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largely by association. At any rate, Wundt's theory must certainly be reckoned with.

Dr. King's identification of many early religious practices and ideas with the social activities of the group, and his explanation of their *original* ultimateness in value by the ultimateness of the group for the interest and experience of the individual at that time, seems to me well-founded. But I do not believe that by itself it will explain the nature of all religious *ideas*, especially the later ones, any more than an account of the origin of some æsthetic values in mimes and dances as social activities, let us say, explains the development of a sense of the sublime or beautiful in nature. Those who do not regard the 'instrumental' view as an adequate account of mind will naturally be disposed to allow more to that '*metaphysisches Bedürfniss*' of which Schopenhauer speaks in a similar connection. The theoretical interest certainly plays an important part in the history of religious ideas, and not all of religion belongs to the habitual side of mind. Dr. King points out the great share taken by 'reflection' in developing the more advanced 'historical' religions. Some consideration of the nature of 'reflection,' as an activity which interprets its objects rather than responds to them, might go far to establish a continuity in the various lines of the religious evolution which would not reside chiefly in a physical or social 'background' or 'environment' of the religious mind, and to justify a metaphysics as well as a psychology of religion—since it would show that there are other modes of explanation besides efficient causation. But this issue is too fundamental for discussion here.

The book is well and accurately printed. The note on page 13, which evidently was at first in the body of the text, should be restored to its original position, as its absence leaves an hiatus there. Sir Alfred Lyall is referred to in the Index, and on pages 191 and 248, as 'Charles.'

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Knowledge, Life and Reality; An Essay in Systematic Philosophy.

By GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD. New York, Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1909.—pp. x, 549.

The new book by Professor Ladd makes no profession of adding anything radically new or distinctive to the body of thought already worked out by this author in much detail throughout a series of well-known volumes. Nevertheless, it has a genuine and significant place to fill on the shelf of the *corpus Laddicum*. It is not only a sort of *omnium gatherum*, drawing all portions of the system into the conspectus of a single volume, but it is also in some sense a message to the gentiles, since its style and arrangement are designed to make it less formidable to the unwary than

are more special discussions. The author says: "Several of these have been designedly technical and elaborate treatises of particular departments of philosophy. But in this one volume I am putting into semi-popular form the system of reflective thinking which has been evolved and published previously in separate volumes. The reader who requires a more detailed exposition and defense of this system should study it in these monographs. To them, however, not infrequent reference has been made in the present volume." Accordingly, a survey of the table of contents shows that the material of this book is distributed among the special departments which Professor Ladd has already treated, assigning about three or four chapters to a department. The direct quotations, while sometimes rather extensive, are on the whole less in evidence than might have been anticipated. The general plan of the work suggests in some ways that of the *Introduction to Philosophy*. And this also is an introduction to philosophy. The main differences between the two turn upon the fact that the earlier volume was before the elaboration, and the present one after the detailed development of Professor Ladd's system. True the reader need not be already acquainted with that system; but the book is written with close reference to the form in which the discussions stand on many hundreds of printed pages.

Our estimation of the present book will turn to an unusual degree, then, upon the significance which we find in Professor Ladd's philosophical work taken as a whole. From the standpoint of encyclopedic completeness and attention to empirical science, his system is comparable to that of another great system-maker, Herbert Spencer. The comparison is suggestive. Herbert Spencer has received a great deal of attention from all the world, and is especially well known to students of science. Yet there can be little doubt that Professor Ladd's work is based upon a richer, sounder, and more critical treatment of the various branches of science which are relevant to its issues, and it is incomparably more competent in its treatment of the major metaphysical ideas involved in a philosophical synthesis. But it is more sober, balanced, considerate of all interests, and home-staying. It does not turn the entire cultural universe upside down. And therefore it makes little noise. Perhaps it should be urged more strongly upon the attention of scientific students who seek some reasoned discussion of the import of a philosophical synthesis in touch with the empirical sciences. At any rate its experimental character is far more genuine than that of Spencer.

When compared with the systematic work of trained metaphysicians, however, and especially of those trained in the dialectic of the Hegelian school, Professor Ladd's writings exhibit a noteworthy contrast. The dialectic is less forceful. It can almost be said that these writings do

not try to prove things. They do, indeed, state matters in such a way, and manage the discussion to such an effect, as to make the faith in higher categories seem reasonable and justifiable. The characteristic Laddian bond of inference is rather well expressed in the present volume (p. 193) as follows: "And now, gathering together the conclusions which seem suggested, if not forced upon the mind by an attempt to interpret the significance of the categories, we affirm," etc. If the reader's faith and hope are already determined in the same direction as that of the author, the discussion may give both insight and the consciousness of a fair measure of rationality. In the face of sharp adverse criticism, however, more powerful weapons are needed. Of course it is possible to retort that the appearance of greater stringency in the dialectic of the disciples of Hegel is delusive, and that the gentle persuasiveness of philosophical insight is more fairly interpreted by the more modest and demure manner of Ladd. But at any rate the contrast is sufficiently genuine, and reveals Professor Ladd's writings as less efficient representatives of *philosophia militans*.

In regard to content of teaching, this writer is noteworthy for the many sidedness and sanity of his system. His realism is of a type which enables him to engage closely with the sturdy dogmas of common sense, and yet he can appropriate the higher idealism of German metaphysical speculation. The student whose insight has been borne on to the more reflective concepts of philosophy may be irked by the frequent appearance of "selves and things" on Professor Ladd's pages; but it is needful to remember the penalties which philosophy has paid by reason of too violent a breach with common sense. The sense of illusion which so much of metaphysical discussion carries with it is both unnecessary, false, and harmful; and the phenomenalism which strives to fixate this illusionism into a philosophical dogma is theoretically indefensible. The insistence upon the ontological character of even ordinary perception, as well as of the scientific judgment, is compatible with the highest reaches of philosophical idealism; and it is the merit of this author to have maintained such compatibility with a steady hand. Especially in the middle reaches of a philosophical student's reflections, discussions of the type and spirit presented by Professor Ladd are of service.

In point of literary style the present volume is somewhat less difficult than some of the others. It remains true, however, that a considerable amount of serious purpose is presupposed in the reader, and also that this writer does not attain the verve of philosophical expression which a very few men, inferior perhaps in point of sanity of thought and judgment, are able to display.

E. L. HINMAN.