction between existence and non-existence. Again the thing may be of a nature that nothing can be predicated of it with any degree of logical precision or reasonableness; nor when its existence or non-existence is assumed should any attempt be made to define it by an enumeration of any of its distinctive
predicates. And lastly existence and non-existence of the thing may be affirmed at one and the same time, and it declared "not predicable." Knowledge per se is not attainable, and not only should our affirmations and negations be characterized by a tone of modesty and doubt, but even glaring contradictions should not be set aside as unworthy of acceptance. Here we have the entire drift of the modern philosophy of uncertain, relative, contingent, rather than absolute knowledge, or knowledge shaped by a priori notions or forms of thought and the raw material furnished by sense, knowledge conditioned as contradistinguished from knowledge per se, anticipated and set forth!

But the question rises,—How can a system evolved by omniscience be made compatible with one of universal scepticism, with a knowledge of the phenomenal, rather than the real, relative and contingent, rather than absolute and unconditioned. It is an indisputable fact that Mahavira, the founder of Jainism, claimed in imitation of Buddha omniscience, and consequently his knowledge was avowedly a knowledge of essences as well as of phenomena, knowledge of things as they are in themselves as well of things as they appear, knowledge unlimited, all-comprehensive, and real, both absolutely and relatively. His revelations of facts, principles and truths could not but be represented, and were in reality represented as absolutely reliable; and so far as these are concerned the assumption on the part of his disciples of a tone of uncertainty, doubt or scepticism was reprehensible infidelity, a daring contradiction of his claims, a war against the position assumed by him as an infallible teacher. The true explanation of this phenomenon is to be sought in the fact that men of thought, even among his chosen disciples, laughed in their sleeves at the claim to
omniscience unhesitatingly advanced by him, and recklessly allowed by his followers in general. We are more surprised at the credulity with which this claim on the part of Buddha and Mahavira was allowed, than the arrogance with which it was put forth, but our surprise diminishes when we remember that such credulity on the part of the unthinking masses was from the beginning intermixed with secret scepticism on the part of a thoughtful minority, whom considerations of prudence and policy dissuaded from the extreme of open rupture.

But howsoever explained or accounted for, these paralogisms, like those enlarged upon by Kant under a different sky ushered in an era of universal scepticism, and the Charvakas, did not scruple to push them to their legitimate issues; as was done by the followers of the great philosopher of Konigsberg. The Charvakas transferred these paralogisms from the sphere of ontology to that of deontology, from metaphysics to morals. It can not, according to the Jains, be ascertained with certainty whether a thing is existent or non-existent, predicable or non-predicable; and knowledge of being properly so called is on the part of man an impossibility. It can not according to the Charvakas be ascertained with certainty whether a particular action ought to be done or not; and knowledge of duty is on the part of man equally unattainable. Let us then be content with the phantasmagoria of becoming in physics and psychology, and with the impulses of our sensuous animal nature in morals. Let us eat, drink and be merry for to-morrow we die!

The foregoing delineation of the march of ideas, their filiation and progressive development, may be pronounced, and that justly, beautiful indeed, but not susceptible of proof
or substantiation. We are ready to admit that document-
ary evidence in favor of the assumption of the posteriority
of the Charvaka scheme of thought to that of the Jainas is
not procurable or presentable. The literature of the system
at our disposal is very scanty indeed, too scanty in fact to
justify a tone of assurance on our part. Scattered notices
of some of its principles are to be met with in the philoso-
phical treatises extant, the Sutras and the Commentaries; but
a categorical statement of its varied features of thought and
reasoning is nowhere presented in these works excepting one.
Colebrooke has a short paper on the subject published in the
second volume of his works edited by Professor Cowell, but it
is avowedly based on these sporadic notices, and therefore not
of a very valuable character. He, however, inclines to the
view we have presented of the origin of the system, and its
relation to preexisting types of thought. Wilson has a paper
scarcely more valuable, and he falls into the mistake of
tracing its origin to a person named Charvaka, rather than
to Vrihaspati justly represented as the founder by Cole-
brooke. The only brief but a concatenated statement of
the chief ingredients of the Charvaka philosophy within the
reach of the English reader is embodied in the paper on the
subject in the Sarva-Darsana Sangraha; but this, though
of great value in a philosophical point of view, affords no
cue to the solution of the historical problem of its origin
and rise. We are therefore most willing to admit that the
line of reasoning which has induced us to look upon the
Charvaka scheme as posterior in origin to that of the Jaina
and the Buddhist systems is purely a priori, worthy of a
place among historical speculations, such as those of Buckle
rather than in sober narratives of facts! Nor should it be
forgotten that some of the minor schemes of thought presented
in the Upanishads were wild enough to give birth to a system of Epicurism like that of the Charvakas.

It is desirable to allude to some of the notices of the Charvaka doctrine scattered within the compass of the controversial literature of ancient India before attempting a summary of its principles as presented in the Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha. Colebrooke states that one of the main elements of the system, viz., the negation or denial of the soul, is referred to and combated in the Brahma-Sutras, as a tenet held by "some," which vague term is applicable according to some of their scholiasts to the Charvakas, or Lokayatikas a branch of their sect. The following extract from Colebrooke's paper is presented as a proof of the pointedness of the allusion apparently vague in Vyasa's aphorisms, and of the accuracy of his commentators in their interpretation thereof:

"Bhaskara Acharya quotes the Vrihaspatya Sutras—(Vrihaspati's aphorisms) apparently as the text-work or standard authority of this sect or school; and the quotation expressing that "the elements are earth, water, fire and air; and from the aggregation of them in bodily organs, there results sensibility and thought, as inebriating property is deduced from a ferment and other ingredients.

"To the foregoing arguments of the Lokayatikas or Charvakas, the answer of the Vedantist is, that "thought, sensation, and other properties of soul or consciousness cease at the moment of death, while the body yet remains; and therefore can not be properties of the corporeal frame, for they have ceased before the frame is dissolved. The qualities of body, as color, &c., are apprehended by others, not so those of soul, viz., thought, memory, &c. Their existence, while body endures, is ascertained, not their
cessation when it ceases. They pass to other bodies. Elements or sensible objects are not sentient, or capable of feeling themselves; fire, though hot, burns not itself; a tumbler, however agile, mounts not upon his own shoulders. Apprehension of an object must be distinct from the thing apprehended. By means of a lamp, or other light, objects are visible; and if a lamp be present, the thing is seen; not so if there be no light. Yet apprehension is no property of the lamp; nor is it a property of the body, though observed only where a corporeal frame is. Body is but instrumental to apprehension."

The gross materialism of the Charvakas is in this passage not merely alluded to with unmistakable pointedness, but controverted by means of reasonings based on an admitted fact, and a series of analogies. The Charvakas differed from pre-existing schools of thought in their enumeration of the ultimate powers of nature, as they admitted only four of the five elements recognized in these, viz, earth, water, fire, air; the fifth akas or ether being discarded by them. When these aggregate into human bodies, sensation and thought are evolved out of their aggregation precisely in the manner in which the intoxicating property of, say, wine issues out of the mixture of certain substances in certain conditions. Thought does not inhere or exist potentially in any of these elements, but springs out of their combination in certain proportions; and the idea that these so-called elements are all reducible to one primal material form fitted under laws immanent in it to evolve the varied types of material and mental energy noticeable in creation was evidently not admitted. The arguments adduced by their Vedantic opponent may appear, and are somewhat childish and inconclusive. He in the first place confounds existence
with manifestation; and from the non-manifestation of mental operations in a visible and tangible corpse he jumps to the conclusion of their non-existence. Again when he insists on the essential difference between the body and soul by pointing to the perceptibility of the one and the non-perceptibility of the other, he fails to see the force of the analogy adduced by the Charvakas. They may justly retort by saying that sensation and thought are no more imperceptible than the inebriating influence proceeding from certain substances mixed in certain proportions, and placed in certain conditions. The arguments advanced by modern thinkers to prove logically or scientifically the existence of the soul are equally inconclusive, and our belief in its existence should always be represented as a content of human consciousness; and this may be said of our belief in external nature and our faith in God. We have a self-consciousness, a world-consciousness and a God-consciousness; and our belief in self, the world and God rests on the rock of this three-fold consciousness, and the gates of logic and science can not prevail against it!

Let us here quote a passage, in which four champions of this school are brought forward as interlocutors or rather controversialists, from the Vedanta Sar:

"A Charvaka says that the gross body is his self: on account of the text of the Veda (Taittiriya Upanishad, 2. 1) "This is man as made up of the extract of food;" and because he sees that a man leaving his own son (to burn) departs himself from a burning house; and because of the experience "I am fat," "I am lean."

"Another Charvaka says that the organs of sense are his self; on account of the text of the Veda (Chhandsogya Upanishad v. 1.7.) "They, the organs of sense went to
Prajapati and said Lord, which of us is the chief? He said unto them, he is chief among you whose departure makes the body seem worthless" and because in the absence of the organs of sense the functions of the body cease; and because of the experience, "I am blind of one eye," "I am deaf."

"Another Charvaka says that the vital airs are his self; on account of the text of the Veda (Taittiriya Upanishad 2. 2) "There is another, an inner self, made of the vital airs;" and because in the absence of the vital airs the organs of sense are inactive; and because of the experience. "I am hungry," "I am thirsty."

"Another Charvaka says that the mind is his self; on account of the text of the Veda (Taittiriya Upanishad, 2. 3) "There is another, an inner self, made of the mind;" and because when the mind sleeps the vital airs cease to be; and because of the experience, "I resolve," "I doubt."

This extract shows in the first place that the Charvakas were divided into several sects, all of which, however, concurred in upholding the banner of unmitigated materialism by denying the existence of the soul, or a spiritual entity in man either apart from or intermixed with the body. One class identified what is called self with the body itself, another with the organs of sense, a third with the vital airs, and a fourth with the mind which was regarded by all classes almost of Hindu philosophers as a material organ of thought synonymous with the sensory. The arguments the champions of these sects brought forward to smash their antagonists of the Vedantic school show on their part a skilful use of the weapons of the enemy's camp or armory. They quoted well-known texts from the Vedas in support of their materialistic views. Did they pay any reverence or
homage to these venerable records, acknowledge their canonicity, and look upon them as the last court of appeal in religious controversy? In their opinion the Vedas are "tainted by the three faults of untruth, self-contradiction and tautology," and they "are only the incoherent rhapsodies of knaves." Their antipathy to the Vedas is extended to their learned expounders in these words:—"the impostors, who call themselves Vaidic Pandits are mutually destructive, as the authority of the Gyan-Kanda, is overthrown by those who maintain that of the Karma-Kanda; while those who maintain the authority of the Gyan-Kanda reject that of the Karma-Kanda." Their contempt of current beliefs and superstitions is expressed in the following lines:—

"The Agnihora, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and smearing one's self with ashes,—

Brihaspati says, these are but means of livelihood for those who have no manliness nor sense."

To these extracts, all quoted from the paper in the Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha, let us add a line of a metrical exposition of their faith or no-faith:—

"The three authors of the Vedas, are buffoons, knaves, and demons."

In their attitude towards the Vedas the Charvakas went a great deal further than either the Baudhas or the Jainas. Buddha did certainly repudiate the authority of the Vedas, but he maintained that, if the interpolations by which they had in his opinion been disfigured and corrupted were picked up and cast aside, the rule of rectitude preached by him would be found in them in all its integrity. And he generally spoke of these documents in a conciliatory, if not respectful, tone and, as a rule, humoured popular prejudices and thereby disarmed opposition. Mahavira adopted a similar policy
of conciliation, and, though he sometimes spoke of the Brahmins and Buddhists in the harshest terms possible, going the length of classing them with thieves and robbers, his attitude toward current beliefs and superstitions was by no means one of uncompromising and implacable hostility. And both these reformers allowed a wide latitude of faith and practice in what may be called the outer courts of their ecclesiastical establishments, reserving their stringent rules for the initiated only. The Charvakas were the most stout-hearted, the most unyielding as well as reckless champions of the destructive criticisms of those early times. They inveighed against the national faith with reckless impetuosity and in language, not only sharp, but scurrilous, and they never scrupled to stigmatize the interested upholders of its rites and ceremonies as "buffoons, knaves, and demons."

Why did they then fortify their doctrinal beliefs by quotation from the Upanishads? Their object doubtless was to prove to the satisfaction of their Brahmin opponents that their own scriptures were in favor of the sentiments they opposed with such unreasonable vehemence. The Charvakas, moreover, might have some respect for the Upanishads, as though their most prominent tendency is pantheism, there is not a scheme of scepticism which cannot be supported by appropriate quotations from their heterogeneous texts. And besides there is after all a very faint line of demarkation between the pantheism of Brahmin belief and their own materialism, while that perfect confusion of moral distinctions at which they aimed is legitimately deducible from the recognized principles of their opponents. Given a refined definition of matter, such as has in these days been attempted by scientists like Professor Tyndall, materialism becomes sublimated into pantheism; while the twin sisters are both
in favor of that iron necessitarianism which saps the very foundations of both religion and morals!

In the arguments employed by the different classes of the Charvakas in the extracts quoted from the Vedanta Sar the personal "experiences" are insisted on. When a person says "I am fat" or "lean" he identifies himself with the body; and when he says "I am blind" or "deaf," the organs of his body are presented as his own self; and again when he says, "I am hungry" or "thirsty," the vital airs to which hunger and thirst are said to be traceable form the being he calls "I," and lastly, when he says, "I resolve" or "doubt" he centres his being in the material evolution in which the power of thought inheres. The idea, that colloquial phrases are not employed with philosophical accuracy and precision, and that consequently arguments based on them cut both ways, being fitted to be arrayed against their theories as well as in their favor, does not seem to have crossed their minds.

This, their favourite argument, is presented in the following extracts from their own writings given in the paper, so often alluded to, in the Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha:

"In this school there are four elements, earth, water, fire and air;

And from these four elements alone is intelligence produced,

Just like the intoxicating power from Kinnia, &c, mixed together;

Since in "I am fat," "I am lean" these attributes abide in the same subject,

And since fatness, etc, reside only in the body, it also is the soul and no other,

And such phrases as "my body" are only significant metaphorically."
Here we see, not only the main argument insisted on, but the trick resorted to for the purpose of obviating the difficulty pointed out by us as sure to result from reasonings based on loosely used colloquial phrases. Every such phrase likely to be arrayed against them by their opponents is "metaphorical," while that which might be construed or twisted into an argument in favour of their system is literal!

We have, in our remarks on the sentiments expressed severally by the champions of this school introduced as interlocutors in the Vedanta Sar, anticipated much of what has to be said in our review of the brief but very valuable paper in the Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha. It is time to advert to its exposition, exhaustive and at the same time succinct, of the Charvaka doctrine. Its founder is expressly declared to have been Vrihaspati—a very common name: but nothing is said to enable us to have an insight into his personal history. If Charvaka is regarded as the name of a great sage, as Wilson supposes, he might have been the follower of Vrihaspati by whom his teachings were systematized; and from what is said in the paper itself we may be justified in drawing such a conclusion. He is called "the crest-jem of the atheistic school, the follower of the doctrine of Vrihaspati," who "abolished" the "notion" of ascribing "supreme felicity" to "the Divine Being." The system and the systematizer go by the same name, the exact derivation or meaning of which we have failed to ascertain.

The only means of proof or source of knowledge insisted on is, as has already been indicated, perception, and a labored argument is attempted to prove that inference, testimony, comparison, &c, which are added to it by other schools, theistic and pantheistic, monistic as well as dualistic are inadmissible. The line of reasoning may be thus summarized—Universals cannot
possibly be proved, and therefore the syllogistic form of argumentation is fallacious. The stock illustrative argument of the Logical Schools, viz., "the mountain smokes, therefore the mountain has fire" is vicious, because it presupposes the universal, "whatever smokes has fire." Its force hinges on the invariable connection between the sign or middle term, smoke, and the major term, fire. But how can this connection be substantiated? not certainly by perception, as it has to do with things present, not with things past and future. Perception is of two kinds, external and internal, perception of the senses and perception of the mind or the inner sensory. External perception occurs when the object perceived is brought into contact with the sense through which it is perceived but in the case supposed no such contact is realized. Again internal perception or that of the sensory is mediate, not immediate, realized, not directly, but indirectly through the senses. The universal, therefore cannot be substantiated by perception. Can it be proved by inference; No—for one inference must have another to support it, and so we must go on from succeeding to preceding inferences till we land in the fallacy of a regressus ad infinitum. Testimony is even according to one of the logical schools, that of Kanada, or Vaiseshika, included in inference, and is neutralized by the same element of viciousness. Besides why should the Charvakas, who positively refuse to accept the ipsi dixit of Manu himself, build the theory of invariable connection between smoke and fire on the groundwork of human testimony? And lastly, as regards comparison and the other proofs posited, they are intended simply to show the relation which one object has to another, not to lead to "unconditioned knowledge" or demonstrate universal propositions. Universals being thrown out of calculation, the syllogistic mode
of reasoning must be pronounced fallacious. Does not this recall to our minds John Stuart Mill's contempt for every species of *a priori* reasoning?

The summum-bonum according to this scheme is set forth in the following stanza:

"While life is yours, live joyously;
None can escape Death's searching eye:
When once this frame of ours they burn,
How shall it e'er again return."

The aim or end of philosophy is, as in the Epicurean school, pleasure. "The only end of man" it is distinctly said "is enjoyment produced by sensual pleasures." But here an objection may be started. Pleasure in this life is accompanied with and followed by pain. Is pain along with pleasure to be regarded as the end of man? No—it is our business to secure the pleasure and avoid the pain as far as possible, "just as the man who desires fish takes the fish with their scales and bones, and having taken as many as he wants desists; or just as the man who desires rice, takes the rice, straw and all, and having taken as much as he wants, desists." The analogy does not at first sight seem apposite. The meaning, however, is plain. For the sake of a few scales and bones, no body dreams of giving up the pleasure or luxury of eating fish; or for the sake of the husk no body gives up the luxury of eating rice. If so, would it not be foolish to cut ourselves off from pleasure for the sake of the little pain with which it is inseparably united? This is more clearly set forth in the following lines:

"The pleasure which arises to men from contact with sensible objects,

Is to be relinquished as accompanied by pain—such is the reasoning of fools;
The berries of paddy, rich with the finest white grains,
What man, seeking his true interest, would fling away
because covered with husk and dust."

But why should gross, sensual pleasure be made the end
of human existence? The reason assigned is the Epicurean
reason—for to-morrow we die! The Charvakas emancipated
themselves completely from the thraldom of a belief to which
all pre-existing schools, even the wildest of them, had suc-
cumbed. They gave up that chain of transmigration by
which even the atheistic speculations of Kapila, Buddha and
Mahavira had been bound and cramped; and their attitude
in this respect was the legitimate outcome of their peremp-
tory denial of the soul. That the body is dissolved at death,
the different ingredients of which it consists being decom-
posed and mingled with their counterparts in external nature,
was maintained by every school of philosophy in ancient
India. And, as the body was in this school the all-in-all
its dissolution meant the annihilation of man; and conse-
quently his reappearance on the stage of life in another
form, or in an endless variety of new forms, was stoutly
denied. The Buddhists also denied the existence of the
soul, or a permanent subject of thought, feeling and voli-
tion; but they believed in Karmā and in its power to bring
together fresh aggregates to exhaust its fruits: and by this
clumsy expedient they maintained their faith in transmi-
gration somewhat modified intact. The Charvakas cast
Karma overboard along with the metempsychosis inseparable
from it. Their disbelief in Karma, called also Adrishta, is
thus emphatically expressed:

"Form this it follows that fate, &c do not exist, since they
can only be proved by inference. But an opponent will say,
if you thus do not allow Adrishta, the various phenomena
of the world become destitute of any cause. But we cannot accept this objection as valid, since these phenomena can all be produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things. Thus it has been said:

"The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing cool the breeze of morn!

By whom came this variety? from their own nature was it born."

The belief of pre-existing schools, by which the morals of the nation were safe-guarded, being cast aside all talk of entanglement and liberation is sheer nonsense. There is no God, no future state, no moral law, no salvation. This string of negations is set forth in the following lines:

"There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another world,

Nor do the actions of the four casts, &c produce any real effect."

Again we have the unequivocal statement:—"Hence it follows that there is no other hell than mundane pain produced by purely mundane causes, as thorns, the only supreme is the earthly monarch whose existence is proved by the world's eye-sight; and the only liberation is the dissolution of the body."

Our advanced thinkers of Comptistic tendencies will accept this statement in all its integrity, after having substituted for "the earthly monarch" the phantasm or chimera of humanity. The attitude of the Charvakas towards current religious practices or superstitious is the legitimate outcome of their theoretic beliefs. They looked upon death as the end-all of human existence; and they had no alternative but to oppose the ceremony of feeding the dead called Srādha. Their contempt for it is expressed in the following lines:
"If the Sradha produces gratification to beings who are dead, Then here too in the case of travellers when they start, it is needless to give provisions for the journey. If beings in heaven are gratified by our offering Sradha here, Then why not give the food down below to those who are standing on the house-top."

The Hindu might retort by saying that the soul disentangled from the trammels of the body or material chains might be supposed capable of doing things which with these it would be idle on its part to attempt. Be that as it may, the Charvakas were thoroughly consistent in their hostility to this and other ceremonies having for their object the refreshment and comfort of the dead. They moreover, deduced their disbelief in liberation from their materialistic view of human nature. No soul, no liberation!—nothing can be more reasonable than such deduction. And if the idea of liberation was absurd, the current superstitions resorted to for the purpose of receiving it should be opposed. One of these practices was the periodical offering up of sacrifices, and this was a practice which the Charvakas were determined to hold up to ridicule. The argument they arrayed against it had nothing original about it, as it had been employed by the Buddhists before their day and generation. It is embodied in the following lines:—

"If a beast slain in the Jyotishtoma rite will itself go to heaven, Then why does not the sacrificer forthwith murder his own father?"

The final conclusion of their entire scheme of thought was in perfect keeping with the atheistic principles and speculations by which it was characterized. No God, no soul, no
heaven, no hell, no worship, no liberation, the string of negations being once admitted, morality vanishes into thin air, and Epicureanism becomes the legitimate outcome. And the Charvaka Epicureanism is pithily expressed in the following lines:—

"While life remains let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee even though he runs in debt,

When once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever return again?"

Professor Cowell finds in the scheme of Pyrrho of Elis and his followers a counterpart of this system of gross materialism and Epicurean license. In his short paper on it inserted as an appendix in the Second Volume of his splendid edition of Colebrooke's works he thus expresses his belief:—

"Much of the chapter (in the Sarva Darsana) gives only the same details which Colebrooke had already collected from various scattered references, but the discussion on the sources of knowledge has an interest of its own, as being the best account we have of the Hindu Skeptical school corresponding to Pyrrho and Sextus Empiricus among the Greeks." But the resemblance or correspondence is closer in the case of the Jainas than in that of the Charvakas. Pyrrho ushered in the era of universal scepticism by insisting on his tenet of suspense of judgement. Knowledge of things as they are is, according to his scheme, unattainable; and as things appear to different persons with varieties of mental peculiarities, and under varieties of circumstances, in diverse and even opposite forms, dogmatism in philosophy must give place to doubt and uncertainty. Opinion rather than reliable knowledge is all we can boast of, and what seem to us contradictories may after all be reconciled, and should therefore be accepted without hesitation.
The grand conclusion at which we ought to arrive is—"We know nothing, not even this itself, that we know nothing." This was precisely the position occupied by Mahavira's followers, whose paralogisms have already been set forth and dwelt upon. The Charvaka negation of all proofs but perception necessarily leads to universal scepticism, when phenomena are regarded as invariably deceptive or unreliable; but it does by no means clearly appear that the champions of this school cared to insist, except perhaps casually or incidentally, on this feature of their creed. Their main, if not sole, object was to inveigh against dogmatism in the sphere of religion and morals, rather than in that of Physiology or what is now called science. They very likely threw the puzzling questions about the reliability of perception as a source of knowledge into the background, and were, moreover, willing for all practical purposes to accept the testimony of the senses as both accurate and reliable. But what they could not stand was the claim put forth by religion to restrain and circumscribe the gratification of their passions and appetites. And on their own theory, their negation of God, moral order, future state of rewards and punishments, no fault, we maintain, could be found with them.

But why go to ancient philosophy in quest of a counterpart to this scheme of thought when it can be found in the materialistic speculations of the day. In an American Periodical a translation is given of the "Infidel Catechism" published by a French author of materialistic tendencies, and in this short production we may recognize the main features of the Charvaka scheme revived in language more precise. The catechism runs thus:

"Q.—What is God? A—God is an expression."
Q.—What is the exact value of this expression? A.—The exact value of the word—Nature.

Q.—What is Nature? A.—It is the material world, and all is matter.

Q.—How is it then that there are Gods? A.—Because man has invented them.

Q.—What is soul? A.—Nothing.

Q.—What is the distinction between soul and body? A.—It is a simple analytic process.

Q.—What is generally understood by the word soul? A.—Thought independent of matter.

Q.—Can such independence exist? A.—No—since everything belongs, to the material order.

Q.—What is man? A.—Man is one of the most favored products of the earth; but nature makes no more account of him than of the smallest insect. In consequence of his material conformation, he possesses a larger measure of intelligence than any other animal.

Q.—The materiality of the soul, then, involving its negation there is no future life? A.—No.”

This French thinker would perhaps talk glibly of a morality evolved out of social conditions, of a future life in the grateful remembrance of posterity, and of Humanity as the beginning and end of human faith; and he may by means of smooth and well-cut periods support an earnest exhortation to altruism, the grand duty of living for others. But many of his countrymen have drawn the only legitimate conclusion deducible from his own premises. If all is matter, and nothing but matter, let us live as the materialistic tendencies of our nature demand, so imperiously, so peremptorily! If we are descendants of monkeys, let us live as monkeys.
What is the grand principle, the principle of principles, we are to follow? Is it not the law of the survival of
the fittest or strongest? Now what elements in man are stronger than his appetites and passions? His love
of order, compassion, benevolence, gratitude, are so many straws before the dashing waves of his animal propensities.
If the strongest are to survive, these ought to live, and the loftier elements of his nature ought to be cast out and en-
tombed as imbeciles fit only to die! But is there not the grand cause of Humanity to be subserved? Is man to live
for himself not for that grand stream of life of which he is only a component part? The persons, however, whom a lofty
philosophy has led to cast aside God, heaven, hell, and durable law of rectitude as mere phantasms, are not likely to be
influenced by a couple of newly created myths. Away with Humanity, and the perennial stream of life—they naturally
exclaim! Let these phantoms, created and canonized in the nineteenth century, the boasted age of science, go where
those of a Theological age have gone—that is to the dogs! And let the brutal elements of our nature, the strongest in us
triumph, and let us decry all those social restraints by which the natural development of our animal propensities is checked
as outrageously tyrannical, and hasten the millennium, when the laws of property being abolished, and marriage being
denounced as an unrighteous monopoly, human beings will range at large in all the glory of brute force and unrestrain-
ed license! And this was the conclusion to which the Charvakas were brought by a similar line of reasoning in
an unscientific age! There is nothing new under the sun!

An atheistic system, specially when accompanied with com-
plete abnegation of principle and uncheeked license in con-
duct, can not happily prevail, except in very narrow circles,
even in this wicked world. Human society can not do without a religion, and its better elements instinctively recoil from the infatuation with which the banner of irreligion and immorality is at times unfurled. But it is not merely to the instinctive horror of atheism in theory and licentiousness in practice, evoked in human society in general whenever its exhibition is demanded by philosophemes of a Godless and immoral type, that the very little influence exercised over the national mind by the Charvaka system is to be traced. Certain peculiar features in our national character must be enumerated as among the most potent causes of its failure. The Hindus are pre-eminently a religious people, and the compliment, as it is generally understood, paid the Athenians by St. Paul, may even more appropriately be paid them. They have from time to time sanctioned atheistic theories, but only after having modified them so far as to render their original features of a repulsive character thoroughly unrecognizable under a coating of what may be called Hindu accretions. Buddhism and Jainism, originally atheistic, became popular only when these systems had incorporated with their substance the main principles of the national faith, and thereby bowed submissively to the prevalent religious traditions and tendencies of the country. But Charvakaism, as it positively refused to follow this policy of amalgamation with current ideas and aspirations, was very soon after its inception thrown beyond the confines of national sympathy; and its influence has consequently been of the most limited type. Its complete, or all but complete failure is a warning to those who are striving under the banner of Western culture to naturalize in the country the atheistic notions and practices held and sanctioned in more favored lands by small coteries of free-thinkers and free-livers. It is true that the altered
conditions realized here by the spread of secular education of a superficial stamp may be justly represented as eminently fitted to favor the growth of rank scepticism, specially when an apparently earnest purpose is declared to be one of its inherent elements; but the deep religiousness of the Hindu character will before long see through the flimsy profession the innate tendency of all atheistic speculation to sap the very foundations of social order and peace; and an early condemnation of them, even when their viciousness or disastrous nature is concealed under plausible names, such as Comptism or Theosophy, by the sober intellect of the nation may be sanguinely anticipated!
CHAPTER IX.

THE THEISM OF REACTION IN INDIA.

The philosophical systems of ancient India were all atheistic, either ostensibly or covertly. The predominant line of thought in the Upanishads has been represented, and certainly with propriety, as pantheistic; but it ought not to be forgotten that the pantheism they give prominence to is tantamount to nihilism. A substance, so called, is certainly put forward as the starting point of the evolutionary process to which the objects of nature, both spiritual and material, perceptible or imperceptible, are to be traced. That substance is declared to be spiritual, and to possess a self-evolving power; and expressions and phrases are employed, such as might justify our ascription to it of a subtle species of personality. But the predicates by which it is determined are confessedly traced to false attribution, and should one by one be withdrawn or enucleated; and what is left, after the work of abstraction is completed, cannot with any degree of propriety, be described as an entity. It is simply the Pure-Being of ancient Greek schools, without power, without quality, and without relation,—the absolute and unconditioned of modern philosophy, something been as well as nonbeen, the abyss of contradictions and paradoxes. The pantheism of the Upanishads, reproduced in the Brahma-Sutras, and naturally developed into the illusion theory of the Vedanta Sar, would, when subjected to a process of rigid analysis, lead, and actually did lead, to absolute nihilism. No wonder that ethical distinctions were obliterated under its shade, and good and evil, as well as
subject and object, were represented as one and the same thing!

The Sankhya school was in its primitive type obviously and avowedly atheistic. It not only tabooed all speculations having for their object a proper solution of questions appertaining to the existence and attributes of God, but proved by a tissue of sophistical reasoning that even if God did exist, he could not possibly be the Creator and Ruler of the Universe. It apparently raised the banner of dualism where that of so-called monism had been unfurled by the authors of the Upanishads; but the dualism it gave prominence to was after all materialistic monism; for of the two entities, posited by it, one called Purush or Soul, is, like the God of Vedantism, devoid of power, quality and relation, and tantamount in consequence to nonentity or non-being. The entity called Prakriti, the self-evolving material essence, with the moral qualities, good and bad, potentially existing in it, is the only beent according to this scheme; and it is in every respect the prototype of the species of materialism which is being championed and popularised in these days by a few well-known scientists.

But the Sankhya School had to succumb, not long after its establishment, to the deep religiousness of the Hindu race; and it added a God to its assumed categories to satisfy popular clamor, more than to meet the exigencies of its scheme of thought and speculation! The Being, however, whose existence is assumed, is entirely out of element, so to speak, in its system, a superfluous entity added to it, but out of harmony with its recognized features; but the incongruity arising from what may be called its outlandish character was obviated by its being quietly shelved in the region of nonentity. The God of the Se-Iswar Sankhya,
or Sankhya with God, is, like the Being posited by the Vedantic schools, without material and spiritual attributes and therefore equals nothing. The Yoga system, its offshoot, is in its philosophical aspects simply its duplicate, and may therefore justly be stigmatized as thoroughly atheistic.

The two Logical schools apparently proceeded from the dualism of these schemes of speculative thought to what may be called a species of trialism. They maintained the eternal existence of God, soul, and matter; but they, also, by confining all operations needing energy and activity to an unseen force, reduced the others, matter excepted, to nothing. A vein of theistic phraseology runs through their speculations, but a smooth or specious terminology cannot do away with their underlying atheism. The Purva-Mimansa school saw the utter groundlessness of these assumptions, and very judiciously steered clear of all speculation about the origin and end of creation, confining its work to the elaboration of a ritual fitted by its inherent efficacy to ensure the blessings of salvation.

From all this it will appear that Buddha was by no means the first man in India to lift up the banner of materialistic monism. He at first occupied the position of an agnostic, and proscribed all theological investigations both as fruitless, and as having no conceivable bearing on human duty. But when he claimed omniscience, he could not but find himself in a position to deny authoritatively the existence of a God. If with his all-comprehensive and perfect knowledge of all truths, all facts, all relations, all contingencies, possibilities, and eventualities, he could not, and did not, affirm the existence of a God, the legitimate deduction is there is no such Being entitative or existent! As has already been said, Buddha made himself a God, and could therefore
legitimately deny the existence of a God if his omniscience had failed to find out such a Being in the infinitude of space and time; and consequently his very silence on such a topic is an unmistakeable avowal or declaration of, not merely agnostic unbelief, but atheistic disbelief. But he not merely discarded the nonentity called God by some of his predecessors, but cast aside along with it the nonentities called souls by Kapila, whom he followed in the main line of his philosophic speculations. Man, according to his system, is a congeries of material aggregates, which are dispersed as soon as he breathes his last; and the only abiding element in connection with him is his Karma, which brings together conglomerate after conglomerate of fresh aggregates till its fruits being exhausted it terminates in annihilation!

Here is materialism with a vengeance, but a dualistic character was given it by Mahavira, the founder of the Jaina scheme of philosophy. The souls of the Sankhya system were revived, but represented as inherent in matter, though different from it. But the representations presented of souls called Lives being so full of incoherence and inconsistency, and an entity in addition to the two marking the starting point of evolutionary processes being posited, viz., Karma, and represented, moreover, as the omnific power, the system may be described as dualistic, trialistic, and monistic. But when the work of analysis is carefully effected, and adventitious elements, or elements in obvious contradiction to its essential features are thrown away, the scheme appears thoroughly materialistic, the entities posited being matter and force immanent therein, the very entities of which materialism cannot yet get rid without sinking into what in Indian phraseology is called voidism.
But these systems, so diverse in their characteristic features, concurred with one another in developing a noble moral purpose. Whether souls were reduced by refinements of logic to nothing, or whether they were boldly declared non-existent, a grand object was placed before human aspirations and human hopes; and bondage and liberation were the topics on which the ingenuity of thought and the charms of language were centred. The sorrows of existence were eloquently set forth, their cause was ingeniously traced, and the appliances, physical and moral, fitted to ensure their extinction were feelingly dwelt upon. Not only were the ordinary precepts of morality inculcated and enforced, but ascetic seclusion, mortification, penance, and calm meditation were set forth as the loftiest objects of human search and aspiration. And the ladder of liberation was pointed to as rising from the conscientious practice of social virtues up to the serene, insensible repose of still contemplation or rather self-centred thought.

But the bow of morality was bent with excessive rigor, and the consequence was a reaction towards immorality. The licentiousness of the era immediately succeeding the Restoration is the legitimate sequence, according to Lord Macaulay, of the gloomy type into which social morality had been thrown by the injudicious among the champions of the pre-existing Puritan School; while the gross profligacy of the age of Louis XV is traced by the same brilliant historian to the austere religion into which the Grand Monarch had been betrayed during the last few years of his eventful reign. The varied forms, more or less gloomy and repulsive, of asceticism associated with these schools of Hindu philosophy, could not flourish without being followed by a reaction of a disastrous character. The extreme of
ascetic rigor gave birth to the opposite extreme of moral laxity. The Charvakas were the legitimate successors of the anchorites and mendicants, who, after having sapped the very foundations of morality by atheistic speculations, had been striving by the practice of austerity and meditation to liberate themselves from a bondage which on their own principles could not but be denounced as fictitious. The Charvakas propounded a scheme decidedly more consistent than any elaborated by their predecessors. If God is without power, quality, and relation, the world can do without him, and the sooner his existence is expunged from human creeds the better; and if souls are of the same description, they ought to share the same fate. God and souls being cast aside, nothing remains but our animal nature with its passions and appetencies, and what is there to check their gratification? Eat, drink, and be merry, for to-morrow we die!

Has it come to this?—Philosophy asked astonished! God, souls, liberation, religious duties, Karma-kand, Gyan-kand, hermit seclusion, austerity, meditation, both "seeded" and "seedless"—all, all gone! Philosophy recoiled from such an abyss of darkness and negation, and a reform was called for. A leading spirit was needed to explode the sophisms opposed to the most cherished beliefs of the schools and restore philosophy to its pristine glory; and such a spirit appeared in perhaps the acutest thinker and the ablest controversialist our country can boast of, the great man who has reigned supreme in mediæval and modern schools of Hindu Philosophy, and from whose dominating influence only western culture can emancipate the national mind! This was no other than the great Sankara Acharya, the redoubtable champion of Vedantic philosophy, and the
irrepressible opponent of every scheme antagonistic to it. It is to be regretted that the material at our disposal for the purpose of presenting a suitable biography of this acutest of thinkers is of the scantiest type. Nothing in short is known beyond the facts, that he was a native of Malabar, that he early took the vows of celibacy and poverty, and gave himself unreservedly to the work of religious reform, and that he established four great monasteries in as many parts of India to ensure the perpetuation and propagation of the doctrine he was instrumental in resuscitating. What was this doctrine? The pantheism of the Upinishads and the Brahma-Sutras, the scheme of thought which has no where found a soil more congenial than in the national mind. His commentaries are among the standard works of the Vedantic School, and in acuteness of thought and strength of reasoning they are unsurpassed in the ancient literature of the world. They are decidedly more polemical than expository, and in them we see the figure of a giant engaged in grappling with antagonistic systems with controversial powers of the highest order. The conclusion, to which his recondite disquisitions bring us, is sad indeed, though attractive to some minds. Nothing exists but God, and the varieties of objects we see around us, or rather which make impressions on the senses, are illusions brought into existence by an illusion illusorily-conceived! The objects of creation deceive us, our minds deceive us, and God deceives us! Under such a belief moral distinctions vanish into thin air, human responsibility ceases, and our actions become illusory. But is there not something Real posited beneath the shifting and deceptive phenomena of nature? something which we may lay hold on and depend upon? No—the Real is after all the unreal. The God posited is without power, quality,
and relation, and equals nonentity according to Hegel. Rank nihilism was therefore the scheme of thought which Sankara revived, defended, and preached with the acuteness of a great thinker, the self-sacrificing devotion of an ascetic, and the enthusiasm of an apostle. No wonder that in later Vedantic Schools, or schools of eclecticism, he is said to have been an incarnation of Siva himself.

But how could such a system satisfy even the intellectual necessities of the philosopher, not to speak of the moral wants of society in general. Some approach towards theism was demanded by the exigencies of the schools, as well as by the aspirations of the masses; and therefore the bow of pantheism, so tightly bent by Sankara, rebounded when unbent towards a species of theism. This is what we have ventured to call, in conformity with phraseology popularised by Professor Blakey of Edinburgh, the Theism of Reaction. It appeared in two distinct lines of development, Sivaiaism and Vaishnaiism, the recognition first of Siva and then of Vishnu as a God (\textit{sarguna}) with quality, in contradistinction to the Vedantic God (\textit{nirguna}) without quality. These two systems have a philosophical, as well as a popular aspect; but in an exposition of Hindu philosophy both in its orthodox and its heterodox lines of development the latter ought to be thrown into the background.

It ought, however, to be distinctly stated that both these schemes lack the essential feature of heterodoxy, \textit{viz.}, denial of the authority of the Vedas. The founders of these systems did not like Buddha and Mahavira look upon and represent these venerable records as containing some, if not all the germs, of truth under heaps of interpolation; nor did they go so far with the Charvakas as to denounce them as the productions of fools and knaves. On the contrary they
admitted their canonicity, and constantly appealed to them in their attempts to settle all matters of dispute or controversy. Nay, they even showed more reverence for them than had been evinced by those of the champions of orthodox philosophy, who, while ostensibly bowing to their authority, had really poured contempt upon them by a bold denial of the existence of a God. Why are they then held up as champions of heterodox schools? Because in their exegetical manoeuvres they overstepped the line behind which Hindu orthodoxy is intrenched. Monier Williams in his recently published book "Religious Thought and Life in India" very justly observes that Hindu Philosophy par excellence is pantheism; and consequently any scheme of thought inconsistent with it has, and cannot but have, the stigma of heterodoxy stamped upon it. From the Upanishads any scheme of thought can be evolved, but theism or belief in an intelligent, voluntary, personal creator and ruler of the universe. The materialism of some schools, the voidism of others, and the nihilism of a third set, may be propped up successively by quotations from these sacred books, while pantheism is admittedly the main line of their tissue of complex thought. But the only ism which they cannot be made to support, except by the application of the varied instruments of torture, is Theism; and when this is evolved out of them, the process cannot but be denounced as heterodox. Saivaisin and Vaishnaism have always been considered in their popular aspects as thoroughly orthodox; but in their philosophical features they are so obviously at war with the teaching of the Vedas or Upanishads that, in spite of their avowed filiation thereto, they ought to be characterized as heterodox or classed with the systems called heterodox.
We shall in our treatment of this duplex subject pursue a very simple course. We shall treat of the two systems separately, one after the other, presenting their philosophical aspects, and then conclude with a few general observations on their popular developments. Let us begin with—

I.—Saivaism.

Saivaism in its philosophical aspects owes its origin to the spirit of generalization by which plurality is reduced to unity, the multiform to the uniform; as well as to what may be called human curiosity to discover an adequate cause for creation. The varied processes of nature in progress around us, both in the sphere of physical operations and in that of providential outgoings, may be classed under three heads: creation, preservation, and destruction. The essential unity of these three apparently diverse classes of operations could not be recognized by our forefathers before philosophy had inured them to breadth of view and comprehensiveness of thought, and consequently a triad of deities was posited as their starting point; though, as the activity pre-supposed therein was regarded as an indication of weakness, an original passive cause, absolute and unconditioned, was placed behind the divine triumvirate. The triad consisted of Brahma, the creator; Vishnu, the preserver; and Siva or Rudra, the destroyer; but the functions thus divided were eventually found to be of one and the same class; and consequently the triad was reduced to a monad. The first two divinities were quietly shelved, and the third was represented as the god who creates and preserves, integrates and disintegrates, while the phantom behind the triad was at times retained and at times thrust aside. This god was represented as sarguna, or a being with power, quality, and relation; and under his auspices or banner different classes of Theistic schools,
sprang into existence. Four of these schools are alluded to, and their respective beliefs indicated in, as many chapters, in the Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha, which we shall make our guide book in passing through the labyrinths of the Saiva philosophy.

1. The first of these is called the Pasupati system, and the word, which names and characterises the scheme, is thus explained:—"By the word Pasu we are to understand the effect (or created world), the word designating that which is dependent on something ulterior. By the word pati we are to understand the cause (or principium), the word designating the Lord, who is the cause of the universe, the pati or ruler." The system dwells upon three classes of pain, "personal, physical, and hyperphysical," and makes emancipation there-from turn on, not "mere knowledge," but "accurate characterization of principles," of which there is no hope except "by the five categories" assumed. The statement of these five categories proceeds in what may be called the a posteriori line, beginning with the effects perceived, and rising up to the "something ulterior" inferred. "All that is effected or educed, depending on something ulterior, it is threefold, sentiency, the insentient and the sentient." We pass over the learned disquisition on sentiency contenting ourselves with representing it as a material evolute, not an abstraction. The following passage shows that what is said about the insentient is almost a reproduction of the Sankhya categories:

"The insentient, which, while unconscious, is dependent on the conscious, is of two kinds—as styled the effect and as styled the cause. The insentient, styled the effect, is of ten kinds, viz., the earth and the other four elements, and their qualities, color, and the rest. The insentient, called the causal insentient, is of thirteen kinds, viz., the five organs of cognition, the five
organs of action, and the three internal organs—the intellect, the egoizing principle, and the cogitant principle,—which have for their respective functions ascertainment, the illusive identification of self with notself, and determination."

If by the 'qualities' were meant, the five tanmatras or tenuous elements we would have here a complete enumeration of the Sankhya categories, as some original substance, like Prakriti, out of which the elements and the organs—internal, and external—have been evolved, is pre-supposed; while the existence of the soul, as a distinct category, is affirmed.

Here is what is said of the spirit:—"The sentient spirit, that to which transmigratory conditions appertain, is also of two kinds—the appetent and the non-appetent. The appetent is the spirit associated with an organism and organs; the non-appetent is the spirit apart from organism and organs." Scarcely anything is mentioned about the spirit or soul beside the bare fact of its existence, which, according to the following passage, is eternal:—"In other systems the create is that which has become, and that which shall become; but in this system it is eternal, the spirits and so forth, the sentient and insentient." Both matter and soul are, according to this, as according to the Sankhya scheme, eternal; and it is difficult to see how this feature of the Pasupati philosophy differentiates it from "other systems," as excepting the Vedantic, all systems almost concur in maintaining it.

Regarding the fourth entity we have the following utterance:—"The cause is that which retracts to itself and evolves the whole creation. This, though one, is said to be divided according to a difference of attributes and actions (into Maheswara, Vishnu, &c). The Lord is the possessor of infinite, visual and active power. He is absolutely first
as connected eternally with this lordship and supremacy, as possessing a supremacy, not adventitious or contingent."

Here is propounded the old theory of evolution and involution; and it is by no means certain whether creation with its array of sentient beings and insentient objects is evolved out of the divine substance or out of eternally existing matter. The context might warrant the latter conclusion, as specially both matter and souls are represented as eternal, though the idea of creation being retracted to the cause or reinvolved in it is peculiarly pantheistic, and might justify the assumption of their eternal existence in God, rather than apart from Him. The description, moreover, of God given tallies almost exactly with what is presented in the Vedantic records, the only differentiating quality being activity. He has "infinite, visual, active power," and is not, therefore, thoroughly passive and quiescent, as the God posited in pantheistic schools. He is also described as the Creator or rather the architect who evolves creation by His own will, rather than in obedience to the dictates or impulses of Karma. This is clearly brought out in the following sentence:—"In other systems the principium is determined in its evolution of creative activity by the efficacy of works, whereas in this system the principium is the Lord not thus determined." This idea is also unfolded in the following distich:—

"Since he, acting according to his will, is not actuated by the efficacy of works,

For this reason is he in this system the cause of all causes?"

The ordinary objection to this theory, viz., that it interferes with and neutralizes the system of rewards and punishments characteristic of the divine administration, is stated, and refuted at length; and the care with which it is both stated
and vindicated, marks it as one of the vital elements of the Pasupati scheme.

It is not at all easy to find out and state what the fifth and the last category of the system is. Perhaps an absolute, unconditioned substance is posited behind the emergent and omnific cause, called the Lord and a return thereby is realized to the pantheism of the Upanishads. Nor is this to be wondered at, as the scheme, like almost all forms of medæval thought, oscillates between pantheism and theism, and is likely, therefore, to interpose between the creation and the quiescent Being or non-being out of which it is evolved an emanent deity clothed with anthropomorphic powers and qualities. And to such vacillation on its part all the inconsistencies and contradictions in its statement of principles are to be traced.

Its irresistible tendency to pantheism appears also in the *summum bonum* towards which its devotees are drawn. That is "union" or "conjunction of soul with God," but in the sense of absorption, the only difference between it and that of Vedantic schools being that, while in the latter absorption means the extinction of individual consciousness, in the former its continuance is insisted on. The blessed condition is attained, not by still meditation, as in Vedantic schools, but by "acts of piety" such as "bathing with sand, lying upon sand, oblations, mutterings and devotional perambulation." The "oblations" are of six kinds, *viz.* "laughter, song, dance, muttering *hum*, adoration, and pious ejaculation." And six "postures" are also recommended, *viz.*, "snoring, trembling, limping, moving, acting absurdly, talking nonsensically." In short the devotee must be inebriated with devotional enthusiasm and raised to a very lofty pitch of extasy before he can bring himself to a proper recognition of the categories
on the accurate knowledge or characterization of which his emancipation from material bonds, and consequent absorption in the Deity hinge!

2. The second paper on Saivaism in the *Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha* is entitled "The Saiva-Darsana," and treats of the creed of a sect of Saivas or Maheswaras by which the theory of creation being independent of the efficacy of works is stoutly combated and denied. The Maheswaras "hold the opinion that 'the Supreme Being is a cause in dependence on our actions, &c., and they maintain that there are three categories distinguished as the Lord, the soul, and the world (or literally 'the master' 'the cattle' and 'the fitter')."

The first of these categories, *viz.*, the Supreme Being is represented as the intelligent Creator of the universe, and the theological argument is employed to prove His existence and intelligence. "Now Siva is held to be the Lord (or master.) Although participation in the divine nature of Siva belongs to liberated souls and to such beings as Vidyeswara, &c., yet these are not independent, since they depend on the Supreme Being; and the nature of an effect is recognized to belong to the worlds, &c., which resemble him, from the very fact of the orderly arrangement of their parts. And from their thus being effects we infer that they must have been caused by an intelligent being. By the strength of this inference is the universal acknowledgment of a Supreme Being confirmed." His omnipotence is assumed, if not categorically stated and His omniscience is set forth in the following distich:—

He is omniscient from his being the maker of all things, for it is an established principle—

"That he only can make a thing who knows it with its means, parts and ends."
But an objector stands up and maintains that if the Supreme Being were the maker of the world he must have a body, as "experience shows that all effects, as jars, &c., are produced by beings possessed of bodies as potters, &c." The objector further maintains that "if God were possessed of a body, then he would be like us subject to trouble, and no longer be omniscient or omnipotent." This objection is disposed of by three different lines of argumentation. The premise that effects can be produced only through bodies is denied, and the ability of "the incorporeal soul" to "produce motion" is affirmed; along with God's power to assume various forms "to show his mercy to his devoted servants." But it is maintained that God has a permanent body, not a material body, but "a body of pure energy (Sakti)." "This body," it is said, "created according to his own will, is not like our bodies, but it is the cause of the five operations of the Supreme, which are respectively grace, obscuration, destruction, preservation and production." The following lines are quoted to prove that, as human minds cannot possibly rise up to the formless, God must assume forms to come down to their level, and thus render intelligent and cordial worship on the part of man possible:

"Thou art to be worshipped according to rule as possessed of form;
For the understanding cannot reach to a formless object."

This energy or power, emanating from the formless Divine Spirit, originating and guiding the natural processes of integration and disintegration, manifesting and at the same time veiling God, reminds the student of philosophy of the "œon" and "power" theory of Neo-Platonism.

The second category, the soul called Pasu (the cattle),
has no predicates indicated such as may enable us to distinguish it from the first. Indeed the identity of the first two categories is assumed, and even affirmed, in spite of utterances indicative of an essential difference between the two. The disquisition begins with these words:—"We now proceed to explain the second category, the soul (pasu). The individual soul, which is also known by such synonyms as the non-atomic, the Khetrajna, or the knower of the body, &c., is the Pasu." Then follows an argument to show how the Saiva idea of the soul differs from that of the Charvakas, who identify it with the body, that of the Naiyayikas, who represent it as "cognizable by perception," that of the Jainas, who look upon it as "non-pervading," that of the Baudhas in whose opinion it is "momentary," that of the Vedantists who consider it as "only one," and of the Sankhyas who maintain that it is "devoid of action." This argument, besides giving us an insight into the variety of notions entertained at the time of the inception of Saivaism of the soul among philosophers, assigns one predicate to the soul, viz., activity in contradistinction to the absolute passivity of the Sankhya School; but this attribute it shares with the first category God or Siva. The soul is moreover said to be non-atomic, or "anana," a term or title applied to God in the Brihad Aranyaka Upanishad; while the term Kshetrajna is applied to the soul in the Gita, the preponderant feature of which is an eclectic amalgamation of Sankhya with Vedantic schemes of thought. The soul is further identified with God by its being endowed with that "intelligence" which "consists in vision and action;" but the identity is expressly affirmed and proved by the following lines quoted from a work which comes under the heading "Sruti," or Revelation:—
"It is revealed that identity with Siva results when all fetters are removed."

Different kinds or classes of souls, ranging between those completely fettered and those thoroughly unfettered or emancipated, are indicated, but we pass over the enumeration, and content ourselves with insisting on the fact that the liberated souls themselves become Sivas, as is affirmed in the following distich:—

"The liberated souls are themselves Sivas, but these are liberated by his favor;

He is to be known as the one eternally liberated whose body is the five Mantras."

The only feature of difference between God and the soul is herein indicated, viz., that while God is "eternally liberated," the soul becomes, it is not explained how, fettered, and has to be emancipated by divine "favor." It ought to be mentioned here that the divine body of pure energy is said to be composed of five Mantras or Rig Veda hymns, the titles of which are given. What nonsense! the reader will be disposed to exclaim. But nothing is strange in religious books, in one of which we have the following evolutionary process indicated:—

"A sound proceeds out of the mystical syllable om and in that sound a rudimentary atom of matter is developed. From this atom are developed the four sounds, fifty-one Sanscrit letters, the Vedas, the Mantras, &c., the bodily, intellectual, and external enjoyments of the souls that have not attained to spiritual knowledge at the end of each period of the world's existence, and have been swept away by the waters of the world-destroying deluge; after these the three stages of heavenly happiness are developed, to be enjoyed by the souls that have a favorable balance of meritorious
deeds, or devoted themselves to the service of God or the abstract contemplation of the Deity, viz., (1) the enjoyment of the abode of Siva; (2) that of near approach to him; (3) that of union with him.” (Siva-prakasapatalai as translated by the Rev. F. Foulkes.)

If our modern evolutionists were simply to indicate the process of evolution in detail, as has been done by Hindu philosophers, their dissertations would be equally edifying! But let us return to the condition of the liberated souls. The Buddhist and Jaina theory of liberation finds its counterpart in the Siva-Drasana; and not only are deified mortals presented as supreme objects of devotion, but the number of the units composing the highest order of the hierarchy of gods is fixed, as that of Buddhas and Jins, as is seen in the following lines:—

"The Supreme of his own will makes one hundred and eighteen of these the lords of the Mantras.

Eight of these are called Mandaliens, eight again are Krodha, &c.;

Viresa, Srikantha and the hundred Rudras—these together are the hundred and eighteen."

It ought, moreover, to be observed that the lofty position of these first class deified mortals is not unattainable, as it is distinctly said with reference to higher orders of struggling souls that "the supreme Being, in conformity with their maturity puts forth a power agreeable thereto, and transfers them to the position of the hundred and eighteen Lords of the Mantras. Both Buddhism and Jainism hold out such hopes to cheer and animate devotees who are struggling upward towards the unique position occupied by the Buddhas and the Jins; and yet it is very strange that their number never increases!"
Now we come to the third and last category matter, called pasa. This is said to be "fourfold," and consists of mala, karma, maya and rodha-sakti. These terms are partially explained in the following lines:

"The enveloper-controller (mala), the over-powerer (rodha) action and the work of Maya.

These are four 'bonds,' and they are collectively called by the name of 'merit'

But a fuller explanation is given in the following passage:

(1) "'Enveloping' because mala exceedingly obscures and veils the soul's powers of vision and action; 'controlling' because mala, a natural impurity, controls the soul by its independent influence."

(2) "The 'overpowerer' is the obscuring power; this is called "a bond" (or matter) in a metaphorical sense, since this energy of Siva obscures the soul by superintending matter (rather than by partaking of the nature of matter.)"

(3) "Action (or rather its consequences, karma) as being performed by those who desire the fruit. It is in the form of merit or demerit, like the seed and shoot, and it is eternal in a never-beginning series."

(4) "'Maya' because herein as an energy of the divine being all the world is potentially contained at a mundane destruction, and again at a creation it all comes into manifestation, hence the derivation of the name."

The soul is fettered indeed, fettered by its native depravity, by its own volitions and actions, and by the twofold divine energy obscuring its vision through matter and through the all-pervading illusion by which the phenomenal is mistaken for the real. But it is happily not hopelessly entangled, and its emancipation from corruption and the
twofold illusion called into existence by divine energy, may
be secured by knowledge (Gyan), ceremonial action
(Krīya), meditation (Yoga) and practical duty (charya).
And, therefore, the system is called "the great tantra pre-
pared of three categories and four parts." It begins with
theism and ends in pantheism, its God being the universal,
all-pervading, one luminious substance, its souls scintillations
of this substance, and its world an illusion created by an
energy emanating from it; while the theistic phraseology
adopted or employed only tends to make "confusion worse
confounded."

(3) The third Saiva-paper in the Sarva-Darsana Sang-
raham is entitled "The Pratyabhijna-Darsana or Recognitive
system." It is even more thoroughly pantheistic than the
previous schools organized under the banner of Saivaisms,
and its salient features may be set forth in a few sentences.
There is a tone of vacillation and ambiguity in its exposition
of doctrine and principle, but its underlying vein of pan-
theism is easily recognizable beneath its clouds of dubious
phraseology. For in some passages of the paper under
review, God is said to be immanent in the soul and in every
object of nature, and all that the devotee is required to do
is to throw off the veil over his eyes, and recognize Him
both in and out of himself. The "nature of Siva" is said
to be the essence "that resides in all things," while "the
result," of a correct knowledge of the system is set forth as
"the bringing of mankind near unto God." But the obvi-
ous purport of these, and such sentences is neutralized by
what is expressly said about God, creation, and the liberated
soul. Of God we have the following portraiture:—"In
reality God is without plurality or difference, as transced-
ing all limitations of space, time and figure. He is pure
intelligence, self-luminousness, the manifestor; and thus we may read in the Saiva aphorisms, "Self is intelligence." On the subject of creation we have this unmistakable utterance,—

"The mere will of God, when he wills to become the world under its forms of jar, of cloth, and other objects, it is his activity marked out by motive and agent.

This process of essence into emanation, whereby, if this be that comes to be, cannot be attributed to motionless, unsentient things."

God becomes the world, and so the essential identity of the Creator and the creation is affirmed. The entire scheme of Salvation associated with the system is set forth in this distich:

"This agent of cognition, blinded by illusion, transmigrated through the fatality of works:

Taught his divine nature by science, as pure intelligence, he is enfranchised."

But man is under the spell of maya, and as he does not recognize himself as God, he is in trouble and distress, and he moreover disdains himself just as the lover unrecognized is neglected by his beloved one. This is set forth in the following sentence:—"As the gallant standing before the damsel is disdained as like all other men, so long as he is unrecognized, though he humbles himself before her with all manner of importunities; in like manner the personal self of mankind, though it be the universal soul, in which there is no perfection unrealized, attains not its own glorious nature; and, therefore, this recognition thereof must come into play."

The difference between this system and Vedantic pantheism hinges, not so much on its principles, as on the method associated with it of attaining its summum bonum,
HINDU HETERODOXY.

viz., liberation from the spell of illusion. According to Vedantic principles Brahma is known neither by works of piety nor by the knowledge of the Vedas, but by austerity and meditation; but according to this system the bare knowledge of the identity of the soul with God acquired in consequence of proper instruction is enough to lead to the recognition which results in complete Salvation. This is set forth in the following distich:

"When once the nature of Siva that resides in all things has been known with tenacious recognition, whether by proof or by instruction in the words of a spiritual director.

There is no further need of doing aught or of any further reflection. When he knows Suvarna (or Siva) a man may cease to act and to reflect."

(4) The fourth and the last paper is entitled "the Rasesvara-Darsana or Mercurial system," and it indicates a philosophic bathos, a decent from the sublime to the ridiculous. It is a labored eulogy on mercury as first the substance that gives permanence to the human body and then as the principium or the ultimate power of creation and preservation, and fit, therefore, to be identified with Siva. The impermanence of the body is a characteristic principle of Hindu philosophy, set forth in touching statements and illustrated by a variety of affecting imagery; and the object of the system is to show how its weakness may be converted into strength, its tendency to disease and dissolution effectually checked, and its stability and permanence ensured. Its difference from the orthodox systems is indicated in the following lines:

"Liberation is declared in the six systems to follow the death of the body."
Such liberation is not cognized in perception like an emblematic myrobalan fruit in the hand.

Therefore a man should preserve that body by means of mercury and of medicaments."

The origin of mercury is thus set forth together with its position in the scale of being:—

"The ascetic, therefore, who aspires to liberation in this life should first make to himself a glorified body. And, inasmuch as mercury is produced by the creative conjunction of Haro and Gauri (Siva and his consort) and mica is produced from Gauri, mercury and mica are generally identified with Haro and Gauri in the verse—

"Mica is thy seed, and mercury is my seed;

The combination of the two, O Goddess, is destructive of death and poverty."

Nay even the conjunction spoken of is not needed, as mercury, which is called parada, "because it is a means of conveyance beyond the series of transmigratory states," "arises" says Siva "from my members, and is the exudation of my body." What wonder that it is set forth as an object of worship as God himself in the following lines:—

"From seeing it, from touching it, from eating it, from merely remembering it. From worshiping it, tasting it, from imparting it, appear its six virtues.

Equal merit accrues from seeing mercury as accrues from seeing all the phallic emblems.

On earth, those at Kedar, and all others whatsoever."

The six virtues are perhaps involved in the body made "immortal, the repository of services, the root of merit, riches, pleasure, liberation." The paper concludes with a metrical prayer the first line of which runs thus:—
“May that mercury, which is the very self, preserve us from dejection and from the terrors of metempsychosis!”

II.—Vaishvanism.

The Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha has two papers on the subject, the first being an exposition of the principles of the school founded by Ramanuja and the second of that established by Madhava. But the schemes of thought associated with these non-dualistic schools agree in almost all their essential features; and they both have the same object, viz., to oppose vehemently the monistic reform effected in the republic of philosophy by the great Sankara Acharya. Their points of agreement and disagreement are set forth in a controversial Sanscrit Poem called "The Tattva-Muktavali," originally written by Purnananda Chakravarti, a Bengalee pandit, and recently edited and translated by Professor E. B. Cowell of Cambridge. Both the systems are trialistic, the categories assumed by them both being God, soul, and non-soul or matter. God is emphatically set forth as the Creator of the universe, and not devoid of qualities; and the argument from design is insisted on in these words:—"This earth must surely have had a maker; for its having the nature of an effect is a sign, just as we see to be the case in pots."
The old difficulty, however, puzzles the poet, only a moment. If God is the creator, He must have a body, and consequently infirmities incompatible with divine perfections. This objection is met by the assertion that God has a pure body, "richly endowed with the six qualities, which according to a commentator, are "sovereignty, knowledge, glory, prosperity, dispassion and virtue." God moreover, is emphatically declared to be a Being with, not without qualities, Sarguna, not Nirguna, the theory being denounced as blasphemous which represents as "void of qualities" Him "who is the
ocean of qualities." The non-identity of the soul with the Universal Spirit is proved by Revelation, or references to Sruti and Smriti, as well as by argument based on perception and inference. Sharp contrasts between the omnipotence and omniscience of the one and the parvipotence and parviscience of the other are pointed to as fitted to set forth the absurdity of non-dualism; and the assertion is ventured that "there is as vast a difference between Brahma and thee as between Mount Meru and a mustard seed!" The existence of what are called "pairs" in this world, such as knowledge and ignorance, virtue and vice, true and false science, forms the basis of a dualistic argument the conclusion of which is expressed in the words: "thus everywhere there are opposite pairs, and similar is the notorious pair, Brahma and the soul." The difference, moreover, between the universal spirit and matter is affirmed, and Kapila is praised for stating that "the soul is different from the elements, the senses, the internal organ and primary matter and also from that which is called the individual"—though Kapila in his Aphorisms keeps clear of all allusion to a Being behind the entities, spiritual and material, posited by him. Here then we have the trialism of Yoga philosophy and the Logical schools resuscitated with elements super-added fitted to convert their highest category from a non-entity into an entity. But all the concessions made to theism are nullified by the following words:—"He by a particle of whose intellect thou, O soul, hast been produced the foremost of intelligent beings." Such words tend to represent God as both the efficient and material cause of the universe, and, therefore, indicate a recoil to pantheism! The theory of illusion is emphatically denied in some verses and affirmed in others.
But let us take leave of this Poem, and attempt an analysis of the first of the two papers on Vaishnavism as a Philosophy in the Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha.

1. The first paper entitled "The Ramanuja system" presents, as its name implies, an insight into the philosophy of the school founded by Ramanuja, the great Vaishvanya reformer, who flourished in the twelfth century. His biography is presented by Monier Williams in his "Religious Thought and Life in India" in a couple of short sentences, which we take the liberty to transcribe:—"Ramanuja, or as he is often called Ramanujacharya, was born about the twelfth century at Stri (Sri) Parrambattur, a town about twenty-six miles west of Madras. He is known to have studied and taught at Kanchipuram (Conjeveuram) and to have resided towards the end of his life at Sri-Ranghan on the Kaveri, near Trichinopoly, where for many years he worshipped Vishnu in his character of Srianganath." The characteristic feature of his philosophy is the trialism involved in the assumption of the three categories of God, the soul and non-soul. This is set forth in the following words in the Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha:—"The tenets of Ramanuja are as follows:—Three categories are established, as soul, not-soul and Lord; as subject, object and supreme disposer. Thus it has been said—

"Lord, soul and not-soul are the triad of principles: Hari (Vishnu)
Is Lord: individual spirits are souls; and the visible world is not-soul."

This statement is followed by a tissue of elaborate and acute reasoning directed against the monistic position of the Advaitavadins, or the champions of Vedantic non-dualism; and their watch-words and mottoes quoted and explained or
rather distorted into a sense opposed to their views. But instead of following this line of special pleading through its successive steps, let us quote the passage in which the categories are described:

"Of these (soul, not-soul and the Lord) individual spirits or souls, consisting of uncontracted and unlimited pure knowledge, but enveloped in illusion, that is in works from all eternity, undergo contraction and expansion of knowledge according to the degrees of their merits. Soul experiences fruition, and after reaping pleasures and pains, proportionate to merit and demerit, then ensues knowledge of the Lord, or attainment of the sphere of the Lord. Of things which are not soul, and which are objects of fruition, (or experience of pleasure or pain) unconsciousness, unconduciveness to the end of man, susceptibility of modification, and the like are the properties. Of the Supreme Lord the attributes are subsistence, as the internal controller (or animator) of both the subjects and objects of fruition; the boundless glory of illimitable knowledge, dominion, majesty, power, brightness and the like, the countless multitude of auspicious qualities; the generation at will of all things other than himself, whether spiritual and non-spiritual; various and infinite adornment with unsurpassable excellence, singular, uniform, and divine."

Souls are in other passages described as eternal and atomic, "a part" of "the hundredth part" of the hundredth part "of a hair." They consist of pure knowledge, but being under the spell of illusion, which is divine energy, they have to toil their way through different degrees of fruition and knowledge till they are absorbed in God. The Ramanuja theory of absorption differs materially from the Vedantic, inasmuch as it does not involve the extinction of individual consciousness. Matter is unconscious, passes through
a plurality of forms, and does nothing but enchain the soul, obscure its vision and mar its happiness; and, therefore, deserves all the curses pronounced on the mischievous activity of Prakriti in the Sankhya scheme. And God is represented as the internal controller, or the motive power both in souls and matter; and He acts through the divine energy called Maya or illusion for "sport" or "pastime." "Auspicious qualities" are ascribed to him along with boundless knowledge and power, but whether this is to be represented in Vedantic phraseology as "false attribution" to be cast overboard when His real nature is to be ascertained, is not clearly stated. But He is said to exist, "in consequence of pastime," "under five modes," viz., adoration, emanation, manifestation, the subtle and the internal controller. Adoration is the form in which he appears in images, while under the heads of emanation and manifestation may be classed the incarnations which embody either infinitesimal portions of His essence or His entire self. He is called "the subtle" because he is in the words of a Vedic text quoted, passionless, deathless, without sorrow, without hunger, desiring truth, true in purpose; while He is the internal controller because He is one who "abiding in the soul rules the soul within." When all that is predicated of God is properly sifted, the residuum left is what scientists call inscrutable force.

But the system oscillates between theism and pantheism. It is called "monism" because the "Supreme Spirit, alone is in all forms as all is its body;" and it is called "pluralism" because "the essential natures of soul, and not-soul and the Lord are different and ought not to be confounded." The theistic element is after all so subtle, intangible or indeterminate that the Ramanuja doctrine has been severally described as monistic, dualistic and trialistic.
The path of liberation is thus indicated:—

"The worship of the Deity is described in the Pancharatna as consisting of five elements, (1) the access; (2) the preparation; (3) oblation—(4) recitation; (5) devotion. Of these access is the sweeping, smearing, and so forth, of the way to the temple. The preparation is the provision of perfumes, flowers and the like appliances of worship. Oblation is worship of the deities. Recitation is the muttered ejaculation of the sacred texts, with attention to what they mean, the rehearsal of the hymns and lauds of Vishnu, the commemoration of his names, and study of institutes which set forth the truth. Devotion is meditation on the deity."

The system in its theoretical aspect begins with theism and ends in pantheism; and in its practical aspect it begins with the ordinary duties of image worship, and rises through successive stages up to the height of passionless meditation!

2. The second paper is entitled "the System of Purna-Prajna" a nom-de-plume assumed by Madhava, a Kanarese Brahmin who flourished in the thirteenth century, and of whom very little is known besides the facts, that he was educated in a convent, that he laid the foundation of a Theistic School, and that he vehemently opposed the nondualism of thinkers of the Sankara Acharya stamp. In the paper itself he is said to have been "the third incarnation of Vayu," the Vedic god of the wind, the first being Hanuvat and the second Bhima. His system does not materially differ from that of Ramanuja, though the two systems are expressly declared in the prologue to be at war with each other in some respects. Monier Williams maintains that Madhava's scheme is dualistic, and, therefore, different from that of Ramanuja, which is trialistic; and his opinion receives at first sight sanction from statements such as the following:
"Independent and dependent, two principles are received: The independent is Vishnu the Lord, exempt from imperfections and of inexhaustible excellencies."

But a trialism is set forth in the following lines quoted with approbation from the Bhāgyav Gita:

"Two are these persons in the universe—the perishable and the imperishable; The perishable is all the elements; the imperishable is the unmodified.

The other, the most excellent person, called the Supreme Spirit,

Is the undecaying Lord, who pervading sustains the three worlds."

The third element of the triad, *viz.*, matter is thrown completely into the shade, and the difference between the first two is pointed out, in unmistakable statements, as analogous to that subsisting between the master and the servant, the benefactor and the dependent, the King and the subject. The difference, moreover, is set forth by some analogies as essential, but by others as non-essential. When, for instance, it is said to be as marked as that between "a bird and the string," or between "the juices of various trees," or between a robber and the robbed," it cannot but be held up as essential; but when the analogies are "the rivers and the sea," "fresh and salt water," a thoroughly pantheistic notion of identity is suggested.

The Lord, Vishnu or Hari, is placed above the entire hierarchy of gods in the following passage, in which, moreover, some of His attributes are set forth:

"Brahma, Siva, and the greatest of the gods decay with the decay of their bodies;

Greater than these is Hari, undecaying, because his body is for the sustentation of Lakshimi."
By reason of all his attributes, independence, power, knowledge, pleasure, and the rest.
All they, all the deities, are in unlimited obedience to him.”
The attributes of the second entity or the soul are not categorically stated, and only its “atonic size” and “servitude” are indicated in the exordium, in which the different points of agreement between this scheme and that of Ramanuja are enumerated. The duality of the soul and God is the main thing insisted on, and it is proved by revelation. The other two proofs admitted, viz., perception and inference cannot, it is affirmed, either establish the existence of God or set forth His essential difference from creation. But the liberty taken with the well-known Vedic watch-words may be seen in the following:

“And this text (that art thou) indicates similarity (not identity) like the text—the sun is the sacrificial post.”

Or to propose another explanation of the text, Atma tat tvan asi, that art thou, it may be divided Atma atat tvan asi. He alone is soul possessing independence and other attributes, and thou art not that (atat) as wanting those attributes;

The texts Aham Brahma, I am Brahma, and that of which the translation is, He that knows the absolute becomes the absolute, are held expressive of similarity rather than identity, and, perhaps, made to pass through a similar torturing process in other standard works of the school.

The path of emancipation is service or obedience which is threefold, (1) stigmatisation; (2) imposition of names; and (3) worship. The devotee is required to have the discus, one of the four sacred things held in Vishnu’s four hands, imprinted on his right hand, and the conch-shell on his left; and the branding instantaneously converts him into an heir of glory,
who, "shaking off his guilt, goes to the heaven" of "ascetics." He is moreover directed to give his "sons and others" "such names as Kesava" the object being to ensure to him the store of merit acquired by the frequent repetition of the many names of Vishnu. And lastly worship "is of ten kinds, viz., with the voice, (1) veracity; (2) usefulness; (3) kindliness, (4) sacred duty, with the body; (5) alms-giving; (6) defence; (7) protection, with the common sensory; (8) mercy; (9) longing; and (10) faith." The classification is by no means scientific, but the recognition of good works as a species of worship is a wholesome check to the ascetic tendencies of almost all the isms and ologies of the country. And it is, moreover, a characteristic feature of this system, that salvation is made dependent on "grace" which is, however, purchased by knowledge, not, however, of the distinction between God and soul, but of the "excellency" of the divine character. As this point discriminates or differentiates the system from almost all pre-existing types of thought, the sentence in which it is made ought to be quoted:—"And it is declared that the grace of Vishnu is won only through the knowledge of his excellency, not through the knowledge of non-duality;" and finally, the upshot of emancipation is absorption, such as leaves individual consciousness intact.

Concluding Remarks.

One or two observations ought to be made before the paper is brought to a close. And the first is, that the heterodoxy with which these quasi-theistic systems are branded is significant, inasmuch as it is calculated to show the utter futility of all efforts to evolve pure theistic notions from the Upahisnads. There is, as has already been said, scarcely a scheme of thought of the wildest description, which may not be propped up by appropriate quotations from these venerable records.
Nihilism or Voidism may call to its aid, has in fact called to its aid the string of passages in which creation is traced to what is either expressly said to be nothing, or represented so as to be tantamount to nothing. Materialism finds support in the statements in which the perceptible universe is declared to be only a congeries of modes or manifestations of that Avyka. (Unseen) which has been identified with the Prakriti of the Sankhya school. And pantheism is the line of thought in the Upanishads which is preponderant. The only thing, which cannot be found in these documents is theism; and when it is attempted to evolve theistic notions from them, the approved canons of exegesis have to be set aside, and clear statements distorted and tortured precisely in the manner in which modern rationalists have tried to eliminate the supernatural from the Bible!

Our second remark is that when men are allowed to create their God, He assumes diverse forms according to the varied idiosyncrasies of the parties in whose hands the creative process is left. This appears from the diversity of forms in which Siva has been worshipped in the country, and the varieties of attributes ascribed to him by different classes of the worshippers. Monier Williams brings these varieties of forms under five distinctive heads but a few more might have been added with propriety. Siva was originally worshipped as the impersonation of the destructive or disintegrating processes of nature, and consorted with two other deities, who represented its brighter powers and operations. But the spirit of generalization, evoked by philosophical investigations, merged the triad into a monad, and Siva was clothed with all the powers and functions of nature, beneficent and malignant, destructive and constructive. Again ascetism prevailed under the shade of
philosophy; and the favored God was converted into the prince of ascetics, seated under the shade of an umbrageous tree, wrapped up in profound meditation, his body naked and besmeared with ashes, his hair matted, and his countenance indicative of serenity and quiescence. But the ardent student of philosophy needed assistance, and the God was in consequence brought out of the region of what may properly be called lifeless inactivity, to which he had been relegated, and made the prince of philosophers and sages, engaged in teaching science and revealing rules of grammar and logic. The common people of the baser sort could not endure either his ascetic retirement or his philosophic wisdom; and they made him the God of drinking and smoking, one who under the influence of liquor and ganja distinguishes himself by acts, for which in a good government he would be safely lodged either in a bedlam or in a house of correction! The variety of forms in which the god Vishnu has been worshipped brings the same tendency into bold relief.

And the last remark we have to make is, that the theism which originates in human speculations rapidly degenerates into epicurism. The history of all theistic movements originated by man in this and other lands, as well amongst semi-civilized races as among those more favored, proves this to a demonstration. Saivaism in India degenerated into the orgies associated with the Vamachari worship of the female organ of generation, and Vaishnavism sank into the consecrated profligacy or rather bestiality of the Maharajas of the Vallabha sect, which was exposed in the Supreme court of Bombay in 1862. Man's only refuge is flight from his own speculations about God to the Revelation. He has vouchsafed for his guidance!
CHAPTER X.

KABIR AND HIS CREED.

There is a tendency manifested by writers on Indian subjects to overrate our national conservatism, or aversion to innovation and change. Nor is this to be looked upon as a matter of wonder. Some of the prevalent institutions and customs of the country may be traced through successive periods of political convulsions, through the rise and fall of governments, dynasties, national organisations and religious sects, back to the time when Alexander invaded the Punjab, and found within its confines a chieftain whose bravery and sense of personal dignity he could not but respect. And to-day its vast populations are apparently distinguished by no feature or trait of character more prominent than that immobility which seemingly defies all attempts made by philanthropists to raise them to a platform of civilization loftier than what is at present occupied by them. But there are, it should be noted, some signs of the times eminently fitted to bring us to the conclusion that our national conservatism, though represented by common consent as hard as iron, is after all flexible enough to yield to what may be called superior force. Under the dominating influence of Western culture our national traditions and beliefs are being revolutionized with a rapidity which may, perhaps justly, be described as indicative of unhealthy growth. The characteristic ideas of Indian social life, such as excessive reverence for antiquity, exaggerated respect for age, servile obedience to authority, unreasoning adherence to tradition, as well as such as are embodied in institutions like the
caste system, early marriage, female seclusion and ignorance, and perpetual widowhood, are chased out of the native mind almost as soon as it is brought fairly in contact with the ideas transplanted by English education. And it is simply the narrowness of the area affected by it that stands in the way of revolutionary changes in our national habits of life, or in the sphere of our social usages and customs.

The truth is, Indian conservatism needs, as every feature of national character does, a force mightier and higher than itself to overcome it. And such a force was scarcely brought to bear upon it before the commencement of what may appropriately be called the inroads of Western culture. The country remained isolated and screened from foreign influence, proud of its own achievements and absorbed in its overweening idea of its own importance and greatness, till its dreams of superiority were dashed to the ground by a series of successful Muhammadan invasions followed by Muhammadan occupation of some of its fairest parts. The Muhammadans brought with them an alien creed and some forces of a civilization higher than the indigenous, but these were not mighty enough to overcome completely or revolutionize the prevalent traditions and usages; but yet they succeeded in compelling our national conservatism to yield so far as to enable them to leave a permanent impress of their long-continued dominance on our modes of thought and habits of life. And moreover, their influence was penetrating enough to effect a noticeable change even in the sanctity of our philosophic thought; and this change is too important to be overlooked in an attempt to trace Hindu philosophy through successive stages of development from its inception at a time immemorial down to
its modern phases. A few preliminary observations will prepare our way.

The eclectic tone of the national intellect could not but have a new work forced upon it when an alien and a hostile creed appeared on the stage of our national history to dispute the claims of prevalent types of faith. The feeling at first evoked was that of intense hatred, and for years, if not ages, there was on the part of the national systems a struggle, not indeed for life, but for the maintenance and perpetuation of their universally acknowledged ascendency; while there was on the part of the imported creed, not merely a recoil from and abhorrence of current beliefs and usages of a sacred character, but that spirit of earnest propagandism which might justly be characterized as unscrupulous when looked at from the lofty standpoint of Christian principle, but which according to its own standard was quite legitimate. But when a period of sacred warfare with indifferent results was over, a wish, more or less ardent, for peace was manifested by the belligerent parties; and there was evoked within the confines of the national faith the spirit of eclecticism which gave a new turn to the philosophical speculations of the country.

Nor was the task before it likely to appear too Quixotic to be accomplished. The national predilection for eclecticism had already worked miracles of reconciliation. It had, as indicated in books like the Swetasvatara Upanishad and Bhagavad Gita, successfully reconciled the rank atheism of the Sankhya system with Vedantic pantheism, and effected, moreover, an amalgamation of the flighty speculations of the schools with the grovelling superstitions of popular belief. It had brought into the inner sanctuary of the national polytheism the materialism of the Buddhists,
and the hylozoism of the Jainas; and it had discovered "the missing link," as the New Dispensationists would call it, fitted to reconcile all forms of faith, from gross fetishism up to subtle, impalpable transcendentalism. And it could therefore look upon the task of reconciliation forced upon it by the ingress of Muhammadan theism as both practicable and easy.

There were elements in Muhammadan belief of which the spirit of eclectic ism could make an excellent use in its attempt to incorporate it with the national faith. The basis or fundamental principle of both the systems is the same, viz.: Theism prominently brought forward in the one system and lying dormant or buried in the other, while there is scarcely any difference in the precepts of morality embedded in both. Might not a superstructure of union be reared on this broad substratum? This was precisely the question raised, as it has been in our day by men like Raja Ram Mohun Roy and Babu Keshab Chunder Sen. But the scheme of amalgamation as regards the popular faith could not but prove abortive, the repellent force on the Hindu side being the caste system and on the Muhammadan side intense hatred of idolatry. But the contact between the two systems has by no means been fruitless, as Hinduism has to some extent been confessedly Muhammadanized and Muhammadanism Hinduized; while a good natured and peaceful exchange of objects of worship and features of ceremony has been realized among at least the less intelligent and less bigoted.

But though all schemes of popular amalgamation were sure to be repelled indignantly by both the parties concerned, a philosophic unification might be attempted with success. The two barriers to reconciliation did not exist within
the sacred enclosure of philosophy, the caste system being unrecognized by the learned of Hindustan, and Muhammadan doctors being disposed to look at popular superstitions with a friendly eye. And elements eminently fitted to lead to a perfect union of what at first appeared hostile schemes of philosophic thought were not wanting either on the side of Hindu speculation or on that of its rival. The transcendentalism reverenced in Hindu schools is also inscribed, so to speak, on the banner of Muhammadan philosophy.

A scheme of occult philosophy resembling what is in vogue in India, not only in its main outlines, but in the most vital of its elements, is associated with Islamism. It is called Sufism, a word which is evidently a corruption of the Greek word known to English readers as sophism; but it does not, like the Greek expression, indicate a species of sensationalism less refined or rather grosser than what is associated in these days with the names of philosophers like John Stuart Mill. Nay, it indicates a flight of thought sublimer even than the intellectualism ushered in by Socrates, whose whole life was spent in exposing the fallacies, invalidating the pretensions and humiliating the persons of jaunty sophists. Its fundamental principles recall to the mind the faith of the Neo-Platonists, specially of the school of Plotinus and his successors. It upholds belief in an absolute essence in conjunction with the theory of development or evolution which converts all objects of creation, both animate and inanimate, into its various modes or manifestations. It specially represents human souls as portions of God separated from Him by a sad accident, and longing for reunion with or absorption into the original substance; and the way it indicates to the attainment of their object or the consummation of their wishes is not
materially different from that set forth in Hindu books of philosophy. The upward path begins with the devotion associated with ritual observances, and goes up through successive stages of development to the height of serene meditation. These stages, barring the lowest of mere ritualistic observance, are seven in number,—the first, that of proper search after God and service of a thoroughly spiritual type; the second, that of all-absorbing love; the third, that of monastic seclusion; the fourth, that of genuine knowledge; the fifth, that of ecstatic vision; the sixth, that of the revelation of true nature of God or the Truth; and the seventh, that of re-union with God which, realized in this life, leads to absorption into the divine substance in that which is to come. An amalgamation of this scheme with the dominant philosophic thought of our country, the Vedantic pantheism, is suggested as thoroughly feasible at first sight.

The language employed in Muhammadan philosophical works to indicate their vital elements is the language of the erotic passions, the language of love and marriage, even of wantonness and mirth. The devotee is the lover, God is the object of love, the adored damsel; the mysteries of religion are her ringlets; while love to her is intoxicating wine, and religious enthusiasm is inebriation and mirth. The ardent worshipper is the madman, rendered insane by his separation from the object of his love, and pining away in consequence of his intense longing to be reunited. Persian and Urdu poetry derive their rhapsodical character, their vein of ambiguity and mystification as well as the grossness or apparent licentiousness of their imagery, from the speculations of the Sufi sect, and the phraseology, in which they are couched.
The principal work of this sect is the *Mesnevi* of Jelalu’dd-Din Mevlana, recently translated by James W. Redhouse, and published in Trübner's series as an oriental work of rare significance as well as merit. It consists of a prose and a poetic portion, written in a style on the whole perspicuous, if not very fascinating; and it conveys instruction in the highest of truths and the sublimest of subjects through the medium of personal narratives, legendary incidents and parabolic fables. The personal narratives cluster around the author mainly, and the difficulties he had to encounter are prominently brought forward therein, along with the varied types of scepticism he had to meet and overcome; but the effect is marred by the miraculous elements brought in and indiscriminately diffused. The legendary incidents, when thoroughly sifted, might present a picture of the age in which the author flourished, and the types of thought from which he derived his inspiration; while the fables are fitted to remind the Indian reader of the *Hitopadesha* in which the teachers are speaking animals and talking birds, rather than human beings.

With reference to the scheme of thought to which it gives prominence the translator remarks thus:—"The Dervishes of Islam appear to be a kind of gnostics. They styled themselves Poor, Impassioned, Adepts and Perfect. In many respects their doctrines correspond with those of Buddha, Pythagoras and Plato, making all souls that are destined to salvation to be emanations from the divine light or glory of God, in which they will be again congregated; and all those doomed to perdition have been formed out of the fire of His wrath to which also they will eventually be consigned." This subtle species of pantheism does not stand prominently out from the pages of the book
he has translated so well; and his discernment in matters
of philosophic significance appears at a discount when his
mistake in placing Buddha in the same category with
Pythagoras and Plato is considered.

We cannot, however, read the book carefully without
being irresistibly brought to the conclusion that the pre-
ponderant tendency of its thought is theistic or at least sus-
ceptible of theistic interpretation. The phraseology employ-
ed is that in vogue in the schools of Muhammadan sophists.
God is represented as the object of love, and the devotee
as the lover; but the perfect identity of creation with the
Creator, involved in every scheme of pantheism, is set forth,
not in its declarations generally, but in a few solitary
passages. Jelal, for instance, answered an objection started
by a Dervish in these words:—

"Had not that impeachable proposition been true, we had
not proffered it. There is therein, forsooth, a contradiction
in terms, but it is a contradiction in time, so that the
receptacle and the recepted may differ,—may be two
distinct things; even as the universe of God's qualities is
the receptacle of the universe of God's essence. But these
two universes are really one. The first of them is not
He, the second of them is not other than He. Those
apparently two things are in truth one and the same.
How there is a contradiction in terms implied? God
comprises the exterior and the interior. If we cannot say
He is the interior, He will not include the exterior. But
He comprises all, and in Him all things have their being.
He is then the receptacle also, comprising all existences, as
the Koran (xli. 54) says: 'He comprises all things.'"

These and such like utterances are thoroughly pantheis-
tic, representing as they do all "existences" or forms of
transitory existence as included in or forming part and parcel of the divine essence. But it must be confessed that there is in the book a tone of vacillation and ambiguity which can be explained in two different ways, either by supposing that the author's mind oscillated between the pantheism of some Greek schools and the marked theism of the Koran, or by the hypothesis that he consciously couched pantheistic thought in theistic phraseology to obviate the revulsion of feeling an open declaration of his real doctrine might give rise to. The latter supposition appears the more tenable, when we take into consideration the dodge he resorts to in bolstering up his pantheism, when unmistakably pronounced, as in the passage quoted, by means of a citation from the Koran.

Such being the essential feature of the esoteric philosophy associated, by no means inseparably, with Mahamadanism, the idea of effecting its amalgamation with current schemes of Hindu thought very naturally flashed on the minds of Indian thinkers. It is impossible to ascertain who the originator of this idea was; but it may be represented as almost certain that in the mind of the low-caste reformer, Kabir, it developed into a scheme tangible enough, though by no means practicable. Kabir's following has never been very large, the number of those who acknowledge his authority and submit to his spiritual rule being less even than half a million according to the last Census. They are numerous in the North-Western Provinces and in Central India, but their chief sanctuary is Kabir Chaura at Benares, a shrine visited by hosts of pilgrims belonging to their own and other kindred sects. These devotees are fed as a rule by its mahant or spiritual ruler, who for this and other pious services receives,
according to Wilson, a monthly allowance from the Maharajah of Benares, and donations and largesses from other wealthy patrons. Wilson refers to a fact which, if well grounded, might lead one to question the accuracy of the estimate presented in the Census referred to. It seems that at a mela or religious festival held at Benares under the auspices of Maharajah Cheit Sing no fewer than 35,000 Kabir-Panthis, or Kabir's followers, of the monastic or mendicant orders, were assembled, and if this number represented the ascetic classes the number of the lay disciples must have been four or fivefold larger, and consequently the total would have been nearly as many times larger than what is indicated in the Census. But the estimate of the audience, based as it is on mere hearsay reports, may justly be set aside as exaggerated.

But though Kabir's following is small, his influence is wide-spread. Several sects which owe their origin mediate-ly, if not immediately, to him, spread his name and prestige through a wide extent of territory. Wilson in his short paper on his system in his well-known treatise on Hindu sects enumerates no less than twelve of these, besides tracing several important sects, such as the Dadu-panthis, who are divided into three classes and numerous in Marwar and Ajmere, to Kabir's teaching. The principal of the twelve enumerated is perhaps the sect of the Satnamis, whose number, according to the Census, is half a million, and who are numerous in Oude and the adjoining provinces. But Kabir should be held up, not only as the progenitor of these small and, to some extent, obscure sects, but the progenitor also of the sect originated by Nanak, and developed under his successors into a national faith. This fact is overlooked by Wilson, who evidently never read the Adi-Granth, and
who had to be informed of the fact that considerable portions of that adored book are avowedly traced to Kabir's authorship.

A biography of Kabir is presented, along with those of almost a host of Indian Saints, in the well-known Hindi work called Vakta-mala, or the Garland of Saints; but as it is a tissue of legend and fable, no glimpse whatever can be obtained from it either of the mental peculiarities of the reformer or of the atmosphere of thought which he breathed. As a record of the educational processes through which he passed, or even of his doings and achievements, it is perfectly useless; though as a specimen of the way in which history, both national and individual, used to be written in the country, its significance cannot be overrated. Every portion of the reformer's life is encircled by what Strauss calls a garland of myths,—his birth, his initiation into a prominent school of philosophy, his varied, peaceful encounters with Brahminical opponents, his interviews with Rajahs and the Emperor himself, and his death.

Kabir evidently was a low-caste man, born and bred up in the house of a weaver at Benares; but a legend was invented, certainly not unconsciously, to cover the disgrace of his ignoble origin, a legend scarcely less bizarre than the one associated with the birth of Romulus and Remus. His mother is said to have been a virgin widow, the daughter of a Brahmin who was an ardent disciple of Ramanand, one of the two great Vaishnava reformers of the mediaeval era of Indian philosophy. She was very anxious to see the great reformer, and coaxed her father till she was allowed to accompany him to Ramanand's sanctum sanctorum to gratify her wish. The reformer, ignorant of her widowhood, blessed her with what may be called the prospective birth
of a son; and as the blessing could not possibly be withdrawn even when her real condition was disclosed, a son she was destined to have, and ultimately had. To stop the tongue of rumour and screen herself from disgrace, she retired to a secluded place, and exposed the child when she was delivered. The child was found and brought up by a weaver and his wife. The Kabir-panthis of the mendicant orders observe no caste, but yet they cannot bear the idea of a great religious reformer springing from the womb of a low-caste woman. Such is the influence of the system!

Kabir was a disciple of Ramanand: and a very puzzling question had to be settled by his followers, specially those of them who wrote his biography. How could a Javan, a very low-caste weaver, not better than a Muhammadan, have himself enrolled among the initiated disciples of a Vaishnava reformer? Kabir had recourse to a stratagem, which is given in detail in Vakta-mala. The whole story may be thus summarized:—Kabir, though a low-caste weaver, had a predilection for Ram-worship, accidentally developed in him, and he spent his days and nights in solitude, meditating on Ram and devoutly repeating his holy name. The Deity was pleased, and directed him by revelation to become a disciple of Ramanand; but his caste debarred him from the privilege: he bethought himself of a tortuous plan which might succeed where a straightforward-course was sure to fail. He knew that the great reformer was in the habit of bathing every morning at the famous Ghat at Benares called Munikarnica, and he thought that if he stretched or laid himself down on one of the steps thereof, Ramanand's foot might accidentally touch him, and his object might be gained. He followed this plan on a gloomy morning and stretched himself full length on one of the
steps of the frequented ghat. Ramanand, as he was passing down self-absorbed or perhaps muttering his morning orisons, unconsciously trod upon the recumbent devotee, and exclaimed 'Ram, Ram';—the sacred name repeated when an accident occurs, and also when a disciple is formally initiated. Kabir construed the exclamation into a public recognition of his discipleship; and perhaps he forsook his hereditary trade, left home, and led the life of an ascetic giving out that he was a follower of the great Vaishnava reformer. At all events he showed a tendency in that direction. His parents became annoyed, and upbraided him; and his mother in a fit of passion repaired, evidently along with him, to the sanctuary of Ramanand, and reproached him with having made her son an outcaste and a madman. The reformer replied that he did not even know her son, and could not but represent her remonstrances as utterly groundless. Kabir, however, reminded him of the occurrence at the ghat, and he, overpowered with a deep sense of his worthiness, embraced the new disciple affectionately, and favored him with the recognized badges of initiation, the rosary, and the tilak or mark imprinted on the forehead. He, moreover quoted some sacred texts fitted to prove that even a Javan, when full of faith in Hari as Kabir was, might, though ignorant of the Vedas, be initiated into the holy orders of one of the most prominent of which he was the founder.

But petty persecutions were in store for the new disciple. Kabir seems to have returned home with his irate mother, remaining under his paternal roof for a time as a lay-disciple and practising his trade. Once he went to the market with a newly woven piece of cloth, but instead of selling it made a present of it to a religious mendicant who was or seemed
to be in need of it. But being afraid to return home and brave his mother's lectures, he returned to a secluded forest, and began to pray after the orthodox fashion, that is by simply repeating the name of his patron god Ram. The deity, thus adored and propitiated, walked into his house in the form of Kabir with cartloads of valuables, provisions, &c., which his mother at first traced to robbery, but ultimately utilized in feasting a host of religious mendicants, not exclusively of his own order. Kabir was delighted, and his faith was strengthened. The Brahmans of the neighbourhood had their avarice stimulated, and reproached the recluse weaver with having wasted his wealth in feeding and enriching lazy mendicants, rather than making a proper use of it by distributing presents to men of their caste. They, moreover, went about inviting a host of Brahmans in his name to his house; and Kabir foreseeing the impossibility of doing justice to the invitations thus surreptitiously issued retired once more to one of his favorite haunts, and repeated the sacred name. The god once more relieved him of his trouble by a miraculous intervention, and his fame as an ascetic and a thaumaturgist was noised abroad. This excited the envy of the Brahmans, and they tried to run down his reputation evidently by getting a common prostitute to accuse him of incontinence. Kabir, however, in the pride of conscious innocence, took hold of the woman and walked about with her in market places; the consequence of which course was that the religious orders were scandalized and he was shunned.

But Kabir carried his impudence much further. Handing the unfortunate he walked into the palace of a Rajah who had held him in great esteem, but who now felt it his duty to withhold even the ordinary marks of courtesy.
Kabir, however, sat down regardless of the neglect; but when he arose to depart he poured a few drops of water thrice successively. The Rajah's superstitious fears were excited, and he followed him, bewailing his impropriety, and entreaty the saint to explain the cause. He was told that the drops of water poured had been a blessing, not a curse to him, inasmuch as they had extinguished a fire accidentally made to blaze in one of his temples at a distance. The king by enquiry assured himself of the fact, and became a greater admirer of Kabir than he had ever been. And in this way all the tricks resorted to by envious Brahmans to tarnish his bright name only resulted in his reputation for sanctity being raised and established!

But a shaper trial awaited him. His sworn enemies, the envious Brahmans, approached the Emperor of Delhi himself, and accused the saint of varieties of crimes, such as corrupting the faith of young and old persons, spreading infidelity, seducing chaste women and walking with them shamelessly along the streets, and obtaining money by illegal means. Kabir was summoned to appear before the Emperor, but when directed by the Kazi to salute His Majesty in the prescribed form, he peremptorily refused to do so saying these words:—"Ram and his devotees excepted, all are bad." The Emperor flew into a rage, and ordered him to be immediately chained and thrown into the river; but the flowing waters brought him safe to the banks whereon he stood, unchained and unharmed, and carried on a controversy with some unbelievers. He was then plunged into a blazing fire; and as he once more escaped unscathed, an attempt was made to blow him away from guns, but in vain. The Emperor, convinced of his sanctity by the failure of these repeated attempts to inflict condign punishment
upon him, prostrated himself before the saint and begged forgiveness. Muhammadan historians have, we suppose, designedly omitted all reference to these stupendous miracles and the Emperor's humiliation consequent on them!

But his continence was put to the test as well as his faith, and the temptation for the purpose came from above. Maya-devi, the impersonated divine energy, appeared in the form of a beautiful young woman to tempt him to incontinence; but her meretricious arts failed to shake it, as the persecutions to which he had been subjected had failed to subvert his faith. And finally, when he appeared superior to all sorts of temptations and ripe for translation into a better world, he was taken up to heaven. His lifeless corpse, however, became a bone of contention between his Muhammadan and Hindu followers; the former claiming the privilege of burying it on the plea that he was a Muhammadan saint, and the latter that of cremating it on the ground of his alleged Hindu faith. Words ran high between the contending parties, and an affray was averted by the timely intervention of a mediator, who simply asked them to look for the body they were fighting for. And when in pursuance of this advice they laid aside the cloth by which the corpse had been covered, they found it missing, as it had been removed by supernatural power to some unknown locality. The contending parties thereupon divided the piece of cloth, one-half of which was buried by the Muhammadans, and the other cremated by the Hindus.

Such is the biography of Kabir as presented in Vaktramala, a book of legends, myths and fables, of great value indeed as a standing proof of our national want of what Germans call historical consciousness, but worse than worth-
less as a historical document. But two or three things to which it gives prominence are worthy of notice. And the first of these is the proverbial avarice or cupidity of the sacerdotal orders. Kabir's Brahman opponents were ready to forgive his scepticism and schismatic conduct if they could only obtain pecuniary gifts from him as the price of their forbearance. But their treachery also stands out in bold relief, as they tried insidiously to ruin him even after having received such gifts from him. The fact also, that the founders of Hindu sects had after all very little of real persecution to encounter should not be overlooked. But the worst thing brought to light in the narrative is the characteristic Hindu tendency to worship brute force rather than moral excellence. Kabir did all he could to alienate the reverence or devotion of sensible men by perambulating the streets with a notorious prostitute as his companion; but as he proved a samarthi or man of power, his reputation for sanctity could not be shaken among a people prone to place exhibitions of physical force above those of purity, holiness, or goodness!

The quarrel over his lifeless corpse, though perhaps apocryphal as the other prodigious stories embodied in the narrative, is fitted to prove that Kabir carried his eclecticism much further than his predecessors or prototypes had done. His object was not merely to unite the indigenous creeds under the banner of a home-spun theory of religion or philosophy, but to extend the benefits of his generous scheme of amalgamation to an exotic and imported faith. And he may therefore be justly represented as one of the earliest, if not the earliest, représentatives and exponents of a new tendency in Hindu thought. His scheme has been further expanded in our day by the champions of
Brahmoism who very generously extend the privilege of amalgamation to another foreign faith, Christianiety!

This tissue of fable being set aside as affording no clue whatever, or scarcely any clue to the personal history of Kabir, attention may be called to the biographical notices scattered in the records ascribed to him or traced to his authorship. The following notices are embodied in Kabir's own portion of the Adi-Granth:—At page 462 we have these words:—

"Say O Ram, what is now my state?
Benares is left (by me) and my intellect has become little.
(My) whole life is lost in Shivpuri (Benares).
At the time of death I have risen and come to Maghar.
Many years have I practised austerities at Kasi.
Death has come on in the dwellings of Maghar.
Kasi and Maghar I consider as the same.
How shall I come across my slight devotion?
The Guru, the elephant, says: everybody knows Shiva,
But Kabir dies uttering: Sri Ram!"

Again at page 466, we have his caste indicated:—

"By caste a weaver, patient of mind,
Utters Kabir with natural ease the excellencies (of Ram)."

These verses confirm the general belief that Kabir was by caste a weaver, born in the holy city of Benares where he spent the greater portion of his life, and where he had the courage to oppose prevalent types of devotion, specially those associated with the worship of its tutelary god Visheswar or Siva. He died at Maghar, a place near Gorwickpore, (not near Patna as stated in Vakta-mala), a place, moreover, which shares with Kabir Chaura, his sacred shrine at Benares, what may be called the pilgrim-devotion of his followers.
The question: When did he live and flourish? may be settled satisfactorily by a reference to sporadic notices in Muhammadan as well as Hindu records. It is an undeniable fact that Nanak Shah was a disciple of Kabir, the disciple in short of Kabir by whom his principles were expanded and embodied into a national faith, and as Nanak began to teach in 1490, he must have flourished before that date. From an enlarged edition of Vakta-mala published by Priya Das it appears that the Emperor, by whom he is said to have been thrown successively into a river and a blazing furnace, was Secunder Shah, a fact also distinctly mentioned by Abulfazl, "who says," according to Wilson, "that Kabir the Unitarian lived in the reign of Sultan Secunder Lodi." Wilson's conclusion therefore is unassailable, that Kabir flourished in the early part of the fifteenth century.

Wilson presents a list of the works in which Kabir's doctrines are set forth, a list consisting of no less than a score of different books, mostly, if not all, written in verse in the various dialects of the Hindi language, not by Kabir himself who does not seem to have left any records behind him, but by his successors. The most important of these is the Bijek or Uijek, which he represents as "the authority among the Kabir-panthis in general," and from which he presents appropriate extracts, or extracts fitted to set forth the occult philosophy in which they believe. The style of this standard work is justly described as obscure and enigmatical; and the diversities of interpretations to which it has given rise have given birth to diversities of beliefs amongst Kabir's followers. Wilson also makes special reference to another important work "supposed to be addressed by Kabir himself to Dhormodas, his chief pupil, and follower of Ramanand's doctrines," and epitomizes the philosophy or the jargon of
philosophy developed therein; an edition somewhat modified of that taught by Ramanand. To this scheme a reference will be made in the sequel. Meanwhile attention ought to be called to Kabir's portion of the Adi-Granth, a document or a series of documents to which no allusion whatever has been made by Wilson, but by which nevertheless a surer clue is afforded to the nature and drift of the reformer's teaching than any of the books he mentions or the extracts he presents.

It is not widely known that considerable portions of the Adi-Granth, whole chapters, short and long, are ascribed to Kabir, being, in short, embodiments, so to speak, of his aphorisms and sayings. We shall have to speak of the work and the splendid translation of it made by Dr. Ernest Trumpp under the auspices of the Government of India; and it is not necessary for us to dwell here on its merits and demerits. But it is our duty to indicate the magnitude of Kabir's portion by a reference to the chapters in which it is to be found. At page 126 of the translation under the heading "Speech of the Bhagats (Saints)" there is a short chapter consisting of four stanzas ascribed to Kabir, and at pages 127 and 128 another consisting also of four stanzas. Again, all the pages between 458 and 488 have nothing but Kabir's sayings arranged under different heads such as "Kabir's l—lxiv," "Bhavanakhri, by Kabir, 1—45," "Thitis by Kabir, 1—16," "Vars by Kabir, 1—45." And lastly, between the pages 652 and 665 several chapters of Kabir's sayings are given.

Add to all this Kabir's slokas or distichs which are appended as a sort of addendum to the Granth, and which occupy all the pages between 671 and 685; and some idea may be formed of the magnitude of his portion of the big book.
The truth is Kabir's portion of the Granth is scarcely smaller than that ascribed to even Nanak himself!

Of course it cannot positively be affirmed that the large or small portions of the Adi-Granth ascribed to Kabir are of unimpeachable genuineness; nor can such a question with reference to the utterances ascribed to the reformer be satisfactorily set at rest. But it may be safely assumed that as Nanak's scheme was decidedly an off-shoot of Kabir's system, the doctrinal teachings of the latter could not have been seriously tampered with by the authors or compilers of the Granth, and those embodied in the portions alluded to may therefore be justly regarded as reliable. At all events the existing documents are the only sources of all the available information on the subject, and must therefore be utilized in our attempts to present an exposition of Kabir's philosophy. What Kabir's teaching was apart from existing records we cannot possibly ascertain; and we must evolve nothing from our own consciousness!

Kabir has been called a theist, and there are certain sayings embodied in the chapters alluded to susceptible, when detached from the context, of a thoroughly theistic interpretation. But whatever the drift of solitary passages or of sporadic utterances may be, the scheme of thought disclosed is simply a form of pantheism, an edition somewhat revised of what is inculcated in the Upanishads and Brahma Sutras. This will appear if we take into consideration Kabir's views of (1) Transmigration, (2) God, (3) Maya, (4) Salvation, and lastly (5) of Absorption. Before extracts indicative of these are presented, Kabir's attitude towards the caste system, the religious books of the Hindus and Muhammadans, and the rites and ceremonies observed by them ought to be indicated.
Kabir was a low-caste reformer, and his hostility to the caste system was even more implacable than that manifested by Buddha or Mahavir. The essential equality of all men is a characteristic feature of Kabir’s doctrine, and the hollowness of the pretensions advanced by the higher castes, specially the Brahmans, is mercilessly set forth in his sayings. At page 460 of the Adi-Granth we have his opposition to caste distinctions set forth in these words:

"Whilst dwelling in the mount there is no clan nor caste.

From the seed of Brahma the whole certain (is made).

PAUSES.

Say, O Pundit, when were the Brahmans made?

By saying: (I am) a Brahman, (thy) life (and) religion are lost.

If thou art a Brahman born from a Brahman woman:

Why hast not thou come in another way?

Whose art thou, O Brahman, whose am I the Sudra?

Whose blood am I, whose milk art thou?

Kabir says: Who reflects on Brahma:

He is called a Brahman by me."

Again in an extract from the Bijek presented by Wilson we have these words:—"‘The woman’ (Maya) relieved from the burden of the embryo, adorned her person with every grace. I and you are of one blood, and one life animates us both; from one mother is the world born: what knowledge is this that makes us separate: no one knows the varieties of this descent, and how shall one tongue declare them; nay should the mouth have a million of tongues, it would be incompetent to the task."

The Brahmans are by no means treated with courtesy by Kabir, who invariably represents them as "cheats."
Kabir's attitude towards the sacred books of the Hindus and Mussulmans is set forth in the following passages in his portions of the Granth:

"The daughter of the Veda is the Smriti, O Brother! She has come with a chain and a rope." (p. 467.)

"Kabir says: Those are good riders, Who keep aloof from the Veda and the Koran." (p. 467.)

"The Shastras, Vedas, astrology and many grammars they know.

"They know the Tantras, Mantras and all medicines, (yet) at the end they must die.

"All the Vedas, Purans and Smrities are searched (by them), (but) in no wise are they spared.

"Kabir says: Utter Ram; he extinguishes birth and death." (p. 654.)

"Giving up the book (Koran) adore Ram, O silly one thou art practising heavy oppression.

"Kabir puts his trust on Ram, the Turks are consumed and defeated." (p. 655.)

"By no one is the secret of the weaver known. The whole world is stretched out (by him) as a warp. When thou hearest the Veda and the Purans, Then (by me) a warp of such extent is spread out." (p. 664.)

"(Where there) is no day and night, no Veda and Shastra, there dwells the formless One.

Kabir say: "Meditate on that divine mode, O foolish world!" (p. 665.)

His attitude towards current superstitions is thus set forth:

"For the sake of bathing there are many tirthas,
O foolish mind! For the sake of worshipping there are many gods.

"Kabir says: 'No emancipation (is obtained by it), emancipation is in the service of Hari.'" (p. 476.)

"(Who) enters into intimacy with the highest light:
He subdues his five senses.
Religious merits and demerits, both he discards."
(p. 484.)

"The jogis, ascetics, austere devotees and sanyasis wander about at many tirthas.
Those with plucked-out hair, those with Munj-cord, the silent ones, those who are wearing matted hair, are dying at the end." (p. 654.)

"If one will become a Turk by being circumcised, what shall be done with a woman?
"As the woman does not give up her half-bodied state, she must therefore remain a Hindu." (p. 655.)

"What the Kazi says is not agreed to (by God).
"He keeps fasts, makes prayers, (and utters) the Kalimah, (but) paradise does not accrue thereby." (p. 658.)

"If by immersion in the water, salvation be obtained, (know) the frogs bathe continually.
"As the frogs, so are those men; again and again they fall into the womb." (p. 664.)

This string of extracts is eminently fitted to bring forward Kabir as a very bold reformer or a champion of ultra-radicalism. He denounced caste distinctions in no measured terms, sneered at what in these days would be called paper-revelation, insisted on the sufficiency of the light or spiritual insight within us, opposed the doctrine of mediation in all its forms, and represented external observances as both irksome and useless. But his followers made
him their mediator, not certainly without his consent, constituted his sayings, terse and epigrammatic, into a revelation, made him the object of various forms of external worship, and lastly, converted the localites inseparably associated with his name into sacred spots of pilgrim devotion! Our late illustrious countryman Babu Keshab Chunder Sen might have derived from his career, and the long-continued attitude of his numerous followers towards him, a lesson eminently calculated to deter him from the course he recklessly pursued!

But Kabir was not out and out a fanatic, opposed to the slightest approach to a concession or a compromise, and determined to push forward his new creed by means only of the momentum of a lofty, though undiscerning enthusiasm. He did pursue a conciliatory, nay a temporising policy, disclosing in his procedure the elasticity of conscience and laxity of principle, without which a scheme of eclecticim, such as his was, could not possibly succeed. He employed in expounding his peculiar doctrine the phrasedology held sacred amongst both Hindus and Muhammadans, but in a sense different from what is attached thereto; just as Brahmos have in our day tried to conciliate Christians by an unscrupulous use in their own sense of certain technical terms held sacred among us. He also tried to conciliate the Hindus by applying to the god whose worship he inculcated and prescribed the varied adored names of their gods. For instance, he called him Ram, Krishna, Vishnu, Madhana, Madhu-sudana, Gobinda, Gopal, Hari and Narayana; and to make his scheme popular among Moslems he applied the name Allah or even Ali to the great object of his worship. He avowed faith in the entire mass of Hindu mythology, and referred to its mythical heroes as historical characters with-
out the slightest equivocation; and at the same time he represented Muhammadan saints as worthy of reverence and even homage. And lastly, he showed a tendency, in spite of his denunciations, to condone current forms of worship, representing them after the orthodox fashion as stepping-stones to the higher types towards which popular aspirations should be raised. He represented himself as the heaven-appointed guru to proclaim or offer peace to jarring creeds; and at times by calling God the guru he displayed his essential unity with the Almighty. Is not his history repeated in the New Dispensation portion of the Brahma Somaj? There is nothing new under the sun!

It is time to bring forward evidence to show that Kabir’s scheme is pantheistic, rather than theistic, and that consequently they are mistaken who represent him as a champion of theism.

1. Kabir, like almost all the philosophers of Hindustan, begins with transmigration. A few citations will make this apparent:

“As a fish that leaves the water, and is outside of it:
“So I was in a former birth, when destitute of austerity.” (p. 462.)

“Having wandered through the eighty-four lacs of wombs, he (Hari) has come into the world.
“Not having gone out (of the body) he has no spot nor place.” (p. 478.)

“Wandering about in the womb of the eighty-four lacs of creatures, Nand became much worn out, O dear!

“On account of his devotion (Krishna) entered upon an incarnation, great became the lot of the helpless (Nand), O dear!” (p. 480.)

The problem of problems with him, as with almost all his
predecessors of philosophic tendency, was how to be freed from the galling chain of births and re-births, bodies of gross and sinful matter successively assumed and cast off, dungeons of flesh standing in an almost endless series between the pure spirit's first separation from God and its ultimate absorption into Him!

2. What are Kabir's views about God? A few quotations will set forth the nature of these:

"The sun and the moon they call lights."
"In all is spread out the diffusion of Brahm." (p. 467.)
"The soul (or life) is One and all bodies (are therefore One)." (p. 469.)
"The mind sunk into contemplation (of the Supreme) is absorbed in the vacuum, the folly of duality is fled."
"Kabir says: The Fearless One above is seen, (if) deep meditation is applied to the name of Ram." (p. 472.)
"In him (the Supreme) there is no fire and ocean, no sunshine nor shade; in Him is neither production nor destruction.
"Neither life nor death, neither pain nor pleasure pervades Him, there is empty, abstracted meditation (in Him) both (therefore) are not in Him." (p. 473.)
"If the ascetics and perfect devotees obtain the secret:
"They are themselves the Creator, themselves God." (p. 486.)
"In the lotus of the heart is the dwelling of Hari.
"Who having met with the Guru considers the two (God and creature) equal to One?
"He having erected (the lotus of the heart) (from) the mud, puts (it) straight." (p. 488.)
"The day is one, the dress-wearers are manifold, in that (circumstance) Brahma is recognised." (p. 659.)
"Kabir says: Such is the life of the world (the Supreme), there is no other." (p. 662.)

In these extracts all the peculiarly Vedantic ideas of God are reproduced. He is all-diffusive luminousness, an indeterminate essence, formless, without quality, neither good nor bad, neither happy nor miserable, the same with creation, in which He appears as the day appears in varieties of gorgeously dressed dolls, ekam evaditiyam one without a second, one primal, all-pervading, all-comprehensive substance! He is without material properties and moral qualities, an abstracted meditation, and therefore justly called Vacuum!

3. The creed of creeds is non-dualism; but our notions are dualistic! Why? Because we are deceived by Maya, the enchantress who succeeded in deceiving men, the deities, Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva! Hear what is said about her:

"The burning coals of Maya are extinguished.
"In my heart is contentment, the name (is my) support." (p. 470.)

"See, O brother! a storm of divine knowledge has come!
"All the matted shutters, made by the Maya, are blown away they do not remain (any longer.)" (p. 471.)

"The wise and meditating people are giving much instruction, (that) this whole world is a deception.
"Kabir says: 'Without the name of Ram this world is blind by the Maya.'" (p. 479.)

"No one is stronger than the female snake (Maya).
"By whom Brahma, Vishnu, and Mahadhev have been deceived." (p. 659.)

According to Wilson, Maya is represented in the Bijek as "the principle of error and delusion," "the self-born daughter of the first deity, and at once the mother and
wife of Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva." A theogony also, such as may be represented as a mixture of that of philosophy with that of mythology, is presented in the later writings of the school.

4. The pantheistic character of Kabir's teachings is also indicated in his theory of salvation. The method of obtaining it is similar to that described as efficacious in the orthodox schools. Renunciation of family life, seclusion or hermit solitude, the muttering of the sacred name, austerity and meditation are insisted on, not certainly in the case of all classes of followers, but in that of the prepared candidates for complete beatification. And the end of this prescribed course of mortification and penance is the same, viz., self-knowledge, which is equivalent to God-knowledge, knowledge in plainer terms of the perfect identity of the entity called 'I' with God. This is partly preceded and partly followed by the extinction of desire, both good and bad, and of egoism. Two or three quotations will make this manifest:—

"Then the mind becomes tranquil when egoism will depart." (p. 461.)
"Why does he not remain satisfied, why does he not give up desire?" (p. 482.)
"When I (egoism) was, thou (wast) not.
"Now thou art and I am not.
"Now I and (thou have become one (only)" (p. 481.)

5. And lastly, the ultimate result of this salvation is absorption. Let the following citations be presented as evidence:—

"In this society (thou wilt) not die.
"If thou knowest his order thou wilt be united with the Lord." (p. 126.)"
"The mind sunk into contemplation (of the Supreme) is absorbed in the vacuum, the folly of duality has fled." (p. 472.)

"The impassable ocean cannot be crossed.

"The body is contained in the three worlds.

"When the three worlds are contained in the body:

"When the substance is united (with the absolute) substance, the True One is obtained." (p. 483.)

"A diamond is piercing a diamond, (thus) a pure mind is naturally re-absorbed (into the Supreme.)" (p. 663.)

The third of these citations needs some explanation. What is meant by the three worlds being contained in the body? The word 'body' is used in the sense of the entire man, body, soul, and spirit, to adopt the trichotomous division of the Bible; and the meaning perhaps is that when man by austerity and meditation acquires an all-comprehensive knowledge of the three worlds, heaven, earth, and hell, he loses his individuality and sinks in the Absolute.

Our array of proofs is completed. Kabir's views of God, whom he goes as far as to call the Vacuum, of the method of attaining salvation, and of its results, both proximate and ultimate, leave no room for doubt as to his determination to popularize among the lower orders the form of pantheism in vogue in the most prominent of the schools in his day. And the theistic phraseology in which many of his utterances are couched is to be traced to the belief he imbibed as a follower of Ramanand, that a self-evolved emergent Deity stands as a nexus or connecting-link between the Absolute, and the world evolved from Him or It. This self-evolved Deity he calls Hari or Ram, which name he also at times applies to the Absolute Himself or Itself; and as he identifies this being with Maya by calling him the deceiver, and also represents him as an offspring of the enchantress,
the confusion of nomenclature, as well as of ideas, in his teaching is deplorably prominent. He evidently lacked a trained intellect, and as he could neither grasp hair-splitting metaphysical distinctions nor present his thoughts with logical precision, he appears in the writings extant as a rhapsodist, rather than as a profound thinker or even a reliable expositor of the philosophical views in vogue in the school to which he belonged.

Kabir's knowledge of Hindu and Muhammadan literature seems to have been of the most superficial order. He evidently continued all his life-time a perfect stranger to the great sources of Hindu and Muhammadan philosophy; and all the knowledge of the occult truths of these systems of which he could justly boast, seems to have been derived from intercourse with their recognized champions. He certainly came in contact with devotees of the Ramanand school, and his insight into its peculiar teaching is to be traced to the conversations he had with them, rather than to a careful study of their standards and symbols. And he very likely came in contact, as his disciple Nanak is distinctly said to have done, with Muhammadan philosophers of the Sufi school, and the dash of Muhammadan philosophy his writings present is to be traced to his familiar intercourse with them. He very frequently speaks of the wine or intoxication of love divine, calls God his "sweetheart," and represents the relation between the devout worshipper and his beloved object of worship in terms of the sacred flame which is the foundation of connubial happiness. But in these representations he is influenced more by Hindu than by Muhammadan ideas, as instead of describing God as the Mashuqa or the damsel beloved, he looks up to Hari as her Husband and Lord. And the following distich shews that,
while representing the relation between the devout worshipper and the great object of his worship in terms of love, he made a special reference to the flirtations which Krishna carried on with the milk-maids of Vridavana, if not to Ram himself.

"Thou art dark-blue and beautiful, O sweetheart!"
"My heart clings to thee!" (p. 476.)

The writer was informed by a respected Guzerat missionary that an eccentric author was engaged in writing a book with a view to prove that Kabir was no other than the Lord Jesus Christ Himself.* Nor is this to be wondered at, at a time when our Lord has been represented as the Prince of Idealists by the most eloquent of native writers, and when even Comptism has been represented by a writer like Mr. Cotton as the latest outcome of His religion! But setting aside these ebullitions of a heated imagination as unworthy of notice, the question may be pertinently raised, Did Kabir ever come in contact with Christians, as he presumably did with Hindu and Muhammadan sages? Our reply is in the affirmative. Some ideas peculiarly Christian are found interspersed in his writings. His confession of sin in the following distich is Paul-like:—

Kabir (says): "I am the worst of all, every one is good except me.

"Who considers himself in this light, he is my friend." (p. 671.)

The treasure on which the heart ought to be set is indicated in the following lines in words which remind one of the well-known exhortation of our Lord to lay it up in heaven:—

* The book has since been written and reviewed in the Bombay Guardian.
"Fire does not burn it, the mind does not carry it away, no thief comes near it.

"Collect the wealth of the name of Ram, that wealth does not go in any way." (p. 477)

Here is another sentiment peculiarly Christain, a sentiment reproduced in almost the very words by Nañak:

"If fear of God springs up, fear goes.

"Then fear is absorbed in the fear (of God).

"If his fear (of God) subside, fear sticks again (to him).

"(Who has become fearless of God), (in his) breast fear is produced, he flees." (p. 483.)

And lastly, the Fatherhood of God is expressed in these words:—

"My Father is the great Lord.

"How shall I go to that Father?" (p. 653.)

Beal traces the peculiarly Christian idea of Buddha voluntarily giving up, when brought to the verge of nirvana, the inestimable blessing he had been toiling for through an endless series of births and rebirths for the purpose of removing human sorrow, to the influence exercised by Christianity upon Buddhism. And we are prone to trace the Christian ideas, by which the tone of Kabir's teaching is raised above the level of non-Christian views of religion and morality, to some intercourse which we believe he maintained with some professors, if not champions of our faith. Kabir was an eclectic of the first water, and his scheme was a mixture of the creeds into which he obtained an insight, not through the medium of standard works which he perhaps could not even read, but through personal intercourse with those by whom they were severally upheld. Kabir, however, did not conceive the bold idea of uniting Hinduism, Muhammadanism,
and Christianity under the banner of a heterogeneous creed; — this feat was reserved for the electics of the day! He was, however, emphatically a man of the people; and one of the first to bring down a form of mystical theism to the level of popular comprehension from the lofty platform of the schools. But the good he thus accomplished is of the most dubious nature, as his followers, both of the ascetic and laic classes, are scarcely ahead of the masses in superstition or in morals, while in eccentricities of faith and practice they are decidedly behind!
CHAPTER XI.

GURU NANAK AND HIS SUCCESSORS.

Methodism, originated in England in the very hotbed of ecclesiastical formalism and exclusiveness, is justly said to have found a congenial soil in America, where, freed from the tyranny of shibboleths and unshackled by hoary traditions and established usages, it spread like wild fire under the guidance of men of fervid piety and lofty enthusiasm. In the similar manner, Kabir’s philosophico-religious creed, originated in the sacred city of Benares, the very citadel of Hinduism, found a congenial soil in the Punjab, where under the guidance first of a few devout recluses, and ultimately of guerilla chieftains, determined to overcome all obstacles between their secular ambition and its gratification, it developed into something like a national faith.

Punjab has justly been called the border-land between Muhammadan and Hindu influence, it being a sort of territorial intermediary between countries swayed by Islamism and large and fertile provinces where the star of the national faith is in the ascendant. Its present religious condition is fraught with instruction both to the ethnologist and to the Missionary. It is about the only large province in Northern India, if not in India in general, where the preponderant element in the population is Muhammadan. The population, according to the Census of 1881, is 22,712,120: male 12,322,356, and females 10,389,764. The Muhammadan portion is in excess of a moiety of this large number, being 11,642,484: males 5,255,117, and female, 5,407,317; and
the Hindu is considerably less than half, being 9,252,295: males 5,044,040, and females 4,208,255. The difference is covered by all the other religions of the province, both indigenous and exotic, put together. But what is specially noticeable is the fact that the two main religions are, as regards the masses, if not the intelligent classes, so thoroughly assimilated to each other that their followers may justly be brought forward as upholders of one mongrel creed.

In no province of our part of the country is Muhammadanism so thoroughly Hinduized, or Hinduism Muhammadized as in the Punjab. The gross departure on the part of its Muhammadan inhabitants from the purity and integrity of Islamism is by no means difficult to explain. The Mussulmans of the Punjab are descendants of men, who with their families as a rule embraced Muhammadanism not from conviction, but from a desire to escape persecution and civil disabilities, at times when bigots like Aurangzeb took it into their heads, to spread their faith by force. Their hereditary faith in Hindu gods and goddesses has been but partially shaken, if at all; while their predilection for the established usages of the country or its forms of worship has remained almost unimpaired. No wonder that they divide their homage with amusing impartiality between Hindu godlings and Muhammadan saints, never rising to the monotheism of their adopted creed, and invariably cowering below its level of pure worship and lofty requirements? No wonder that they are victimized now by the Mulla, who induces them to perform some ceremonies peculiarly Muhammadan, and then by the Brahman, who leads them to acts fitted to rivet the chains of their hereditary beliefs from which they have yet to be emancipated! While both the
classes of their leaders or priests unite with marvellous unanimity in robbing them, right and left, by working upon their fears and strengthening their superstitions! Revivals amongst them having for their object their complete liberation from Hinduizing influences are not uncommon, as Muhammadan purists of a standard of piety above the reach of mercenary motives occasionally appear amongst them, to lift them up by earnest preaching from the depths of superstition in which they are sunk. But their gross ignorance renders their disinterested efforts more or less abortive, as, even when partially emancipated, they evince a sad tendency to revert to their normal condition of nebulous faith and flexible practice.

The present condition of the Punjabi Mussulmans is fitted to raise a note of warning against the practice, now unhappily growing into fashion, of swelling the numbers of the infant Church of India by mere baptisms or baptisms unaccompanied with a radical change either in the sphere of intellectual convictions or in that of moral disposition. Christianity is in danger of being Hinduised by this process as decidedly as Muhammadanism has been by the suicidal policy of ensuring its spread by force. That there exists amongst the multitudes brought in by indiscreet baptisms a sad tendency to divide their homage between the godlings they are supposed to have abandoned and Him whom they have formally accepted as their Saviour is an undeniable fact; while their practice of mingling heathen superstitions with Christian rites is equally prominent. The only redeeming feature of the procedure is the rapidity with which their offspring are brought under training, such as may in time shield them from the superstitions they imbibe and the bad example to which, if left to themselves, they would succumb. But the
rate of progress ensured in some places to this essentially indefensible process bids fair to render nugatory all attempts to secure what may be called after-growth by educational appliances; and therefore the policy at the bottom of all manipulations having for their object the spread of our religion by means of mere baptisms should be deprecated.

The Hindus of the Punjab repay the compliment paid their faith by their Muhammadan neighbours with compound interest. They rarely worship the great gods of the Hindu pantheon, contenting themselves, as the Census Report humorously says, with repeating the name of Ram when they meet each other, and of Narayana when they are led by sheer indolence to yawn, and with visiting the great shrines once a year when able to do so. Their homage, however, is systematically paid to a host of local devatas or godlings and Muhammadan saints; and specially among the lower orders the lines of distinction are so narrow that intermarriage between Hindus and Muhammadans is by no means a rare thing. Such suppleness of faith and practice on the part of the Punjabis may be easily explained. Hinduism is mild and tolerant in the sense in which Gibbon represented the polytheistic systems of the Roman world as such; and there is literally no limit to its propensity to swallow forms of faith, foreign and even antagonistic to its genius. That every nation has a system of belief vouchsafed to it by God Himself is a cardinal maxim of the Hindu religion; and the only thing it denounces is migration from one faith to another. And if Muhammadanism had given up on its first appearance on Hindu soil, its proselytizing zeal, and some of its obnoxious practices, it would have found an ally, rather than a rival in the national faith. But on account of its rough spirit of proselytism and those of its institutions and rules which are
calculated to scandalize Hindu feeling, there has certainly been a discord where under altered circumstances there might have been a harmony. But this discord is far less apparent in the Punjab than in the other Provinces of Northern India; and the nearest approach to amalgamation noticeable in the land of the five rivers is traceable to its being the border-land between the two religions, as well as to Nanak's confessedly great influence.

The number of Sikhs in the Punjab will by no means appear large to persons who are in the habit of looking upon and representing it as their country par excellence. As given in the Census Report of 1881, from which a great deal of the information here given is derived, the grand total is 1,716,114: males 972,345, and females 743,769; that is about a thirteenth part of the whole population, equal to about a sixth of the Muhammadan portion, and about a fifth of the Hindu. But though numerically the last of the three prominent religions, its influence was paramount before the annexation of the Province, and that simply on account of Sikh domination, the arch of which was completed by Runjeet Sing, the Lion of the Punjab. The reform inaugurated by Guru Nanak was exclusively a religious reform, and had nothing whatever to do with politics; but the secular ambition of some of his successors combined with a series of persecutions, commenced and carried on recklessly by Muhammadan bigotry, ended in converting a community of recluses into a military fraternity, somewhat like that of the Spartans of old. The formidable Khalsa was organized by Guru Gobind, the tenth and last Guru, and circumstances favored its growth to power and ascendancy. The central power, that of the Imperial Court at Delhi, was crippled and paralyzed, after the death of Aurangzeb, by a series of foreign invasions and civil broils;
and the Khalsa took advantage of its growing feebleness to snatch tract after tract of territory from its grasp till its ascendancy in the whole of the Punjab became an acknowledged or undisputed fact. But Runjeet Sing's prophecy about the extension of the red lines on the Indian map was fulfilled a short time after his death; and the power of the Khalsa was broken; and Sikhism has, ever since the annexation of the Punjab, been more or less on the decline. To explain, however, its rise as a peaceful religious reform and its transformation into a military and ultimately royal power, attention must be called to the story of its Gurus or Leaders.

Sikhism owes its origin to the first, the most devout, if not the greatest of these Gurus, Nanak Shah, one of the most celebrated of the religious reformers of Hindustan. Nanak is doubtless a historical character, born and bred up as he was, in the latter half of the fifteenth century, and raised to the height of apostolic dignity about the time when the Lodi dynasty was supplanted by the Mogul. But as good cases are in our courts of justice enveloped in falsehood by what has been called our Asiatic propensity to lying, the founder of the Sikh faith has been converted into a myth by priestly cunning. What has been said of Kabir may, with even greater emphasis, be said of Nanak. Every event of his life is encircled by a garland of myths or rather fables,—his birth, his education, his entrance into life, his marriage, his appearance as a public teacher, his peregrinations, his death and his cremation. Biographies, short and long, are by no means out of the reach of those who wish to study his life carefully; but they are mere tissues of fable; and scarcely an insight is presented therein into the atmosphere of thought he
breathed, and the educational process by which his mental powers were developed; or even into the nature of his career and the successes by which it was crowned. Fable, fable, fable, nothing but fable is what we are treated to from beginning to end!

Translations verbatim of two of these lives, called by the general name of *Janam-Shakhis* or birth-stories, are prefixed to Dr. Ernest Trumpp's scholarly translation of the Adi-Granth; and the first of them is represented by the learned translator as earlier than the second. The second is called the *Janam-patri* or Horoscope, and a story obviously fictitious is related about the way in which it was procured. A disciple by name Bala, better known as Bhai Bala, was anxious to see Angad, the successor of Nanak, and after much rummaging found him "sitting at Khandur a village of the Khahara-Jats," engaged in "twisting van," a kind of coarse twine. When he introduced himself as a follower of Nanak, and one, moreover, who had been the reformer's constant companion from childhood, the Guru enquired if he knew all about the birth of his Great Master. Bala said in reply that all he knew about the great event was that it had occurred "in moments auspicious" enough to proclaim the appearance on the stage of history of an "Avatar" or Incarnation. He, moreover, affirmed that Nanak's father Kallu, the Vedi, had caused a *Janam-patri* to be written, and concealed in some place unknown to him. This bit of information plunged Guru Angad into profound sorrow, and he spent one whole night in doing nothing but shedding tears, but on the following morning he had composure enough to send for Bhai Bala, and depute him for, or entrust to him the great work of looking for and securing the precious manuscript concealed. Bala
proceeded along with another disciple to Talvandi, the village in which both Nanak and he himself had first seen the light, and, hearing of the death of the reformer's parents, looked for his uncle Salu, and meeting him enquired where the Janam-patri might be found. Salu at first hesitated to help the deputation, but being assured that Guru Angad was the legitimate successor of Nanak, and that Sri Chand, as the reformer's own son, and therefore Salu's nephew, would have adequate honor bestowed upon him, he began "to search in the house," and after five days spent in "searching and searching," he found the manuscript, and made it over to Bala with a present of five pice and a cocoanut for the newly installed Guru. When Angad saw the Janam-patri, his joy knew no bounds, and he blessed the bearer of the precious treasure in these words:—"Bhai Bala! may the Creator come into thy mind! to-day thou hast procured us an interview with Nanak."

But when the manuscript was examined, fresh difficulty arose, as the character, if not the language in which it appeared to have been written, was Hindi, not Panjabi or Gurmukhi, and as Angad and the men present could not for this reason decipher it. What a disappointment after the Guru had devoutly "kissed it, and put it on his eyes and on his head!" But a remedy was immediately suggested, and a person named who could read "both the letters." This man by name Paira, a Khatri of the Mokha tribe, was at Sultanpore; and a man was sent to that town to fetch him. Paira came according to orders, and "bowed his head." The Janam-patri was shown, and all parties were overwhelmed with joy when he "read it quite fluently." Specially Guru Angad was much pleased and said:—'Paira, put this for us into Gurmukhi letters.' Paira answered: 'Well, sir, procure
good paper, and I will write it.' The Guru procured paper, pen and ink, and gave them to him. Paira wrote, and Guru Angad "caused it to be written." The childishly graphic way in which the whole affair is chronicled is itself a proof that the document is a fabrication from beginning to end, embodying as it does in quaint style a tissue of stories dictated as a rule by the passion in human breasts called the love of the marvellous, as well as by a desire to present an array of dreams where facts are thoroughly beyond the reach of the historian!

The contents of this precious document, procured at such cost, may be indicated in a brief paragraph. It gives an account of Nanak's birth, and the extraordinary events accompanying it; sets forth that miraculous precocity which led his teacher to hail him as his superior in learning on his first appearance at school at the age of seven; records the miracle by which he confounded the farmer who had accused him before the village mayor of having ruined his field by letting his father Kullu's buffaloes in, and the extraordinary event witnessed when a large cobra spread its hood over his head to shield him from the scorching sun when asleep under a tree; gives an insight into his father's disappointment when instead of doing the work allotted to him he wasted his time in the company of ascetics, both Muhammadan and Hindu, as well as in still meditation; and relates the circumstances under which he was sent to Sultanpore to live with his sister and brother-in-law, his services as an officer under Muhammadan Chief in the Commissariat Department, the accounts of which, so far as entrusted to him, were invariably adjusted by miraculous interventions, his marriage and the unhappiness in which it resulted on account of his ascetic habits, his disappearance under a river.
for three days, and re-appearance on its banks, his retirement from the world and assumption of the functions of a public teacher, all with a minuteness or circumstantiality which is unutterably tedious and wearisome. It also gives an account, equally prolix, of Nanak’s reunion with his wife and two boys after a period of separation spent by him in travelling from place to place, and of the various acts of disobedience on account of which his sons were set aside in the succession in favor of Angad, who carried his obedience to the length of telling a lie, or calling midnight “a watch of the night,” because the Guru was determined to have him do so, and of plunging into a pool of filth to take up a cup thrown thereinto by the Master; and the manuscript concludes with a graphic description of the reformer’s death and of the squabble between Hindus and Muhammadans over his body, which, like that of Kabir, appeared, when the shroud was lifted up, to have been carried away by some angelic power!

As a sample of the puerility, which runs through the entire document, let us quote a portion of the long paragraph, in which the reproaches extorted from Nanak’s mother-in-law by his systematic neglect of his wife are embodied. “The name of the mother-in-law of Nanak was Chandorani. Chandorani came to her daughter, and the daughter began to weep before her mother. Chandorani became very angry and went to Bebe Nanaki (Nanak’s sister,) and began to quarrel with her. She said: ‘How so? You begin to govern thus that you ruin other people’s daughters? You have no fear of God, thou dost not admonish thy brother, thou dost not consider thy sister-in-law as one (with thee), thou dost not look after thy sister-in-law! Neither does thy husband admonish his brother in law, what
have you in your mind?' Bebe Nanaki replied: 'Hear, O aunt, how shall I admonish my brother? My brother is no thief, nor adulterer, nor gambler, he is not committing any wickedness, this is all that he is giving alms to the naked and the hungry; with what one earns oneself, one may do what one pleases. Then you may reproach him when your daughter remains hungry or naked.' This argument that Nanak had thoroughly fulfilled his duty by giving his wife enough to eat and clothe herself withal silenced the irate mother, and she hastened to her daughter and expostulated with her in these words:—'O daughter, thy sister-in-law has put me quite to shame, and I could not give her any answer; O daughter, behave thou also a little humbly.' The daughter Sulakhanai said in reply:—'O mother I am not hungry nor naked, jewels, clothes, food, all this I have. The mother said:—'But daughter, if thou hast all this, why art thou giving a bad name to the son of a Khatri?' The daughter replied:—'O mother, what shall I do? He is not applying me to his mouth (not kissing me), he does not speak to me face to face, what shall I do? To whom shall I speak?' The mother again goes to the sister, relates the grievances with equal circumstantiality, and receives the consolation, 'The Lord will make it well!' The whole story of the book is cast in this mould, and the reader can trace no line of distinction between the mental habits of the male and those of the female characters introduced!

The other document, which is the Janam-Shakhi par excellence, is longer than it, and even more grotesque and fabulous; and indeed the more marked extravagance of its tone and statements would seem to militate against Dr. Trumpp's assumption of its priority. It throws the events so graphically described in the Janam-patri into the
background, and gives prominence to the journeys which Nanak undertook, eastward, southward, northward and westward, to propagate his novel doctrine. Nanak seems to have made his own home his headquarters, to have radiated from it in all directions with chosen companions, to have held long conversations with noted champions of the existing faiths of the country, and to have signalized his career by successes achieved by means fair and foul, by persuasive arguments as well as by tricks of legerdemain. His peregrinations called forth the inventive powers of his biographers, and fables of the widest descriptions were fabricated, and palmed off as historical facts. A few of these may be referred to as samples of the inconceivable wildness, which runs through the document under notice.

In his first missionary tour he set his face eastward, and travelled as far as Benares, distinguishing himself as a thaumaturgist in all the places, cities, towns or villages he visited. On his way back he had many adventures, two of which may be related partially, if not wholly, in the words of the book. Having converted a company of Thugs who wished to rob him, he and his companion Mardana, an itinerant musician, came "to the country of Kanru." One day when hungry, Mardana walked out and stood before the open door of a sorceress, who called him in, "bound him with a thread, and made him a ram and seated him." Nanak came to the spot and heard his faithful companion, "bleat" in ovine form, and when the sorceress came back with a jar of water on her head, he enquired if his "man" had "come here," and on her replying in the negative, he repeated a sloka. "On this the jar on her head remained fixed, it did not go off, as a punishment for her falsehood; she went about with it."
When Nur Shahi, "the head of all conjurers," heard of Nanak’s charm, she sent a company of her followers to undo the mischief done by their superior incantation. These came—"one came mounted on a tree, another came mounted on a deer skin, another on the moon, another on a wall, another brought with her a tiger, another came beating a drum." But while they were practising their "jugglery," Mardana was directed to say, 'Wah Guru,' and thereby regain his human shape and "play on the rebec." The Guru repeated four verses, and the conjurers were foiled in their attempt to out-rival him. Nur Shahi, hearing of their discomfiture, "came with her best disciples mounted on an apparatus of paper." The Baba or Father Nanak repeated four other verses, and she, becoming "tired of her mantras and spells," gave up the contest, and ultimately embraced the new faith and obtained salvation!

The other circumstance, rather than adventure, to which attention is to be called, occurred not long after this. Continuing "their wanderings" "they came to a city of ants." When Mardana found that "trees and shrubs all appeared black, the whole ground also," he was frightened, and recommended speedy departure from the accursed spot. To set forth the power of the denizens of this place the Guru related the following story:—"Mardana, one day a Rajah came up here. Having formed a host of fifty-two complete armies, he had marched out against some Rajah and came to this country. One day one ant went and met him and said: 'O Rajah, remain here and do not march on! And if thou art marching, march according to my will.' The Rajah asked:—'What is thy will?' The ant replied:—'O Rajah, my will is this, that having eaten my bread, thou shouldst go.' The Rajah said:—'I am the Rajah of
fifty-two complete armies, how should I eat thy bread.' The ant replied:—'If not, thou wilt go after a battle.' The Rajah said:—'Well let it be so.' O Mardana, the Rajah taking his fifty-two armies began to fight with the ants. The chief of the ants gave the order to the ants:—'Go and fetch poison.' Having filled their mouth with poison from the Piyal-tree they brought it; every one died, to whom they applied it. O Mardana, the whole host of fifty-two complete armies died with (by) the order of the Lord; the Rajah alone remained alive. Then that ant went and said:—'O Rajah, hear my word, now thou wilt accept my bread?' The Rajah joining his hands stood (as a suppliant) and said:—'Well, may it be so!' Then that ant gave the order to the (other) ants:—'Go and bring nectar!' In the nether region there are seven pools of nectar and seven pools of poison. The ants went, filled their mouths with nectar, and brought it. To whom they applied it, he rose and stood; so the host of fifty-two armies rose and stood by the order of the Lord. The Rajah having risen went to eat bread with his fifty-two armies.' The ants, though endowed with such supernatural power that they could kill and make alive whom they pleased, could not injure a hair of Nanak's or his disciple's head!

He returned home after twelve years' wanderings, and travelled in the Punjab, visiting various places and conversing with celebrated Pirs or Muhammadan saints, and thereby spreading his own tenets. He and Mardana were made prisoners at the capture of a town called Saidpur by Mir Khan, the Mogul general of Baber; but a miracle seen with wonder by his captors not only led to their release, but secured an interview with and extorted homage from Sultan Baber himself. Amongst the noted events of these minor
wanderings are the conversion of Miya Mitha, the famous Muhammadan saint who pretended to be able to "skim him off, as the cream is skimmed off the milk," and that of Duni Chand, who "owned a crore of rupees," and who was persuaded to "give away as alms the flags of seven lakhs (of Rupees)," on which he plumed himself, to "ascetics and uninitiated guests," and to become "a votary of the name" and "to mutter Guru! Guru!"

Nanak’s second great journey was towards the Deccan and terminated in Ceylon, called Singhalla-Dvipa, the inhabitants of which are represented as Hindus. The great event in the Deccan was the conversion of a Muhammadan devotee, who at Nanak’s request spread his "prayer-carpet" on the sea, and sailed on it towards a sacred tower, but whose passage backwards was rendered impossible by the Baba’s charm, till he muttered, Vah Guru, and became a disciple. In Ceylon the Guru sat down in a royal garden, which though "worth nine lakhs," "was dry," but which became "green" the moment it was blessed with his presence. The King being informed of the miracle came to the spot, and persuaded the Baba by varied acts of self-humiliation, as well as by entreaties, to repair to the palace, riding on his royal shoulders. In the palace he refused to eat till the only son of the King was slain by his own hands, (his wife and daughter-in-law helping him by holding the hands and feet of the victim), and cooked. When the prince’s cooked flesh was brought, the King, the Queen and their daughter-in-law were directed to partake of it first; and while they were engaged in doing so, the Guru vanished out of sight, and the four (they themselves and the cooked son revived) found themselves seated. The miracle led to the king’s conversion, and that, we suppose, of the entire island!
In his third great journey he proceeded northwards, passed through Kashmere, where he received homage from a Pandit who had come with "two camels loaded with Purans" and an idol bound to his neck; and having cleared "a lakh and a quarter of mountains he ascended Sumeru, where the residence of Mahadava was." He saw the great gods and the Sidhas, and convinced the latter, if not both the parties, of the superiority of his doctrine by means of miracles more stupendous than any they had worked or could work. And his last great journey led him to Mecca, where the following circumstance occurred. "When the Baba had entered Mecca he lay down to sleep, stretching his feet towards the Kaaba. It was the time of evening prayer. The Kazi Rukn Din came to make his prayers; when he had beheld (Nanak) he said:—O servant of God, why dost thou stretch out thy feet in the direction of the house of God and towards the Kaaba? The Baba replied: 'Where the house of God and Kaaba is not, drag my feet to that direction!' The Kazi Rukn Din turned the feet of the Baba round, and in whatever direction he turned the feet of the Baba, to that direction the face of the Mihrab, (the arch in front of the Kaaba) was also turning." This story has been made capital of by our Brahmo friends, and of course represented as a fact of undoubted authenticity; but they do not seem to have enquired into the particulars, as a Hindu shrine has been substituted by them for the Kaaba, and the scene is laid in the Punjab, not in Mecca. The propensity manifested by them to swallow apocryphal incidents whenever these serve their purpose is worthy of a people, who, whatever may justly be said in favor of their intellectual acuteness, lack most lamentably the historic consciousness by which facts are separated from fictions, and reliable stories from fables!
Nanak's death is referred to in this earlier document, and the fable about the assumed quarrel over his corpse between Hindus and Mussulmans, and its alleged disappearance under the sheet by which it was covered, is also graphically related. The earlier like the later document is only a tissue of fables, rather than myths; and the origin of both is to be traced to priestly cunning, not to unconscious fabrication.

We have purposely laid ourselves open to the charge of retailing fables of the wildest stamp, rather than treating of serious matter, as it is our intention to emphasize one or two of the conclusions deducible from the unmitigated extravagance by which records like the two before us are characterized. And the first is the ease with which, when a religion has made some progress and is rising fast to eminence and ascendancy, miraculous stories are manufactured by its champions and propagated among its professors. The documents were evidently indited when Nanak's tenets had made great progress in the Punjab, if not in the adjacent regions, and when hosts of ignorant professors were but too ready to swallow any number of marvellous tales which might be fabricated with a view to set forth the extraordinary power and raise the prestige of their adored Guru. Nanak had already become a mythical hero, and his virtues, whatever they were, had begun to be looked at through the magnifying glass of a hazy past; and at such a time or under such circumstances nothing could be easier than the work of inventing and popularizing stories fitted to strengthen and intensify the growing belief in his superhuman greatness. The facility with which the marvels embodied in the Janam-Shakhis were coined and promulgated shows cunning on one side and
credulity on the other, a desire to deceive on the part of the inventors and illimitable gullibility on the part of the professors. There is no such thing, we maintain, as we have so often affirmed, as the unconscious fabrication presupposed by Strauss, and his school.

The question may be raised—How did Nanak spread his faith during his life-time? Our reply is, he might have done so by tricks of jugglery, specially as his faith was spread first of all among the most ignorant classes,—the stories of noted champions of Hinduism, Jainism and Muhammadanism converted by his arguments and miracles being set aside as apocryphal. The standard of morality in our country is so low that it would by no means appear strange if our religious reformers were led, either by schemes of self-aggrandisement or of public beneficence, to raise their prestige by means which appear questionable to persons who have from childhood breathed a higher atmosphere of moral thought.

The marvellous fables under notice are fitted to set forth the instinctive belief of mankind that a new religion cannot be spread among the masses of this or any other country without the aid of miracles. It is all very good to talk of the charms of truth, and of its power to secure homage by virtue of its innate excellence without any adventitious help. But those who speak in this strain talk poetry and romance, and forget that they are in a very prosy world, not in aerial, utopian regions. The masses of mankind in this sin-cursed world are, on account of their mental stolidity and moral obtuseness, unable to appreciate the charms of truth, its innate beauty and persuasiveness; but they may be drawn towards it by striking exhibitions of power. And even the intelligent classes fail to rate at
their proper value the sublimest of truths with which as sinful beings in need of pardoning and sanctifying grace, we have to do; and therefore miracles as credentials of a new revelation are *universally*, not merely generally, demanded. But exhibitions of power may be accompanied with what is immoral in doctrine and in character; but though such displays may be set aside as spurious or infernal by persons with properly developed moral consciousness, they are not likely to hinder the progress of a creed in a country wherein, as in our own, moral distinctions are so sadly confounded.

But the important conclusion to be emphasized is that Nanak is after all a mythical, not historical character. We know nothing about him beyond the facts, that he flourished in the Punjab in an age within the precincts of what is called modern history, that he propagated a new faith, and that *perhaps* he derived his inspiration from long conversations held by him with the champions of the varied systems of belief prevalent in his province, as well as from the current writings or teachings of Kabir. Add to all this the fact that he lived and travelled as an ascetic when in the zenith of his fame, if not always, and spread his creed precisely in the way in which the founders of sects in the country are known to have spread theirs, and the whole reliable story of Nanak is told. What a contrast in this respect between the reformer of the Punjab and the great reformer of Germany, Martin Luther, who flourished not long after! Everything about Luther worth knowing is known, the exact place of his birth, his boyhood spent in poverty and trouble, the help providentially accorded to him by a generous woman, his academic career of brilliant success, his disgust with the world and retirement to a
convent, his self-imposed fasts and vigils, the circumstances under which the light of the gospel burst upon his struggling soul amid the thick darkness of a gloomy cloister, his academic fame and his influence as a professor, the theses he published against the sale of indulgences, the courage with which he consigned the papal bull of excommunication to the flames, the heroism he showed at the Diet of Worms and other minor public meetings, the argumentative power beneath which the mightiest of his adversaries cowered, his happy marriage, his constitutional cheerfulness, his drollery and jocoseness, the varied excellencies of his character, and the few great defects by which it was marred;—Luther lives, lives as our next door neighbour, known to us as a friend, admired by us for his genius, loved for his goodness, and revered for his extraordinary piety and zeal. But Guru Nanak is dead, and instead of him we have a mythical hero, who performs fabulous journeys, works queer wonders, carries on quaint controversies. The alternatives before us are either to relegate him to the region of fables, or to draw a picture of him according to our fancies on the background of the date of his birth (A.D. 1469, April-May) and its place (Talvandi regarded by his followers as a sacred pilgrim-spot) and one or two other reliable facts!

The impropriety of placing him in the same category with Christ and Paul is apparent to those who have taken the trouble to look into the sources of all the information we possess regarding him. In addition to excellencies of character in which even Paul appears so far above the Punjab reformer that it is worse than preposterous to place the two characters on one and the same level, the fact that, while the one is on the whole a creation of fabulous consciousness, the other stands out in bold relief from the
platform of reliable history, may be brought forward as an irrefragable argument against their being placed in juxtaposition.

The learned translator is right when he represents Nanak’s life as, *mutatis mutandis*, the life of every other great ascetic of ancient or modern times in India. He early showed an irresistible proclivity to hermit seclusion, such as made him averse to secular work and fond of the society of religious mendicants, and such, moreover, as led to his being stigmatized as mad by his parents and numerous relations. He was sent from his native town to his sister’s at Sultanpore to mend; but, though married and engaged in public business through the influence of his brother-in-law, his love of ascetic retirement grew in warmth and intensity, and he lived as a hermit, spending a very little portion of his income on himself and family, and giving the surplus away in alms. But his final sequestration from domestic life did not take place till he had received a special commission from God. One morning he went to the river to bathe as usual, and disappeared, so as to give rise to the rumour that he had been guilty of embezzlement, and had committed suicide to escape merited punishment. His accounts were examined, and a surplus instead of a deficit was found, as if the existence of a surplus, where nothing in excess of proper adjustment was looked for, were fitted to raise public estimation of his aptitude for business. He reappeared after three days, spending the interval in heaven in converse with God, gave his earthly all to religious beggars, and exchanged the chains of domestic life for the freedom of that of an ascetic. As an ascetic he travelled from place to place with chosen companions, begging his bread and spreading his novel ideas by means, fair and foul, till his
death, which occurred at Katarpur in the Jalandhar Duab in 1538, that is, when he was about seventy years old. Thus far his life may be presented as a typical picture in general of every noted ascetic in India, and a reproduction of the life of Kabir in particular; but there is a distinctive and differentiating feature in it, as his frequent returns to, and reunions with, his family are out of what may be called the ordinary groove of India asceticism.

The learned translator, who in his estimate of oriental or Hindu literature in general, rises above the morbid sentimentalism by which the writings of authors like Max Müller are characterized, falls into the mistake of representing the earlier document as fitted to afford a clue to the mental progress of the Punjab reformer. But, perhaps, he means that the critical reader may by a careful perusal thereof form some idea of the educational process through which Nanak passed, or deduce from it an a priori history of his mental development. Nanak, as presented in the document alluded to, appears above the necessity of education recognised and met in the case of ordinary mortals, endowed, not merely with miraculous powers, but with superhuman knowledge, such as needed neither addition nor subtraction. When at seven he was sent to school, and a wooden slate was given him on which to write the letters of the alphabet, he wrote thereon some of the verses of the Granth, and, thereby not merely confounded his teacher but extorted his homage. In boyhood when he was supposed ill, and a doctor was sent for, the latter after a short conversation with him was forced to acknowledge his infinite inferiority in medical knowledge and skill. When employed through his brother-in-law's influence as an accountant in the Commissariat, his business abilities, notwithstanding his erratic conduct, led
Nawab Doulat Khan, the Accountant-General, to look upon and represent him as the most gifted of his subordinates. And when in the capacity of an itinerant religious teacher he held discussions with Muhammadan ascetics, Hindu Pandits, and champions of the Jaina faith, these were invariably led to acknowledge his eminence, embrace his creed, and pay him homage as their Guru. And lastly it is nowhere mentioned that he attained "the knowledge of the three worlds" by austerity and meditation, the ordinary path marked out for candidates for such all-comprehensive intelligence even by him. In the document there is nothing to indicate growth in his case, excepting physical; and the inconsistency noticeable in Mahavira's life when the founder of Jainaism is represented in the same breath as born with supreme knowledge, and attaining thereto after years of self-imposed penance, is kept clear of. Even in his interview with God Himself, he received the following commission, no increment to his knowledge:—"Nanak, this nectar is a cup of my name, drink it." And after he had "made salutation," and obeyed the command, the assurance was given him:—"Nanak, I am with thee, I had made thee exalted, and who will take thy name, they will all be exalted by me. Having gone, mutter my name and make also other people mutter it. Remain uncontaminated from the world. Remain in the name, (in giving) alms, in performing ablutions, in worship and remembering (me). I have given thee my own name, do this work (I told thee)."

It were superfluous to add that Nanak's scheme of religious reconciliation ended in a fiasco; and his sect would have either dwindled into insignificance or sunk into annihilation, but for the organizing skill and martial abilities of some of his successors, and the new spirit infused into
it by the last of the Gurus. To show how a system of quietism, as Nanak’s scheme is justly called in the Census Report, was converted into the centre of a military propaganda, the radiating point of predatory incursions, guerilla warfare, mighty campaigns, bloody battles, as well as the constructive power of a provincial empire of huge dimensions, a cursory reference to the line of Nanak’s successors is demanded.

Nanak showed commendable disinterestedness, as well as disappointed and grieved his family, by setting aside the claims of his two sons, Lakim Das and Sri Chand, and choosing Angad, a man of his own caste, as his successor, whom he installed by a present of five pice and a cocoanut, and by reverentially bowing to him. Angad had ingratiated himself with Nanak by giving up his individuality, performing menial service, and yielding implicit obedience to commands, from which, as they demanded work of a dirty character, the Baba’s own sons recoiled in horror. He was a quiet man, of ordinary gifts, though prone to rhapsodize; and his memory is preserved better in the verses of the Granth ascribed to him, than in Janam Shakhis. His successor, Amar Das, was a Khatri of a similar mental calibre, a rhapsodist of pious habits; and some portions of the sacred book are traced to his authorship. His successor and son-in-law, Bam Das, was an able man. He utilized the free-will offerings of the Sikhs in restoring, of a very grand scale, the famous tank of Amritsar (the nectar tank), so graphically described in Sir Monier Williams recently published book, and in making it the centre on Sikh devotion and influence. He was fond of literary work, and added many verses to the floating literature of the new faith; and he made the succession hereditary by
making his son Arjun his successor. Arjun was a man of secular, rather than religious, ambition; and he brought the rising sect into hostile contact with Muhammadan chiefs by intermeddling with local politics, and performing what could not but be construed into an act of rebellion against the Emperor Jahangir. He laid aside the garb of an ascetic, and lived as a Punjab chief; and according to Muhammadan historians he was arrested on a charge of high treason, which he brought on himself by helping a rebel prince, and thrown into a dungeon where he pined away and died. He, however, did the cause good by collecting the floating verses of the preceding Gurus, as well as those of the other religious teachers revered by the Sikhs, into the famous work called the Granth, adding thereto his own compositions which form one of its most considerable portions. His son and successor, Har-Govind, was a man of a martial spirit, and he carried his father's secular policy a step further. Fond of hunting and war, rather than of prayer and meditation, he raised up bands of trained soldiers, took up the cause of the oppressed Hindus, made his camp the focus of local discontent and mutiny, and even fought pitched battles with Muhammadan chiefs. He entered successively the services of Jahangir and Shajehan, and though retained as a prisoner for twelve years by the former of these emperors, he died a natural death, choosing his grandson, Har-rai, rather than any of his five sons as his successor. Har-rai, though not particularly of a warlike spirit, pursued the then established policy of the Sikhs, and helped Dara Sheko till he was defeated and slain, and then sent the elder of his two sons to Aurangzeb to apologize for his conduct. The son, by name Ram-rai, was retained as a hostage at the imperial court at Delhi, and his younger
brother Har-Kishen was chosen Guru; but in consequence of the elder brother's complaints, Aurangzeb, glad of the opportunity of interference thereby afforded, summoned Har-Kishen to appear before him. Har-Kishen reluctantly obeyed the summons, and died of small-pox at Delhi. His successor, Teg-Bahadur, was a freebooter, and had a price set on him for making predatory incursions on the Muhammadan population. He was betrayed, arrested and brought to Delhi, where he had the option given him of saving his life by embracing Muhammadanism; but as he bravely refused to take this humiliating step he was cruelly murdered. His son, Guru-Govind, was the last, and in a secular point of view, the greatest of the Gurus. It is desirable to present a little more detailed account of him, specially as he consolidated the martial policy of his immediate predecessors, and infused a new spirit into the Sikh community.

Guru-Govind was fifteen years old, when, in consequence of his father's violent death, he found himself surrounded by dangers, and compelled to flee to the mountains for safety. Here he spent his time partly in profitable reading but mainly in hunting and archery, in which latter art he subsequently distinguished himself as an expert. He studied Persian, and mastered Hindi as far as it can be without some knowledge of Sanscrit, and he seems to have associated with the recognized champions of Hindu orthodoxy, rather than with religious mendicants. His mind consequently was, not merely tinged but saturated with Hindu superstition. When he arrived at years of maturity he formally and publicly assumed the functions of a Guru, and began to gather into one focus the scattered fragments of the Sikh community. He had already formed a plan of vengeance, which in view of his desolate condition or
depressing circumstances could not but be pronounced very bold. He had made up his mind to avenge his father's murder by an utter annihilation of the Muhammadan ascendency, and by the construction of a Sikh empire on its ruins. But, superstitious as he was, he did not wish to enter upon the hazardous enterprise without an assurance of aid from above. He visited the shrine of Naina-Bebi, not far from Anandpore, the town which had been made one of the rallying points of Sikh power, if not the head quarters of the Gurus, and propitiated the goddess by offerings, austerities and even a human sacrifice, and received from her the following assurance:—"Go, thy sect will prosper in the world!"

Returning to Anandpore he collected his followers, and alienated almost the entire body by proposing an appalling test of fidelity. He said that he stood in need of a human victim for sacrificial purposes, and called upon his disciples to offer themselves out of love to him for such a holy purpose. The assembly naturally hesitated, but five brave spirits, whose names are recorded, came forward as volunteers; and Govind made them his favorites and confidants, as well as his disciples, by the performance of a ceremony called "the Pahul of the true faith." It is thus described by Dr. Trumpp, from whose biographical sketches all our information about Nanak's successors is derived:—"He made them bathe and seated them side by side; he dissolved purified sugar in water and stirred it with a two-edged dagger, and having recited over it some verses, he made them drink some of this sherbut, some part of it he poured on their heads, and the rest he sprinkled on their bodies; then patting them with his hand, he cried with a loud voice:—'Say the Khalsa of the Vah Guru!"
Victory to the holy Vah Guru!" This has continued to be the baptismal or initiatory ceremony of the Khalsa, or the military fraternity of Guru-Govind.

These five bold spirits formed the nucleus of the Khalsa, the property, as the expression means, of the Guru. But some changes in the constitution of the Sikh society must be effected before it could be made thoroughly subservient to Govind's great purpose of declaring and carrying on a war of extermination against the Muhammadan power. His predecessors, while occasionally representing caste distinctions as factitious, had in pursuance of a conciliatory policy, left them intact within the confines of their influence. Guru-Govind, however, looked upon the system as the perennial source of the disunion which had invited and consolidated foreign domination, and he utterly abolished it. The result was the segregation of the higher classes from his community: but the loss was more than compensated by the warm attachment of the Jats, who, as hardy soldiers ready to undertake any job, were more serviceable to him than caste-proud men could have been. Guru-Govind, moreover, had the penetration or sagacity to perceive that the Granth, as it had been completed and as it stood, could only give rise to quietism, not the spirit of martial daring and activity he was desirous to see evoked; and he was determined to add his own ideas to it, clothed as its sentiments are, in jingling verse. But the custodians of the sacred volume peremptorily refused to make it over to him for such a purpose; and he obviated the difficulty by inditing a supplementary Granth, called "the Granth of the tenth reign."

Nor did he, amid the varied schemes of re-organization he had to carry out, forget the great work of drilling his followers, and thereby making them equal to the demands
of his service. But in spite of all these preparations his career was one of vicissitudes and reverses, rather than one of triumph and glory. In his first encounter with the Hill Rajahs he was successful, but when they applied for, and obtained assistance from the Emperor, he was repeatedly defeated, fled from place to place, and succeeded in concealing himself in a village in Malwa only in consequence of the false belief in his death current in the Imperial camp. After Aurangzeb’s death, he was fortunate enough to enter the service of Bahadur Shah; but he was assassinated by a Pathan on his way to the Deccan to take charge of an imperial detachment. His life was apparently a failure; but in reality he succeeded in calling into existence one of the mighty forces to which the power of the great Mogul ultimately succumbed; and to his genius is to be traced the subsequent growth and ascendancy of Sikh domination in the Punjab.

The biographical sketches presented by Dr. Trumpp are eminently fitted to explode the fallacy, rendered popular by a host of writers, that it was Muhammadan bigotry that converted the mild, conciliatory scheme of Nanak into one of implacable, irreconcilable hostility to the faith and domination of our Muhammadan rulers. Their bigotry had indeed a great deal to do with the transforming process; but the Sikh Gurus, beginning with Arjun and ending with Govind, were the greater sinners, inasmuch as by their secular ambition and predatory propensities they stimulated suspicion and brought upon themselves the crushing load of the dominant power. Even before they had the slightest ground of complaint, they deviated from the peaceful policy of their predecessors, assumed the state and pomp of earthly rulers, and strove to carry out schemes of
self-aggrandizement without any regard to the principles it was their duty to uphold. They were as a body unscrupulous freebooters, oppressing their own subjects with a system of taxation which the last of them was compelled ultimately to give up, selling their services to the highest bidder, and changing sides as hopes of plunder and personal gain waxed and waned. And the terrible punishments, which overtook them as a body, ought to be traced to their mutinous proceedings, rather than to Muhammadan bigotry!

In the Punjab Census Report the Sikhs are described as a fine race simply because, or rather mainly because they are a warlike people and make very good soldiers. They are tall and stalwart in appearance, animated by a martial spirit, expert in the use of arms, impetuous in their onslaught, and ready to win laurels by a dashing plunge into the thickest of the fight. They made British warriors tremble in their shoes so much so that the Iron Duke, when sending Sir Charles Napier to turn the tide of certain, not dubious, victory in favor of the British power, is reported to have said:—“Either you must go or I!” And to their fighting abilities the restoration of British ascendency, when shaken to its centre by the rebellion of 1857, is mainly due. Are they not a fine race? Our reply is that, when Christian people have no better notion of a fine race than is indicated in such descriptions of Sikh valor and Sikh heroism, Christianity has a great deal yet to do in Christendom!

But the fine race have, for a long time past, been under a civilizing process. Their predatory propensities have been supplanted by habits of peaceful industry, and their minds are being unfolded by a system of education, superior, not merely to what freebooters like Guru-Govind can bring to
bear on them, but even to what Nanak himself utilized in gathering around him a band of faithful recluses. Govind's principles have for years been on the wane in the Punjab and elsewhere, and the intense hatred of Muhammadanism and its professors inspired among his followers is giving place to better feelings, insomuch that the lines of distinction between the rival creeds in the land of the five rivers are becoming fainter and fainter day by day. Nanak has once more regained his ascendancy in his native province, and his fame bids fair entirely to eclipse that of his warlike successors. But the civilisation of the Sikhs, and that of their fellow subjects in and out of the Punjab is to be brought about, neither by the ascetic creed of Nanak, nor by the unscrupulous schemes of conquest matured by Govind, but by a religion which reconciles the claims of this world with those of eternity, and adorns the short span of earthly life while making it a stepping-stone to that which is infinitely higher and more glorious!
CHAPTER XII.

NANAK'S CREED.

It is easier by far to obtain an insight into the main principles of Nanak's creed than it is to ascertain the varied facts of Nanak's life. Nanak's life, as portrayed in the Janam Shakhis extant, is literally lost beneath a cloud of prodigious fable; but Nanak's creed remains stereotyped, in its main outlines, if not in all the variety of its details, in a work, which may be looked upon as the most fortunate book the world has seen. The Christians have always looked upon the Bible with a reverence which has at times been represented, not without some show of justice, as superstitious; but the idea of worshipping the Book of Books has always been repugnant of Christian consciousness. The Koran, as a sacred book, supposed to have been written by the finger of the Almighty Himself, has had lavished on it a degree of homage in comparison with which that paid to the Bible in Christendom may be described as irreverence itself; but it has never been converted into an object of worship even by the Muhammadans. The Veda, as the eternally exhaled breath of Brahm, has been represented as worthy of the heart-devotion to which, according to Christian principles, God alone is entitled, and has moreover at times been literally worshipped along with the Shastras to which it has given birth; but even the Veda has not had a noted shrine dedicated, and systematic worship paid to it. But the Adi Granth has been systematically worshipped in a beautiful temple consecrated to it ever since the day when Guru Govind refused to nominate a successor, and
gave his disciples to understand that if they, in a worshipful spirit, bowed to or prostrated themselves before their sacred scriptures, they would see their Guru therein, if not from an earlier period. Govind’s utterance on the subject ought to be given in his own words, specially as it is the foundation of that Bibliolatry or Book-worship for which the Sikhs are famous all the world over. When requested to appoint a successor the dying Guru said:—“As the nine kings before me were at the time of their death setting another Guru on their throne, so shall I now not do; I have entrusted the whole society (of the disciples) to the bosom of the timeless divine male. Whoever be may disciple, he shall consider the Granth as the form of the Guru, and whichever disciple wishes to have an interview with me, he shall make for one rupee and a quarter, or for as much as he is able, Karah prasad (a sweetmeat made of flour, sugar and clarified butter, offered to a saint and then distributed among the devotees); then opening the book, and bowing the head, he will obtain a reward equal to an interview with me.”

The Adi Granth has a shrine as splendid as any the foremost deities of the Hindu pantheon can boast of, and one of the most graceful, if not superb, temples in India. That temple, made of pure white marble and decorated with gilded and glittering domes and minarets, stands in the centre of a magnificent tank at Amritsar, and presents in the peculiarity of its structure a symbol of the religious unification which it was Nanak’s avowed object to effect. It is connected with the massive embankment of the tank by a marble causeway, and is rather overshadowed, than set off by the neighbouring structures of a massive type which serve the various purposes of pilgrim resort, devotion and show. Under the main dome the Granth is spread open on
a silver stand overhung with brocades, and hundreds of Sikh worshippers, men, women and children, enter the sacred building by the door facing the causeway, prostrate themselves before the open volume, present suitable offerings, and go round the narrow circular corridor by which the sanctuary is surrounded. There are flights of steps leading to the second floor from which a comprehensive view may be secured through beautiful openings of the whole scene, the band of musicians and songsters engaged in chanting the praise of the holy book, the muttering priests ready to receive the offerings and bless the offerer, and the processions of devotees going in and coming out with evident satisfaction, if not with blessed hearts and purified consciences. When at night the book is supposed to be tired of the devotions lavished on it, it is carried with due solemnity to a neighbouring house, which may be described as its dormitory, and within which it is supposed to sleep on a splendid bed! No other book, so far as our limited knowledge extends, has such exuberance of homage lavished on it or is so systematically and so devoutly worshipped.

Some account of the most fortunate book on the surface of the globe cannot but be acceptable. At first sight the Adi-Granth reminds one of the Rig Veda, the oldest religious book of the Hindus, it being almost equally voluminous, its authorship equally varied, and its contents equally miscellaneous. But two among many points of divergence ought specially to be emphasized. The Adi-Granth embodies the religious traditions of an age, not of ages such as are justly said to have intervened between the composition of the earlier and that of the later portions of the Rig Veda; and its authors belong to different orders of society or castes, not to one select class of
minds such as are represented in the earliest hymnology of the Hindu faith. The *Adi-Granth* is not the production of Nanak or even of the Sikh Gurus in general, though their effusions form the most considerable, and perhaps the most venerated portion of it. The Gurus who have enriched it with their outbursts of poetic thought are Angad, Amar Das, Ram Das, Arjun Mall and Teg-Bahadur, besides Nanak; and these all are scions of one and the same caste, the Khattri. We pass over Govind, who is the author of only a very short poem in the *Granth*, and whose own book is not considered as part and parcel of it. They all give different versions of one scheme, and they are as a band of authors sadly deficient in originality of thought and expression; and even in poetic power. But their effusions, however sacred, do by no means form the whole of the book under notice. Kabir, the reformer of the weaver caste, occupies among its authors as conspicuous a position as Nanak himself, his portions of it being nearly as voluminous and held in equal honor. Kabir's great teacher Ramananda, the great Brahmin reformer of the fifteenth century, appears in person, as well as by proxy, that is by his disciples, in the little republic of its authorship. Three other Brahmins, Jagdeva the author of *Gita-Govind*, Surdas who fled from the public service and became a saint at Nindatrana, and Trilochan a priest of the Deccan, have portions by no means large, ascribed to them. Dhanna the cultivator, Naradeva the calico-painter, Ravidas the shoemaker, Sadhna the butcher, Sainu the barber, Shekh Farid the Mahammadan saint converted by Nanak, these, together with a rajah named Pipa and two other persons, Beni and Bhikan, regarding whom nothing is known, complete the motley crew. Almost all the castes, from the
highest to the lowest, are thus represented, but the Khattri element is preponderant. And even Muhammadan hostility is disarmed by the insertion of some pieces said to have been written, if not really composed, by the distinguished Mussulman saint worshipped in the Punjab by Hindus as well as by the followers of the Prophet.

But there is another class of writers of inferior merit and prestige, called Bhattas, whose effusions are added to the body of the book as supplementary poems. These are no less than fourteen in number, and they lived and prospered under the earlier Gurus, making it the sole business of their lives to sing their praises. Their pieces are therefore elaborate panegyrics of the most fulsome kind, and they derive their importance, not from their possession of any excellent qualities of mind and heart, but from the grossness and extravagance of their flattery. The first of these professional flatterers, named Bhatt Kalasu, evidently lived when Nanak’s fame as a reformer was in the air, and he displayed his poetic faculty, and perhaps also his blind enthusiastic devotion, in a panegyric, the most meaningless the world has seen, as what it says is simply the assertion, and the tiresome iteration and reiteration of the assertion, that Nanak’s “qualities” have been sung throughout the everlasting ages by all orders of beings, heavenly, mundane and infernal. The panegyrist, however, does not say what these belauded “qualities” are, nor does he condescend to disclose a single trait of the Baba’s character or a single fact of his life. He, however, assures the world that the same god, who in the Satya-yuga “deceived” Bali “by becoming a dwarf,” who in the Treta-yuga was “called Ram of the Raghu family,” and in the Dvapara-yuga “gave security to the devotees” in the form of Krishna, made “Guru Nanak the authority
in the Kali-yuga." Another poetaster perhaps added the words, "he is (also) called Angad and Amar," and thereby identified the first with the successive Gurus down to Govind the last of them.

From the authorship let us proceed to the contents of the book. They are classed under six different heads by the learned translator:—1, Japji written by Nanak as an introduction to the whole Granth; 2, So daru which consisting of select extracts from the larger poems, is used as morning prayer by the Sikhs; 3, So purkhv which also consists of pieces extracted for devotional purposes; 4, Sohila of the same sort "used as a prayer before retiring to rest;" 5, the Rags which "form the body of the Granth." and are hymns written in various Hindi metres; and 6, lastly the Bhog or the concluding portion. The task of reading this book is irksome duty, and may remind one of the story, repeated by Macaulay, of the man who for some crime was allowed the choice between the reading of a long Italian poem and the galleys, and who finding the account therein of a siege too much for him, "threw down the book and went to the galleys." But instead of obtruding what may be called a "lay" opinion, let us quote the remarks made by Dr. Ernest Trumpp, whose translation has been justly represented in the Punjab Census Report as a marvel of erudition. Speaking of the Rags specified by him, and forming the body of the book, he says:—"The verses of the different Gurus has been distributed into these forementioned Rags, apparently without any leading principle, as hardly any verse is internally connected with another. The name of the Rag is therefore a mere superscription without any reference to its contents. At the conclusion of a Rag frequently some saying of one or more Bhagats
(saints) are added, which seem to have been selected in the same arbitrary way as chance might offer them. No system nor order is therefore to be looked for in any of the Rags. In the first four Rags the most important matter was collected, and they are therefore comparatively of the largest compass; the following minor Rags seem to be a second gathering or gleaning, as materials offered themselves, no attention being paid to the contents, but only to the bulky size of the Granth. By thus jumbling together whatever came to hand, without any judicious selection, the Granth has become an extremely incoherent and wearisome book, the fair thoughts and ideas that it contains, being repeated in endless variations which are for the greatest part nothing but a mere jingling of words." (p. cxx.)

The Sikh cannon, as it now stands, was completed, as has already been indicated, by Arjun Mall, the fifth Guru, who is said to have left some pages blank for the insertion of Teg-Bahadur’s effusions. This very assertion may justify our regarding the story of his being the first and last compiler of the Granth with suspicion. Very likely he began a compilation or redaction which was not completed till after the Guruship had been formally transferred by Govind from living men to the dead book. How or in what shape Nanak’s teachings or those of his immediate successors had floated on ‘the stream of time before the day of Arjun, we have no means of ascertaining; nor is there the slightest possibility of settling the question of genuineness, with reference to the varied pieces of which the book consists. Our only alternative is to accept the book as it stands, and deduce from its miscellaneous contents the salient features of Nanak’s scheme of thought.

A word about the scholarly translation, which we have
already laid under contribution, and which is to furnish the groundwork of what we shall have to say, is desirable. Dr. Ernest Trumpp was, in consequence of his reputed thorough knowledge of the vernaculars of Upper India, as well as of Sanscrit and Pakriti, appointed in 1869 by the India Office to translate the Granth; and he began the work in Europe. But the antique idioms and obsolete words in which the book abounds made it impossible for him to go on, specially as he had no grammar or lexicon of the language to help him. He therefore came to Lahore in 1870, expecting to be able to master the difficulties in his way with the help of native scholars. He engaged the services of two celebrated "Granthis" or doctors of the literature of the Granth; but he found them even more ignorant than he was. He, however, speaks of his intercourse with them and others of their standing in the Sikh community as to some extent helpful; but that which materially helped him was his success in procuring two commentaries in which he found some of the obsolete expressions explained. With copies of these, he returned to Europe, and after years of patient and persevering toil, completed a translation which will ever remain a grand monument of his industry and learning. To this standard translation are prefixed versions of the Janam-patri and Janam-Shakhi, both utilized in the foregoing paper, the paper entitled "Nanak and his Successors," short biographical sketches of the successive Gurus of the Sikh faith, beginning with Angad and ending with Govind, a masterly sketch of the principles of that faith, a chapter on the authorship and contents of the Granth, and another on its language and metres. The preparatory portion consisting of 138 quarto pages, would, if published separately, from a
volume of respectable size and very great value, and its perusal would convey all the information the general reader would care to have about the religion of the Sikhs.

A better way of giving the English reader some idea of the quaintness of the style of this immense mass of poems cannot be conceived than by presenting some specimens of the fantastic nature and mystifying obscurity of the imagery employed. Here are two strings of figures found at page 13.

"Continence is the work-shop, patience the goldsmith. Understanding the anvil, the Veda the tool. Fear the bellows, the heat of austerity the fire. The vessel is love, in this melt Amrita (nectar). (Then) the gold (the word of the Guru) is formed in the true mint."

"Wind is the Guru, water the father, the great earth the mother. Day and night, the two our female and male nurse: the whole world sports."

At page 124 we have the following tissue of expressive and elegant metaphors:—

"Evil mindedness is a Dumni (a very low caste woman), cruelty a butcher's wife, she who is occupied with the censure of others is a sweeper's wife, she who is overcome by wrath is a Chandal's wife."

At page 318 we have the following string of figures, decidedly more in vogue:—

"The mind is the elephant, the body the pleasure-ground, the Guru is the elephant goad. Who attends to the true word (of the Guru), he enjoys lustre at the royal gate."

Another sample will suffice. At page 507, the devotee as maiden in love with Hari is exhorted to make him her "necklace and put it on her breast," her "tooth-powder," her "wrist ornament and put it on," her "finger-ring," her "cloth," her
"collyrium," all the while making "patience" "as her dhari," or "the line of red lead painted on the forehead." There is more meaning, however, in this than in many of the tropes and figures in which the work abounds.

Life is after the orthodox fashion compared to "an ocean," and its good things and bad are represented as "sweet" and "acid" "juices," and the fool is he, who overlooking its nature as "muck" plunges into "the stinking puddle" of transmigration. Man, in the whirl of metempsychosis, goes up and down "like a bucket that is tightly bound to rope," and till he "lights a lamp in the mansion" of his "mind" and "drinks the essence of the name," he cannot see "mares," the real beneath the phenomenal in nature. To attain to this glorious state he is exhorted to "make divine knowledge the molasses, meditation the flowers of the Dhana tree, good actions the bark of the Kikar tree and put (them into it)," and he is moreover to look upon "the world" as "the distilling pot" and "love" as "the plastering," believing that "from this juice nectar is caused to ooze out." A thorough knowledge of rural life in all the variety of its manifestations is the precondition of success in our attempt to decipher the quaint imagery with which almost every page of the Adi-Granth bristles.

It is time to pass from the book to the doctrine embodied in it, but a preliminary inquiry into Nanak's attitude towards the caste system and towards family life is desirable, fitted as it is to correct a mistake into which many, including the learned translator himself, have fallen, and to help us to grasp his scheme of thought in its essence.

What was Nanak's attitude towards the caste system? Dr. Hunter, in his grandiloquent style and reckless way, affirms, while speaking of Buddha and his influence in the most glowing terms of eulogy, that all the great reformers of India
have from the beginning of days, started with two glorious ideas, the brotherhood of man and the care of the poor. This statement is partly correct and partly incorrect. These two ideas are found embedded in the Hindu, as well as in every other religion of the world, buried, it may be, under teaching diametrically opposed to them; and it is a matter of fact that men like Buddha and Nanak did succeed in digging them out; but it is also true that, on the whole, they failed to rise up to the loftiness of these conceptions, and after a great deal of vacillation seemed inclined to what was subversive of them. Buddha sanctioned the caste system after having denounced it in no measured terms by confining the attainment of Buddhahood to the first two castes, and thereby debarring the lower orders from the highest of religious blessings; and he moreover did his best to convert charity to the poor into a morbid sentimentalism fitted to feed and pamper lazy mendicancy, rather than supply real want. And this was precisely what Nanak did. Nanak imitated Buddha and other reformers in his bold denunciations of the caste system, and as he belonged to a caste on the whole respectable, his opposition had more meaning than that of Kabir the reformer of the weaver caste. The following are some of his utterances against caste:—

"Those, who forget the Lord, are low caste people. O Nanak, without the name they are low people." (p. 15.)

"Thou acknowledgest the light (that is in him) and dost not ask after (his) caste. (For) in the other world there is no caste." (p. 494.)

"The Kharti, the Brahmin, the Sudra, the Vaisya and the Chandal are saved by remembering (Hari). By whom his own Lord is known, his dust is Nanak." (p. 430d.)
Add to these, the denunciations of Kabir embodied in his portions of the Granth, and some idea of Nanak’s virulence of opposition to the caste system may be formed. But the Guruship, which at first elective, ultimately became hereditary, was left by him and his successors confined to one caste; and caste rules were observed amongst his followers, till the better or more respectable portion of them were alienated by Guru Govind’s non-recognition thereof in his military fraternity. Nanak’s followers, as those of Buddha, Mahabir or Kabir, are divided into two classes, the Srevakas or householders and the Yalis or mendicants: and amongst the former the lines of caste distinction are as broad as amongst the Hindus themselves. And as regards the care of the poor, no one can read the Granth without being convinced that munificence to lazy mendicants takes the place of charity to the needy as such.

It is a pleasure to find this view maintained by Dr. Trumpp, who concludes his remarks on Nanak’s tolerance of caste-distinctions with these words:—"The dignity of the Brahmins as family priests, &c., was left untouched, and of nearly all the Gurus it is reported, that they had their family priests, though the teaching of the Brahmins, as well as the authority of the Vedas and Purans is often re-proved. It was the last Guru, Govind Singh, who positively prohibited the employment of Brahmins in any capacity, and introduced a new ritual partly taken from the Granth, and partly from his own compositions." We have italicized the word "often," because it indicates the lax principle and accommodating spirit of Nanak’s movements. Nanak, like every other champion of eclecticicism before and since his time, found it necessary to coquet and palter with the existing religions of his province and country, and though
at times he allowed his conviction of their worthlessness to shape itself into tirades of a rancorous type hurled at them, he on the whole considered it judicious, not only to refrain from direct attacks, but also to attach them as pendants or auxiliaries to his own creed. In the language of the New Dispensationists he represented them as preparatory economies which he had come to fulfil, not to destroy, pointing to his scheme of doctrine as the essence of the varied religious books associated with them. And like his ectypes of the day, he found it convenient to tread the uncertain ground of mythology and fable, as if it were the rocky platform of indisputable history!

The same oscillation or double-policy is noticeable in Nanak's attitude towards family life. Dr. Trumpp presents a very favorable view of it in these words:—"Nanak and his followers taught that the state of a householder was equally acceptable to Hari as retirement from the world, and that secular business was no obstacle to the attainment of final emancipation."

At first sight such a presentation of Nanak's idea of the sacredness of family life would seem well grounded. Nanak himself does not seem to have abandoned such life with the completeness with which his prototypes Buddha and Mahavira had done, as though justly liable to the charge of neglecting his wife and two sons, as well as his parents, and though separated from them frequently for lengthened periods, he made his own home his head quarters, and again and again returned to it from his peregrinations as to a place of rest in a dreary land. And his successors were one and all family men, and do not seem to have lived as ascetics apart from their families. Indeed, within a short time after his demise, the Guruship became hereditary, and this fact
might be advanced as a proof that retirement from the world was not regarded by the Gurus as a body as essential to salvation. But Nanak's mind was too full of Hindu ideas to admit of its being entirely emancipated from the current belief in the paramount importance of ascetic sequestration to devotees longing for final beatification; and, therefore, his teachings, as embodied in his own, as well as other portions of the Granth, may be advanced as evidence against the realization in his life of his own notion of the loftiness of domestic life. In Japu or Japji, the introductory portion of the Granth, written by him, he speaks of various "regions" or departments, such as Sachh-Kand, in which, according to him "the Formless one" dwells; Dharma-Kand "the region of justice" Sharm Kand "the reign of happiness," Kurma-Kand "the reign of power;" but he describes Gyan-Kand as the region where "divine knowledge is strong." The reader versed in Hindu literature will at once see that the line of distinction between Karma-Kand and Gyan-Kand insisted on is precisely what separates asceticism from domestic life. Again, in a passage already quoted "continence" is represented as "the workshop" in which, with the help of other virtues Shad or the word of the Guru, a fruit of supreme knowledge is produced; while at page 10 the advanced devotee is described as a person whose "body" is a "virgin." But clearer utterances are not wanting. The following is one:

"Silent recitation, austerity, continence—(this) is the will of the true Guru, by destiny they fall into the lap." (p. 12.)

Again domestic love is indicated in the following as a thing to be renounced entirely:

"Affection for thy family-life, affection for all works. Give up affection, all (this) is useless." (p. 502.)
In the following the true enjoyment of the body is centred in continence:

"When one has laid aside all hope, then he is a Sanyasi. When one is given to chastity, then he is enjoying his body."

(p. 505)

And lastly, the parties whom God accepts are thus described:

"Having forsaken house, palace, elephants, horses, they went to a foreign country. The pirs, prophets, devotees and sincere ones gave up the world and became acceptable."

(p. 507)

To these may be added many texts quoted from the portions of the book, other than those of Nanak. That there are passages susceptible of a very different construction is admitted; but this is simply one of the numerous "contradictions" noticed by Dr. Trumpp.

Again what Nanak says of the paramount importance of such meditation as can be practised only under what may be called the shade of seclusion has, not only a tinge, but the very quintessence of asceticism about and in it. In the following lines "continual meditation" is held out as a stepping-stone to final emancipation:

"The disciple comprehends (the True One), bestowing (on him) one (continual) meditation. He lives in his own house (heart) and is absorbed in the True One."

(p. 320.)

The word 'house' in the second, as in many other places, means the heart, and the species of meditation which, according to Yoga principles, withdraws the mind from all external things, and causes it to be absorbed in itself is the one continual meditation here set forth; and its practice pre-supposes renunciation of family-life and retirement to hermit solitude.
At page 321 we have the following:

"Such a Yogi reflects on union (with the Supreme).
Who having killed the five (senses) keeps the True One in his breast."

It is superfluous to say that the killing of the five senses implies the very essence of the asceticism regarded in the country, both among philosophers and the masses, as indispensably necessary to final emancipation. The truth is that Nanak's mind oscillated, like that of the author of the Gita and all who followed him down to the time of the Punjab reformer, and all who have followed him since, between a proper conception of the sanctity of domestic life and reverence for ascetic seclusion, and ultimately succumbed to the reigning traditions of the schools as well as of the forum. No religion in the state of the householder, excepting that of a rudimentary, preparatory character,—such is the verdict of Hinduism, both philosophical and popular, of the heterodox as well as of the orthodox schools.

But here a question ought to be disposed of. Does Nanak advocate still meditation or does he attach as much importance to muttering the name as to serene contemplation? At first sight he seems to place muttering above meditation. The Granth exhorts people, from beginning to end, to mutter the sacred name of Hari, and resounds with praise of this operation. Almost innumerable passages may be quoted to show that if there is one religious act to which the greatest prominence is given in the Granth, both in Nanak's pieces as well as those of the other authors, it is that of muttering. To confine our remarks to one poem of the book, that with which page 121 begins, muttering is represented as that "by which always, day and night, comfort is brought about," on account of which "all sins and
vices go off," "by which poverty and all pain of hunger cease," and in which "the disciples show their love with their mouth." In a word, it is represented as the great source of every blessing, temporal and spiritual, as well as of that union with the Supreme which betokens final emancipation. But a careful analysis of all that is said by Nanak on this subject is fitted to bring us to the conclusion that muttering, in his opinion, as in that of the champions of the Yoga school, enjoys precedence in the earlier stages of meditation and disappears entirely in its latter stages. Its object is the ultimate extinction of the fickleness of the mind, its withdrawal from objects of sense, and its concentration on itself; and when the end is realized, the means are of course thrown away.

Nanak bases his scheme of thought, orthodox-fashion, on transmigration, the standing nightmare of Hindu philosophy in general. The eighty-four lackhs of births through which the soul passes successively in its upward rise or growth to final emancipation, are distinctly alluded to in more than one place in the Granth. Regarding this long chain of births, Dr. Trumpp makes these remarks:—"According to the popular belief of the Hindus, which is occasionally alluded to in the Granth, four lackhs of souls have once for all emanated from the fountain of light, their number neither increasing nor decreasing. The human souls form only a small part of the creation, which is limited to eighty-four lackhs of forms of existence, viz., nine lackhs of aquatic animals, seventeen lackhs of immovable creatures (such as trees, &c.), eleven lackhs of creeping animals, ten lackhs of feathered animals, twenty-three lackhs of quadrupeds, and four lackhs of men." (p. cii.) But the learned author contradicts himself, as in the same breath he affirms, at page civ., that "every soul is supposed
to have migrated through the eighty-four lackhs of forms of existence before it reached the human birth.” Perhaps the author’s meaning is that the highest stage of human existence, the stage associated with beatification, is the last link of the chain of eighty-four lackhs of births. The truth is, that the popular belief in the matter would be self-contradictory if expressed with mathematical precision.

Let the following texts be quoted from Nanak’s own portions of the Granth, in support of our assertion, that the nightmare of metempsychosis haunted his imagination as thoroughly as that of the most distinguished, and even the most sceptical of his predecessors:—

“By the blind the name is forgotten, in the self-willed is great mistiness.
His coming and going does not cease; having died he is born (again) and becomes wretched.” (p. 28.)

“By whom the name proceeding from the mouth of the Guru is not understood, he having died is born (again), he comes and goes.” (p. 29.)

“He is born and dies (again) who is fostering the three qualities.” (p. 217.)

“The medicine, charm (and) root of the mind is the One; if the thought be fixed (on him) O dear!
He is obtained, who is cutting off the sinful works of the several births, O dear!” (p. 220.)

“In all living creatures the One sports.
The conceited self-willed man wanders again about in wombs.” (p. 329.)

The doctrine of transmigration is not merely directly referred to in passages like the above, but implied in the whole scheme of Nanak’s thought, specially in the soteriological portion thereof.
We cannot characterize Nanak's scheme of thought without a deep insight into its **theological** portion. What was Nanak, a Theist or a Pantheist? The Brahmos have, with marvellous consistency, represented him as a theist, and his name occupies a conspicuous place in their calendar of saints; and they never scruple to scandalize Christian feeling or consciousness by placing him in the same category with the Lord Jesus Christ. But others, who have not, like them, a purpose to serve, have fallen into the mistake of holding up the Punjab reformer as a champion of theism, and even the very intelligent author of the Punjab Census Report cannot be exculpated from the charge of representing him as such. But a man cannot read the first ten pages of the Granth without concluding that, if Nanak was a theist at all, his theism had for its basis or substratum a scheme of unmitigated pantheism, or in plainer terms, was a sort of illusive belief needed by the mind as an important step in its attempt to scale the height of divine science. It will be our endeavour to prove, by chapter and verse, that Nanak was a pantheist of the Gita school, and that whatever of theism he maintained, was held as simply a temporary scaffolding raised to draw the short-sighted mind of man upwards, and make its perception of the real nature of the Infinite possible. But before we present our array of proofs, we wish to give, in his own words, the valued opinion of the highest authority on the subject. Dr. Trumpp says:—"We can distinguish in the Granth a grosser and a finer kind of pantheism. The grosser pantheism identifies all things with the Absolute, the universe in its various forms being considered the expansion of it, the finer pantheism on the other hand distinguishes between the Absolute and the finite beings,
and borders frequently on Theism. Though God is producing all things out of himself and filling all, yet he remains distinct from the creatures, and is not contaminated by the Maya, as a lotus in a pond of water remains distinct from the water surrounding it. The Supreme is in its essence Joti (light, the all energizing vital power) which, though diffused into all creatures, remains distinct from them; the material bodies are dissolved again into atoms, whereas the emanated light is re-absorbed into the fountain of light. In this finer shade of pantheism, creation assumes the form of emanation from the Supreme (as in the system of the Sufis); the atomic matter is either likewise considered co-eternal with the Absolute and immanent in it, becoming moulded into various distinct forms by the energizing vigor of the Absolute, or the reality of matter is more or less denied so that the divine is the only real essence in all." It ought to be remarked here that the finer species of pantheism, alluded to by Dr. Trumpp, is simply an unsuccessful attempt to effect a compromise between the grosser scheme and theism, and that the pantheism, which identifies all things, material and immaterial with God, is the preponderant line of thought in the Granth.

This will appear from what it says about (1) God, (2) Creation, (3) Maya, (4) Final Emancipation and its Result.

1. Let us call attention to what the Granth says about God. He is in the first place set forth in what may be called a string of negations. He is "the Formless," "the Formless One," "without form or figure," "unattainable," "incomprehensible," "indivisible," "imperishable," "endless," "unweighable." The positive assertions or predications about him are the following:—He is "the Infinite," "the
world soul," "the primeval male," "the husband." He is said to be "the abode of virtues," "the abode of qualities," and "His benevolence cannot be written." In the height of self-abasement, Nanak says:—"All virtues are thine, I have none." But all these assurances are neutralized by the emphatic assertion, that He is "without qualities," the three Gunas which, according to the Sankhya scheme, are the productive causes of moral dispositions, good and bad. He is described as full of love and at the same time "without concern," the abode of virtues and "devoid of qualities." At page 319 we have the assurance—"Ram, who is devoid of qualities comes into one's power by praising (him)." This reminds us of the gulf of contradiction miscalled God in the Vedantic schools, of the non-descript, undefinable, indeterminable being or non-being, who is with and without form, with and without quality, neither powerful nor powerless, neither good nor bad, an imaginary line of distinction between substance and no-substance, between existence and non-existence!

But let us present some extracts of a decidedly pantheistic type from Nanak's own sayings as embodied in the book:—

At page 16 the worshipper and all human beings are identified with God in these words:—
"Hari is himself is the Lord, he himself is the worshipper, what is, O Nanak, the helpless being?
Thou, O Hari, the one supreme being, art unintermittingly contained in every body.
Some are donors, some are beggars, all are thy wonderful shows.
Thou thyself art the donor, thou thyself the enjoyer, without thee, I do not know another, Sir."
At page 322 the regenerated devotee is represented as one who "comprehends his ownself" and "knows that inside and outside is the One." At page 321 it is emphatically, said, "He himself is all, He himself exists (in all), by himself (all) is led astray;" and at page 438 the six orthodox systems are denounced "as rubbish," and "the Lord" is said to be "in all" as well as "full of light." Again, at page 503 we have these words:

"Without thee there is no other, O my beloved, without thee there is no other, O Hari!
In all colors and forms art thou; on whom thou bestowest a glance of favor, him thou pardonest."

Add to these the verse of Nandeva, quoted by Dr. Trumpp:

"All is Govind, all is Govind, without Govind there is no other, as in one string there are seven thousand heads, (so) is the Lord lengthwise and crosswise.
A wave of water, froth and bubble do not become separate from the water.
This world is the sport of the Supreme Brahm, playing about he does not become another."

2. At what may be called the very threshold of the Granth in its introductory portion, called Japu or Japji, God is declared to be "the True in all things," that is, in philosophical language, the Real beneath the phenomenal. The dominant pantheism of the book stands out in bold belief from what is said therein about creation, which is simply self-development or self-evolution. The following are some of the passages in which the process in the beginning thereof is set forth:

"The expansion (of the universe) is made from one tank. From this lakhs of rivers have been made." (p. 5.)
There are worlds, and worlds, and forms. As his order is, so is the work (done.) He sees and expands, having reflected." (p. 13.)

"My Lord is the only one, the only one, O brother, the only one. He himself destroys, he himself sets loose, he himself takes and gives. He himself sees, he himself expands, he himself beholds." (p. 495.)

At page 505 all the objects of creation are declared to be only modes of the divine existence:

"There are six houses, six Gurus, six (methods of) instruction.

The Guru of the Gurus is one, the garbs many."

God, according to Nanak, does not create the universe. He simply expands into the universe, and all its varieties of objects are simply His forms, garbs, sports and frolics, the pantomimic shows of the one real substance. The idea of the separate existence of matter in the shape of atoms co-existent with God is foreign to his scheme of thought, as will be manifest when the following lines in which something like the Vedantic order of creation is set forth, are considered:

"From the True one wind (air) has proceeded, from the wind water has been engendered. From the water the three worlds have been made, into everybody light is infused." (p. 30.)

The Granth type of pantheism is, however, not that of the Upanishads, but that of the Gita and the later Vedantic schools. God is supposed to have a superior part, from which human souls have emanated, and an inferior part evolved or expanded into the varied forms of material
existence noticeable around us. It does also, like every other species of pantheism, confound moral distinctions by representing God as not merely "the Beent" in every form of existence, perceptible or imperceptible, but as the sole Agent in creation or the universe. Notice the following among Nanak's utterances on the subject:

"What has pleased him, that has come to pass.
None other is acting (but he)." (p. 217.)

"He himself (the Supreme) leads astray, he himself gives wisdom." (p. 323.)

"Thou thyself causest to be done, thou thyself dost (all things), thou thyself puttest taunts into the minds of men." (p. 494.)

Is not all this absolute fatalism? That Nanak did not rise above the fatalistic tendency of the national mind appears from the following utterances:

"According to destiny one speaks, according to destiny one eats.
According to destiny a way is made, according to destiny one hears and sees.
According to destiny the breath is taken; what shall I go to ask a learned man?" (p. 22.)

"Hear, O foolish, ignorant mind.
His (God's) decree will be executed." (p. 213.)

"Without thee no one has obtained perfection.
By destiny it accrues (and is then) not prevented." (p. 493.)

'The destiny is fixed, the order is written, no order is again given.
As it is written, so it falls, no one can efface it." (p. 508.)

Again, at the same page:

"What is created, that does what it is caused to do:
What can be said to it, O brother?
What must be done, that it does; What cleverness has the creature?"

It must here be noted that the word 'destiny' is in the Granth a word of ambiguous signification, or of double meaning. In some places it means what it signifies, in some of the schools, *viz.*, the accumulated merit or demerit of bygone lives or stages of existence, the inner life, so to speak, of the all but endless chain of transmigration, while in others the word indicates the irreversible and unconditional decrees of God. But the lower destiny of transmigration is after all resolvable according to Hindu notions into the higher destiny of the inexorable decrees of God. For when the long chain of transmigration, in the case of a single human being is traced through its successive stages of development back to its originative source, an act proceeding from a desire to avoid pain and secure pleasure is ultimately landed on; and this act cannot according to Hindu philosophy, be ascribed to human volition, as its productive cause is declared to be an unseen power which operates through the desire which is its immediate antecedent. Nor is this primal act to be traced to a volition of the Deity, he or it being described as thoroughly quiescent, incapable of volition or action, and out of relation, except through a self-evolved, emergent God, to the affairs of life. Dr. Trumpp is right in maintaining that after all the theory of metempsychosis is inconsistent with the essence and drift of Hindu philosophy, and that if the Hindu intellect were less dreamy, and as analytic as it is generally said to be, the theory would be abandoned as untenable, and nothing but absolute fatalism would be allowed to remain as the basis of human actions and human vicissitudes.
Nanak has swept away all moral distinctions by inculcating such fatalism, and Dr. Trumpp attributes the prevailing tendency to represent his scheme as "moralizing deism" to ignorance.

3. But man is not merely irresistibly controlled by fate, but systematically deluded by Maya, the nexus between the Absolute and the creation; the active but very mischievous principle which has sprung, self-evolved, from the passive deity. If there is one being or principle systematically abused in the Granth from beginning to end, it is Maya. Let a few of the innumerable texts in which the mischief it does is set forth, be quoted:

"The body being burnt has become the earth, the mind by the infatuation of the Maya (like) dross; The old vices have again clung to it, the cruel ones sound again the trumpet." (p. 29.)

"(Like) sugar-candy the Maya is sweet in the body, by me and thee a bundle of it is lifted up, O dear! The night is dark, nothing is seen, the mouse cuts up the rope (of life) to pieces, O brother!" (p. 220.)

"(Whose) mind is led astray, into (his) house the Maya comes. Hindered by lust, he does not remain in (his) place." (p. 319.)

"All goddesses and gods are deluded by the Maya. Death doth not give them up without service being performed to the Guru." (p. 327.)

"In the Kali-yuga the Maya is selling liquors, the intoxicated mind keeps on drinking (her) sweet liquor. He himself (the Supreme) makes forms of many kinds, so says helpless Nanak." (p. 495.)

The Maya theory of Nanak is simply a reproduction of the
very clumsy one maintained in the Vaishnava schools, and by Kabir. It may be stated in a sentence or two. Maya issues from the Diety as the divine energy, and gives birth to the three gods to whom creation, preservation and destruction are severally ascribed, and who are in the Vaishnava schools unified into one principle or being, endowed with power equal to the threefold work. Maya, moreover, gives birth to the entire pantheon of Hindu gods and goddesses by incestuous co-habitation with the three gods, her own offspring; and through the whole host of her progeny she does nothing but deceive, delude poor man into egoism, desires, works, rewards, punishments and all the troubles of transmigration.

Her delusions are at times ascribed to her and at times to God Himself. The following two texts give an insight into the theogony of the Granth:—

"The Maya is the Second," so thinks the world. Lust, wrath, selfishness are perdition." (p. 320.)

"There is one Maya, who was delivered of 'setting going,' her three servants are chosen. One is the creator of the world, one the storekeeper, one keeps the court of justice." (p. 11.)

4. Now we advance to the soteriology of the book, the scheme of salvation it sets forth and its results. The method of obtaining final emancipation has already been indicated; religious works, seclusion, muttering, and calm meditation are its varied steps. Its results demand special attention here, they being calculated to serve as additional proofs of the dominant pantheism of Nanak's scheme. And the first of them is the destruction of egoism. The very first illusion of Maya is that which leads man to say "I," "I," that is, to regard himself as separate from the world, other human beings, and from God. The following quotations set forth
the mischief done by egoism or the prevailing sense of dualism:—

"Egotism and selfishness is captivating, the whole (world) is ruined by egotism.

By whom the name is forgotten, having stuck to another business:

They, by giving themselves to duality, are consumed and dead; in their heart is the fire of thirst." (p. 29.)

"His thirst is day and night very great (as there is in him) the disease and abnormal state of egotism." (p. 31.)

"The mind being in the power of inebriated ones (falls) by dint of folly (into) duality." (p. 319.)

"In saying: "I," "I," happiness is not brought about. The conceptions of the mind are false, He (only) is true." (p. 319.)

"In second love (duality) there is painful ignorance." (p. 326.)

"By practising egotism the True One is not obtained.

If egotism depart, the highest step is obtained." (p. 327.)

"The highest step is obtained (by him) worshipping the feet of the Guru,

His mind is reconciled with his mind, egotism and error have ceased." (p. 392.)

"(If) she adorn herself by doing away egotism:

Then the woman sports with her husband on the bed." (p. 504.)

The "woman" in the last line is the worshipper and "the husband" is Hari, the Lord.

The destruction of egotism is followed in the case of the perfected devotee by the extinction of his innate sense of distinction, or his irresistible tendency to discriminate between things that differ. This appears from the following lines:—
"Joy and grief affect him, in whom that God is not formed. Heaven and hell, nectar and poison, gold and copper are the same to him:
To whom praise and blame, covetousness, delusion and passion are the same;
Who is not under the destruction of pain and pleasure, him consider wise!
Nanak says: him consider emancipated, who is a man of this kind." (p. 316.)

The devotee, thus rendered dead to distinctions of all kinds, physical, aesthetic, intellectual and moral, attains to supreme knowledge. It may be said that moral distinctions are not expressly alluded to as being obliterated, and, therefore, we must call attention to another text:—
"In whom the all-filling remains full, destroying (his) poison:
His triad is gone off, he is pure within."

The expression 'triad' here means the three qualities which are the productive causes of all moral dispositions, good and bad, and the destruction of which necessarily implies the destruction of the entire moral nature of man. And where moral nature is considered a thing fit only for violent death, all talk of moral distinctions is nonsense. The knowledge attained is thus indicated:—
"By means of the word (of the Guru) he knows the three worlds." (p. 318.)

"Celebrity, intelligence and final emancipation are in the one name." (p. 318.)

"To the disciple divine knowledge is decreed by reason of former works." (p. 319.)

"In whose house is the palace of the infinite, he becomes infinite himself." (p. 330.)
"He who knows Brahm is himself the supreme Lord, says Nanak." (p. 294.)

The devotee's growing knowledge passes through different stages. He first of all acquires, through the help of the Guru's word, the esoteric meaning of which flashes upon his mind when he retires from the world and gives himself to meditation, a perfect knowledge of the three worlds, heaven, earth, and hell. Instead of looking upon them as distinct from one another, and distinct from God, he finds that they are but deceptive phenomena concealing the Real beneath their veil. They are all the creations of Maya, and, therefore, non-existent, non-real, non-entitative. And the moment he clearly sees his own identity, and that of the world with God, or in other words, the moment he is liberated from the influence or charm of Maya, he himself becomes Brahm, "infinite" in that species of knowledge which has nothing for its object, as well as nothing for its subject, and which, therefore, may justly be said to be equivalent to absolute ignorance. And the last step of the drama is, as in the Vedantic schools, absorption. A few quotations will show this:

"If the True One is found, comfort springs up (in the heart); the true ones are absorbed into the True One." (p. 25.)

"Having joined the assembly of the true ones, Hari is obtained by the disciple, having applied his devotion to Hari.

When his own self is gone, comfort is obtained, (as) water mixing with water is absorbed (in it)" (p. 34.)

"By meeting with the Guru (the disciple) is absorbed in the bosom of Hari," (p. 217.)

"(My) pride is gone, with pleasure I meditate on my own spirit.
Light has sprung up (in me) in the luminous (Supreme) (I am) absorbed,” (p. 317.)

"By whom it (nectar) is drunk, they have become intoxicated, (their) hands (and) noses break.

Light is absorbed in the Luminous One; * * *.” (p. 496.)

Here then, we have the scheme of Hindu pantheism restated, with some modifications in form, but scarcely any in essence. A god without form, power, quality, and relation is posited, and the universe is represented as springing from Him through the blinding influence of an emergent deity, only to play its part as a mere phantasm for a time, and then be re-absorbed into the primal mass. God is at times represented as the central light from which the objects of creation, specially souls, are emitted as sparks, or He is described as the ocean, from which these branch out as rivers; and, finally, He is pointed to as the Real beneath the phenomenal, as the One Being sporting beneath the phantasmagoria of nature. Moral principles are insisted on as necessary to the well-being of society, but they are said to be based on factitious distinctions, which are obliterated as soon as true knowledge is obtained. And devotion is set forth as a thing of subordinate importance, though at times wrought up to ecstasy by purely mechanical appliances,—a steppingstone to that severe contemplation without which saving knowledge is unattainable. There is after all very little difference between Nanak's scheme and that set forth in the standard works of the Vedantic schools; and if there is any, it consists in the varied features of self-contradiction attached to it by an ecclecticism, which is undiscerning!

The prominent feature of Mediæval philosophy in India is Guruism, or, in the words of the New Dispensationists
the doctrine of the prophets, the honored founders of special economies, in whom the progressive series of divine incarnations culminated. The founders of schools, Vaishnava or Saiva, claimed a great deal more than mere authority to promulgate new schemes of thought, or usher in new dispensations of light and grace; they assumed mediatorial functions, identified themselves with God, and demanded the supreme worship due to Him alone. The tone in which they spoke of themselves is fitted to remind one of the sublime self-assertiveness of Krishna in the Bhagvada-Gita; and the result of the prodigious claims advanced by them is that they have been adored as Mediators and Guides rather than venerated as Teachers. Nay, they have been worshipped as incarnations, not only in addition, but in preference to the recognized incarnations of the Hindu faith; and herein is noticeable one main feature of the heterodoxy of the creeds severally propagated by them. It is true that the Guru-theory was not invented in the Middle Ages. It had its origin when philosophy was brought to the birth by Kapila, who is himself distinctly said to have been an incarnation; but it is nevertheless true that the theory in question, which had appeared in an embryonic form in the earliest ages of speculation, was matured and perfected when devotees flocked in large numbers to the standards raised by the great champions of the Saiva and Vaishnava schools.

This theory appears in all its completeness in the Granth. As the Bible, in all its entirety, clusters around the person of our Lord, the Adi-Granth clusters around the person of the Guru, who is represented in unequivocal language not merely as the accredited Teacher sent by God, not merely as the heaven-appointed Prophet and Guide, but a being
identified with God, and, therefore, entitled to supreme worship. Let us, in conclusion, present a few extracts, to show (1) that the Guru is the accredited Teacher sent by God; (2) that he is the Mediator between God and Man; and (3) lastly that he is God Himself, an incarnation embodying in his person, not the two-fold nature ascribed to Christ, but a measure more or less considerable of the essence of God. The following texts set forth the Guru’s functions as a Teacher sent by God:—

“Those who are established by the true Guru, nobody can efface.

Within them is the abode of the name, by the name they will become manifest.” (p. 25.)

The word ‘established’ in the context means rooted and grounded in knowledge.

“O beloved, mutter Hari, Hari, having taken the wisdom (instruction) of the Guru say Hari.” (p. 33.)

At page 29 Hari is said to “fall into the skirt of the disciple” “by the wisdom of the Guru.”

“He extinguishes the fire of (worldly) thirst by the word of the Guru.

Duality, doubt, with natural ease:

(Who) by the instruction of the Guru causes the name to dwell in his heart. (p. 320.)

At page 15 “the Gurus of the Gurus” or prophets of the highest order are said to be “endowed with divine knowledge.” And in many places the Guru is represented as “the Friend” and “the Guide,” and devotees are exhorted to “serve” him, as the teacher is served in India, while the wretch, who is guilty of “reviling” him “is wasted and consumed.” The Guru is distinctly called “the mediator,” and his mediatorial functions are thus set forth:—
"O my friend Gurudeva! Manifest to me the name of Ram"  
(p. 15.)

"O people of Hari, O true men of the True Guru, make supplication to the Guru. We low worms are in the asylum of the True Guru; mercifully manifest (to us) the name."  
(p. 15.)

"By the Guru being joined (with them) they (the true ones) are steeped in truth, the true ones are absorbed in the True One."  
(p. 33.)

"Having met with the Guru, the water of existence is crossed by them."  
(p. 34.)

"Out of mercy he directed my mind (to the One.)
The True Guru gave me the understanding of the One."  
(p. 321.)

"Egotism and selfishness are forgotten by means of the word of the Guru.

By the instruction of the Guru Murari (Hari) is known in the heart."  
(p. 325.)

The Guru, not merely teaches, but reveals Hari to the disciple, doubtless in his own person, and unites him to God through himself. But the Guru is in the following texts identified with God:—

"From the mouth of the Guru is the sound, from the mouth of the Guru is the Veda, in the mouth of the Guru it is contained."

"The Guru is Iswar (Siva), the Guru is Garakh (Vishnu) Brahma, the Guru is the mother of Parvati."  
(p. 3.)

"The Guru is the ladder, the Guru is the boat, the Guru is the buoy, the name of Hari.
The Guru is the pond, the sea, the boat, the Guru is the Tirtha and the sea."  
(p. 25.)

At page 73, in a stanza attributed to a successor of
Nanak, the Guru is said to be "infinitely powerful," "inap- prehensible," "pure," "the creator," "the maker," "form- less, high, unacccessible, infinite;" and his "greatness" is declared "incomprehensible." In a word Hari and Guru are interchangeably used, and the identity of the earthly with the heavenly Guru is set forth in unmistakable terms.

Nanak was an imitator, not an original thinker. He reproduced in his scheme the philosophy in vogue in the Mediaeval schools almost in all its entireness, a philosophy which originally recieved its color and complexion from the Gita; and even in his unsuccessful attempt to bring Hindus and Mahammadans under the banner of one and the same faith, he followed Kabir out and out. His motto was, as appears from the Janam Shakhis, "no Hindu, no Mussul- man," and he boldly affirmed that there is no essential difference between the two systems, which were in his day at war with each other. At page 195 he draws a picture of a true Mussulman, in no respect different from what he presents of a good Hindu. A good Mussulman is one, who "having approved of religion" "gives away (his) property (to) the saints;" who, becoming "firm in the way of religion," "puts a stop to the gyration of death and life;" who "obeys the will of the Lord on his head," "minds the creator," and "parts with his own self," and who is moreover "kindly affected towards all living creatures." And though he at times speaks of the Koran, as well as of the Hindu Shastras, in irreverent and contemptuous terms, he takes good care to represent his scheme as an embodiment of the esoteric meaning of these scriptures, not as a religion essentially new. His language, like that of Kabir, is what has been reproduced in our day by the champions of the New Dispensation, and his complete failure, as regards his
proposed amalgamation of two rival and conflicting systems of faith, and his waning influence in general, ought to be regarded by them as a warning. And the great service he rendered, in pursuance of the policy laid down by Kabir, was to make popular by means of what may be called vernacular teaching, what had formerly been confined to academic groves. It is to the works of Kabir and Nanak, written in popular languages and in a popular style, that the standing wonder of an entire nation, steeped in pantheistic notions, is to be traced.
SUPPLEMENT.*

ESOTERIC BUDDHISM.

Mr. A. P. Sinnett's *Esoteric Buddhism* is one of those books which provoke rather than deserve criticism. Written in a flippant style, brimful of audacity and profanity, with history distorted, science disgraced, and religion pillored, the book is sure to be a perennial source of mischief as long as it lives. The only consolation is that a production so full of vagaries and chimeras, of statements and disquisitions obviously or rather obtrusively grotesque and irrational, cannot possibly live long. But now that fresh efforts are being put forward by the author to extend its pernicious influence by means of popular novels, an attempt should be made to counteract the mischief it is doing, specially among some classes of our educated countrymen.

The book, it is said, has passed through several editions and been translated into two or three of the continental languages of Europe. The secret of its popularity in some quarters, it is by no means difficult to discover and unfold. The theory it propounds is like the subtle, intangible philosophy of Hegel, so flexible in nature and so ambiguous in form and expression, that it may be claimed as its own by each of the varied classes into which the motley community of free thinkers is broken up.

The pronounced atheist, by no means a rare animal in these days, may justly claim the theory as his, inasmuch

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as it is based on a positive denial of a personal God, and posits nothing higher than a quasi-spiritual and quasi-material substance "efflorescing" into beauty and order, and giving rise to gods many and lords many, fitted by acquired merit to guide its processes of development, to a large extant, if not throughly. The "modest" agnostic, his younger brother, finds in its starting point, which is an indeterminate, undefinable, unknowable substance or no-substance, all that can encourage and strengthen his belief in nescience, his love of darkness, both intellectual and moral. The materialist cannot but discover in its materialistic clothing, or in the eternal chatter about affinities and polarities vortices and cataclysms in which it is enshrouded, a strong proof for his doctrine of all matter and no spirit. The pantheist is also encouraged by those of the disquisitions embodied in the book which are so obviously fitted to annihilate the essential distinction between matter and mind, as well as by express statements made on purpose to lead us to look upon the varied objects of nature as "unreal and merely transitory delusions of sense." And the speculative evolutionist has in it his theory of evolution from fiery mists and through the fortuitous concurrence of atoms, rather than in consequence of a designing mind regulating its processes, upheld, and its missing links accounted for. And lastly all classes of infidels cannot but receive with acclamation a book so full of hints, inuendoes and direct allegations fitted, in their opinion, to bring the religion of Christ, and the dogmata to which it has given rise, into contempt.

The popularity of the book among particular classes of our educated countrymen can be easily accounted for. The two things which can insinuate any theory, however apparently wild or untenable, into their good graces, are presented
in the book with a vengeance, viz., intense hatred of Christianity, and an ardent, albeit pretended, veneration for the ancient literature of the country. What a balm to the wounded spirit of a conquered nation, to be assured, and that by a prominent member of the ruling class, that in transcendental speculation it is decidedly ahead of the people, the trophies of whose military prowess, administrative ability, and practical ingenuity are scattered broadcast around it! What a consolation to be told that the only true religion of which humanity may be proud, and before which that brought in by the missionaries pales into a system of gross superstition, lies embedded in the ancient records of a country once the greatest, and destined to be once more the greatest, in the world!

The open arms with which not a few of our highly educated countrymen have received a book so irreverent in its tone, so flippant in its utterances, and so rancorous in its attacks on Christianity or the approved theology of the Church, are not without meaning. It is fashionable with them to pay a few smooth compliments in public meetings to our holy religion, and to those engaged in our country in propagating it; and some missionaries have shown a tendency to set an exaggerated value on them, or to invest them with an importance they do not deserve. The Christianity belauded on such occasions is not the Christianity we hold as life, but the diluted Christianity from which the life-blood has been sucked out, the Christianity from which the God of the Old Testament, the Trinity, the Divinity of Christ, the Atonement, and other vital elements have been abstracted; while missionaries are praised as apostles of civilization, not as propagators of the doctrine of the Cross. Nay, there is always a dash of sarcasm in the eulogy bestowed upon the missionary, as his failure as regards his great work is
assumed with an air of self-complacency, triumph and exultation, while his activity in promoting general improvement is acknowledged in terms of commendation. And sometimes some of our public orators have the effrontery to ask him to give up his hopeless endeavour to proselytize the country, and substitute for it a benevolent scheme of raising it in literature, science, and material civilization!

The "flings" at Christianity with which the book abounds, though harmless in a Christian land, are eminently fitted to prove disastrous to many in India; and as they are intentionally and deliberately set up, as it were, as obstacles in our way, a notice somewhat more detailed than they are entitled to seems desirable. As a prelude to our examination of these rabid attacks on our holy religion, we may mention that gross caricatures are presented in this as in all such books as faithful representations, not only of the doctrines we believe in, but of our attitude towards science and humanity. Let us further state that we shall notice these misrepresentations, not in logical or scientific order, but simply as they stand in the book before us—the Third Edition, published in London by Trübner and Co. in 1884.

In the opening paragraph of Chap. III. (page 29, see also page 187) we have these words:

"The esoteric doctrine finds itself under no obligation to keep its science and religion in separate water-tight compartments. Its theory of physics and its theory of spirituality are not only reconcilable with each other, they are intimately blended together and interdependent."

These sentences imply that "the exoteric doctrine," by which name Christianty is designated throughout the book under review, is under an obligation to deny an intrinsic, essential connection between science and religion. But what
ground is their for this implication? While we Christians certainly maintain that the province of physical science may be differentiated by a sharp line of demarcation from the province of religion, we never stultify ourselves in these days by failing to recognize the link or series of links by which those two departments of knowledge are intimately and inseparably associated with each other. Whatever might have been the attitude of the Church in bygone ages of bigotry and superstition, there is not now within her borders a sensible man or woman ready to call in question the solidarity of material and moral conditions, their intimate connection and interdependence. What enlightened Christians are loth to do is to go the length along with Mr. Sinnett, who in this matter walks in the footsteps of the ancient philosophers of our own and some other lands, of confounding physics with morals, and representing science and religion as one and the same thing.

2. In this same paragraph (p. 30) we have these words:

"For there is a manifest irrationality in the common-place notion that man's existence is divided into a material beginning lasting sixty or seventy years, and a spiritual remainder lasting for ever. The irrationality mounts to absurdity, when it is alleged that the acts of the sixty years—the blundering, helpless acts of ignorant human life—are permitted by the perfect justice of an all-wise Providence to define the conditions of that later life of infinite duration."

By whom is "the common-place notion" in which "a manifest irrationality" is discovered, entertained? Not certainly by the Christian who does not believe in a purely "material beginning" or a purely spiritual ending. Man, according to his belief, is a dualism, consisting of a natural body and an immaterial soul closely associated, and both
presenting a beautiful though incomprehensible example of perfect union, interpenetration, interdependence, and inter-action. Man moreover, is a dualism from beginning to end, a dualism in his natal state, a dualism in infancy, boyhood, youth, mature manhood and old age, and man is destined to remain a dualism forever, after he has passed through this transitory scene of life, and perhaps an intermediate stage of disembodied existence (in which, by the way, many eminent Christians do not believe), in renewed forms, and under conditions and laws different indeed from the present, but not calculated to militate against the theory of perfect identity of being. Again, we Christians object to the morbid sentimentalism which represents a life devoted to sin and folly by such buttered phrases as "the blundering, helpless acts of ignorant human life." Our destiny for time and for eternity is not determined by our helplessness or by our blunders, nor yet by unavoidable ignorance on our part, but by our deliberate choice of what cannot but enchain, degrade, and distress us in life, and what is inherently fitted to deepen our thraldom, debase-ment and misery as long as it is allowed to dominate us, here or hereafter. According to Christian belief, God is the only source of spiritual life, holiness, and happiness; and consequently when a rational creature knowingly and deliberately thrusts Him aside and chooses disobedience to and rebellion against His just authority, it cannot but be plunged into spiritual death, unholiness, and misery; and if its choice of sin becomes, in consequence of long-continued indulgence, not merely inveterate, but unalterably fixed, its misery cannot but in the very nature of the case be permanent and endless. The case is similar to that of a man, who not only shuts his eyes once or twice to the
light of the sun, but deliberately plucks them out, completely blinds himself, and then lives and moves in a self-created darkness. Nobody, in the latter case, would dream of tracing his misery to ignorance or helplessness or blunder, or to anything but a deliberate choice of physical blindness. Why then should holy indignation be evinced by the champions of Theosophy, when a person endowed with intelligence and free will debars himself similarly—by a choice, deepening in intensity, and ultimately settling down into a firm and unalterable purpose—from creature-like obedience, holiness, and glory, and that for ever?

3. In the Chapter on Devachan we are treated to some spirited, if not grandiloquent, descriptions of the ideal pleasures or self-oblivious trance reserved in the region of bliss called Devachan for some, at least, of the constituent elements which compose "the heptenary nature" of the man who in this life develops his higher affinities. Mr. Sinnett cannot of course do justice to such transcendental speculations as are embodied in this chapter without showing the difficulties associated with our poor "exoteric" views of heaven and its unceasing felicity; and so he shows his critical acumen in this passage, (p. 73):

"A heaven which constituted a watch-tower from which the occupants could still survey the miseries of the earth, would really be a place of acute mental suffering for its most sympathetic, unselfish, and meritorious inhabitants. If we invest the imagination with such a very limited range of sympathy that they could be imagined as not caring about the spectacle of suffering after the few persons, to whom they were immediately attached, had died and joined them, still they would have a very unhappy period of waiting to go through before survivors reached the end
of an often long and toilsome existence below. And even this hypothesis would be further vitiated by making heaven most painful for occupants who were most unselfish and sympathetic, whose reflected distress would thus continue on behalf of the afflicted race of mankind generally, even after their personal kindred had been rescued by the lapse of time. The only escape from this dilemma lies in the supposition that heaven is not yet opened for business, so to speak, and that all people who have ever lived from Adam downwards are still lying in a death-like trance, waiting for the resurrection at the end of the world."

The best way of rebutting the allegations embodied in this extract is to follow an order the reverse of what is ordinarily pursued, or, in other words to begin at the tail and go up to the head. The "escape" suggested from the "dilemma pointed out has never been resorted to except by very small and insignificant sections in the Church Universal; the body thereof having uniformly opposed the theory which posits a condition of "death-like trance" between death and the resurrection. There has indeed been a prevailing tendency in the Church to uphold the idea of a Sheol or Hades or an intermediate stage of disembodied existence between the death of the body and its resurrection on the last day; but this state has almost invariably been described as a state of conscious bliss for the good and conscious misery for the bad. Excluding particular sects, the theory of an underground prison where the souls of believers lie either in self-oblivious repose, or with nothing to cheer them beyond the hope of ultimate deliverance by Christ, has invariably been scouted in Christendom; and belief in the instantaneous translation of their spirits, after separation from their earthly tenemtms to the region of bliss, where they are to advance
from glory to glory by seeing, directly and immediately, what they behold here as through a glass, has of late been gaining ground with characteristic rapidity.

Again, the existence in heaven of sublime and ennobling sorrow proceeding from love, sympathy and compassion, is denied by none in the church excepting undiscerning persons who are apt to interpret literally the material images by which heavenly bliss is set forth in Scripture, and whose number is happily becoming more and more insignificant day by day. The God of the Bible is treated by modern infidels precisely in the way in which Christ was treated by his contemporaries. If our Lord had lived, like John the Baptist, in ascetic isolation, these would have represented him as one possessed; and because he was a man of the people and lived as they did, he was stigmatized as a gluttonous man and a wine-bibber! When the God of the Bible manifests his infinite love for poor sinful man, his compassion for the wandering, his sympathy with the distressed, and his readiness to help those who call upon him in trouble, he is anthropomorphous; while if he had abstained from manifestations of boundless benevolence and good will, the very critics, who scoff at the tender representations which are so eminently fitted to draw out our self-centred affections and reverence towards him, would have represented him as cold-blooded and hardhearted. As it is, they go into hysterics the moment they talk of the punishment, which a course of daring rebellion against his fatherly authority and fatherly love necessarily brings down on the impenitent and hardened sinner. The grand sorrows of love are not absent from the heart of the Almighty, and they will not be absent from the hearts of those who are to be like him, as far as creatures can be like the Creator, but such sorrows cannot be described
as "acute mental suffering." Nor should it be overlooked that these sympathetic sorrows are, in the case of the righteous, mitigated by a clear perception of the blessings by which their trials are invariably followed, and of the lofty character matured in the school of tribulation.

4. But Mr. Sinnett's attacks on our exoteric views of heaven are by no means confined to this passage. In the same chapter, and a little further on, we encounter the following words, (p. 81):

"If 'the next world' really were the objective heaven which ordinary theology preaches, there would be endless injustice and inaccuracy in its operation. People, to begin with, would be either admitted or excluded, and the differences of favour shown to different guests within the all-favored region, would not sufficiently provide for differences of merit in this life."

Why not? The nice adjustments and hair-splitting distinctions suggested by the author in the case of Lord Bacon, whose grand intellectual faculties could not but go according to his theory into Devachanic enjoyment, while the inferior elements of his moral nature would receive their merited punishment in dismal regions of misery, have no place "in ordinary theology," which regards the human soul as an indivisible and undiscernible entity. According to the Bible, the future destiny of the soul is fixed, not according to the intellectual powers it may have developed, not even according to the standard of the domestic and social virtues by which its mundane career may have been distinguished, but according to its attitude towards God and heavenly things. And when that is an attitude of loyalty, reverence and devotion, it is translated where these and other elements of piety are perfected, and its condition is beatified;
but when its attitude is one of disobedience and rebellion, it is necessarily excluded from where its presence is sure to be a source of misery to itself, and more than a public nuisance, a plague and a pestilence. Where is injustice in such procedure? Again, ordinary theology does speak of stars which differ from one another, as representing the different degrees of glory in heaven, corresponding to the different degrees of devotion to God and things unseen, manifested in this transitory scene of existence.

5. Again in this very chapter we have what cannot but be called a rabid attack on the most assuring doctrine of the Bible in these words—(p 83).

"But nature does not content herself with either forgiving sins in a free and easy way, or damning sinners outright, like a lazy master too indolent, rather than too good natured, to govern his household justly."

The "free and easy way" in which, according to Christian doctrine, pardon and peace are extended to the greatest of sinners, on condition of living faith, is too well-known to need rehearsal here. If the interposition of the incarnation, obedience to the death, crucifixion, death, burial, resurrection and ascension of the Man of Sorrows, together with his ceaseless intercession and the constant effusion of his Spirit, between the sovereign who grants and the sinner who receives pardon, suggests indolence or good-natured indifference, it must be to minds dead to calm thought and dispassionate reasoning. The scoffer, however, is right in maintaining that if pardon were granted excepting through the intervention of a scheme calculated to reconcile justice to mercy, the free gift would indicate good-natured weakness on the part of the giver; and that those who see nothing congruous or impressive in
the Gospel economy of salvation, have no alternative but to raise the standard of No-Pardon in this vale of tears!

6. In Chapter VIII., the author, in attempting to set forth the new meaning attached to the word "spirituality" by Theosophy, depreciates its ordinary sense in a tone of profanity for which there can be no reason; he besides shows a reprehensible determination to cast dirt on the most sacred of human associations and feelings. Hear what he says:

(p. 125):—

"The ever-recurring and ever-threatened conflict between intellect and spirituality is the phenomenon to be now examined. The common-place conceptions, which these two words denote, must of course be expanded to some extent before the occult conception is realized; for European habits of thinking are rather apt to set up in the mind an ignoble image of spirituality, as an attribute rather of the character than the mind itself,—a pale goody goodness, born of an attachment to religious ceremonial and of devout aspirations, no matter to what whimsical notions of Heaven and Divinity in which the 'spiritually-minded' person may have been brought up."

The word "spirituality" is certainly used in the Church, and by mankind generally, in a sense different from what is attached to it by the champions of Theosophy, who understand by it nothing more than immediate cognition of occult truth, and who should have coined or transliterated a new phrase to express an idea so foreign to it. "Spirituality" certainly means a personal, experimental or saving knowledge of God, resulting, under his blessing, in faith, hope, and love, and manifesting itself, not only in modesty of demeanour and rigid propriety of external life, but in devotional enthusiasm, missionary zeal, and practical benevolence; and
it may be represented as "an attribute of character." But such representation does not exclude it from the privilege of being regarded as an attribute of the mind also, as character, in the proper sense of the term, is the sum total of all our mental and moral excellencies and defects. Spirituality, moreover, includes our attachment to the means of grace, and our "devout aspirations," but it cannot possibly be described as "born of" them, being a gift of God through Jesus Christ, our Saviour and the indwelling Spirit. It is synonymous with genuine goodness, not "goody goodness," and it springs from proper conceptions of God, not from "whimsical notions." The smallest of our Sunday School pupils can see the audacity with which our doctrinal beliefs or dogmas are distorted in this passage, but our countrymen either cannot or will not see it!

A word ought here to be said on our author's assumption of an "ever-recurring and ever-threatened conflict between intellect and spirituality." This conflict is a dream, as reason and faith instead of being, as is so often represented, antagonistic, are thoroughly reconcilable, and only a little gumption is needed to see where the one ends and the other begins. In matters beyond the province of reason to be guided by the voice of the Almighty or revelation, attested by varied lines of cumulative and convincing evidence, is the highest reason. Religious people are always ready to receive with open arms the established facts of science, but they may properly object to the attitude assumed by some scientists, and these by no means the greatest of the age, when they parade their theories and vagaries as proved verities, or even when they raise their "provisional hypotheses" to the lofty position of approved generalizations. A conflict may have existed between religion misunderstood
and science misrepresented; but perfect harmony subsists between the two departments of knowledge when the one is shorn of the errors of interpretation and the other of the unreasonable assumptions of pride.

7. On the following page (126) we have this flippant assertion:

"Although as a concession to 'weak brethren' and 'religion,' on which it looks with good-humoured contempt, modern intellect does not condemn spirituality, it certainly treats the physical human life as the only serious business with which grave men, or even earnest philanthropists, can concern themselves."

Here all we have to say hinges on the sense in which the word "modern intellect" is used in this sentence. If by modern intellect is meant the intellect of small coteries of agnostics, materialists, pantheists and sceptics of varied shades of opinion, the assertion is certainly well grounded; but it ought to be borne in mind that the intellect represented by these blatant champions of infidelity is an infinitesimal portion, and that by no means the best, of the intellect of the modern world. Auguste Comte came through an absured line of reasoning to a perception of the uselessness of theology in the present age of enlightenment. A few men as conceited as he made him their champion, and a proclamation rang in the public ear that the "theological fictions of a dark age" had been cast overboard by the whole world. Does not all such bluster remind us of Dean Swift's spider, who, finding his web shaken by a little puff of wind, concluded that the elemental concussions, which were sure to end in the dissolution of the world, had already commenced?

8. In the Chapter on Nirvana, (X) the author sets forth the grandeur of esoteric salvation in these words (p. 168):—
"The sort of salvation we are talking about now, is not escape from a penalty to be achieved by cajoling a celestial potentate—it is a positive not a negative achievement—the ascent into regions of spiritual elevation so exalted that the candidate aiming at them, is claiming that which we ordinarily describe as omniscience."

It is no part of our business here to speak of the salvation aimed at by the occultist, of his attempt to rise from parviscience to omniscience by austerity and meditation. But we must set forth the groundlessness as well as profanity of the allusion to the Christian scheme of salvation in this sentence. That salvation is, as every school lad of ten knows, a positive as well as a negative boon, including as it does not merely pardon for the past, but a renewed heart leading to a thorough amendment of life for the future. Nor is this salvation attained by "cajoling a celestial potentate," but in consequence of an exhibition of infinite love, in conjunction with infinite justice, overpowering enough to charm the sinner away from the thorny ways of sin into the pleasant paths of loyalty to God and devotion to his service.

9. Passing over many minor attacks we conclude with a passing reference to the fling embodied in these words (p. 197):—

"A religious dogma in flagrant opposition to that which is manifestly truth in respect of geology and astronomy, may find churches and congregations content to nurse it, but is not worth serious philosophical consideration."

We emphatically deny that the approved theology of our "churches and congregations" is "in flagrant" or in any kind of opposition to the established facts of geological and astronomical science, or any science whatever.
We repeat that the science, which rears its superstructure on the solid basis of induction, can never be arrayed against the views clearly taught in the Bible of cosmogony, chronology, the progressive development of the race, under a series of revelations correspondingly progressive, of God and man, of virtue and vice, and of heaven and hell; though the crude theories and flighty speculations, which in some quarters pass for science, may. It is a significant fact that, while Hinduism, Buddhism, and the other religions of the world are buried under prodigious heaps of scientific and philosophic error, the Bible is the only religious book marvellously free from it; and it is for the infidel world to decide whether the wisdom manifested in the rigidness with which it confines itself to its own course of religious instruction, and resists temptations to devious courses, is human or superhuman, natural or supernatural.

Having disposed of some of the flings at our holy religion with which the book under review abounds, it is time for us to look the theory it propounds in the face. But before we do so, we cannot help remarking that the persistent conduct of the Theosophists belies their smooth professions. The nature of some of these may be set forth in the following words of Col. Olcott:—“We interfere with no man’s creed or caste, preach no dogma, offer no article of faith.” “The Society has no more a religion of its own than the Royal Asiatic, or the Royal Geographical or the Royal Astronomical.” “It is neither a propaganda nor a special antagonist of any particular faith.” The foregoing pages will show how its profession of religious neutrality is inconsistent with the audacity and profanity with which it pours contempt on the most sacred of the religious beliefs and associations of
humanity in general,—on God, Heaven, Hell, the immutable principles of rectitude, and the ritualistic observances in which the intensity of devotional feeling finds its expression. And the following pages will show that "the Society" has a "creed," which, though subtle and intangible, Mr. Sinnett does not scruple to call "the only religion of humanity," a creed based on a revelation, connected with observances which may justly be called ceremonial, associated with an array of motives fitted to work on our hopes and fears, and linked finally with efforts calculated to make it the centre of an earnest though unscrupulous propagandism.

What "the only religion of humanity" is will appear if we take into consideration (I.) The Theory of Evolution the book under review propounds, (II.) The ground set forth for our acceptance thereof, and (III.) The apparently contradictory phenomena or facts the theory is said to be fitted to reconcile and harmonize.

I. The book traces, with minuteness and circumstantiality, the evolution of man, through an almost endless series of incarnations and re-incarnations, into a god of limited potency indeed, but of absolute knowledge and boundless benevolence. But as a series of habitats were originally evolved for the reception and accommodation of his successive objective incarnations and subjective states of being, we are favored herein with a cosmogony, as well as what may be called a theogony, or rather a cosmogony "efflorescing," to adopt an oft-used phrase of our author, into a theogony. But as the evolutionary process, however far-reaching in its consequences or magnificent in its range, begins with a primal substance or no-substance, the question rises—What is it? We have the answer furnished on page 176;—

"The one eternal, imperishable thing in the universe, which
the universal \textit{pralayās} themselves pass over without destroying, is that which may be regarded indifferently, as space, duration, matter or motion, not as something having these four attributes but as something which \textit{is} these four things at once, and always."

This nondescript essence or no-essence is represented as "androgy nous," with a male principle ready to "expand and shed,"—called \textit{Brahma} in exoteric theology—and a female principle ready "to gather in and fecundate"—called we suppose \textit{sakti}. Col. Olcott, in a passage quoted by our author, describes this substance as having two sides, a "subjective" and an "objective" side, and the former he calls \textit{Nirvāna}. Elsewhere our author himself calls this substance "nature" and represents it as having "two poles,"—we suppose a positive and a negative one. It ought also to be observed that, in accommodation, we dare say, to our current exoteric views, he calls this substance "cosmic matter," "fiery dust" and "original nebula"! and in the following words he condescendingly comes down to the mental level of poor materialists (p. 183) :

"That which antedates every manifestation of the universe, and would lie beyond the limits of manifestation, if such limits could ever be found, is that which underlies the manifested universe within our own purview—matter animated by motion its \textit{parabrahm} or spirit."

But the essential distinction between matter and motion is emphatically denied, as these two things, along with space and time, are said to "constitute one and the same eternal substance of the universe." The distinction between its male and female principles, its positive and negative poles, its subjective and objective sides, is after all conventional; and therefore, the deepest esoteric philosophy should set it aside
as a difference without a meaning, and call this indescribable, undefinable essence, Nirvana.

This Nirvana has its seasons of activity called manvantra, and its seasons of repose called pralaya, and these alternate with each other with the regularity of a law of nature inherent in it. When it has one of its creative fits, it comes out, self-moved, in a series of "life-waves" or "life impulses," to the circumundulations or "rounds" of which the wonders of creation are to be traced. These animating forces, as they go round and round, call into existence world after world, transform each from what ordinary science would call a state of fusion into a state of solidity and compactness, clothe it with vegetation, people it with varied forms of animal life, marching in an ascending scale from the lowest up the highest, and make it by varieties of esoteric processes the congenial soil of human activity and human progress. As the first instalment of esoteric knowledge, to be eventually communicated in larger measure as our receptiveness for it increases, the book presents only a glimpse of the evolution of the universe in all its vastness and amplitude. It confines its revelations to "the planetary chain" of which our earth is an integral portion, and by no means the best, as within its circumference we find "materiality" balanced, not overridden by "spirituality."

The other six worlds of this circular chain, three of which are gradually solidified as they descend towards it in a curve, the other three being subtilized as they ascend from it in a curve, are of thinner consistency, subtler essence, and forces more spiritual. The first of these spheres, called in the book "World A," has all the multifarious types of vegetable and animal life noticeable on the surface of our globe, but the types there are spiritual fac-similes or "ghosts,"
as the author calls them, of the types here. The original forms are gradually solidified in their transitions through the descending arc of worlds until they appear in this world, where their material and spiritual elements are held in perfect equilibrium. They are then gradually spiritualized as they mount up the ascending curve, on the highest point of which they once more assume their original ghost shapes.

We have then in this great evolutionary system a Nirvana, or what Northern Buddhists call "eternal voidness," a triad of ghost regions, our earth half spirit, half matter, and another triad of ghost regions. Has not spiritualism a firm basis?

When a series of habitats have been fitted up by tidal life-waves, which move in "rushes" and "gushes," but with wonderful regularity, the great work of human evolution begins. Each of these life-waves consists of "spiritual monads" or "egos," which doubtless pass through the preliminary developments needed to prepare the successive worlds of the chain for human habitation, though this fact is concealed under a cloud of high-sounding words, rather than clearly stated. The evolving substance being unitary and indivisible, it is paradoxical to talk of mineral life-waves as different from vegetable life-waves, or of vegetable life-waves as different from animal life-waves; and consequently the development of the lower into the higher waves must necessarily be assumed to give the theory proper shape and consistency. The "individual entities," entitled to be called human by a preparatory process of evolution, have quite a race before them; each of them, when not brought into premature destruction by inherent worthlessness, having to pass seven times round the seven worlds or through seven main, seven sub-divisional, and seven branch races. The arithmetic is
given more clearly in Mr. Sinnett's previous writings than in the book under review; and from one of these Dr. Murdoch quotes the following clear statement in his recently published pamphlet on "Theosophy Unveiled." (p. 83):

"There are seven planets, through which man pass by successive re-incarnations in the progress of his evolution. These seven planets have each evolved seven races, and these seven races each seven sub-races. Thus we have 7 planets \( \times \) 7 races \( \times \) 7 sub-races, thus \( 7 \times 7 \times 7 = 343 \) stages of existence, and as each man and woman has been twice incarnated in each stage, we have \( 343 \times 2 = 686 \) as the number of re-incarnations man has had in the seven planets, and, as I understand, this process has been performed seven times in the 'spiral' evolution of the planets, we thus have \( 686 \times 7 = 4802 \) as the number of existences a human soul has in its progress towards a final Nirvana."

The net result of this calculation is somewhat below the actual number of incarnations the human entities, those we mean which have their nobler "affinities" developed, have to pass through before being lost in the "eternal void." Hear what the author says in the book itself. (p. 51):

"Again there is a curious cyclic law which operates to augment the total number of incarnations beyond 686. Each sub-divisional race has a certain extra vitality at its climax, which leads it to throw off an additional off-shoot race at that point in its progress, and again another off-shoot race is developed at the end of the sub-divisional race by its dying momentum, so to speak. Through these races the whole tide of human life passes, and the result is that the actual normal number of incarnations for each monad is not far short of 800."

The number of incarnations suggests the vastness of the
number of years the entities have to complete before their final absorption into Nirvana. This is vaguely referred to in the book, but set forth in an extract presented by Dr. Murdoch from Mr. Sinnett's other writings on the subject. The extract runs thus:—

"At all his 4802 deaths man passes into a paradise of happiness and rest, a 'world of effects,' the average life there being probably 8,000 years between each re-incarnation. Thus the time of man in this world of effects, which is called Devachan, is $4802 \times 8000 = 38,416,000$ years. This seems a very long time, but in a conversation I had on the subject I was informed that, although the Brothers were shy as to giving exact quotations in figures, it was yet understood that the probable duration of a finished soul on the planets was more like 70,000,000."

Man moreover, has to pass through varieties of objective forms and subjective changes during these long, wearisome years. These are indicated in the following extract from the book, which though long is worthy of reproduction, inasmuch as it embodies the germs of esoteric philosophy (p. 115):—

"In the first round therefore we find man, a relatively ethereal being compared even on earth with the state he has now attained here, not intellectual, but super-spiritual. Like the animal and vegetable shapes around him, he inhabits an immense but loosely organized body. In the second round he is still gigantic and ethereal, but growing firmer and more condensed in body—a more physical man, but still less intelligent than spiritual. In the third round he has developed a perfectly concrete and compacted body, at first the form rather of a giant ape than of a true man, but with intelligence coming more and more into the
ascendant. In the last half of the third round his gigantic stature decreases, his body improves in texture, and he begins to be a rational man. In the fourth round, intellect, now fully developed, achieves enormous progress. The direct races with which the round begins, acquire human speech as we understand it. The world teems with the results of intellectual activity and spiritual decline. At the half way point of the forth round, here the polar point of the whole seven-world period is passed. From this point outward the spiritual Ego begins its real struggle with body and mind to manifest its transcendental powers. In the fifth round the struggle continues, but the transcendental faculties are largely developed, though the struggle between these on the one hand with physical intellect and propensity is fiercer than ever, for the intellect of the fifth round as well as its spirituality is an advance on that of the fourth. In the sixth round humanity attains a degree of perfection both of body and soul, of intellect and spirituality, which ordinary mortals of the present epoch will not readily realize in their imaginations. The most supreme combinations of wisdom, goodness and transcendental enlightenment which the world has ever seen or thought of, will represent the ordinary type of manhood. Those faculties which now, in the rare efflorescence of a generation, enable some extraordinarily gifted persons to explore the mysteries of nature and gather the knowledge of which some crumbs are now being offered (through these writings and in other ways) to the ordinary world, will then be the common appanage of all. As to what the seventh round will be like, the most communicative occult teachers are solemnly silent. Mankind in the seventh round will be something altogether too God-like for mankind in the fourth round to forecast its attributes."
It were long and tedious to follow the author through the columns of his vagaries on the disruption at death of the seven constituent principles in man; the reception of the lower ones into atmospheric regions, and of the higher ones into the self-oblivious bliss of paradise or Devachan; the confinement of the magnificently wicked characters, like Satan, as described by Milton, within the dark vaults of A'vitchi or lowest hell; the almost endless series of rebirths determined by the affinities developed in successive incarnations, the solar pralayas occurring after fixed intervals and ending in a universal pralaya, and various other points of subordinate importance. But it would be desirable to dwell a moment longer on the consummation to which we may, according to occult science, look forward. Man in his present condition, that is in the fifth race of the fourth round, prides himself on his intellectual attainments; but he is sadly deficient in spirituality, that is, so far as the development of those latent powers is concerned which will enable him to cognize directly and immediately the varied steps of the great evolutionary process described in the book. But if he shakes off the trammels of his "physical intellectualty," goes through the probations of initiation, becomes a devotee of occult science, and places himself under the training of the unseen school of unseen Mahatmas, he will, as he clears the rounds before him, pass through different degrees of adeptship, and finally develope into a Dhyan Chohan or Planetary Spirit, and be in a position to guide some of the processes of nature. He will continue on this lofty summit of being, possessed of "absolute knowledge" which is emphatically said to be equal to "absolute ignorance," radiant with the glory of absolute benevolence which we suppose is equal to absolute malevolence, and endowed
with power which, as it is limited, cannot, unfortunately, be described as absolute impotence! As the world has continued long, and as innumerable persons have scaled up, either in the natural way or by prematurely developing extraordinary powers, to this height, there are innumerable Dhyan Chohans, who while they regulate the general processes of nature, do not, like the God of the Bible, trench on individual responsibility by controlling the petty details of individual life. "The collective intelligence" of this galaxy of Dhyan Chohans is Avaloketiswara or Addi-Buddha, an abstraction which some writers have mistaken for a concrete personality or a personal god, whose existence is not merely ignored, but emphatically denied. Five of these beatified spirits have, even according to exoteric doctrine, appeared in times of general degeneracy, on the stage of history, as Buddhas, to substitute spirituality for intellectuality; and the last of these, Sakya Muni, had to re-incarnate himself in the person of Sankara Acharya to rectify the disorders arising from the indiscreet, but benevolent zeal with which he had in his first incarnation invited the lower orders of society to the privilege of occult study; to reconcile all that is durable in Hindu thought with his own peculiar teaching, and establish monasteries for the spiritual advancement of initiates and adepts; while the masses were left as they could not but be, to "amuse themselves with their mythologies."

This is the creed of Esoteric Buddhism or Theosophy, the initiation probations are its ceremonies, and the organized efforts put forth to ensure its propagation make the society it represents a propaganda! The short history of this movement gives the lie to every one of the smooth professions which are thrown out as baits by Col. Olcott and Co.
Mr. Lillie in the remarks quoted by Dr. Murdoch, in the pamphlet referred to, affirms that the system unfolded in the book under review is "not Buddhism." It must be confessed that there are points of contact between it and Buddhism specially that of the north, in which form of that Proteus-like faith we see one of the earliest attempts made to reconcile Hindu Pantheism with Buddhistic materialism. For instance, the theory of a primal substance evolving in its creative fits world after world in endless succession, and lying perfectly indolent in its seasons of repose, is the basis of all Buddhistic speculations, derived as it originally was by Buddha himself from the Sankhya philosophy. The theory of *Karma* as the cause or parent source of successive incarnations, and the ready expedient utilized in explaining the evils of existence or the problems of sin and misery is Buddhistic as well as Hindu. And the idea of an Arhat Buddha or Dhyan Chohan evolved from man by means of self-control and meditation is a characteristic feature of the northern type, specially, of this subtle, cameleon-like faith. In support of this assertion many quotations might be made from "The Lotus of the True Law" recently translated by W. Kern and published in the series of Max Muller's "Sacred Books of the East;" but one will suffice:—(p. 195). Says Buddha, called the Sugata,—

"It is by learning from them this course (of duty) that *Kotis* of beings arrive at full ripeness, who, (at first) lowly disposed and somewhat lazy, in course of time all become Buddhas."

The system, however, differs from Buddhism, which emphatically denies the existence of the human soul or a permanent centre of the aggregates (skandhas) constituting man, in its assumption of a permanent entity or life-wave
beneath the ever-shifting forms of the all but endless chain of transmigration. But here again an attempt at reconciliation is made in its recognized distinction between personality and individuality; the former being represented as temporary and changeable, and the latter as permanent and immutable. Add to all this its doctrine of annihilation, and the resemblance between the two systems is almost complete.

Yet, even in view of the points of resemblance between the two systems, it must be admitted that Theosophy, called in the book *Esoteric Buddhism*, represents a congeries of systems, rather than a consistent, coherent theory; and its vacillation or heterogeneity proceeds from a desire on the part of its advocates to please everybody but the Christian. It, in the first place, embodies an attempt to reconcile the rank materialism of Buddhistic philosophy with the varied phases of pantheistic thought represented by the Vedantic schools, the *Parinama* or transformation theory of the Upanishads as well as the *maya* or illusion theory of Sankara Acharya, whom with inimitable impudence it represents as the second incarnation of Sakya Sinha, the last of the Buddhas that have appeared from time to time to regenerate society. It, moreover, conciliates the masses of our countrymen, as well as of Ceylon and Burma, by discovering an esoteric meaning in the mythologies in which they believe, and the current types of superstition which they uphold. The only religion its champions cannot bear the sight of is Christianity, and we are glad that their antipathy to our religion is so inveterate and implacable. If men like Col. Olcott and women like Madame Blavatsky were in favor of Christianity, our faith in it would receive a rude shock!
II. Our second point, viz., the ground on which Esoteric Buddhism rests its claims to acceptance, may be disposed of in a few words. The whole thing, the entire tissue of fictions and vagaries is a revelation which we are called upon to receive with implicit, unquestioning faith. The difference between the oriental and the occidental method of teaching is pointed out distinctly in the opening chapter of the book; and the latter is justly represented as encouraging what may be called the human propensity to enquire, to question, to court explanation and demand proof; while the former simply displays authority and commands belief. The esoteric science is communicated by oriental teachers, and all tendency to enquire into its nature or question its reasonableness must be nipped in the bud. The student must receive it with his hat in his hand, and practice what it enjoins, and then, when his eyes are opened and his latent powers developed, he will be in a position to prove what he has now to swallow unproved. It will, however, be some time before the world will cast off what stands on solid evidence, and accept with implicit confidence, a revelation vouchsafed by Mahatmas whose existence is problematical, through the instrumentality of persons whose honesty is rendered doubtful by recent disclosures.

III. And lastly, we need not dwell long on the boasted achievements of Esoteric Buddhism. The credulity with which the author swallows not merely the provisional hypotheses, but the wildest speculations of science, is marvellous indeed. The Darwinian theory of the descent of man from certain original living germs created by God is rejected as incompatible with Mr. Sinnett's bold negation of a Personal Deity, but the improvement upon it attempted
by his atheistic followers is received with open arms, and an attempt is made to explain the missing links by the simple assertion that the intermediate forms, the complete disappearance of which is a puzzling problem, were animated by circumundulating life-waves, and left to perish when no longer needed. This explanation reminds one of an attempt made by an indigenous teacher to explain the sentence "A verb must agree with its noun in number, gender and person" by simply repeating it, and emphasizing the word "must." The esoteric doctrine reconcile what esoteric doctrine calls divine sovereignty with human responsibility, by affirming that while nature regulates and controls the grand processes of evolution, man is left under certain conditions free to choose and act. What a grand discovery is this? The author laughs at the idea of a super-intending Providence watching the petty details of our daily life, but at the same time maintains that "there is no such thing as indifference to small things in Chemistry or Mechanics." John Stuart Mill's great difficulty of reconciling omnipotence with boundless benevolence in the Deity is easily obviated by a reproduction of that philosopher's assumption of a God of limited power and infinite good will, such a being incarnated in the innumerable company of Dhyan Chohans or Dhyani-Buddhas. And lastly, grand localities have been discovered for the growth and decay of pre-historic civilizations in the lost Atlantis and the lost Lemurias or the great Continent submerged in the Indian Ocean. Is not all this what the Bombay Guardian emphatically calls a "hoax?"

Now what can be the influence of such a book on our educated countrymen whom we love in the proportion we hate all attempts made by unscrupulous men to lead them astray?
Here we have a Personal God emphatically denied, and so that principle of philosophic fairness, which has, specially since the days of John Foster, been universally considered inconsistent with the attitude of disbelief as contradistinguished from unbelief, presumptuously set aside. Here we have every type of positive religion rejected, and Christianity pilloried; our religious necessities ignored, our religious feelings scandalized, and our religious aspirations laughed at. Here we have the prestige of morality wered inasmuch as, though commended, it is represented as occupying a plane much lower than that of immediate perception of occult truth. And here we have all the notorious frauds of spiritualism consecrated. In view of the mischief it is doing and likely to do, it is impossible for us to speak of the book except in terms expressive of our abhorrence of its tone of flippancy, impiety and blasphemy.

Note by the Editor.

Mr. Sinnett professes to give in his book pure undiluted truth as received directly at the hands of "those great beings, the perfected efflorescence of former humanity." As most, almost all, is not only unverified by any evidence or show of evidence, but absolutely unverifiable, it is a positive relief to come across a passage, even a negative one, that can be brought to the test of fact. Here is the only one we remember to have met. Mr. Sinnett says very authoritatively (p. 205.) :

"Never in any authentic Buddhist writings will any support be found for the notion that any human creature, once having attained manhood, falls back into the animal kingdom."

This is so contrary to the Hindu theory of transmigration
and to all we had read of Buddhism that we at once concluded that Mr. Sinnett must have been napping, or that "those great beings" must have been "physically very tire by a ride of 48 hours consecutively," Koot Hoomi's explanation or excuse for plagiarism. So we turned up "Si-yu-ki: Buddhist Records of the Western World," vol. ii. p. 78, which we had just been reading, and where will be found the following instructive, albeit mythical story, concerning no less a personage than Buddha himself:—

There were some 500 fishermen who joined in partnership to fish in the river Gundak. In doing so they caught a great fish with eighteen heads. Each head had two eyes. They at once resolved on killing the monster. Buddha supernaturally observing what they were intent on, resolved on using the opportunity as a means of converting and guiding the fishermen. He accordingly addressed them thus:—"Kill not that fish. By my spiritual power I will open the way for the exercise of expediency, and cause this great fish to know its former kind of life. In order to this I will cause it to speak in human language, and truly to exhibit human affections." On being questioned the fish accordingly stated that formerly by the merit he had gained, he was born in a noble family as the Brahman, Kapitha. Relying on his high origin he insulted other persons, and on his extensive knowledge he despised all books and rules, and with a supercilious heart reviled the Buddhists with opprobrious words, and ridiculed their priests by comparing them to every kind of brute beast, as the ass, or the mule, or the elephant, or the horse, and every unsightly form. In return for all this, he acknowledged that he received this monstrous fishy body. He expresses however his gratitude that he is born in Buddha's time, permitted to see his sacred
form, to receive instruction at his hands and privileged to confess his former misdeeds and make due repentance.

Buddha at once instructed and converted him by wisely opening his understanding. The fish then expired and was born in heaven.

Buddha then directed the attention of the fishermen to his doctrines, and preached to them also the principles of Buddhism. They were all forthwith enlightened. Repenting of their faults, they destroyed their nets, burnt their boats, assuming the religious yellow robes, came out of the reach of worldly influences, and died in the odour of sanctity."

By this teaching Buddha not only obtain new followers, but succeeds in throwing a good deal of odium on a distinguished Brahman enemy who had no doubt lately died; while at the same time he kindly sends him to heaven.

Editor, I. E. R.

THE END.