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NOTES.

NOTE ON A PASSAGE IN THE GORGIAS OF PLATO.

In the Gorgias, p. 497A, the following passage occurs:

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα τὸ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εὖ πράττειν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀνιᾶσθαι κακῶς ; ὥστε ἕτερον γίγνεται τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

ΚΑΔ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ἄττα σοφίζει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οἶσθα, ἀλλ' ἀκκίξει, ὦ Καλλίκλεις. καὶ πρόϊθι γ' ἔτι εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν, ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς, ἴν' εἰδῆς ὡς σοφὸς ὢν με νουθετεῖς. οὐχ ἅμα διψῶν τε ἕκαστος ἡμῶν πέπανται καὶ ἅμα ἠδόμενος διὰ τοῦ πίνειν ;

ΚΑΔ. Οὐκ οἶδα ὅτι λέγεις.

The difficulty in this passage lies in the clause *ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς* of the second *ῥῆσις* of Sokrates. Remove these words from their place in the sentence and you have a clear and appropriate sense : "This is pretending, Kallikles ; you know well enough. Yes, and keep right on a while longer and you will know how wise a man you are who try to set me right." *Πρόϊθι*—*εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν* here means, as the context shows, and as Dr. Thompson well renders, "Answer a few more questions." Now, as the phrase *ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς* stands, *ὅτι* cannot be the conjunction of indirect discourse, for some word, *λέγων*, *ἀποκρινόμενος* or the like, would be required for it to depend upon ; nor can it be the relative *ὅτι*, and to give it the force of 'because' is to introduce a reason where none is required and where too it would be utterly misplaced.

Three solutions of the difficulty, and so far as I know, only three, have been proposed. 1. To strike the words out altogether. 2. To alter the distribution of the dialogue by giving the words from *καὶ πρόϊθι* to *νουθετεῖς* inclusive to Kallikles, on the ground that *ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς* comes more appropriately from him. 3. To transfer the words to the second *ῥῆσις* of Kallikles, substituting *ἔχων ληρεῖς* for *λέγεις*.

To the first Dr. Woolsey reasonably objects "That *ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς*, a choice Attic expression, has not the air of a gloss, and it is not easy to say what it is a gloss upon."

To the second Dr. Thompson objects that "Even so the clause *ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς* is in the way : nor is there much point in the next

clause, ἵν' εἰδῆς, as coming from Callicles. In the mouth of Socrates it is an apt retort to οὐκ οἶδ' ἅπτα σοφίζει, as if he had said, 'You blame me διὰ τὸ σοφίζεσθαι, answer a few more questions and you will discover that γοῦ are no σοφός.' And Dr. Woolsey says: "As Callicles wishes to break off the discourse, πρόθι εἰς τοῦμπροσθεν is not what *he* would say."

There remains the third proposition, which Dr. Thompson seems inclined to adopt, thinking the phrase "comes more naturally from Callicles." But is there no other place nearer hand to which the words may be transferred? And can they not be retained in the ῥῆσις of Sokrates? I venture to answer these questions in the affirmative. Why not place these troublesome words after νουθετεῖς? ὅτι could then be taken as the conjunction of indirect discourse, dependent upon the idea of saying implied in νουθετεῖς. In this case the conjunction would have the function of the inverted commas in English, and the subject of ληρεῖς would be Sokrates, not Kallikles. The sense would be: "Answer a few more questions and you will know what wisdom is yours who try to set me right by saying 'you are talking nonsense.'" Does this sense suit the context? Dr. Woolsey says: "νουθετεῖς can only point at the advice given by Callicles to Sokrates," on pp. 484-486. Doubtless there is an allusion to that advice; but subsequently in 488A, just before beginning his "dialectical attack" upon the position of Kallikles that natural and conventional justice were different things, Sokrates says: σὺ οὖν, ὥσπερ ἤρξω νουθετεῖν με, μὴ ἀποστῆς, ἀλλ' ἱκανῶς μοι ἔνδειξαι τί ἐστὶ τοῦτο ὃ ἐπιτηδευτέον μοι, καὶ τίνα τρόπον κτησαίμην ἂν αὐτό, and again, in 489D, Sokrates says: καί, ὦ θανμάσιε, πραότερόν με προδίδασκε, ἵνα μὴ ἀποφοιτήσω παρὰ σοῦ. This is Socratic irony, of course, but Kallikles, though his reply to this last (εἰρωνεύει, ὦ Σώκρατες) shows he felt the irony, still keeps up the superior tone of the practical man of the world in the presence of the pedantic philosopher. Of what sort then was the νουθέτησις of Kallikles in response to the above-quoted request of Sokrates? In 489B he says: οὔτοσιν ἀνὴρ οὐ παύσεται φλυαρῶν. εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχρύνει, τηλικούτος ὢν, ὀνόματα θηρεύων. In 490C: Σιτία λέγεις καὶ ποτὰ καὶ ἰατροὺς καὶ φλυαρίας. 490E: ποῖα ὑποδήματα φλυαρεῖς ἔχων; and just below ὡς αἰ ταῦτὰ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. In 491E: ὡς ἡδὺς εἶ! In 492C he winds up his tirade against temperance thus: τρυφή καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ ἐλευθερία, ἐὰν ἐπικουρίαν ἔχῃ, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ τε καὶ εὐδαιμονία· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ καλλωπίσματα, τὰ παρὰ φύσιν συνθήματα, ἀνθρώπων φλυαρία καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξια. 494D: ὡς ἄτοπος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς δημηγόρος. 494E:

οὐκ αἰσχύνει εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγων, ὃ Σώκρατες, τοὺς λόγους. Finally, in the present passage: οὐκ οἶδ' ἅπτα σοφίζει, ὃ Σώκρατες. In all of these cases the tone is the same; φλυαρία, φλυαρεῖν, or words of similar import are the only replies that come to the lips of Kallikles when pressed by the arguments of his opponent; they form the substance of the *νουθέτησις*, "the setting right" which Sokrates had asked of him. Sokrates had already rebuked Kallikles, but had in doing so alluded only to the peculiarities of his attitude at the moment; now the rebuke applies to the general tone assumed by Kallikles throughout the argument, and in what way could this, in the light of the expressions I have cited, be better done than by saying ἴν' εἰδῆς ὡς σοφὸς ὦν με νουθεεῖς ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς?

Dr. Thompson remarks also, that the question οὐχ ἄμα κ. τ. λ., "comes in abruptly." "We should have expected," he says, "Πρόειμι δῆ, or some such prefatory formula." A particle of transition, it seems to me, would answer the purpose quite as well, and I suggest the insertion of ἀλλ' before οὐχ ἄμα. Compare 494E: Ἡ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἄγω ἐνταῦθα, ὃ γενναῖε, ἢ ἐκείνος ὃς ἂν φῆ ἀνέδην οὕτω τοὺς χαίροντας, ὅπως ἂν χαίρωσιν, εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, καὶ μὴ διορίζηται τῶν ἡδονῶν ὅποια ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά; ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν λέγε, πότερον φῆς εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθὸν κ. τ. λ. Here, after rebuking Kallikles for the charge he had made, Sokrates resumes the discussion, introducing his question by the use of ἀλλά. Just below, 495 A: οὐ τοίνυν ὀρθῶς ποιῶ οὐτ' ἐγὼ, εἴπερ ποιῶ τοῦτο, οὔτε σύ, ἀλλ' ὃ μακάριε, ἄθρει μὴ οὐ τοῦτο ἢ τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ πάντως χαίρειν, κ. τ. λ. Here also ἀλλά introduces the resumption of the interrupted argument. May not the same word have been used in the passage before us? Supposing that the sentence originally ran ἀλλ' οὐχ ἄμα κ. τ. λ., it is not difficult to account for the disappearance of ἀλλ'; ΔΛ might easily be mistaken for Μ, and some would-be corrector, reading, as he supposed, ἄμ' οὐχ ἄμα κ. τ. λ., would quite naturally strike out ἄμ' as tautological. For these reasons I suggest the reading: καὶ πρόϊθι γ' ἔτι εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν, ἵνα εἰδῆς ὡς σοφὸς ὦν με νουθεεῖς ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς. ἀλλ' οὐχ ἄμα διψῶν τε ἕκαστος ἡμῶν πέπανται καὶ ἄμα ἡδόμενος διὰ τοῦ πίνειν;

W. A. LAMBERTON.