THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

NEWMAN
THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

WITH AN INTRODUCTION, TWO PREFATORY ESSAYS
AND NOTES CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY

BY

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VOLUME III

TWO ESSAYS
BOOKS III, IV, AND V—TEXT AND NOTES

Oxford
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
1902

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PREFACE

TO THE THIRD AND FOURTH VOLUMES.

My first words must be words of regret. The lamented death of Professor Susemihl not many months ago, which no one deplores more than I do, leaves a great gap in the ranks of Aristotelian scholars. His learning, his industry and powers of work, his thoroughness, and his acuteness will long be missed. The students of Aristotle's writings have abundant cause to be grateful to him, and none more so than myself. Even when I have differed from him most, I have always found his views suggestive and instructive. It was from him that I first learnt what the close study of a work of Aristotle's meant.

Of the friends who gave me assistance in the revision of the proofs of my first two volumes three—Mr. Alfred Robinson, Mr. R. L. Nettleship, and Mr. Evelyn Abbott—are, to my deep regret, no more. I have especially often missed the valued help of Mr. Alfred Robinson, whose death several years ago was a great loss to many besides myself.

Owing to weak health, the Warden of Wadham, Mr. G. E. Thorley, has, unfortunately for me, been unable to give me the assistance which he kindly gave me in the revision of the proofs of the first two volumes. Professor Bywater's suggestions have been but few—far fewer than I could have wished—but, on the other hand, I have gained a new and very valuable ally in Mr. Herbert Richards, whose Greek scholarship needs no
commendation from me, and who has most kindly found
time to peruse all the proofs of the explanatory notes con-
tained in the third and fourth volumes and to give me
the benefit of his comments on them, which have been,
I need not say, of great use to me, though I am alone
responsible for the views expressed in this work. The
references in the General Index under the name of
Mr. Richards will suffice to show how many valuable
suggestions I owe to him. For emendations of the text
and transpositions not explicitly attributed to him I am
responsible.

In five or six of the Additions and Corrections to
Vols. I, II, and III placed at the end of Vol. III I have
profited by some remarks on my commentary on the first
two Books kindly sent me by Prof. Robinson Ellis in 1888
shortly after its appearance.

To all who have assisted me with information or
suggestions in the correction of the proofs, and among
them to the readers of the Press, my best thanks are due.

To Mr. F. G. Kenyon I am greatly indebted for the
collation of MS. Harl. 6874 which I publish in an Appendix
to my third volume. Many students have had cause to
testify to his unvarying kindness and readiness to assist,
and I can add my emphatic testimony to theirs.

I have not carried my collation of the Politics in O¹
(MS. 112, Corpus Christi College, Oxford) beyond the first
two Books, but I have completed my collation of MS.
Phillipps 891 (z), a manuscript of William of Moerbeke's
Latin Translation which, as will be seen from my critical
notes (see for instance those on 1306 a 24 and 1315 b 31),
ocasionally offers excellent readings, found in no other
MS. of the Latin Translation hitherto collated. It is
throughout akin to a, though it sometimes differs from a,
but the original reading of a has often been erased by
a corrector, and where this has happened, the original
reading of z commonly remains intact and furnishes a probable clue to the original reading of a. I have again to thank the owner of the Phillipps Library, Cheltenham, for giving me every facility for the collation of this MS.

A list of the symbols and abbreviations used in the work will be found at the end of the fourth volume.

In my third and fourth volumes I have been able to refer to the English translation by Messrs. Costelloe and Muirhead of the volume of Zeller's Philosophie der Griechen which relates to Aristotle, and to the English translation by Messrs. Brooks and Nicklin of the first volume of Gilbert's Handbuch der griechischen Staatsalterthümer. The first volume of Gerth's edition of the Syntax of Kühner's Greek Grammar did not appear till my revision of the proofs of the third volume was almost completed. My references to Dittenberger's Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum are for a similar reason mostly to the first edition. The references in the first two volumes to Meisterhans, Grammatik der attischen Inschriften are to the first edition of the work, those in the third and fourth to the second edition, published in 1888.

November, 1901.
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ON THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE POLITICS AND THE LATIN TRANSLATION OF WILLIAM OF MOERBEKE. II.

The following remarks are in continuation of those contained in vol. ii. p. xli sqq. My object in them has especially been to study the characteristics of the two families into which the MSS. of the Politics fall and the errors to which they are most liable, and also to throw light on the methods of translation adopted in the vetus versio, in the hope that these inquiries may help us to discover the true reading in the many cases in which the MSS. of the two families offer different readings.

It has long been observed (see vol. ii. p. lvii) that the MSS. of the first family (Π₁) are prone to omit both sentences and words. These omissions occur less often in some Books than in others. They are less numerous in the Sixth (old Fourth), the Seventh (old Fifth), and the Eighth (old Sixth) than in the other Books. Very few omissions occur between 1326 b and 1330 a (inclusive of these columns), none in 1332 b and 1333 a, 1334 a, 1338 a, and 1340 a.

Sentences are omitted in Π₁ owing to a similarity of ending in 1253 b 25, 1275 a 28, 1287 b 38, 1337 a 29, b 25, and 1299 a 8, owing to a similarity of the beginning in 1324 b 28 and 1311 b 37, and for no clear reason in 1275 a 11 and 1331 a 21.

Single words are still more often omitted in Π₁, and
especially small words, as I have pointed out in Class. Rev. 7. 305 (1893). Out of 184 omissions in Π1 117 are omis-
sions of words of one syllable. 'If I do not err, καὶ is
omitted in Π1 twenty-four times in the course of the Poli-
tics, μὲν eight and δὲ nine times, τοὺς and its parts six times,
evai five times, ἄν five times, and ἕκ thrice. M* Π1 omit
the article thirty-five times, and τὸ eight times, and very possibly
Γ did the like, though of this we cannot be sure, for the Vetus
Interpres seldom renders τὸ, and, writing in Latin, of course
seldom renders the article (Class. Rev. ibid.). Π1 are par-

cially prone to omit ἃ, καὶ, and the article, where these
small words are repeated near together. See as to ἃ 1268 a
6, 1282 a 17, 1324 b 30, 1298 b 32, and 1305 a 32 (it is in
these passages only that ἃ is omitted in Π1); as to καὶ
1253 a 1, 25, 1255 a 5, 1259 b 31, 1260 b 17, 1263 a 23,
1264 a 16, 1317 b 6; as to the article 1265 a 12, 1266 b 3,
1268 a 17, 1269 a 38, 1272 b 28, 1279 a 34, 1282 a 40, 1285 a
6, 1325 a 8, 1331 b 5, 8, 1332 a 22, 1316 a 36.

Nor is it only sentences and words that Π1 are apt to
omit. These MSS. often omit syllables, mostly the first
or last syllables of words—the first in 1262 a 30, 1273 a 10,
1283 a 11 (here, however, the ἀν- of ἀνισότητα is omitted
because πᾶσαι precedes), 1285 b 36, 1342 b 32, and 1298 a
31; the last in 1268 b 16, 1276 b 20, 1278 b 40, 1283 b 20,
1287 b 19, 1335 b 35, and 1315 a 15. In 1336 b 20 and
1300 b 28 the first two syllables are omitted in Π1. In
1335 b 4 and 1317 a 36 a syllable or more than a syllable
is omitted from the middle of the word. The first letter
of a word is clearly omitted in Π1 in 1324 b 30 and 1315 b
18, and probably in 1265 b 19, 1297 b 7, and 1320 a 29;
the last letter often disappears, especially when it is a ν or
s (see 1255 a 39, 1265 b 21, 1267 b 40, 1337 b 41, 1297 a 17,
1300 a 32, 1308 b 25, and 1309 a 31). On the other hand,
two or three words are repeated in Π1 in 1333 b 38 and
1297 a 24.

Omissions, etc. in Π2. Many omissions occur in Π2 also, and some of them are
omissions of a sentence or of more sentences than one.
POLITICS AND THE VETUS VERSIO. II.

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Such omissions occur in 1334 a 37, 1337 b 16–20, 34–35, 1298 a 6, 1301 a 30–31, 1307 b 32–34, but they are easily explained, for they are caused by a similarity of ending. In 1292 b 32, if Π² are wrong in omitting the sentence omitted, they have not this excuse. In 1336 b 18 the words omitted by Π² are probably rightly omitted. Omissions of two words occur in 1285 b 16 (αὶ πάτρου), 1326 b 32 (τὸν ὅρον), and 1335 a 37 (δεῖ χρῆσθαι): at least it seems likely that Π² are wrong in omitting these words. Omissions of a single word occur in 1259 a 37 (μέρη), 1276 a 33 (ἐθνος), 1288 b 16 (ἐγγον), 27 (ἀγαθοῦ), 1306 a 6 (ἐθέος), and perhaps in 1304 b 6, where αἰτία may have dropped out after αἰ.

Omissions of small words, and especially of καὶ and the article, are frequent in Π², though not nearly as frequent as in Π¹. Omissions of a syllable occur in Π² in 1294 b 26 (ἀδηλος for διάδηλος), 1314 b 7 (δόξει for δόξειεν), and 1320 a 38 (οὐναθροίζων Π¹, ἀθροίζων Π²). It is not often that Π² can clearly be shown to omit a letter.

We note in Π² a certain tendency to substitute ο for ω (e.g. in 1269 a 23, 1274 b 13, 1286 a 37, 1294 b 38, 1302 b 6, and 1317 a 39), and these MSS. substitute ου for ω in 1273 a 9 and 1314 a 18, and ω for ου in 1301 a 38 and 1307 a 38.

In five passages Π² have the aorist infinitive, while Π¹ (or at any rate Μ⁴ Π¹, for the reading of Γ is uncertain) have the present infinitive. These passages are 1260 b 36, 1267 a 35, 1284 a 5, 1332 b 1, and 1317 a 36.

Some errors in the MSS. go back to an early date; thus the errors of φιλητία for φιλητία in Π¹ (1271 a 27, 1272 a 2, b 34), of Οὐσίων, Οὐσία for Οὐσίων, Οὐσία in Π¹ (1285 b 10, 16), and of Δεῖ for Ἄεί in Π (1296 b 7) no doubt originated in days when uncialss were in use.

Errors shared by all the MSS. and the Vetus Interpres must also have originated early. Under this head fall—

1274 b 7, ἐπίσκεψιν for ἐπίσκηψιν
1275 b 39, καὶ for καν
1276 b 9, λέγομεν for λέγομεν (or has ἄν been omitted?)
ON THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE

1278 a 34, αὐτῶν for ἀστῶν (αὐτῶν ΓΠ, but ἀστῶν Vat. Pal. and Codex Hamilton)
1280 b 4, ἀδικήσασιν for ἀδικήσουσιν
1287 a 4, βασιλεῖας for πολιτείας (Julian seems to have read βασιλεῖας: see critical note)
1324 b 37, δεσπόζον for δεσποστόν
1327 a 21, πολεμίου for πολέμους
32, ὑπάρχουν for ὑπάρχουτα
1337 a 1, καλῶς for κακῶς
1296 a 9, πολιτείων for πολιτῶν
1300 a 2, ἢ ἡ μοθός for ἡ μοθῷ
1306 a 30, σάμου for σύμου
1317 b 41, ἐπὶ for ἐτε.

Errors which we find in all extant MSS., though they were probably not present in the Greek text used by the Vetus Interpres, will also be of early date. Under this head fall—

1260 b 41, ἢστης for ἐς ὅ τῆς
1266 b 2, δὴ or δὲ for δ' ἤδη
1278 b 20, περὶ for παρὰ
1283 a 7, ὑπερέχειν for ὑπερέχει.

Confusions of letters.

The mistakes which have given rise to these erroneous readings are mistakes easily made, and they frequently recur in the MSS. of the Politics. We often note a confusion of ε and η (as in 1274 b 7), of ι and ει (as in 1260 b 41), of ο and ου (as in 1280 b 4), of παρά and περὶ (as in 1278 b 201), of πόλις, πολιτής, and πολιτεία (as in 1296 a 9), of πολέμους and πολέμιους (as in 1327 a 21). For the interchange of καὶ and καὶ reference may be made to 1282 b 8 and 1290 a 1, for that of ο and οι in 1276 b 9 to 1271 a 40 and to Vat. Pal. in 1275 b 10, and for that of καλῶς and κακῶς to 1294 a 7, while the change of ἀστῶν into αὐτῶν, of Σίμου into Σάμου, and of ἐτε into ἐπι needs no explanation. The substitution of ὑπάρχουν for ὑπάρχουτα is probably due to the omission of a τ over the last syllable of ὑπάρχουν. That of δεσπόζον for δεσποστόν appears to point to a confusion of στ and ζ. The erroneous readings in the four

1 This error may probably be due to the misreading of a contraction.
remaining passages (1287 a 4, 1300 a 2, 1266 b 2, 1283 a 7) are easily explainable.

Among other confusions of letters which are of frequent occurrence in the Politics may be mentioned those of α with αη (1290 b 19, 1309 b 37, 1318 a 3, 1322 b 37), of ας with ου (1268 a 11, 1274 b 14, 1285 a 24, b 5, 1339 a 1, 1294 a 37, 1313 b 39), of αυ with ου (1274 a 4, 1280 a 29, 1338 a 31), of ους with ους (1292 b 36, 1309 b 14) and perhaps with ωυ (1272 a 29, b 16, 1302 b 30), of α with ου, which occurs in 1288 a 15 not only in Π², but also in Vat. Pal., and of η with ει and ο with ω and ωυ, which are too common to need illustration.

The variations of reading hitherto noticed have been due to errors of transcription, but many variations of reading in the MSS. are evidently due not to this cause, but to the occasional use in the MSS. copied by the scribes, or perhaps in the archetype, of ambiguous contractions or contractions easily misread or misinterpreted. Just as in the first of the four handwritings of the papyrus of the Πολυτελα ο written above the line stands indiscriminately for -οι -ου -ου -ος and -ους (see Sandys, 'Aθ. Πολ. p. xxxvi), so in the MSS. from which the existing MSS. of the Politics were copied the terminations of words, and especially of common words like the cases of αυτός and ουτος, were probably often represented by ambiguous contractions.

In 1337 a 28, where the true reading is αυτώ, Μ* has αυ with τ added over it, and it is very likely that the Vetus Interpres found the same contraction in the Greek text used by him and took it to represent αυτων, for his rendering is ἰπσοῦν. The next word in the same line is variously given by Π³ Π² as αυτο, by Μ* as αυτω, and by Γ Π¹ as αυτω, the fact probably being that the writers of all these MSS. had before them an ambiguous contraction (perhaps αυ with τ over it). So in 1312 b 9 Π²-³ have αυ with τ over it, and the other MSS. make more or less successful attempts to interpret this contraction, Γ Π¹ having αυτης rightly, Μ* αυτης, Π⁴ Ald. αυτο, and so forth. The same
thing holds of ὄντως. In 1297 a 1 Μϡ has τοῦ with τ over it, Π ρ ὑπότως, and the rest rightly τοῦτως, the ambiguous contraction reproduced in Μϡ being interpreted with varying success by the rest.

In 1283 b 9 Μϡ has ὑπάρχει with χ added over ρ’, Π ρ ὑπάρχει, the rest rightly ὑπάρχης: in 1307 b 12 Μϡ has χειροτονήσαν with τ over a and Π χειροτονήσαντας, the true reading being χειροτονήσαντα: in 1335 a 27 Μϡ has πλη with θ’ over η, which Vet. Int. perhaps interprets, though wrongly, by his rendering mutum: in 1303 b 33 Μϡ has a symbol for the termination of the word which Vet. Int. renders Εστίαεις: in 1309 b 28 Π has ποιη with σ over η and Μϡ pr. Π² ποιήσῃ, the true reading being ποιήσει. It is probably owing to the use of an ambiguous contraction for πάντας that many MSS. have πάνω in 1286 a 25, and we may explain in a similar way the frequent interchange in the MSS. of πόλις πολί̣ς and πολιτεία (see for instance Susemihl’s apparatus criticus in 1326 b 5, 1304 a 17, and 1318 a 9), and the false reading ἐπαινοῦμεν in place of ἐπαινοῦσιν which we find in Π¹ in 1289 a 1 (cp. 1267 a 25, where Μϡ has ἐπίθυμων in place of ἐπιθυμοῦν, the reading of Π¹, and ἐπίθυμησονς, the reading of Γ Π², and 1258 b 4, where Π¹ have ἐποροσάμεθα and Π² ἐποροῦσθη). The divergence of the MSS. in 1282 a 27, where Π².³ etc. have μέγιστον, Μϡ μέγιστοι, Π¹.⁴ μέγισται, and Γ μέγιστα, may also be thus explained. For other possible instances of the same thing see the passages referred to in vol. ii. p. 1, note 2.

That errors may have arisen from this cause at a very early date is clear from the fact that the papyrus of the Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία is full of contractions, though, according to Mr. Kenyon (Palaeography of Greek Papyri, p. 92), it is ‘highly probable’ that it was ‘written not very far from the year 90’. If the writers of the MSS. of the Politics which have come down to us, or the writers of the MSS. they copied, have had to any large extent to expand contractions of the kind described above, skill will have been needed by them in the discharge of their function no less than fidelity. We must bear this in mind in reference to
the question of the comparative claims of the two families of MSS. There can be little doubt that they both descend from an archetype in which ambiguous contractions were occasionally, and perhaps frequently, used, and the question evidently arises, which set of copyists, those of the first or those of the second family, was the more successful in expanding these ambiguous contractions. This is a question which it is not easy to answer positively, but the presumption is in favour of the more careful copyists, and, if we may judge by a comparison of omissions, the copyists to whom we owe the MSS. of the second family did their work more carefully than those to whom we owe the MSS. of the first. It would be rash, however, to dogmatize as to the superiority of either of the two families of MSS. in passages which are likely to have been affected by this source of error.

So far we have been concerned with variations of reading of a more or less minute kind. In not a few cases, however, the readings offered by $\Pi^1$ diverge widely from those offered by $\Pi^2$. The following list comprises most of the more marked and less easily explicable of these divergences:

**Book I.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\Pi^1$</th>
<th>$\Pi^2$</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1254 a 15, ἀν</td>
<td>δὲ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1255 a 24, ἀλως ($\Pi^1 \ P^u \ M \ T \ L\alpha$)</td>
<td>ἂμα</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32, εξ ἀρχῆς</td>
<td>πανταχοῦ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b 26, τοῦτων</td>
<td>τῶν τοιοῦτων</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1256 b 1, κοµίζονται</td>
<td>πορίζονται</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1258 b 27, τέταρτον</td>
<td>τρίτον</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Book II.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\Pi^1$</th>
<th>$\Pi^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1260 b 28, τίς (Γ?)</td>
<td>ἦ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1261 b 2, τοῦτο δὲ μιµεῖται τὸ ἐν</td>
<td>ἐν τοῦτοι δὲ μιµεῖσθαι τὸ ἐν</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>μέρει τοὺς ἰσοὺς εἰκεῖν</td>
<td>μέρει τοὺς ἰσοὺς εἰκεῖν (οἱ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τὸ δ' (τάδ' Ι') ὡς ὁμοίους</td>
<td>τὸς εξ ἀρχῆς</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>εἶναι εξ ἀρχῆς</td>
<td>εἰκεῖν) ὁμοίους (οἱ ὁμοίως)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1264 b 31, δὲ</td>
<td>γὰρ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ON THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE

\[ \begin{array}{ll}
\text{Π}^1 & \text{Π}^2 \\
1265 \text{a} 4, \text{eis (Γ?)} & \text{πρὸς} \\
35, \text{ἐξ} & \text{χρῆς} \\
1266 \text{a} 37, \text{ἀναγκαῖον added after εἶναι} & \text{ἀναγκαῖον omitted} \\
1267 \text{b} 26, \text{kórpē} & \text{kόσμω πολυτελεῖ} \\
1268 \text{b} 5, \text{δίκης} & \text{kρίσεως} \\
1269 \text{b} 21, \text{τοιοῦτος ἔστιν} & \text{φανερὸς ἦστι τοιοῦτος ὃν} \\
1271 \text{b} 28, \text{κρῆτες} & \text{λύκτοι} \\
1272 \text{a} 35, \text{ἐκ τινων} & \text{ἐκ τῶν} \\
1273 \text{a} 41, \text{ταύτην οὐχ οἷόν τε βε-} & \text{ταύτην οὐχ οἷόν τ' εἶναι βε-} \\
\text{βαίος ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι} & \text{βαίοις ἀριστοκρατικὴν πολι-} \\
\text{τὴν πολιτείαν} & \text{τείαν} \\
\end{array} \]

BOOK III.

\[ \begin{array}{ll}
1281 \text{a} 17, \text{δεῖ (Γ?)} & \text{χρῆ} \\
28, \text{σουσδαία} & \text{δικαία} \\
1282 \text{a} 32, \text{μετώπων} & \text{μεγάλων} \\
b 5, \text{διορίσαι} & \text{διῆλθαν} \\
1285 \text{a} 12, \text{γὰρ} & \text{γαῖν (οὖν Π')} \\
1286 \text{a} 25, \text{πάντας Π'} \text{Π}^4 & \text{πάνω} \\
1287 \text{a} 31, \text{φθείρει or διαφθείρει} & \text{διαστρέφει} \\
\end{array} \]

BOOK IV (VII).

\[ \begin{array}{ll}
1326 \text{a} 21, \text{μερῶν} & \text{μορίων} \\
25, \text{οὐ μὴν ἄλλα} & \text{ἄλλα μὴν} \\
1328 \text{a} 14, \text{νομίζειν} & \text{ὑπολαμβάνειν} \\
b 15, \text{ἄ (Γ?)} & \text{ὡν} \\
1329 \text{a} 20, \text{μέρος} & \text{γένος} \\
b 13, \text{δὲ} & \text{γὰρ} \\
1330 \text{b} 14, \text{ταύτην} & \text{τοιαύτην} \\
21, \text{οἰκείων} & \text{ἰδίων} \\
1332 \text{b} 40, \text{τῶν τοιοῦτων} & \text{τοῖσον τῶν} \\
1335 \text{b} 4, \text{παιδείας} & \text{παιδονομίας} \\
28, \text{δεῖ (Γ?)} & \text{χρῆ} \\
39, \text{kai} & \text{ἡ} \\
1336 \text{b} 20, \text{θετέον (θετητέον Μ')} & \text{νομοθετήτεων} \\
\end{array} \]

BOOK V (VIII).

\[ \begin{array}{ll}
1337 \text{a} 36, \text{διὰ} & \text{περὶ} \\
b 22, \text{εἰρηναί (Γ?)} & \text{ἐλέηθη} \\
\end{array} \]
| Book VI (IV) | | Book VII (V) | | | Book VIII (VI) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Π¹ | Π² | | | |
| 1339 b 21, γάρ | γοῦν | 1301 b 26, πανταχοῦ Π¹ P² | πάντων | 1317 b 17, τοιούτων | τούτων |
| 1340 b 7, δὲ | γάρ | 1308 b 17, οὗτως μεθύσειν | οὗτος ἡγείν | 1319 a 7, τοῖς παλαιοῖς | τοῖς πολλοῖς |
| 1341 b 1, ἵσμιοι | σαμβύκαι | 1310 b 17, αἱ τυραννίδες | τῶν τυραννίδων | 1320 a 4, μηθ " | ἡ |
| 1342 b 32, διάνοιαν | πανθείαν οἷον | 1315 a 38, ἀφαιρεσίν (Γ?) | παραίρεσιν οἷον παραίρεσιν | 1321 a 5, μάλιστα | κάλλιστα |

Of the above sixty-two divergences twelve are due to Tendency of the MSS., and especially of Π¹, to repeat a word or words from a contiguous line, often the preceding or following line, the word thus
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repeated sometimes extruding another word from the text and sometimes not doing so. Thus in Π¹—

in 1255 a 24 ἄμα is displaced by ἀλως probably repeated from 21; in 1255 a 32 πανταχοῦ is displaced by ἐξ ἀρχῆς repeated from 30 sq.;

in 1265 a 35 χρήσεων is displaced by ἔξω probably repeated from ἔξεις;

in 1266 a 37 ἀναγκαῖον is added after εἰναι, being repeated from ἀναγκαῖον in the preceding line;

in 1272 a 35 ἐκ τῶν is displaced by ἐκ τινῶν repeated from the preceding line;

in 1326 a 21 μορίων is displaced by μερῶν probably repeated from μέρος in the preceding line;

in 1328 a 14 ὑπολαμβάνουσι is displaced by νομίζουσι repeated from νομίζουσι in the following line;

in 1329 a 20 γένους is displaced by μέρος perhaps repeated from 23;

in 1289 a 5 τῶν is displaced by ἃ repeated from the preceding line;

in 1298 b 13 διορισμῶν is displaced by τρόπων repeated from the preceding line;

in 1320 a 4 ἀλλαγχείσθαι is displaced by μηδ᾽ ἀλλαγχείσθαι repeated from μηδ᾽ ἀλλαγχείσθαι in 2.

In 1268 b 5 Π² appear to fall into a similar error, δίκης being displaced in these MSS. by κρίσεως repeated from the preceding line.

Occasionally all the MSS., and not those of the first or second family only, may be reasonably suspected of this error. Thus in 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 39, where all the MSS. except Π have δήλων δὲ καὶ (Π omits καὶ) τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς Τυρταίου ποιήσεως τῆς καλουμένης Εὐνομίας, the words καὶ τοῦτο are probably repeated by mistake from the preceding line. So again it is possible that in 2. 5. 1263 a 13, where almost all the MSS. have λαμβάνοντας, and in 2. 6. 1265 b 2, where all have περὶ τὰς πόλεις, they have suffered in a similar way, λαμβάνοντας being repeated from λαμβάνοντας in the following line and περὶ τὰς πόλεις from περὶ τὰς πόλεις in the preceding line. The same thing may have happened to all the MSS. in 2. 7. 1267 a 8, where ἐπιθυμοῦεν may have taken the place of ἀδικοῦεν through repetition from ἐπιθυμῶ, 6 (see explanatory note
on 1267 a 5), in 2. 8. 1268 b 1, where γεωργήσει may have displaced some other word owing to the presence of γεωργοῦντας in the preceding line, and in 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 14, where πολιτελαν may be a repetition of πολιτελαν in 1329 a 12 and may have pushed out some other and more appropriate word (see explanatory note on 1329 a 13).

Γ Με are sometimes affected by this cause of error when P1 escapes. Thus in 2. 6. 1265 b 11 ἄλλως repeated from ἄλλων in the preceding line has displaced πελέστας in Γ Με, in 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 3 βέλτιον from the preceding line has displaced κάλλους in Με and probably Γ (Vet. Int. melius), and in 4 (7). 11. 1330 b 25 τρόπον from the preceding line has displaced χρόνον in Γ Με.

The MSS. of the second family are not free from this kind of error, though they have suffered much less from it than those of the first. We have already seen that in 1268 b 5 κρίσεως repeated from the preceding line probably takes the place of ἀλεξις in Π2. So again in 2. 4. 1262 b 33 Π2 prefix εἰς to τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας because εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας occurs in the preceding line, and in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 35 Π2 add τὸ πλήθος after δεῖ ποιεῖν because δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸ πλήθος occurs in the following line.

Twelve, then, of the sixty-two variations of reading which have been enumerated may be thus accounted for. Five others (1255 b 26, 1330 b 14, 1332 b 40, 1292 a 17, 1317 b 17) are due to an interchange of οὖνος and τουῦνος, four (1264 b 31, 1329 b 13, 1340 b 7, 1289 a 8) to an interchange of δὲ and γὰρ (the contractions being somewhat similar), and the eleven following to an interchange of not very dissimilar words—

1256 b 1, κομίζονται and πορίζονται
1282 b 5, διαρίσαι and δηλώσαι
1285 a 12, γὰρ and γοῦν
1339 b 21, 
1287 a 31, διαφθείρει and διαστρέφει
1341 b 1, ἵμμεθα and σαμβάκα
1293 a 24, πολλάνων and ἄλλων

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In two other passages (1271 b 28 and 1308 b 17) a gloss has probably displaced the true reading in Π¹, and in three (1335 b 4, 1336 b 20, and 1342 b 32) one or more syllables have been omitted in Π¹. The variations of reading in 1267 b 26 and 1268 b 21 are probably due to the tendency of Π¹ to omit words. In 1286 a 25 the substitution of πάνν for πάντας, and in 1301 b 26 that of πάντων for πανταχού, may well be due to ambiguous contractions. In 1258 b 27 the substitution of τέταρτον for τρίτον, though wrong, is natural enough, τρίτον having occurred in 25. In 1330 b 21 the substitution in Π¹ of οικείων for ἰδίων is explained in the critical note on the passage. In 1282 a 32 the interchange of μειώνων and μεγάλων resembles that of πλείους and πολλοὺς in 1290 b 2, that of βέλτιστων and βέλτιον in 1333 b 7, and that of φανερωτάτη and φανερωτέρα in 1293 b 32. As to 1261 b 2 and 1273 a 41 something has already been said in vol. ii. pp. 234 sq. and lv. The following variations of reading remain, sixteen in number:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Π¹</th>
<th>Π²</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1254 a 15, ὅν</td>
<td>δέ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1260 b 28, τίς (Γ?)</td>
<td>ἃ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1265 a 4, εἰς (Γ?)</td>
<td>πρός</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1281 a 17</td>
<td>δεῖ (Γ?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1335 b 28</td>
<td>χρὴ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1281 a 28, σπουδαία</td>
<td>δίκαια</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1326 a 25, οὐ μὴν ἄλλα</td>
<td>ἄλλα μὴν</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1328 b 15</td>
<td>ὃν</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1294 a 36</td>
<td>ἃ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1335 b 39, καὶ</td>
<td>ἃ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1337 a 36, διὰ</td>
<td>περὶ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b 22, εἴρηται (Γ?)</td>
<td>ελέχθη</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1293 a 21, ὁ ol</td>
<td>εἰ μὲν</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1310 b 17, αἱ τυραννίδες</td>
<td>τῶν τυραννιδῶν</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1315 a 38, ἀφαίρεσιν (Γ?)</td>
<td>παραίρεσιν οὐ παραίνεσιν</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In seven of these passages (1260 b 28, 1265 a 4, 1281 a 17, 1335 b 28, 1281 a 28, 1335 b 39, 1337 b 22) words not themselves similar, but of similar meaning are interchanged, and in an eighth (1315 a 38) the interchange of ἀφαίρεσιν and παραλύειν may well be the result of accident. The divergences in the remaining eight (1254 a 15, 1326 a 25, 1328 b 15, 1294 a 36, 1337 a 36, 1293 a 21, 1310 b 17, 1320 b 9) are less easily explained.

A certain number of variations of reading are probably due, as has been said already in vol. ii. p. liii, to grammarian revisers of the text. Thus, while both families use the nominative μονάρχος (1292 a II, 15 and 1313 b 39), not μονάρχης, Π² use the oblique cases of μονάρχος, Π¹ almost always those of μονάρχης. So again M⁸ P¹ and possibly Γ have ὀψοποιητική in 1255 b 26, while Π² have ὀψοποιηκή, and in 1256 a 6 M⁸ P¹ and possibly Γ have κερκιδοποιητική, while Π² have κερκιδοποιηκή. In 1289 b 32, again, M⁸ P¹ and possibly Γ have ἀσπλον, Π² ἀνοτλον. These differences of reading seem to be due to intentional correction, but others which are at first sight of a similar nature are probably due to accidental causes. Thus Π¹ inherit the form φιλίτια and Π² the form φιδίτια, the rival forms originating at the outset no doubt in the resemblance of Λ and Δ. It is probably also owing to accident that in 1280 a 29 Π² have εἰσενέγκατα and M⁸ P¹ (we cannot be certain as to Γ) εἰσενεγκόντα, in 1283 b 14 Π² δόξαιν and M⁸ P¹ δόξειαν, in 1285 a 24 and b 5 Π² πάτριαι and ἔκοψιαι τε καὶ πάτριαι and M⁸ P¹ πάτριαι and ἔκοψιοι τε καὶ πάτριοι, in 1292 b 9 Π² εἴπαμεν and M⁸ P¹ εἴπομεν, in 1302 b 4 Π² διὰ μικρότητα and M⁸ P¹ διὰ σμικρότητα, in 1307 a 31 Π² ἔδυναντο

1 In 1312 a 29, however, P¹ has τοῖς μονάρχοις with Π², while Γ M⁸ have τοῖς μονάρχαις. See also Additions and Corrections.
and M* P¹ ἵφδυναρτο, and in 1311 b 14 Π² νιεῖ and M* P¹ νιὼ. It is easy to confuse av and ov, ai and oi, a and o, e and η. If in 1338 b 23 M* P¹ L* Ald. have ληστρικά and Π² (except L* Ald.) ληστρικά, we remember that τ and τρ are easily confused, and that in 1336 b 30 Π² have θεατῶν and Π¹ θεάτρων.

In cases in which the two families of MSS. offer different readings I am still of opinion, as I have been from the first, that the MSS. of the second family deserve our confidence more often than those of the first. The comparative merits of the readings offered by the two families vary from Book to Book, and in no Book does the first family stand the comparison as well as in the Second, yet even there it seems to me that the second family has the advantage. My reasons for so thinking have been given in an article which appeared in the Classical Review in July, 1893 (7. 304 sqq.).

Even where the readings of the first family receive the support of the Vatican Palimpsest, they are not always to be adopted. This will be evident on a reference to 1287 a 32, b 41, and 1288 a 13.

It has been pointed out in vol. ii. p. lix that not much weight attaches to readings supported by M* P¹ against the consent of Γ Π², or to those supported by Γ M* against the consent of P¹ Π². On the other hand (and this has not as yet, I think, been pointed out) readings supported by Γ P¹ against the consent of M* Π² are very often correct. This will be found to be the case in the following passages:—

1261 a 14, διειλέων Γ P¹, διελθέων the rest;
1270 a 13, αὐτῆς Γ P¹, αὐτῆν the rest;
1276 b 33, where Γ P¹ add a sentence missing in the other MSS., except that in two it is added by correctors;
1282 a 32, ἀρχοστὶν Γ P¹, ἀρχοσῶν M*, ἀρχοσοῦν Π²;
1285 b 22, ὄρισμένοις Γ P¹, ὄρισμένων the rest;
33, πλείωνων Γ P¹, πλείωνος the rest;
1327 b 34, om. καὶ Γ P¹, not so the rest;
1334 a 37, Γ P¹ add a sentence missing in the rest;
1335 b 11, ἐλευθέρων Γ P¹, ἐλευθέρων the rest;
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1340 b 14, ἐστὶν τι, ἐστὶν Π, ἐκείνη the rest;
1341 a 15, κοινῶν Π, κοινῶν the rest;
1289 a 17, ἐκάστους Π, ἐκάστης the rest;
1290 a 1, δὴ Π, δὲ the rest, except correctors in Π². 4;
1294 b 29, τῶν Π, τῶν the rest;
1295 b 34, βῆλω Π, βῆλων the rest;
1314 a 25, μὲν οὖν Π, μὲν the rest;
1316 b 1, πόλυ Π, πόλλαι the rest;
1320 a 8, φερομένων Π (λέγε φερόμενον), φερόντων the rest;
   b 3, φημιένους Π, φημί νέους the rest.

For passages in which the accentuation is corrected in Π, see critical note on 1293 a 28. It has already been remarked (vol. ii. p. xliii, note 3) that Demetrius Chalcondylas, the scribe of Π, was a learned scholar and that many of the good readings peculiar to Π are probably emendations of his, and the question might be asked whether the good readings which Π shares with Γ were not suggested to Demetrius by a study of the vetus versio. How far it is likely that Demetrius would study the vetus versio, I am unable to say, but I doubt whether he owes these readings to it, for it is evident from passages like 1280 b 6, where the true reading is διασκοποῦν and Π has διακοποῦν, while Γ Μ have διακοποῦν, that Π has a good independent tradition of its own. In 1297 a 1 and (if Sus.¹ is right, for in Sus.² ³ ⁴ the erroneous reading is ascribed to Γ Μ) in 1261 b 27 Γ Π agree in a false reading which Π is not likely to have borrowed from the vetus versio.

In some passages of the Politics the true reading is preserved by one MS. only and in not a few by two or three: thus it is preserved by Γ in 1260 b 41, 1266 b 2, 1283 a 7 etc., by Γ Μ in 1299 a 1, by Γ Π⁴ L in 1299 a 2, by Γ Ald. corr.¹ Π² in 1332 a 33, by Π² ³ Vat. Pal. in 1278 b 30, by Π³ and a correction in Π² in 1304 b 28, by Π⁴ Ald. in 1286 b 33. We sometimes owe the true reading to quite inferior MSS. (e.g. in 1275 b 39, 1284 b 40, 1295 a 28, 1296 b 31, 1308 b 15, 1317 a 12, 1318 b 17, 1320 a 16).

Not a few good readings are due to the Latin translation of Aretinus (Lionardo Bruni of Arezzo, who was born in
1369 and died in 1444). They are probably conjectural emendations of his. Among them the following may be mentioned:—

1264 a 19, ὑπομενοῦσι (Γ Π ὑπομένονοι)
1337 a 14, παυδεύεσθαι (Γ Π παυδεύεσθαι);
1339 a 20, ἐπιφ (Γ Π ἐπίφ);
1296 a 9, πολιτῶν (Γ Π πολιτῶν);
1299 a 14 (with ‘ut videtur, corr.¹ P¹,’ says Sus.¹, and corr.¹ P¹ means Demetrius Chalcondylas), πολιτείας (Γ Π πολιτείας);

b 36, αὐταί αἱ (αὐταί αἱ Π², αἱ αὐταὶ Π¹);
1300 b 4, τὸ τε (the rest τὸ δὲ or τὸν δὲ or τὸ τέ δὲ);
1311 a 10, τὸ τό (the rest τῶ τὸ or τῶ);
1317 b 41, ἐτι (Γ Π ἐτι).

That the Fifth (old Eighth) and the Eighth (old Sixth) Books are incomplete, we have seen already (vol. ii. p. xxix). It is probable that something is wanting at the end of the Seventh (old Fifth) Book also. The question, however, to what extent ordinary lacunae occur in the text of the Politics is one of a different kind. That a small lacuna exists in the best MSS. in 1285 a 19 has already been noticed (vol. ii. p. lxxvi). A somewhat larger one appears to occur in ΓΠ in 4 (7). 15. 1334 b 4 after the word ἀρετῶν (see explanatory note on 1334 a 41). It seems likely that several omissions occur in the passage 1300 a 23–b 5. Words appear to have fallen out of the text in 1301 a 6, 1307 a 31, and 1320 b 35 also.

In two instances the transposition of passages has seemed to me to be called for: I have suggested the transposition of 7 (5). 3. 1303 b 3, στασιάζοντι—7, δότες to after στασιάζοντι in 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 39, and of 7 (5). 10. 1312 a 17, μάλιστα δὲ—20, ἐπιθέσεις to after μεθύοντα in 7 (5). 10. 1312 a 6.

Traces of the handiwork of an editor piecing together disquisitions originally unconnected appear to be especially visible in the Sixth (old Fourth) Book (see explanatory notes on 1289 b 27 and 1290 b 21–24). Prof. W. Christ remarks in the preface to his edition of the Metaphysics of Aristotle (p. xviii), ‘Philosophus iis quae chartae iam
mandaverat haud contentus nova subinde in margine adiecit, quae qui post auctoris mortem eius libros divulgarunt parum circumspecte primariae orationi intexuisse videntur'. We may perhaps account in this way for the state in which we find the Third and Fourth Chapters of the Sixth (old Fourth) Book (see vol. i. Appendix A and explanatory note on 1289 b 27).

A few remarks may be added to what has already been said with regard to the translation of the Vetus Interpres in vol. ii. p. xli sqq. A further study of this translation has confirmed my impression (see vol. ii. p. lxiv) that he often misread his Greek text; thus for example in 1285 b 7 he renders πορίσαι emerunt, probably misreading it as προσθαν, in 1286 a 35 he renders ὄργιωθήναι impetu ferri, misreading it apparently as ὀρμηθήναι, in 1330 a 11 he appears to misread πάλιν as πᾶσιν, in 1341 b 31 τόπον as τρόπον, in 1291 a 11 κομψός as κούφως, in 1319 a 24 θυρανλεῖν as θηρευεῖν. It would be easy to add many other instances.

It should be pointed out that the Vetus Interpres often uses two different Latin words to render the same Greek word when it is repeated close together; thus in 1338 b 28 he renders τῷ μόνον μὴ πρὸς ἀσκοῦντας ἁσκεῖν eo solutum quod ad eos qui non studuerant conabatur, in 1295 b 30 his equivalent for ἐπιθυμοῦσαν is desiderant and in 31 concipiscunt, in 1295 b 32 μὴ τῇ ἐπιθυμοῦσα ἀπερὶ ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖν is rendered neque insidias patiuntur neque fraudes moliumtur: see also his renderings in 1303 b 14, 15 (διάστασιν), 1304 a 19, 20, 25 (εἰδοκιμήσαι), 1321 a 21, 22 (καθιστάναι), and several other passages. This is not always so: thus in 1299 b 13 he translates ἀρχάς and ἀρχὴν occurring in the same line principatus and principatum. On the other hand, he often uses one Latin word in rendering two Greek words occurring close together; thus in 1303 a 35, 36 he translates both ἔσθεξάμενοι and ὑπόδεξάμενοι suscipientes, in 1304 a 21-24 he translates both συντονωτέραν and ἴσχυροτέραν fortiorem, in 1304 b 30, 33 both συστάντες and ὄθρωσθέντες are represented by coadunati, in 1305 a 39, 40 praeses represents
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προστάτης and πραξιστήρα τοῦ ἡγεμόνα, and in 1306 a 5, 6 conatus est represents εὐεχεῖρος and conantur ἐπιχειροῦσι.

In rendering Greek words he often selects, if he can, a Latin word connected in meaning with the Greek; thus his equivalent for δήμους is populatio in 1298 a 6, for συμμαχία compugnatio in 1298 a 4, 26, for ἑλπιστομένου minorata in 1319 a 3, for ἄστυγείτονας municipales vicinos in 1330 a 17.

He sometimes retains the case of the Greek in his rendering, notwithstanding that in Latin it is wrong: so in 1299 b 33 we have populi praeconsiliari for τοῦ δήμου προβουλευτέων, in 1304 a 31 habebat politiae for εἶχετο τῆς πολιτείας, and in 1304 b 11, 12 voluntariorum transmutant politiam and detinent involuntariorum for ἑκόντων μεταβάλλουσι τῆν πολιτείαν and κατέχουσιν ἁκόντων: but this he does not always do.

In addition to the inexactnesses in translation mentioned in vol. ii. p. lxiii it may be noted that the Vetus Interpres often renders a verb as passive where it should be rendered as middle, and often renders the present tense by the future and a future participle by a present participle. He also sometimes renders the singular by the plural, the plural by the singular, the comparative by the positive, the superlative by the positive or the comparative, and the positive by the comparative or the superlative.

1 E. g. in 1332 a 27, 1288 b 31, 1289 a 14, 1290 b 4, 1297 b 8, 1298 b 27, 1305 a 16.

2 E. g. in 1281 a 19, 1287 a 32, 1313 b 15, 16.

3 E. g. in 1291 a 7 and 1298 a 19.

4 E. g. in 1287 a 27 (dant for δίδωσιν), 1307 b 33 (parvae exponsae for τὸ μικρὸν δαπάνημα), 1321 a 40 (expensarium for τῆς δαπάνης), 1322 a 19 (divisi sunt for διήρηται).

5 E. g. in 1338 b 11 (speciem for τὰ εἶδη), 1296 a 34, 35 (democraticam and oligarchiam for δημοκρατίας and ἀληθορρίας), 1303 a 14 (vere- cundiam for τὰς ἐρυθείνας), 1310 b 34 (beneficium for εὐεργεσίας).

6 E. g. in 1283 a 35 (generosi for γεναιότεροι), 1287 b 9 (multos for πλεῖον), 1331 a 30 (eminenter for ἐρυμοτέρων), 1333 b 10 (super-gressivas for πλεονεκτικωτέρας), 1298 a 36 (mediocris for μετριωτέρων), 1299 b 12 (facile for βασιν).

7 E. g. in 1276 a 19 (super-ficialis for ἐπισαλοιωσάτη).

8 E. g. in 1315 a 26 (ampliori for πλειότερη).

9 E. g. in 1330 a 41 (recentiores for εὐεργεσίμοι), 1293 a 30 (plus for πολύ).

10 E. g. in 1292 b 29 (neces-sariüssimas for ἀναγκαίας).
Since I wrote in vol. ii. p. lvi that, as Vet. Int. has \textit{qui mutaverit} in 1269 a 18, he may have found not \textit{kynh\textsigma s}, but \textit{\' o kynh\textsigma s} in his Greek text, I have discovered that \textit{qui mutaverit} there probably stands simply for \textit{kynh\textsigma s} (see critical note on 1340 b 24).

It has already been pointed out (vol. ii. p. lxiv) that the Vetus Interpres sometimes seeks to mend defects in his Greek text by slight conjectural alterations: to the cases already noticed may be added 1284 a 19 (where, finding \textit{\d\sigma o\kappa o\n\sigma i} omitted in his Greek text, as in M* P\textsuperscript{1}, and being consequently unable to make sense of the passage, he translates \textit{\d\iota \omega \kappa e\epsilon \nu} as if it were \textit{\d\iota \omega \kappa o\n\sigma i}) and 1329 a 17, where for a similar reason he adds \textit{videtur}.

Here and there in the MSS. of the \textit{vetus versio}, as in those of the Politics, words find their way into the text from an adjacent line: thus in Sus.\textsuperscript{1} p. 536. 3 \textit{quod} is wrongly added after \textit{aristocratiae}, being evidently derived from the following line (see also the readings of \textit{a} in Sus.\textsuperscript{1} pp. 296. 5 and 300. 4). Sometimes two alternative equivalents for a word stand together in the text of the translation: thus in 1283 a 9 two equivalents for \textit{kreit\tau\nu}, \textit{melior} and \textit{valentior}, both appear in the text; the same thing perhaps happens in 1285 a 10 also, where \textit{\epsilon \nu \chi e\iota \rho \os \nu \mu \omega} is rendered \textit{promptus potens lege}, the two words \textit{promptus} and \textit{potens} being probably alternative renderings of \textit{\epsilon \gamma \chi e\iota \rho \os}.

It is often difficult to decide whether false renderings in the \textit{vetus versio} are due to error on the part of the translator—for instance, to a misreading or mistranslation of the Greek text—or to corruption in the MSS. of the \textit{vetus versio}. That they are sometimes due to the latter cause will be seen from the critical note on 1338 a 28. Corruption of the text may be suspected in 1270 a 35, \textit{traiciebant} (\textit{tradebant}?) \textit{politiam} (\textit{\mu \tau e\iota \delta\sigma o\sigma a\nu \tau \iota \sigma \pi o\lambda i\epsilon\lambda a}), 1275 a 20, \textit{adiectionem} (\textit{\epsilon \γ k\lambda \mu \alpha : obiectionem}?), 1331 a 2, \textit{insultus} (\textit{\tau \a s \pi o\lambda i\omega \kappa i\alpha \iota s}), 1335 a 16, \textit{lexatur} (\textit{\epsilon \pi \chi \omega r\omega \rho \iota \alpha \zeta \epsilon \tau a i}), 1305 b 17, \textit{invalescens} (\textit{\epsilon \pi \theta \e m\epsilon \nu o s}), 1318 b 3, \textit{permittere} (\textit{\sigma \mu \mu e\iota \sigma \a i : persuadere}?) and elsewhere.
ON THE CONTENTS OF THE THIRD, FOURTH (SEVENTH), AND FIFTH (EIGHTH) BOOKS.

The Third Book is addressed to a wider class than the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth). It is addressed to the framers of all States, the Fourth and Fifth only to the framers of the 'best State'. Aristotle's aim in the Third Book is to point out how the State should be organized if its constitution is to be just, in the Fourth and Fifth how it should be organized if it is to be happy and to live the most desirable life.

The first five chapters of the Third Book are introductory to the rest. They are designed to show, (1) what is the minimum amount of rights which a citizen must possess if he is to be a citizen at all, and what further rights he will possess if he is to be a citizen in the fullest sense (cp. c. 5. 1278 a 35, λέγεται μάλιστα πολίτης ὁ μετέχων τῶν τιμῶν); (2) that each constitution awards these rights to different persons, that a democracy, for instance, awards them to a wider class than an oligarchy or an aristocracy, so that, while a citizen in a democracy may be a day-labourer lacking the virtue of a citizen, or even a person of illegitimate or semi-alien birth, a citizen under the best constitution will possess, if a ruler, the full virtue not only of a good citizen, but also of a good man. Thus there are many kinds of citizen; the citizen varies with the constitution and rises and falls as it rises and falls. And as the citizen rises and falls, so the polis rises and falls, for the polis is an aggregate of citizens.

Thus these five chapters prepare the way for the study
of the best constitution, to which we pass in the last chapter of the Third Book. They would, however, have been in fuller harmony with the remainder of the Book, if in the account which they give of the citizen the fact had been kept in view that the polis may be ruled by a king or a few 'best men'. We hear nothing in these chapters of the citizen of a kingship or of an aristocracy in which a few 'best men' rule. They imply that a citizen shares both in ruling and in being ruled, but is this true of the citizen of a kingship or of an aristocracy of the kind just mentioned? We might have expected the study of the citizen which they contain to include not only a study of the citizen in a State consisting of men more or less alike and equal, but also a study of the citizen in a State ruled by a king or a few 'best men'. In this expectation we are disappointed.

At the beginning of the Sixth Chapter we pass from the citizen and the polis to the constitution, the main subject of the Book, and indeed of the Politics. The question is now asked (1278 b 6) 'whether we are to hold that one constitution exists or more than one' (a question already answered by implication in c. 1. 1275 a 38 sqq. and c. 5. 1278 a 15), 'and, if more than one, what and how many there are and what differences exist between them'. In answer to this question we have first the division of constitutions into normal forms and deviation-forms, and then in c. 7. 1279 a 22 the question is again raised, 'how many constitutions there are and what they are', and we are told to study the normal constitutions first, for the deviation-forms will be manifest when these have been distinguished, the answer to the question how many constitutions there are coming in the shape of an enumeration of six constitutions.

Of this classification of constitutions something has already been said in vol. i. pp. 214–225. Reference may also be made to Class. Rev. 6. 289 sqq., where I have pointed out that, though Aristotle has before him Plato's classification of constitutions in Polit. 297, 301 sqq., there are important differences between the two classifications. The
six constitutions of the Politicus, if we omit the best, are marked off from each other by their observance or non-observance of law, whereas the six constitutions of the Politics are distinguished by a different test, their aim; the three good constitutions make their aim the common advantage of the citizens, while the three bad ones aim at the advantage of the ruling individual or class. Aristotle's classification implies that this difference of aim suffices to make one constitution different in kind from another.

It is open to objection on more grounds than one. In the first place, it leaves out of sight the possibility that the One, Few, or Many, or two of them, may share supremacy (see note on 1279 a 27). Again, in 8 (6). 1. 1316 b 39 sqq. we find that constitutions exist which are partly aristocratic, partly oligarchical, and others which are partly polities, partly democracies. These constitutions will be partly normal and partly deviation-forms; they do not, therefore, fall under any of the six heads. Thus the classification is not exhaustive. Again, we can conceive the existence of constitutions under which rule is exercised for the advantage of the rulers, but yet for the common advantage, or partly for the one end, partly for the other (see note on 1279 a 17). These also fall outside the classification. And then again we might ask whether a constitution which, while it aims at the common advantage, takes a low view of that common advantage, construing it for instance as the acquisition of wealth or empire, should not also be treated as a distinct constitution from one which seeks the common advantage and studies it in a nobler way. Aristotle would perhaps reply that a constitution of this kind does not really study the common advantage. Still it cannot be said to study the advantage of a section of the citizens only, and thus it appears to escape enumeration.

But in fact, as has been pointed out in vol. i. pp. 217–220, Aristotle tends on fuller consideration to rest the distinction between constitutions not on the number of rulers or the aim with which they rule, but rather on the attribute—virtue, wealth, free birth, etc.—which they raise to supremacy.
Even this basis of classification, however, proves hardly satisfactory, for the absolute kingship and the true aristocracy raise the same attribute—fully equipped virtue—to supremacy (6.12.1289 a 32 sq.), and oligarchy and tyranny both do homage to wealth (7.10.1311 a 10). Yet Aristotle distinguishes between the absolute kingship and the true aristocracy, and also between oligarchy and tyranny.

Passing on to the Eighth Chapter, we are told in c. 8. c. 8. 1279 b 11 sq. that it is necessary to state at slightly greater length ‘what each of these constitutions is’, the constitutions referred to being apparently the three deviation-forms. Little is said of tyranny in what follows, but the nature of oligarchy and democracy is more fully explained, and we learn that the distinction between them is to be found not so much in the comparative number of those who rule in each as in the fact that the rich rule in the one and the poor (or the free-born) in the other.

The Ninth Chapter is closely connected with the Eighth. c9. It throws further light on the nature of oligarchy and democracy by examining the version of justice which underlies each of these constitutions and showing its inadequacy. The one claims more than its due for a superiority in wealth, and the other claims more than its due for an equality in free birth, neither wealth nor free birth being the end for which the polis is formed. The end for which the polis is formed is, in fact, good life, and those who contribute most to it have a better right to supreme power in the polis than the wealthy and free-born, if the two last-named classes are inferior in virtue. Thus the Ninth Chapter is a natural sequel to the Eighth, carrying its investigation of the nature of oligarchy and democracy further and using the conclusions as to the nature of these two constitutions arrived at in the Eighth; it also, however, forms an introduction to the discussions which follow, preparing the way for the inquiries of cc. 10–13 on the subject, ‘what ought to be the supreme authority of the polis’?
This question, the central question in any inquiry respecting constitutions, for the main business of a constitution is to determine the supreme authority of the polis (c. 6. 1278 b 9 sq.), is discussed in the Tenth and Eleventh Chapters, and the conclusion is arrived at in c. 11. 1282 b 1-13 that the supreme authority in a polis should be rightly constituted laws, or in other words laws adjusted to the normal constitutions (for such laws will be just), the magistrate or magistrates being supreme only in respect of matters which the law owing to its generality cannot regulate aright. We might suppose that the question 'what ought to be the supreme authority of the polis' was now finally answered, but two chapters follow, the Twelfth and Thirteenth, which upset or greatly modify the conclusion arrived at in c. 11, for they decide that in a certain case the supreme authority should not be laws of any kind, but the will of an absolute king raised above law.

There is much in these two chapters to suggest a doubt whether they were placed where they stand by Aristotle. They make an important modification in the conclusion arrived at in c. 11, and yet do not do this explicitly. Again, the transition from c. 11 to c. 12 is very abrupt. Then again, the two chapters are not heralded by any previous announcement, nor are they closed with any recapitulation of their results. This is suspicious, for previous announcements and recapitulations are often wanting in the Politics in the case of chapters or passages which look like subsequent additions or interpolations (e.g. 1. 11: 2. 12. 1274a 22–b 26: 4 (7). 10. 1329a 34–b 35). On the other hand, there are arguments to be urged in their favour. Some of these have been noticed in vol. i. Appendix C. The following may be added. The conclusion in favour of law arrived at in c. 11, which is upset or seriously modified by cc. 12 and 13, can hardly represent Aristotle's final and matured opinion, for it conflicts as much with the contents of c. 17 as with those of cc. 12 and 13. In both places we find a full recognition of the legitimacy under certain circumstances of an absolute kingship uncontrolled by law. We need
not, therefore, be surprised that the conclusions of c. 11 are modified in cc. 12 and 13. Then again, the mode in which cc. 12 and 13 refute the claims to exclusive supremacy preferred by the rich, the free-born, the good, and the many closely resembles that in which similar claims are refuted in the preceding chapters. Aristotle's plan throughout the Third Book is to refute exclusive claims to supremacy by arraying superior claims in opposition to them; thus in the Ninth Chapter he refutes the claims of the rich and the free-born by setting up against them those of the good, and in the Eleventh he refutes those of the few best by setting up against them those of the many. In just the same way in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Chapters he refutes the claims of the rich, the free-born, the good, and the many to exclusive supremacy by setting up against them those of a single individual of surpassing wealth, nobility, or virtue. Thus the method followed in these two chapters closely resembles that which has been followed in the chapters which precede them. As to the absence in them of a preliminary announcement and a recapitulation, the same thing is true of 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 5-1334 a 10. We are not prepared by any preliminary announcement for the transition in 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq., nor indeed for that in 4 (7). 11. 1330 a 34 sqq. On the whole I still incline to think that the Twelfth and Thirteenth Chapters were placed where they stand by Aristotle.

Their teaching is important. We learn from them a lesson which we have not been taught before, and which Aristotle appears to have been the first to teach. This is that the same constitution is not in place under all circumstances. If the constitution is to be just, the supreme authority which it sets up ought not only to be one which will rule for the common advantage, but also that which justice requires to exist in the particular case, looking to the distribution among the members of the community of the attributes which contribute to the being or well-being of the polis (virtue, wealth, free birth, etc.). If the distribution of virtue and political capacity in a given
community is such as to call for an absolute kingship, an aristocracy or polity would be out of place in it, though both of these are normal constitutions, constitutions in which rule is exercised for the common advantage. And so again, if the distribution of virtue, wealth, free birth, etc., is such as to make a constitution just in which all classes share in rule, an absolute kingship would be out of place under those circumstances.

Another lesson which is especially insisted on in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Chapters is that a bare superiority in one only of the attributes which contribute to the being or well-being of the polis does not confer a right to exclusive supremacy. Nothing but a transcendent superiority in virtue and political capacity does so. We remember that Aristotle has rested natural slavery in a similar way on a vast disparity between master and slave (1. 5. 1254 b 16 sqq.: cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 3 sqq.). Where this great disparity does not exist, and the good, the rich, and the free-born coexist in a community, and the many taken as a whole are superior to the few, the constitution must allow a fair share of power to all these classes (3. 13. 1283 b 40 sqq.). Aristotle goes so far as to say (3. 13. 1283 a 26 sqq.) that a constitution which gives exclusive supremacy to those possessed of a bare superiority in one attribute only is a deviation-form, and this he would apparently say even if the one attribute were virtue. In the Seventh Chapter constitutions have been said to be deviation-forms in which the rulers rule with a view to their own advantage; now we are told that a constitution is a deviation-form in which the rulers claim exclusive supremacy on the strength of a bare superiority in one attribute only. Aristotle's account of a deviation-form in the Thirteenth Chapter is evidently not quite the same as that which he gives in the Seventh. According to the Thirteenth Chapter even an aristocracy may be a deviation-

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1 Yet it is allowed in 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 39 sqq. that those who excel in virtue have a plausible claim to be considered absolutely unequal.
form if the superiority in virtue to which it awards supremacy is a bare superiority only.

The discussion of kingship which follows in cc. 14-17 contains a passage, 1288 a 6-15, which may be intrusive or a subsequent addition, but it seems to be otherwise in correct order. We might have expected that more would be said about kingship than is said, and that Aristotle would follow up his study of it with a study of aristocracy. The kinds of kingship have been clearly distinguished, and why should not those of aristocracy be similarly enumerated? This is not done; on the contrary, Aristotle passes on to inquire in c. 18 which is the best of the normal constitutions, and he finds that the best is kingship or aristocracy, whence he infers that, as the citizen of the ‘best State’ is a good man, the citizen of a kingship or an aristocracy will be a good man, and a kingship or aristocracy will be brought into being by the education which produces good men. We expect him to proceed at once to inquire what education produces good men, but this, as has been pointed out in vol. i. p. 293 sqq., he does not do till the Thirteenth Chapter of the Fourth (old Seventh) Book. The drift of the Eighteenth Chapter of the Third Book evidently is that if we wish to study how a kingship or an aristocracy is to be brought into being, we shall best do so by studying how the best constitution is to be brought into being (cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 31 sqq. and 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 2 sqq., 31 sqq.). The chapter is apparently intended to account for the absence of an inquiry how a kingship or an aristocracy is to be brought into being and for the substitution in its place of an inquiry how the best constitution is to be brought into being and instituted. It evidently prepares the way for a study of the ‘best State’, though possibly for a different study of it from that which we possess in the Fourth and Fifth Books (the old Seventh and Eighth).

Aristotle's main aim in the Third Book is to correct and Remarks broaden the conceptions of justice on which Greek consti-

on the Third Book.
tutions were based, just as in the Fourth and Fifth (the old Seventh and Eighth) he seeks to correct and broaden Greek conceptions of happiness. He rises in the Third above the one-sidedness of oligarchy and democracy, just as in the Fourth and Fifth he rises above the one-sidedness of the Lacedaemonian State.

A marked characteristic of the Third Book is its union of tolerance for imperfect types of political organization with a clear recognition of what is best. Aristotle accepts the lower forms of the citizen and the constitution, but he also sets before us their higher forms. A defective citizen does not cease to be a citizen, nor a defective constitution to be a constitution. Any man is a citizen who possesses certain political rights, whether he is fit to have them or not, and any ‘ordering of the supreme authority’ is a constitution, even if it gives power to the wrong persons. Not only is the citizen not identical with the good man, but even the good citizen is not necessarily so. There are many grades of citizens and constitutions. As Aristotle holds that the polis exists to realize good life, we might have expected him to say that only those are citizens who are able and purposed to realize it, and only that a constitution which gives rule to those who will rule with a view to the realization of good life, but this he does not do. His wish evidently is not to deny the names of citizen and constitution to any type of citizen and constitution to which these names were given in the ordinary use of language, and yet to point to the type of citizen and constitution which best deserved the name.

The reasons why the old Seventh and Eighth Books should be placed after the Third have been adequately stated by Zeller (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. ii. p. 504) and others. The object of the Second Book, as we are told in its opening sentences, is to prepare the way for the inquiry what constitution is the best, and though, as has been already pointed out (vol. i. p. 226), the Third Book addresses itself to a different and
THE TRANSITION TO THE FOURTH BOOK. xxxv

wider question, the inquiry what each constitution is, it prepares the way for the study of the best constitution (vol. i. p. 291), and its last chapter concludes with the words, 'we must now attempt to state with respect to the best constitution, in what way it comes into being and how it should be instituted', and with an unfinished fragment of the sentence with which the old Seventh Book begins. The inference is obvious that the old Seventh Book originally followed the Third in the MSS. It is not likely that Aristotle, after reaching the threshold of the inquiry as to the best constitution, and indeed actually beginning it, drew back again, and postponed its treatment till he had dealt in three Books (the old Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth) with the polity and the deviation-forms and with changes of constitution, thus parting this inquiry by a long interval from the Second and Third Books, with which it is so closely connected. The old Fourth Book, in fact, speaks of the inquiry into the best constitution as already over (6 (4). 2. 1289a 30 sqq.), and though the inquiry on the subject which we possess may not have been written at the time when these words were penned, there seems to me to be little doubt that Aristotle intended to take up and deal with the question of the best constitution immediately after the Third Book.

It has, indeed, been suggested that the old Seventh and Eighth Books are an independent treatise, not originally designed to form part of the Politics, but the links between the old Seventh Book and the Second and Third are too numerous to allow of this supposition (see Class. Rev. 6. 291 sqq.). No doubt, as has been pointed out in vol. i. p. 292 sqq., the Third and the old Seventh Books do not dovetail into each other with perfect exactness. The transition from the one to the other leaves something to be desired, and the old Seventh Book is not quite in all respects what the Third Book leads us to expect it to be. To the defects of harmony to which reference has been made in vol. i. p. 292 sqq. this may be added, that while the opening chapters of the Third Book define the citizen...
as one who has access to deliberative and judicial office, the younger citizens of the State sketched in the old Seventh Book have no share in deliberative and judicial functions. A difference appears also to exist between the best constitution as sketched in the Fourth (old Seventh) Book, which must evidently be an aristocracy, and the account of aristocracy given in the Third Book. For though both in the best constitution of the former Book and in the aristocracy of the latter the rulers are a comparatively small number of men of high virtue, the reason why their rule is willingly accepted by the ruled is different in the two cases. In the one case it is willingly accepted because the ruled are men fitted to be ruled by rulers of this type as freemen should be ruled (3. 17. 1288 a 9 sqq.), whereas in the other it is willingly accepted because the rulers are older men, and because the ruled will become rulers in their turn on attaining a certain age. We hear nothing in the Third Book of the plan by which rule falls to men of superior age and is acquired by the ruled on the attainment of a certain age, nothing of these precautions for securing the willing submission of the ruled. The Fourth (old Seventh) Book appears to be written with a closer regard to what is practicable than the Third. It is conceivable that, as has been suggested in vol. ii. p. xxxi, note 2, the sketch of the 'best State' contained in the Fourth (old Seventh) Book is a second edition of an earlier sketch which was more completely in harmony with the teaching of the Third Book. But perhaps it is more likely that, some interval of time having elapsed between the composition of the two Books, Aristotle saw, when he came to depict the 'best State' in the Fourth (old Seventh) Book, that some things of which he had dreamed in the Third were but dreams. Thus the absolute kingship of which we hear so much in the Third is dismissed in the Fourth as no longer practicable, and the aristocracy described in the Third assumes a more practicable form in the Fourth.}

1 See the late Prof. H. Sidgwick's remarks in Class. Rev. 6. 143, and my own in 6. 291 sq.
In writing the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books Aristotle has three States especially before him, the weak points of which he does his best to avoid. These are the two ideal States sketched by Plato in his Republic and Laws and the Lacedaemonian State. The main differences between Aristotle’s ‘best State’ and these three States have already been pointed out in the first volume, and our recapitulation of them here need only be a brief and summary one.

Aristotle’s first objection to the State of the Republic is that it does not realize happiness. None of its citizens are truly happy. The most desirable life is not realized in it, the life of fully equipped virtuous activity, for though the first or ruling class has virtue, it has not the equipment which is needed for virtuous action. How can it practise liberality, for instance, if it has no property? Another weak point of Plato’s State is that the members of the second and third classes, though called citizens, are not really so, for they have no share in ruling. The citizens of the ‘best State’, according to Aristotle, should be able and purposed to rule and be ruled with a view to the life in accordance with virtue, and this the second and third classes of Plato’s State are not. The citizens of the ‘best State’, again, should be men of full virtue, and this cannot be said of the members of Plato’s third class, even if it can be said of those of his second. Another weak point dwelt on by Aristotle is that the second class will be discontented with its position, as it is permanently excluded from rule. Aristotle further objects to the communism of the Republic. He wishes the land of his ‘best State’ to be owned by the men of full virtue who are its citizens, though they will freely share the use of it and of all their property with their fellow-citizens and with others. In these and in other points his ‘best State’ diverges from the State of the Republic.

It stands in marked contrast to the State of the Laws also. Its citizen-body and its territory are smaller. The life lived by its citizens is a more ideal life. It is not
simply ‘temperate’, but ‘temperate and liberal’, and its supreme end is not work, but leisure and contemplation, the *diagógē* which is the best employment of leisure. Its constitution differs from that of the State of the Laws. It is an aristocracy, not a polity inclining to oligarchy. It will not covertly favour the wealthier class in elections to offices. It will take stricter precautions against pauperism than the State of the Laws, placing a limit on the procreation of children, not merely on the number of the citizens.

To the Lacedaemonian State Aristotle’s ‘best State’ stands in a relation of far more decided contrast. Plato in the Republic and Laws had sought happiness in the right direction, though in Aristotle’s opinion he had failed to secure it for his citizens. The Lacedaemonian State did not do so; it sought happiness in empire, and valued virtue not for its own sake, but only as a means to empire and external goods. This error led it into a further error; its laws and training developed only one kind of virtue, that through which empire is won, military virtue. A third error was that it failed to train its citizens to make a right use of leisure and to live for *diagógē* as well as work. All these errors will be avoided in Aristotle’s ‘best State’. It will be a State living for the highest end, for leisure and *diagógē* *more* than for work, for peace more than for war, for things noble rather than for things necessary or useful. Its education will be a preparation for a life of this kind; it will develop the virtues of justice, temperance, and wisdom as well as military virtue, and it will develop military virtue better than the Lacedaemonian education did, for it will not brutalize the young by an over-laborious gymnastic training. The dependent classes of the State, unlike those of the Lacedaemonian State, will be organized aright. Its slave-system will be so constituted as to secure the efficiency and submissiveness of the slaves. Its women will not be uncontrolled and uneducated, nor will they be allowed to rule the men. Its citizens will be neither too few nor too many, their numbers being kept at the proper level by a wise regulation of marriage and the procreation
of children and of the right to buy and sell, give and bequeath; there will be no extremes of wealth and poverty within their ranks, no undue love of honour or money; the State will be ruled by its best men, not by persons of no special excellence, and by statesmen who make peace rather than war their end, and who are not only men of action, but also men of philosophical aptitude, not by mere soldiers to whom war is the one thing worth living for. There will be no senate organized in a narrow oligarchical way, no ephorate with over-great powers. On minor contrasts we need not dwell.

Our knowledge of Aristotle's views on the subject of education is imperfect. Education, according to him, should vary with the constitution (i. 13. 1260 b 13 sqq.: 5 (8). i. 1337 a 14 sqq.), yet the only scheme of education he gives us is that which is intended for the 'best State', so that we know little or nothing as to the kind of education which he would recommend under other forms of constitution than the best. That he wishes the State to concern itself with education in all forms of constitution is clear from 5 (8). i. 1337 a 12 sqq. (cp. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 12 sqq.), where we are told that if the ethos which is appropriate to each constitution is not developed in the citizens—that is, the ethos which tends to the maintenance of each—the constitution will not last. The 'best State' for which his scheme of education is designed is a State very unlike those of the present day, for under Aristotle's best constitution the citizens are withdrawn from 'necessary activities' —the activities of agriculture, trade, and industry—in a way in which the men of modern States are not, and then again, a far longer gymnastic training was required in youth with a view to military efficiency in the Greece of Aristotle's day than is required in modern times. Thus we must be prepared to find much in Aristotle's scheme of education which is unsuitable to the present day. Still the broad principles on which it rests are not without interest even for ourselves.
We notice that his scheme includes no arrangements for the education of women and girls, notwithstanding what is said in I. 13. 1260 b 13 sqq., or for the education of the non-citizen classes, notwithstanding what is said in 2. 5. 1264 a 36 sqq. The due regulation of education involves, in Aristotle’s opinion, the regulation of marriage and of the rearing of infant children during the years in which education in the strict sense of the word cannot be said to have begun, and this is fully kept in view by Aristotle, but when school-training has commenced for the child, Aristotle confines his attention to it, though we learn from Protagoras in Plato, Protag. 325 C sqq. that there are many influences not included in school-training which then promote a child’s growth in virtue. Aristotle does not attempt to direct or regulate these.

His scheme of education for the ‘best State’ represents to a large extent a reaction against prevailing notions of education. In his criticism of the actual education of Greece he distinguishes between the States which paid special attention to the education of the young and undertook the direction of it, and the majority of States, which left its direction to the parent and allowed the child to be taught what the parent pleased in the way he thought best.

In the latter class of States, to which Athens belonged, education was little better than a chaos. The parent’s caprice was to a certain extent controlled by the general acceptance of four subjects of education—reading and writing, gymnastic, music, and drawing—but each parent was free to educate his children apart from the rest and to give a special prominence in their education to whichever of these subjects he preferred, so that there was no security for an identity of training, no enforcement of the principle that the citizen belongs to the State and not to himself, nor again was any care taken that the education given to children was in harmony with the constitution and favourable to its maintenance.

Marriage was left to a great extent unregulated, with the
result that children were often the offspring of over-young or over-old parents. The rearing of infancy was also left unregulated, nor were children's minds sufficiently protected from evil influences in the earlier years of life, the years in which, according to Aristotle, permanent tastes are formed. Not only were the games and nursery-tales of infancy often other than they should be, but children were allowed to be too much in the company of slaves and were too much exposed to hearing indecent language and seeing indecent pictures and statues. Boys and youths were allowed freely to witness the performance of iambi and comedy. The subjects chosen for youthful study were studied with a wrong aim and in a wrong way. Reading, writing, and drawing were studied merely for their utility, and music for the pleasure it gave. Music was often studied in too technical a fashion with a view to the attainment of a skill in execution suitable rather to virtuosi than to citizens. The only subject studied with a view to virtue was gymnastic, which was thought to produce courage. We do not hear of any studies by which it was sought to develop other virtues. Education in these States was evidently too utilitarian and too narrow in its aim; it needed to be made more capable of influencing the character as a whole and the reason.

The States, on the other hand, which paid special attention to the education of the young and made it a matter of public concern erred in a somewhat different way. The

1 This would only be true of the children of the better-to-do citizens, for we gather from 8 (6). 8. 1333 a 5 sq. that the poorer citizens had no slaves.

Aristotle's feeling as to utilitarianism in education may be gathered from his remark (4 (7). 14. 1333 b 1 sqq.) that the aim in the education of the young should be to fit them to do both work which is necessary and useful and work which is noble, but the latter more than the former. He treats as vulgar (φορτίκια) the preference of 'virtues thought to be useful and more productive of gain' to virtues of a higher kind (4 (7). 14. 1333 b 9 sq.). In 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 37 sqq. he hints, not without some quiet sarcasm, that reading and writing should not be studied with a merely utilitarian aim, but rather because studying them enables us to master other studies, and that drawing should not be studied to save us from being cheated in the purchase of household utensils, but because the study of it makes us scientific observers of physical beauty, adding that 'to seek what is useful everywhere does not at all bef fit great-souled and free-spirited men'.
Lacedaemonian State was one of them. We do not learn from Aristotle whether more care was taken at Sparta than elsewhere to regulate marriage and the rearing of infants and to protect early childhood from corrupting influences, but we know that, at any rate after a certain age, the State took the education of the young into its own hands, withdrawing it from the control of the parent, and educating the boys together and in the same way and with a view to the welfare of the whole State, severing them to a great extent from home and from contact with slaves. So far it did well, but its gymnastic training was too severe and laborious, and here again, as elsewhere, the education given was too narrow, failing to train the whole man, and also too utilitarian, though it studied that which was useful to the State rather than that which was useful to the individual. Its aim was to develop the more utilitarian virtues (4 (7). 14. 1333 b 9 sq.), the virtues which favour the acquisition of empire, not to develop all the virtues nor to develop virtue for its own sake. The Lacedaemonian training was not even the best training for war or the winning of empire; much less was it the best for the preservation of empire when won, for it did not develop justice or temperance or the intellectual excellence which enables men to use aright the leisure which follows the acquisition of empire, and saves them from degenerating under the influence of ease and plenty and peace. It was based on a systematic preference of that which is useful to that which is noble, of that which is lower to that which is higher, of that which is only a means to that which is the end. It taught men to prefer external goods and empire to virtue, the lower kinds of virtue to the higher, war to peace, and work to leisure.

Aristotle's aim in education is to develop the whole man—the body, the appetites (δρέξεως, including θυμός, ἐπιθυμία, and βουλήσεως: see note on 1334 b 19), and the reason—in such a way as to harmonize the three elements in a willing co-operation for the best end, a life spent in the exercise of all the virtues, moral and intellectual, and
especially the highest of them, those connected with the right use of leisure. In Aristotle's view he is a truly educated man who has learnt from youth upwards to love virtue for its own sake, and virtue not of one kind only, but of all, whose youthful love of virtue has been crowned with reason, and in whom reason, fully developed both on its practical and on its contemplative side and working for the best end, is mated with appetites which take pleasure in obeying it and with a body well prepared for the service of both. Aristotle's conception of education agrees with his conception of the man of full virtue (σωτηράσιος) as a man in whom many excellences are combined (3. 11. 1281 b 10 sqq.). He would not be satisfied with an education which merely brought the body and the lower appetites under the control of some higher appetite, such as the love of the good; the appetites must, indeed, be trained to love what is good, but that is not enough; they must be brought under the control of reason fully developed and directed to the best end

As the body develops before the soul and the appetites of the soul before reason, the education of the body should come first, then that of the appetites, and then that of the reason, but the body must be so trained as to subserve the development of the soul, and the appetites so trained as to subserve the development of the reason. The body and the appetites are apparently conceived by Aristotle as trained by habituation (5 (8). 3. 1338 b 4 sq.), or in other words by a repetition of acts resulting in a formed habit, whereas the reason is mainly trained by instruction (Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 11o3a 15 sq.: Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1332 b 10 sq.). Thus training by habituation comes first, training by reason later (Pol. 5 (8). 3. 1338 b 4 sq.). We have been already told in the Nicomachean Ethics (10. 10. 1179 b 23 sqq.) that training by habituation must precede training by

1 We miss in Aristotle's scheme of education any training specially designed to develop activity in accordance with virtue, though he lays stress on this as an element in happiness (4 (7). 1. 1323 b 22, 40 sqq.).
teaching, but the cause assigned there for this is not that reason develops later than the body and the appetites, but that training by teaching will not be effectual in producing virtue if it is not preceded by a long course of habituation beginning in childhood.

The education of the body must, in Aristotle's view, be such as to make it a fit instrument for the soul; its growth must not be stunted nor its beauty impaired (5(8). 4. 1338 b 9 sqq.), it must not be subjected in early youth to toils so excessive as to enfeeble it for the work of after-years (5(8). 4. 1338 b 40 sqq.) or to brutalize the character (5(8). 4. 1338 b 11 sqq.), nor must hard work be imposed on the body and mind simultaneously (5(8). 4. 1339 a 7 sqq.), nor again must the training of the body be such as to unfit it for subsequent studies or to produce βαρανσία (5(8). 6. 1341 a 6 sqq.).

The education of the appetites—i.e. of θυμός, ἐπιθυμία, and βουλήσις—must be such as to lead them to love the noble qualities of character which reason will later on give them additional reasons for loving, and thus to prepare them to render a willing obedience to reason when it develops. The appetites must, therefore, be habituated to take pleasure in the right things; the child must be watched and guided in its pleasures from infancy. A well-ordered gymnastic training must follow, not too laborious in early youth, and, midway in this, three years devoted to the study of reading, writing, drawing, and music. The musical training of the young should be such as to lead them to love ennobling melodies and the reproductions of mildness, courage, temperance, and other virtues which melodies contain, and so eventually to love these virtues themselves. Music should be the ally and precursor of reason, preparing the way for her before she appears, and beginning the wholesome discipline of the likings which she will later on carry to completion. No attempt must be made to hasten the development of reason, but, on the other hand, there must be nothing in the musical training of youth which will not be favourable to it; the use of the pipe (αὐλός) in
education, for instance, is not favourable to it (5(8). 6. 1341 b 6), and therefore must be rejected.

So important a part of youthful education is the training of the appetites to feel pleasure in the right things represented by Aristotle to be, that we might be tempted to take it for the whole. But the training of the body and the reason are also essential parts of youthful education; indeed, Aristotle sometimes distinguishes παθεία from habituation (e.g. in 3. 18. 1288 b 1 and 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 16), or in other words from the training of the appetites.

The direct education of the reason, which is to follow the education of the appetites, is not dealt with in the Politics as it has come down to us, though we may infer from 4(7). 14. 1333 a 24 sqq. that it will be directed to the development both of the practical and of the contemplative reason, and will make the development of the latter its supreme end.

Aristotle's conception of education commends itself to us more than the scheme by which he seeks to realize it. The amount of time which he devotes to gymnastic training appears to us to be disproportionately large. He surrenders to it all the years from seven to twenty-one with the exception of three. He does so partly because in ancient Greece, as we have seen, a long gymnastic training in youth was essential to full military efficiency, partly because without a suitably developed body neither the appetites nor the reason can be all that they should be, and partly because, as hard mental and bodily work must not be required of the young simultaneously, and bodily exercise is indispensable in youth for the growth and development of the body, mental work in youth must necessarily be confined within narrow limits. He is thus led greatly to shorten the amount of time devoted in youth to the work to which he attaches so much importance—that of training the appetites to take pleasure in the right things. For this kind of training he relies mainly on the study of music, and yet he allot's to this study only a very small part of the first twenty-one years of life—
a fraction of the three years after puberty which he gives up to other studies than gymnastic. Does he not hope too much from this brief musical training? Can it do all that he expects it to do for the moral improvement of the boys who are to receive it? It may be doubted, indeed, whether it is by a study of particular subjects, such as music, that a love of what is noble is instilled into the young. Is it not rather by intercourse with a parent or teacher or friend whose example and influence win the heart to a love of goodness? Then again, does not Aristotle underrate the extent to which the reason is susceptible of cultivation in boyhood? He admits in i. 13. 1260 a 13 sq. that boys possess the deliberative element of the soul, though in an imperfect form. Why then should not this element receive more cultivation in youth than Aristotle provides for it? Some kinds of mental work, again, fall well within the range of the boyish mind; yet Aristotle makes no provision for the training of those intellectual aptitudes which boys may well possess. Is it quite clear that even in the education of the body and the appetites training by habituation will suffice by itself without an admixture of training by reason? Another question may well be asked. Does Aristotle's scheme of education call for enough effort from the young? Is not their 'distaste for everything unsweetened' too much studied in it? Would not a training which gave them more difficulties to face and to conquer develop in them more force of will and be more really useful to them? Does not education largely consist in acquiring the power and the will to do that which is distasteful to us, when it ought to be done?
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Γ'.

Τῷ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκόπουντι, καὶ τῖς ἐκάστῃ καὶ 1274 b 32
ποία τις, σχεδὸν πρώτη σκέψις περὶ πόλεως ἰδεῖν, τί ποτε
ἐστίν ἡ πόλις· νῦν ἡ γὰρ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν φάσκοντες
τὴν πόλιν πεπραγμένην τὴν πράξειν, οἱ δ' οὗ τὴν πόλιν ἄλλα 35
τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἡ τῶν τύραννων τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ
νομοθέτου πάσαν ὀργὰν τὴν πραγματείαν ὀδον περὶ πόλιν·
2 ἡ δὲ πολιτεία τῶν τὴν πόλιν οἰκούντων ἐστὶ τάξις τις. ἐπεὶ
δ' ἡ πόλις τῶν συγκεκριμένων, καθάπερ ἄλλο τῶν ὁλων
μὲν συνεστῶτων δ' ἐκ πολλῶν μορίων, δὴ λοιπὸν ὁτί πρῶτερον 40
ὁ πολίτης ἄνθρωπος· ἡ γὰρ πόλις πολιτῶν τι πλῆθός ἐστιν,
ὡστε τίνα χρή καλεῖν πολίτην καὶ τίς ὁ πολίτης ἐστι, σκέ- 1275 a
πτέον. καὶ γὰρ ὁ πολίτης ἀμφισβητεῖται πολλάκις· οὐ
gὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες εἶναι πολίτην ἐστι γὰρ
tις δὲ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ πολίτης ὃν ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πολλάκις
3 οὐκ ἐστὶ πολίτης. τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἄλλους ποὺς τυχάνοντας 5
tαύτης τῆς προσηγορίας, οὐν τοὺς ποιητοὺς πολιτικάς, ἀφε-
tέον· ο δὲ πολίτης οὐ τῶ οἰκείων ποι τολίτης ἐστίν (καὶ
4 γὰρ μέτοικοι καὶ δοῦλοι κοινωνοῦσι τῆς ὀικῆσιος), οὐδ' οἱ
τῶν δικαίων μετέχοντες οὕτως ὁστε καὶ δίκην ὑπέχειν καὶ
δικᾶξεθαι (τούτο γὰρ ὑπάρχει καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ συμβόλων κοι- 10
νονούσιν· καὶ γὰρ ταύτα τούτως ὑπάρχει· πολλαχοῦ μὲν οὖν
οὐδὲ τούτων τελεός οἱ μέτοικοι μετέχουσι, ἀλλὰ νέμειν
5 ἀνάγκη προστάτητι, ὡστε ἀτελῶς πως μετέχουσι τῆς τοιαύτης
κοινωνίας), ἀλλὰ καθάπερ καὶ παῖδας τοὺς ἡμῖν ἔτη· ἂν-
κιαν ἐγγεγραμμένους καὶ τοὺς γέροντας τοὺς ἀφειμένους 15
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φατέον εἶναι μὲν πως πολίτας, οὐχ ἀπλῶς δὲ λιὰν ἀλλὰ προστιθέντας τοὺς μὲν ἀτελεῖς τοὺς δὲ παρηκμακότας ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἐτερον (οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει δὴλον γὰρ τὸ λεγόμενον). ξηποτομεῖ γὰρ τὸν ἀπλῶς πολίτην καὶ μηδὲν ἔχοντα
20 τοιοῦτον ἐγκλήμα διορθώσεως δεόμενον, ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀτέμων καὶ φυγάδων ἐστὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ διαπορεῖ καὶ λύειν. πολίτης δ' ἀπλῶς οὐδὲν τῶν ἀλλῶν ὁρίζεται μᾶλ-6 λον ἡ τῷ μετέχειν κρίσεως καὶ ἄρχης. τῶν δ' ἄρχων αἱ μὲν εἰσὶ διηρημέναι κατὰ χρόνον, ὡστε ἐνίας μὲν ὅλως δις
25 τὸν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔξεστιν ἄρχειν, ἢ διὰ τινῶν ὄρισμένων χρόνων' ὅ δ' ἀόριστος, οὗν ὁ δικασθῇ καὶ ἐκκλησιαστῇς. τάχα 7 μὲν οὖν ἀν φαίη τις οὖν' ἄρχοντας εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους, οὐδὲ μετέχειν διὰ ταύτ' ἄρχης'. καίτοι γελοῖον τοὺς κυριώτατους ἀποστερεῖν ἄρχης. ἀλλὰ διαφερέτω μηδὲν περὶ ὀνόματος
30 γὰρ ὁ λόγος· ἀνώνυμον γὰρ τὸ κοίνων ἐπὶ δικαστοῦ καὶ ἐκκλησιαστοῦ, τί δει ταύτ' ἄμφω καλεῖν. ἐστο δὴ διορισμοῦ χάριν ἀόριστος ἄρχης. τίθεμεν δὴ πολίτας τοὺς οὕτω μετε-8 χοντας. ὁ μὲν οὗν μάλιστ' ἀν ἐφαρμόσας πολίτης ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς λεγομένους πολίτας σχεδὸν τοιοῦτός ἐστιν' δει δὲ
35 μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι τῶν πραγμάτων ἐν ὅσι τὰ ὑποκείμενα διαφέρει τῷ εἴδει, καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐστὶ πρῶτον τὸ δὲ δεύτερον τὸ δ' ἐχόμενον, ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲν ἐστιν, ἢ τοιαύτα, τὸ κοινὸν, ἢ γλαύχρως. τὰς δὲ πολιτείας ὅρῳμεν 9 εἴδει διαφερούσας ἅλληλων, καὶ τὰς μὲν ὑστέρας τὰς δὲ
1275 ἢ προτέρας οὖσας· τὰς γὰρ ἡμαρτησιν καὶ παρεκβεβηκυνιάς ἀναγκαίον υστέρας εἶναι τῶν ἀναμαρτητῶν (τὰς δὲ παρεκ-βεβηκυνιάς πῶς λέγομεν, υστέρον ἐστίν φανερὸν). ὅστε καὶ τὸν πολίτην ἐτερον ἀναγκαίον εἶναι τὸν καθ' ἐκάστην πολι-5 τείαν. διόπερ ὁ λεχθεῖς ἐν μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ μάλιστ' ἐστὶν 10 πολίτης, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις εὐνόεται μὲν, οὐ μὴν ἀναγκαίον. (ἐν) ἐνίας γὰρ οὐκ ἐστι δὴλον, οὐδ' ἐκκλησίαν νομίζουσιν ἅλλα συγκλήτους, καὶ τὰς δίκας δικάζουσι κατὰ μέρος, οὖν ἐν Λακεδαιμονὶ τὰς τῶν συμβολαῖων δικάζει τῶν
1275 a 16—1276 a 3.

11 δ' ἰσως ἀρχή τις ἑτέρα. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ Καρχηδόνα: πάσας γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τινὲς κρίνουσι τὰς δίκας. ἀλλ' ἔχει γὰρ διόρθωσιν οὶ τοῦ πολίτου διορισμοῦ· εὖ γὰρ ταῖς ἀλλαίς πολιτείαις οὐχ ὁ ἀόριστος ἀρχὸν ἐκκλησιαστὴς ἔστι καὶ δικαστὴς· ἀλλὰ ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχήν ὀρισμένος· 15 τοῦτον γὰρ ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τισιν ἀποδέδοται τὸ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ δικαίωσαι· 

12 δικαίων ἡ περὶ πάντων ἡ περὶ τινῶν. τίς μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ὁ πολίτης, ἐκ τοῦτων φανερῶν· ὃ γὰρ ἐξουσία κοινωνεῖν ἀρχὴς θατέρου μονον, οἰνον πατρὸς ἢ μητρός· οἱ δὲ καὶ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πλέον ἰητούσιν, οἰνον ἐπὶ πάππους δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἢ πλείους. οὕτω δὲ ὀρισμένοις πολιτικῶς καὶ ταχέως, ἀποροδότω τινὲς τὸν 25 τρίτον ἕκεινον ἢ τέταρτον, πῶς ἔσται πολίτης. Τοργίας μὲν οὖν ὁ Δεοντίνος, τὰ μὲν ἰσως ἀπορών τὰ δ' εἰρωνεύμονες, ἐφη, καθάπερ ὅλμους εἰναι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ὀλμοποιῶν πεποιημένους, οὕτω καὶ Δαρισταίους τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν δημοιργῶν πε- 3 ποιημένους, εἰναι γὰρ τινας Δαρισταίους· ἔστι δ' ἀπλοῦν· 30 εἰ γὰρ μετείχον κατὰ τὸν ῥήθεντα διορισμὸν τῆς πολιτείας, ἦσαν πολιταί· και γὰρ οὔθε δυνατὸν ἐφαρμόττειν τὸ ἐκ πολίτου ἢ ἐκ πολιτιδος ἐπὶ τῶν πρῶτων οἰκησάντων ἢ κτι- σάντων. ἀλλ' ἰσως ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον ἔχει ἀπορίαν, ὅσι μετέχον μεταβολῆς γενομένης πολιτείας, οἰον Ἀθήνησιν 35 ἐποίησε Κλεισθένης μετὰ τὴν τῶν τυράννων ἐκβολής· πολ- 4 λοις γὰρ ἐφυλέτευσε ξένους καὶ δόους μετοίκους. τὸ δ' ἀμ- φισβήτημα πρὸς τοὺς ἐστίν οὐ τὶς πολίτης, ἀλλὰ πότερον ἀδίκως ἢ δικαίως. καὶ τοῖς καὶ τοῦτο τις ἐτί προσαπορηθεῖεν, ἀρ' εἰ μὴ δικαίως πολίτης, οὐ πολίτης, ὡς ταυτὸ δυναμένου 1276 a 5 τοῦ τ' ἀδίκου καὶ τοῦ ψευδοὺς. ἐπεὶ δ' ὀράμεν καὶ ἀρχοντᾶς 

tinas ἀδίκως, οὐς ἀρχεῖν μὲν φήσομεν ἀλλ' οὐ δικαίως, ὁ
δὲ πολίτης ἄρχῃ τινὶ διωρισμένος ἐστὶν (ὅ γὰρ κοινωνῶν τῆς
5 τοιασδέ ἄρχής πολίτης ἐστὶν, ὡς ἐφαμεν), δῆλον ὃτι πολί-
3 ται μὲν εἶναι φατέον καὶ τούτως, περὶ δὲ τοῦ δικαίου ἢ
μὴ δικαίως συνάστει πρὸς τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον ἀμφισ-
βήτησιν. ἀποροῦσι γὰρ τινὲς πόθ᾽ ἡ πόλις ἐπραξῆ καὶ πότε
οὐχ ἡ πόλις, οἷον ὅταν ἔξ ὀλιγαρχίας ἢ τυραννίδος γένηται
10 δημοκρατία. τότε γὰρ οὔτε τὰ συμβόλαια ἔνει βούλονται 2
διαλύειν, ὡς οὐ τῆς πόλεως ἀλλὰ τοῦ τυράννου λαβόντος,
οὔτ᾽ ἀλλὰ πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων, ὡς ἐνίας τῶν πολιτειῶν τῷ
κρατεῖν οὕσας, ἀλλὰ οὐ διὰ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον. εἰπερ οὖν
καὶ δημοκρατοῦνται τινὲς κατὰ τὸν τρόπον τούτον, ὁμοίως
15 τῆς πόλεως φατέον εἶναι ταύτης τὰς τῆς πολιτείας ταύτης
πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος.
ἔοικε δ᾽ οίκειος ὁ λόγος εἶναι τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης, πῶς 3
ποτὲ χρὴ λέγειν τὴν πόλιν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἢ μὴ τὴν
αὐτὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέραν. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιπολαιοτάτη τῆς ἀπορίας
20 ἥττησις περὶ τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐστὶν· ἐνδέχεται
γὰρ διαζευχθῆναι τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ τοὺς
μὲν ἑτερον τοὺς δ᾽ ἑτερον οἰκήσαι τόπον. ταύτην μὲν οὖν 4
πραστέραν θετεῖν τὴν ἀπορίαν (πολλαχῶς γὰρ τῆς πόλεως
λεγομένης ἐστὶ πως εὐμάρεια τῆς τοιαύτης ἥττησις). ὁμοίως
25 δὲ καὶ τῶν τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικοῦντων ἀνθρώπων πότε δεὶ
νομίζειν μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν. οὖ γὰρ δὴ τοῖς ςεχεσιν 5
ἐή γὰρ ἃν Πελοποννήσῳ περιβαλεῖν ἐν τεῖχος. τοιαύτη
δ᾽ ἵσως ἐστὶ καὶ Βαβυλῶν καὶ πᾶσα ἡτίς ἤχει περιγραφῆν
μᾶλλον ἐθνος ἢ πόλεως· ἃς γέ φαιν ἐλαξωκιάς τρίτην
30 ἡμέραν οὐκ ἀισθένει τι μέρος τῆς πόλεως. ἀλλὰ περὶ 6
μὲν ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας εἰς ἀλλὸν καἱρὸν χρήσιμος ἢ σκέ-
ψις· περὶ γὰρ μεγέθους τῆς πόλεως, τὸ τε πόσον καὶ
πότερον ἐθνος ἢ πλείον συμφέρει, δεὶ μὴ λαυθάνειν τὸν
πολιτικὸν· ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικοῦντων τῶν αὐτῶν τόπον,
35 πότερον ἐως ἢ τὸ γένος ταύτο τῶν κατοικοῦντων, τῆν
αὐτὴν εἶναι φατέον πόλιν, καίπερ αἰεὶ τῶν μὲν ϑεορμε-
νων τῶν δὲ γινομένων, ὥσπερ καὶ ποταμοὺς εἰώθαμεν λέγειν τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ κρήνας τὰς αὐτὰς, καίπερ ἄεὶ τοῦ μὲν ἐπι-
γινομένου νάματος τοῦ δ' ὑπεξιόντος, ἡ τοῦ μὲν ἀνθρώπους
φατέον εἶναι τοὺς αὐτοὺς διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ
πόλιν ἐτέραν; εἶπερ γὰρ ἐστὶ κοινωνία τὶς ἡ πόλις, ἔστι δὲ 1276 b
κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας, γιγανίμενης ἐτέρας τῷ εἰδεὶ καὶ
dιαφερούσης τῆς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δύσειν ἄν καὶ τήν πόλιν ἐναί 
μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν, ὥσπερ γε καὶ χορὸν ὅτε μὲν κομικὸν ὅτε δὲ 
τραγικὸν ἐτέρων εἶναι φαμεν, τῶν 5

8 αὐτῶν πολλάκις ἀνθρώπων ὄντων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πάσαν ἀλλὴν κοινωνίαν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἐτέραν, ἂν εἰδὸς ἐτέρων ἡ τῆς 
συνθέσεως, ὧν ἄρμονίαν τῶν αὐτῶν φθόγγων ἐτέραν εἶναι 
9 λέγομεν, ἂν ὅτε μὲν ἡ Δόριος ὅτε δὲ Φρύγιος. εἰ δὴ 
τούτων ἔχει τῶν τρόπων, φανερῶν ὅτι μάλιστα λεκτέον τὴν 10 
αὐτὴν πόλιν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας· όνομα δὲ κα-
λειν ἐτέρων ἡ ταύτων ἐξεστὶ καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικοῦντων 
αὐτὴν καὶ πάμπαν ἐτέρων ἀνθρώπων. εἰ δὲ δίκαιον δια-
λύειν ἡ μὴ διαλύειν, ὅταν εἰς ἐτέραν μεταβάλη πολιτείαν 
ἡ πόλις, λόγως ἐτερος.

Τῶν δὲ νῦν εἰρημένων ἐχόμενον ἐστὶν εἰποκέψασθαι 4 
πότερον τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετῆν ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου 
σπουδαίου θετοῦ, ἡ μὴ τὴν αὐτήν. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ γε τούτο 
tυχεῖν δεῖ ξητήσεσι, τὴν τοῦ πολίτου τύπῳ τινὶ πρῶτον 
ληπτέον, ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ πλωτὴρ εἰς τις τῶν κοινωνῶν ἐστὶν, 20 
2 ὡσεὶ καὶ τὸν πολιτὴν φαμέν. τῶν δὲ πλωτηρῶν καίπερ 
ἀνομοίων ὄντων τὴν δύναμιν (ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐρέτης, ὁ δὲ 
kυβερνήτης, ὁ δὲ προφετής, ὁ δ' ἀλλὴν τὺν' ἔχων τοιαύτην ἐπωνυμίαν) δὴλον ὡς ὁ μὲν ἀκριβέστατος ἐκάστου λόγος 
ἰδίος ἐσται τῆς ἀρετῆς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κοινὸς τις ἐφαρμόσει 25 
pάσιν. ἡ γὰρ σωτηρία τῆς ναυτιλίας ἔργων ἐστὶν αὐτῶν 
3 πάντων τούτου γὰρ ἐκατός ὁρέγεται τῶν πλωτηρῶν. ὁμοίως 
tοῖνν καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν, καίπερ ἀνομοίων ὄντων, ἡ σωτηρία 
tῆς κοινωνίας ἔργων ἐστί, κοινωνία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία.
30 διδ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀναγκαίον εἶναι τοῦ πολίτου πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν. εἴπερ οὖν ἐστὶ πλεῖον πολιτείας εἰδή, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τοῦ σπουδαίου πολίτου μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τελείαν· τὸν δ' ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φαμὲν κατὰ μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τελείαν, ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐνδέχεται πολίτην ὀντα σπουδαίον 4

35 μὴ κεκτηθήσαι τὴν ἀρετὴν καθ' ἦν σπουδαίος ἀνήρ, φανερῶν οὖ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον ἐστὶ διαποροῦντας ἐπελθεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας. εἰ γὰρ 5 ἀδύνατον εξ ἀπάντων σπουδαίων ὄντων εἶναι πόλιν, δεῖ δ' ἐκαστὸν τὸ καθ' αὐτὸν ἔργον εὐ ποιεῖν, τούτῳ δ' ἀπ' ἀρετῆς·

40 ἐπεί δὲ ἀδύνατον ὁμοίως εἶναι πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, οὐκ ἂν 1277 a εἴη μία ἀρετὴ πολίτου καὶ ἄνδρὸς ἁγαθοῦ. τὴν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σπουδαίου πολίτου δεὶ πάσιν ὑπάρχειν (οὕτω γὰρ ἀρίστῃν ἀναγκαίον εἶναι τὴν πόλιν), τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἄνδρος τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ πάντας ἀναγκαίοις ἁγαθοῦ εἶναι τοὺς ἐν 5 τῇ σπουδαίᾳ πόλει πολίτας. ἔτι ἐπεὶ εξ ἀνομοίων ἡ πόλις, 6 ὡσπερ ζῷον εὐθὺς ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆ ἐκ λόγου καὶ ὀρέξεως καὶ οἰκίας εἰς ἄνδρος καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ κτήσις ἐκ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ πόλις εἰς ἀπάντων τε τούτων καὶ πρὸς τούτως εἰς ἀλλῶν ἀνομοίων

10 συνεστηκέναι εἰδῶν, ἀνάγκη μὴ μίαν εἶναι τὴν τῶν πολιτῶν πάντων ἀρετὴν, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ τῶν χορευτῶν κορυφαίον καὶ παραστάτου. διότι μὲν τοῖνυν ἄπλως οὐχ ἡ αὐτή, φανερὸν 7 ἐκ τούτων· ἀλλ' ἄρα ἔσται τινὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἁρετὴ πολίτου τε σπουδαίου καὶ ἄνδρος σπουδαίοι; φαμέν δὴ τὸν ἄρχοντα τῶν 15 σπουδαίων ἁγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ φρόνιμον, τόν δὲ πολιτικὸν ἀναγκαίον εἶναι φρόνιμον. καὶ τὴν παιδείαν δ' εὐθὺς 8 ἐτέραν εἶναι λέγουσι τινες ἁρχόντων, ὡσπερ καὶ φαίνονται οἱ τῶν βασιλέων υἱεῖς ἐπικήν καὶ πολεμικὴν παιδεύομενοι, καὶ Εὐριπίδης φησίν "μὴ μοι τὰ κόμψ', ἀλλ' ὄν πόλει 20 δει, ως οὐσάν τινα ἁρχόντος παιδείαν. εἰ δὲ ἡ αὐτὴ ἁρετὴ 9 ἁρχόντως τε ἁγαθοῦ καὶ ἄνδρος ἁγαθοῦ, πολιτης δ' ἐστι καὶ ὁ ἁρχόμενος, οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀπλῶς ἄν εἴη πολίτου καὶ ἄνδρος,
τινὸς μέντοι πολίτου· οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρχοντος καὶ πολίτου, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ’ ἦσος Ἰάσων ἐφή πεινήν, ὅτε μὴ τυραννοὶ, ὥστε γὰρ ἠρχεσθαι καὶ ἁρχεῖν, καὶ πολιτὸς δοκίμου (δοκεῖ) ἡ ἀρέτη· εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἁρχεῖν, καὶ ἁρχεῖν καὶ ἁρχεσθαι καλῶς. εἰ οὖν τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀνδρὸς τίθεμεν ἀρχικὴν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ πολιτοῦ ἁμφοῦ, οὐκ ἂν εἰς ἁμφοὶ ἐπανεῖται ὁμοίως. ἐπεί οὖν ποτὲ δοκεῖ ἐτερα καὶ οὐ ταυτὰ δείν τὸν ἀρχοντα μαν-30θάνειν καὶ τὸν ἀρχόμενον, τὸν δὲ πολιτὴν ἁμφότερ’ ἐπιστασθαι καὶ μετέχειν ἁμφοῦ, τούτους ἄν κατίδοι τις. ἐτι γὰρ ἀρχὴ δεσποτικῆς ταύτην δὲ τὴν περὶ τάναγκαι λέγομεν, ἃ ποιεῖν ἐπιστασθαι τὸν ἀρχοντ’ οὐκ ἀναγκαίον, ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον’ θάτερον δὲ καὶ ἀνδραποδῶδες. 35

12 λέγω δὲ θάτερον τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ὑπηρετεῖν τὰς διακονικὰς πράξεις. δοῦλοι δ’ εἰδὴ πλείω λέγομεν· αἱ γὰρ ἐργασίαι πλείοις. διὸν ἐν μέρος κατέχονσιν οἱ χερνήτες οὕτοι δ’ εἰςίν, ἄσπερ σημαίνει καὶ τοῦν’ αὐτούς, οἱ ζωντες ἀπὸ τῶν χειρῶν, ἐν οἷς ὁ βάναυσος τεχνιτὴς ἐστίν. διὸ παρ’1277 b ἐνίοις οἱ μετείχον οἱ δημιουργοὶ τὸ παλαιὸν ἀρχῶν, πρὶν δήμον γενέσθαι τὸν ἔσχατον. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔργα τῶν ἄρχο-μένων οὕτως οὐ δεῖ τὸν ἀγάθον οὐδὲ τὸν πολιτικόν οὐδὲ τὸν πολιτὴν τὸν ἀγάθον μανθάνειν, εἰ μὴ ποτε χρείας χάριν 5 αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἐτι συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι τὸν μὲν δεσπότην τὸν δὲ δοῦλον’ ἀλλ’ ἐστὶ τις ἀρχῆ καθ’ ἡν ἀρχέi 13 τῶν ὁμοίων τῷ γένει καὶ τῶν ἑλευθέρων· ταύτην γὰρ λέγομεν εἰναι τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρχὴν, ἣν δεῖ τὸν ἄρχοντα ἀρχόμενον μαθεῖν, οἶνον ἰππαρχεῖν ἰππαρχηθέντα, στρατηγεῖν ἰο στρατηγηθέντα καὶ ταξιαρχήσαντα καὶ λοχαγῆσαντα. διὸ λέγεται καὶ τοῦτο καλῶς, ὡς οὖν ἐστιν εὖ ἀρξαί μὴ 15 ἀρχθέντα. τούτων δὲ ἀρέτη μὲν ἑτέρα, δεῖ δὲ τὸν πολιτήν τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπιστασθαι καὶ δύνασθαι καὶ ἁρχεσθαι καὶ ἁρχεῖν, καὶ αὐτὴ ἀρέτη πολίτου, τὸ τὴν τῶν ἑλευθέρων 15 ἀρχὴν ἐπίστασθαι ἐπ’ ἁμφότερα. καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ἄγαθοῦ
ἀμφω, καὶ εἰ ἐπερεύ εἰδὸς σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀρχικῆς, καὶ γὰρ ἀρχομένου μὲν ἐλευθέρου δὲ, δὴ λοι ὅτι οὐ μία ἂν εἶν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρετή, ὅν δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ' εἴδη

20 ἔχουσα καθ' ἀ ἁρξὲι καὶ ἁρξὲται, ὃσπερ ἄνδρος καὶ γυναικὸς ἐτέρα σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρία (δόξα γὰρ ἂν εἶναι 17 δειλὸς ἀνήρ, εἰ ὅτως ἄνδρειος εἶ ὃσπερ γυνὴ ἄνδρεία, καὶ γυνὴ λάλος, εἰ ὅτω κοσμία εἶ ὃσπερ ὁ ἀνήρ ὁ ἀγαθὸς), ἐπεὶ καὶ οἰκονομία ἐτέρα ἄνδρος καὶ γυναικὸς (τοῦ μὲν

25 γὰρ κτάσθαι, τής δὲ φυλάττειν ἐργον ἐστὶν) ἡ δὲ φρονήσις ἀρχοντὸς ὁδὸς ἀρετὴς μόνης: τὰς γὰρ ἄλλας ἐοικεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κοινὰς καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἀρχομένου δὲ ὃς ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀρετὴς φρονήσις, ἀλλὰ δόξα 18 ἀληθῆς: ὃσπερ αὐθοποιοῖς γὰρ ὁ ἀρχόμενος, ᾧ' ἀρχῶν

30 αὐλητὴς ὁ χρώμενος, πότερον μὲν ὃν ἡ αὐτὴ ἁρετὴ ἄνδρος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου σπουδαίος ἢ ἐτέρα, καὶ πῶς ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ πῶς ἐτέρα, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων.

5 Περὶ δὲ τῶν πολίτην ἐτι λείπεται τίς τῶν ἀπορίῶν, ὃς ἀληθῶς γὰρ πότερον πολίτης ἐστὶν ὃς κοινοῖς ἐξεστὶν

35 ἀρχῆς, ἡ καὶ τοὺς βαναύσους πολίτας θετέων; εἰ μὲν ὃν καὶ τῶν τοιαύτων οὐσι μὴ μετέστιν ἀρχῆς, οὐχ ὃν τε παντὸς εἶναι πολίτου τὴν τοιαύτην ἁρετὴν (ὁτὸς γὰρ πολίτης): εἰ δὲ μηθεὶς τῶν τοιούτων πολίτης, ἐν τίνι μέρει θετέως ἐκαστος; οὐδὲ γὰρ μέτοικος οὐδὲ ξένος. ἡ δὲ γα τούτων τῶν λόγων

1278 α γον οὐδὲν φήσωμεν συμβαίνειν ἄτοπον; οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ δοῦλοι τῶν εἰρημένων οὐδέν, οὐδ' ἢ ἀπελεύθεροι. τούτῳ γὰρ ἀληθές, ὡς οὐ πάντας θετέον πολίτας ὃν ἀνευ οὐκ ἄν εἰ ἐνα πόλις, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἢ παῖδες οὐσαύτως πολίται καὶ οἱ ἄνδρες, ἀλλ' 5 οἱ μὲν ἀπλῶς οἱ δ' ἢ ζυγόθεσως: πολίται μὲν γὰρ εἰσὶν, ἀλλ' ἀπελεύθεροι. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις παρ' ἐνόιοις 3 ἢν δοῦλον τὸ βάναυσον ἡ ξενικῶν διὸ διότι οἱ πολλοὶ τοιοῦτοι καὶ νῦν' ἡ δὲ βελτίστη πόλις οὐ ποιήσει βάναυσον πολίτην.

εἰ δὲ καὶ οὐτος πολίτης, ἀλλὰ πολίτου ἁρετὴν ἢν ἐπιτημεν

10 λεκτέον οὐ παντός, οὐδ' ἐλευθέρου μόνον, ἀλλ' οὐσι τῶν ἐργῶν
4 εἰςίν αὖθειμένοι τῶν ἀναγκαίων. τῶν δὲ ἀναγκαίων οἱ μὲν ἐνὶ λειτουργοῦντες τὰ τοιαῦτα δοῦλοι, οἱ δὲ κοινῆ βάναυσοι καὶ θήτες. φανερῶν δὲ ἐνετέθην μικρὸν ἔπισκεψαμένοι πῶς ἔχει περὶ αὐτῶν· αὐτὸ γὰρ φανέν τὸ λεχθὲν ποιεῖ 5 δῆλον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ πλείους εἰσίν αἱ πολιτείαι, καὶ εἰδὴ πο- 15 λίτων ἀναγκαίοι εἶναι πλεῖο, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ ἀρχομένου πολίτου, ὥστ' ἐν μὲν τινι πολιτείᾳ τοῦ βάναυσον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ τὸν θήτα πολίτας, ἐν τισὶ δ' ἀδύνατον, οἷον εἰ τίς ἐστίν ἢν καλοῦσιν ἀριστοκρατικὴν καὶ ἐν ᾗ κατ' ἀρετὴν αἱ τιμαὶ διδόνται καὶ κατ' ἄξιαν· οὐ γὰρ οἷον τ' ἐπιτηδεύ- 20 σαί τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ζώντα βίον βάναυσον ἡ θητικῶν. ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλίγαρχίαις θήτα μὲν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι πολίτην (ἀπὸ τιμημάτων γὰρ μακρῶν αἱ μεθὲξεις τῶν ἀρχῶν), βάναυσον δὲ ἐνδέχεται· πλουτοῦσι γὰρ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν 7 τεχνιτῶν. ἐν Θήβαις δὲ νόμος ἢν τὸν δέκα ἑτῶν μὴ ἀπε- 25 σχημένον τῆς ἀγορᾶς μὴ μετέχειν ἀρχῆς. ἐν πολλαῖς δὲ πολιτείαις προσφελέκεται καὶ τῶν ξένων νόμος· ὁ γὰρ ἐκ πολιτίδος ἐν τισι δημοκρατίαις πολίτης ἔστιν· τὸν αὐτὸν 8 δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τούς νόδους παρὰ πολλοῖς. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ δ' ἐνδεικνύων τῶν γνησίων πολιτῶν ποιοῦνται 30 πολίτας τοὺς τοιούτους (διὰ γὰρ ὀλιγαρχεῖαν οὐτὸ χρώνται τοῖς νόμοις), εὔποροντες δ' ὀχλοῦ κατὰ μικρῶν παραιροῦν- ται τοὺς ἐκ δοῦλοι πρῶτον ἡ δούλης, εἶτα τοὺς ἀπὸ γυναικῶν, 9 τέλος δὲ μόνον τοὺς ἐξ ἀμφότερον ἀστών πολίτας ποιοῦσιν. ὅτι μὲν οὗν εἰδῆ πλεῖον πολίτου, φανερῶν ἐκ τούτων, καὶ ὅτι λε- 35 γεται μάλιστα πολίτης ὁ μετέχουν τῶν τιμῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἄουμης ἐποίησαν "ὡς εἰν τιν' ἀτιμητὸν μετανάστην"· ὥσπερ μέτοικος γὰρ ἐστιν ἡ τῶν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχον. ἀλλ' ὅπου τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπικεκριμένον ἐστίν, ἀπάτης χάριν τῶν συνο- 10 κούντων ἐστίν. πόστερον μὲν οὖν ἔτεραν ἡ τὴν αὐτὴν θετεόν 40 καθ' ἢν ἀνήρ ἀγαθός ἐστι καὶ πολίτης σπουδαῖος, δῆλον ἐκ 1278 b τῶν εἰρημένων, ὃτι τινός μὲν πόλεως ὁ αὐτὸς τινὸς δ' ἔτερος, κάκεινος οὐ πάς ἀλλ' ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ κύριος ἡ δυνάμενος
ἐίναι κύριος, ἣ καθ' αὐτὸν ἢ μετ' ἄλλων, τῆς τῶν κοινῶν ἕπιμελείας:

6 Ἐπει δὲ ταῦτα διάφοραται, τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα σκεπτέον πότερον μιᾶν θετέον πολιτείαν ἢ πλείονας, κἂν εἰ πλείονας, τίνες καὶ πόσαι, καὶ διαφοραῖ τίνες αὐτῶν εἰσίν. ἔστι δὲ πολιτεία πόλεως τάξις τῶν τέ ἄλλων ἄρχόν καὶ μάλιστα

tῆς κυρίας πάντων' κύριον μὲν γὰρ πανταχόο τὸ πολι-

tεμα τῆς πόλεως, πολίτεμα δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία' λέγω 2

d' οὖν ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατικαῖς κύριοι ὁ δήμος, οἱ δ' ὁλίγοι τούναντίων ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις φαμέν δὲ καὶ πολιτείαν ἐτέραν ἐίναι τούτων. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τούτων ἐροῦμεν

15 λόγου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ὑποθετέον δὴ πρῶτον τίνος
χάριν συνέστηκε πόλις, καὶ τῆς ἄρχῆς εἰδὴ πόσα τῆς περὶ

άνθρωπον καὶ τὴν κοινωνίαν τῆς ὄφη. εἰρηται δὴ κατὰ 3

tοὺς πρῶτους λόγους, ἐν οἷς περὶ οἰκονομίας διωρίσθη καὶ δε-


σποτείας, καὶ ὃτι φύσει μὲν ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπος ζοὸν πολιτικῶν,

20 διὸ καὶ μηδὲν δεδεμονὶ τῆς παρ' ἀλλήλων βοηθείας [οὐκ

ἐλαττον] ὀρέγονται τοῦ συζήνιον μὴν ἄλλα καὶ τὸ κοινὴ

συμφέρον συνάγει, καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἐκάστῳ τοῦ

ζήνα καλώς. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοῦτ' ἔστι τέλος, καὶ κοινὴ

4 πάσι καὶ χωρίς συνέρχονται δὲ καὶ τοῦ ἧν ἐνεκεν αὐτοῦ

25 καὶ συνέχουσι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, ἵσος γὰρ ἐνεστὶ τι

τοῦ καλοῦ μόριον καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἦν αὐτὸ μόνον, ἄν μὴ τοῖς

χαλεποῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον ὑπερβάλλῃ λίαν. δὴ λοις δ' ὅσ 5

καρτεροῦσι πολλήν κακοπάθειαν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων

γλιχόμενοι τοῦ ἦν, ὡς ἐνούσῃς τινὸς εὐθυραίας ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ

30 γλυκύτητος φυσικῆς. ἄλλα μὴν καὶ τῆς ἄρχης γε τοὺς

λεγομένους τρόπους βάδισον διελεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐξοτε-

ρικοῖς λόγοις διοριζόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν πολλάκις. η μὲν γὰρ 6

dεσποτεία, καίπερ ὄντος καὶ ἀλήθειαν τῷ τε φύσει δούλω

καὶ τῷ φύσει δεσπότη ταύτω συμφέροντος, ὅμως ἄρχει

35 πρὸς τὸ τοῦ δεσπότου συμφέρουν οὕτων ἦττον, πρὸς δὲ τὸ τοῦ

dούλου κατά συμβεβηκόσι, οὗ γὰρ ἐνδεχεται φθειρομένου τοῦ
7 δούλου σώζεσθαι τὴν δεσποτείαν. ἡ δὲ τεκνων ἄρχη καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ τῆς οἰκίας πάσης, ἦν δὴ καλοῦμεν οἰκονομικῆν, ἢτοι τῶν ἀρχιμεῖων χάριν ἔστιν ὡς κοινὸς τινὸς ἀμφοῖν, καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν τῶν ἀρχιμεῖων, ὡσπερ ὥρμεν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας 40 τέχνας, οἷον ιατρικὴν καὶ γυμναστικὴν, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς 1279 a δὲ κἂν αὐτῶν εἶν' οὔδεν γὰρ κωλύει τὸν παιδοτρίβην ἕνα τῶν γυμναζομένων ἐνίοτ' εἶναι καὶ αὐτῶν, ὡσπερ ὁ κυβερ-
8 νήτης εἰς ἐστὶν ἀεὶ τῶν πλωτήρων. ὁ μὲν οὖν παιδοτρίβης ἡ κυβερνήτης σκοπεῖ τὸ τῶν ἀρχιμεῖων ἁγαθὸν· ὅταν δὲ 5 τούτων εἰς γένηται καὶ αὐτὸς, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μετέχει τῆς ὀφελείας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πλωτήρ, ὁ δὲ τῶν γυμναζομέ-
νων εἰς γίνεται παιδοτρίβης ὅν. διὸ καὶ τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχὰς, ὅταν ἢ κατ' ἱσότητα τῶν πολιτῶν συνεσθηκινία καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα, κατὰ μέρος ἄξιοῦσιν ἄρχειν, πρότερον μὲν, 10 ἢ πέφυκεν, ἄξιοῦντες ἐν μέρει λειτουργεῖν, καὶ σκοπεῖν τινα πάλιν τὸ αὐτοῦ ἁγαθὸν, ὡσπερ πρῶτον αὐτὸς ἄρχον ἐσκό-
10 πεῖ τὸ ἐκείνου συμφέρον. νῦν δὲ διὰ τὰς ὀφελείας τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ἁρχῆς βούλονται συνεχῶς ἄρχειν, οἷον εἰ συνεβαίνειν υγιαίνειν ἀεὶ τοῖς ἀρχοῦσι νοσα- 15 κεροίς ὀσφίν καὶ γὰρ ἀν οὕτως ἑσοῦ ἐκδικον τὰς ἀρχὰς.
11 φανερὸν τούτων ὡς δοσάι μὲν πολιτείαι τὸ κοινὴ συμφέρον σκοποῦσιν, αὐτὰ μὲν ὅρθαι τυγχάνουσιν οὕτας κατὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον, ὅσα δὲ τὸ σφέτερον μόνον τῶν ἁρχῶντων, ἡμαρτημέναι καὶ πᾶσα παρεκβάσεις τῶν ὅρθων πολιτειῶν· 20 δεσποτικαὶ γὰρ, ἡ δὲ πόλεις κοινωνία τῶν ἑλευθέρων ἐστίν.
Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐχόμενον ἐστὶ τὰς πολιτείας 7 ἐπισκέψασθαι, πόσα τῶν ἁριθμῶν καὶ τῖνες εἰσὶ, καὶ πρῶ-
tον τὰς ὅρθας αὐτῶν· καὶ γὰρ αἱ παρεκβάσεις ἐσοῦνται 2 φανεραὶ τούτων διορισθεῖσιν. ἐτεὶ δὲ πολιτεία μὲν καὶ τὸ 25 πολίτευμα σημαίνει ταυτόν, πολίτευμα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κύριον τῶν πόλεων, ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι κύριον ἢ ἐνα ἢ ὀλίγους ἢ τοὺς πολλοὺς, ὅταν μὲν ὁ εἰς ἢ οἱ ὀλίγοι ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον ἄρχοσι, ταύτας μὲν ὅρθας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι
30 τὰς πολιτείας, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἔδιον ἡ τοῦ ἐνῶς ἢ τῶν ὀλιγῶν ἢ τοῦ πλῆθους παρεκβάσεις· ἡ γὰρ οὐ πολίτας φατέον εἶναι τοὺς μετέχοντας, ἡ δὲ κοινοῦν τὸν συμφέροντος. καλεῖν δὲ εἰσόθαμεν τῶν μὲν μοναρχῶν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν 3 ἀποβλέπουσαν συμφέρον βασιλείαν, τὴν δὲ τῶν ὀλίγων μὲν
35 πλείονον δὲ ἐνὸς ἀριστοκρατίαν, ἡ δὲ τὸ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἀρ- χεῖν, ἡ δὲ τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἀριστον τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς κοινοῦσιν αὐτῆς· ὅταν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύσεται συμ- φέρον, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὑνομα πασῶν τῶν πολιτείων, πολιτεία. συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως· ἓνα μὲν γὰρ διαφέρειν
40 καὶ ἁρετὴν ἡ ὀλίγους ἐνδέχεται, πλείους δ' ἡ ἁρετῶν
1279 b ἡκριβώθηκα τρὸς πάσαν ἁρετήν, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα χρῆ τὴν πολε- μικὴν· αὐτὴ γὰρ ἐν πλήθει γίγνεται. διόπερ κατὰ ταύτην
45 τὴν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον τὸ προπολεμοῦν, καὶ μετέχουσιν
αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὁπλα. παρεκβάσεις δὲ τῶν εἰρή- 5
5 μένων τυραννίς μὲν βασιλείας, ὀλιγαρχία δὲ ἀριστοκρατίας,
δημοκρατία δὲ πολιτείας. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυραννίς ἐστὶ μοναρ- χία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρχοῦντος, ἡ δ' ὀλι-
γαρχία πρὸς τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων, ἡ δὲ δημοκρατία πρὸς τὸ
συμφέρον τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων· πρὸς δὲ τῷ κοινῷ λυσιτελοῦν
10 οὐδεμία αὐτῶν.
8 Δεὶ δὲ μικρὰ διὰ μακροτέρων εἰς τὰς ἐκάστη τούτων
τῶν πολιτείων ἐστὶν· καὶ γὰρ ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας, τῷ δὲ
περὶ ἐκάστην μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦντι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀποβλέ-
ποντι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν οἰκεῖον ἐστὶ τῷ πολιορκῶν μηδὲ
15 της καταλείπειν, ἀλλὰ δηλοῦν τὴν περὶ ἐκαστοῦ ἀλῆτειν.
ἐστὶ δὲ τυραννίς μὲν μοναρχία, καθάπερ εἰρηταί, δεσπο-
τική τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινώνιας, ὀλιγαρχία δ' ὅταν ὧν
κύριοι τῆς πολιτείας οἱ τὰς ὄσσια ἔχουντες, δημοκρατία δὲ
tοῦναντίον ὅταν οἱ μὴ κεκτημένοι πλῆθος ὄσσια ἀλλ' ἀποροί.
20 πρῶτη δ' ἀπορία πρὸς τὸν διορισμὸν ἐστὶν· ἐγὼ ἔχω
πλείους δυντές εὐπόροι κύριοι τῆς πόλεως, δημοκρατία δ' ἐστὶν
ὅταν ἡ κύριοι τὸ πλῆθος, ὁμοίως δὲ πάλιν κἂν εἰ που † συμ-
βαίνη † τοὺς ἀπόρους ἔλαττους μὲν εἶναι τῶν εὐπόρων, κρεῖτ-
τους δ’ ὄντας κυρίους εἶναι τῆς πολιτείας, ὅπως δ’ ὀλέγον
κύριον πλῆθος, ὀλιγαρχίαν εἶναι φασίν, οὐκ ἀν καλὸς δὸξείειν 25
4 διωρίσθαι περὶ τῶν πολιτείων, ἀλλὰ μὴν κἂν τις συνθεῖς
τῇ μὲν εὐπορίᾳ τὴν ὀλιγότητα τῇ δ’ ἀπορίᾳ τὸ πλῆθος
οὕτω προσαγορεύῃ τὰς πολιτείας, ὀλιγαρχίαν μὲν ἐν ἧν τὰς
ἀρχὰς ἔχουσιν οἱ εὐπόροι ὀλέγοι τὸ πλῆθος ὄντες, δημο-
κρατίαν δὲ ἐν ἧν οἱ ἄποροι πολλοὶ τὸ πλῆθος ὄντες, ἀλλην 30
5 ἀποριάν ἔχει. τίνας γὰρ ἐροῦμεν τὰς ἄρτι λεχθεῖσας
πολιτείας, τὴν ἐν ἧν πλείους εὐπόρους καὶ ἐν ἧν ἥλαττους οἱ
ἁμαρτοὶ, κύριοι δ’ ἐκάτεροι τῶν πολιτείων, εἶπερ μηδεμία
6 ἀλλὰ πολιτεία παρὰ τὰς εἰρημένας ἐστίν; έοικε τοῖνοι ὁ
λόγος ποιεῖν δήλων ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὀλέγον ἡ πολλοὺς εἶναι κυ-
35 ρίους συμβεβηκὸς ἐστίν, τὸ μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις τὸ δὲ ταῖς
dημοκρατίαις, διὰ τὸ τοὺς μὲν εὐπόρους ὀλέγους, πολλοὺς
δὲ εἶναι τοὺς ἀπόρους πανταχοῦ (διὸ καὶ οὐ συμβαίνει τὰς
7 ὑπερθέσαις αἰτίας γίνεσθαι διαφορᾶς), δὲ δὲ διαφέρουσιν ἡ τε
dημοκρατία καὶ ἡ ὀλιγαρχία ἀλλήλων, πενίᾳ καὶ πλούτος 40
ἐστίν, καὶ ἀναγκαῖοι μὲν, ὅπου ἀν ἄρχωσι διὰ πλούτον ἀν 1280 a
τ’ ἐλάττους ἀν τε πλείους, εἶναι ταύτην ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὅπο
8 δ’ οἱ ἄποροι, δημοκρατίαι, ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει, καθάπερ εἴπο-
μεν, τοὺς μὲν ὀλέγους εἶναι τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς εὐποροῦσι μὲν
γὰρ ὀλέγοι, τῆς δὲ ἑλευθερίας μετέχουσι πάντες: δὲ δ’ ς 5
αἰτίας ἀμφισβητοῦσιν ἀμφότεροι τῆς πολιτείας.

Δηπτέον δὲ πρῶτον τίνας ὅρους λέγουσι τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας 9
καὶ δημοκρατίας, καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιον τὸ τε ὀλιγαρχικὸν
καὶ δημοκρατικὸν. πάντες γὰρ ἀπτοῦνται δικαίου τινός, ἀλλὰ
μέχρι τινὸς προέρχονται, καὶ λέγουσιν οὐ πάν ὁ κύριος 10
δίκαιον. οὐδ’ δοκεῖ ἵσον τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ ἔστιν, ἀλλ’
2 οὐ πάσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἰσοίς’ καὶ τὸ ἀνίσον δοκεῖ δίκαιον
eῖναι, καὶ γάρ ἔστιν, ἀλλ’ οὐ πάσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνίσοις. οἱ
δὲ τούτ’ ἀφαιροῦσι, τὸ οἷς, καὶ κρίνουσι κακῶς. τὸ δ’ αἰτίον
ὅτι περὶ αὐτῶν ἡ κρίσις’ σχέδον δ’ οἱ πλείστοι φαίλοι 15
κριταὶ περὶ τῶν οἰκείων. ὃστ’ ἐπεὶ τὸ δίκαιον τις ἢν, καὶ 3 διήρηται τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπον ἐπὶ τε τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ οἷς, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς, τὴν μὲν τοῦ πράγματος ὑστήτη ὁμολογοῦσι, τὴν δὲ οἷς ἀμφισβητοῦσι, 20 μάλιστα μὲν διὰ τὸ λεχθὲν ἄρτι, διότι κρίνουσι τὰ περὶ αὐτῶν κακῶς, ἐπειτὰ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ λέγειν μέχρι τινὸς ἐκατέρους δίκαιον τι νομίζουσι δίκαιον λέγειν ἄπλως. οἱ μὲν 4 γὰρ ἂν κατὰ τι ἁνίσοι ὁδίν, οἵν οἱρμάσιν, ὥλος οἴονται ἁνίσοι εἶναι, οἱ δὲ ἂν κατὰ τὶ ἱσοὶ, οἴον ἔλευθερία, ἡλος 25 ἵσοι. τὸ δὲ κυριώτατον οὐ λέγουσιν εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν κτῆτο- 5 μάτων χάριν ἐκοινώνησαν καὶ συνήλθον, τοσοῦτον μετέχουσιν τῆς πόλεως ὄσοντερ καὶ τῆς κτήσεως, ὥστ’ ὁ τῶν ὀλιγαρ- χικῶν λόγος δόξειν ἀν ἰαχύειν (οὐ γὰρ εἶναι δίκαιον ἱσον μετέχειν τῶν ἐκατῶν μνὸν τούν εἰσενέγκαντα μίαν μναν τῷ 30 δόντι τὸ λοιπὸν πᾶν, οὔτε τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὔτε τῶν ἐπιγιγνό- μένων) εἰ δὲ μῆτε τοῦ ζῆν μοῦν ἐνεκεὶ ἄλλα μᾶλλον τοῦ 6 εὐ ζῆν (καὶ γὰρ ἂν δοῦλῳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἥμι σῶν ἦν πό- λις νῦν δ’ οὐκ ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ μῆ μετέχειν εὐθείαμονίας μηδὲ τοῦ ζῆν κατὰ προαιρέσειν), μῆτε συμμαχίας ἐνεκεῖν, ὅπως 35 ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἄδικονται, μῆτε διὰ τὰς ἀλλαγὰς καὶ τὴν χρήσιν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ γὰρ ἂν Τυρρηνοῖ καὶ Καρ- χιδόνιοι, καὶ πάντες οἷς ἐστὶ σύμβολα πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὥς 39 μᾶς ἂν πολίται πόλεως ἥσαν. εἰσὶ γοῦν αὐτὸς συνθῆκαι 7 περὶ τῶν εἰσαγωγοῦσι καὶ σύμβολα περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἄδικείν 40 καὶ γραφαὶ περὶ συμμαχίας. ἀλλ’ οὔτ’ ἀρχαὶ πᾶσιν ἐπὶ 1280 b τοῦτοις κοιναὶ καθεστῶσιν, ἀλλ’ ἔτεραι παρ’ ἐκατέροις, οὗτε τοῦ ποίους τινὰς εἶναι ἰεὶ φροντίζουσι ἰετοὶ τοὺς ἐτέρους, οὗτ’ ὅπως μηδεὶς ἄδικος ἐσται τῶν ὑπὸ τὰς συνθῆκας μηδὲ μοχθηριάν ἔξει μηθεμίαν, ἀλλὰ μοῦν ὅπως μηθεν ἄδικείς 5 σουσιν ἀλλήλους. περὶ δ’ ἄρετῆς καὶ κακίας πολιτικῆς διασκοποῦσιν ὅσοι φροντίζουσι εὐνομίας. ἢ καὶ φανερὸν ὅτι δεὶ περὶ ἄρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖς εἶναι τῇ γ’ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄνομα- ξομένῃ πόλει, μὴ λόγου χάριν. γίνεται γὰρ ἡ κοινωνία
1280 a 16—1281 a 1.

συμμαχία τῶν ἄλλων τόπῳ διαφέρουσα μένον τῶν ἀποθεν συμμάχων, καὶ ὁ νόμος συνθήκη καὶ, καθάπερ ἐφη Δυ-κόφρων οἱ σοφιστῆς, ἐγγυητής ἀλλήλοις τῶν δικαίων, ἀλλ' ὁ ὦς οἱς ποιεῖν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους τοὺς πολίτας. ὅτι δὲ τούτων ἔχει τῶν τρόπων, φανερῶν. εἰ γὰρ τις καὶ συναγάγων τοὺς τόπους εἰς ἐν ἑστήκει τὴν Μεγαρέων πόλιν καὶ Κορινθίων τοῖς τείχεσιν, ὅμως οὐ μία πόλις. οὔδ' εἰ πρὸς 15 ἀλλήλους ἐπιγαμίας ποιήσαι τοὺς καὶ τούτῳ τῶν ἰδίων ταῖς πόλεσι κοινονημάτων ἔστιν. ὁμοίως δ' οὔδ' εἰ τινες οἰκόνες χωρὶς μέν, μὴ μέντοι τοσοῦτον ἀποθεν ὅστε μὴ κοινωνεῖν, ἀλλ' εἴησαν αὐτοῖς νόμοι τοῦ μὴ σφάς αὐτοὺς ἀδικεῖν περὶ τὰς μεταδόσεις, οἶνον εἰ ὁ μὲν εἴη τέκτων ὁ δὲ γεωργὸς 20 ὁ δὲ σκυτότρομος ὁ δ' ἄλλο τοιοῦτον, καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶν μύριοι, μὴ μέντοι κοινωνεῖν ἄλλου μηθενός ή τῶν τοιούτων. 11 οἶνον ἀλλαγῆς καὶ συμμαχίας, οὔδ' οὔτω ποι πόλις. διὰ τίνα δὴ ποτ' αἰτίαν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ διὰ τὸ μὴ σύνεγγυς τῆς κοινωνίας, εἰ γὰρ καὶ συνέθεοι οὖτω κοινωνούντες, ἐκαστὸς 25 μὲντοι χρόνῳ τῇ ἑδία οἰκία ὄσπερ πόλει καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ὡς ἐπιμαχίας οὔσης βοηθούντες ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας μένον, οὐδ' οὔτως ἀν εἰναι δόξει πόλις τοῖς ἀκριβῶς θεωροῦσιν, εἰπέρ 12 ὁμοίως ὁμιλοῦν συνελθόντες καὶ χωρὶς. φανερῶν τοῖς ὅτι η πόλις οὐκ ἔστι κοινονία τόπον καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν σφάς 30 αὐτοὺς καὶ τῆς μεταδόσεως χάριν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, εἰπέρ ἐσται πόλις, οὐ μὴν οὖδ' ὑπάρχοντων τοῦτον ἥδη πόλις, ἀλλ' ἡ τοῦ εὖ ζην κοινωνία καὶ ταῖς οἰκίαις καὶ τοῖς γένεσι, ζωῆς τελέας χάριν καὶ αὐτάρκους. οὐκ ἐσταί μέντοι τοῦτο μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα 35 κατοικοῦντων τόπον καὶ χρωμένων ἐπιγαμίαις. διὸ κηδείαν τ' ἐγένοντο κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ φρατρίας καὶ θυσίας καὶ διαγωγαὶ τοῦ συζην. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον φιλίας ἐργον' ἡ γὰρ τοῦ συζην προαίρεσις φιλία. τέλος μὲν οὖν πόλεως τὸ εὖ ζην, 14 ταῦτα δὲ τοῦ τέλους χάριν. πόλις δὲ ἡ γενῶν καὶ κομῶν 40 κοινονία ζωῆς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους. τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ὡς 1281 a
πολιτικῶν γ’. 9–11.

φαμέν, τὸ ζῆν εὐθαμίνων καὶ καλῶς. τῶν καλῶν ἀρα πράξεων χάριν θετέον εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, ἀλλ’ ὦ τοῦ συγήν. διόπερ ὦσι συμβάλλονται πλείστον εἰς τὴν 15 5 τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν, τούτοις τῆς πόλεως μέτεστι πλείον ἢ τοῖς κατὰ μὲν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ γένος ἴσοις ἢ μείζονι κατὰ δὲ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἀνίσοις, ἢ τοῖς κατὰ πλούτον ὑπερέχουσι κατ’ ἀρετὴν δ’ ὑπερεχομένοις. ὅτι μὲν οὖν πάντες οἱ περὶ τῶν πολιτείων ἀμφισβητοῦντες μέρος τί τοῦ δικαίου 10 λέγουσι, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων

10 Ἐξεῖ δ’ ἀπορίαν, τί δεὶ τὸ κύριον εἰναι τῆς πόλεως. ἢ γάρ τοι τὸ πλῆθος, ἢ τοὺς πλουσίους, ἢ τοὺς ἐπιεικείς, ἢ τὸν βέλτιστον ἐνα πάντων, ἢ τύραννον. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἑξεῖν φαίνεται δυσκολίαν. τί γάρ; ἄν οἱ πένητες διὰ τὸ 15 πλείους εἶναι διανέμεται τὰ τῶν πλουσίων, τούτ’ οὐκ ἄδικόν ἐστίν; ἢ ἐδοξε γάρ νη Δία τὸ κύριον δικαίως. τὴν οὖν ἄδικιάν 2 τὶ χρῆ λέγει τὴν ἑσάχθην; πάλιν τε πάντων ληφθέντων, οἱ πλείους τὰ τῶν ἑλπτῶν ἂν διανέμεταιν, φανερὸν ὅτι φθείρουσι τὴν πόλιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐχ ἢ γ’ ἀρετὴ φθείρει τὸ 20 ἑχον αὐτὴν, οὔδὲ τὸ δίκαιον πόλεως φθαρτικον’ ὡστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸν νόμον τούτον οὐχ οἶδον τ’ εἶναι δίκαιον. ἐτι καὶ 3 τὰς πράξεις ὅσα τὸ τύραννος ἐπραξέν, ἄναγκαιον εἶναι πάσας δικαίας: βιαζέται γὰρ ὃν κρείττων, ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τοὺς πλουσίους. ἀλλ’ ἄρα τοὺς ἑλάττους δίκαιον 25 ἀρχεῖν καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους; ἀν οὖν κάκεινοι ταῦτα ποιῶσι καὶ διαρπάζοσι καὶ τὰ κτήματα ἀφαιρῶνται τοῦ πλῆθος, τοὺ’ ἐστὶ δίκαιον; καὶ θάτερον ἄρα. ταῦτα μὲν τοῖνυ ὅτι πάντα 4 φαίλα καὶ οὐ δίκαια, φανερὸν’ ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἀρχεῖν δεὶ καὶ κύριος εἶναι πάντων; οὐκόνοι ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἄλλους 30 ἀτίμους εἶναι πάντας, μὴ τιμωμέοις ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρ- χαῖς. τιμᾶς γάρ λέγομεν εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς, ἀρχόντων δ’ αἰεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς ἄλλους ἀτίμους. ἀλλ’ 5 ἓνα τὸν σπουδαιότατον ἀρχεῖν βέλτιον; ἄλλ’ ἐτι τοῦτο ὁλι- γαρχικῶτερον’ οἱ γὰρ ἀτίμοι πλείους. ἀλλ’ ἴσως φαίη τις
1281 a 2—1281 b 25.

ἀν τὸ κύριον ὦλως ἀνθρωπον εἶναι ἄλλα μὴ νόμον φαίλον, 35 ἐξουτά γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα πάθη περὶ τὴν ψυχήν. ἂν οὖν ἦ νόμος μὲν ὀλγαρχίκος δὲ ἡ δημοκρατίας, τι διοίκει περὶ τῶν ἑπορμημένων; συμβῆσεται γὰρ ὁμοίως τὰ λεχθέντα πρότερον. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἐστοι τὸ ἐστερὸς λόγος. ὃτι δὲ δεὶ κύριον εἶναι μᾶλλον τὸ πλήθος ἢ τοὺς ἁρύστους 40 μὲν ὄλγους δὲ, δόξειεν ἂν λύσεις καὶ τίν' ἔχειν ἀπορίαν, 2 τάξα δὲ κἂν ἀλῆθειν, τοὺς γὰρ πολλοὺς, ὃν ἐκαστὸς ἐστιν οὐ σπουδαῖος ἁνὴρ, ὃμως ἐνδέχεται συνελθόντας εἶναι βελ—1281 b τίους ἐκείνους, οὐχ ὃς ἐκαστὸν ἀλλ' ὃς σύμπαντας, οἰὸν τὰ συμφορητὰ δεῖσιν τῶν ἐκ μᾶς διαπάνης χαρηγηθέντων' πολλῶν γὰρ οὕτων ἐκαστὸν μόριον ἔχειν ἀρετὴς καὶ φρονίσεως, καὶ γίνεσθαι συνελθόντων ὁσπερ ἐνα ἀνθρωπον 5 τὸ πλήθος πολύποδα καὶ πολύχειρα καὶ πολλᾶς ἔχοντ' 3 αἰσθήσεις, οὗτο καὶ περὶ τὰ ἡθη καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν. δίδ καὶ κρίνουσιν ἀμείνων οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ τὰς μουσικὰς ἔργα καὶ τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν. ἄλλοι γὰρ ἅλλο τι μόριον, πάντα δὲ 4 πάντες. ἄλλα τοῦτο διαφέρουσιν οἱ σπουδαῖοι τῶν ἀνθρών 10 ἐκαστοῦ τῶν πολλῶν, ὁσπερ καὶ τῶν μὴ καλῶν τοὺς καλοὺς φασὶ καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα διὰ τέχνης τῶν ἀληθείων, τὸ συνάχθαι τὰ διεσπαρμένα χωρίς εἰς ἐν, ἐπεὶ κεχωρισμένων γε κάλλων ἔχειν τοῦ γεγραμμένου τοῦδε μὲν τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν 5 μόν, ἔτερον δὲ τινὸς ἐτερον μόριον. εἰ μὲν οὖν περὶ πάντα 15 δήμον καὶ περὶ πάν πλῆθος ἐνδέχεται ταύτην εἶναι τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν πολλῶν πρὸς τοὺς ὀλγαρχούς σπουδαίους, ἀδηλων, ἵσως δὲ νὴ Δία δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ἐνών ἀδύνατον (ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς κἀν ἐπὶ τῶν θηρίων ἀρμόσει λόγος: καὶ οἱ δια- φέρουσιν ἔνιοι τῶν θηρίων ὡς ἐπος εἰσεῖν;) ἀλλὰ περὶ τι 20 πλῆθος οὐδὲν εἶναι κωλύει τὸ λεζήθειν ἄληθες, διδ καὶ τὴν πρότερον εἰρημένην ἀπορίαν λύσειν ἂν τις διὰ τούτων καὶ τὴν ἐχομένην αὐτῆς, τίνων δὲ κυρίως εἶναι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν (τοιοῦτοι δ' εἰσιν ὅσοι μῆτε 7 πλούσιοι μήτε ἀξίωμα ἔχουσιν ἀρετής μηδεν) τὰ μὲν γὰρ 25 VOL. III. C
μετέχειν αὐτοὺς τῶν ἀρχῶν τῶν μεγίστων οὐκ ἁσφαλές (διὰ τε γὰρ ἀδικίαν καὶ δι’ ἀφροσύνην τὰ μὲν ἄδικείν ἂν τὰ δ’ ἀμαρτάνειν αὐτοὺς), τὸ δὲ μὴ μεταδίδοναι μηδὲ μετέχειν φοβερόν· ὅταν γὰρ ἄτιμοι πολλοὶ καὶ πένητες ὑπάρχοντες πολομένοι, πολεμίζων ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πλήρη τῇ πόλιν ταύτην. λείπεται δὴ τοῦ βουλευθῆσαι καὶ κρίνειν μετέχειν αὐτοὺς. 8 διόπερ καὶ Σόλων καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν τινῶν νομοθετῶν τάττουσιν ἐπὶ τε τὰς ἀρχαιεσίας καὶ τὰς εὐθύνας τῶν ἀρχῶντων, ἀρχεῖν δὲ κατὰ μόνας οὐκ ἔδωσιν· πάντες μὲν γὰρ ἔχουσι 9 συνελθόντες ἰκανήν αἰσθήσιν, καὶ μιγνύμενοι τοῖς βελτίωσι τὰς πόλεις ὡφελοῦσιν, καθάπερ ἡ μὴ καθαρὰ τροφὴ μετὰ τῆς καθαρᾶς τὴν πᾶσαν ποιεῖ χρησιμωτέραν τῆς ὀλγῆς· χωρίς δ’ ἐκαστὸς ἄτελὴς περὶ τὸ κρίνειν ἐστίν. ἔχει 10 δ’ ἡ τάξις αὐτὴ τῆς πολιτείας ἀποροῖαν πρῶτην μὲν διὶ δόξειν 40 ἀν τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶναι τὸ κρίναι τὸν ὅρθος ἱατρεύκει, οὔπερ καὶ τὸ ἱατρεύσαι καὶ ποιῆσαι υγία τὸν κάμμοντα τῆς νόσου τῆς παρούσης· οὕτως δ’ ἐστὶν ἱατρός. ὡμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ 1282 α περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐμπειρίας καὶ τέκνας, ὡσπερ οὖν ἱατρὸν δει διδόναι τὰς εὐθύνας ἐν ἱατροῖς, οὔτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐν τοῖς ὄμοιοις. ἱατρός δ’ ὁ τε δημιουργὸς καὶ ὁ ἱατρευτεύων-11 κόσ καὶ τρίτος ὁ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην· εἰσὶ γὰρ 5 τινες τοιοῦτοι καὶ περὶ πάσας ὡς εἰπεῖν τὰς τέκνας, ἀποδίδομεν δὲ τὸ κρίνειν οὔδὲν ἤττων τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις ἡ τοῖς εἰδόσιν. ἔπειτα καὶ περὶ τὴν αἰρέσιν τὸν αὐτὸν ἀν 12 δόξειν εἰχεῖν τρόπον· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἔλεσθαι ὅρθος τῶν εἰδότων ἐργόν ἐστὶν, οὖν γεωμέτρητε τοῖς γεωμετρικῶς καὶ 10 κυβερνητῆς τῶν κυβερνητικῶν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ περὶ ένών ἐργῶν καὶ τεχνῶν μετέχουσι καὶ τῶν ἱδιωτῶν τινῶς, ἀλλ’ οὔ τι τῶν εἰδότων γε μάλλον. ὡστε κατὰ μὲν τούτων τὸν λόγον οὐκ ἂν εἰ ὁ πλήθος ποιητέων κύριον οὕτε τῶν ἀρχαιεσίων οὕτε τῶν εὐθυνῶν. ἀλλ’ ἴσως οὔ πάντα ταύτα λέγεται καλῶς 14 15 διὰ τε τῶν πάλαι λόγων, ἀν ἂν τὸ πλῆθος μηδὲ ταῦτα ἀνδρα- ποδώδες (ἐσται γὰρ ὕκαστος μὲν χείρων κρίθης τῶν εἰδότων,
απαντες δὲ συνελθοντες ἃ βελτίους ἢ ὦ περι ηπησας οὐτ' ἀριστ' ἀν κρίνειν, ὅσων τάργα γιγνώσκοντι καὶ οἱ μὴ ἔχοντες τὴν τέχνη, οἴον οἰκίαν οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ γνώναι τοῦ ποιήσαντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ βέλτιος τινὸς ὁ χρώμενος αὐτῇ κρινεὶ (χρηταὶ δ' ὁ οἰκονόμος), καὶ πηδάλιον κυβερνήτης τέκτονος, καὶ θωτίν οἱ δαιτυμῶν ἄλλοι
15 οὖχ οἱ μάγειροι. ταύτην μὲν οὖν τὴν ἀπορίαν τάχα δόξειε τις ἄν οὗτῳ λῦει ἰκανός· ἄλλη δ' ἐστίν ἐγκλημενη ταύτης.
δοκεῖ γὰρ ἄτοπον εἶναι τὸ μειζόνων εἴναι κυρίους τοὺς φαύλους τῶν ἐπιεικῶν, αἱ δ' εὐθυναὶ καὶ αἱ τῶν ἀρχῶν αἵρεσεις εἰςι μέγιστον· ἂς ἐν ἐνίαις πολιτείαις, ὡσπερ εἰρηταί, τοὺς δήμοις ἀποδίδασιν· ἢ γὰρ ἐκκλησία κυρία πάντων τῶν τοιούτων ἐστίν. καὶ τοῦ τῆς μὲν ἐκκλησίας μετέχουσι καὶ βουλεύουσι καὶ δικάζονται ἀπὸ μικρῶν τιμημάτων καὶ τῆς τυχόντος ἠλικίας, ταμείους δὲ καὶ στρατηγοῦσι καὶ τάς μεγίστας ἀρχὰς ἀρχοῦσιν ἀπὸ μεγάλων. ὄρμοις δὴ τις ἄν λύσει καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν· ἵσως γὰρ ἔχει καὶ ταῦτ' ὁρθός. οὖ γὰρ ὁ δικαστὴς οὐδ' ὁ βουλευτὴς οὐδ' ὁ ἐκκλησιαστὴς ἀρχον ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ δικαστήριον καὶ ἡ βουλὴ καὶ τὸ ὁ δήμος τῶν δὲ ῥηθέντων ἐκαστος μόριον ἐστὶ τούτων (λέγω δὲ μόριον τὸν βουλευτὴν καὶ τὸν ἐκκλησιαστήν καὶ τὸν δικαστήν)· ὡστε δικαίως κύριον μειζόνων τὸ πλῆθος· ἐκ γὰρ πολλῶν ὁ δήμος καὶ ἡ βουλή καὶ τὸ δικαστήριον καὶ τὸ τίμημα δὲ πλεῖον τὸ πάντων τούτων ἢ τὸν καθ' ἕνα καὶ κατ' ὁ λέγουσι μεγάλας ἀρχὰς ἀρχόντων. ταύτα μὲν οὖν διωρίσθων τούτων τὸν τρόπον· ἢ δὲ πρώτη λεγέθησα ἀπορία ποιεῖ φαινερὸν οὐδὲν οὕτως ἔτερον ὡς ὅτι δει τοὺς νόμους εἴναι κυρίους κειμένους ὀρθῶς, τὸν ἀρχοντα δὲ, ἀν τε εἰς ἀν τε πλείους ὠσί, περὶ τούτων εἴναι κυρίους περὶ οὐσων ἐξαδιωκοῦσιν οἱ νόμοι λέγειν ἀκριβῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ βάδιον εἶναι καθόλου διορίζοντα 50 σαὶ περὶ πάντων. ὅποιοὺς μὲντοι τινὰς εἴναι δεὶ τοὺς ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους, οὐδέν πω δήλου, ἀλλ' ἐτί μὲνει τὸ πάλαι διαπορηθεῖν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ καί ομοίως ταῖς πολιτείαις ἀνάγκη
καὶ τοὺς νόμους φαύλους ἢ σπουδαίους εἶναι καὶ δικαίους ἢ ἀδίκους. πλὴν τούτῳ γε φανερῶν, ὅτι δὲ δεῖ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν κείσθαι τοὺς νόμους. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἶ τούτῳ, δῆλον ὅτι τοὺς μὲν κατὰ τὰς ὀρθὰς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δικαίους, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὰς παρεκβεβηκινίας οὐ δικαίους.

12 Ἑπεὶ δ' ἐν πάσαις μὲν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις καὶ τέχναις ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος, μέγιστον δὲ καὶ μάλιστα εἶναι τῇ κυριωτάτῃ παιδίᾳ, αὐτὴ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτικὴ δύναμις, ἔστι δὲ πολιτικῶν ἀγαθῶν τὸ δίκαιον, τούτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κοινὴ συμφέρον, δοκεῖ δὲ πᾶσιν ἰσόν τι τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ μέχρι γε τῶν ὁμολογοῦσι τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις, ἐν οἷς διάφοροι διέρχονται περὶ τῶν ἥθικῶν (τὰ γὰρ καὶ τισὶ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ δεῖν τοῖς ἰσοίς ἰσόν εἶναι φασιν) ποιῶν δ' ἰσότης ἐστὶ καὶ ποιῶν ἀνισότης, δεὶ μὴ λανθάνειν ἐχεί γὰρ τούτ' ἀπορίαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν πολιτικῆν. ἰσως γὰρ ἂν φαίη τις κατὰ παντὸς ὑπεροχήν ἀγαθοῦ δεῖν ἀνίσως νενεμηθήσαι τὰς ἀρχάς, εἰ πάντα τὰ λουπᾶ μηδὲν διαφέροντες ἀλλ' ὀρμοὶ τυγχάνοντες· τοῖς γὰρ διαφέρονσιν ἐτερον εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τούτ' ἀληθὲς, ἔσται καὶ κατὰ χρώμα καὶ κατὰ μέγεθος καὶ καθ' ὀψινῶν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλεονεξία τις τῶν πολιτικῶν δικαιῶν τοῖς ὑπέρθεσεν. ἔτει τὸν ἐπιστόλαν τὸν ψεῦδος; φανερῶν δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἐπιστήμῶν καὶ δυνάμεων· τῶν γὰρ ὁμοίων αὐλητῶν τὴν τέχνην οὐ δοτέον πλεονεξίαν τῶν αὐλῶν τοῖς εὐγενεστέροις· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐλήσουσι βέλτιον, δεὶ δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὸ ἔργον ὑπερέχοντι διδόναι καὶ τῶν ὀργάνων τὴν υπεροχήν. εἰ δὲ μὴπο δῆλον τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐτέ μᾶλλον αὕτω προαγαγοῦσιν ἐσται φανερῶν. εἰ γὰρ εἰ θα τὸν ὑπέρχον μὲν κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικὴν, πολὺ δ' ἐλλείπον κατ' εὐγενείαν ἢ κάλλος, εἰ καὶ μείζον ἐκαστὸν ἐκείνων ἀγαθῶν ἐστὶ τῆς αὐλητικῆς (λέγω δὲ τὴν τ' εὐγενείαν καὶ τὸ κάλλος), καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ὑπερέχουσι πλέον τῆς αὐλητικῆς ἢ ἐκείνου κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικῆν, ὃμως τούτῳ δοτέον τοὺς διαφέροντες
τῶν αὐλῶν· δει γὰρ εἰς τὸ ἐργὸν συμβάλλεσθαι τὴν ὑπε- 1283 a ῥοχήν καὶ τοῦ πλοῦτου καὶ τῆς εὐγενείας, συμβάλλονται δ’ ——— 6 οὗτοι. ἔτι κατὰ γε τούτων τῶν λόγων πάν ἁγαθὸν πρὸς πάν ἀν εἰς συμβλητόν. εἰ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τί μέγεθος, καὶ ὅλως ἀν τὸ μέγεθος ἐνάμιλλον εἴη καὶ πρὸς πλοῦτον καὶ πρὸς 5 ἐλευθερίαν. ὡσ’ εἰ πλείον ὀδὶ διαφέρει κατὰ μέγεθος ἢ ὀδὶ κατ’ ἁρετήν, καὶ πλείον ὑπερέχει ὅλως ἁρετῆς μέ- γεθος, εἰς ἂν συμβλητὰ πάντα· τοσοῦτο γὰρ [μέγεθος] εἰ 7 κρείττων τοσοῦτο, τοσοῦτο δὴλον ὃς ἵσον. ἔπει δὲ τούτ ἀδύνατον, δὴλον ὃς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν εὐλόγως οὐ κατὰ 10 πάσαν ἀνίσοτητ’ ἀμφισβητοῦσι τῶν ἄρχων (εἰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν βραδεῖς οἱ δὲ ταχεῖς, οὗτοι διὰ τοῦτο δεὶ τοὺς μὲν πλείον τοὺς 8 ἔλαττον ἔχειν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἁγώσιν ἡ 8 τούτων διαφορὰ λαμβάνει τὴν τιμήν), ἀλλ’ εξ’ ὃν πόλις συν- νέστηκεν, εν τούτοις ἀναγκαῖον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν. 15 διόπερ εὐλόγως ἀντιποιοῦνται τῆς τιμῆς οἱ εὐγενεῖς καὶ ἐλεύ- θεροι καὶ πλούσιοι. δεὶ γὰρ ἐλευθέρους τ’ εἶναι καὶ τίμημα 9 φέροντας (οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἰς πόλις εξ’ ἀπόρου πάντων, ὥσπερ οὐδέ’ ἐκ δούλων)· ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ δεὶ τούτων, δὴλον ὅτι καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς πολεμικῆς ἁρετής· οὗτε γὰρ ἂνευ 20 τούτων οἰκείοι τὸν δυνατόν, πλην ἂνευ μὲν τῶν προ- τέρων ἀδύνατον εἶναι πόλιν, ἂνευ δὲ τούτων οἰκείοι σαι καλῶς. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πόλιν εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν ἡ πάντα 13 ἡ ἐνια γε τούτων ὅρθως ἀμφισβητεῖν, πρὸς μὲντοι ξῆν ἁγαθῆ ἡ παιδεία καὶ ἡ ἁρετή μάλιστα δικαίως ἂν ἀμφισ- 25 βητοῖσαν, καθάπερ εἰρηται καὶ πρότερον. ἐπεὶ δ’ οὔτε πάντων ἵσον ἔχειν δεὶ τοὺς ἰσοὺς ἐν τι μόνον ὄντας οὔτε ἄνισον τοὺς ἀνίσους καθ’ ἐν, ἀνάγκη πάσας εἶναι τὰς 2 τοιαύτας πολιτείας παρεκβάσεις. εἰρηται μὲν οὖν καὶ πρό- τερον ὅτι διαμφισβητοῦσι τρόπον τῶν δικαίως πάντες, 30 ἀπλῶς δ’ οὐ πάντες δικαίως, οἱ πλούσιοι μὲν ὅτι πλείον μέτεστι τῆς χώρας αὐτοῖς, ἡ δὲ χώρα κοινῶν, ἔτι πρὸς τὰ συμβάλλαια πιστοὶ μᾶλλον ὃς ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον· οἱ δ’ ἐλεύ-
Θεροὺς καὶ εὐγενεῖς ὡς ἐγγός ἄλληλαν (πολίται γὰρ μᾶλλον 35 οἱ γενναιότεροι τῶν ἁγιῶν, η δ' εὐγένεια παρ' ἐκάστους οἷκος τίμιος, ἓτι διότι βελτίως εἰκὸς τοὺς ἐκ βελτίων; 3 εὐγένεια γὰρ ἄστῳ ἁρέτῃ γένους). ὡμοῖως δέ φήσομεν δικαίως καὶ τὴν ἁρέτην ἀμφισβητεῖν: κουμνικὴ γὰρ ἁρέτη ἐναι φαμεν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ἡ πάσας ἀναγκαῖον ἀκολουθεῖν 40 τὰς ἄλλας. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οἱ πλείονες πρὸς τοὺς ἑλάττους: δια 1283 δὲ πάντες εἰλὲν ἐν μιᾷ πολεῖ, λέγω δ' ήδοι οἱ τ' ἁγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι καὶ εὐγενεῖς, ἵνα δὲ πλήθος ἄλλο τι πολιτικόν, πότερον ἀμφισβήτησις ἐσταὶ τίνας ἁρχεῖν δει, ἦς ὡς ἐσταὶ; καθ' ἐκάστην µὲν οἷον πολιτείας τῶν εἰρημένων 5 ἀναμφισβήτητος ἡ κράτις τίνας ἁρχεῖν δεῖ (τοὺς γὰρ κυρίους διαφέρουσιν ἄλληλαν, οἷον ἡ µὲν τ' ἐκ πλουσίων ἢ δὲ τ' ἐκ τῶν σπουδαίων ἀνδρῶν εἶλαι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστη τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπον): ἀλλ' ὡμοῖος πεποίημεν, ὅταν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ταῦτα ὑπάρχη τχόνων, πῶς διερεῖτεν. εἰ δὴ τὸν ὑπὸ ἄρθρῳ δέλην λέγειν δικαιοῦν οἱ διὰ τὸν πλεῖον ἀξίωτάς ἁρχεῖν, ὡμοῖος δὲ καὶ οἱ κατὰ γένος· δῆλον γὰρ ὅσι τις πάλιν εἰς πλουσιότερος ἀπαντῶν ἐστί, δῆλον ὅτι κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ δικαίον τοῦτον ἁρχεῖν τὸν ἑνά ἀπάντην δεῖσθαι, ὡμοῖος δὲ καὶ τὴν εὐγενεία διαφέρουτα τῶν ἀμφισβητοῦν- 10 τῶν δὲ ἐλευθερῶν. ταῦτα δὲ ταῦτα ὅσα συμβῆσται καὶ δὲ περὶ τὰς ἀριστοκρατίας ἐπὶ τῆς ἁρέτης: εἰ γὰρ τὶς εἰς ἁμεῖ- λον ἀνὴρ εἰς τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτείματι σπουδαίων ἅστων, τοῦτο εἶλαι δεῖ κύριον κατὰ ταῦτα δικαίον, οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ πλήθος εἰλαὶ γε δεὶ κύριον διότι κρείττους εἰσὶ τῶν.
διό όλων, κακό είναι ἡ πλεονέας μέν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐλάττους δὲ τῶν 25
cολλών κρείττους δια τῶν ἄλλων, τούτους ἂν δείξει κυρίους
9 εἰναι μάλλον ἢ τὸ πλήθος. πάντα δὲ ταύτ' ἐξεκε φανερῶν
ποιεῖν ὅτι τούτων τῶν ὄρων οὐδεὶς ὤρθος ἐστί, καθ' ὃν
ἀξιούσιν αὐτοῖ μὲν ἀρχεῖν τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ὑπὸ σφῶν ἀρχε
10 θαί πάντας. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ πρὸς τούς κατ' ἀρετὴν 30
ἀξιούντας κυρίους εἶναι τοῦ πολιτεύματος, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
tοὺς κατὰ πλούτων, ἔχοις ἄν λέγειν τὰ πλῆθη λόγω τινά
δίκαιον' οὐδὲν γὰρ καλῶν ποτὲ τὸ πλήθος εἶναι βέλτιον τῶν
διλήνων καὶ πλουσιότερων, οὐχ ὡς καθ' ἔκαστον ἀλλ' ὡς
11 ἄρθροις. διὸ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπορίαν, ἢν ἤπτομοι καὶ προβάλει
λοιπὲς τίνες, ἐνδεχεται τούτων τὸν τρόπον ἄπανταν' ἀποροῦσι
γὰρ τινὲς πότερον τῷ νομοθέτῃ νομοθετήτων, βουλομένως
τίθεσθαι τοὺς ὀρθοτάτους νόμους, πρὸς τὸ τῶν βελτιώνων
συμφέρον ἤ πρὸς τὸ τῶν πλειώνων, ὅταν συμβαινὴ τὸ λειχέν.
12 τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν ληστέον ἵσως: τὸ δ' ἵσως ὀρθὸν πρὸς τὸ τῆς 40
πόλεως δῆλης συμφέρον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ τῶν πολι-
tῶν' πολίτης δὲ κοινὴ μὲν ὁ μετέχων τοῦ ἀρχείν καὶ ἀρ-
χεῖαι ἐστι, καθ' ἐκάστην δὲ ποικίλων ἐτερος, πρὸς δὲ τὴν
1284 a
ἀρίστην τὸ δυνάμενο καὶ προαρχαίους ἀρχεῖαι καὶ ἀρχεῖν
13 πρὸς τοῦ βίων τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν. εἰ δὲ τις ἐστιν εἰς τοσοῦτον
diaφέρων κατ' ἀρετής ὑπερβολήν, ἡ πλεονέας μέν ἐνὸς μη
μέντοι δυνατὸ πλήρωμα παρασχέσθαι πόλεως, ὥστε μὴ 5
συμβλητὴν εἶναι τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῆς πάντων μηδὲ τὴν
dύναμιν αὐτῶν τὴν πολιτικὴν πρὸς τὴν ἑκείνων, εἰ πλείους,
ei δ' εἰς, τὴν ἑκείνου μόνον, οὐκέτι θετέον τούτους μέρος
πόλεως: ἀδικησονται γὰρ ἀξιούμενοι τῶν ἵσων, ἁνίσοι τοσοῦ-
tον κατ' ἀρετὴν δυντες καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν: ὁσπερ γὰρ 10
14 θεον ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰκὸς εἶναι τῶν τοιοῦτων. ὅθεν δὴλον ὅτι
καὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν ἀναγκαῖαν εἶναι περὶ τοῦ ἓως καὶ τῷ
γένει καὶ τῇ δυνάμει: κατὰ δὲ τῶν τοιοῦτων οὐκ ἔστι νόμος:
αὐτοὶ γὰρ εἰσὶ νόμος, καὶ γὰρ γελοίοις ἄν εἰν νομοθετεῖν τὸις
πειρώμενος κατ' αὐτῶν: λέγοιεν γὰρ ἄν ἓως ἀπερ 'Αντι-
σθένης ἐφη τοὺς λέοντας δημηγοροῦντων τῶν δασυπόδων καὶ
τὸ ἵσον ἄξιοιντον πάντας ἔχειν. διὸ καὶ τίθενται τῶν ὀστρα-
κιῶν αἱ δημοκρατοῦμεναι πόλεις, διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν·
αὐταὶ γὰρ δὴ δοκοῦσί διόκειν τὴν ἱσότητα μάλιστα πάντων,
20 ὡστε τοὺς δοκοῦντας ὑπερέχειν δυνάμει διὰ πλοῦτον ἢ πολυ-
φιλίαν ἢ τινὰ ἄλλην πολιτικὴν ἰσχύν ὀστράκιζον καὶ με-
θίστασαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως χρόνους ὁρισμένους. μυθολογεῖται 16
δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἀργοναύτας τὸν Ἡρακλέα καταλιπτέιν διὰ
τοιαύτην αἰτίαν· οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλειν αὐτὸν ἁγείν τὴν Ἀρχώ
25 μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς ὑπερβάλλοντα πολὺ τῶν πλωτηρῶν.
διὸ καὶ τοὺς ψέγοντας τὴν τυραννίδα καὶ τὴν Περιάνδρου
Θρασυβούλῳ συμβουλίαν οὐχ ἀπέλευσε οἰητέον ὀρθὸς ἐπιτιμῶν
(φασὶ γὰρ τὸν Περιάνδρον εἰπεῖν μὲν οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν πεμ-
17 φθέντα κῆρυκα περὶ τῆς συμβουλίας, ἀφαιροῦτα δὲ τοὺς
ὑπερέχοντας τῶν σταχὺν ὁμάλναι τὴν ἄρουραν· 
30 ἀγνοοῦντος μὲν τοῦ κήρυκος τοῦ γινομένου τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀπαγ-
γείλαντος δὲ τὸ συμπεσόν, συνυόντας τὸν Θρασύβουλον ὅτι
δὲὶ τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας ἀνδρὰς ἀναιρεῖν). τούτῳ γὰρ οὐ μόνον 18
συμφέρει τοῖς τυράννοις, οὐδὲ μόνον οἱ τύραννοι ποιοῦσιν,
35 ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὸς ἀλιγαρχίας καὶ τὸς δη-
μοκρατίας· ὁ γὰρ ὀστρακισμὸς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν
τρόπον τινὰ τὸ κολούειν τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας καὶ φυγαδεύειν.
τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ περὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ ἔθνη ποιοῦσιν οἱ 19
κύριοι τῆς δυνάμεως, οἷον Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν περὶ Σαμίους καὶ
40 Χίους καὶ Λεσβίους (ἐπεὶ γὰρ βάττον ἐγκρατῶς ἔσχον τὴν
ἀρχὴν, ἐταπείνωσαν αὐτοὺς παρὰ τὰς συνθῆκας), ὁ δὲ Περ-

1284 b βοῖν Ἡθελεῖς Μῆθους καὶ Βαβυλωνίους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς
πεφρονηματισμένους διὰ τὸ γενέσθαι ποτὲ ἐπ' ἀρχῆς ἐπέ-
κοπτε πολλάκις. τὸ δὲ πρόβλημα καθόλου περὶ πάσας 20
ἔστι τὰς πολιτείας, καὶ τὰς ὀρθὰς· αἱ μὲν γὰρ παρεκβε-

5 ἁκυίαι πρὸς τὸ ἵδιον ἀποσκοποῦσα τούτῳ δρῶσιν, οὐ μὴν
ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰς τοῦ κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπισκοποῦσα τῶν αὐτῶν
ἔχει τρόπον. δὴλον δὲ τούτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν 21
καὶ ἐπιστημονών οὗτε γὰρ γραφεῖν ἐάσειεν ἀν τῶν ὑπερβάλλοντα πόδα τῆς συμμετρίας ἔχειν τὸ ᾽ζόν, οὐδ’ εἰ διαφέροι τὸ κάλλος, οὗτε ναυπηγὸς πρόμναν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι τις νεάς, οὐδὲ δὴ χοροθέασκαλός τὸν μείζον καὶ κάλλιον τοῦ παντὸς χοροῦ φθεγγόμενον ἐάσει συν-22 χορεύειν. ὡστε διὰ τούτο μὲν οὖθεν κολύει τοὺς μονάρχους συμφωνεῖν ταῖς πόλεσιν, εἰ τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς ὑφελίμου ταῖς πόλεσιν οὖσης τοῦτο δρώσιν. διὸ κατὰ τὰς ὁμολογιῶν. 15 μένας ὑπεροχὰς ἔχει τι δίκαιον πολιτικὸν ὁ λόγος ὁ περὶ τῶν ὀστρακισμῶν. βέλτιον μὲν οὖν τῶν νομοθέτην ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὕτω συντησάς την πολιτείαν ὡστε μὴ δεῖσθαι τοιαῦτας ἰατρείας· δεύτερος δὲ πλοῦς, ἀν συμβῇ, πειρᾶσθαι τοιοῦτο τινὶ διορθόματι διορθοῦν. ὅπερ οὖν ἐγίγνετο περὶ τὰς πόλεις 20 οὖ γὰρ ἐξελευτον πρὸς τὸ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς οἰκείας συμφέρων, 24 ἀλλὰ στασιαστικῶς ἔχρωντο τοῖς ὀστρακισμοῖς. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς παρεκβεβηκνυίας πολιτείαις ὁτι μὲν ἰδία συμφέρει καὶ δίκαιον ἑστι, φανερὸν, ἰσως δὲ καὶ ὁτι οὐχ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον, καὶ τοῦτο φανερὸν· ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας 25 ἐχει πολλῆν ἀπορίαν, οὐ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἁγαθῶν τῇ ὑπεροχὴν, οἶνον ἰσχύος καὶ πλούτον καὶ πολυφιλίας, ἀλλ’ ἀν τις γένηται διαφέρον κατ’ ἀρετὴν, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ φαίειν ἀν δεῖν ἐκβάλλειν καὶ μεθιστάναι τὸν τιοῦτον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ’ ἀρχείν γε τὸ τοιοῦτον παραπλῆσιον 30 γὰρ καὶ εἰ τοῦ Διὸς ἀρχεῖν ἁξιοῖεν, μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς. λείπεται τοῖνυν, ὅπερ οὐκε πεφυκέναι, πείθεσθαι τῷ τοιοῦτῳ πάντας ἀσμένως, ὡστε βασιλεῖας εἶναι τοὺς τοιοῦτους ἁδίον τοῖς ταῖς πόλεσιν. Ἦσως δὲ καλῶς ἔχει μετὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους λόγους με-14 ταβῆναι καὶ σκέψασθαι περὶ βασιλείας· φαμὲν γὰρ τῶν ὀρθῶν πολιτείων μίαν εἶναι ταῦτην. σκεπτέον δὲ πότερον συμφέρει τῇ μελλούσῃ καλῶς οἰκήσεσθαι καὶ πόλει καὶ χώρα βασιλεύσεσθαι, ἢ οὗ, ἀλλ’ ἰδον τις πολιτεία μάλ-20 λον, ἢ τισὶ μὲν συμφέρει τισὶ δ’ οὐ συμφέρει. δεῖ δὲ 40
πρῶτον διελέσθαι πότερον ἐν τῷ γένος ἐστὶν αὐτῆς ἡ πλείους

1285  ἐξεῖ διαφοράς. ἰδίῳ δὲ τούτῳ γε καταμαθεῖν, ὅτι πλεῖων
tε γένη περιέχει καὶ τῆς ἁρχῆς ὁ τρόπος ἐστὶν οὐχ εἰς
pαιῶν. ἡ γὰρ ἐν τῇ Δακοκικῇ πολιτείᾳ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι 3
βασιλεία μᾶλλον τῶν κατὰ νόμον, οὐκ ἐστὶ δὲ κυρία πάν-
tῶν, ἀλλὰ ἐτοι ἐξέλθη τὴν χώραν, ἡγεμόν ἐστὶ τῶν πρὸς
tῶν πόλεμον ἕτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀποδέδοται τοῖς
βασιλεύσεις. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ βασιλεία οἶνον στρατηγία τις 4
αὐτοκράτορον καὶ ἀδιός ἐστιν κτεῖναι γὰρ οὐ κύριος, εἰ
μὴ ἐν τινὶ βασιλείᾳ, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἁρχαίων ἐν ταῖς
10 πολεμικοῖς ἐξόδοις ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ. δῆλοι δ᾽ "Ομήρος: ὁ
gὰρ Ἀγαμέμνον κακῶς μὲν ἀκούσων ἰδείχετο ἐν ταῖς ἐκ-
κλησίαις, ἐξέλθοντων δὲ καὶ κτεῖναι κύριος ἤν. λέγει γοῦν 5
"ὅν δὲ κ᾽ ἐγὺς ἀπάνευθε μάχης, οὐ οἱ ἄρχοι ἐσσεῖται
φυγεῖν κύνας ἢ οἱ οἶνοις. πάρ γὰρ ἐμοὶ θάνατος." ἐν μὲν
15 οὖν τούτ᾽ εἶδος βασιλείας, στρατηγία διὰ βιοῦ, τούτων δ᾽ αἱ
μὲν κατὰ γένος εἰσίν, αἱ δ᾽ αἰρεταὶ: παρὰ ταύτην δ᾽ ἄλλο 6
μοναρχίας εἶδος, οίαι παρ᾽ ἐνίοις εἰσὶ βασιλεῖαι τῶν βαρ-
βάρων. ἔχουσι δ᾽ αὐτὴν τὴν δύναμιν πάσης παραπλησίαν
tυραννίστω, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ κατὰ νόμον καὶ πατρικά διὰ γὰρ
20 τὸ δουλικότερον εἶναι τὰ ἡθη φύσει οἱ μὲν βάρβαροι τῶν
Ἐλλήνων, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν τῶν περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην,
ὑπομένουσι τὴν δεσποτικὴν ἁρχὴν οὐδὲν δυσχεραίνοντες.
tυραννικά καὶ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ τοιούτον εἰσίν, ἀσφαλεῖς δὲ διὰ 7
25 τὸ πάτρια ταῦτα καὶ κατὰ νόμον εἶναι. καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ δὲ βα-
τὸ δουλικότερον εἶναι τὰ ἡθη φύσει οἱ μὲν βάρβαροι τῶν
Ἐλλήνων, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν τῶν περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην,
ὑπομένουσι τὴν δεσποτικὴν ἁρχὴν οὐδὲν δυσχεραίνοντες.
tυραννικά καὶ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ τοιούτον εἰσίν, ἀσφαλεῖς δὲ διὰ 7
20 τὸ πάτρια ταῦτα καὶ κατὰ νόμον εἶναι. καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ δὲ βα-
τὸ δουλικότερον εἶναι τὰ ἡθη φύσει οἱ μὲν βάρβαροι τῶν
Ἐλλήνων, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν τῶν περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην,
ὑπομένουσι τὴν δεσποτικὴν ἁρχὴν οὐδὲν δυσχεραίνοντες.
tυραννικά καὶ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ τοιούτον εἰσίν, ἀσφαλεῖς δὲ διὰ 7
νόμον ἀλλὰ τῷ μῆ πάτριος εἶναι μόνον. ἦρχον δ' οί μὲν διὰ βλου τὴν ἀρχὴν ταῦτην, οἳ δὲ μέχρι τινῶν ὀρισμένων χρόνων ἡ πράξεων, οὖν εἰλοντό ποτε Μιτυληναῖοι Πιττα-35 κὸν πρὸς τοὺς φυγάδας ὅν προειστήκεσαν Ἀντιμενίδης καὶ 'Αλκαῖος ὁ ποιητής. δηλοὶ δ' 'Αλκαῖος ὅτι τύραννον εἰλοντο τὸν Πιττακὸν ἐν τινὶ τῶν σκολιῶν μελῶν' ἐπιτιμᾷ γὰρ ὅτι "τὸν κακοπάτριδα Πιττακὸν πόλεως τὰς ἀχόλω καὶ βαρυδαίμονος Ἑστάσαντο τύραννον μὲγ' ἐπαινεύοντες ἀολ.-1285 b

λέες." αὕται μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ τε καὶ ἦσαν διὰ μὲν τὸ δεσποτικὰ εἶναι τυραννικὰ, διὰ δὲ τὸ αἱρεταί καὶ ἐκὸντων βασιλικὰ τέταρτον δ' εἰδὸς μοναρχίας βασιλικῆς αἱ κατὰ τοὺς ἡρωϊκοὺς χρόνους ἐκουσία τε καὶ πάτρια γιγνόμεναι κατὰ νόμον' 5
diὰ γὰρ τὸ τοὺς πρότους γενέσθαι τοῦ πλῆθους εὐρεγέτας κατὰ τέχνας ἡ πόλεμον, ἡ διὰ τὸ συναγαγεῖν ἡ πορίσαι χώραν, ἐγίγνοντο βασιλεῖς ἐκὸντων καὶ τοῖς παραλαμβάνοντι πάτριοι, κύριοι δ' ἦσαν τῆς τε κατὰ πόλεμον ἡγεμονίας καὶ τῶν θυσίων, ὡς μὴ ἱερατικαί, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τοῖς δίκαι ἐκρινον. τοῦτο δ' ἐποίον οἱ μὲν οὖν ὁμνύοντες, οἱ δ' ὁμνύοντες: δ' δ' ὄρκος ἦν τοῦ σκῆπτρου ἐπανάτασις. 10
οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων χρόνων καὶ τὰ κατὰ πόλιν καὶ τὰ ἐνδήμα καὶ τὰ ὑπερόρια συνεχῶς ἦρχον· ὑστερον δὲ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν παριέντων τῶν βασιλεῶν, τὰ δὲ τῶν ὄχλων 15 παραιρουμένων, ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν αἱ πάτριοι θυσίαι κατελείφθησαν τοῖς βασιλεῖσι μόνον, ὅπου δ' ἄξιον εἵπεν εἶναι βασιλείαν, ἐν τοῖς ὑπεροχίων τῶν πολεμικῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν μόνον εἶχον.

14 Βασιλείας μὲν οὖν εἴδη ταῦτα, τέταρα τὸν ἀριθμὸν, 20 μία μὲν ἡ περί τοὺς ἡρωϊκοὺς χρόνους (ἀυτή δ' ἦν ἐκὸντον μὲν, ἐπὶ τισι δ' ὁρισμένοις· στρατηγὸς γὰρ ἦν καὶ δικαστὴς ἡ βασιλεία, καὶ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς κύριοι), δευτέρα δ' ἡ βαρβαρική (ἀυτὴ δ' ἦστιν ἐκ γένους ἀρχὴ δεσποτικὴ κατὰ νόμον), τρίτη δὲ ἦν αἰσιμυνητείαν προσαγωρεύοντι 25 (ἀυτὴ δ' ἦστιν αἱρετὴ τυραννίς), τετάρτη δ' ἡ Δακωνική.
τούτων (αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀπλῶς στρατηγία κατὰ γένος αἵδιος). αὕται μὲν οὖν τούτον τὸν τρόπον διαφέρουσιν ἅλληλων, πέμπτον δ' εἴδος βασιλείας, ὡταν ἤ πάντων 3ο κύριος εἰς ὧν, ὥσπερ ἐκαστὸν ἐθνὸς καὶ πόλεις ἐκάστῃ τῶν κοινῶν, τεταγμένη κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομικὴν ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ οἰκονομικὴ βασιλεία τις οἰκίας ἐστὶν, οὕτως ἡ βασιλεία 15 πόλεως καὶ ἔθνους ἔνδος ἡ πλείονων οἰκονομία. σχεδὸν δὴ δύο ἐστὶν ὡς εἰπεῖν εἰδὴ βασιλείας περὶ ὧν σκεπτέον, αὕτη 35 τε καὶ ἡ Δακονική' τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων αἱ πολλαὶ μεταξὺ τούτων εἰςιν, ἐλαττώνων μὲν γὰρ κύριοι τῆς παμβασιλείας, πλείονων δ' ἐισὶ τῆς Δακονικῆς. ὥστε τὸ σκέμμα σχεδὸν 2 περὶ δυῶν ἐστὶν, ἐν μὲν πότερον συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεσι στρατηγίας αἵδιον εἰναι, καὶ τούτον ἡ κατὰ γένος ἡ κατὰ μέρος, ἡ οὖ συμφέρει· ἐν δὲ πότερον ἕνα συμφέρει κύριον εἰναι πάντων, ἡ οὖ συμφέρει. τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης στρατηγίας ἐπισκοπεῖν νόμων ἔχει μᾶλλον εἶδος ἡ πολιτείας (ἐν ἀπάσαι γὰρ ἐνδέχεται γύρνεσθαι τούτῳ ταῖς πολιτείαις), 1286 α' ἢ ἡ οὖ συμφέρει· ἐν δὲ πότερον ἕνα συμφέρει κύριον εἰναι πάντων, ἡ οὖ συμφέρει. τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης στρατηγίας ἐπισκοπεῖν νόμων ἔχει μᾶλλον εἶδος ἡ πολιτείας (ἐν ἀπάσαι γὰρ ἐνδέχεται γύρνεσθαι τούτῳ ταῖς πολιτείαις), 5 ὥστε ἀφείσθω τὴν πρῶτην. ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς τρόπος τῆς βασι- 3 λείας πολιτείας εἴδος ἐστὶν, ὥστε περὶ τούτου δει θεωρῆσαι καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας ἐπιδραμεῖν τὰς ἐνούσας. ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶ τῆς ἡτήσεως αὕτη, πότερον συμφέρει μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχεθαι ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων νόμων. δοκοῦσι δὴ τοῖς 4 τοῖς 10 νομίζουσι συμφέρειν βασιλεύεσθαι τὸ καθόλου μόνον οἱ νόμοι λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ προσπίπτοντα ἐπιτάττειν, ὥστ' ἐν ὅποιον τήν τὸ κατὰ γράμματ' ἀρχεῖν ἡλίθιον καὶ ἐν Ἀλγύπτῳ μετὰ τὴν τετρήμερον κινεῖν ἐξεστί τοῖς ἰατροῖς, ἐδ' ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ κυνδύνως. φανερὸν τοῖς ὃς 15 οὐκ ἐστίν ἡ κατὰ γράμματα καὶ νόμους ἀριστή πολιτεία διὰ τὴν αὕτην αἴτηται. ἀλλὰ μὴν κάκειν δὲν ὑπάρχειν 5 τὸν λόγον τὸν καθόλου τοῖς ἀρχουσιν' κρείττον 8' φ' μὴ πρόσετι τὸ παθητικὸν ὅλως ἢ ὃ συμφέρεις. τῷ μὲν οὖν νόμῳ τούτῳ οὔχ ὑπάρχει, ψυχὴν δ' ἀνθρωπίνην ἀνάγκη τούτ' 20 ἐχεῖν πᾶσαν. ἀλλ' ἴσως ἄν φαίη τις ὡς ἀντὶ τούτου βου-
6 λεύσεται περὶ τῶν καθ’ ἐκαστὰ κάλλιον. ὅτι μὲν τοῖνυν ἀνάγκῃ νομοθέτην αὐτὸν εἶναι, δήλου, καὶ κείσθαι νόμους, ἀλλὰ μὴ κυρίους ἢ παρεκβαίνουσιν, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν γ’ ἄλλων εἶναι δεὶ κυρίους· δότα δὲ μὴ δυνατὸν τὸν νόμον κρίνειν ἢ ὄλως ἢ εὖ, πότερον ἐνα τὸν ἀριστον δεὶ ἀρχεῖν ἢ πάντας; 25 7 καὶ γὰρ νῦν συνιόντες δικάζομαι καὶ βουλεύομαι καὶ κρινοῦσιν, αὐταὶ δ’ αἱ κρίσεις εἰσὶ πᾶσαι περὶ τῶν καθ’ ἐκαστον. καθ’ ἐνα μὲν οὖν συμβαλλόμενος ὀστισοῦν ἵσως χείρων· ἀλλ’ ἐστίν ἢ πόλις ἐκ πολλῶν, ὠσπερ ἐστίασις συμφορητὸς καλλίων μιᾶς καὶ ἀπλῆς. διὰ τούτῳ καὶ κρίνει ἁμείνον 30 8 ὡς πολλὰ ἢ εἰς ὀστισοῦν. ἐτί. μᾶλλον ἀδιάφθορον τὸ πολὺ, καθάπερ ὅδορ τὸ πλεῖον, οὔτω καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὀλίγων ἄδιαφθορότερον· τοῦ δ’ ἐνὸς ὑπ’ ὁργῆς κρατηθέντος ἢ τινος ἐτέρου πάθους τοιούτου ἀναγκαῖον διεφθάρμα τὴν κρίσιν, ἐκεῖ δ’ ἔργον ἀμα πάντας ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν. 35 9 ἐστο δὲ τὸ πλῆθος οἱ ἐλευθεροὶ, μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν νόμον πράττοντες, ἀλλ’ ἂ περὶ δὲν ἐκλείπειν ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῶν, εἰ δὲ δὴ τούτῳ μὴ βάδιν ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλ’ εἰ πλείους εἶν ἄγαθοι καὶ ἄνδρες καὶ πολιτεία, πότερον ἢ εἰς ἀδιαφθορώτερον ἄρχων, ἢ μᾶλλον οἱ πλείους μὲν τὸν ἀρίθμῳ ἄγαθοι 40 δὲ πάντες; ἢ δὴλον ὡς οἱ πλείους; ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν στασιάσουσιν, 1286 b 10 ὃ δ’ εἰς ἀστασίαστος. ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺτ’ ἀνιδιθεῖν ἵσως ὅτι σπουδαίοι τὴν ψυχῆν, ὠσπερ κάκεινος ὑπ’. εἰ δὴ τὴν μὲν τῶν πλείων ἄρχην ἄγαθῶν δ’ ἄνδρῶν πάντων ἀριστοκρατίαν θετεῖν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἐνὸς βασιλείαν, αἰτετότερον οὐλ ἐνη σας 5 πόλεσιν ἀριστοκρατία βασιλείας, καὶ μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ χωρὶς 11 δυνάμεως οὖσας τῆς ἄρχης, ἃν ἢ λαβεῖν πλείους ὁμοίους. καὶ διὰ τούτ’ ἵσως ἐβασιλεύουσον πρότερον, ὅτι σπανίον ἢν εὗρείν ἄνδρας πολὺ διαφέρουσα κατ’ ἀρετὴν, ἀλλους τε καὶ τότε μικρὰς οἰκοῦντας πόλεις, ἐτί δ’ ἀπ’ εὐεργεσίας καθίστασαν ἢ τοὺς βασιλείας, ὅπερ οὖσιν ἔργον τῶν ἄγαθῶν ἄνδρῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ συνέβαινε γέγονεν οἱ πολλοὶ ὁμοίοι πρὸς ἀρετὴν, οὐκέτι ὑπέμενον ἀλλ’ ἐξῆτον κοινῷ τι καὶ πολιτείαν καθίστασαν.
επεὶ δὲ χείρος γιγνόμενοι ἐχρηματίζοντο ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν, 12
15 ἐνεπεθέν ποθὲν εἴθος γενέσθαι τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας· ἐντιμον
γὰρ ἐποίησαν τὸν πλοῦτον. ἐκ δὲ τούτων πρῶτον εἰς τυραν-
νίδας μετέβαλλον, ἐκ δὲ τῶν τυραννίδων εἰς δημοκρατίαν·
αἰεὶ γὰρ εἰς ἐλάττους ἄγοντες δὴ αἰσχροκέρδειαν ἴσχυρότε-
ρον τὸ πλῆθος κατέστησαν, ἀστ' ἐπιθέσθαι καὶ γενέσθαι
20 δημοκρατίας. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ μείζονες εἶναι συμβέβηκε τὰς 13
πόλεις, ἵσως οὐδὲ βάδιον ἐτι γίγνεσθαι πολιτείαν ἐτέραν παρὰ
dημοκρατίαν. εἰ δὲ δὴ τις ἁριστον θείῃ τὸ βασιλεύεσθαι
taῖς πόλεσιν, πώς ἔξει τὰ περὶ τῶν τέκνων; πότερον καὶ
tὸ γένος δεῖ βασιλεύειν· ἀλλὰ γιγνόμενοι ὁποῖοι τινες
25 ἑτυχοῦν, βλαβερῶν, ἀλλ' οὐ παραδόσει κύριος ὃν τοῖς 14
tέκνοις. ἀλλ' οὐκέτι τοῦτο βάδιον πιστεῦσαι χαλεπὸν γὰρ,
καὶ μείζονος ἀρετῆς ἢ κατ' ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν. ἔχει δὲ
ἀπορίαν καὶ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, πότερον ἔχειν δὲι τῶν
μέλλοντα βασιλεύειν ἰσχύν τινα περὶ αὐτόν, ἢ δυνηθείσαι
30 βιαζέσθαι τούς μὴ βουλουμένους πειθαρχεῖν, ἢ πώς ἐνδέχεται
tὴν ἁρχὴν διοικεῖν; εἰ γὰρ καὶ κατὰ νόμον εἰς κύριος, μη- 15
dὲν πράττων κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν παρὰ τὸν νόμον, ὅμως
ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ δύναμιν, ἢ φυλάξει τοὺς νόμους.
tάχα μὲν οὖν τὰ περὶ τὸν βασιλέα τὸν τοιοῦτον οὐ χαλεπὸν 16
35 διορίσαι (δεὶ γὰρ αὐτόν μὲν ἔχειν ἰσχὺν, εἰναι δὲ τοσαύτην τὴν
ἰσχῦν ὡστε ἐκάστον μὲν καὶ ἐνὸς καὶ συμπλείονων κρείττω
τοῦ δὲ πλῆθος ἢττῳ, καθάπερ οἱ τ' ἁρχαίοι τὰς φυλακὰς
ἐδίδοσαν, ὅτε καθιστάειν τινα τὰς πόλεως ὃν ἐκάλουν ἀλισμυ-
νήτην ἢ τύραννον, καὶ Διονυσίφ τις, ὃτ' ἦτει τοὺς φυλακᾶς,
40 συνεβούλευε τοῖς Συρακοσίοις διδόναι τοσοῦτον τοὺς φυλακας).
ο τοιαύτη γάρ ἀρχή τίς ἐστι καὶ περὶ Ἐπίδαμμον, καὶ περὶ
2 ὁποῖντα δὲ κατὰ τι μέρος ἐλαττοῦν· περὶ δὲ τῆς παμβα-
σιλείας καλομένης, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ἀρχεῖ πάντα κατὰ
τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βούλησιν ὁ βασιλεὺς—δοκεῖ δὲ τισιν οὐδὲ κατὰ τού
φύσιν εἶναι τὸ κύριον ἐνα πάντων εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ὅπως
συνεστήκεν ἐξ ὑμοίων ἡ πόλις· τοῖς γὰρ ὑμοίοις φύσει τὸ
αὕτω δίκαιον ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὴν αὕτην ἀξίαν κατὰ φύσιν
εἶναι, ὡστ' εἰπέρ καὶ τὸ ἔσον ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνίσους τροφῆν ἢ
ἔσθήτα βλαβερὸν τοῖς σώμασιν, οὕτως ἔχει καὶ τα περὶ τῶν
3 τιμάς, ὑμοίως τοῖς καὶ τὸ ἀνίσον τοὺς ἰσούς· διόπερ οὐδὲν
μᾶλλον ἄρχειν ἢ ἄρχεσθαι δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἀνὰ μέρος τοῖς
ὡσαύτως. τοῦτο δ' ἢ ἢ νόμος· ἡ γὰρ τάξις νόμος. τὸν
ἀρὰ νόμον ἄρχειν αἰρετώτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐνα
4 τινά, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον τοῦτον, καὶ εἰ τινὰς ἄρχειν 20
βέλτιον, τούτους καταστατέων νομοφύλακας καὶ ὑπηρέτας τοῖς
νόμοις· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ εἶναι τινὰς ἄρχας, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἐνα τού-
τον εἶναι φασὶ δίκαιον ὑμοίων γε οὕτων πάντων. ἀλλὰ μὴν
δὲν γε μὴ δοκεῖ δύνασθαι διορίζειν ὁ νόμος, οὐδ' ἀνθρωπος
5 ἀν δύναιτο γνωρίζειν. ἀλλὰ ἐπίτηδες παιδεύσας ὁ νόμος 25
ἐφιστησι τὰ λοιπὰ τῇ δικαιοστάτῃ γνώμῃ κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν
tοὺς ἄρχοντας. ἐτι δ' ἐπαναφθοῦσαὶ δίδωσιν, δ' τι ἂν δόξη
πειρομένους ἄμεινον εἶναι τῶν κειμένων. ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον
κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νοῦν
μόνους, ὃ δ' ἀνθρωπον κελεύων προστίθει καὶ θηρίον· ἡ τε 30
γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχοντας διαστρέφει καὶ
tοὺς άρίστους ἄνδρας. διόπερ ἀνευ ὧρει ὁ νόμος ἐστίν.
6 τὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν εἶναι, δοκεὶ παράδειγμα ψεύδος, ὅτι τὸ
κατὰ γράμματα ιατρεύεσθαι φαύλον, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἰρετώτερον
7 χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἔχουσι τὰς τέχνας. οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν διὰ φι-
35 λίαν παρὰ τῶν λόγον ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἀρνοῦται τὸν μισθὸν τοὺς
κάμμουσαν ὑγιάσαντες· οἳ δ' ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἄρχαις
πολλὰ πρὸς ἐπήρειαν καὶ χάριν εἰώθασι πράττειν, ἐπεὶ καὶ
tοὺς ιατροὺς ὅταν ὑποπτεύσι πιστευθέντας τοὺς ἐχθροῖς δια-
40 φθείρειν διὰ κέρδος, τότε τὴν ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων θεραπείαν ἄντικρίζοντες ἂν μᾶλλον. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰσάγωνται γ’ ἑφ’ ἐαυτοὺς 8

1287 b οἱ ιατροὶ κάμνοντες ἄλλους ιατροὺς καὶ οἱ παιδοτρίβαι γνωμαξόμενοι παιδοτρίβας, ὡς οὐ δυνάμενοι κρίνεις ὧν ἀληθεὶς διὰ τὸ κρίνεις περὶ τε οἰκείων καὶ ἐν πάθει ὄντες. ὡστε δήλων ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον ἴησόντες τὸ μέσον ἴησόν· ὁ γὰρ νόμος τὸ 5 μέσον. ἐτί κυρίωτεροι καὶ περὶ κυριωτέρων τῶν κατὰ γράμματά νόμοιν οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἐδή εἰςίν, ὡστ’ εἰ τῶν κατὰ γράμματα ἀνθρώπος ἄρχῃν ἀσφαλέστερος, ἀλλ’ οὐ τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἔθος. ἀλλὰ μὴν όὔθε βάδιον ἐφοράν πολλὰ τὸν ἐνα’ δείσει ἄρα πλείονες εἰναι τοὺς ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ καθισταμένους ἀρχοντας, 10 ὡστ’ τί διαφέρει τοῦτο ἐς ἀρχής εὐθὺς ὑπάρχειν ἢ τὸν ἔνα καταστήσαι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον; ἐτι, ὁ καὶ πρότερον εἰρημένον 10 ἐστίν, εἴτε ὁ ἀνήρ ὁ σπουδαῖος, διότι βελτίων, ἄρχειν δικαίον, τοῦ δὲ ἐνός οἱ δύο ἀγαθοὶ βελτίως· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔστι τὸ “σὺν τε δ’ ἐρχομένω” καὶ ἡ εὐχὴ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, “τοιοῦτοι δέκα μοι συμφράδιμονες.” εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν περὶ ἐνόν ἀλλ’ ἄρχαι κύριαι κρίνειν, ὡσπερ ὁ δικαστής, περὶ δὲν ὁ νόμος ἀδύνατει διορίζειν, ἔτει περὶ ἄν γε δυνατός, οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβήτει περὶ τοῦτων ὡς οὐκ ἄν ἄριστα ο νόμος ἄρξει καὶ κρίνειεν. ἀλλ’ ἐπείδη τὰ μὲν ἐνδέχεται περιληφθῆναι τοῖς νόμοις τὰ 11 20 δὲ ἀδύναμα, ταῦτ’ ἐστίν ἃ ποιεῖ διαπορείν καὶ ζητεῖν πότερον τὸν ἄριστον νόμον ἄρχειν αἱρετότερον ἢ τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἄριστον περὶ δὲν γὰρ θυμοῦνται νομοθετήσαι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν. οὐ τούτων τοῦτο γ’ ἀντιλέγονται, ὡς οὐκ ἀναγκαίον ἄνθρωπον εἰναι τὸν κρινοῦντα περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐχ 25 ἐνα μόνον ἄλλα πολλοὺς. κρίνει γὰρ ἐκαστός ἄρχων πεπαιδευμένος ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καλῶς, ἀτοπὸν τ’ ἵσως ἂν εἶναι δόξειν εἰ δεῖτον ἵδιον τῆς δυναμείς καὶ δυσιν ἄκοαις κρίνων, καὶ πράττον δυσὶ ποιεῖ καὶ χειρίζεται, ἡ πολλοὶ πολλοὶς, ἔτει καὶ νῦν ὁφθαλμοὺς πολλοὺς οἱ μόναρχοι ποιοῦσιν 30 αὐτῶν καὶ ὅτα καὶ χειρας καὶ πόδας· τοὺς γὰρ τῇ ἀρχῇ καὶ αὐτοῦ φίλους ποιοῦνται συνάρχουσι. μὴ φίλου μὲν οὖν ὄντες
ού ποιήσουσι κατὰ τὴν τού μονάρχου προαίρεσιν' ἐι δὲ φίλοι
κάκεινοι καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς, ὅ γε φίλος ἵσος καὶ ὁμοίος, ὥστ' ἐι
tούτους οἴεται δειν ἀρχεῖν, τοὺς ἵσος καὶ ὁμοίοις ἀρχεῖν οἴεται
dειν ὁμοίως. ὧ μὲν οὖν οἱ διαμφισβητοῦντες πρὸς τὴν βασι-
35
λείαν λέγουσιν, σχεδὸν ταῦτ' ἔστιν. ἀλλ' ἵσως ταῦτ', ἐπὶ μὲν 17
tινων ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, ἐπὶ δὲ τινων οὐχ οὕτως. ἔστι
γὰρ τι φύσει δεσποστῶν καὶ ἀλλο βασιλευτῶν καὶ ἀλλο πολι-
tικῶν καὶ δίκαιων καὶ συμφέρων τυραννικῶν δ' οὐκ ἔστι κατὰ
φύσιν, οὐδὲ τῶν ἀλλῶν πολιτείων ὅσι παρεκβάσεις εἰσίν' 40
2 ταῦτα γὰρ γίγνεται παρὰ φύσιν. ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων
γε φανερῶν ὡς ἐν μὲν τοῖς ὁμοίως καὶ ἵσοις οὔτε συμφέρων 1288 a
ἐστὶν οὔτε δίκαιον ἕνα κύριον εἶναι πάντων, οὔτε μὴ νόμων ὄν-
tων, ἀλλ' αὐτῶν ὡς οὔτα νόμων, οὔτε νόμων ὄντων, οὔτε ἀγαθῶν
ἀγαθῶν οὔτε μὴ ἀγαθῶν μὴ ἀγαθῶν, οὔδ' ἄν κατ' ἄρετήν
3 ἀμείνων ὃ, εἰ μὴ τρόπον τινά, τίς δ' ὁ τρόπος, λεκτέων 5
εἰρηταὶ δὲ ποι ἡδὴ καὶ πρότερον. πρῶτον δὲ διοριστέον τι το
βασιλευτῶν καὶ τί τὸ ἀριστοκρατικόν καὶ τί τὸ πολιτικόν.
4 βασιλευτῶν μὲν οὖν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔστι πλήθος δ' ἐφύκε φέρειν
gένος ὑπερέχον κατ' ἄρετήν πρὸς ἡγεμονίαν πολιτικῆν, ἀρι-
stokratikón δὲ πλήθος δ' ἐφύκε φέρειν πλήθος ἀρχεσθαι 10
δυνάμενον τῆν τῶν ἔλευθερων ἀρχὴν ὑπὸ τῶν κατ' ἄρετήν
ἡγεμονικών πρὸς πολιτικὴν ἀρχὴν, πολιτικῶν δὲ πλήθος ἐν
ὁ' ἐφύκεν εὐγγίγνεσθαι πλήθος πολεμικών, δυνάμενον ἁρ-
χεσθαι καὶ ἀρχεῖν κατὰ νόμον τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν διανέμοντα
5 τοῖς εὐπόροις τὰς ἀρχὰς. ὅταν οὖν ἡ γένος ὅλον ἡ καὶ τῶν 15
ἀλλων ἔνα τινά συμβῇ διαφέροντα γενεσθαι κατ' ἄρετήν
tοσοῦτον ὅσθ' ὑπερέχειν τὴν ἐκείνον τῆς τῶν ἀλλῶν πάντων,
tότε δίκαιον τὸ γένος εἶναι τοῦτο βασιλικόν καὶ κύριον πάντων
6 καὶ βασιλέα τὸν ἔνα τοῦτον, καθάπερ γὰρ εἰρηταὶ πρότερον,
οὐ μόνον οὕτως ἔχει κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, ὁ προφέρειν εἰδὼλαίν 20
οὶ τὰς πολιτείας καθιστάντες, οἱ τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς καὶ
οἱ τὰς ὁλιγαρχίκας καὶ πάλιν οἱ τὰς δημοκρατικὰς (πάντη
gὰρ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἀξιόψις, ἀλλ' ὑπεροχὴν οὐ τὴν αὐτήν),
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34 ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Ι’. 17-18—Δ’ (H’). 1.

άλλα καὶ κατὰ τὸ πρόστερον λεχθέν, οὔτε γὰρ κτείνειν ἥ 7
25 φυγαδεύειν οὐδ’ ὀστρακίζειν δὴ ποὺ τὸν τοιοῦτον πρέπον ἑστίν,
οὔτ’ ἀξίουν ἀρχεσθαι κατὰ μέρος· οὐ γὰρ πέφυκε τὸ μέρος
ὕπερέχειν τοῦ παντός, τῷ δὲ τὴν τηλικαύτην ὑπερβολὴν
ἐχοντι τούτῳ συμβέβηκεν. ὡστε λείπεται μόνον τὸ πείθεσθαι τὸν
τοιοῦτον, καὶ κύριον εἶναι μή κατὰ μέρος τοῦτον ἀλλ’ ἀπλῶς.
30 περὶ μὲν οὖν βασιλείας, τίνας ἔχει διαφοράς, καὶ πότερον
οὐ συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡ συμφέρει, καὶ τίσι, καὶ πῶς,
18 διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· ἐπεὶ δὲ τρεῖς φαμέν εἶναι τὰς
ὀρθὰς πολιτείας, τοῦτων δ’ ἀναγκαίοι ἁρπάστην εἶναι τὴν ὑπὸ
tῶν ἁρπάστων οἰκονομομένην, τοιαύτη δ’ ἑστὶν ἣ συμβέβη-
35 κεν ἢ ἕνα τίνα συμπάντων ἢ γένους ὅλον ἢ πλῆθος ὑπερέχον
εἶναι κατ’ ἁρπήν, τῶν μὲν ἀρχεσθαι δυναμένων τῶν δ’ ἀρχειν
πρὸς τὴν αἰρετωσάτην ᾣWindowSize: 0, εὖ δὲ τοῖς πρῶτοι ἐδείχθη λόγοι
ὅτι τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον ἀνδρός ἁρπήν εἶναι καὶ πολίτου
tῆς πόλεως τῆς ἁρίστης, φανερὸν ὅτι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ
40 διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἁνήρ τε γίνεται σπουδαῖος καὶ πόλιν συστή-
σειεν ἃν τὶς ἁριστοκρατουμένην ἡ βασιλευμένη, ὡστ’ ἐσταὶ
1288 b καὶ παιδεία καὶ ἔθη ταῦτα σχέδουν τὰ ποιοῦντα σπουδαίον
ἀνδρὰ καὶ τὰ ποιοῦντα πολιτικῶν καὶ βασιλικῶν. διωρισμέ- 2
νὸν δὲ τοῦτων περὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἢ δὴ πειρατέων λέγειν τῆς
ἁρίστης, τίνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι τρόπον καὶ καθίστασθαι πῶς.
5 [ἀνάγκη δὴ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ αὐτῆς ποιήσασθαι τὴν προσή-
κουσαν σκέψιν]
2 χόντων αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν μη τῇ γέγονηται παράλογον, διὸ δεὶ πρῶτον ὀμολογεῖσθαι τίς ὁ πᾶσιν ὡς εἰπεῖν αἱρετάτατοι βίοι, μετὰ 20 δὲ τοῦτο πάτερον κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἦ ἔτερος, νομίσαντας οὖν ἰκανῶς πολλὰ λέγεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς, καὶ νῦν χρηστεύου ἀὐτοῖς.

3 ὥς ἀληθῶς γὰρ πρὸς γε μίαν διαίρεσιν οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητήσειν ἄν ὅς οὐ τριῶν οὐσῶν μεριδῶν, τῶν τε ἐκτὸς καὶ τῶν ἐν 25 τῷ σώματι καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἐσχῆ, πάντα ταῦτα ὑπάρχειν 4 τοῖς μακαρίοις χρή. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν φαίν μακάριοι τῶν μηδὲν μάριον ἔχεται ἀνδρίας μηδὲ σωφροσύνης μηδὲ δικαιοσύνης μηδὲ φρονήσεως, ἀλλὰ δεδίδα μὲν τὰς παραπτωμένας μνάσιας, ἀπεχόμενον δὲ μηδενός, ἂν ἐπιθυμήσῃ τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ 30 πιεῖν, τῶν ἐσχάτων, ἐνεκα δὲ τεταρτημορίου διαφθείροντα τοὺς φιλτάτους φίλους, ὦμοιος δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν οὕτως ἀφρόνα καὶ διεσυνεμένον ὡςπέρ τι παιδίον ἢ μαίνοι 5 μενον. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν λεγόμενα ὡςπέρ πάντες ἀν συγχωρήσειν, διαφέρονται δ' ἐν τῷ ποσῷ καὶ ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς. 35 τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς ἔχειν ἰκανὸν εἶναι νομίζον τὸν ὅποιον, πλοῦτον δὲ καὶ χρημάτων καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ δόξης καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων εἰς ἀπειρὸν ἦτοι τῇ ὑπερβολῇ. ἥμεις δὲ αὐτοῖς ἑροῦμεν ὅτι ῥάδιον μὲν περὶ τοῦτον καὶ διὰ τῶν ἔργων διαλαμβάνειν τὴν πίστιν, ἄροντας ὃτι κτῶται καὶ 40 φυλάττονυς οὐ τὰς ἀρετὰς τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα ταῦτας, καὶ τὸ ζηνν' εὐδαιμονίων, εἰτ' ἐν τῷ χαίρειν ἔστιν εἰτ' ἐν ἀρετῇ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰτ' ἐν ἀμφότεροι, ὅτι μάλλον ὑπάρχει τοῖς τὸ ἡθος μὲν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν κεκοσμημένοις εἰς ὑπερβολήν, περὶ δὲ τὴν ἐξω κτῆσιν τῶν ἁγαθῶν μετριάζουσιν, Ἦ τοῖς ἐκεῖνα μὲν κεκτημένοις πλεῖοι τῶν χρησίμων, ἐν δὲ τούτοις 5 ἐλλείπουσιν' οὐ μὴν ἄλλα καὶ κατὰ τῶν λόγων σκοπουμένοις 7 εὐσύνοπτον ἔστιν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἔχει πέρας, ὡςπέρ ὀργανῶν τι' πᾶν δὲ τὸ χρησίμων ἔστιν, ὅτι τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἤ βλάπτειν ἀναγκαῖον ἦ μηδὲν ὀφελος εἰναι αὐτῶν τοῖς ἐχουσιν' τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν ἐκαστον ἁγαθῶν, δοφ' περ ἀν 10 D 2
36 ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Δ' (Η'). 1–2.

υπερβάλλη, τοσούτο μάλλον χρήσιμον εἶναι, εἰ δεῖ καὶ τοῦτοι ἐπιλέγειν μὴ μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἄλλα καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον. ὥστε τὸ δήλον ὦς ἀκολουθεῖ φύσιμον τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀρίστη τὴν ἐκάστου πράγματος πρὸς ἄλληλα κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν, ἡνπερ εἰληφεὶ διάστασιν ὦν ἕφασκεν αὐτὰς εἶναι διαθέσεις ταῦτα. ὥστε εἰπερ ἑστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τῆς κτήσεως καὶ τοῦ σώματος τιμώτερον καὶ ἄπλως καὶ ἢμῖν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν τῇν ἁρίστῃν ἐκάστου ἀνάλογον τούτων ἔχειν. έτι δέ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνεκεν ταῦτα πέρυκεν αἴρετα καὶ δεὶ πάντας 20 αἰρείσθαι τοὺς εὑροῦντας, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων ἐνεκεν τῇν ψυχῆν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐκάστῳ τῆς εὐθαμονίας ἐπιβάλλει τοσοῦτον τὸν ὅσον περ ἄρετής καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ τοῦ πράττειν κατὰ ταῦτα, ἕστω συνωμολογημένου ήμῶν, μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμένοις, διε εὐθαμίων μὲν ἑστὶ καὶ μακάριος, δὲ οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν 25 ἐξωτερικῶν ἁγαθῶν ἄλλα δὲ αὐτῶν αὐτὸς καὶ τῷ ποιοῦ τις εἶναι τῆν φύσιν' ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν εὐπνὴται τῆς εὐθαμονίας διὰ ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον ἔτεραν εἶναι (τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἁγαθῶν τῆς ψυχῆς αἴτιοι ταυτόματος καὶ τῇ τύχῃ, δικαιας δ' οὐδένς οὐδὲ σώφρον ἀπὸ τὺχης οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τύχην ἑστὶν) ἔχομενον 11 30 δ' ἑστὶ καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων δεόμενον καὶ πόλιν εὐθαμίων τὴν ἁρίστην εἶναι καὶ πράττουσαι καλῶς, ἀδύνατον δὲ καλῶς πράττειν τοῖς μὴ τὰ καλὰ πράττουσιν' οὐδὲν δὲ καλῶν ἔργον οὔτ' ἄνδρος οὔτε πόλεως χωρίς ἁρετής καὶ φρονήσεως· ἀνδρία 12 δὲ πόλεως καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ φρόνησις τῇν αὐτὴν ἔχει 35 δύναμιν καὶ μορφῆν, δὲν μετασχηχόντων ἐκαστός τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεται δικαίος καὶ φρονίμος καὶ σῶφρον. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ταῦτα μὲν ἐπὶ τοσούτον ἐστὸν πεφρομιμασμένα τῷ λόγῳ (οὔτε γὰρ μὴ βιγγάνειν αὐτῶν δυνατῶν, οὔτε πάντας τοὺς οἰκείους ἐπεξελθεῖν ἐνδέχεται λόγους· ἐτέρας γὰρ ἑστὶν ἔργον σχολῆς ταῦτα· νῦν δὲ ὑποκείσθω τοσοῦτον, ὅτι βίος μὲν ἀριστεῖς, καὶ χωρίς ἐκάστοτε καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεωις, δὲ μετὰ ἁρετῆς κεχο- 1324 αρηγημένης ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὅστε μετέχειν τῶν κατ' ἁρετὴν πρά- ξεων, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντας, ἐάσαντας ἐπὶ τῆς νῦν
1323 b 11—1324 a 35.

μεθόδου, διασκεπτέον ύστερον, εἰ τις τοῖς εἰρημένοις τυγχάνει μὴ πειθόμενον·

Πότερον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι φατέον 2 ἐνός τε ἐκάστου τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πόλεως ἡ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν, λοιπὸν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν. φανερῶν δὲ καὶ τούτοι πάντες γὰρ ἂν 2 ὀμολογήσατε εἴναι τὴν αὐτὴν. ὦσοι γὰρ ἐν πλούσι τὸ ζῆν εὑ τίθενται ἐφ' ἐνός, οὕτω καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὅλην, ἦν ἡ πλουσία, μακαρίζουσιν ὦσοι τε τὸν τυραννικὸν βίον μάλιστα τιμῶσιν, ἵνα καὶ πόλιν τὴν πλείστων ἄρχουσαν εὐδαιμονεστάτην ἂν εἶναι φαϊνει εἰ τε τις τὸν ἐνα δὲ ἁρετὴν ἀποδέχεσαι, 3 καὶ πόλιν εὐδαιμονεστέραν φήσει τὴν σπουδαιοτέραν. ἀλλὰ ταύτ' ἂδὴ δύο ἐστίν ἄ δείται σκέψεως, ἐν μὲν πότερος αἱρε- τότερος βίος, δ' ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ συμπολιτεύεσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως 15 ἡ μᾶλλον ὁ ἕξικος καὶ τὴς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ἀπολελυ- μένος, ἦτι δὲ τίνα πολιτείαν βετέον καὶ ποιαν διάθεσιν πόλεως ἀρίστην, εἰτε πάσιν ὄντος αἱρετοῦ κοινονεῖ πόλεως 4 εἰτε καὶ τισὶ μὲν μὴ τοῖς δὲ πλείστοις, ἐπεὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτι- κῆς διανοίας καὶ θεωρίας τοῦτ' ἐστιν ἔργον, ἀλλ' οὗ τὸ περὶ 20 ἐκαστον αἱρετῶν, ἥμεις δὲ ταύτην προηρήμεθα νῦν τὴν σκέψιν, ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ πάρεργον ἂν εἰτη τοῦτο δὲ ἔργον τῆς μεθόδου 5 ταύτης' ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαίον εἶναι πολιτείαν ἀρίστην ταύ- την καθ' ἢν τάξιν κἀν ὁστισθον ἀριστα πράττοι καὶ ζῷη μακαρίως, φανερὸν ἐστιν' ἀμφισβητεῖν δὲ παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν 25 ὀμολογούντων τὸν μετ' ἁρετῆς εἶναι βιῶν αἱρετῶτατον, πότε- ρον ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς βίος αἱρετὸν ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ πάντων τῶν ἕκτος ἀπολελυμένος, οἷον θεωρητικὸς τις, ὅν 6 μόνον τινὲς φασιν εἶναι φιλόσοφον. σχέδον γὰρ τούτους τοὺς δύο βίους τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ φιλοτιμότατοι πρὸς ἁρετήν 30 φαίνονται προαιροῦμενοι, καὶ τῶν προτέρων καὶ τῶν νῦν' λέγω δὲ δύο τού τε πολιτικὸν καὶ τῶν φιλόσοφον. διαφέρει δὲ οὐ μικρὸν ποτέρως ἔχει τὸ ἀληθὲς· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν γε εὖ φρονοῦντα πρὸς τὸν βελτίων σκοπὸν συντάττεσθαι καὶ τῶν 7 ἀνθρώπων ἐκαστον καὶ κοινὴ τὴν πολιτείαν. νομίζουσι δ' οἷς 35
μὲν τὸ τῶν πέλας ἀρχεῖν δεσποτικὸς μὲν γιγνόμενον μετ' ἀδικίας τινὸς εἶναι τῆς μεγίστης, πολιτικὸς δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄδικον οὐκ ἔχειν, ἐμπόδιον δὲ ἔχειν τῇ περὶ αὐτὸν εὐθηρία τοῦτον δ' ὥσπερ ἔξ ἐναντίας ἑτεροί τυγχάνουσι δοξάζοντες, μόνον 40 γὰρ ἀνδρὸς τὸν πρακτικὸν εἶναι βίον καὶ πολιτικὸν, ἐφ' ἐκάστης γὰρ ἀρέτης οὐκ εἶναι πράξεις μᾶλλον τοῖς ἰδιώταις

1324 b ἢ τοῖς τὰ κοινὰ πράττουσι καὶ πολιτευόμενοι. οἱ μὲν οὖν 8 οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνοντιν, οἱ δὲ τὸν δεσποτικὸν καὶ τυραννικὸν τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι μύον εὐδαίμονα φασίν. παρ' ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ τῆς πολιτείας οὕτος ὀρος καὶ τῶν νόμων, ὅπος 5 δεσπόζωσι τῶν πέλας. διὸ καὶ τῶν πλείστων νομίμων χώδην 9 ὦς εἰπεῖν κειμένων παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις, ὅμως εἰ ποῦ τι πρὸς ἐν οἱ νόμοι βλέπουσι, τοῦ κρατείν στοχαζόνται πάντες, ὥσπερ ἐν Δακεδαίμονι καὶ Κρήτῃ πρὸς τὸς πολέμους συντετακται σχεδὸν ἢ τε παιδεία καὶ τὸ τῶν νόμων πλῆθος. ἔτι δ' ἐν 10 10 τοῖς ἐθνεσι πάσι τοῖς δυναμένοις πλεονεκτεῖν ἡ τοιαύτη τετίμηται δύναμις, οὖν ἐν Ἑκυθᾶς καὶ Πέρσας καὶ Ἐθραί καὶ Κέλτοις· ἐν ἐνίοις γὰρ καὶ νόμοι τινὲς εἰσὶ παροξύνων- τες πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν ταύτην, καθάπερ ἐν Ἐρχηδῶνι φασὶ τὸν ἐκ τῶν κρίκων κόσμον λαμβάνειν ὅσα ἀν στρατεύσων- 15 ταί στρατείας· ἢν δὲ ποτε καὶ περὶ Μακεδονίου νόμος τῶν 11 μηδένα ἀπεκταγκότα πολέμου ἄνδρα περιεξόθαι τὴν φορ- βείαν· ἐν δὲ Ἑκυθᾶς οὐκ ἐξήν πῦνειν ἐν ἐορτῇ τινι σκῦφον περιφερομένον τῷ μηδένα ἀπεκταγκότε πολέμου· ἐν δὲ τοῖς 12 Ἰβηρσιν, ἐδείκε πολεμικό, τοσοῦτος τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὀβελίσκους 20 καταπηγνύουσι περὶ τῶν τάφων ὅσους ἀν διαφθείρῃ τῶν πολεμίων· καὶ ἑτέρα δὴ παρ' ἑτέροις ἐστὶ τοιαύτα πολλά, 12 τὰ μὲν νόμοις κατειλημμένα τὰ δὲ ἐδεικνύοντες, καὶ τοῖς δύοξεῖν ἄν ἄγαν ὀποῖον ὅσος εἶναι τοὺς βουλομένους ἐπισκοπεῖν, εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐργον τοῦ πολιτικοῦ, τὸ δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν ὅπως ἄρχῃ 25 καὶ δεσπόζῃ τῶν πλησίων καὶ βουλομένων καὶ ἔνοβος θεατεῖν, πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἴη τοῦτο πολιτικὸν ἡ νομοθετικὸν, δ' γε μηδὲ 13 νόμιμον ἐστιν; οὐ νόμιμον δὲ τὸ μὴ μόνον δικαίως ἀλλὰ
καὶ ἀδίκως ἀρχεῖν, κρατεῖν δ' ἐστὶ καὶ μὴ δικαῖος. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἐν ταῖς ἀλλαίς ἐπιστήμαις τούτῳ ὅρωμεν· οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ ἱατροῦ οὔτε τοῦ κυβερνήτου ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ ἦ πεῖσαι ἢ βια-, σασθαι τοῦ μὲν τοὺς θεραπευομένους τοῦ δὲ τοὺς πλωτήρας.

14 ἀλλ' ἐοίκασιν οἱ πολλοὶ τὴν δεσποτικὴν πολιτικὴν οἰρέσθαι εἶναι, καὶ ὅπερ αὐτοῖς ἐκαστοί οὐφασὶν εἶναι δίκαιον οὐδὲ συμφέρον, τούτ' οὐκ οἰσχύνονται πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀσκοῦντες· αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ παρ' αὐτοῖς τὸ δικαίως ἀρχεῖν ἥττοῦσίν, πρὸς 35 δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους οὕθεν μέλει τῶν δικαίων. ἀτόπον δὲ εἰ μὴ φύσει τὸ μὲν δεσποτότιον ἐστὶ τὸ δὲ οὖ δεσποστόν, ὡστε εἰπερ ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τούτον, οὐ δὲι πάντων πειράσθαι δεσπόζειν, ἀλλὰ τῶν δεσποστῶν, ὡστερ οὐδὲ θηρεύειν ἐπί θοίνην ἡ θυ- σίαν ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς τούτο θηρευτὸν· ἐστὶ δὲ θη- 40

16 ρευτὸν δ' ἄν ἄγριον ἢ ἐδεστὸν ζῴον. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἡ γ' ἄν καὶ καθ' ἐαυτὴν μία πόλις εὐθαϊμών, ἡ πολιτεύεται δηλοῦτι 1325 α καλῶς, εἰπὲν ἐνδεχεται πολίν οἴκεσθαι ποι καθ' ἐαυτὴν νό- μοι χρωμένην σπουδαίοις, ἡς τῆς πολιτείας ἡ σύνταξις οὐ πρὸς πόλεμον οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν ἐστὶ τῶν πολεμών· 17 μὴθὲν γὰρ ὑπαρξέτω τοιοῦτον. δήλον ἄρα ὅτι πᾶσας τᾶς 5 πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιμελείας καλᾶς μὲν θετέων, οὐχ ὡς τέλος δὲ πάντων ἀκρότατον, ἀλλὰ ἐκείνῳ χάριν ταύτας. τοῦ δὲ νομοθέτου τὸν σπουδαίον ἐστὶ τὸ θεάσασθαι πόλιν καὶ γένος ἀνθρώπων καὶ πᾶσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν, ζῴης ἀγαθῆς πῶς 18 μεθέξουσι καὶ τῆς ἐνδεχομένης αὐτοῖς εὐθαϊμωνίας. διὸσει 10 μέντοι τῶν ταττομένων ἐνια νομίμων καὶ τούτῳ τῆς νομο- θετικῆς ἐστίν ίδεῖν, εάν τινες ὑπάρξωσι γειτνιώτετε, ποία πρὸς ποιούς ἀσκητέου ἢ πῶς τοῖς καθήκουσι πρὸς ἐκάστους χρη- στεύον. ἀλλὰ τούτῳ μὲν κάν υστερον τύχας τῆς προσηκοιής σκέψεως, πρὸς τί τέλος δεῖ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν συνείνειν 15 πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ὁμολογούντας μὲν τὸν μετ' ἀρετῆς εἶναι βλον 3 αἰρετώτατον, διαφερομένους δὲ περὶ τῆς χρήσεως αὐτοῦ, λε- κτέων ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀμφιτέρους αὐτοὺς (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀποδοκιμά- χουσι τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχάς, νομίζοντες τὸν τε τού ἑμεθέρου
20 βίον ἐτερόν τινα εἶναι τοῦ πολιτικοῦ καὶ πάντων αἱρετῶτατον, οἱ δὲ τούτων ἀριστων· ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸν μηδὲν πράττοντα πράττειν εὖ, τὴν δ᾽ εὐπραγίαν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι ταύτων) ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἀμφότεροι λέγουσιν ὅρθως τὰ δὲ οὐκ ὅρθως, οἱ μὲν ὅτι ὁ τοῦ ἐλευθέρου βίος τοῦ δεσποτικοῦ ἀμείνων τούτο 25 γὰρ ἀληθές· οὐδὲν γὰρ τὸ γε δοῦλος, ἢ δοῦλος, χρήσθαι σεμνῶν· ἢ γὰρ ἐπίταξις ἢ περὶ τῶν ἀναγκαῖων οὐδὲν μετέχει τῶν καλῶν. τὸ μὲντοι νομίζειν πάσαν ἀρχὴν εἶναι δεσποτεῖαν οὐκ ὅρθων· οὐ γὰρ ἔλαττον διεστηκέν ἢ τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴ τῆς τῶν δούλων ἢ αὐτό τὸ φύσει ἐλεύθερον τοῦ 30 φύσει δοῦλον. διώρισται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἰκανῶς εὐ τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις. τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐπαίνει τὸ ἀπράκτειν τοῦ πράττειν 3 οὐκ ἀληθές· ἢ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία πράξεις ἔστιν, ἐτί δὲ πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν τέλος ἔχουσιν αἱ τῶν δικαιῶν καὶ σωφρόνων πράξεις. καίτοι τάξι ἄν ὑπολάβοι τις τούτων οὖτω διωρισ-35 μένοι ὅτι τὸ κύριον εἶναι πάντων ἀριστων· οὐτὸ γὰρ ἂν πλείστων καὶ καλλίστων κύριος εἰπράξεως. ὡστε οὐ δεῖ 4 τὸν δυνάμενον ἄρχειν παριέναι τῷ πλησίον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, καὶ μήτε πατέρα παίδων μήτε παῖδας πατρός μήθ᾽ ὀλος φίλον φίλου μηδένα ὑπολογίζειν μὴ δὲ πρὸς τούτο 40 φροντίζειν· τὸ γὰρ ἀριστων αἱρετῶτατον, τὸ δ᾽ εὑ πράττειν ἀριστων. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἀληθῶς ἵσως λέγουσιν, εἰπερ ὑπάρ-

1325 b ξει τοῖς ἀποστεροῦσι καὶ βιαζομένοις τοῖς τῶν ὄντων αἱρετῶ-5 τατον· ἀλλ᾽ ἵσως οὐχ οὖν τε ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ᾽ ὑποτίθενται 5 τοῦτο ψεῦδος· οὐ γὰρ ἐτί καλὰς τὰς πράξεις ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τῷ μὴ διαφέροντες τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἄνὴρ γυναικὸς ἡ πατὴρ
5 τεκνῶν ἡ δεσπότης δούλων· ὡστε ο παραβαίνων οὖθεν ἂν τηλικοῦτον καταρθώσειν ὑποτερον ὅσον ἥδη παρεκβεβήκη τῆς ἁρετῆς. τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίως τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τῷ (ἐν)
5 μέρει, τοῦτο γὰρ ἵσων καὶ ὁμοίως· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἵσων τοῖς ἵσως 6 καὶ τὸ μὴ ὁμοίως τοῖς ὁμοίως παρὰ φύσιν, οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν
10 παρὰ φύσιν καλῶν. διὸ κἂν ἄλλος τις ἡ κρείττων κατ' ἁρετὴν καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν πρακτικὴν τῶν ἀριστῶν, τούτω
7 καλὸν ἄκολουθεῖν καὶ τοῦτο πείθεσθαι δίκαιον. θεὶ δ’ οὐ μόνον ἄρετην ἄλλα καὶ δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν, καθ’ ἤν ἦσται πρακτικός. ἀλλ’ εἰ ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς καὶ τὴν ἐυδαιμονίαν ἐυπραγιάν θετέον, καὶ κοινῇ πάσης πόλεως ἄν εἰ ὦ καὶ καθ’ 15 ἑκατὸν ἄριστος βίος ὁ πρακτικός, ἀλλὰ τὸν πρακτικὸν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἑτέρους, καθάπερ οἴονται τινες, ὡδὲ τὰς διανοίας εἶναι μόνας ταῦτας πρακτικὰς τὰς τῶν ἀποβαινοῦντων χάριν γιγνομέναι ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον τὰς αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν ἐνεκέν θεωρίας καὶ διανοή- 20 σεις. ἡ γὰρ ἐυπραξία τέλος, ὡστε καὶ πράξεις τις μα- λιστα δὲ καὶ πράττειν λέγομεν κυρίως καὶ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν 9 πράξεων τοῖς ταῖς διανοίας ἀρχιτέκτονας, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ’ ἀπράκτειν ἀναγκαῖον τὰς καθ’ αὐτὰς πόλεις ἰδιομένας καὶ ζῆν οὐτω προβοηθήμενα’ ἐνδεχέσθαι γάρ κατὰ μέρη καὶ τοῦτο 25 συμβαίνει’ πολλαὶ γὰρ κοινωνία πρὸς ἀλληλα τοῖς με- 10 ρεσι τῆς πόλεως εἰςιν. ὁμοιοὶ δὲ τοῦτο ὑπάρχει καὶ καθ’ ἑνὸς ὠτοίον τῶν ἀνθρώπων’ σχολή γὰρ ἄν ὁ θεὸς ἔχοι κα- λῶς καὶ πᾶς ὁ κόσμος, οἷς οὐκ εἴσιν ἐξωτερικαὶ πράξεις παρὰ τὰς οἰκείας τὰς αὐτῶν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸν αὐτὸν βίον 30 ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν ἀριστὸν ἐκάστῳ τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεις καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, φανερὸν ἔστιν’ Ἐπεὶ δὲ πεφρομίαστα τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα περὶ αὐτῶν, 4 καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας ἡμῖν τεθεώρηται πρότερον, ἀρχὴ τῶν λοιπῶν εἰσίν πρῶτον ποίας δεῖ τὰς ὑποθέ- 35 σεις εἶναι περὶ τῆς μελλούσης κατ’ εὐχήν συνεστάναι πόλεως: 2 οὐ γὰρ οἶνον τε πολιτείαν γενέσθαι τὴν ἀρίστην ἀνευ συμμέ- τρου χορηγίας. διδ’ δὲ πολλὰ προϋποτεθείσαν καθάπερ εὐχομένους, εἶναι μὲντοι μηδὲν τούτων ἀδύνατον. λέγω δὲ 3 οἶνον περὶ τε πλῆθος πολιτῶν καὶ χώρας. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ 40 τοῖς ἄλλοις δημιουργοῖς, οἶνον ψάντη καὶ ναυτηγῷ, δεὶ τὴν ὠλην ὑπάρξειν ἐπιτηδεῖαν οὖθαν πρὸς τὴν ἐργασίαν (ὅσον 1326 a γὰρ ἄν αὐτῇ τυγχάνῃ παρεσκευασμένη βέλτιον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ γεγυμόμενον ὑπὸ τῆς τέχνης εἶναι κάλλιον), οὕτω καὶ
τῷ πολιτικῷ καὶ τῷ νομοθετῇ δεῖ τὴν οἰκείαν ὑλὴν υπάρχειν
tοῦπολιτικῆςχορηγίαςπρῶτον 4
tὸτεπλήθοςτῶνἀνθρώπων,πόσουςτεκαὶποίουςτινὰς
ὑπάρχεινδεὶφύσει,καὶκατὰτὴνχώρανὀσαύτως,ὀσὴν
τεἰναικαὶποιαντιὰναυτὴν.οὐούταιμὲνοὐνοὶπλείστοι
προσήκεινμεγάληνεῖνανηνευδαιμόναπόλινεὶδετοῦτοί
10 ἀληθείς,ἀγνοοῦτιοιμεγάληκαὶποίαμικρὰπόλις.κατ’5
ἀριθμὸνγὰρπλήθοςτῶνἐνοικούντωνκρίνουσιτὴνμεγάλην,
δεὶδὲμᾶλλονμὴεἰςτὸπλήθοςεἰςδὲδύναμινἀποβλέ-
πειν.ἐστὶγὰρτικαὶπόλεωςἐργον,ὅστετὴνδυναμένην
τούτομάλιστ’ἀποτελεῖν,ταύτηνοιὴτέονεἰναιμεγάλην,οἶον
15 Ἰπποκράτηνοὐκἀνθρωπονἀλλὰιατρὸνεῖναιμελζωφύσειν
ἀντικοῦντοςκατὰτὸμέγεθοςτοῦσώματος.οὐ6
μὴνἀλλὰκαὶεἰδεὶκρίνεινπρὸστὸπλήθοςἀποβλέποντας,
οὐκατὰτὸτυχὸνπλήθοςτοῦτοιποιητέον(ἀναγκαῖονγὰρἐν
ταῖςπόλεσινἰσοςὑπάρχεινκαὶδουλῶνἀριθμὸνπολλών
20 καὶμετοίκωνκαὶξένων),ἀλλ’ὅσοιπόλεωςεἰσὶμέροςκαὶ
ἐξδὲσυνισταταιπόλιςοἰκείωνμορίωνἡγὰρτοῦτονὑπε-
ροχὴντοῦπλήθουςμεγάληςπόλεωςστημεῖν,ἐξἡςδὲβάναν-
σούμὲνἐξέρχονταιπολλοὶτὸνἀριθμὸνὀπλίταιδὲὁλύοι,
ταύτηνἀδύνατονεἰναιμεγάληνοὐγὰρταῦτὸνμεγάληντε
25 πόλιςκαὶπολυάνθρωπος.ἀλλὰμὴνκαὶτοῦτογεἐκτῶν7
ἐργῶνφανερὸνὅτιχαλεπῶν,ἰσωςδ’ἀδύνατον,εὐνομεῖσθαι
τὴνλίανπολυάνθρωπον.τῶνγοὺνδοκουσῶνπολιτεύονται
καλῶςοὐδεμιὰνὁρμῶνοὖσανἀνεμένηνπρὸστὸπλήθος.
τοῦτοδὲδῆλονκαὶδιὰτῆςτῶνλόγωνπίστεως.οτεγὰρ8
30 νόμοιςτάξειςτῆςἐστὶ,καὶτὴνεὐνομίανἀναγκαῖονεὐταξίαν
eῖναι,ὁδὲλίανὑπερβάλλωνἀριθμὸςοὐδύναταιμετέχειν
tάξεωςτῆςγὰρδὴτοῦτοδυνάμεωςἐργῶν,ὅτιςκαὶτόδε
συνέχειτὸπάντειτογεκαλὸνἐνπλήθειμακεγέθει
εἰσωθείσαι.διὸκαὶπόλιςῆςμετὰμεγέθουςὁλεκθεῖς9
35 ὁρὸςὑπάρχει,ταύτηνεῖναικαλλιστὴνἀναγκαῖον.ἀλλ’ἐστὶ
tικαὶπόλεωςμεγέθουςμέτρου,ὡςπερκαὶτῶνἀλλῶνπάν-
10 τοις, ἐφόν φυτῶν ὀργάνων καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἐκαστὸν οὔτε λίαν μικρὸν οὔτε κατὰ μέγεθος ὑπερβάλλον ἔξει τὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν ὄλως ἐστερημένον ἔσται τῇς φύσεως, ὅτε δὲ φαύλως ἔχον, οἷον πλοίων σπιθαμαίων μὲν οὐκ ἔσται 40 πλοίων ὄλως, οὐδὲ δυνών σταδίων, εἰς δὲ τι μέγεθος ἔλθον ὅτε μὲν διὰ σμικρότερα φαύλην ποιήσει τὴν ναυτιλίαν, ὅτε δὲ 1326 b

11 διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν. ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ πόλις ἢ μὲν εἰς ὁλίγων λίαν οὐκ αὐτάρκης (ἡ δὲ πόλις αὐτάρκες), ἢ δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν ἤγαν ἐν τοῖς μὲν ἀναγκαίοις αὐτάρκης, ὡσπερ ἑθύνος, ἀλλ' οὔ πόλις· πολιτείαν γὰρ οὐ ράδιον ὑπάρχειν· τις γὰρ στρατής-5 γὸς ἐσται τοῦ λιαν ὑπερβαλλοντος πλῆθος, ἢ τῆς κηρυκῆς ἡ Στεντόρειος; διδ πρώτην μὲν εἶναι πόλιν ἀναγκαίον τὴν ἐκ τοσοῦτον πλῆθος δ' πρῶτον πλῆθος αὐτάρκες πρὸς τὸ εὐ ζην

12 ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν' ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὴν ταύτης ὑπερβάλλουσαν κατά πλῆθος εἶναι μείζω πόλιν, 10 ἀλλὰ τούτ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡσπερ εἰσπομεν, ἀδριστον. τίς δ' ἐστὶν ὁ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ὅρος, ἐκ τῶν ἐργῶν ἰδεῖν ράδιον. εἰσὶ γὰρ αἱ πράξεις τῆς πόλεως τῶν μὲν ἀρχόντων τῶν δ' ἀρχομένων,

13 ἄρχοντος δ' ἐπίταξες καὶ κρίσεις ἔργων πρὸς δὲ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ πρὸς τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς διανέμειν κατ' 15 ἀξίαν ἀναγκάιον γνωρίζειν ἀλλήλους, ποιοῖ τινες εἰσὶν, τοὺς πολίτας, ως ὅπου τοῦτο μὴ συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι, φαύλως ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς κρίσεις· περὶ ἀμφότερα γὰρ οὐ δικαίων αὐτοσχεδιάξειν, ὅπερ ἐν τῇ πολυναυπροπίᾳ τῇ λίαν ὑπάρχει φανερῶς. ἐτὶ δὲ ἐξειοι 20 καὶ μετοίκοις ράδιον μεταλαμβάνειν τῆς πολιτείας· οὔ γὰρ χαλεπῶν τὸ λανθάνειν διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ πλῆθους. δὴ-λον τῶν ὡς οὖσοι ἐστὶ πόλεως ὅρος ἀριστος, ἡ μεγίστη τοῦ πλῆθους ὑπερβολῆ πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ἑωὶς ευσύνοπτος. περὶ μὲν οὖν μεγέθους πόλεως διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τούτον· 25 Παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς χώρας ἔχει. περὶ δὲ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ποιῶν τινά, δήλου ὃτι τὴν αὐτάρκεστᾷν πάς τις ἀν ἐπαινέσεις· τοιαύτην δ' ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν παν-
tosó̂rov' τὸ γὰρ πάντα υπάρχειν καὶ δείσθαι μηδένος
30 αὕταρκες. πλήθει δὲ καὶ μεγέθει τοσαύτην ὥστε δύνασθαι
tοὺς οἰκοῦντας ἕνα σχολάζοντας ἐλευθερώς ἀμα καὶ σω-
φρόνως. τούτον δὲ τὸν ὄρον εἰ καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς λέγομεν, 2
ὕστερον ἑπισκεπτέον ἀκριβέστερον, ὅταν ὅλος περὶ κτή-
σεως καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν οὕσιν εὐστράς συμβαίνῃ ποιεῖσθαι
35 μνείαν, πῶς δὲ καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν
αὐτῆς· πολλαὶ γὰρ περὶ τὴν σκέψιν ταύτην εἰσίν ἀμφί-
βητήσεις διὰ τοὺς ἔλκοντας ἐφ’ ἐκατέραν τοῦ βίου τὴν
ὑπερβολὴν, τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν γλυσχρότητα τοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν
τρυφὴν. τὸ δ’ εἴδος τῆς χώρας οὐ χαλεπῶς εἰπεῖν (δεὶ δ’ ἐνια 3
40 πείθεσθαι καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὴν στρατηγικάν ἐμπείρους), ὅτι χρὴ
μὲν τοὺς πολεμιῶς εἶναι δυσέμβολον, αὐτοῖς δ’ εὐεξοῦν.
1327 ἀ ἐτὶ δ’ ὀσπερ τὸ πλῆθος τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐσύνοπτον ἐφα-
μευ εἰναι δεῖν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν χώραν’ τὸ δ’ εὐσύνοπτον τὸ
εὑβοηθητον εἶναι τὴν χώραν ἐστίν. τῆς δὲ πόλεως τὴν θέσιν
εἰ χρὴ ποιεῖν κατ’ εὐχῆν, πρὸς τε τὴν θάλατταν προσήκει
5 κείσθαι καλῶς πρὸς τε τὴν χώραν. εἴς μὲν ὁ λεχθεὶς 4
ὁρος’ δεὶ γὰρ πρὸς τὰς ἐκβοηθείας κοινὴν εἶναι τῶν τόπων
ἀπάντων’ ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς πρὸς τὰς τῶν γινομένων καρπῶν
παραπομπᾶς, ἐτὶ δὲ τῆς περὶ ξύλα ύλῆς, καὶ εἰ τίνα
ἄλλην ἐργασίαν ἡ χώρα τυγχάνοι κεκτημένη τοιαύτην,
10 εὐπαρακόμιστον.
6 Περὶ δὲ τῆς πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν κοινωνίας, πότερον
ἀφέλιμος ταῖς εὐνομουμέναις πόλεις ἡ βλαβερά, πολλὰ
tυγχάνουσιν ἀμφισβητοῦντες· τὸ τε γὰρ ἐπιζευγόσθαι τίνας
ἐν ἄλλοις τεθραμμένοις νόμοις ἀσύμφορον εἶναι φασὶ πρὸς
15 τὴν εὐνομίαν, καὶ τὴν πολυνυθρωπίαν’ γίνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ
ἐκ τοῦ χρῆσθαι τῇ θαλάσσῃ διαπέμποντας καὶ δεχομένους
ἐμπόρον πλῆθος, ὑπεναντίαν δ’ εἶναι πρὸς τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι
καλῶς. ὅτι μὲν οὖν, εἰ ταῦτα μὴ συμβαίνει, βέλτιον καὶ 2
πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ πρὸς εὐπορίαν τῶν ἀναγκαλῶν μετέ-
20 χείν τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν χώραν τῆς θαλάσσης, οὐκ ἄδηλον.
3 καὶ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ βάζον φέρειν τοὺς πολέμους εὐβοηθήτους εἰναι δὲ κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα τοὺς σωθησομένους, καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν· καὶ πρὸς τὸ βλάψαι τοὺς ἐπιτιθεμένους, εἰ μὴ κατ᾽ ἀμφὸς δυνατὸν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ θάτερον ὑπάρχει μᾶλλον ἀμφότεροι μετέχουσιν. ὅσα τ᾽ ἄν μὴ τυγχάνῃ 25 παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς οὖν, δεξασθαί ταῦτα καὶ τὰ πλεονάζοντά τὸν γιγνομένων ἐκπέμψασθαι τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστίν· αὐτῇ γὰρ ἐμπορικὴν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τοῖς ἄλλοις δεὶ εἰναι τὴν πόλιν· οἶ δὲ παρέχοντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς πᾶσιν ἀγορὰν προσδοῦν χάριν ταῦτα πράττουσιν· ἂν δὲ μὴ δεὶ πόλιν τοιαύτης 30 μετέχειν πλεονεξίας, οὐδ᾽ ἐμπόριον δεὶ κεκτήσθαι τοιοῦτον.

5 ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν ὀρῶμεν πολλαῖς ὑπάρχοντα καὶ χώραις καὶ πόλεσιν ἐπίνεια καὶ λιμένας εὐφώς κείμενα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ὥστε μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ νέμειν ἀστυ μὴτε πόρρω λίαν, ἀλλὰ κρατεῖσθαι τείχεσι καὶ τοιοῦτοι ἄλλοι ἐμίμασι, 35 φανερῶν ὡς εἰ μὲν ἄγαθὸν τι συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι διὰ τῆς κοινωνίας αὐτῶν, ὑπάρξει τῇ πόλει τούτῳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, εἰ δὲ τί βλαβερὸν, φυλάξασθαι βάδιον τοῖς νόμοις φράζοντας καὶ διορίζοντας τῖνας οὐ δεὶ καὶ τίνας ἐπιμισγεσθαι δεὶ

6 πρὸς ἀλλήλους. περὶ δὲ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως, ὅτι μὲν 40 βέλτιστον ὑπάρχειν μέχρι τῶν πλῆθος, οὕκ ἄδηλον (οὐ γὰρ μόνον αὐτῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πλησίων τοῖς δεὶ καὶ φοβερῶς 1327 b εἰναι καὶ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν, ὥσπερ κατὰ γῆν, καὶ κατὰ 7 θάλατταν· περὶ δὲ πλῆθος ὑδὴ καὶ μεγέθους τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης πρὸς τὸν βίον ἀποσκεπτέον τῆς πόλεως· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἡγεμονικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν ζήσεται βίων, ἀναγκαῖοι καὶ ταύτι 5 τὴν τὴν δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν πρὸς τὰς πράξεις σύμμετρον. τὴν δὲ πολυανθρωπίαν τὴν γιγνομένην περὶ τὸν ναυτικὸν ὦχλον οὐκ ἀναγκαίον ὑπάρχειν τοῖς πόλεσιν, οὐδὲν γὰρ 8 αὐτοῦς μέρος εἰναι δἐ τῆς πόλεως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιβατικῶν ἑλεύθερον καὶ τῶν πεζεύστων ἑστίν, ὅ κύριόν ἐστι καὶ ἐκρατεῖ τῆς ναυτιλίας· πλῆθος δὲ υπάρχοντος περιοίκων καὶ τῶν τὴν χώραν γεωργοῦντων, ἀφθονίαν ἀναγκαίον εἰναι
καὶ ναυτῶν, ὀρῶμεν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο καὶ νῦν ὑπάρχουν τισὶν, οἷον τῇ πόλει τῶν Ἡρακλεωτῶν" πολλὰς γὰρ ἐκπληροῦσιν 15 τριήρεις κεκτημένοι τῷ μεγέθει πόλιν ἑτέροις ἐμμελεστέραν.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν χώρας καὶ λιμένων καὶ πόλεων καὶ ἁθαλάττης καὶ περὶ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως ἐστῶ διωρισμένα τῶν τρόπων τούτων· περὶ δὲ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλῆθους, τίνα μὲν 7 ὅρον ὑπάρχειν χρῆ, πρόσερον εἶπομεν, ποῖους δὲ τινὰς τὴν 20 φύσιν εἶναι δεῖ, νῦν λέγωμεν. σχέδου δὴ κατανοήσειν ἄν τις τούτῳ γε, βλέψας ἐπὶ τε τὰς πόλεις τὰς εὐδοκιμοῦσας τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ πρὸς πάσαν τὴν οἰκουμένην, ὡς διείληπται τοῖς ἔθνεσιν τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ψυχρῶις τόποις ἔθνη 2 καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἐὐρώπην θυμοῦ μὲν ἐστὶν πλῆρη, διανοίας 25 δὲ ἐνδεεστέρα καὶ τέχνης, δίσπερ ἐλεύθερα μὲν διατελεῖ μᾶλλον, ἀπολίτευτα δὲ καὶ τῶν πλησίων ἄρχειν οὐ δυνάμενα· τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν διανοητικὰ μὲν καὶ τεχνικὰ τὴν ψυχήν, ἅθυμα δὲ, δίσπερ ἄρχόμενα καὶ δουλεύοντα διατελεῖ τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος ὅσπερ μεσεύει κατὰ 3 30 τοὺς τόπους, οὕτως ἀμφοῖν μετέχει· καὶ γὰρ ἐνθυμον καὶ διανοητικῶν ἔστιν· δίσπερ ἐλεύθερον τε διατελεῖ καὶ βέλτιστα πολιτεύμενον καὶ δυνάμενον ἄρχειν πάντων, μιᾶς τυγχάνου πολιτείας· τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ἔχει διαφοράν καὶ τὰ 4 τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔθνη [καὶ] πρὸς ἀλλήλα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει τὴν φύσιν μονόκολων, τὰ δὲ εὐ [τὲ] κέκραται πρὸς ἀμφοτέρας τὰς δυνάμεις ταῦτας. φανερὸν τοῖνυν ὅτι δεὶ διανοητικῶς τε εἶναι καὶ θυμοειδεῖς τὴν φύσιν τοὺς μελλοντας εὐαγώγους ἐσεσθαί τῷ νομοθέτῃ πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν. ὅπερ γὰρ 5 φασὶ τινὲς δεῖν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς φύλαξι, τὸ φιλήτορος μὲν 35 ἐστίν τῶν γνωρίμων, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἄγνωτας ἄγριους, ὁ θυμὸς ἐστιν ὁ ποιῶν τὸ φιλήτορον· αὐτὴ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς 128 ὁ δύναμις ὁ φιλοῦμεν. σημεῖον δὲ· πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς συνήθεις καὶ φίλους ὁ θυμὸς αἴρεται μᾶλλον ἦ πρὸς τοὺς ἄγνωτας, ὀλγοφορεῖσθαι νομίσασ. διὸ καὶ Ἀρχιλόχοις προσηκόντως 6 τοῖς φίλοις ἐγκαλῶν διαλέγεται πρὸς τὸν θυμόν·
1327 b 13—1328 a 37.

σὺ γὰρ δὴ παρὰ φίλων ἀπάγχεο.
καὶ τὸ ἄρχον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἔλευθερον ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως ταῦτης ὑπάρχει πάσιν ἀρχικὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀόρτητον οἶ φυμός. 7 οὐ γὰρ οἶκος δ’ ἔχει λέγειν ἤλεπτοὺς εἰναὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγνώτας πρὸς οὐδένα γὰρ εἶναι χρῆ τοιοῦτον, οὔδε εἰσιν οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι τῆς φύσιν ἄγριοι, πλὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας. τούτο δὲ ἴο μᾶλλον ἐτί πρὸς τοὺς συνήθεις πάσχονσιν, ὅπερ εἰρήται πρότερον, ἄν ἀδικεῖσθαι νομίσωσιν. καὶ τούτῳ συμβαινει κατὰ λόγον παρ’ οἶς γὰρ ὀφείλεσθαι δεῖν τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, πρὸς τὸ βλάβει καὶ ταύτης ἀποστερεῖσθαι νομίζουσιν ὅθεν εἰρήται "χαλεποὶ πόλεμοι γὰρ ἀδελφῶν." 15 καὶ "οἱ τοῦ πέρα στέρξαντες, οὐδὲ καὶ πέρα μισοῦσιν."

9 Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πολιτευομένων, πόσοισ τε ὑπάρχειν δεῖ καὶ ποιοῖς τινὰς τῆς φύσιν, ἐτί δὲ τὴν χώραν πόσην τε τινα καὶ πολίν τινα, διώρισται σχεδὸν (οὐ γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀκρίβειαν δεί̣ (ητείν διὰ τῆς φύσιν τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῶν 20 γεγονόμενων διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως); ἐπεὶ δ’ ὀσπέρ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συνεστῶτων οὐ ταῦτα ἐστὶ μόρια τῆς ὅλης συστάσεως, δι’ ἀνευ τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἂν εἴη, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ πόλεως μέρη θετέον ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, 2 οὐδ’ ἄλλης κοινωνίας οὐδεμιᾶς, ἐξ ἃς ἐν τῷ τὸ γένους. ἐν γάρ 25 τι καὶ κοινὸς εἶναι δεὶ καὶ ταῦτῳ τοῖς κοινοῖς, ἀν τε ἵσον ἂν τε ἀνίσον μεταλαμβάνωσιν, οἶον ἐτί προφῆ τοῦτο ἐστί̣ 3 εἰτε χώρας πλῆθος εἰτ’ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐστίν. όταν δ’ ἢ τὸ μὲν τοῦτον ἔνεκεν τὸ δ’ οὖ ἔνεκεν, οὐδὲν ἂν γε τοῖς κοινῷ ἄλλ’ ἢ τὸ μὲν ποιήσαι τῷ δὲ λαβεῖν λέγω δ’ οἴον 30 ὀργάνῳ τε παντὶ πρὸς τὸ γεγυμένων ἐργον καὶ τοῖς δημιουργοίς οἰκία γὰρ πρὸς οἰκοδόμοι οὐδέν ἐστίν δ’ γίνεται κοινῶν, 4 ἄλλ’ ἐστὶ τῆς οἰκίας χάριν ἡ τῶν οἰκοδόμων τέχνην. διὸ κτήσεως ἡταῖ τοῖς πόλεσιν, οὐδέν δ’ ἐστίν ἡ κτήσεις μέρος τῆς πόλεως. πολλὰ δ’ ἐμψυχα μέρη τῆς κτήσεως ἐστίν. ἢ δὲ 35 πόλεως κοινωνία τῆς ἐστὶ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἔνεκεν δὲ ζωῆς τῆς ἐνδε- 5 χομένης ἀρίστης. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστίν εὐδαίμονία τὸ ἄριστον, αὐτὴ δὲ
ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρήσις τις τέλειος, συμβέβηκε δὲ οὕτως ὡστε τοὺς μὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι μετέχειν αὐτῆς, τοὺς δὲ μικρὸν ἦν μὴδέν, δὴλον ὡς τοῦτ' αἵτινος τοῦ γίγνεσθαι πόλεως εἶδη καὶ διαφόρας καὶ πολιτείας πλείους· ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον καὶ δι',

1328 b ἄλλοις ἐκαστοί τοῦτο θηρεύοντες τοὺς τε βίους ἐτέρους ποιοῦνται καὶ τὰς πολιτείας. ἐπισκέπτεσθε δὲ καὶ πόσα ταυτί ἐστιν 6 ὄν ἀνευ πόλις οὐκ ἂν εἶν' καὶ γὰρ ἃ λέγομεν εἶναι μέρη πόλεως, ὑπὸ τούτοις ἂν εἶ (ἂ) ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν. ληπτέον 5 τοῖς τῶν ἔργων τὸν ἀριθμόν' ἐκ τούτων γὰρ ἐσται δὴλον. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὑπάρχειν δεῖ τροφὴν, ἐπείτα τέχνας (πολλῶν 7 γὰρ ὄργανον δεῖται τὸ ξῆν), τρίτον δὲ ὀπλα (τοὺς γὰρ κοινονοῦντας ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχειν ὑπὸ πρὸς τῇ ἀρχήν, τῶν ἀπειθοῦντων χάριν, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐξοθείνειν ἀδίκειν 10 ἐπιχειροῦντας), ἐτί χρημάτων τινὰ εὐπορίαν, ὅπως ἔχωσι καὶ πρὸς τὰς καθ' αὐτοὺς χρέιας καὶ πρὸς πολεμικὰς, πέμπτον δὲ καὶ πρῶτον τὴν περὶ τὸ θείον ἐπιμελεῖαν, ἦν καλοῦσιν ἰερατείαν, ἐκτὸς δὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν καὶ πάντων ἀναγκαίωταν κρίσιν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ τῶν δικαιῶν τῶν πρὸς 15 ἀλλήλους. τὰ μέν οὖν ἔργα ταῦτ' ἐστιν ὃν δεῖται πᾶσα 8 πόλις ὡς εἰπεῖν (ἢ γὰρ πόλις πληθὸς ἐστιν οὐ τὸ τυχόν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ζωὴν αὐταρκεῖς, ὡς φαμέν, ἐὰν δὲ τὴν τυγχάνῃ τούτων ἐκλείπουν, ἀδύνατον ἀπλῶς αὐτάρκη τὴν κοινωνίαν εἶναι ταύτην)· ἀνάγκη τοῖνυν κατὰ τὰς ἐργασίας 9. 20 ταῖς συνεπάγεται πόλιν· δεῖ ἄρα γεωργόν τ' εἶναι πληθὸς, οἳ παρασκευάσουσι τὴν τροφὴν, καὶ τεχνίτας, καὶ τὸ μάχιμον, καὶ τὸ εὐπορον, καὶ ἑρείς, καὶ κριτᾶς τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ συμφερόντων· 9 Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων λοιπῶν σκέψασθαι πότερον πάσι 25 κοινωνητέον πάντων τούτων (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀπανταίνει καὶ γεωργοῦς καὶ τεχνίτας καὶ τοὺς βουλευμένους καὶ δικαζόντας) ἢ καθ' ἐκαστοῦ ἐργον τῶν εἰρημένων ἄλλους ὑποθέτεων, ἢ τὰ μὲν ἴδια τὰ δὲ κοινά τούτων ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστίν, οὐκ ἐν πάσῃ δὲ ταὐτῷ πολιτείᾳ. καθάπερ γὰρ εἶπομεν, 2
καὶ πάντας κοινωνεῖν πάντων, καὶ μὴ πάντας 30 πάντων ἀλλὰ τινὰς τινῶν. ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ ποιεῖ τὰς πολιτείας ἑτέρας· ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις μετέχουν 3 πάντες πάντων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλγαρχίαις τούναντιον. ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν σκοποῦντες περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας, αὐτὴ δ’ ἐστὶ καθ’ ἣν ἡ πόλις ἃν εἶπ μάλιστ’ εὐδαίμων, τὴν δ’ 35 εὐδαιμονίαν ὅτι χωρὶς ἀρετῆς ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν εἰρηται πρότερον, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων ὡς ἐν τῇ κάλλιστα πολιτευμένῃ πόλει καὶ τῇ κεκτημένῃ δικαίους ἀνδρας ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, οὔτε βάναυσον βίον οὔτ’ ἀγοραῖον δεῖ ζῆν τοὺς πολῖτας (ἀγεννησί γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος βίος καὶ πρὸς 40 ἀρετὴν ὑπενταντίος), οὔδε δὴ γεωργοῦς εἶναι τοὺς μέλλοντας ἔσεσθαι (δεὶ γὰρ σχολῆς καὶ πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν τῆς ἀρετῆς 1329 α καὶ πρὸς τὰς πράξεις τὰς πολιτικὰς). ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ πολεμικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ κρίνον περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἐνυπάρχει καὶ μέρη φαίνεται τῆς πόλεως μάλιστα ὄντα, πότερον ἐπερὰ καὶ ταῦτα θετέον ἡ 5 τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀποδοτέον ἀμφοῖ; φανερὸν δὲ καὶ τούτῳ, διὸτι τρόπον μὲν τινὰ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, τρόπον δὲ τινὰ καὶ ἑτέρους. ὡς ἐν γὰρ ἑτέρας ἀκμῆς ἔκατερον τῶν ἔργων, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῖται φρονῆσεως τὸ δὲ δυνάμεως, ἑτέρους. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀδυνατῶν ἑστὶ τοὺς δυναμένους βιάζεσθαι καὶ κωλύειν, τούτους 10 ὑπομένειν αρχομένους αἱ, ταῦτῃ δὲ τοῖς αὑτοῖς· οἱ γὰρ τῶν ὅπλων κύριοι καὶ μένειν ἢ μὴ μένειν κύριοι τῆν πολιτείαν. 6 λείπεται τοῖνος τοῦ αὐτοῖς μὲν ἀμφότεροις ἀποδιδόναι τὴν πολιτείαν ταύτην, μὴ ἁμα δἐ· ἀλλ’, ὁσπερ πέφυκεν, ἡ μὲν δύναμις ἐν νεωτέροις, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἐν πρεσβυτέροις 15 ἑστὶν, οὕκοιν οὕτως ἀμφοῖν νενεμησθαί συμφέρει καὶ δίκαιοι 7 εἶναι· ἐξεὶ γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ διαίρεσις τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν. ἀλλὰ μὴ καὶ τὰς κτήσεις δεῖ (εἰναί) περὶ τούτους· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ εὐποριὰν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς πολιταῖς, πολίται δὲ οὔτοι, τὸ γὰρ βάναυσον οὔ μετέχει τῆς πόλεως, οὔδ’ ἄλλο οὐδὲν γένος δ’ 20 μὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς δημιουργὸν ἐστίν. τοῦτο δὲ δὴλον ἐκ τῆς

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υποθέσεως τῷ μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖ τὸν ἀναγκαίον ὑπάρχειν μετὰ τὴν ἀρετῆς, εὐδαιμόνα δὲ πόλιν οὐκ εἰς μέρος τι βλέπων ἐὰν λέγειν αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ εἰς πάντα τοὺς πολίτας.

25 φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὃτι δὲ τὰς κτήσεις εἶναι τούτων, εἴπερ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς γεωργοὺς δοῦλους ἢ βαρβάρους [4] περιοικοὺς. λοιπὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν καταριθμηθέντων τὸ τῶν ἱερῶν γένος, φανερὰ δὲ καὶ ἡ τούτων τάξις. οὕτε γὰρ γεωργὸν οὕτε 9 βάναυσον ἰερέα καταστατέων ὑπὸ γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν πρέπει 30 τιμᾶσθαι τοὺς θεοὺς· ἐπεί δὲ διήρηται τὸ πολιτικὸν εἰς δύο μέρη, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ τε ὀπλιτικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευτικὸν, πρέπει δὲ τὴν τε θεραπείαν ἀποδιδόναι τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν ἔχειν περὶ αὐτοῦ τοὺς διὰ τὸν χρόνον ἀπειρηκότας, τούτως ἀν ἐγνωρίσως ἀποδοτέων. δὲν μὲν τούτων ἀνευ 10 πόλεως οὐ συννόσταται, καὶ δόσα μέρη πόλεως, εἰρηταί (γεωργοῖ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τεχνίται καὶ πάν τὸ θητικὸν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεισιν, μέρη δὲ τῆς πόλεως τὸ τε ὀπλιτικὸν καὶ βουλευτικὸν, καὶ κεχώρισται δὴ τούτων ἐκαστὸν, τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος.

10 Ἡσοκε δ' οὗ νῦν οὐδὲ νεωτί τοῦτ' εἶναι γνώριμον τοῖς περὶ πολιτείας φιλοσοφούσιν, ὅτι δὲν διηρήσθαι χωρίς κατὰ γένη 1329 b τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὸ τε μάχιμον ἔτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸ γεωργοῦν ἐν Ἀλεύπτῳ τε γὰρ ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τούτων ἐτε καὶ νῦν, τὰ τε περὶ τὴν Κρήτην, τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ Ἀλεύπτου Σεσώτριος, ὡς φασίν, οὕτω νομοθετήσαντος, Μίνω δὲ τὰ 5 περὶ Κρήτην. ἀρχαία δ' ἐοικεν εἶναι καὶ τῶν συστιτίων ἡ 2 τάξις, τὰ μὲν περὶ Κρήτην γενόμενα περὶ τὴν Μίνω βασιλείαν, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν πολλῷ παλαιότερα τοίνυν. φασὶ γὰρ ὅτι λόγιοι τῶν ἔκει κατοικούντων Ἰταλίαν 3 τινα γενέσθαι βασιλέα τῆς Οἰλιατρίας, ἀφ' οὗ τὸ τε ὄνομα 10 μεταβαλόντας Ἰταλόν ἀντ' Οἰλιατρῶν κληθήσεται καὶ τὴν ἀκτὴν ταύτην τῆς Ἐυρώπης Ἰταλίαν τούνομα λαβεῖν, ὅση τετύχηκεν ἐντὸς οὐσα τοῦ κόλπου τοῦ Σκυλλητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ Δαμητικοῦ' ἀπέχει γὰρ ταῦτα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ὀδὸν ἡμι-
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1329 a 22—1330 a 5.

4 σεις ἡμέρας. τοῦτον δή λέγουσι τὸν Ἰταλὸν νομέδας τοὺς ὠνωτρόπους ὄντας ποίησαι γεωργούς, καὶ νόμους ἄλλους τε 15 αὐτοῖς θέσαει καὶ τὰ συσσίτια καταστήσαει πρῶτον. διὸ καὶ νῦν ἐτὶ τῶν ἀπ’ ἐκείνου τυνὲς χρώνα τοῖς συσσιτίοις 5 καὶ τῶν νόμων ἔνιοι. ἥκον δὲ τὸ μὲν πρὸς τὴν Τυρρη-νίαν Ὀπικῷ καὶ πρότερον καὶ νῦν καλοῦμενοι τὴν ἐπωνυ-μίαν Ἀδσουνεῖς, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὴν Ἰαπυγίαν καὶ τὸν Ἰόνιον 20 Ἑώνες, τὴν καλομενήν Σιρίτων ἦσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Ἑώνες

6 Ὄνωτροί τὸ γένος. ἢ μὲν οὖν τῶν συσσιτίων τάξις ἐντεύθεν γέγονε πρῶτον, ὅ δὲ χωρισμὸς ὁ κατὰ γένος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλῆθους εἷς Αἰγύπτου πολὺ γὰρ ὑπερτείνει τοῖς χρόνοις τὴν

7 Μίνω βασιλείαν ἡ Σεσοφωτίων. σχέδου μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ 25 ἀλλὰ δεὶ νομίζειν εὑρήσαθαι πολλάκις ἐν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ, μᾶλλον δ’ ἀπειράκις τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαία τὴν χρείαν διδάσκειν εἰκὸς αὐτήν, τὰ δὲ εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην καὶ περιου-σίαν ὑπαρχόντων θὰ τούτων εὐλογοῦν λαμβάνειν τὴν αἰξη-σίων ὡστε καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας οἴεσθαι δεῖ τὸν αὐτὸν 30 ἑκεῖν τρόπον ὅτι δὲ πάντα ἀρχαία, σημειῶν τὰ περὶ Ἀἰγύπτου ἐστίν οὗτοι γὰρ ἀρχαῖοτατοί μὲν δοκοῦσι εἶναι, νόμοι δὲ τετυχῆκασι καὶ τάξεως πολιτικῆς. διὸ δεὶ τοῖς μὲν εἰρημένοις ἰκανῶς χρῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ παραλειμμένα πειρασθάν ζητεῖν. 35

9 "Οτι μὲν οὖν δεὶ τὴν χάραν εἶναι τῶν ὅπλα κεκτημένων καὶ τῶν τῆς πολιτείας μετεχόντων, εἰρήται πρότερον, καὶ διότι τοὺς γεωργούντας αὐτῶν ἑτέρους εἶναι δεῖ, καὶ πόσην τινὰ χρῆ καὶ ποιάν εἶναι τὴν χάραν περὶ δὲ τῆς διανομῆς καὶ τῶν γεωργούντων, τίνας καὶ ποιόν εἶναι χρή, 40 λεκτέον πρῶτον, ἐπειδὴ οὔτε κοινὴν φαμεν εἴναι δεῖν τὴν κτήσιν, ὡσπερ τινὲς εἰρήκασιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ χρήσει φιλικός 1330 a γινομένην κοινήν, οὔτ’ ἀπορεῖν οὐδένα τῶν πολιτῶν τροφῆς. 40 περὶ συσσιτίων τε συνδοκεὶ πᾶσι χρήσιμον εἶναι ταῖς εὗ κατεσκευασμέναις πόλεσιν ὑπάρχειν δ’ ἢν δ’ αἰτίαν συν- δοκεῖ καὶ ἡμῖν, ύστερον ἔροῦμεν. δεῖ δὲ τούτων κοινωνεῖν.
πάντας τούς πολίτας, οὐ γάρ δὲ τούς ἀπόρους ἀπὸ τῶν ἴδιων τε εἰσφέρειν τὸ συντεταγμένον καὶ διουκεῖν τὴν ἀλ-λην οἰκίαν. ἐτὶ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεούς δαπανήματα κοινὰ πάσης τῆς πόλεως ἐστιν. ἀναγκαῖον τοῖν εἰς δύο μέρη. 11 διηρήσθαι τὴν χώραν, καὶ τὴν μὲν εἶναι κοινὴν τὴν δὲ τῶν ἴδιωτῶν, καὶ τούτων ἐκατέραν διηρήσθαι δίχα πάλιν, τῆς μὲν κοινῆς τὸ μὲν ἐτέρων μέρος εἰς τὰς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς λειτουργίας, τὸ δὲ ἐτέρων εἰς τὴν τῶν συσσιτίων δαπάνην, τῆς δὲ τῶν ἴδιωτῶν τὸ ἐτέρων μέρος τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἐσχατιὰς, 15 ἐτέρων δὲ τὸ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ἵνα δύο κλῆρον ἐκάστῳ νεμηθέντων ἀμφοτέρων τῶν τότων πάντες μετέχωσιν τὸ τε γὰρ ἵσον οὕτως ἔχει καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ἀστυ-γείτονας πολέμους ὀμονοητικότερον. ὅπως γὰρ μὴ τούτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, οἱ μὲν ὀλγηρωφύτευσε τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ὀμόρους 20 ἔχορας, οἱ δὲ λιῶν φροντίζουσι καὶ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν. διὸ παρ’ εἰνοῖς νόμοις ἐστὶ τοὺς γειτνιώντας τοὺς ὀμόροις μὴ συμ-μετέχειν βουλής τῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολέμους, ὡς δὲ τὸ ἴδιον οὐκ ἄν δυναμένους βουλευσάσθαι καλῶς. τὴν μὲν οὖν χώραν ἀνάγκη διηρήσθαι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον διὰ τὰς προειρημένας 25 αἰτίας’ οὗς δὲ γεωργήσοντας μάλιστα μὲν, εἰ δὲι κατ’ εὐχὴν, δοῦλους εἶναι, μὴτε ὁμοφύλου πάντων μὴτε θυμοειδῶν (οὕτω γὰρ ἄν πρὸς τε τὴν ἐργασίαν εἶεν χρήσιμοι καὶ πρὸς τὸ μηδὲν νεωτέρες ἀνθρώπους), δεύτερον δὲ βαρ-βάρους περιοίκους παραπλησίους τοὺς εἰρήμενους τὴν φύσιν. 30 τοῦτον δὲ τοὺς μὲν [ἰδίους] ἐν τοῖς ἴδιοις εἶναι ἴδιους τῶν κε-1 κτημένων τὰς οὐσίας, τοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ κοινῇ γῇ κοινοῦς. τίνα δὲ δεὶ τρόπον χρήσθαι δοῦλοις, καὶ διότι βέλτιον πάσι τοῖς δοῦλοις ἀθλον προκείσθαι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ὑστερον ἐρούμεν. 11 Τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὅτι μὲν δεὶ κοινῆν εἶναι τῆς ἡπείρου τε 35 καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ τῆς χώρας ἀπάσης ὁµοῖος ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων, εἰρήνα τρόπερον’ αὐτῆς δὲ πρὸς αὐτὴν εἶναι τὴν θέσιν εὐχεσθαι δεὶ κατατυγχάνειν πρὸς τέταρτα δὴ βλέποντας, πρῶτον μὲν, ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, πρὸς ὑγίειαν (αἱ τε 2
γάρ πρὸς ἐς τήν ἐγκλίσιν ἐχούσαι καὶ πρὸς τὰ πνεύματα
tά πνεύματα ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνατολῆς ὑγιεινήτεραι, δεύτερον δὲ 40
κατὰ βορέαν (ὑψηλέμερο γάρ αὐτὰ μᾶλλον) τῶν δὲ λοι-
πῶν πρὸς τε τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικὰς καλῶς 1330 b

3 ἔχειν. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὰς πολεμικὰς αὐτοῖς μὲν ἐνέξοδον
εἴναι χρῆ, τοῖς δὲ ἐναντίοις δυσπρόσοδον καὶ δυσπερίλητον,
ὑδάτων τε καὶ ναμάτων μάλιστα μὲν ὑπάρχειν πλῆθος
οἰκείων, εἰ δὲ μῆ, τούτο γε ἐυρηταί διὰ τοῦ κατασκευάζειν 5
ὑποδοχὰς ὁμβρίους ὕδασιν ἀφθόνους καὶ μεγάλας, ὅστε
μηδέποτε ὑπολείπειν εἰργομένους τῆς χώρας διὰ πόλεμον.

4 ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ περὶ υγιείας φροντίζειν τῶν ἐνοικοῦντων, τούτῳ
δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ κείσθαι τὸν τόπον ἐν τῇ τοιούτῳ καὶ πρὸς
τοιοῦτον καλῶς, δεύτερον δὲ ὕδασιν υγιεινὸς χρῆσθαι, καὶ 10
τούτῳ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἔχειν μὴ παρέργους. οἰς γὰρ πλείστοις
χρόμεθα πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ πλειστάκις, ταῦτα πλείστον
συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν υγίειναν ἥ δὲ τῶν ὕδατων καὶ τοῦ
5 πνεύματος δύναμις τοιαύτην ἔχει τὴν φύσιν, διόπερ ἐν
ταῖς εὗ φρονούσαι δεῖ διωρίσθαι πόλεσιν, εάν μὴ πάνθ' 15
ὁμοία μῆτ' ἀφθονία τοιούτων ἢ ναμάτων, χωρὶς τὰ τε εἰς
tροφὴν ὕδατα καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην χρέαιν. περὶ δὲ
τῶν τῶν ἑρμηνῶν, οὐ πάσαις ὁμοίως ἔχει τὸ συμφέρον
τοῖς πολιτείαις οἷον ἀκρόπολις ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ μοναρχι-
kών, δημοκρατικὸν δ' ὀμαλότης, ἀριστοκρατικὸν δ' οὐδέτερον, 20
6 ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἰσχυροὶ τόποι πλείους. ἢ δὲ τῶν ἱδίων ὁική-
σεων διάθεσις ἠδίων μὲν νομίζεται καὶ χρησιμωτέρα πρὸς
tὰς ἄλλας πράξεις, ἀν εὐτυμοὶ ἢ καὶ κατὰ τὸν νεότερον
καὶ τὸν Ἰπποδάμειον τρόπον, πρὸς δὲ τὰς πολεμικὰς
ἀσφαλείας τούναντιν, ὡς εἰχον κατὰ τὸν ἄρχαίον χρόνον. 25
δυσέξοδος γὰρ ἐκείνη τοῖς ἓκειν καὶ δυσεξερέυνητος τοῖς
7 ἐπειτιθεμένοις. διὰ δὲ τούτων ἅμφω' τέρων μετέχειν (ἐνδέχε-
ται γάρ, ἀν τις οὐτω κατασκευάξῃ καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς
γεωρ-
γοῖς ἀς καλοῦσι τίνες τῶν ἀμπέλων συστάδας) καὶ τήν μὲν
ὅλην μὴ ποιεῖν πόλιν εὐτυμον, κατὰ μέρη δὲ καὶ τόπους. 30
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Δ' (H'). 11-12.

οὔτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ κόσμον ἔξει καλὸς. περὶ δὲ τείχῶν, οἱ μὴ φάσκοντες δεῖν ἔχειν τὰς τῆς ἀρε-8 
ῆς ἀντιποιομένας πόλεις λίαν ἀρχαίως ὑπολαμβάνοντιν, καὶ ταῦτ' ὀρῶντες ἑλεγχομένας ἔργῳ τὰς ἑκείνως καλλω-35 
πυσαμένας. ἦστι δὲ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ὄμοιούς καὶ μὴ πολὺ τῷ 9 
πλήθει διαφέροντας οὐ καλὸν τὸ πειράσθαι σώζεσθαι διὰ 
τῆς τῶν τείχων ἐρμηνεύτητος· ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ συμβαίνει καὶ ἐνδέχεται πλεῖον τὴν ὑπεροχὴν γένυσθαι τῶν ἐπιστῶν καὶ 
τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὀλγοῖς ἀρετῆς, εἰ δεῖ 
40 σώζεσθαι καὶ μὴ πάσχειν κακῶς μὴδὲ ὑβρίζεσθαι, τὴν 
ἀσφαλεστάτην ἐρμηνεύτητα τῶν τείχων οἰητῶν εἶναι πόλε-1331 
1α μικατάτην, ἀλλωσ τε καὶ νῦν εὑρημένοι τῶν περὶ τὰ 
βέλη καὶ τὰς μηχανὰς εἰς ἀκρίβειαν πρὸς τὰς πολιορκίας. 
ὅμων γὰρ τὸ τείχη μὴ περιβάλλει ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄξιοιν 10 
καὶ τὴν χώραν εὐεμβολον ζητεῖν καὶ περιαρεῖν τοὺς 
5 ὀρείνους τόπους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ταῖς οἰκήσεις ταῖς ἱδίαις 
μὴ 
περιβάλλειν τούχους ὡς ἀνάνδρων ἑσομένων τῶν κατοικοῦν-
των. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τούτῳ γε δεῖ λανθάνειν, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν 
περιβεβλημένοις τείχη περὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐξεστιν ἀμφοτέρως 
χρῆσθαι ταῖς πόλεσιν, καὶ ὡς ἐχούσας τείχη καὶ ὡς μὴ 
10 ἐχούσας, ταῖς δὲ μὴ κεκτημέναις οὐκ ἔξεστιν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτον 
ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, οὐχ ὅτι τείχη μόνον περιβλητέον, ἀλλὰ 
καὶ τούτων ἐπιμελητέον, ὅπως καὶ πρὸς κόσμον ἔχῃ τῇ 
πόλει πρεπόντως καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς χρείας, τὰς τε 
ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς νῦν ἐπεξευρημένας. ὁσπερ γὰρ τοῖς ἐπιτι-15 
13 
15 
θεμένοις ἐπιμελεῖ ἐστι δὲ ὧν τρόπων πλεονεκτήσωσιν, οὐτὸ 
τὰ μὲν εὑρήται τὰ δὲ δεῖ ζητεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ τοὺς 
φυλαττομένους· ἀρχήν γὰρ οὐδ' ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἐπιτίθεσθαι 
τοῖς εἰ παρεσκευασμένοις.

12 Ἐπεὶ δὲ δεὶ τὸ μὲν πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν ἐν συστι- 
20 τίοις κατανεμηθήσατι, τὰ δὲ τείχη διειλήφθαι φυλακτη- 
ρίοις καὶ πύργοις κατὰ τόπους ἐπικαίρους, δῆλον ὡς αὐτὰ 
προκαλεῖται παρασκευάζειν ἐνία τῶν συστιτίων ἐν τούτοις
2 τοῖς φυλακτηρίοις. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ τοῦτον ἄν τις δια-
κοσμήσει τὸν τρόπον, τὰς δὲ τοὺς θείους ἀποδεδομένας οἴκη-
σεις καὶ τὰ κυριϊτατα τῶν ἄρχειων συσσίτια ἀρμόττει 25
τὸν ἐπιτηδεύον τε ἐξει καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν, ὡσα μὴ τῶν
ιερῶν ο νόμος ἀφορίζει χωρίς ἢ τι μαντεῖον ἀλλο πνεόχρη-
στον. εἰ δ' ἂν τοιοῦτος ο τόπος ὡστὶς ἐπιφάνειαν τε ἐξει
πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἄρετῆς θέσιν ικανῶς καὶ πρὸς τὰ γειτνιάωτα
μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἐρμηνεύτερος. πρέπει δ' ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦτον 30
τὸν τόπον τοιαύτης ἄγορᾶς εἶναι κατασκευῆς οὐκαὶ καὶ περὶ
4 Θετταλίαν ὀνομάζουσιν, ἢν ἐλευθέραν καλοῦσιν, αὐτὴ δ' ἐστὶν ἢν
dei καθαρὰν εἶναι τῶν ὁνίων πάντων, καὶ μήτε
βάναυσον μήτε γεωργὸν μήτε ἄλλον μηδένα τοιοῦτον παρα-
βάλλειν μὴ καλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄρχοντων (εἰ δ' ἂν 35
εὐχαρις ὁ τόπος, εἰ καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια τῶν πρεσβυτέρων
5 ἐχοὺ τὴν τάξιν ἑνταῦθα· πρέπει γὰρ διηρήσθαι κατὰ τὰς
ἡλικίας καὶ τοῦτον τὸν κόσμον, καὶ παρὰ μὲν τοῖς νεωτέ-
ροις ἄρχοντας τίνας διατρίβειν, τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους παρὰ
toῖς ἄρχονται· ἡ γὰρ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς τῶν ἄρχοντων παροῦ· 40
σία μάλιστα ἐμποίει τὴν ἀληθινὴν αἶδο καὶ τῶν τῶν ἔλευ-
6 θέρων φόβου· τὴν δὲ τῶν ὁνίων ἄγορὰν ἐτέραν τε δεὶ ταῦτ· 1331 b
τῆς εἶναι καὶ χωρίς, ἔχουσαν τόπον εὐσυνάγωγον τοῖς τε
ἀπὸ τῆς θαλάττης περιπομένοι καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας
πᾶσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἕπλθος ἑπιαρείται τῆς πόλεως εἰς ἱέρεις,
εἰς ἀρχοντας, πρέπει καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν συσσίτια περὶ τῆν τῶν
7 ιερῶν οἰκοδομημάτων ἐξειν τὴν τάξιν. τῶν δ' ἄρχειων δόσα
περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια ποιεῖται τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, περὶ τε γρα-
φᾶς δικῶν καὶ τὰς κλῆσεις καὶ τὴν ἄλλην τὴν τοιαύτην
dιοίκησιν, ἐτι δὲ περὶ τὴν ἄγορανομίαν καὶ τὴν καλουμένην
ἀστυνομίαν, πρὸς ἄγορα μὲν δει καὶ συνόδο τινὶ κοινῇ κα-
το τεσκενάσθαι, τοιοῦτος δ' ὁ περὶ τὴν ἄναγκαιαν ἄγορὰν ἔστι
τόπος· ἐνσχολάζειν μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἄνω τίθεμεν, ταῦτην δὲ
8 πρὸς τὰς ἄναγκαιας πράξεις. νευεμήσθαι δὲ χρὴ τὴν εἰρη-
μένην τάξιν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν χώραν καὶ ἱάρ ἐκεῖ τοίς
15 ἀρχοῦσιν, οὐς καλὸσιν οἱ μὲν ὑλωροῦσι οἱ δὲ ἀγρονόμους, καὶ φυλακτήρια καὶ συσσίτια πρὸς φυλακὴν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, ἤτι γὰρ ἔρα κατὰ τὴν χώραν εἶναι νενεμημένα, τὰ μὲν θεοῖς τὰ δὲ ἢρωιν. ἀλλὰ τὸ διατρίβειν νῦν ἀκριβο-9 λογουμένους καὶ λέγοντας περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀργὸν ἔστιν.

20 οὐ γὰρ χαλεπον ἐστὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα νόησαι, ἀλλὰ ποιήσαι μᾶλλον τὸ γὰρ λέγειν εὐχής ἔργον ἔστι, τὸ δὲ συμβῆναι τύχης. διδ περὶ μὲν τῶν τοιούτων τὸ γε ἐπὶ πλείον ἀφεῖσθω τὰ νῦν,

13 Περὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς, ἐκ τῶν καὶ ἐκ ποιῶν

25 δεὶ συνεστάναι τὴν μέλλουσαν ἔσθεθαι πόλιν μακαρίαν καὶ πολιτεύσεσθαι καλῶς, λεκτέων. ἐπεὶ δὲ δ' ἐστὶν ἐν οἷς 2 γίγνεται τὸ εὐ πάσι, τούτου δ' ἐστίν ἐν μὲν ἐν τῷ τῶν σκοπῶν κείσθαι καὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν πράξεων ὀρθῶς, ἐν δὲ τάς πρὸς τὸ τέλος φεροῦσα πράξεις εὐρίσκει (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ 30 ταῦτα καὶ διαφωνεῖν ἀλλήλους καὶ συμφωνεῖν ἐνίοτε γὰρ ὁ μὲν σκοπὸς ἐκκείται καλῶς, ἐν δὲ τῷ πράττειν τοῦ τυχεῖν αὐτοῦ διαμαρτάνουσι, ὅτε δὲ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τὸ τέλος πάντων ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλος ἐθεντο φαίλον, ὅτε δὲ ἐκατέρου διαμαρτάνουσιν, οὖν περὶ ἰατρικῆς οὔτε γὰρ 35 ποίον τι δεὶ τὸ υγιαῖν εἶναι σῶμα κρίνουσιν ἐνίοτε καλῶς, οὔτε πρὸς τῶν ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῖς ὄρον τυγχάνουσι τῶν ποιητικῶν· δεὶ δ' ἐν ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ἐπιστήμαις ταῦτα ἀμφότερα κρατεῖσθαι, τὸ τέλος καὶ τὰς εἰς τὸ τέλος πράξεις· ὅτε μὲν οὖν τοῦ τε εὖ ἥν καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐφίεται 340 πάντες, φανερὸν, ἀλλὰ τούτων τοῖς μὲν ἐξουσία τυγχάνειν, τοῖς δὲ οὐ, διὰ τινα φύσιν ἢ τύχην (δείται γὰρ καὶ χο-

1332 ἐκ των τοῦ ἥν καλῶς, τοῦτον δὲ ἐλάττονος μὲν τοῖς ἄμεινον διακειμένοις, πλείονος δὲ τοῖς χείρον), οἱ δ' εὕθες οὐκ 4 ὀρθῶς θητοῦσί την εὐδαιμονίαν, ἐξουσίας ὑπαρχοῦσι. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ προκείμενον ἐστὶ τὴν ἁρίστην πολιτείαν ἰδεῖν, αὐτὴ δ' 5 ἐστὶ καθ' ἥν ἄριστ' ἀν πολιτεύοιτο πόλις, ἄριστα δ' ἀν πολι-

τεύοιτο καθ' ἥν εὐδαιμονεῖν μάλιστα ἐνδέχεται τὴν πόλιν,
5 δῆλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἔδει, τί ἐστι, μὴ λανθάνειν. φαμέν δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς, εἴ τι τῶν λόγων ἑκείνων ὀφελος, ἐνεργείαι εἶναι καὶ χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς τελείαν, καὶ ταύτην 6 οὐκ ἔξ ὑποθέσεως ἄλλ' ἀπλῶς. λέγω δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως τάναγκαίαν, τὸ δ' ἀπλῶς τὸ καλὸς· οἶνον τὰ περὶ τὰς δι- καίας πράξεις αἱ δίκαιαι τιμωρίαι καὶ κολάσεις ἀπ' ἀρε- τῆς μὲν εἰσίν, ἀναγκαῖαι δὲ, καὶ τὸ καλὸς ἀναγκαῖος ἐξουσίω (αἱρετώτερον μὲν γὰρ μηθένδος δείσθαι τῶν τοιοῦτων μήτε τὸν ἄνδρα μήτε τὴν πόλιν), αἱ δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τιμὰς καὶ 7 τὰς εὐπορίας ἀπλῶς εἰσὶ κάλλισται πράξεις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐτερον κακοῦ τινὸς αἴρεσις ἐστιν, αἱ τοιαῦται δὲ πράξεις τούναντίουν κατασκευά γὰρ ἀγαθῶν εἰσὶ καὶ γεννήσεις. χρῆσαι ὅτι δ' ἄν οἱ σπουδαῖοι ἄνηρ καί πενίᾳ καί νόσῳ καί ταῖς ἄλλαις τύχαις ταῖς φαιλιας καλῶς· ἀλλὰ τὸ μακάριον 20 ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίως ἐστὶν. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο διώρισται κατὰ τούς ἡθικοὺς λόγους, οὗτος τοιοῦτος ἐστὶν ὁ σπουδαῖος, ὃ διὰ τὴν 8 ἀρετὴν τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἔστι τὰ ἀπλῶς ἄγαθὰ, δῆλον δ' ὅτι καὶ τὰς χρῆσεις ἀναγκαίον σπουδαίας καὶ καλὰς εἶναι ταύτας ἀπλῶς. διὸ καὶ νομίζουσιν ἄνθρωποι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας αἰτία 25 τὰ ἑκτὸς εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὡσπερ εἰ τοῦ κιθαρίζειν λαμπρῶν καὶ καλῶς αἰτίωτο τὴν λύραν μᾶλλον τῆς τέχνης, ἀναγκαῖον τοῖς χείμενοι τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν, τὰ 9 δὲ παρασκευάσαι τὸν νομοθέτην. διὸ κατ' εὐχὴν εὐχόμεθα τὴν τῆς πόλεως σύστασιν, ὅν ἡ τύχη κυρία· κυρίαν γὰρ 30 ὑπάρχειν τίθεμεν· τὸ δὲ σπουδαίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν οὐκέτι τύχης ἔργον, ἀλλ' ἐπιστήμης καὶ προαρέσεως. ἀλλὰ μὴν σπουδαία γε πόλις ἐστὶ τοῦ τοὺς πολίτας τοὺς μετέχοντας τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι σπουδαίους· ἢμιν δὲ πάντες οἱ πολίται 10 μετέχουσι τῆς πολιτείας. τούτ' ἀρα σκέπτεσθον, πῶς ἄνηρ γί- 35 νεται σπουδαίος. καὶ γὰρ εἰ πάντας ἐνδέχεται σπουδαίους εἶναι, μὴ καθ' ἐκαστὸν δὲ τῶν πολιτῶν, οὔτως αἱρετῶτερον' ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τὸ καθ' ἐκαστὸν καὶ τὸ πάντας. ἀλλὰ μὴν 11 ἀγαθοὶ γε καὶ σπουδαῖοι γίγνονται διὰ τρίων. τὰ τρία δὲ
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Δ' (H'). 13-14.

40 ταύτα ἐστι φύσις έθος λόγος. καὶ γὰρ φύναι δεὶ πρῶτον οἷον ἀνθρωπον ἄλλα μὴ τῶν ἄλλων τι ζῷων, οὕτω καὶ ποιῶν τινα τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν. ἐνια τε οὐδὲν ὤφελος

5 φύναι· τὰ γὰρ ἐθη μεταβαλεῖν ποιεῖ· ἐνια γὰρ ἐστὶ διὰ τῆς φύσεως ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα διὰ τῶν έθῶν ἐπὶ τὸ χείρον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα τῶν ζῴων μάλιστα μὲν ἑ διὰ τῆς φύσεως ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα διὰ τῶν έθῶν ἐπὶ τὸ χείρον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον, τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα τῶν ζῴων μάλιστα μὲν ἑ διὰ τῆς φύσεως ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα διὰ τῶν έθῶν ἐπὶ τὸ χείρον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον. τὸ γὰρ μὲν τοῖνυν φύσιν οἴους εἶναι δεὶ τοὺς μέλλους-13 τας εὐχερείασις ἐσεθαι τῷ νομοθέτῃ, διῳρόσμεθα πρότερον, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἔργον ἥδη παιδείας· τὰ μὲν ἧγε ἐθείδεμοι μανθάνουι, τὰ δ' ἀκούντες.

14 Ἐπει δὲ πᾶσα πολιτικὴ κοινωνία συνεστηκεν εξ ἀρ-χόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων, τοῦτο δὴ σκεπτεόν, εἰ ἐτέρους εἶναι δεὶ τοὺς ἀρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρχομένους ἡ τοὺς αὐτοὺς διὰ 15 βίων· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ἄκολουθεὶν δεῖσει καὶ τὴν παιδείαν κατὰ τὴν διαφρεσιν ταύτην. εἰ μὲν τοῖνυν εἰησαν τοσοῦτον 2 διαφέροντες ἀτεροὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσον τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἥρωας ἡγούμεθα τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφέρειν, εὑρὸς πρῶτον κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πολλῆν ἔχουσα ὑπερβολὴν, εἰτα κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν, ὅστε ἀναμφισβήτητον εἶναι καὶ φανερᾶν τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῖς ἀρχομένοις τὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων, δῆλον ὅτι βέλτιον αἰε τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοὺς μὲν ἀρχεῖν τοὺς δ' ἀρχεῖσθαι καθάπαξ· ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτ' οὐ ράδιον λαβεῖν οὐδὲ ἐστὶν ὀσπὲρ 3 εν Ἰνδοῖς φησὶ Σκύλαξ εἶναι τοὺς βασιλέας τοσοῦτον δια-

25 φέροντας τῶν ἀρχομένων, φανερὸν ὅτι διὰ πολλὰς αἰτίας ἀναγκαῖον πάντας ὁμοίως κοινωνεῖν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεῖσθαι. τὸ τε γὰρ ἴσον ταύτων τοῖς ὁμοίως, καὶ χαλεπῶν μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν συνεστηκυῖαν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον. μετὰ γὰρ τῶν ἀρχομένων ὑπάρχουσι νεωτερίζειν 4 30 βουλόμενοι πάντες οἱ κατὰ τὴν χώραν· τοσοῦτος τε εἶναι
τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι τὸ πλήθος ὠστ' εἶναι κρέαττος πάντων τούτων, ἐν τῷ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὦτι χεὶ δεῖ τοὺς ἄρχοντας διαφέρειν τῶν ἀρχομένων, ἀναμφισβήτητην. πῶς οὖν ταῦτ' ἐσται καὶ πῶς μεθέξουσι, δεὶ σκέ-5 ψασθαί τῶν νομοθέτην, εἰρηται δὲ πρότερον περὶ αὐτοῦ. 35 ἡ γὰρ φύσις δέδωκε τὴν διαίρεσιν, ποιήσασα αὐτὸ τῷ γένει ταῦτ' τὸ μὲν νεώτερον τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον, ὡς τοῖς μὲν ἄρχεσθαι πρέπει, τοῖς δ' ἄρχειν· ἄγανακτεῖ δὲ οὐδεὶς καθ' ἥλικιαν ἄρχομενος, οὐδὲ νομίζει εἶναι κρέαττον, ἀλλὰ τε καὶ μέλλων ἀντιλαμβάνειν τοῦτο τὸν ἔρανον, ὅταν τῷ τῆς 40 ἑκατονομήν ἥλικιας. ἔστι μὲν ἄρα ὡς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι φατέον, ἔστι δὲ ὡς ἐτέρους. ὡςτε καὶ τὴν παιδείαν ἐστιν ὡς τὴν αὐτὴν ἄναγκαιον, ἔστι δ' ὡς ἐτέραν 1333 a εἶναι. τὸν τε γὰρ μέλλοντα καλῶς ἄρχειν ἄρχησθαν φασὶ δεῖν πρῶτον. ἔστι δὲ ἄρχης, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἰρηταὶ λόγοις, ἢ μὲν τοῦ ἄρχοντος χάριν, ἢ δὲ τοῦ ἄρχομένον. 7 τούτων δὲ τὴν μὲν δεσποτικὴν εἶναι φαμεν, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἐλευ-5 θέρων. διαφέρει δ' ἕνα τῶν ἐπιταττομένων οὐ τοῖς ἐργοῖς ἀλλὰ τῷ τίνος ἑκατονομῆς. διὸ πολλὰ τῶν εἶναι δοκοῦντων διακοινών ἐργῶν καὶ τῶν νέων τοῖς ἐλευθεροῖς καλὸν διακοινών πρὸς γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ μῆ καλὸν οὐχ οὐτὸ διαφέρουσιν αἱ πράξεις καθ' αὐτὰς ὡς ἐν τῷ τέλει καὶ τῷ 10 Τίνος ἑκεν. ἔπει δὲ πολίτου και ἄρχοντος τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι φαμεν καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρός, τοῦ δ' αὐτῶν ἄρχομενον τε δεῖν γίγνεσθαι πρότερον καὶ ἄρχοντα ὑστερον, τοῦτ' ἀν εἰ ἧ τῷ νομοθέτῃ πραγματευτέον, ὅπως ἀνδρεῖς ἄγα-θοι γίγνονται, καὶ διὰ τίνων ἐπιτηθεμάτων, καὶ τί τὸ 15 τέλος τῆς ἀρίστης ὁμῆς. διηρήται δὲ δύο μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς τὸ μὲν ἔχει λόγον καθ' αὐτό, τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔχει μὲν καθ' αὐτό, λόγῳ δ' ὑπακούειν δυνάμενον. ὡς φαμὲν τάς ἀρε-τάς εἶναι καθ' ὃς ἀνήρ ἀγαθὸς λέγεται ποι. τούτων δ' ἐν ποτέροι μάλλον τὸ τέλος, τοὺς μὲν οὕτω διαίροντιν ὡς ἡμεῖς 20 φαμέν οὐκ ἔδηλον πῶς λεκτέον. αἰεὶ γὰρ τὸ χείρον τοῦ
βελτίωνός ἐστιν ἐνεκεν, καὶ τοῦτο φανερὸν ὁμοίως ἐν τε τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν, βέλτιων δὲ τὸ λόγον ἔχον διήρηταί τε διίχῇ καθ' ὄντερ εἰώθαμεν τρόπον διαι-25 ρέιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πρακτικὸς ἐστὶ λόγος ὁ δὲ θεωρητικός. ὥσποτος οὖν ἀνάγκη διηρήσθαι καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος δηλοῦσθ: 11 καὶ τὰς πράξεις δ' ἀνάλογον ἐρούμεν ἐχειν, καὶ δεῖ τὰς τοῦ φύσει βελτίωνος αἱρετωτέρας εἰναι τοῖς δυναμένοις τυγ-χάνειν ἢ πασῶν ἢ τοῖν δυνών αἰεὶ γὰρ ἐκάστῳ τούθ' αἱρε-30 τάτατον, οὐ τυχεῖν ἐστιν ἀκροτάτου. διήρηται δὲ καὶ πᾶς 12 ὁ βίος εἰς ἀσχολίαν καὶ εἰς σχολὴν καὶ πόλεμον καὶ εἰρήνην, καὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὰ μὲν εἰς τὰ ἀναγκαία καὶ χρήσιμα τὰ δὲ εἰς τὰ καλά, περὶ δὲν ἀνάγκη τὴν αὐτὴν 13 αἴρεσιν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς μέρεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεις-35 σιν αὐτῶν, πόλεμον μὲν εἰρήνης χάριν, ἀσχολίαν δὲ σχολῆς, τὰ δ' ἀναγκαία καὶ χρήσιμα τῶν καλῶν ἐνεκεν. πρὸς πάντα μὲν τούν τὸν πολιτικόν βλέποντι νομοθετηένων, καὶ κατὰ τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατὰ τὰς πράξεις αὐτῶν, μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὰ τέλη. τὸν 14 αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ τούς βίους καὶ τὰς τῶν πραγμά-των διαιρέσεις· δεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἀσχολεῖν δύνασθαι καὶ πο-1333 b λεμεῖν, μᾶλλον δ' εἰρήνην ἄγειν καὶ σχολάζειν, καὶ τα-ναγκαία καὶ τὰ χρήσιμα δὲ πράττειν, τὰ δὲ καλὰ δεὶ μᾶλλον. ὅστε πρὸς τούτους τοὺς σκοποὺς καὶ παῖδας ἐτι ὄντας παιδευτέον καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἡλικίας, ὥσιν δέονται 5 παιδείας. οἱ δὲ νῦν ἀρίστα δοκοῦντες πολιτεύεσθαι τῶν 15 Ἐλλήνων, καὶ τῶν νομοθέτων οἱ ταύτας καταστήσαντες τὰς πολιτείας, οὕτε πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον τέλος φαίνονται συντάξαν-τες τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας οὕτε πρὸς τὰς πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν παιδείαν, ἀλλὰ φορτικῶς ἀπέκλιναν 10 πρὸς τὰς χρησίμους εἶναι δοκοῦσας καὶ πλεονεκτικοτέρας, παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τῶν ὑστερόν τινες γραψάντων 16 ἀπεφήναι τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν· ἐπαίνοντες γὰρ τὴν Δακε- δαιμονίων πολιτείαν ἀγανται τοῦ νομοθέτου τῶν σκοπῶν, ὅτι
πάντα πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν καὶ πρὸς πόλεμον ἐνομοθέτησεν· ἀκαὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἐστὶν εὐδέλεγκτα καὶ τοῖς ἐργοῖς ἐξε- 

17 λήλεγκται νῦν. ὡσπερ γὰρ οἱ πλείστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ζηλοῦσι τὸ πολλῶν δεσπόζειν, ὅτι πολλή χορηγία γίγνεται τῶν εὐτυχημάτων, οὕτω καὶ Θίβρων ἀγάμενος φαίνεται τὸν τῶν Δακώνον νομοθέτην, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκαστὸς τῶν γρα- 

φόντων περὶ (τῆς) πολιτείας αὐτῶν, ὅτι διὰ τὸ γεγυμνάσθαι 18 πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους πολλῶν ἤρχον· καίτοι δὴλον ὡς ἐπειδὴ νῦν γε ὀὐκέτι ὑπάρχει τοῖς Δάκοισι τὸ ἀρχεῖν, οὐκ εὐδαι- 

μονες, οὐδ’ ὁ νομοθέτης ἁγαθός. έτι δὲ τοῦτο γελοῖον, εἰ μένοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις αὐτοῦ, καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντος πρὸς τὸ χρὴσθαι τοῖς νόμοις, ἀποβεβλήκασι τὸ ζῆν κα- 

19 λῶς. οὐκ ἄρθος δ’ ὑπολαμβάνονσιν οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἢν δεὶ τιμῶντα φαίνεσθαι τὸν νομοθέτην τοῦ γὰρ δεσποτικὸς ἀρχεῖν ἢ τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχῆς καλλίων καὶ μᾶλλον μετ’ ἀρετῆς. έτι δὲ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ τὴν πόλιν εὐδαιμόνα νομι- 

ζεῖν καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐπαινεῖν, ὅτι κρατεῖν ἤσκησεν ἐπί τὸ 30 τῶν πέλας ἀρχεῖν ταῦτα γὰρ μεγάλην ἐξει βλάβην. 

20 δήλον γὰρ ὅτι καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν τῷ δυναμένῳ τοῦτο πει- 

ρατέον διώκειν, ὅπως δύνηται τῆς οἰκείας πόλεως ἀρχεῖν· ὅπερ ἐγκαλοῦσιν οἱ Δάκωνες Παυσανία τῷ βασιλεῖ, καὶ- 

περ ἔχουσι τηλικαίτην τιμήν. οὐτε δὴ πολιτικὸς τῶν τοιού-35 

tῶν λόγων καὶ νόμων οὐδέσι οὔτε ὀφέλιμος οὔτε ἀληθῆς ἐστίν. 

21 ταύτα γὰρ ἀριστα καὶ ἰδία καὶ κοινή, τὸν (τε) νομοθέτην ἐμποιεῖν δει ταύτα ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὴν τε τῶν 

tολεμικῶν ἀσκήσεως οὐ τοῦτον χάριν δει μελετῆν, ἢν κατα- 

dουλώσωσιν τοῦς ἀναξίους, ἀλλ’ ἢν πρῶτον μὲν αὐτοὶ μὴ 40 

dουλεύσωσιν ἑτέροις, ἐπείτα ὅπως ἤτοσί την ἡγεμονίαν τῆς 

ὁφελείας ἐνεκα τῶν ἀρχομένων, ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντων δεσπο-1334 η 

22 τείας. τρίτον δὲ τὸ δεσποτεῖν τῶν ἄξιων δουλεύειν. ὅτι δὲ 

dει τὸν νομοθέτην μᾶλλον σπουδάζειν ὅπως καὶ τὴν περὶ 

tὰ πολεμικὰ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην νομοθεσίαν τοῦ σχολάζειν ἐνεκεν 

tάξη καὶ τῆς εἰρήνης, μαρτυρεῖ τὰ γιγνόμενα τοῖς 5
λόγοις· αἱ γὰρ πλείσται τῶν τοιούτων πόλεων πολεμοῦσαι
μὲν σῶζονται, κατακτησάμεναι δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπόλλυνται.
τὴν γὰρ βαφῆν ἀφίασιν, ὥστε ὁ σίδηρος, εἰρήνην ἅγου-
tes. αὖτιοι δὲ ὁ νομοθέτης οὐ παιδεύσας δύνασθαι σχο-
ιολάζειν.
15 Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τέλος εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ κοινὴ καὶ
ἰδία τοῖς ἄνθρώποις, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι
τῷ τε ἀρίστῳ ἄνδρὶ καὶ τῇ ἀρίστῃ πολιτείᾳ, φανερῶν ὅτι
δεῖ τὰς εἰς τὴν σχολὴν ἄρετὰς ὑπάρχει· τέλος γὰρ,
15 ὡσπερ εἰρήται πολλάκις, εἰρήνη μὲν πολέμῳ, σχολὴ δὲ'
ἄσχολίας. χρήσιμοι δὲ τῶν ἄρετῶν εἰσὶ πρὸς τὴν σχολὴν 2
καὶ διαγωγὴν, ὅν τε ἐν τῇ σχολῇ τὸ ἔργον καὶ ὃν ἐν τῇ
ἀσχολίᾳ. δεὶ γὰρ πολλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχειν, ὅπως
ἐξῆ σχολάζειν ὅσο σώφρονα τὴν πόλιν εἶναι προσήκει
20 καὶ ἄνδρεῖαν καὶ καρτερικὴν· κατὰ γὰρ τὴν παροιμίαν, οὐ
σχολὴ δουλοῖς, οὐ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενοι κυνωνεύειν ἄνδρείως
dουλοὶ τῶν ἐπίοντων εἰσίν. ἄνδριας μὲν οὖν καὶ καρτερίας 3
δεὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀσχολίαν, φιλοσοφίας δὲ πρὸς τὴν σχολὴν,
σωφροσύνης δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἐν ἀμφιτέροις τοῖς χρό-
25 νοῖς, καὶ μᾶλλον εἰρήνην ἅγουσι καὶ σχολάζουσιν ὁ μὲν
γὰρ πόλεμος ἀναγκᾶζει δικαίους εἶναι καὶ σωφρονεῖν, ἢ δὲ
tῆς εὐνυχίας ἀπόλαυσις καὶ τὸ σχολάζειν μετ’ εἰρήνης
ὑβριστὰς ποιεῖ μᾶλλον. πολλῆς οὖν δεὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ 4
πολλῆς σωφροσύνης τοὺς ἄριστα δοκοῦντας πράττειν καὶ
30 πάντων τῶν μακαριζομένων ἀπολαύσειν, ὅριν εἴ τινες
εἰσίν, ὥσπερ οἱ ποιηταὶ φασίν, ἐν μικρὰς νυσίς; μάλιστα
γὰρ οὕτω δεῖσονται φιλοσοφίας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ δι-
kαιοσύνης; ὅσο μᾶλλον σχολάζουσιν ἐν ἀφθονίᾳ τῶν τοιούτων
ἀγαθῶν. διότι μὲν οὖν τὴν μέλλουσαν εὐδαιμονήσειν καὶ 5
35 στουδαίαν ἐστεθαί πόλιν τούτων δεὶ τῶν ἄρετῶν μετέχειν,
φανερῶν, αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ὄντος μὴ δύνασθαι χρῆσθαι τοῖς
ἀγαθοῖς, ἔτι μᾶλλον τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἐν τῷ σχολαζεῖν
χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἀσχολούντας μὲν καὶ πολεμοῦντας φαίνεσθαι
1334 a 6—1334 b 30. 63

ἀγαθοῦς, εἰρήνην δ' ἀγοντας καὶ σχολάζοντας ἀνδραποδώ-κατ' ἔτι πρὸς τὸν οὐκ ἀνεξάκινητεν Ἱλαρίμους ἔργῳ τὴν ἀρετήν· ἐκείνῳ μὲν γὰρ οὐ ταύτῃ διαφέροντες ἀλλοι μέγιστα τῶν 1334 b ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ γενέσθαι ταύτα μᾶλλον διὰ τῖνος ἀρετῆς. ἐπεὶ δὲ μείζω τε ἀγαθὰ ταύτα, καὶ τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν τὴν τούτων ἢ τὴν τῶν ἀρετῶν... καὶ ὅτι δὲ αὐτήν, φανερῶν ἐκ τούτων, πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἐστιν, τούτῳ δὴ θεωρητέον.

5 τυγχάνομεν δὴ διηρημένοι πρότερον ὅτι φύσεως καὶ ἐθνος καὶ λόγου δει. τούτων δὲ ποιοὺς μὲν τινὰς ἐναι χρή τὴν φύσιν, διώρισται πρότερον, λοιπὸν δὲ θεωρήσαι πρότερον παϊδευτέοι τῷ λόγῳ πρότερον ἢ τοῖς ἐθεσίν. ταύτα γὰρ δεῖ πρὸς ἀλλήλα συμφωνεῖν συμφωνίαν τὴν ἀρίστην· ἐνδεέχει—

8 θέσεως, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἑβδόμοις ἡθανατί. φανερῶν δὴ τούτῳ γε πρῶτον μὲν, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοῖς, ὡς ἡ γένεσις ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ τέλος ἀπὸ τίνων ἀρχῆς ἀλλου τέλους, ὡς καὶ τὸς ἡμῶν καὶ τὸν νοῦς τῆς φύσεως τέλος, ὡστε πρὸς τούτων τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἑβδόμοι δεῖ παρασκευάζειν

9 μελετής, ἐπεῖτα ὅσπερ ψυχῆ καὶ σῶμα δ' ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὀρθῶν δύο μέρη, τὸ τε ἁλογοῦν καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, καὶ τὰς ἐξεῖς τὰς τούτων δύο τῶν ἁριθμῶν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ὀρέξις τὸ δὲ νοῦς ὅσπερ δὲ τὸ σῶμα 20 πρότερον τῆς γενέσεις τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡστε καὶ τὸ ἁλογοῦν τοῦ

10 λόγον ἔχοντος. φανερῶν δὲ καὶ τούτῳ θυμὸς γὰρ καὶ βούλησις, ἔτι δὲ ἐπιθυμία καὶ γενομένους εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει τοῖς παιδίσιοι, ὅ δὲ λογισμὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς προϊόσκει ἐγγίγνεσθαι πέφυκεν. διὸ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦ σῶματος τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν 25 ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι προτέραν ἡ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐπείτα τὴν τῆς ὀρέξεως, ἕνεκα μὲντοῦ τοῦ νοῦ τῆς τῆς ὀρέξεως, τὴν δὲ τοῦ σωμάτος τῆς ψυχῆς.

Εἰστερ οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τῶν νομοθέτην ὅραν δεῖ ὅπως 16 βέλτιστα τὰ σώματα γέννηται τῶν τρεφομένων, πρῶτον μὲν 30
πολιτικών Ἀ' (Ἡ'). 16.

ἐπιμελητέον περὶ τὴν σύζευξιν, πάτε καὶ ποίους τινὰς ὄντας χρῆ ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἄλληλους τὴν γαμικὴν ὁμιλίαν. δεί δ' 2 ἀποβλέποντα νομοθετεῖν ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν πρὸς αὐτούς τε καὶ τὸν τοῦ ζῆν χρόνον, ἱνα συγκαταβαίνωσι ταῖς ἡλι-35 κίαις ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν καὶ μή διαφωνῶσιν αἱ δυνά-μεις τοῦ μὲν ἓτι δυναμένου γεννᾶν τῆς δὲ μὴ δυναμένης, ἡ ταύτης μὲν τοῦ δ' ἀνδρός μῆ (ταύτα γὰρ ποιεῖ καὶ στά-σεις πρὸς ἄλληλους καὶ διαφοράς) ἐπειτα καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν τέκνων διαδοχίν, δεί γὰρ οὔτε λιαν ὀπολείπεσθαι ταῖς 3 40 ἡλικίαις τὰ τέκνα τῶν πατέρων (ἀνόητος γὰρ τοῖς μὲν πρεσβυτέροις ἡ χάρις παρὰ τῶν τέκνων, ἢ δὲ παρὰ τῶν 1335 a πατέρων βοήθεια τοῖς τέκνοις), οὔτε λιαν πάρεγγος εἶναι (πολλὴν γὰρ ἔχει δυσχέρειαν ἢ τε γὰρ αἰδῶς ἔττου ὑπάρ-χει τοῖς τοιούτοις ὀστερ ἡλικιώταται, καὶ περὶ τὴν οἰκονομίαν ἐγκληματικὸν τὸ πάρεγγος): ἐτὶ δ', ὅθεν ἀρχῶμεν δεύρο 4 5 μετέβημεν, ὅπως τὰ σώματα τῶν γεννωμένων ὑπάρχη πρὸς τὴν τοῦ νομοθέτου βούλησιν. σχεδὸν δὴ πάντα ταῦτα συμβαίνει κατὰ μίαν ἐπιμέλειαν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀρισταὶ τέλος 5 τῆς γεννήσεως ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλείστον εἴπειν ἄνδράς μὲν ὁ τῶν ἐβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀρίθμος ἔσχατος, πεντήκοντα δὲ 10 γυναιξίν, δεὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς σύζευξεως κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν εἰς τοὺς χρόνους καταβαίνει τοῦτοις. ἐστὶ δ' ὁ τῶν νέων συν- 6 δυσαμὸς φαίλος πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποιίαν' ἐν γὰρ πάσι ζῴοις ἀτελὴ τὰ τῶν νέων ἐγκονα καὶ θηλυτόκα μάλλον καὶ μικρὰ τὴν μορφήν, ὡστ' ἀναγκαίον ταῦτα τοῦτο συμβαίνει καὶ 15 ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν. τεκμήριον δὲ' ἐν ὀσιάς γὰρ τῶν πόλεων ἐπιχωριάζεται τὸ νέος συζευγνύναι καὶ νέας, ἀτε- λείς καὶ μικρὸ τὰ σώματα εἰσιν. ἐτὶ δὲ ἐν τοῖς τόκοις 7 αἱ νέαι πονοῦσι τε μάλλον καὶ διαφθείρονται πλείους. διὸ καὶ τῶν χρησμῶν γενέσθαι τινὲς φαιν διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν 20 τοῖς Τροικηνίοις, ὡς πολλῶν διαφθειρόμενων διὰ τὸ γαμί- σκευαί τάς νεωτέρας, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὴν τῶν καρπῶν κο- μιδήν. ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνην συμφέρει τὰς ἐκδο-8
σεις ποιείσθαι προσβυτέραις· ἀκολαστότεραι γὰρ εἶναι δο-
κούσι νέαι χρησάμεναι ταῖς συννοσίαις. καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄρρενων
δὲ σῶματα βλάπτεσθαι δοκεῖ πρὸς τὴν αὐξήσιν, ἐὰν ἐτὶ τοῦ 25
σπέρματος αὐξανομένου ποιώνται τὴν συννοσίαν· καὶ γὰρ
τοῦτο τῶν ἀρσεμένων χρόνων, διὸ ὑπερβαίνει πληθύνει ἐτι
9 (ἡ μικρόν). διὸ τὰς μὲν ἀρμόττει περὶ τὴν τῶν ὀκτωκαίδεκα
ἐτῶν ἡλικίαν σύζευγιναί, τοὺς δὲ ἔπτα καὶ τριάκοντα [, ἡ
μικρόν]: ἐν τοσούτῳ γὰρ ἀκμάζουσί τε τοῖς σώμασι σύζευξις 30
ἐσται, καὶ πρὸς τὴν παύλαν τῆς τεκνοποιίας συγκαταβῆσεται
10 τοῖς χρόνοις εὐκαίρως· ἔτι δὲ ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων τοῖς
μὲν ἀρχομένοις ἐσταί τῆς ἁμής, ἐὰν γίγνηται κατὰ λόγον
εὐθὺς ἡ γένεσις, τοῖς δὲ ἡδῆ καταλελυμένης τῆς ἡλικίας
πρὸς τὸν τῶν ἐβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἅριθμόν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ 35
πότε δεὶ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν σύζευξιν, εἰρήται, τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὴν
ὀραν χρόνοις δεὶ χρῆσθαι οἷς οἱ πολλοί χρῶνται καλῶς καὶ
νῦν, ὀρίσατες χειμῶνας τὴν συναυλίαν ποιεῖσθαι ταύτην.
11 δεὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὺς ἡδῆ θεωρεῖν πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποίαν τά τε
παρὰ τῶν ἅτρων λεγόμενα καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῶν φυσικῶν· 40
οἱ τε γὰρ ἅτρω τούν καιρῶν τῶν σωμάτων ἰκανῶς λέγοισι,
καὶ περὶ τῶν πνευμάτων οἱ φυσικοί, τὰ βορεία τῶν νοτίων 1335 b
2 ἐπανούντες μᾶλλον, ποίων δὲ τῶν τῶν σωμάτων ὑπαρ-
χόντων μάλιστ' (ἀν) ὑφέλος εἰ τοῖς γεννομένοις, ἐπιστή-
σασι μὲν μᾶλλον λεκτέων ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς παιδονομίας,
τόπῳ δὲ ἰκανῶν εἰτείν καὶ νῦν. οὑτε γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἀθλητῶν 5
χρῆσιμος ἡγίσι πρὸς πολιτικῆν εὐεξίαν οὐδὲ πρὸς ὑγείαν
καὶ τεκνοποίιαν, οὑτε ἡ πρεπετυχὴ καὶ κακοπονητὴ λίαν,
3 ἀλλ' ἡ μέση τούτων, πεποιημένην μὲν οὖν ἐχεῖν δεὶ τὴν
ἐξίν, πεποιημένην δὲ πόνοις μὴ βιαίοις, μὴ γὰρ πρὸς ἕνα
μόνον, ὡσπερ ἡ τῶν ἀθλητῶν ἡγίσι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τάς τῶν 10
ἐλευθέρων πράξεις. ὁμοίως δὲ δεὶ ταῦτα ὑπάρχειν ἀνδράσι
καὶ γυναιξίν. Χρῆ δὲ καὶ τὰς ἑγκύους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν
σωμάτων, μὴ βαθμούσας μὴ ἀραίᾳ τροφῇ χρωμένας.
tότῳ δὲ ράδιον τὸ νομοθέτη ποιῆσαι προστάξαντι καθ'
15 ἡμέραν τινὰ ποιεῖσθαι πορείαν πρὸς θεῶν ἀποθεραπεῖαν τῶν εἰληχῶτων τὴν περὶ τῆς γενέσεως τιμῆς. τὴν μέντοι διά
νοιαν τοῦναντίον τῶν σομάτων ῥαθυμοτέρος ἀρμότει διά-
γειν' ἀπολαύοντα γὰρ φαίνεται τὰ γεννώμενα τῆς ἐχούσης
ὡςπέρ τὰ φυόμενα τῆς γῆς. περὶ δὲ ἀποθέσεως καὶ 15
20 τροφῆς τῶν γυγνομένων, ἔστω νόμος μηδὲν πεπηρομένον
τρέφειν, διὰ δὲ πλήθος τέκνων, εὰν ἡ τάξεις τῶν ἔθων
κολύη, μηδὲν ἀποτίθεσθαι τῶν γυγνομένων' ἀρίσθαι γὰρ
dει τῆς τεκνοποιίας τὸ πλῆθος, εὰν δὲ τισὶ γλυγνηταὶ παρὰ
ταύτα συνυσσάχθεντοι, πρὶν αἰσθῆσιν ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ ὄφην,
25 ἐμποιεῖσθαι δεῖ τὴν ἄμβλωσιν τὸ γὰρ ὅσιον καὶ τὸ μὴ
dιωρισμένον τῇ αἰσθῆσει καὶ τῷ ἤπνῃ ἔσται. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ μὲν
ἀρχὴ τῆς ἡλικίας ἀνδρὶ καὶ γυναικὶ διαρκεῖ, πότε ἄρχε-
σθαι χρὴ τῆς συζύγεως, καὶ πόσον χρόνων λειτουργεῖν ἀρ-
μότει πρὸς τεκνοποιίαν ἀρίσθων τὰ γὰρ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων
30 ἐκγονα, καθάπερ τὰ τῶν νεωτέρων, ἄτελῆ γίνεται καὶ τοῖς
σῶμασι καὶ ταῖς διανοιαῖς, τὰ δὲ τῶν γεγορακτῶν ἀσθενῆ.
idι κατὰ τὴν τῆς διανοιας ἀκμῆν' αὕτη δ' ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς
πλείοτοις ἥντερ τῶν ποιητῶν τινὲς εἰρήκασιν οἱ μετροῦντες
ταῖς ἑβδομάσι τὴν ἡλικίαν, περὶ τῶν χρόνων τῶν τῶν πεντῆ-
35 κοντα ἑτῶν. ὡστε τέταρτοι ή πέντε ἔτεσιν ὑπερβάλλουντα
τὴν ἡλικίαν ταύτην ἀφεῖσθαι δεῖ τῆς εἰς τὸ φανερὸν γεν-
νήσεως' τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν υγιείας χάριν ἄν τίνος ἄλλης τοιαῦ-
της αἰτίας φαίνεσθαι δεῖ ποιομένους τὴν ὀμίλιαν. περὶ δὲ 1
τῆς πρὸς ἄλλην ἢ πρὸς ἄλλον, ἔστω μὲν ἀπλῶς μὴ καλὸν
40 ἀπτόμενον φαίνεσθαι μὴδαμῇ μηδαμῶς, ὅταν ἢ καὶ προσαγο-
ρευθῇ πόσις, περὶ δὲ τῶν χρόνων τῶν τῆς τεκνοποιίας
1336 α ἐὰν τις φαίνηται τοιοῦτον τι δρῶν, ἀτιμία ηθομοῦσθο πρε-
πούσῃ πρὸς τὴν ἀμαρτίαν.
17 Γενομένων δὲ τῶν τέκνων οὔεσθαι μεγάλην εἶναι δια-
φορὰν πρὸς τὴν τῶν σομάτων δύναμιν τὴν τροφῆν, ὅποια
5 τις ἂν ἦ. φαίνεται τε διὰ τε τῶν ἄλλων ἑως ἐπισκο-
πούσι, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἔθνων οἷς ἐπιμελεῖς ἔστιν ἄγειν τὴν
1335 b 15—1336 a 39.

πολεμικὴν ἔξειν, ἡ τοῦ γάλακτος πλήθουσα τροφὴ μάλιστ' 2 οἰκεία τοῖς σώμασιν, ἀοινοτέρα δὲ διὰ τὰ νοσήματα, ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ κινήσεις ὡσας ἐνδέχεται ποιεῖσθαι τηλικοῦτων συμ-
φέρει. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ διαιστρέφεσθαι τὰ μέλη δὲ ἀπαλβ-10 τητα χρώνται καὶ νῦν ἐνία τῶν ἐθνῶν ὀργάνοις τισὶ μη-
χανικοῖς, ὅ τὸ σῶμα ποιεῖ τῶν τοιούτων ἁστραβές. συμ-
φέρει δ' εὐθὸς καὶ πρὸς τὰ ψύχη συνεβίζειν ἐκ μικρῶν
παιδῶν· τούτο γὰρ καὶ πρὸς υγίειαν καὶ πρὸς πολεμικὰς

3 πράξεις εὐχρηστότατον, διὸ παρὰ πολλοῖς ἐστὶ τῶν βαρ-15 βάρων ἔθος τοῖς μὲν εἰς ποταμοὺς ἀποβάπτειν τὰ γενό-
μενα ψυχρῶν, τοῖς δὲ σκέπασμα μικρὸν ἀμπίσχειν, οἷν
Κελτοῖς. πάντα γὰρ ὁσα δυνατῶν ἐβίζειν, εὐθὸς ἀρχο-
μένων βέλτιον μὲν ἐβίζειν, ἐκ προσαγωγῆς δ' ἐβίζειν
ἐυφής δ' ἡ τῶν παιδῶν ἔξεις διὰ. θερμότητα πρὸς τὴν τῶν 20

4 ψυχρῶν ἀσκησιν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τὴν πρότην συμφέρει ποιε-
σθαι τὴν ἑπιμέλειαν τοιαύτην τη καὶ τὴν ταύτη παραπλη-
σιὰν τὴν δ' ἐχομένη ταύτης ἡλικίαν μέχρι πέντε ἔτων,
ἡν οὔτε πῶ πρὸς μάθησιν καλῶς ἐχεῖ προσάγειν οὐδεμιᾶν
οὔτε πρὸς ἀναγκαίους πόνους, ἰπὼς μὴ τὴν αὔξησιν ἐμποδί-25
ζοιν, δεὶ δὲ τοσαύτης τυγχάνειν κινήσεως ὥστε διαφεύγειν
τὴν ἀργίαν τῶν σωμάτων. ἢν χρὴ παρασκευάζειν καὶ δι'

5 ἄλλων πράξεων καὶ διὰ τῆς παιδίας. δεὶ δὲ καὶ τὰς
παιδίας εἶναι μῆτε ἀνελευθέρους μῆτε ἐπιπόνους μῆτε ἀνε-
μένας. καὶ περὶ λόγων δὲ καὶ μύθων, πόδων τινὰς ἀκούειν δεὶ 30
τοὺς τηλικοῦτους, ἑπιμελεῖς ἐστὸ τοῖς ἄρχονσιν ὦς καλοῦσι
παιδούμοις. πάντα γὰρ δεὶ τὰ τοιαύτα προδοποιεῖν πρὸς
tὰς ύστερον διατριβάς· διὸ τὰς παιδίας εἶναι δεὶ τὰς πολ-
λὰς μιμήσεις τῶν ύστερον σπουδασμένων. τὰς δὲ διατά-
σεις τῶν παιδῶν καὶ κλαυθμοὺς οὐκ ὁρθῶς ἀπαγορεύσωσιν οἱ 35
καλύντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις· συμφέρουσι γὰρ πρὸς αὔξησιν
γίνεται γὰρ τρόπον τινὰ γυμνασία τοῖς σώμασιν· ἡ γὰρ
τοῦ πνεύματος κάθεξις ποιεῖ τὴν ἴσχυν τοῖς πονὸσιν, δὲ
συμβαίνει καὶ τοῖς παιδίοις διαστειωμένωσι. ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ
68 ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Δ' (H'). 17—Ε' (Θ'). 1.

40 τοῖς παιδονύμοις τὴν τούτων διαγωγὴν τὴν τ' ἀλλην, καὶ ὅπως ὅτι ἥκιστα μετὰ δοῦλων ἐσταί. ταυτὴν γὰρ τὴν ἡλι-κίαν, καὶ μέχρι τῶν ἐπτὰ ἔτων, ἀναγκαῖον οίκου τὴν τρο-φὴν ἔχειν. εὐλογον οὖν ἀπολαύειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκοουσμάτων καὶ τῶν ὁραμάτων ἀνελευθέραν καὶ τηλικοῦτος ἄντας. ὅλως 8 μὲν οὖν αἰσχρολογίαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ὥσπερ ἄλλο τι, δει 5 τῶν νομοθέτην ἐξορίζειν (ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ εὐχερὸς λέγειν ὅτι οὖν τῶν αἰσχρῶν γίνεται καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν σύνεγγυς), μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῶν νέων, ὅπως μὴτε λέγοσι μήτε ἀκούσας μη-δὲν τοιοῦτον· ἔὰν δὲ τις φαίνηται τι λέγον ἢ πράττων τῶν 9 ἀπηγορευμένων, τὸν μὲν ἔλευθερον μήπο δὲ κατακλίσεως 10 ἰδιωμένον ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις ἅτιμαις κολάξει καὶ πλη-γαῖς, τὸν δὲ πρεσβύτερον τῆς ἡλικίας ταυτῆς ἅτιμαις ἀνελευθέροις ἀνδραποδωδίας χάριν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ λέγειν τι 15 τῶν τοιούτων ἐξορίζομεν, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν ἢ γραφάς ἢ λόγους ἁσχήμονας. ἐπιμελέσας μὲν οὖν ἐστὼ τοῖς 20 τούς δὲ νεατέρους οὐτ' ἐάμβον οὔτε κομφοδίας δειάτας νομοθέ- τητεν, πρὶν ἡ τὴν ἡλικίαν λάβωσιν ἐν ἢ καὶ κατακλίσεως ὑπάρξει κοινωνεῖν ἤδη καὶ μέθης καὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν τοιούτων γιγνομένης βλάβης ἀπαθεῖς ἢ παιδεία ποίησε πάντας. νῦν μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐν παραδρομῇ πεποιήμεθα τῶν λόγουν 25 ὑστερον δ' ἐπιστήσανται δεῖ διορίσαι μᾶλλον, εἰτε μὴ δεῖ πρῶτον εἰτε δεὶ διαπορήσαντας, καὶ πῶς δεῖς· κατὰ δὲ τὸν παρόντα καιρὸν ἐμνήσθημεν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον. ἂνω γὰρ οὐ 1 παρὰ ἐβαίνει τὸ τοιοῦτον Θεόδωρος ὅ τῆς τραγῳδίας ὑπο-κριτῆς· οὔτε γὰρ πώποτε παρῆκεν ἐαυτῷ προεισάγειν, 30 οὔδε τῶν ἐντελῶν ὑποκριτῶν, ὡς οἰκειομένων τῶν θετῶν ταῖς πρῶταις ἀκοαῖς. συμβαίνει δὲ ταύτῳ τούτῳ καὶ πρὸς
τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁμιλίας καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων
14 πάντα γὰρ στέργομεν τὰ πρῶτα μᾶλλον. διό δεῖ τοῖς
νέοις πάντα ποιεῖν ἕνα τὰ φαύλα, μάλιστα δ' αὐτῶν ὄσα
ἔχει ἡ μοχθηρίαν ἡ δυσμένειαν. διελθόντων δὲ τῶν πέντε 35
ἐτῶν τὰ δύο μέχρι τῶν ἐπτὰ δεὶ θεοροῦν ἡδὴ γίγνεσθαι
15 τῶν μαθήσεων, ἀς δείησι μαρτάνειν αὐτούς. δύο δ' εἰσὶν
ἡλικίαι πρὸς ἃς ἀναγκαῖον διηρήσθαι τὴν παιδείαν, μετὰ
tὴν ἄπο τῶν ἐπτὰ μέχρι ἡβης καὶ πάλιν μετὰ τὴν ἁφ'
ἡβης μέχρι τῶν ἐνός καὶ ἐκεῖσιν ἐτῶν. οἱ γὰρ ταῖς ἔβδο- 40
μάσι διαιροῦντες τὰς ἡλικίας ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λέγοντοι οὐ
κακῶς, δεὶ δὲ τῇ διαίρεσι τῆς φύσεως ἐπακολουθεῖν πάσα
γὰρ τέχνη καὶ παιδεία τὸ προσελίπουν βούλεται τῆς φύ-
6 σεως ἀναπληροῦν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον εἰ ποιητῶν
tάξιν τινὰ περὶ τοὺς παίδας, ἐπείτα πότερον συμφέρει κοινὴ
pοιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν αὐτῶν ἢ κατ' ἱδιον τρόπον (δ' 5
γίγνεται καὶ νῦν ἐν ταῖς πλέονται τῶν πόλεων), τρίτον δὲ
ποιαν τινὰ δεὶ ταύτην.

Ε' (Θ').

"Οτι μὲν οὖν τῷ νομοθέτῃ μάλιστα πραγματευτέον περὶ
tὴν τῶν νέων παιδείαν, οὐδεὶς ἀν ἀμφισβητήσειν, καὶ γὰρ
ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐ γεγονόμενον τοῦτο βλάπτει τὰς πο-
2 λιτείας (δεὶ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκάστην παιδεύεσθαι τὸ γὰρ ἡθος
tῆς πολιτείας ἐκάστης τὸ οίκειον καὶ φυλάττει εἰσθε τὴν 15
πολιτείαν καὶ καθίστησιν ἐς ἀρχής, οἶν οὐ τὸ μὲν δημοκρα-
tικὸν δημοκρατίαν, τὸ δ' ὀλιγαρχικὸν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἀεὶ δὲ
tὸ βέλτιστον ἡθος βελτίωνος αἵτινος πολιτείας), ἐτι δὲ πρὸς
πάσας δυνάμει καὶ τέχνας ἐστὶν τά δεὶ προπαιδεύεσθαι
καὶ προεβίεσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἐκάστων ἐργασίας, ὡστε δὴλον 20
3 ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς πράξεις. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν τῷ τέλος
tῇ πόλει πάση, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὴν παιδείαν μίαν καὶ
tὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντων καὶ ταύτης τὴν ἐπιμέ-
λειαν εἰναι κοινῆν καὶ μή κατ’ ἵδιαν, δι’ τρόπον νῦν ἐκα-25 στος ἐπιμελεῖται τῶν αὐτοῦ τέκνων ἱδία τε καὶ μάθησιν ἱδίαν, ἂν ἀν δόξῃ, διδάσκουν. δει δέ τῶν κοινῶν κοινῆν ποιεῖται καὶ τὴν ἀσκησιν. ἀμα δέ οὔδε χρὴ νομίζειν οὗτων αὐτοῦ τῶν τινὰ εἰναὶ τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντας τῆς πόλεως, μόριον γὰρ ἐκατόσ τῆς πόλεως. ἢ δ’ ἐπιμέλεια 30 πέφυκεν ἐκάστον μορίον βλέπειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ δλοῦ ἐπιμελεῖαν. ἐπανέσειε εἰς ἀν τις καὶ τοῦτο Δακεδαμονίους καὶ γὰρ πλείστην ποιοῦνται ὑποῦν ἐπεὶ τῶν παῖδας καὶ κοινῆς ταύτην. ὅτι μὲν οὖν νομοθετητέον περὶ παιδείας καὶ ταύτην 2 κοινῆς ποιηθέν, φανερῶν τίς δ’ ἐστίν ἡ παιδεία, καὶ πώς 35 χρὴ παιδεύσῃ τινα, δεὴ μὴ λανθάνειν. νῦν γὰρ ἀμφισβητεῖ-ται περὶ τῶν ἔργων οὐ γὰρ ταύτα πάντες ὑπολαμβάνουσιν δεῖν μανθάνειν τοὺς νέους οὕτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὕτε πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν ἀριστον, οὔδε φανερὸν πότερον πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν πρέπει μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς θέος ἐκ τῆς ἐμ-2 ποδῶν παιδείας ταραχόδης ἡ σκέψις, καὶ δὴ λοιποῦ οὔδὲν πό-τερον ἀσκεῖν δεὶ τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸν βίον ἢ τὰ τείνουτα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ τὰ περιττά (πάντα γὰρ εἶληφε ταύτα κρι-1337 b τὰς τινὰς). περὶ τε τῶν πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὕτως ἐστίν ὁμολογούμε-νον (καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν εὐθὺς πάντες τιμῶ-σίν, ὅστ’ εὐλόγως διαφέρονται καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀσκησίν αὐτῆς). ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα δεὶ διδάσκεσθαι τῶν χρησίμων, 3 οὐκ ἄδηλων ὅτι δὲ οὐ πάντα, διηρημένων τῶν τε ἐλευθέρων ἔργων καὶ τῶν ἀνελευθέρων, φανερῶν ὅτι τῶν τοιοῦτων δεὶ μετέχειν ὅσα τῶν χρησίμων ποιήσει τὸν μετέχοντα μὴ βάναυσον. βάναυσον δ’ ἐργὸν εῖναι δεὶ τοῦτο νομίζειν καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μάθησιν, ὅσαι πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις καὶ 10 τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀχρηστοὶ ἀπεργάζονται τὸ σῶμα τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ τῆς διάνοιας, διὸ 5 τὰς τε τοιαύτας τέχνας ὅσαι τὸ σῶμα παρασκευάζουσιν χεῖρον διακεῖσθαι βαναύσους καλούμεναι, καὶ τὰς μισθαρνι-κὰς ἐργασίας· ἁσχολον γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ τα-
πεινήν. ἦστι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἑλευθερίων ἐπιστημῶν μέχρι μὲν 15 
tivnos ἐνίων μετέχειν οὐκ ἄνελεύθερον, τὸ δὲ προσεδρεύειν λιῶν 
6 πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν ἐνοχὸν ταῖς εἰρημέναις βλαβάις. ἔχει δὲ 
pollhν διαφορὰν καὶ τὸ τίνος ἔνεκεν πράττει τις ἢ μαν-
θάνει, τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἀρίθμῳ ἡ φίλων ἡ δὲ ἄρετὴν οὐκ 
ἄνελεύθερον, ὃ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πράττων πολλάκις δὲ ἄλλοις 20 
θητικὸν καὶ δουλικὸν δὸξειν ἀν πράττειν. αἱ μὲν οὖν κα-
tαβεβλημέναι νῦν μαθήσεις, καθὰπερ ἐλέξῃ πρότερον, 
ἐπαμφοτερίζουσι: ἐστὶ δὲ τέταρτα σχεδὸν ὁ παιδεύειν εἰώ-3 
θασί, γράμματα καὶ γυμναστικῆς καὶ μουσικῆς καὶ τέταρ-
tον ἐνοικε γραφικῆς, τὴν μὲν γραμματικῆς καὶ γραφικῆς 25 
ὡς χρησίμου πρὸς τὸν βίον οὖσας καὶ πολυχρῆστοις, τὴν δὲ 
γυμναστικῆς ως συντείνουσαν πρὸς ἄνδριαν τὴν δὲ μουσικῆς 
2 ἡ διαπορρῆσειν ἐν τις. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἡδονῆς ἁρίν οἱ 
πλεῖστοι μετέχοντος ἀυτῆς. οἱ δὲ εἴς ἀρχὴς ἔταξαν ἐν παι-
δείᾳ διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν χητεῖν, ὅπερ πολλάκις εἰρή-30 
tαι, μή μόνον ἀσχολεῖν ὅρθως ἀλλὰ καὶ σχολάζειν δύ-
νασθαι καλῶς: αὐτὴ γὰρ ἀρχὴ πάντων, ὅν καὶ πάλιν 
3 εἴπομεν περὶ αὐτῆς. εἰ γὰρ ἀμφότερος μὲν δὲν, μᾶλλον 
ἀπετέλον τὸ σχολάζειν τῆς ἀσχολίας καὶ τέλος, χητητέον 
ὁ τι ποιοῦντας δεῖ σχολάζειν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ παίζοντας τέλος 35 
4 γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ βίου τὴν παιδίαν ἡμῖν, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο 
ἀδύνατον, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν ταῖς ἀσχολίαις χρηστέον ταῖς 
παιδίαις (ὁ γὰρ πονῶν δεῖται τῆς ἀναπαύσεως, ᾧ δὲ παι-
idία χάριν ἀναπαύσεως ἐστιν τὸ δὲ ἀσχολεῖν συμβαίνει 
μετὰ πόνου καὶ συντονίας), διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ παιδίας εἰσάγε-40 
σθαι καιροφυλακοῦντας τὴν χρήσιν, ὡς προσάγοντας φαρ-
μακείας χάριν ἀνείσις γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη κύνης τῆς ψυχῆς, 
καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡδονῆν ἀναπαύσεις τὸ δὲ σχολάζειν ἐχειν 1338 a 
5 μακάριος. τοῦτο δὲ οὐ τοῖς ἀσχολοῦσιν ὑπάρχει ἄλλα τοῖς 
σχολάζουσιν ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἀσχολών ἐνεκά τινος ἀσχολεῖ 
tέλους ὡς οὐχ ὑπάρχοντος, ᾧ δὲ εὐδαιμονία τέλος ἐστίν, ἦν 5
ού μετὰ λύπης ἄλλα μεθ' ἡδονῆς οἴονται πάντες εἶναι, ταύτην μέντοι τὴν ἡδονήν οὐκέτι τὴν αὐτήν τιθέασιν, ἄλλα καθ' ἐαυτοὺς ἐκαστός καὶ τὴν ἔξω τὴν αὐτῶν, ὁ δ' ἀριστος τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν καλλίστων. ὡστε φανερὸν ὅτι

10 δεὶ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολὴν μανθάνειν ἄττα καὶ παιδεύεσθαι, καὶ ταύτα μὲν τὰ παιδεύματα καὶ ταύ- τας τὰς μαθήσεις ἐαυτῶν εἶναι χάριν, τάς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἀσχολίαν ὡς ἀναγκαῖας καὶ χάριν ἄλλων. διὸ καὶ τὴν 7 μονασκὴν οἱ πρότερον εἰς παιδείαν έταξαν οὕς ὡς ἀναγκαῖον

15 (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐξεί τοιοῦτον) οὐδ' ὡς χρῆσιμον, ὀσπερ τὰ γράμ- ματα πρὸς χρηματισμὸν καὶ πρὸς οἰκονομίαν καὶ πρὸς μάθησιν καὶ πρὸς πολιτικὰς πράξεις πολλὰς δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ γραμμή χρῆσιμος εἶναι πρὸς τὸ κράνειν τὰ τῶν τε- χνιτῶν ἔργα καλλίων οὐδ' αὐτοπερ ἡ γυμναστικὴ πρὸς

20 ὑγίειαν καὶ ἀλκήν (οὐδέτερον γὰρ τούτων ὁρῶμεν γεγρόμενον ἐκ τῆς μουσικῆς). λειτεται τοῖνυν πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ 8 διαγωγῆν, εἰς ὁπερ καὶ φαινόνται παράγοντες αὐτήν· ἢ γὰρ οἴονται διαγωγῆν εἶναι τῶν ἐλευθέρων, ἐν ταύτη τάτ- τουσιν. διόπερ "Ομηρος οὕτως ἐποίησεν

25 ἀλλ' οὖν ἢ μὲν ἢ ἐστὶ καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαίτα θαλείν, καὶ οὕτω προειπτών ἐτέρους τινάς, "ο καλέουσιν αἰσθήν," φη- 9 σιν, "ο κεν τέρπησιν ἀπαντάς," καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δὲ φησιν (ὁ) 'Οδυσσεύς ταύτην ἀρίστην εἶναι διαγωγῆν, ὅταν εὐφραίνο- μένοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων "δαίμωνσ 8 ἀνὰ δώματ' ἀκουάξων- 30 ται αἰσθῆς ἢμενοι ἐξεῖσιν." ὃκεν μὲν τοῖνυν ἐστὶ παιδεία τις 10 ἢν οὕς ὡς χρησίμην παιδευτέων τοὺς νείσι ὄνοι ὡς ἀναγκαίαν ἀλλ' ὡς ἐλευθέροι καὶ καλῆς, φανερὸν ἐστιν πότερον δὲ μία τῶν ἀρίθμων ἡ πλείους, καὶ τίνες αὐτοὶ καὶ πῶς, ὅπερ- ρον λεκτέον περὶ αὐτῶν. νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτον ἢμῖν εἶναι πρὸ 11

35 ὁδὸ γέγονεν, ὃτι καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐξομέν τινας μαρτυρίαν ἐκ τῶν καταβεβλημένοις παιδευμάτων· ἡ γὰρ μουσικὴ τούτο ποιεῖ δὴλον. ἢτι δὲ καὶ τῶν χρησίμων ὃτι δεῖ τινά παιδεύεσθαι τοὺς παιδας οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ χρῆσιμον,
1338 a 6—1338 b 29.

όν τὴν τῶν γραμμάτων μάθησιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ πολλὰς
12 ἐνδέχεσθαι γίγνεσθαι δι' αὐτῶν μαθήσεις ἐτέρας, ὦμοιος 40 δὲ καὶ τὴν γραφικὴν οὐχ ἢν ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις ὦμοίοις μὴ δια-
μαρτάνωσιν, ἀλλ' ὡςιν ἀνεξαπάτητοι πρὸς τὴν τῶν σκευῶν ὀψην τε καὶ πρᾶσιν, ἢ μάλλον ὅτι ποιεῖ θεωρητικόν τοῦ
περὶ τὰ σώματα κάλλους. τὸ δὲ ἦσθεν πανταχοῦ τὸ χρή-
σιμον ἤκιστα ἀρμόττει τοῖς μεγαλοψύχοι καὶ τοῖς ἐλευ-
13 θέροις. ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερὸν πρὸτερον τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἢ τὸ λόγῳ
παιδευτέον εἶναι, καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα πρότερον ἢ τὴν διά-
5 νοιαν, δήλον ἐκ τούτων ὅτι παραδοτέον τοὺς παιδας γυμνα-
στικῆ καὶ παιδοτριβικῆ· τούτων γὰρ ἢ μὲν ποιάν τίνα ποιεῖ
tῆν ἔξιν τοῦ σῶματος, ἢ δὲ τὰ ἐργα.

Νῦν μὲν οὖν αἳ μάλιστα δοκοῦσα τῶν πόλεων ἐπιμε-4 λεῖσθαι τῶν παῖδων αἳ μὲν ἀθλητικὴν ἔξιν ἐμποιοῦσι, λοι-10 βόμενα τὰ τε εἰδὴ καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν τῶν σωμάτων, οἱ
dὲ Δάκωνες ταύτην μὲν οὔχ ἦμαρτον τὴν ἀμαρτίαν, θη-
ρίδεες δ' ἀπεργάζονται τοὶς πόνοις, ὡς τοῦτο πρὸς ἄνδριαν
2 μάλιστα συμφέρον. καίτοι, καθάπερ έἰρηται πολλάκις, ὦτε
πρὸς μιᾶν ὦτε πρὸς μάλιστα ταύτην βλέποντα ποιητέον 15
tῆν ἐπιμέλειαν εἰ τε καὶ πρὸς ταύτην, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐξευρι-
σκούσιν' ὦτε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις οὔτ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν
ὁρῶμεν τὴν ἄνδριαν ἀκολουθοῦσαν τοῖς ἀγριωτάτοις, ἀλλὰ
3 μᾶλλον τοῖς ἠμερωτέοις καὶ λεοντώδεσιν ἠθεσίν. πολλά
δ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν ἥ πρὸς τὸ κτεῖνει καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἄνθρω-
20 ποφαγίαν εὐχερῶς ἑξει, καθάπερ τῶν περί τὸν Πώλιον
Ἀχαιοὶ τε καὶ Ἡνίοχοι καὶ τῶν ἥπειρωτικῶν ἐθνῶν ἐτερα,
tὰ μὲν ὦμοιος τούτοις τὰ δὲ μάλλον, ἢ ληστρικά μὲν ἐστιν,
4 ἄνδριάς δ' οὐ μετελήψασιν. ἔτι δ' αὐτοὶ τοὺς Δάκωνες
ίσμεν, ἐως μὲν αὐτοὶ προσήδεαν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις, ὑπε-
25 ρέχοντας τῶν ἄλλων, νῦν δὲ καὶ τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἄγωσι καὶ
tοῖς πολεμικοῖς λειπομένους ἐτέρων' οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοὺς νέους
γυμνάζειν τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον διέφερον, ἀλλὰ τῷ μόνον μή
5 πρὸς ἀσκούντας ἀσκεῖν, ὡστε τὸ καλὸν ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ θηριώδες
30 δει πρωταγωνιστεῖν· ουδε γὰρ λύκος οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων ἀγωνίσατο ἀν οὔδενα καλὸν κίνδυνον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀνήρ ἀγαθὸς. οἱ δὲ λαῖν εἰς ταῦτα ἀνέντες τοὺς παίδας, καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπαιδαγάγουσιν ποιῆσαι, βαναύσουσιν κατεργάζονται κατὰ γε τὸ ἀληθὲς, πρὸς ἐν τε μόνον ἔργον τῇ 35 πολιτικῇ χρησίμους ποιῆσαι, καὶ πρὸς τούτο χείρον, ὅς φησίν ο λόγος, ἐτέρων. δεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν προτέρων ἔργον 7 κρίνειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἀνταγωνιστᾶς γὰρ τῆς παιδείας νῦν ἔχουσιν, πρότερον δ᾽ οὐκ εἶχον. ὡτι μὲν οὖν χρηστεύων τῇ γυμναστικῇ, καὶ πῶς χρηστεύων, ὁμολογούμενον ἐστιν 40 (μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἡβης κουφότερα γυμνάσια προσωπικών, τὴν βίαιον τροφὴν καὶ τοὺς πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόνους ἀπερίγρατος, ἔνα μηδὲν ἐμπόδιον ἦ πρὸς τὴν αὔξησιν τῆς καλοῦ χάρι οὐ 1339 a μικρὸν ὃτι δύνανται τούτῳ παρασκευάζειν, ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὁλυμπιονικαῖς δύο τις ἄν ἢ τρεῖς εὑροὺς τοὺς αὐτοὺς νεκηκότας ἀνδρας τε καὶ παῖδας, διὰ τὸ νέους ἀσκοῦντας ἀφαρεῖσθαι τὴν δύναμιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαῖων γυμνασίων· οταν δ᾽ ἄφι 5 ἡβης ἔτη τρία πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους μαθήμασι γένωνται, τότε ἀρμότει καὶ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς ἀναγκοφαγίαις καταλαμβάνειν τὴν ἐχομένην ἥλικιαν, ἀμα γὰρ τῇ τε διανοίᾳ καὶ τῷ σώματι διαπονεῖν οὕτω δεί, τουσαντίον γὰρ ἐκάτερον ἀπεργάζεσθαι πέφυκε τῶν πόνων, ἐμποδίζων ο μὲν τοῦ 10 σώματος πόνος τὴν διάνοιαν, ο δὲ ταύτης τὸ σῶμα·
5 Περὶ δὲ μουσικῆς ἔνα μὲν διηπορήκαμεν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ πρότερον, καλὸς δ᾽ ἔξει καὶ νῦν ἀναλαβόντας αὐτὰ προαγαγεῖν, ἢν νόστερ ένδοσῖμον γένεται τοῖς λόγοις οὐδὲν έις εἴπειν ἀποφαίνομεν περὶ αὐτῆς, ὀὔτε γὰρ τίνα 2 15 ἔξει δύναμιν ράδιον περὶ αὐτῆς διελεῖ, οὔτε τίνος δεὶ χάριν μετέχειν αὐτῆς, πότερον παιδίας ἐνεκα καὶ άναπαυσεως, καθάπερ ὑπνον καὶ μέθης (ταῦτα γὰρ καθ᾽ αὐτὰ μὲν οὔτε τῶν σπουδαίων, ἀλλ ήδέα, καὶ ἀμα παύει μέριμναν, ὡς φησίν Εὐριπίδης· διὸ καὶ τάττουσιν αὐτήν καὶ 3 20 χρώνται πάσι τούτοις ὄμοιως, ὑπνοὶ καὶ μέθη καὶ μουσικῆ
1338 b 30—1339 b ii.

τιβέασι δὲ καὶ τὴν ὑρχήσειν ἐν τούτοις, ἢ μᾶλλον οἰητέον πρὸς ἁρετὴν τι τείνειν τὴν μουσικήν, ὡς δυναμένην, καθάπερ ἢ γυμναστικὴ τὸ σῶμα ποιών τι παρασκευάζει, καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν τὸ ἱθὸς ποιών τι ποιεῖν, ἐθίζουσαν δύνασθαι χαι-

4 ρειν ὀρθῶς, ἢ πρὸς διαγωγὴν τι συμβάλλεται καὶ πρὸς φρόνησιν (καὶ γὰρ τούτο τρίτον θετέον τῶν εἰρημένων). ὦτε μὲν οὖν δεῖ τοὺς νέους μὴ παιδιᾶς ἕνεκα παιδεύειν, οὐκ ἀδη-

λον· οὐ γὰρ παίζουσι μανθάνοντες· μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἢ μάθησις. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὖθε διαγωγὴν γε παιοῦν ἀρμόττει καὶ ταῖς ἥλικίαις ἀποδίδονα ταῖς τοιαύταις· οὐδενὶ γὰρ 30 ἀτελεί προσήκει τέλος. ἀλλ' ἵσως ἀν δόξειν ἢ τῶν παῖ-

δων σπουδὴ παιδιᾶς εἶναι χάριν ἀνδράσι γενομένους καὶ τελειωθείσιν. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτ ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, τίνος ἢν ἔνεκα δεόι μανθάνειν αὐτούς, ἀλλὰ μὴ καθάπερ οἱ τῶν Περσῶν καὶ Μῆδων βασιλεῖς, δὲ ἄλλων αὐτὸ ποιοῦντων μεταλαμβάνειν 35

6 τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς μαθήσεως; καὶ γὰρ ἀναγκαίον βέλτιον ἀπεργάξεσθαι τοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πεποιημένους ἔργον καὶ τέχνην τῶν τοιοῦτον χρόνων ἐπιμελουμένων δοὺς πρὸς μάθησιν μόνων, εἰ δὲ δεῖ τὰ τοιαύτα διαπονέαν αὐτοὺς, καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν ὄγνων πραγματείαν αὐτοὺς ἢν δεόι παρασκευάζειν· ἀλλ' 40

7 ἀτοπον. τὴν δ' αὐτὴν ἀπορίαν ἔχει καὶ εἰ δύναται τὰ ἡθὶ βελτίων ποιεῖν· ταῦτα γὰρ τί δεῖ μανθάνειν αὐτοὺς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἔτερων ἀκούσων ὀρθός τε χαῖρειν καὶ δύνασθαι κρίνειν, ὅπερ οἱ Δάκωνε; ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ οὐ μανθάνοντες ὁμος δυ-

νανται κρίνειν ὀρθῶς, ὡς φασί, τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ τὰ μη 5 χρηστὰ τῶν μελῶν. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ εἰ πρὸς εὐημε-

ρίαν καὶ διαγωγὴν ἐλευθερίαν χρηστῶν αὐτή· τί δει μαν-

θάνειν αὐτοὺς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἔτερων χρωμένων ἀπολαύειν; σκο-

πεὶν δ' ἔξεστι τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἢν ἐχομεν περὶ τῶν θεῶν· οὐ γὰρ ὁ Ζέεις αὐτὸς ἀείδει καὶ κιθαρίζει τοῖς ποιηταῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ βαμαύους καλούμεν τοὺς τοιοῦτοι καὶ τὸ πράττειν οὐκ 9 ἀνδρὸς μὴ μεθύοντος ἢ παίζοντος. ἀλλ' ἵσως περὶ μὲν 10 τούτων ὑστερον ἐπισκεπτέου, ἢ δὲ πρώτη ἐποὶ ἵσως ἐστὶν πότε-
76 ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Ε’ (Θ’). 5.

ρον οὔ θετέον εἰς παϊδείαν τὴν μονσικὴν ἡ θετέον, καὶ τί
dῦναται τῶν διαπορηθέντων τριῶν, πότερον παϊδείαν ἡ παι-
diὰν ἡ διαγωγὴν. εὐλόγως δ’ εἰς πάντα τάττεται καὶ
15 φαίνεται μετέχειν, ἡ τε γὰρ παιδία χάριν ἀναπαύσεως 10
ἐστι, τὴν δ’ ἀνάπαυσιν ἀναγκαίον ήδειαν εἶναι (τῆς γὰρ
dιά τῶν πύων λύπης ἰατρεία τίς ἐστιν), καὶ τὴν διαγωγὴν
ὀμολογουμένως δεί μὴ μόνον ἔχειν τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ
τὴν ἡδονήν (τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων ἔστιν).
20 τὴν δὲ μονσικὴν πάντες εἶναι φαμέν τῶν ἡδίστων, καὶ ψι- 11
λὴν οὖσαν καὶ μετὰ μελῳδίας (φησὶ γοῦν καὶ Μουσαίος
εἶναι “βροτοῖς ἡδίστοιν ἀείδειν”· διὸ καὶ εἰς τὰς συνονίας
cαι διαγωγὰς εὐλόγως παραλαμβάνουσιν αὐτὴν ὡς δυναμένην
eὐφραίνειν), ὡστε καὶ ἐνεύθεν ἃν τις ὑπολάβοι παιδεύε- 25 σθαι δεῖν αὐτὴν τοὺς νεωτέρους. ὅσα γὰρ ἀβαβηθ’ τῶν 12
ἡδέων, οὐ μόνον ἀρμότει πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς
tὴν ἀνάπαυσιν· ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐν μὲν τῷ τέλει συμβαίνει τοῖς
ἀνθρώποις ὁλιγάκις γίνεσθαι, πολλάκις δὲ ἀναπαύονται
cαι χρῶνται ταῖς παιδιαῖς οὖχ ὅσον ἐπὶ πλέον ἀλλὰ καὶ
30 διὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, χρήσιμον ἃν εἰς διαναπαύειν ἐν ταῖς ἀπὸ
tαύτης ἡδοναῖς. συμβέβηκε δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ποιεῖσθαι 13
tὰς παιδιὰς τέλος· ἔχει γὰρ ἱσως ἡδονήν τινα καὶ τὸ
tέλος, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν, Ἲητοῦντες δὲ ταύτην, λαμβά-
νουσιν ὡς ταύτην ἐκεῖνην, διὰ τὸ τῷ τέλει τῶν πράξεων
35 ἔχειν ὁμοιώμα τι’ τὸ τε γὰρ τέλος οὐδενὸς τῶν ἐσομένων
χάριν αἰρετὸν, καὶ αἱ τοιαύται τῶν ἡδονῶν οὐδενὸς εἰς τῶν
ἐσομένων ἐνέκεν, ἀλλὰ τῶν γεγονότων, οἴον πόνων καὶ λύ-
pῆς. δ’ ἢν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν ᾧτοῦσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν γίγνε- 14
σθαι διὰ τούτων τῶν ἡδονῶν, ταύτην ἃν τις εἰκότως ὑπο-
40 λάβοι τὴν αἰτίαν· περὶ δὲ τοῦ κοινωνεῖν τῆς μονσικῆς, οὐ
diὰ ταύτην μόνην, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς
tας ἀναπαύσεις, ὡς ἐοικεῖ—οὐ μὴ ἀλλὰ ᾧτητέον μὴ ποτε 15
1340 αὐτὸ μὲν συμβέβηκε, τιμιωτέρα δ’ αὐτῆς ἡ φύσις ἔστιν ἡ
κατὰ τὴν εἰρημένην χρείαν, καὶ δεὶ μὴ μόνον τῆς κοινῆς
1339 b 12—1340 a 35.

ηδονής μετέχειν ἀπ’ αὐτῆς, ἢς ἔχουσι πάντες αἰσθησιν (ἐχει γὰρ ἡ μουσικὴ τὴν ἡδονήν φυσικὴν, διὸ πάσαις ἡλικίαις καὶ πάσιν ἡθεσιν ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς ἐστὶ προσφιλῆς), ἀλλ’ ὅ ὁ δὲι πῃ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἱθος συντείνει καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν.

16 τοῦτο δ’ ἄν εἴη δήλου, εἰ ποιοὶ τινες τὰ ἡθη γεγονόμεθα δι’ αὐτῆς. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁτι γεγονόμεθα ποιοὶ τινες, φανερῶν διὰ πολλῶν μὲν καὶ ἐτέρων, οὐχ ἡκιστα δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν Ὄλυμπον μελῶν ταῦτα γὰρ ὁμολογούμενος ποιεῖ τὰς ψυχὰς 10 ἐνθουσιαστικάς, δ’ ὃ ἐνθουσιασμὸς τοῦ περὶ τὴν ψυχήν ἡθος

17 πάθος ἐστίν. ἔτι δὲ ἀκροφόμενοι τῶν μιμήσεων γίγνονται πάντες συμπαθεῖς, καὶ χωρὶς τῶν ρυθμῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβεβηκεν εἶναι τὴν μουσικὴν τῶν ἱδέων, τὴν δ’ ἀρετὴν περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς καὶ φιλείν καὶ μισεῖν, 15 δεὶ δηλοῦτι μανθάνειν καὶ συνεθίζεσθαι μηδὲν ὄντος ὡς τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ἡθεσι καὶ ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν, ἔστι δὲ ὁμοιόματα μάλιστα παρὰ τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις ἐν τοῖς ρυθμοῖς καὶ τοῖς μέλεσιν ὅργης καὶ πράοτητος, ἔτι δ’ ἀνδρίας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ πάντων 20 τῶν ἐναντίων τοῦτοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἥδικῶν (δήλου δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων μεταβάλλομεν γὰρ τὴν ψυχήν ἀκροφόμενοι τοιούτων), δ’ δ’ ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἔδισμος τοῦ λυπείσχαι καὶ χαίρειν ἐγγύς ἔστι τῷ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τὸν αὐτὸν ἐχειν τρόπον (οἶνοι εἶ τις χαίρει τὴν εἰκόνα τίνος θεώμενος μὴ 25 δ’ ἀλλὰ αἰτιῶν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν μορφὴν αὐτὴν, ἀναγκαῖον τούτῳ καὶ ἀυτὴν ἐκείνῃ τὴν θεωρίαν, οὐ τὴν εἰκόνα θεωρεῖ, 20 ἡθεῖαν εἶναι), συμβεβηκε δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν ὁμοίωμα τοῖς ἡθεσιν, οἶνον ἐν τοῖς ἀπτοίς καὶ τοῖς γενοστοῖς, ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς ὄρατοις ἤρέμα 30 (σχήματα γὰρ ἐστὶ τοιοῦτα, ἀλλ’ ἔπει μικρόν, καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσιν, ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶ ταῦτα ὁμοιόματα τῶν ἱθῶν, ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰ γεγονόμενα

21 σχήματα καὶ χρώματα τῶν ἱθῶν, καὶ ταῦτ’ ἐστίν ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν οὗ μὴν ἀλλ’ ὄσον διαφέρει καὶ 35
περὶ τὴν τοῦτων θεωρίαν, δεῖ μὴ τὰ Παύσωνος θεωρεῖν τοὺς νέους, ἀλλὰ τὰ Πολυγνώτου κἂν εἰ τις ἄλλος τῶν γρα-
φέων ἢ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν ἑστὶν ἥτικος, ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέ-
λεσιν αὐτοῖς ἑστὶ μυϊματα τῶν ἡθῶν. καὶ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ φανε-
40 ρόν’ εὐθὺς γὰρ ἢ τῶν ἀρμονίων διέστηκε φύσις, ὡστε ἀκούν-
tας ἄλλος διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔχειν τρόπον
πρὸς ἑκάστην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν ἐνίας ὀδυρτικοτέρως
1340 b καὶ συνεστηκότως μᾶλλον, οἶον πρὸς τὴν μεζολυδιστὶ καλο-
μένην, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαλακοτέρως τὴν διάνοιαν, οἶον πρὸς
τὰς ἀνεμένας, μέσως δὲ καὶ καθεστηκότως μάλιστα πρὸς
ἐτέραν, οἶον δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἢ δωριστὶ μόνη τῶν ἀρμονίων, ἐνθού-
5 σιαστικοῖς δ’ ἡ φρυγιστὶ ταῦτα γὰρ καλῶς λέγονσι οἱ περὶ 23
τὴν παιδείαν ταύτην πεφιλοσοφικότες. λαμβάνουσι γὰρ τὰ
μαρτύρια τῶν λόγων εἷς αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ
τρόπον ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἤθος
ἔχουσι στασιμότερον οἱ δὲ κινητικὸν, καὶ τοῦτοι οἱ μὲν
10 φορτικοτέρας ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις οἱ δὲ ἐλευθερωτέρας. ἦκ 24
μὲν οὖν τούτων φανερῶν ὅτι δύναται ποιεῖν τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς
ἤθους ἡ μουσικὴ παρασκευάζειν εἰ δὲ τοῦτο δύναται ποιεῖν,
ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι προσακείναι νὰ παιδευτέον εἰν αὐτῇ τοῖς νέοις.
ἔστι δὲ ἀρμόττουσα πρὸς τὴν φύσιν τὴν τηλικαυτὴν ἡ δι- 25
15 δασκαλία τῆς μουσικῆς οἱ μὲν γὰρ νέοι διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν
ἀνήδυντον οὐδὲν ὑπομένουσιν ἐκόντες, ἢ δὲ μουσικὴ φόσει
tῶν ἡδυμένων ἑστίν. καὶ τὰς ἐς οἰκονομεύει ταῖς ἀρμονίαις
καὶ τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς εἶναι διὸ τολμὸν ἐν τοῖς σοφῶν οἱ
μὲν ἀρμονίαι εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, οὶ δ’ ἔχειν ἀρμονίαν.
6 Πότερον δὲ δεῖ μανθάνειν αὐτοὺς ἄδοντάς τε καὶ χει-
ρουργοῦντας ἢ μὴ, καθάπερ ἦτορθή πρότερον, τὸν λεκτέον.
οὐκ ἄδεην δὴ ὅτι πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν πρὸς τὸ γέγε-
νοισθαί ποιοὺς τινας, εάν τις αὐτὸς κοινοῦν τῶν ἔργων ἐν
γὰρ τὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἢ χαλεπῶν ἑστὶ μὴ κοινωνισάντας
25 τῶν ἔργων κρίτας γενέσθαι σπουδαίους. ἀμα δὲ καὶ δεὶ τοὺς 2
παιδὰς ἔχειν τινὰ διατριβὴν, καὶ τὴν Ἀρχότου πλαταγῆν
.
οίσθαι γενέσθαι καλῶς, ἣν διδάσας τοῖς παιδίοις ὅπως χρόμενοι ταύτη μηδὲν καταγνύσσι τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν·
οὐ γὰρ δύναται τὸ νέον ἥσυχάξειν. αὐτὴ μὲν οὖν ἔστι τοῖς
νηπίωις ἀρμοττουσα τῶν παιδίων, ἡ δὲ παιδεία πλαταγη 30
3 τοῖς μείζοις τῶν νέων. ὅτι μὲν οὖν παιδευτέον τὴν μονσικὴν
οὐτως ὀστε καὶ κοινωνεῖν τῶν ἔργων, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν τοιού-
των· τὸ δὲ πρέπον καὶ τὸ μῆ πρέπον ταῖς ἡλικίαις οὐ
χαλεπὸν διορίσαι, καὶ λῦσα πρὸς τοὺς φάσκοντας βάναυ-
4σον εἰναι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν. πρώτον μὲν γὰρ, ἐπεὶ τοῦ κρίνειν 35
χάριν μετέχειν δεὶ τῶν ἔργων, διὰ τοῦτο χρή νέους μὲν
οὕτως κρῆσθαι τοῖς ἔργοις, προσβυτέρους δὲ γινομένους τῶν
μὲν ἔργων ἀφείσθαι, δύνασθαι δὲ τὰ καλὰ κρίνειν καὶ
χαίρειν ὁρθῶς διὰ τὴν μάθησιν τὴν γενομένην ἐν τῇ νεότητι·
5 περὶ δὲ τῆς ἐπιτιμήσεως ἦν τινες ἐπιτιμᾶσιν ὁς ποιοῦσις 40
τῆς μονσικῆς βαναύσους, οὐ χαλεπὸν λῦσαι σκεψαμένους
μέχρι τε πόσον τῶν ἔργων κοινωνητέον τοῖς πρὸς ἀρετὴν
παιδευμένους πολιτικῆν, καὶ ποίων μελῶν καὶ ποίων ῥυ-
θμῶν κοινωνητέον, ἐτι δὲ ἐν ποιίς ὀργάνοις τὴν μάθησιν
6 ποιητέον, καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο διαφέρειν εἰκός. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἡ
λύσις ἐστὶ τῆς ἐπιτιμήσεως· οὐδὲν γὰρ καλῶς τρόπους τινὰς
tῆς μονσικῆς ἀπεργάζεσθαι τὸ λεχθὲν. φανερὸν τοῖνυν ὅτι 5
δεὶ τὴν μάθησιν αὐτῆς μὴ ἑμποδίζειν πρὸς τὰς ὑστερον
πράξεις, μὴτο σῶμα ποιεῖν βανάυσον καὶ ἄχρηστον πρὸς
tὰς πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἁσκήσεις, πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρή-
7 σεις ἤδη, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαθήσεις ὑστερον. συμβαινοί δὲ ἀν
περὶ τὴν μάθησιν, εἰ μὴτα πρὸς τοὺς ἀγώνας τοὺς τεχν-
10 κοὺς συντείνοντα διαπονοεῖον, μὴτα τὰ θαυμάσια καὶ περιττὰ
tῶν ἔργων, ἄ νυν ἐλήλυθεν εἰς τοὺς ἀγώνας, ἐκ δὲ τῶν
8 ἀγώνων εἰς τὴν παιδείαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα μεχρὶ
περ ἀν δύναται χαίρειν τοῖς καλῶς μέλεσι καὶ ῥυθμοῖς,
καὶ μὴ μόνον τῷ κοινῷ τῆς μονσικῆς, ὅστε καὶ τῶν ἀλ-
15 λῶν ἐνια ζῶνων, ἐτι δὲ καὶ πλήθος ἀνδραπόδων καὶ παι-
δίων. δήλον δὲ ἐκ τούτων καὶ ποίος ὀργάνοις χρηστέον.
οὔτε γὰρ αὖλοις εἰς παιδείαν ἀκτέον οὔτ' ἄλλο τεχνικὸν 9 ὀργανον, οἷον κιθάραν κἂν εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἔτερον ἔστιν, ἄλλα
20 ὅσα ποιῆσι αὐτῶν ἀκροατὰς ἀγαθοὺς ἢ τῆς μουσικῆς παι-
δείας ἢ τῆς ἄλλης: ἐτί δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ αὖλος ἥβικὸν ἄλλα
μᾶλλον ὀργιαστικόν, ὡστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτῷ καίρους
χρηστέον ἐν οἷς ἡ θεωρία κάθαρσιν μᾶλλον δύναται ἢ μά-
θησιν. προσβάμεν δὲ ὅτι συμβέβηκεν ἐναντίον αὐτῷ πρὸς 10
25 παιδείαν καὶ τὸ κοιλύειν τῷ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι τὴν αἰλικήν.
διὸ καλὸς ἀπεδοκύμασαν αὐτὸι οἱ πρῶτοι τὴν χρήσιν ἐκ
tῶν νέων καὶ τῶν ἑλευθέρων, καὶ πρὸς χρησάμενοι τὸ πρῶ-
tὸν αὐτῷ. σχολαστικότεροι γὰρ γιγνόμενοι διὰ τὰς εὔπο- 11
rious καὶ μεγαλοπυχότεροι πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἐτί τε πρῶτον
30 καὶ μετὰ τὰ Μηδικά φρονηματισθέντες ἐκ τῶν ἔργων,
πάσης ἑπτούτων μαθήσεως, οὐδὲν διακρίνοντες ἄλλ' ἐπιγή-
tοῦσ' διὸ καὶ τὴν αὐλητικὴν ἡγανόν πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις.
καὶ γὰρ ἐν Δακεδαίμονὶ τὶς χορηγὸς αὐτὸς ἡλιστη τῷ 12
χορῷ, καὶ περὶ Ἀθηνᾶς οὔτως ἐπεχειρισάσαν ὡστε σχεδὸν οἱ
35 πολλοὶ τῶν ἑλευθέρων μετείχον αὐτῆς: δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τοῦ
πίνακος δὴν ἀνέθηκε Θράσυππος Ἐκφαντίδη χορηγῆσας.
ὑστερον δ' ἀπεδοκυμάσθη διὰ τῆς πεῖρας αὐτῆς, βέλτιον
dυναμένων κρίνειν τὸ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν
συντείνον' ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ὀργάνων τῶν ἀρχαίων, 13
40 οἷον πηκτίδες καὶ βάρβιτοι καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἡδονὴν συντείνοντα
tοῖς ἀκούουσι τῶν χρωμένων, ἔπιγάγον καὶ τρίγωνα καὶ
1341 ὑσμβύκαι, καὶ πάντα τὰ δεδεμένα χειρουργικῆς ἐπιστήμης.
εὐλόγως δ' ἔχει καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν αὖλῶν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων
μεμβολογημένου' φασὶ γὰρ δὴ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν εὑροῦσαν ἀπο-
βαλεῖν τοὺς αὖλους, οὐ κακῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει φάναι καὶ διὰ 14
5 τὴν ἀσχημοσύνην τοῦ προσώπου τοῦτο ποιῆσαι δυσχεράνασαν
tὴν θεοῦν: οὐ μὴν ἄλλα μᾶλλον εἰκὸς δὴ τῆς τὴν διάνοιαν
οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἢ παιδεία τῆς αἰλικῆς: τῇ δ' Ἀθηναὶ τὴν ἐπι-
στήμην περιτίθεμεν καὶ τὴν τέχνην. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν τε ὄργα- 15
νων καὶ τῆς ἐργασίας ἀποδοκιμάζομεν τὴν τεχνικὴν παι-
δειαν, τεχνικήν δὲ τίθεμεν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀγώνας (ἐν ταύτῃ ἣ γαρ ὁ πράττων οὐ τῆς αὐτοῦ μεταχειρίζεται χάριν ἀρετής, ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἡδονής, καὶ ταύτης φορτικής, διότερ οὐ τῶν ἑλευθέρων κρίνομεν εἶναι τὴν ἐργασίαν, ἀλλὰ 16 θητικωτέραν καὶ βαναύσους δὴ συμβαίνει γλυγνεσθαι πονηρὸς γαρ ὁ σκοπὸς πρὸς ὅν ποιοῦνται τὸ τέλος ὁ γαρ 15 θεατῆς φορτικὸς δὲ μεταβάλλει εἰσάγει τὴν μουσικήν, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας τοὺς πρὸς αὐτὸν μελετῶντας αὐτοὺς τε ποιοὺς τίνας ποιεῖ καὶ τὰ σῶματα διὰ τὰς κινήσεις.

Σκεπτέων δ' ἐτι περὶ τε τὰς ἀρμονίας καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς, 7 [καὶ πρὸς παιδείαν] πότερον πάσαις χρηστέον ταῖς ἀρμονίαις καὶ πάσι τοῖς ρυθμοῖς ἢ διαιρετέον, ἔπειτα τοῖς πρὸς παιδείαν διαπονοοῦσι πότερον τῶν αὐτῶν διορισμὸν θήσομεν ἢ τρίτων δει τινὰ ἐτερον, ἐπειδή τὴν µὲν μουσικὴν ὁρῶμεν διὰ μελοποιίας καὶ ρυθμῶν ὀσάν, τούτων δὲ ἐκάτερον οὐ δει λεηθέναι τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν πρὸς παιδείαν, καὶ πότερον 25 προαιρετέον μᾶλλον τὴν εὐμελῆ μουσικὴν ἢ τὴν εὐρυθμον. 2 νομίσαντες οὖν πολλὰ καλῶς λέγειν περὶ τούτων τῶν τε νῦν μουσικῶν ἐνίοις καὶ τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας δοσο τυγχάνουσιν ἐμπείροι ἔχουστε τῆς περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν παιδείας, τὴν µὲν καθ' ἐκαστον ἀκριβολογίαν ἀποδώσομεν ζητεῖν τοῖς βουλο-30 µένοις παρ' ἐκείνων, νῦν δὲ νομικῶς διέλαμβεν, τοὺς τύπους νῦν ἐπιτάσσει περὶ αὐτῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν διαίρεσιν ἀποδεχόμεθα τῶν μελῶν ὡς διαιροῦσι τίνες τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, τὰ µὲν θηκὰ τὰ δὲ πρακτικὰ τὰ δ' ἐνθυσιαστικὰ τιθέντες, καὶ τῶν ἀρμονίων τὴν φύσιν πρὸς ἐκαστα τούτων οἰκείαν 35 ἄλλην πρὸς ἄλλο μέρος τιθέασι, φαμέν δ' οὐ µιᾶς ἐνεκεν ὡφελείας τῇ µουσικῇ κρῆσθαι δεῖν ἄλλα καὶ πλειόνων χάριν (καὶ γαρ παιδείας ἐνεκεν καὶ καθάρσεως—τί δὲ λέγομεν τὴν καθαρσίν, νῦν µὲν ἄπλως, πάλιν δ' ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς ἐρούμεν σαφέστερον—τρίτον δὲ πρὸς διαγωγήν, 40 πρὸς ἀνείριν τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσιν), φανερὸν ὅτι χρηστέον µὲν πάσαις ταῖς ἀρμονίαις, οὐ τὸν 1342 α

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αὐτῶν δὲ τρόπον πάσαις χρηστεύον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν τὴν παιδείαν ταίς ἡθικωτάσισ, πρὸς δὲ ἀκράσιν ἐτέρων χειρουργοῦντων καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἐνθουσιαστικαῖς. δ' 4 5 γὰρ περὶ ἐνὶας συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχῆς ἵσχυρός, τοῦτο ἐν πάσαις ὑπάρχει, τῷ δὲ ἦττον διαφέρει καὶ τῷ μάλλον, οἶνον ἔλεος καὶ φόβος, ἐτὶ δ' ἐνθουσιασμός. καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς κινήσεως κατακώχμῳ τινὲς εἰσιν' ἐκ τῶν δ' ἱερῶν μελῶν ὀρῶμεν τούτους, ὅταν χρῆσονται τοῖς ἐξοργία- 10 10 0ν νὰ τὴν ψυχῆν μέλεςι, καθιστάμενος ὁσπὲρ ἱατρείας τυ- χόντας καὶ καθάρσεως. ταύτῳ δὴ τούτῳ ἀναγκαῖον πάσχειν 5 καὶ τοὺς ἐλεήμονας καὶ τοὺς φοβητικοὺς καὶ τοὺς ὀλῶς πα- θητικοὺς, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει τῶν τοιούτων ἐκάστω, καὶ πάσι γίγνεσθαι τινα κάθαρσιν καὶ κουφίζεσθαι 15 μεθ' ἡδονῆς. ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μέλη τὰ καθαρτικά παρέ- χει χαράν ἀβλαβῆ τοῖς ἄνθρωποις. διὸ ταῖς μὲν τοιαύταις 6 ἀρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις μέλεσι (χρησθαί) θετέον τοὺς τὴν [θεατρικήν] μουσικῆν μεταχειριζομένους ἄγωνιστάς (ἐπεί 8' ὁ θεατὴς διττός, ὁ μὲν ἐλεύθερος καὶ πεπαιδευμένος, ὁ δὲ 20 φορτικὸς ἐκ βαναύσων καὶ θητῶν καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων συγ- κείμενος, ἀποδοτέον ἄγανας καὶ θεωρίας καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις πρὸς ἀνάπαυσιν εἰσὶ δ' ὁσπέρ αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ παρε- 7 σταμμέναι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔξεως, οὔτω καὶ τῶν ἁρμονίων παρεκβάσεις εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν μελῶν τὰ σύντονα καὶ παρακε- 25 χρωσμένα, ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἡδονήν ἐκάστοτε τὸ κατὰ φύσιν οἰκεῖον διόσπρ ἀποδοτέον ἐξουσιάν τοῖς ἄγωνισμένοις πρὸς τῶν θεατὴν τῶν τοιούτων τοιούτῳ τινὶ χρῆσθαι τῷ γένει τῆς μουσικῆς) πρὸς δὲ παιδείαν, ὁσπέρ εἰρηται, τοῖς ἥθικοις τῶν 8 μελῶν χρηστεύων καὶ ταῖς ἀρμονίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις. τοιαύτη 30 0' ἡ δωριστή, καθάπερ εἴσπομεν πρότερον δέχεσθαι δὲ δεὶ κἂν τινα ἄλλην ἡμῖν δοκιμάζωσιν οἱ κοινωνοὶ τῆς ἐν φι- λοσοφίᾳ διατριβής καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν παιδείαν. ὁ 9 8' ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ Σωκράτης οὐ καλὸς τὴν φρυγιστῇ μόνην καταλείπει μετὰ τῆς δωριστῆ, καὶ ταῦτα ἀποδοκιμάσας
τῶν ὁργάνων τῶν αὐλῶν. ἔχει γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν 1342 b
ἡ φρυγιστὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν ἥπερ αὐλὸς ἐν τοῖς ὁργάνοις.

10 ἀμφο γὰρ ὀργιαστικά καὶ παθητικά, δηλοὶ δ’ ἡ ποίη-
σις πᾶσα γὰρ βακχεία καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη κίνησις
μάλιστα τῶν ὁργάνων ἐστίν ἐν τοῖς αὐλῶν, τῶν δ’ ἁρμo-5
νίων ἐν τοῖς φρυγιστὶ μέλεια λαμβάνει ταῦτα τὸ πρέπον,
ὅων ὁ διδύραμβος ὀμολογουμένως εἶναι δοκεὶ Φύργιον.

11 καὶ τούτου πολλὰ παραδείγματα λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τὴν σύνε-
σιν ταύτην ἄλλα τε, καὶ διότι Φιλόξενος ἐγχειρήσας ἐν
τῇ δωριστὶ ποίησαι διδύραμβον τοὺς Μυσοὺς οὐχ οἷος τ’ ἦν, 10
ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς ἐξέπεσεν εἰς τὴν φρυγιστὶ τὴν

12 προσήκουσιν ἁρμονίαν πάλιν. περὶ δὲ τῆς δωριστὶ πάντες
ὀμολογοῦσιν ὡς στασιμωτάτης οὕτης καὶ μάλιστ’ ἢδος ἐχοῦ-
σης ἀνδρείου. ἐτι δὲ ἐπεὶ τὸ μέσον μὲν τῶν ὑπερβολῶν
ἐπαινούμεν καὶ χρήναι διώκειν φαμέν, ἡ δὲ δωριστὶ ταύτῃ τ’15
ἔχει τὴν φύσιν πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἁρμονίας, φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ

13 Δῶρια μέλη πρέπει παιδεύεσθαι μᾶλλον τοῖς νεωτέροις. εἰς
δὲ δύο σκοποὶ, τὸ τε δυνατὸν καὶ τὸ πρέπον· καὶ γὰρ τὰ
dυνατὰ δεῖ μεταχειρίζεσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ τὰ πρέποντα ἐκά-
στως· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ὀρισμένα ταῖς ἡλικίαις, οἷον τοῖς 20
ἀπειρηκόσι διὰ χρόνου ὢν ῥάδιον ἄδειν τὰ συντόνους ἁρμo-
νίας, ἄλλα τὰς ἀνειμένας ἡ φύσις ὑποβάλλει τοῖς τηλικοῦ-

14 τοῖς. διὸ καλὸς ἐπιτίμοι καὶ τούτο (τὸ) Σοκράτει τῶν περὶ
tὴν μοισικὴν τινες, ὅτι τὰς ἀνειμένας ἁρμονίας ἀποδοκι-
mάσειεν εἰς τὴν παιδείαν, ὡς μεθυστικὰς λαμβάνων αὐτάς, 25
οὐ κατὰ τὴν τῆς μέθης δύναμιν (βακχευτικὸν γὰρ ἡ γε
μέθη ποιεῖ μᾶλλον) ἀλλ’ ἀπειρηκνίας. ὡστε καὶ πρὸς τὴν
ἐσομένην ἡλικίαν, τὴν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων, δεῖ καὶ τῶν τοιού-

15 τῶν ἁρμονιῶν ἀπτεσθαι καὶ τῶν μελῶν τῶν τοιούτων. ἐτι
δ’ εἰ τὶς ἐστὶ τοιαύτη τῶν ἁρμονιῶν ἡ πρέπει τῇ τῶν παί-30
δων ἡλικία διὰ τὸ δύνασθαι κόσμον τ’ ἔχειν ἁμα καὶ
παιδείαν, οἷον ἡ λυδιστὶ φαίνεται πεποιθεῖνα μάλιστα τῶν
ἀρμονιῶν . . . δῆλον ὅτι τούτους ὄρους τρεῖς ποιητέον εἰς τὴν
παιδείαν, τὸ τε μέσον καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ τὸ πρέπον . . .

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BOOK III.

1274 b 33. Vet. Int. renders ποτε by quidem, as in 1276 a 18 and 1286 a 1. 40. Vet. Int. has et for δε, as in 1291 b 40, βραχέων δε.

1275 a 11. καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τούτοις ὑπάρχει om. Π. 19. γὰρ ΠΠ Vet. Pal. Bekk.: δε Ar. Conring, Sus. See explanatory note. 20. ἐγκλημα] Vet. Int. adiectionem (objiectionem ?). "Εγκλημα is rendered accusatio in 1264 a 27 and 1268 b 19, the two other passages of the Politics in which it occurs. δεμενον] Vet. Int. opportunam, as in 1323 b 30 and in Rhet. 1. 2. 1357 a 9 and 2. 7. 1385 a 20 (Dittmeyer, Quae ratio inter vetustam Aristotelis Rhetoricorum translationem et Graecos codices intercedat, p. 50). 24. διηρη-μέναι ΠΠ Vet. Pal. (Vet. Int. divisi): διωρισμέναι Scaliger, Sus. See explanatory note on 1275 a 23. 27. ἄν φαίης Π146 Vet. Pal., φαίη Μs, ἀντίφαίη Π83 etc. Göttling conj. ἄν ἀντίφαίη. But in Eth. Nic. 3. 8. 1117 a 14, where the MSS. have ἀντισταθεῖν, Heylbut (Aspas. Comm. Praef. p. x) and Bywater accept ἄν παθεῖν from Aspasius. See also Stallbaum's critical note on Plato, Gorg. 481 D, where he restores ἄν φη from the best MSS. in place of the vulg. ἀντιφή. 28. καίτοι . . ἀρχῆς om. Π. 37. ] Vet. Int. secundum quod, which may represent ] (see critical note on 1280 a 24), though qua is a more usual equivalent for it in Vet. Int. (see e.g. 1279 a 11 and 1286 a 23).

1275 b 7. I follow Coray and Sus. in adding ἐν before εἰναις: cp. c. 11. 1282 a 27, ἄς ἐν εἰναις πολιτείαις, where Ms P1 and possibly Ρ omit ἐν, and 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 27, Ἄκατακεκυάστας ἂρχεον οἶον ἐν εἰναις πολιτείαις ἐστίν, where Π2 om. ἐν. 13. ἄλλα . . γὰρ] Vet. Int. sed, but this stands for ἄλλα γὰρ here, as in 1282 b 8 and 1323 b 36. Γὰρ om. Π1 Ρ6 and over an erasure Ρ4. 16. ἀποδέδοται Π: Vet. Int. attribuitur, as in 1299 a 26. In 1285 a 6 ἀποδέδοται is rendered attributa sunt, but it is doubtful whether Vet. Int. found
\textbf{CRITICAL NOTES.}

\textit{apodidotoi} in \textit{G} in the passage before us and in 1299 a 26, for he renders \textit{πέτσονθε} by \textit{palitur} in 1294 b 17. 17. \textit{M} \textsuperscript{P} omit the second \textit{περί}, but see critical note on 1331 b 24 and explanatory note on 1284 a 35. 21. \textit{δὲ} \textit{δὲ} \textit{II} \textit{Vat. Pal. Bekk.}: all MSS. of \textit{Vet.} Int. which have been examined but three (h k z) have \textit{etiam}, which stands for \textit{δὲ} in 1277 b 16 and 1292 b 10; h k z have \textit{autem}. I follow Sus. in reading \textit{δὲ}. \textit{πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν} \textit{Vet.} Int. \textit{secundum usum}: did he find \textit{κατὰ} in \textit{Γ}? 25. \textit{δὲ} \textit{Π} \textit{P} \textit{Sus.}: \textit{δὲ} \textit{Π} \textit{P} \textit{Bekk.} 26. \textit{ἐκεῖνος} \textit{Vet.} \textit{Int. hunc (τοῦτον \textit{Γ}?).} 30. \textit{ἐλών} \textit{γὰρ} \textit{των} \textit{λαρυσ-} \textit{ποιόν} (\textit{ἐλών} \textit{γὰρ} \textit{των} \textit{λαρυσποιόν} \textit{ΠΠ} \textit{Vat. Pal.}) is bracketed by Ridgeway and Sus., and Camerarius (Interp. \textit{p. 112}) would read \textit{λαρυσποιόν} in place of \textit{λαρυσποίον}. See explanatory note on 1275 b 26. 32. \textit{ἡσαυ} \textit{Π} \textit{Ald. Vat. Pal. Sus.} and over an eraure \textit{P} \textit{?): \textit{ἡσαυ} \textit{δὲ} \textit{P} \textit{23} etc. Bekk. \textit{καὶ} \textit{γὰρ} \textit{οὐδὲ} \textit{Ms} \textit{P} \textit{123} \textit{Vat. Pal. etc. Sus.}: \textit{καὶ} \textit{γὰρ} \textit{οὐ} \textit{P} \textit{4} etc. Bekk.: \textit{Vet. Int. neque enim}, which, perhaps represents \textit{καὶ} \textit{γὰρ} \textit{οὐδὲ}. 33. \textit{ἐκ} om. \textit{P} \textit{and} and perhaps \textit{Γ} (\textit{Vet. Int. quod ex eisse mare aut femina}). 34. \textit{ἐκεῖνος} \textit{Victorius et vir doctus} in marg. Aldinae Monacensis \textit{… ἐκεῖνον aut ἐκεῖνη} \textit{Ms}, \textit{ἐκεῖνη} \textit{P} \textit{etc. et pr. \textit{П} (rasura super \textit{εἰ}) et pr. \textit{P} \textit{et corr. \textit{P} \textit{?), \textit{ἐκεῖνη} pr. \textit{P} \textit{(ut videtur) et editores inde a Victorio et Morelio posteaque} \textit{ἐχονοι} \textit{eadem editores,' Sus.}, who reads \textit{ἐκεῖνο} and \textit{ἐκεῖ Γ.} \textit{Vet. Int. illi magis habent.} 35. Richards would add \textit{οὖς} after \textit{οἶνον}, a suggestion which well deserves to be recorded, though I am not sure that any change should be made in the text. 39. \textit{κἂν} \textit{Bekk.} \textit{Sus.}: \textit{καὶ} \textit{Π} \textit{Bekk.} \textit{It} is not easy to say what \textit{Vet.} Int. found in his Greek text, for he has \textit{equidem et cum hoc adhuc aliquid dubitatil:} perhaps \textit{κἂν} \textit{κἂν} \textit{τὸτῳ τὶς} \textit{ἐτὶ} \textit{προσαπορίσεων}. As to the omission of \textit{ἄν} \textit{by \textit{Γ} \textit{Π} see critical note on 1283 b 14. τοῦτο \textit{L} \textit{Ald. pr. \textit{M} \textit{Bekk. Sus.}, \textit{τοῦτῳ} \textit{Γ} \textit{P} \textit{3 3}.} 1276 a 4. \textit{τῆς} om. \textit{Ms} \textit{P} \textit{? the reading of \textit{Γ} is of course uncertain.} 5. \textit{ἐφαμεν} \textit{P} \textit{Π} \textit{2 Bekk. Sus.}: \textit{φαμεν} \textit{Γ} \textit{Ms}. 14. \textit{καὶ} \textit{δὴμοκρατοῦνται τως\textit{]} \textit{Vet. Int. in democratiam versae fuerunt (or fuerint) quaedam, a rendering which it is hard to explain. We cannot be sure that \textit{καὶ} was omitted in \textit{Γ}, for \textit{Vet. Int.} often fails to render \textit{καὶ}: \textit{in} may, however, stand for \textit{κατὰ} installed in the place of \textit{καὶ}. Does \textit{versae fuerunt} stand for \textit{ἐτράποντο} repeated from \textit{τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον?} 21. Sus. brackets \textit{τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους}, but compare the similar repetition of \textit{τὴν χώραν} in 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 33 (where Sus. brackets \textit{τὴν χώραν}, and of \textit{τῶν ἡθῶν} in 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 33 sq. (where Sus. brackets the first \textit{τῶν ἡθῶν}). 25. \textit{τὸν αὐτὸν}
1275 b 17—1277 a 39.

τὸν αὐτὸν τὸπον P4 Bekk. and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. eundem locum). As to additions of this kind in P4 see critical note on 1329 a 1. 33. ἔδωσ om. Π² and in a lacuna P¹.


30. διὸ Π¹ Π² Vet. Pal. Bekk. Sus.: διὸσερ Γ Μ⁴. 33. τὸν δ’ ἀγαθὸν ἀνδρα λαμβὼν κατὰ μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τελείαν is found only in Γ Π¹ Ar., corr.³ Π² (in paler ink than the MS.), and marg. P⁴: τὴν, however, is omitted in pr. P¹ and supplied by the scribe in the same ink as the MS.; it is also written above the line in marg. P⁴: we cannot be sure that it was added in Γ. 36. ἀλλὰ om. Μ⁸ Vet. Pal. pr. Π¹, but not Γ (as Sus. says), for Vet. Int. has quin immo, which represents ὅλῳ Μ¹ allā in 1278 b 21 and 1323 b 6. 39. αὐτὸν Π² Bekk., αὐτὸν Π (Vet. Int. ἱστομ): ἐαυτὸν Μ⁸ Π¹ Sus. 40. ἐπεὶ δὲ Π² Vet. Pal. Ar., ἐπεὶ δ’ Bekk., ἐπειδὴ δὲ Π¹, ἐπειδὴ Γ Μ⁴ Syburg, Thurot, Sus.: Thurot and Sus., however, place ἐπειδὴ . . . τολίτας before δεὶ, 38.

1277 a 8. κτῆσις is bracketed by Bernays. See explanatory note. 12. ἀπλῶς om. Π¹. 17. ἀρχοντος] τοῦ ἀρχοντος Π⁴ Bekk. φαίνονται παιδευόμενοι] Vet. Int. videntur erudiri, which stands for φαίνονται παιδευόμενοι: cp. 1338 a 20 and 1339 a 2. 20. δὲ Π² Bekk.: δὴ Π¹ Sus. (Vet. Int. itaque). Vet. Pal. has εἰδεανη. 24. ἵσως om. Π¹. τυραννοί] τυραννεί Μ⁴ Π¹ pr. Π² (corrected in the same ink as the MS.): Vet. Int. has quando non tyrannizat, which probably represents οτὲ μὴ τυραννεί. 26. After or (with Bernays) before ὁδικοῦ we should probably supply ὁδει: compare the omission of ὁδοὺς before ὁδεὺς in Π¹ in 3. 13. 1284 a 19. I prefer this change to Dr. Jackson's ingenious suggestion of ὁδεὶ καὶ in place of ὁδικοῦ (adopted by Sus.ᵃ). 30. ἔτερα Coray: ἀμφότερα Γ Π: ἀμφὼ ἔτερα Bernays, who translates 'Beide müssten Verschiedenes (lernen).' ἀμφότερα from the next line, however, may perhaps have taken the place of ἔτερα. 32. τοιντεῦθεν Π² Vet. Pal. Bekk., κατεῦθεν Γ Π¹ Sus. (Vet. Int. et hinc), κατεῦθεν Μ⁴. 34. λέγομεν, ἄ Lam.: λεγόμενα Γ Π. Heybut in his report of the readings of Vet. Pal. (Rhein. Mus. 42. 103) does not note any variation in 34 from the reading of Sus.⁵ (λέγομεν, ἄ), but this may be an oversight. Sus.ᵃ takes the reading of Vet. Pal. here to be that of Γ Π, λεγόμενα. 39. αὐτοὺς] See explanatory note on 1277 a 38.
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1277 b 2. πρὶν δῆμων γενέσθαι] Vet. Int. antequam fuisset demus. Γενέσθαι is rendered by fuisse in 1329 b 9 and by esse in 1288 a 16, just as εγένετο is rendered by fuit in 1297 b 16, 1303 b 38, and 1304 a 5. 14. ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν Π² Bekk.: ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι Π¹ Sus. See critical note on 1288 a 13. The words are found in both orders (see e.g. 1284 a 2, 1317 b 2, 1277 a 26 sq., b 20).

20. δοσπερ] ὃς γὰρ Ἄ Μ§ pr. P¹. 23. αὐλος Π¹ Bekk., ἀλλος P² etc., ἀλλος Ald., ἀλαλος P⁴. See explanatory note on 1277 b 22. κοσμία] Ζ has ornata without any erasure (with c h k l m n and rec. a), which is probably right, for κοσμεῖν is rendered by ornare in Vet. Int. in 1323 b 3, 1314 b 37, and (in z) 1321 a 37: b g Sus. ordinata.

29. δοσπερ αὐλοποιὸς γὰρ Π² Bekk.: δοσπερ γὰρ αὐλοποιὸς Π¹ Sus. Π² are probably right, for in 1278 a 37 ΓΠ have δοσπερ μετοίκος γὰρ ἑστὶν ὁ τῶν τιμῶν μῆ μετέχων. A similar variation occurs in 1293 b 17, where Π² have εἰς ἀρετὴν τε καὶ δῆμον and Μ§ P¹ (Γ?) εἰς τε ἀρετὴν καὶ δήμον, and in 1302 a 31, where Π² have περὶ ἑν δὲ, and Μ§ P¹ (Γ?) περὶ δὲ ἑν. See critical note on 1300 b 17 and cp. also 1326 b 4, where Μ§ P¹ and possibly Γ have ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἀναγαγαῖοις, and P² ³ ⁴ ἐν τοῖς μὲν ἀναγαγαῖοις.

1278 a 11. τῶν δὲ ἀναγαγαῖον] See explanatory note. 12. κομη Π¹ Sus.: κομοι Π² Bekk. 26. μῆ μετέχειν ἄρχης] μῆ μετέχειν ἄρετης Γ Μ§. Vet. Int. has non participare virtute, but in a z the words principatu fortes interpres are added after virtute. It has not been pointed out that the three words are probably a corruption of 'principatu fortes interpres,' a suggestion by the translator that principatu should be read in place of virtute, in which he was undoubtedly right. 32. Vet. Int. does not translate δὲ. Vet. Pal. has δοξάνων with Π. παραφύτως] Vet. Int. eligitum, which probably represents προαφύτων (cp. 1325 b 25 and 1341 b 26). Vet. Int. may have found this reading in Γ; it is more likely, however, that he misread his Greek text. 34. αὐτῶν Vet. Pal., αὐτῶν codex Hamilton collated by Dr. H. Rabe, confirming a conjecture of Perizonius (ad Ael. Var. Hist. 6. 10), αὐτῶν ΓΠ. The two words are often confused in the MSS.: thus Π¹ have αὐτῶν in place of αὐτός in 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 32, and in Oecon. 2. 1346 b 27 the MSS. have αὐτῶν in place of αὐτός. 36. Sus.³⁸ : ἡ δοσπερ ... 38, μετέχων post 40, ἐχίνι Vaticanum et pr. P¹ et corr. P⁴, 37, ἤσει ... 38, μετέχων ibidem Π² Ar., 37, δοσπερ ... μετέχων ibidem Γ Μ§, verum ordinem restituit corr. Π¹ (i.e. Demetrius Chalcondylas, the writer of P¹, in the same ink as the MS.). 37. ὤσει] Vet. Int. ac si,
just as he has ac si for ὥσπερ κἂν in 1312 a 26. 40. Schneider (followed by Sus.) may well be right in adding ἄρετην after τὴν αὕτην (cp. c. 4. 1277 a 20, where Π¹ omit ἄρετην after ἥ αὕτην), but ἄρετην is omitted in 1. 13. 1260 a 24 and 3. 13. 1283 a 40.

1278 b 1. ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων om. Π¹, but Vat. Pal. agrees with Π³ in adding the words. 3. κάκεινος Π Ms Π² Vat. Pal. (Vet. Int. εἰλλε) : Demetrius Chalandylas, the writer of Π¹, has first written κάκεινος and then corrected it to κάκεινης, adding, however, o above η (see Sus.¹). Π¹ Sus. add θ' after κάκεινος or κάκεινης. ἦ δυνάμενοι εἶναι κύριος is added by Π¹ Π² Vat. Pal., but omitted by pr. Π³ (add. marg. Π³). 7. κἂν Π² Vat. Pal. (κἂν el πλείους om. Ms) : η τί Π¹ and possibly Π (Vet. Int. et si plures), but et si appears to represent κἂν el in 1326 a 17, 1340 a 37, and 1341 a 19. 12. δημοκρατικαί] z has democratici : the other MSS. of Vet. Int. democratici. 14. τούτων] z has horum : the other MSS. of Vet. Int. eorum. 15. δῆ] δὲ pr. Q² Bekk. 17. δῆ Π² (except Π¹), Bekk. : δὲ Π Π¹ Sus. Vat. Pal. has δῆ, κατὰ] καὶ κατὰ Π¹ corr. Π² Bekk. 19. καὶ ὅτι Π Vat. Pal. Sus., ὅτι Bekk. : Vet. Int. fails to render καὶ, but this he often fails to do (see vol. ii. p. lxiii). 3. is added before ἄνθρωπος in Ms Π¹ Sus. (Vet. Int. homo leaves the reading of Π uncertain): om. Π² Vat. Pal. : see critical note on 1253 a 2, and Stallbaum on Plato, Rep. 619 β, γέννηται ἄνθρωπος. 20. παρ' ἄλληλον] παρ' ἄλληλον Π (Vet. Int. ab inveni): περὶ ἄλληλον Ms Π² and pr. Π¹, also Vat. Pal. βοηθείας politeias Π Ms Vat. Pal. Π¹ Vat. Pal. omit οὐκ ἔλαστον and are probably right: see Heylbut in Rhein. Mus. 42. 108, who urges that the meaning intended to be expressed by οὐκ ἔλαστον here is always expressed by οὐκ ἔττου, οὐδὲν ἔττου, in Aristotle’s writings (e.g. in 2. 6. 1265 a 26, 3. 11. 1282 a 6 etc.), while ἔλαστον on the contrary always means what is smaller in number, time, or space. 25. καὶ συνέχουσι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν] These words are placed after αὕτω by Π¹ Vat. Pal., but after μάριν by Π². Bekker’s text is συνέρχονται δὲ καὶ τοῦ ζην ἕνεκεν αὐτοῦ (Ἰσως γὰρ ἐνεστὶ τι τοῦ καλοῦ μάριον) καὶ συνέχουσι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ζην αὐτὸ μάριν κ.τ.λ. 27. ὑπερβάλλῃ Ms : ὑπερβάλλῃ Π³³ etc. Vat. Pal. : ὑπερβάλλει Π¹ : it is uncertain what reading Vet. Int. found in his Greek text, for his rendering is excessadur. 30. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τῆς φραχῆς γἐ] z adds et before principatus, thus giving an equivalent for καὶ, which the other MSS. of Vet. Int. do not. γε add. Π³³ Vat. Pal. 40. ὥσπερ] ὡς Ms Π¹ Sus. The reading of Π is uncertain (Vet. Int. ut). Vat. Pal. has ὥσπερ. Π¹ often omit
small words, and these MSS. (or at any rate Ms P1) omit περ also in 1317 a 23.

1279 a 2. ειναι πι, but not Vat. Pal. 3. ειναι om. Π1, but not Vat. Pal. 12. αυτου P1 Ald. Bekk. Sus.: the other MSS. and Γ αυτου. 20. καὶ after παυσα Π2 Bekk., but see explanatory note on 1281 a 26. 25. το πολεμεμα Π1 Vat. Pal. Sus.: Π2 Bekk. omit το: the reading of Γ is uncertain. 27. διηγοντας η z has paucos, but paucum, the reading of the other MSS. of Vet. Int., may perhaps be right, for Ms has δηγον. 34. των before δηγων om. Ms P1 and possibly Γ, but not Vat. Pal. 37. πολεμεμας] Vet. Int. vivit (politice vivit? : cp. 1267 b 29, 1255 b 37).

1279 b 15. τι om. Π1, but Π2 often omit τις and its parts (see critical note on 1288 a 16). 22. + συμβαινη +] συμβαινη Ms P2 etc.: συμβαινη Vat. Pal.: συμβαινη Bekk.1: συμβαινει P14 Bekk.2 Sus. (compare the reading of these two MSS. in 1278 b 27). Vet. Int. accidat, which might stand for either reading (see critical notes on 1253 a 22, b 26). See explanatory note on 1260 b 31. Meister (Das Colonialrecht von Naupaktos, p. 291 sqq.) defends the use of ai with the subjunctive (ai ἀναρεθεί = ai ἀναρεθεί) in a Locrian inscription from Naupactus (Hicks, Manual, No. 63: Cauer, Delectus Inscr. Gr., ed. 2, No. 229), but the verb is there used, as he remarks, in a future sense, which is hardly the case here, and even if this were otherwise, the difference of dialect would have to be taken into account. 26. καν τις P1 Π2 Vat. Pal. Bekk.: εαι τις Ms: Vet. Int. si quis, which may represent either ειν τις or καν τις, for si stands for καν in 1282 b 8, 1298 b 23, and 1309 b 9: καν ει τις Sus. 28. προσαγορευη Morelius Bekk.: προσαγορευει Vat. Pal. Qb Tb Ald.: προσαγορευει Ms P123 etc. Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. appellel what was the reading of Γ. 32. Sylburg and Bekker add oi before ευπορωι. 38. Sus. adds δια after συμβαινει and reads διαφορας in place of διαφορας in 39, but see explanatory note.


1280 a 15. φαιλοι κριαι Π2 Vat. Pal.: κριαι φαιλοι Π1. See explanatory note on 1275 a 32. For similar transpositions cp. 1277 a 1 (αρετη μια Π1: μια αρετη Π2 Vat. Pal.), 1281 a 27 (φαιλα παντα Π1: παντα φαιλα Π2 Vat. Pal.), 1323 b 19 (αιρετα πεφυκε ταιτα Π1: ταιτα πεφυκεν αιρετα Π2), 1326 b 8 (ζην ει Π1: εο ζην Π2), 1290 b 8 (μορια πλειονα Π1: πλειονα μορια Π2 Vat. Pal.), 1294 a 22 (αρετη και πλοιοι αρχαιοι Π1: αρχαιοι πλοιοι και αρετη Π2), 1320 a 23 (εκκλησιας ολιγας Π1: ολιγας εκκλησιας Π2). In 1322 a 31 it is Π2 that place the
substantive before the adjective (ἐν σχήματι δὲ μείζων Π²: ἐν μείζων δὲ σχήματι Π¹). See critical note on 1282 a 40, and cp. 1311 a 22, where Π² have τῶν ὑπερέχοντας τῶν πολιτῶν (except P⁴, which omits τῶν), and Π¹ τῶν πολιτῶν τῶν ὑπερέχοντας. 24. ἐλευθερία] ἐλευθερία M⁸, ἐλευθερία οὗ ἐλευθερία Γ (Vet. Int. secundum libertatem, and secundum pecuniás in 1280 a 23 represents χρήμασιν), ἐλευθερίοι Π², ἐλευθεροῖς with the first ἐ above the line Vat. Pal., ἐλευθεροὶ Π¹. Sus. ascribes the introduction of ἐλευθερία into the text to Vict., whose first edition appeared in 1552, but Sepulveda’s translation, which appeared in 1548, already has the rendering ut libertate (p. 83 b).


1280 b 2. τοῦ om. M⁸ P⁴ Vat. Pal. and perhaps Γ, possibly rightly: Vet. Int. neque quaes quoquam esse oporteat alteros alteri curant. 4. Æεὶ] Æεὼν P²³ etc.: Æεὶ P⁴ Vat. Pal. The mistake is a frequent one: see critical notes on 1283 a 7 and 1286 a 30. ἀδικήσωσιν Morelius, ἀδικήσωσιν Π Vat. Pal.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. tniuste agant what was the reading in Γ, for Vet. Int. has habeat for Æεὶ. 5. πολιτικῆς om. Π¹. 6. διακοσμοῦσιν Π²: διακο- ποῦσιν pr. Π¹ (corrected in a paler ink than the MS.), διακοσμοῦσιν Γ M⁸ Vat. Pal. 8. γίνεται Π: γῆρεται Vat. Pal. 9. ἀποθεῖ] See critical note on 1262 a 29. In ’Αθ. Πολ. c. 22, l. 28 ἀποθεῖν is the form used. 10. συμμάχων Γ Π Vat. Pal. Bekk.: συμμαχών Conring, Sus. See explanatory note on 1280 b 8. 13. συναγά- γοι] συνάγου Π⁸ Bekk. So in 1317 a 36 M⁸ P⁴ and possibly Γ have συνάγειν, Π² συναγαγεῖν. 18. ἀποθεῖ] See critical note on
1262 a 29, where, however, Vat. Pal. should have been stated to have απωθεν here, not αποθεν. 19. εἰσησαν P¹ Vat. Pal.: οἱ ἔσαν the other MSS. and Π (Vet. Int. si essent). 23. ποιν Π Vat. Pal. and probably Π (Vet. Int. quidem, which represents ποιε in 1274 b 33 and πως in 1286 a 12): πο Ar. Bekk. Sus. 30. ἡ πώλις οὐκ ἐστι Π² Bekk., ἡ πώλις οὐκ εστιν Vat. Pal.: οὐκ ἐστιν ἡ πώλις Π¹ Sus. 34. τελείας M¹ P¹ Vat. Pal. Sus. : τελείας Π² Bekk.: the reading of Π is uncertain. 35. καὶ Π: ἡ Vat. Pal. 37. φρατρία: See critical note on 1264 a 8. 40. δὲ ἦ Π Π Vat. Pal.: δὴ ἦ or δὴ Sus.

1281 a 3. χάριν Π² Vat. Pal. Bekk.: om. Π M¹ pr. P¹ Sus. brackets it. 16. γὰρ Π² Π² Vat. Pal. Bekk.: δὲ Μ¹ P¹ Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. ὁποτέμεν which reading he found in his Greek text, for in 1263 b 30 and 1289 a 1 ὁποτέμεν represents χρη and in 1342 b 15 ὁποτέμεν represents χρη, while ὁποτέμεν often elsewhere represents δεί (e.g. in 1262 b 2–7). In 1335 b 28 again Μ¹ P¹ and possibly Π have δεί and Π² χρη. ληφθέντων Π Π (Vet. Int. accepti): λειφθέντων Vat. Pal. 21. τοῦτον Π: τούτων Vat. Pal. 25. ταῦτα] ταῦτα Π: Vat. Pal. does not give breathing or accent. Sus. ascribes the reading ταῦτα to Vict. and Lamb. followed by Montecatino, and it is true that Vict. and Lamb. have haec eadem and Montecatino (vol. iii. p. 138) eadem, but I find the rendering ‘li medesimi danni’ (‘the same losses’) in Bernardo Segni’s Italian translation of the Politics (p. 147, ed. 1549), which was published before either of Victorius’ editions or the translation by Lambinus appeared. 27. πάντα φαῦλα Π² Vat. Pal. Bekk.: φαῦλα πάντα Π¹ Sus. See critical note on 1280 a 15. 28. δικαία Π² Vat. Pal. Bekk. Sus.: σπουδαία Π¹. 36. ἔξυπνα γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα πάθη περὶ τὴν ψυχήν] These words are placed after ἀλλὰ μὴ νόμον φαῦλον in Π¹ Π² Vat. Pal. Bekk., but before these words in Π M¹ Sus. (1894) places the words in the following order—ἀλλὰ ἵσως φαῦς τις ἣν τὸ κύριον δλως ἀνθρωπον ἐναι φαῦλον ἔξυπνα γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα πάθη περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀλλὰ μὴ νόμον. But the order of Π¹ Π² Vat. Pal. seems to me preferable. No doubt it interposes ἀλλὰ μὴ νόμον φαῦλον between ἀνθρωπον and ἔξυπνα, but as to that see explanatory note on 1276 a 28. 41. δόξειν ἄν λίσταν Κ.Τ.Λ.] See explanatory note on 1281 a 40. 1281 b 1. οὐ Π¹ P¹, οδ Π² etc. 5. συνελθόντων Π¹ Π² Sus., συνελθόντας P¹ etc., corr.¹ P² (same ink as MSS.), Bekk. 7. τά
perὶ τὰ ἡθη Γ in place of perὶ τὰ ἡθη (Vet. Int. quae circa mores). perὶ is added before τὴν διάνοιαν by Ms and perhaps by Γ (Vet. Int. circa intellectum), but this is not certain, for Vet. Int. often repeats prepositions (see critical note on 1253 a 36). 8. κρίνονυμ'] κρῖνη Γ Ms. 13. κεκαροσμενὼν] κεκαροσμενὼν Γ (Vet. Int. separatum), καὶ κεκαροσμενον Ms. 25. μηδέν] μηδὲ ἐν suggested by Sus. with a query, μηδὲ ἐν P1, μη δὲ ἐν Ms, μηδέν P2, μηδὲ ἐν P4, μηδεν Ald. 30. πολεμίου] Vet. Int. seditionis. 42. ο is added before λατρός in Ms followed by Sus.: the reading of Γ is uncertain (Vet. Int. iste autem est medicus). Ms P1 are probably wrong: see explanatory note on 1253 b 11 and Bon. Ind. 546 a 51 sqq., and cp. c. 4. 1277 b 15, αὐτη ἀρετῆ πολίτου, and 5 (8). 3. 1337 b 32, αὕτη γάρ ἀρχὴ πάντων.

1282 a 5. καὶ is placed not after but before τοιοῦτοι in Ms P1, followed by Sus.: Vet. Int. does not render it in either place. The authority of Ms P1 unsupported by Γ is small, and it is probably better to follow P2 and to place καὶ after τοιοῦτοι, taking it to mean 'in connexion with wellnigh all the arts, as well as in connexion with the medical art.' 7. καὶ ομ. Π1, but καὶ is very frequently omitted in Π1. 10. έι γάρ καὶ] Vet. Int. et enim si, which probably stands for έι γάρ καὶ and not for καὶ γάρ έι, for et si stands for έι καὶ in 1282 b 38 and 1322 b 8. 11. As to οβ τί see explanatory note on 1282 a 10. 17. Π1 ομ. ή before βελτίως, but these MSS. are apt to omit ή when it is followed by a second ή, as in the passage before us. This happens in 1268 a 6, 1324 b 30, 1298 b 32, and 1305 a 32, as well as here. The same thing holds also of καὶ. See also critical note on 1331 b 24. 18. μόνον Π: μόνος Γ (Vet. Int. solus). Sus.12 μόνος, Sus.34 μόνον. I incline to retain μόνον: cp. c. 13. 1284 a 34, οὐδὲ μόνον οἱ τῷ πραγματικοῦ ποιοῦσιν. 21. κρίνει] κρίνει Π1. 27. μέγιστον P2 etc. Bekk.: μέγιστοι Π1, μέγισται P14, μέγιστα Π Sus. (Vet. Int. maxima). έν om. Ms P1 and possibly Γ, though Vet. Int. has in quibusdam politis (see critical note on 1275 b 7). 32. ἀρχοντον Π1, ἀρχοντον Ms: ἐχοντον Π2 (so in 41 Π2 have ἐχόντων for ἀρχόντων). μεγάλων Π2 Bekk., μεγίστων Π1 Sus. 40. τὸ before πάντων om. Ms P1, and probably also Γ, for Vet. Int. does not render it, though he renders τὸ before τῶν. πάντων τούτων Π2 Bekk.: τούτων πάντων Π1 Sus. So in 1332 b 31 Π2 have πάντων τούτων: Γ Ms τούτων πάντων. πάντων τούτων is the more usual and less emphatic order (see Class. Rev. 10. 106), but Π1 have a leaning
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to inversions of this kind (see critical note on 1280 a 15). ταῦτα πάντα (‘every one of these things’) is used when emphasis is called for (e.g. in 1268 b 3, 1281 a 13, 1291 a 16, 1309 a 39, 1321 b 38), which does not seem to be the case in the passage before us.

1282 b 5. δορίσων Π¹ Sus. (Vet. Int. determinare): δηλόντοι Π² Bekk. Π¹ are probably right: cp. 1287 b 16 sq. 8. καὶ Π² Bekk., καὶ M⁸ Π¹ Sus.: Vet. Int. si (which however a b z Alb. omit) may perhaps stand for καὶ, as in 1279 b 26, 1298 b 23, and 1309 b 9.

1283 a 4. μᾶλλον] See explanatory note. 7. ὑπέρέχει corr. Π¹ and possibly Π (Vet. Int. excedit): ὑπέρέχειν the rest. But the addition of a final ν is a common error of the MSS. (see critical notes on 1280 b 4 and 1286 a 30).

8. I follow Sus. in bracketing μέγεθος: see explanatory note on 1283 a 6.

10. καὶ om. Π¹, but see critical note on 1282 a 7. 11. ἀνισότητα Π², except P⁴ (which has ἀνισότητα), ἀσοτήτα M⁸, ἀσοτήτα pr. P¹ (corrected in a paler ink), ἀσοτήτα or ἀσοτητι Γ (Vet. Int. aequalitates).

17. τ’ om. M⁸ Π¹ and probably Γ (Vet. Int. does not render τε, but then he seldom does so). 27. ἵσων Π¹, ἵσων Π² (‘ut videtur,’ Sus.) Π³ etc. 32. τὰ om. M⁸ Π¹: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. ad conventiones what was the reading in Γ. 36. οἶκοι] Vet. Int. habetur. 37. δὲ Π: of Susemihl’s MSS. of the Vet. Int. only two (g k) have autem representing δὲ, while five have etiam, which stands for δὲ in 1275 b 21, 1277 b 16, and 1292 b 10: z has autem etiam. Sus. seems to go too far in assuming that Γ had δὲ.

1283 b 2. τι om. Π¹, but Π³ often omit τις and its parts (see critical note on 1288 a 16).

14. δόξαν γὰρ (ἀν) δόξαν γὰρ Π², δόξαν γὰρ Π¹, δόξαν γὰρ M⁸. We cannot tell from Vet. Int. videbuntur enim whether Γ had δόξαν γὰρ or δόξαν γὰρ. Δόξαν may be right, for δόξα (opt. of δοεῖν) occurs in 3. 4. 1277 b 21, and δόξαν in Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1181 a 1. ἀν om. Γ Π (as in 1275 b 39), add. Coray Bekk.⁸ Sus. Π¹ omit ἀν in 1267 a 40, 1297 a 41, and 1313 a 20; it is not therefore surprising that Γ Π should now and then omit it. See Bon. Ind. 41 b 4 sqq. 20. τοῦτο ἵσως or τοῦτ’ ἵσως Π², τοῦτος Π¹, but here Π¹ omit the last syllable, as (e.g.) in 1276 b 20 (κοινών for κοινονῶν) and 1335 b 35 (ὅς for ὅτα). 1284 a 5. παραχίσδῳ Π² Bekk., παρεξηγόν M⁸ Π¹ Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. exhiberi what was the reading in Γ. For other variations of a similar nature see Susemihl’s apparatus criticus on 1260 b 36, 1267 a 35, 1332 b 1, and 1317 a 36. 19. ἀντα


γὰρ δὴ δοκοῦσι διώκειν Π², αὐτὰς γὰρ δὴ διώκειν Μˢ, and probably Γ, though Vet. Int. has hae enim utique persecutur, ταύτας γὰρ δεῖ διώκειν Π¹, where ταύτας and δεῖ are in all likelihood conjectural emendations of Demetrius Chalcondylas, the writer of the MS., intended to remedy the flaw caused by the omission of δοκοῦσι in the archetyp of Π¹. 37. τὸ Π¹23, τὸ the other MSS. and Γ (Vet. Int. scilicet prohibere). καλοῦειν Π¹ and marg. Π²3: καλοῦειν the rest and Γ. 41. παρὰ Π¹ Π⁴, the rest περὶ.

1284 b 11. τι om. Π¹, but see critical note on 1288 a 16. 13. μονάρχους Π² Bekk., μονάρχας Π¹ Sus. (Vet. Int. monarchas).


1285 a 6. τοῖς om. Μ⁴ P¹: the reading of Γ is uncertain. Π³ often omit the article. 8. αὐτοκρατόρων Π Bekk.²: the translation of Vet. Int. is ducatus quidam exercitus imperialis, and hence Vict. Schn. Bekk.² and Sus. read αὐτοκράτωρ, though it is just possible that imperialis is in the genitive in agreement with exercitus and represents αὐτοκρατόρων. See explanatory note on 1285a 7. 9. εν τιν βασιλεία] Leonards Areteus does not translate these words. His rendering is (MS. Ball. 242), vitae enim necisque alician non habet potestatem, nisi dum bellum gerit, ut etiam apud antiquos fuisset videtur. Nor does Giph. translate εν τιν βασιλεία. Bekk.² brackets the words. Sus. and Bernays bracket βασιλεία, and it is true that the word may easily have been repeated from βασιλεία two lines above, but on the whole I incline to retain it (see the explanatory note for my interpretation of the passage). Bywater would read ἐνεκα δειλας in place of εν τιν βασιλεία, while Jackson would omit these words and transpose εν ταις πολεμικαις εξοδοις to take their place (Sus.⁴). 10. εν χειρος νώμα] Vet. Int. promptus potens lege, but z and pr. a omit promptus, which is probably an alternative reading for potens, the equivalent for εφχειρος Γ. In just the same way in 1283 a 9 two alternative renderings of κερίτων (meior and valentior) have together found their way into the text of Vet. Int. ὁ γὰρ ἀγαμέμνων Π³ Bekk.: ἀγαμέμνων γὰρ Μ⁴ P¹ Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. Agamemnon enim which reading he found in Γ. The reading of
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π² is probably right, the Agamemnon of the epic being referred to: Bywater adds τοῦ before Ἐκτροσ in Eth. Nic. 7. 1. ιηεγ οη 2ο. Cr. c. 16. 1287 b ι4, where Π have τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος. 12. γούν Π² Bekk. Sus. (except P¹, which has οὗ), γὰρ Π¹. So in 1339 b 26 Π² have γούν and Π¹ γὰρ. 13. μάχης νοῆσον τί Π¹, μάχης νοῆσον corr.¹ Π¹ (in the same ink as the MS.): Vet. Int. quem ego videro fugientem e proclio. Here Γ P¹ appear to complete the sense from a gloss. 18. παραπλησίαι] παραπλησίως P⁴⁶ etc. pr. P². 19. τυραννίσαι, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ κατὰ Sus., τυραννίσαι καὶ κατὰ Π¹ Μ⁸, τυραννίσαι κατὰ Π¹ and a corrector of P² in paler ink than the MS., τυραννισμεν and after a lacuna κατὰ Π³ pr. P², τυραννίσην εἰσὶ δ' ὀμοὶ κατὰ Π⁶ Λ⁸ Q Μ Mb Ub (as to these MSS. see critical note on 1253 a 12), τυραννισθα εἰσὶ δ' ὀμοὶ κατὰ Ald. Bekk. A short lacuna evidently existed in the archetype of the best MSS., and this has been filled up (perhaps conjecturally) in Π⁶ Λ² Q Μ Mb Ub. 20. ἕδη] έδη Π². 24. πάτρια Π² Bekk.: πάτρια Π³ Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. πατρία which reading he found in Γ. See critical note on 1285 b 5. 25. τὴν αὐτὴν Π: τοιαύτην or τὴν τοιαύτην Γ (Vet. Int. talem). 35. μυτηληναίου Π. The MSS. have μυτηλήνη, μυτηληναῖοι in almost every passage of Aristotle's writings in which these words occur: Rhet. 2. 23. 1398 b 12, however, is an exception, for there the best MSS. have μυτηληναῖοι. Pr. Π³ has μυτηλήνην in 1304 a 4. Πιττακών] πιττακόν Π¹ and also in 38 and 39. In 1274 b 18 all MSS. have πιττακός. The form φιττακός appears on imperial coins of Mytilene (Head, Hist. Num. p. 488). Φ sometimes takes the place of Π in Attic inscriptions; thus in some of them we find the form φαρθένως in place of παρθένος (Meisterhans, Gramm. der att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 79). As to the same confusion in MSS. see Mr. T. W. Allen in Journ. Hell. Studies, 15. 299. 36. φυγάδας] The reading προφυγα in Vet. Int. is probably right, for a stands alone in reading προφυγες (z has προφυγας): cp. i. 303 a 35. 39. τῶν κακοπάτραδα Πιττακῶν κ.τ.λ. See explanatory note.

1285 b 2. διὰ μὲν τὸ δεσποτικαί εἶναι τυραννικαὶ] So Sus. after Sepulveda: διὰ μὲν τὸ τυραννικαί εἶναι δεσποτικαί Π Π. Sepulveda's note is (p. 99), 'herilia, quoniam tyrannica. Sic legitur in graecis exemplaribus quaequeunque mihi videre contigit, sed lectio videtur esse transposita, quae commodius habitura videretur, si sic esset—tyrannica, quoniam herilia.' There is little doubt that he is right: compare the corresponding sentence 1285 a 23 sq. and also 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 15 sqq. 5. έκοισαι τε καὶ πάτρια Π² Bekk.: έκοισαι τε
(M8 ἐκούσιοι τε) καὶ πάτρωι M8 P1 Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. voluntariae et patrīae which reading he found in Ρ. The fem. form ἐκούσιος is more commonly used in Aristotle's writings than ἐκούσια (in 1313 a 5 all MSS. have ἐκούσιον ἅρχην), and this is the case in Greek literature generally (Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. Blass, 1. 537), but Kb has ἐκούσιαι in Eth. Nic. 3. 7. 1114 b 24, καὶ αἱ κακία ἐκούσιοι ἀν ἐλευ, and the fem. ἐκούσιαι occurs in Plato, Rep. 603 C, and ἐκούσια in Plato, Laws 925 A. The fem. form πατρία is also less often used in Aristotle's writings than πάτρωοι (in 1285a 33 all MSS. have πάτρωοι), but in 7 (5). 5. 1305a 28 all MSS. have τὴν πατρίας δημοκρατίας. Plato uses the fem. πατρία in Laws 759 A. 7. παρίσια] Vet. Int. emerunt, which probably represents πρίασθαι, a misreading or mistake in Γ for πορίσαι. 10. θυσίων] οὐσίων Π1, and so in 16 οὐσία Π1 for θυσία, readings which indicate that the archetype of these MSS. was written in uncial characters (see Sus.1 p. xiv, and critical notes on 1271 a 27 and b 25). 12. ἐπανάτασις P2 Ald. corr. P3, ἐπανάστασις M8 P14 pr. P3: we cannot be sure from Vet. Int. elevatio which reading he found in Γ, but perhaps he may have found ἐπανάτασις, for in 1302 b 33 he renders ἐπανάστασις insurrectio. 13. καὶ τὰ κατὰ πόλιν] See explanatory note. 16. M8 adds αἱ πάτρωι and Π1 αἱ πάτρωι before οὕσια, which wrongly takes the place of θυσία in Π1, and Vet. Int. has patrīae substantiae: αἱ πάτρωι (or πάτρωι) is omitted in Π2 Bekk. That the ἄρχων βασιλεὺς at Athens, who was more or less the representative of the ancient kings, had to do with πάτρωι θυσία, we see from Ἄθ. Πολ. c. 57: cp. Plato, Polit. 290 E. But whether these two words are rightly added by Π1 before θυσία is doubtful. The language of Plutarch in Quaest. Rom. c. 63 makes rather in favour of their omission—ἐπει δ' οὐκ ομετρίασαν (αἱ βασιλεῖς) ἄλλ' ἦσαν ὑπερήφανοι καὶ βαιρεῖς, τῶν μὲν Ἑλλήνων οἱ πλείστοι τὴν ἐξουσίαν αὐτῶν περιελάμενοι μόνον τὸ θεῦ εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀπελιπον—but Π2 occasionally omit words or parts of words wrongly (these MSS., for instance, are undoubtedly wrong in omitting μὴ in 1335 b 25 and in reading αἱ for αὐτία in 1304 b 6), and I incline on the whole to accept the reading of Π1 here, though it is no doubt possible that αἱ πάτρωι is a gloss. 22. ὁρισμένος Γ P1, the rest ὁρισμένων. τε is added after στρατηγός in M8 P1, and possibly was added in Γ also, but this is uncertain, for, as usual, Vet. Int. gives no rendering for it. 33. πλείστον Π1 corr.1 P23 (i.e. corrections in P23 in the same ink as the MSS.): πλείστον M8 Π2. 36. παμβασιλεῖαι] βασιλεῖας Π1, but Π1 occasionally omit the first

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syllable of words, e.g. in 1342 b 32 (διάνοιαν ὑπὸ παιδείαν ὕιον) and 1273 a 10 (τάξιατα τα δόξατα). 39. μέρος Π1 Π2 Bbek., αἴρεσιν Π4 Λ8 Sus. ‘Κατὰ μέρος fortasse corruptum in Pol. 3. 15. 1285 b 39’ (Bon. Ind. 456 a 24).

1286 a 1. ποτε is added after πότερον in Π1 (Vet. Int. quidem, which represents ποτε, for πῶς ποτε is rendered qualiter quidem in 1276 a 17). It is probably a blundered dittography of πότερον. 9. δοκούν τις the third Basle edition of Aristotle, followed by Bekker: δοκεῖ γιὰ Π Sus., who prefers (with Götling) to correct οἱ νόμοι, the reading of Π in the next line, to ο νόμοι. Either change may be right: that of Bekker avoids the transition from νόμου, 9, to ο νόμοι, 10, and then back to νόμους in 15, but it may be urged on the other hand that there is a similar transition from νόμου to νόμοι in 1292 a 32 sq. 12. καί] καὶ πῶς Π1 Σus., καὶ πῶς Μ8. Is not πῶς; a marginal query by some perplexed reader which has crept into the text? 13. τετρήμερον Π1 Π2 Bbek., τρίμερον γιὰ Μ8 Sus. In 1304 b 12 and 1305 b 27 Π1 wrongly substitute τριακοσίων and τριακοσίων for τετρακοσίων and τετρακοσίων, an error which occurs also in the MSS. of Lysias Or. 30. 8 and elsewhere. On the other hand, in 1258 b 27 Π3 have τέταρτον in place of τρίτον. In Hist. An. 5. 19. 553 a 10 all Bekker’s MSS. have the form τετράμερον. 14. αὐτῷ Π Sus. (Vet. Int. in suo periculo), αὐτῷ Μ8, αὐτοῦ the rest and Bekker. 25. πάντας Π1 Π4: πάνω Π4, Π8. 30. κρίνει] κρίνειν Μ8 Π3. See critical notes on 1280 b 4 and 1283 a 7. 35. ὄργιαθηναὶ] Vet. Int. ἵππει ferri. He may have misread ὄργιαθηναί as ὄργηθηναι (see Schn.). 38. εἶ δὲ δὴ] Vet. Int. si aulem, which may possibly stand for εἶ δὲ δὴ: cp. 1292 b 32 and 1295 a 34. τοῦτο μὴ Π2 Bbek.: μὴ τοῦτο Πι Sus. See critical note on 1280 a 15.

1286 b 1. δὲ πάντας] δ᾽ ἄνδρες Γ Μ8. 7. ὁμοίως] ὁμοίως Γ Π3 (Vet. Int. similiiter). 10. οἴκοιντας] Vet. Int. habitationi, but Vet. Int. sometimes substitutes the indicative for the participle, e.g. in 1329 b 4, where he has lege statuit for νομοθέτησαντος, in 1333 a 18, where he has poësit for δυνάμενον, and in 1305 a 24, where he has seditionem novit for στασίας. 14. γενόμεναι] γενόμενοι Μ8 Π4: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. facti whether Γ had γενόμενοι or γενόμενου. 15. Vet. Int. does not translate ποθεῖν, but neither does he translate ποιόν in 1288 a 25. 17. μετέβαλλον Μ8 Π3 Π4 Vat. Pal. Bekk. and probably Γ (Vet. Int. transmutabantur): μετέβαλλον Π1 Bbek.2 Sus. 21. ἐτ] Vat. Int. iam (ἡδι Γ?). 24. ὁποίοι Γ Π1 Julian (ep. ad Themist. p. 261 Α) and corr. Π1, ὁποίοι Vat. Pal.,
1285 b 39—1287 a 25.

25. τόις om. Julian. 29. αὐτὸν the third Basle edition of Aristotle, αὐτῶν γ Π, ἡ Βατ. Π., ἡ the rest. 31. καί is added before κατὰ in Π², but omitted in Π¹ Βατ. Π. 32. αὐτοῦ γ Bekk. Sus. (Vet. Int. suam voluntatem), αὐτοῦ Π. 33. φυλάξει Π² Ald., φυλάξει Μ¹ Π¹, φυλάξει Π²α et c. Βατ. Π.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. custodiēt whether he found φυλάξει or φυλάξει in γ, for τούς φυλασσόμενους in 1331 a 16 is rendered custodientes by Vet. Int., while in 1285 a 26 φυλάσσουσι is rendered custodint. 36. ἐκάστον] Vet. Int. ea quae singularum, where singularum may possibly represent ἐκάστων, not ἐκάστος, for singularum represents ἐκάστων in 1337 α 20 and singularis ἐκάστως in 1295 a 38. Did Vet. Int. find ἐκάστων (or ἐκάστον) in γ? 40. συρακόσιος Βατ. Π.: συρακόσιοι all other MSS. except Π¹, which has συρακόσιο. In Rhet. 2. 6. 1384 b 16 Α² has συρακόσιος (συρακόσιος Β² Ζ², συρακόσιοι Κ²). In Pol. 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 38, however, all MSS. have συρακόσιοι, and in 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 8 the MSS. have συρακόσιοι, except pr. Π³, which has συρακόσιοι. We know from inscriptions (Meisterhans, pp. 21, 75, ed. 2) and from coins that Συρακόσιοι is the correct form.

1287 a 4. πολιτείας Victorius and Camerarius (Interp. p. 138), followed by Bekker and Sus.: βασιλείας Γ Π Βατ. Π. Julian (Ep. ad Themist. p. 261 A) appears to have read βασιλείας, for he says, ἐξίς δὲ περὶ τού· κατὰ νόμον λεγομένου βασιλείας διεξέλθων, ὦ ἐστιν ὑπηρέτης καὶ φύλαξ τῶν νόμων, καὶ τοῦτον οὖδὲ βασιλεία καλῶν οὖδὲ τοῦ τοιοῦτον εἴδος (sc. βασιλείας?) οὐδένα. 9. πάντα Π Βατ. Π.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. principatur omnibus whether he found πάντα or πάντων in γ: πάντων Julian, Sus., πάν Cod. Voss. of Julian (according to Hertlein). 10. αὐτοῦ Π: αὐτὸν Julian, αὐτοῦ Hertlein. See explanatory note. Vet. Int. adds dicitendum after ὤ βασιλείας from a gloss λεκτικοῦ which appears in Π². δὲ om. Julian. το add. Julian after οὖδὲ. 11. τὸ κύριον ἐνα πάντων ἐίναι τῶν πολιτῶν Π¹ Π²: τὸ κύριον ἐίναι πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν ἐνα Γ Μ¹. ὄνομ.—ἡ πόλις om. Julian. 13. καὶ—φύσιον om. Julian. 15. τὰ Sus. following the better MSS., το Bekk. following Π⁴ and others of the less good MSS. 16. τοιοῦ om. Π¹ but not Βατ. Π. οὐδὲν Γ Π Βατ. Π. Bekk.: οὐδὲν Bernays, Sus. 23. ὄνομα Π¹ Bekk. Sus.: ὄνομα Π³. 25. ἀλλ' ἐπιτήδεις παθεύσαι το νόμος ἐφίστησι] So Π² Βατ. Π. (ἐφίστησιν Βατ. Π.): παθεύσαι om. M¹ Π²: Vet. Int. sed universalis lex instituit, which probably stands for ἀλλὰ τὸ καθόλου ὁ νόμος ἐφίστησι, though ἐφιστικά is
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not once rendered by Vet. Int. instituere in the Politics (it is rendered insistere in 1336 b 25). Τὸ καθῖδου may probably have been a gloss in Ρ (Sus.⁴); the words εἰπὼνς παιδεύωσας were either wanting in Ρ or left untranslated by Vet. Int. 27. Vet. Int. adds omnia before his equivalent for ἐπανορθοῦσαν. He has dant for δίδωσιν and may have found δίδωσιν in his Greek text, but he is not always faithful to the number which he finds in his Greek text (e.g. in 1338 b 11 and 1296 a 34, 35). ὁ τι ἂν δύνῃ] Vet. Int. quodcumque videbitur, as in 1318 a 28. The more usual equivalent is quodcumque videatur. 28. Π Vat. Pal. have ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον κελεύων ἀρχεῖν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἀρχεῖν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τοὺς νόμους. Vet. Int. quidem intellectum iubet principari videtur iubere principari demum et leges (thus he fails to render οὖν and seems to have found νοῦν in Ρ in the place of νόμου). The Vossian MS. of Julian has ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον κελεύων ἀρχεῖν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νόμον μόνους: thus it wrongly omits δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἀρχεῖν and has (no doubt rightly) τὸν νόμον μόνους in place of τοὺς νόμους. 30. ἑ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία κ.τ.λ.] Vet. Int. quando enim concupiscentia tale et furor principatum habuerit (or habuit), tandem et optimos viros interire, representing possibly ὅτε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἀρχον, τέλος καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἀνδρας διαφέρει (or διαφέρει, for Vet. Int. sometimes renders the present by the future, e.g. in 1281 a 19). Μ⁸ has ὡ τε in place of ἑ τε, as Ρ apparently had ὅτε. See next note. 31. ἀρχοντας διαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἀνδρας Π² Vat. Pal. Bekk.: ἀρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἀνδρας διαφέρει Μ⁸ Ρ¹ (except that pr. Ρ¹ has ψιθείρει) Sus. As to Vet. Int. see preceding note. In 1336 a 10 the correct reading διαστρέφεσθαι has been corrupted in Π¹ into διαφέρεσθαι, and διαστρέφει appears to have been corrupted in these MSS. here in a somewhat similar way. Julian has καὶ ὁ θυμὸς διαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἀνδρας, omitting ἀρχοντας, but otherwise agreeing with Π². 32. νοῦς ὁ νόμος Π²: ὁ νοῦς νόμος Μ⁸ Vat. Pal. Julian pr. Ρ¹: we cannot be sure from Vet. Int. intellectus lex est which reading he found in Ρ. 34. καὶ om. Vat. Pal. possibly rightly: it is bracketed by Sus. But see explanatory note. 38. ἐπάρχειαν] Vet. Int. affectum. He does not understand the word. In Rhet. 2. 2. 1378 b 14, 18 and 2. 4. 1382 a 2 ἐπηρεαζομος is rendered ἐπιρέασμος, and in Rhet. 2. 2. 1378 b 17 ὁ ἐπηρεάζων qui epireazit. 39. πιστεύεται Π Vat. Pal. Bekk.: πιστεύεται Schn. Bekk. Sus. and perhaps Ρ. Vet. Int. has persuasos ab inimicis for πιστεύεται τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, and this probably represents πιστεύεται τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, for
πατερβίντες is represented elsewhere in the Politics by crediti (1305a 22, 28) or credibles facti (1310b 16), and nowhere by persuasi, while πειθόςων is represented by persuadeantur in 1332b 7.


17. γε is added in Π1 Βατ. Παλ. and possibly was added in Γ, though Vet. Int. does not render it, for he seldom renders γε. δυνατός] Vet. Int. potuit, but see above on 1286b 10.  18. ὡς—κράτειν is placed in Π3 wrongly before ἐπεί, 17.  19. ἐπείδὴ Π2 Βατ. Παλ. Βέκκ.: ἐπεὶ Π1 Π1: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. quoniam which reading he found in Π.  22. νομοθετήσαι Π Βατ. Παλ. Βέκκ.: νομοθετήσας Coray and possibly Π (Vet. Int. lege statuta esse), but this is not certain, for Vet. Int. often renders the active by the passive.  26. τ᾽ ἵσως Π1 Βατ. Παλ. Συσ.: τ᾽ ἵσως Π2 Βέκκ.

27. διόταν] See explanatory note.  29. μόναρχα Π2 Βατ. Παλ. Βέκκ.: μονάρχα Π1 Συσ.  30. αὐτῶν Morelius, Βέκκ., Συσ., and perhaps Π (Vet. Int. sibí): αὐτῶν Π. τῇ ἀρχῇ] τῆς ἀρχῆς Casaubon, Richards, probably rightly (cp. 33).  31. αὐτοῦ Π3 Συσ., αὐτοῦ Γ Π Βέκκ.1, αὐτοῖς Βέκκ.2 The Aldine edition of the Scholia Graeca in Aristophanem, in quoting ἄρσον, 26—συνάρχον, 31, on Acharn. 92 (ed. Didot, p. 390), gives αὐτοῖς, but this quotation may have been interpolated by the editor of the Aldine, the Cretan Marcus Musurus, as to whose interpolations in these Scholia see Dindorf's preface in Didot's edition of them, p. iv. In that case this reading would no doubt be a conjectural emendation by Musurus. As to αὐτοῖς, see explanatory note.  38. δεσποτῶν Σύλβουργ, Βέκκ.: δεσποτῶν Π2 Βατ. Παλ.: δεσποτικῶν Π1 Συσ. (two MSS. of the Vet. Int., however, a z, have despotum). Compare 1324b 39, where Π46 L1 have δεσποτικῶν and the other MSS. δεσποτῶν, the true reading being δεσποτῶν. καὶ ἄλλο βασιλεύτων Π2 Βατ. Παλ. Βέκκ.: om. Π1 (καὶ ἄλλο βασιλικῶν Συσ.).  39. Richards would add τοῦτο after δικαίων.  41. τὰ is added before παρὰ φύσιν in Π1 Βατ. Παλ. (Vet. Int. quae praeter naturam).

1288 a 6. ηῦθος om. Π1, but these MSS. occasionally omit ηῦθος: see critical note on 1268b 2.  9. z has aristocratica autem multitudo for ἀριστοκρατικῶν δὲ πλῆθος (with rec. b), whereas all the other MSS. of Vet. Int. which have been examined have aristocratica.  10. Vict. and Βέκκ.2 bracket πλῆθος δ᾽ πέφυκε φίρεν, but then the
rulers in an aristocracy cease to be a part of τὸ ἄριστοκρατικὸν πλῆθος. Sus. prefers to bracket πλῆθος ἄρχεσθαι δυνάμενον, but this course is open to the same objection. In reality the ἄριστοκρατικὸν πλῆθος includes both rulers and ruled, as we see from c. 18. 1288 a 35 sqq. 12. ἡγεμονικὸν] Vet. Int. praesidibus, which stands for ἡγεμόνων (see 1303 b 28, 1305 a 40, 1313 b 29, and 1316 b 18), but it is possible that Vet. Int. mistook the reading in γ and that this was ἡγεμονικῶν, not ἡγεμόνων. 13. Π² add καὶ ἐν before ἐγγίνεσθαι, but Π¹ Vet. Pal. Sus. omit καὶ ἐν, Vet. Pal. reading εὐγγενεσθαι. Bekk.¹ brackets καὶ ἐν, and Spengel and Bekk.² bracket πλῆθος ἐν ὧν πέφυκε καὶ ἐν ἐγγίνεσθαι, but a πλῆθος which is a fit subject for Polity is not necessarily exclusively composed of πολεμικὸ: it is rather under the sway of πολεμικό (cp. c. 7. 1279 b 2, διότι παρὰ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον τὸ προπολεμικόν). Καὶ ἐν (ἐν;) is probably an intimation that the copyist found ἐγγίνεσθαι in the text which he was copying in addition to ἐγγίνεσθαι, πολεμικὸν Π² Bekk. Sus., πολιτικὸν Π¹ Vet. Pal. Politikὸν probably comes from the preceding line. ἄρχεσθαί καὶ ἄρχειν Π² Vet. Pal. Bekk., ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαί Γ² Sus., καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι Μ⁸. See critical note on 1277 b 14. 15. εὐπόροι Π¹ Bekk. Sus., ἀπόροι Π² Vet. Pal. ή γένος Π¹ Π² Bekk.: ή γένος Γ Μ⁸: ή γένος Sus. τῶν ἄλλων should probably follow, not precede, ἐνα τινά: the two words may, however, have been placed where they stand in order to avoid the hiatus in ή καὶ ἕνα τινά τῶν ἄλλων, or they may be repeated (a common blunder) from τῶν ἄλλων, 17. 16. τινὰ om. Π¹, but see critical notes on 1273 b 27, 1279 b 15, 1283 b 2, 1284 b 11, and 1324 a 37. 22. πάντη Π¹, if Vet. Int. penitus stands for πάντη, παντῆ Π¹ Pal. Pal., πάντη Sus.: πάντες Π² Bekk. 24. ἀλλὰ καὶ Π¹ R Schn. Sus. (Vet. Int. immo, which represents ἀλλὰ καὶ in 1282 a 20—a fact which has hitherto escaped notice): ἀλλὰ Μ⁸ Π² Vet. Pal. 27. τῆν om. Μ⁸ Π⁴ Qb Tb and possibly Γ, followed by Bekker. 29. τοῦτον om. Π¹, but see critical note on 1257 b 24. 39. τῆς πόλεως τῆς ἄριστης Π² Vet. Pal.: τῆς ἄριστης πόλεως Μ⁸ Π¹ and probably Γ (Vet. Int. optimae civilitatis). So in 1260 b 23 Π² have τῆς πολιτείας τῆς ἄριστης, while Μ⁸ Π¹ and probably Γ have τῆς ἄριστης πολιτείας, and in 1331 a 5 Π² have τῶς οἰκήσει ταῖς ἴδιαις, while Μ⁸ Π¹ and probably Γ have ταῖς ἴδιαις οἰκήσει. It should be noticed that in 1288 b 3 Π Vet. Pal. Π¹ Pal. have περὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἡδονοπειρατῶν λέγει τῆς ἄριστης. 40. διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν] z has per eadem rightly (with g alone of the MSS. of Vet. Int. collated by Sus.): all the other MSS. have per eadem.
1288 b 3. δὲ Π, δὴ Vat. Pal. perhaps rightly: Conring had already conjectured δῆ. 5. ἀνάγκη δῆ τῶν μέλλωντα περὶ αὐτῆς ποιήσασθαι τὴν προσήκοισαν σκέψιν, which is evidently a slightly different version of the opening words of the Fourth (old Seventh) Book, is added by Γ Π Vat. Pal. at the end of the Third, except that Π P6 L5 omit τῶν μέλλωντα and substitute γὰρ for δῆ. In one of the best MSS. of the Metaphysics, Α, the closing words of one Book are often repeated in the opening words of the next: see Christ’s preface to his edition of the Metaphysics, p. vii.

BOOK IV (VII).

1288 b 5. See critical note at the close of the Third Book.

1323 a 16. πρῶτον Π1 Π2 Bekk.: πρότερον Γ Μ8 Sus. 20. ὁμολογεῖσθαι Π: Vet. Int. confessum esse, but he may probably have found ὁμολογείσθαι, not ὁμολογῆσθαι, in his Greek text (compare his renderings in 1262 b 6, where he has arbitratus est for οίτεια, and 1273 b 39). 27. χρῆ om. Π3. 29. παραπτομένας] Vet. Int. volantes, but this may probably stand for παραπτομένας, not παραπτομένας, for he has dicens for προεισών in 1338 a 26, pascentes for ἐπινεοντας in 1305 a 26, peccare for διαμαρτάνειν in 1338 a 41, 1288 b 37, and 1297 a 7, laborare for διαπονεῖν in 1339 a 8 and 1341 b 22, and labores for φιλοσοφίας in 1338 b 25, to mention no other examples. 30. τὸῦ is added after η in Μ5 Π1: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. comedere vel bibere whether he found this τὸῦ in Γ. 32. ὅμως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν οὕτως ἄφρονα] Vet. Int. similiter autem et quae circa prudentiam se habent, neque enim beatificant sic imprudentem, where Sus. thinks that the translator has rendered a gloss. 40. διαλαμβάνειν Π2 Bekk.: διαλαμβάνειν Π (Vet. Int. provenire should probably be pervenire, the reading of Sus., which no doubt stands for διαλαμβάνειν, though διαβλέπειν in 1272 b 21 is rendered transitivit): Λαμβάνειν Lamb. Bekk.2 Sus. See explanatory note on 1323 a 39.

1323 b 6. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ Γ (Vet. Int. quin immo) Π2: οὐ μὴν Μ8 pr. P1. 8. ὅν] Vet. Int. eorum, which perhaps should be eorum quorum, or simply quorum. 9. αὐτῶν om. Π1. Αὐτῶ is omitted by Π1 in 1301 a 8. 15. εἰληφε Π2 Bekk.: εἰληφε Π Π1 Bekk.2 Sus. 17. τιμώτερον] Vet. Int. pretiosior: see critical note on 1267 b 1. 23. συναμμολογημένον] z has confessum with all the MSS. of Vet. Int. except a, and this is probably the correct
reading: Sus. follows a, which has concessum. See critical note on 1323 a 20. 27. τοῦτ' Γ in place of ταῦτ', the reading of Π (Vet. Int. hoc).
41. έκάστω Π² Bekk.: έκάστου the rest, except that Π⁴ V⁵ Ald. and pr. Π³ S⁶ omit καὶ χωρίς έκάστου (or έκάστο): έκάστου Sus.
1324 a 10. δοσι τε] All the MSS. of Vet. Int. except ζ have quicunque: quicunque autem. See critical notes on 1330 b 4, 1332 a 42, and 1336 a 5. 12. ε' τι τις] Vet. Int. si etiam aliquis, where τε is rendered (it is not often rendered by Vet. Int.) and rendered by etiam, as in 1327 a 25. 14. πότερον] πότερον Γ (Vet. Int. utrum): Μ⁸ has a contraction which may represent πότερον (see Sus.').
22. γάρ is omitted in Γ Π⁴ ⁶ Ι⁸ Bekk. See critical note on 1272 b 36. 31. λέγω δὲ δύο] We expect λέγω δὲ τοὺς δύο (cp. 1307 a 10, λέγω δὲ τὰ δύο δήμου καὶ διηγαρχίαν). The natural meaning of λέγω δὲ δύο surely is 'and I call the political and the philosophical lives two.' There was a question whether these lives were two or only one (cp. 28 sq. and Plato, Gorg. 500 D), but this can hardly be Aristotle's meaning here. Should τοὺς be added before δύο? 33. γε Spengel Sus., τε Μ⁸ Π¹ Π² Bekk. Vet. Int., as usual, does not render τε.
35. έκάστων and τὴν πολιτείαν Π² Bekk., έκάστῳ and τῇ πολιτείᾳ Π¹ Sus. 37. τῶν om. Π¹, but see critical note on 1288 a 16.
1324 b 3. παρ' ἐνίοις κ.τ.λ.] Π² omit καὶ before τῶν νόμων, which I add with Congreve (Π⁴ ⁶ omit ὅρος also): παρ' ἐνίοις δ' οὖτος καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῆς πολιτείας ὅρος Γ Μ⁸ Sus.: παρ' ἐνίοις δ' οὖτος καὶ τῆς πολιτείας ὅρος τῶν νόμων Π¹. 8. πολέμους Π² Bekk. Sus.: πολέμιους Π¹.
16. ἀπεκταγόστα and 18. ἀπεκταγόστα] In 16 Π² ⁵ have ἀπεκταγόστα, pr. Π³ (correxit margo recens) ἀπεκταγόστα, Π⁴ ⁶ ἀπεκτακόστα, Μ⁸ ἐπατακόστα, and in 18 Μ⁸ Π¹ ⁴ ⁶ have ἀπεκτακόστα, pr. Π³ (correxit recens) ἀπεκτακόστα, Π⁵ ἀπεκτακόστι: Π² has the forms given in the text (Sus.'). It is not absolutely certain that ἀπεκτακόστα and ἀπεκτακόστι should not be read, for we find ἀπεκτακόστες in Polyb. 11. 18. 10 and ἀπεκτακότοι in some MSS. in Polyb. 3. 86. 10, but the authority of Π² ³ is in favour of ἀπεκταγόστα and ἀπεκταγόστι, and ἀπεκτάγαστι occurs in Menand. Μισοῦμενος, Fragm. 8 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 173) and ἀπεκταγόκος in some MSS. (followed by Hultsch) in Polyb. 3. 86. 10 (see Kühner, Ausf. gr. Gr., ed. Blass, 2. 468, and Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective, p. 395). Cp. Moeris (ed. Bekk. p. 189), ἀπέκτονεν 'Ἀστικά, ἀπέκταγεν Ἑλλήνες.
20. καταπηγόστοι] Vet. Int. commissant, which probably represents καταπηγόστοι: he may have misread καταπηγόνωσι. 28. ἄλλα ... ὀρῶμεν om. Π¹. 30. τὸ ή πείσω ή βιάσασθι Π², τὸ πείσαι ή τὸ
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]>o0sæbæi Ms P¹ and probably Ῥ (Vet. Int. suasisse aut sanasse); but see critical notes on 1282 a 17 and 1298 b 32. 37. ἔσποδον and of ἔσποδοιν Π Π Bekk. Giph. (p. 893) ἔσποτον and of ἔσποτον: Stahr, Sus. ἔσποστον and of ἔσποστον, probably rightly. 39. ἔσποστον Λamb. (also a recent correction in P⁸, but this corrector probably reproduces the conjecture of Lamb.: cp. 1332 a 41): Sepulveda had already translated the words ipsis duntaxat qui tali imperio sunt idonei, and Segni, ἀ χι ἐ ἀ λτό ἀ σεωτά: ἔσποστοιν P⁴ ⁸ ² L⁵, ἔσποστον the rest (Vet. Int. despotibus).

1325 a 5. ἔδηλον ἄρα ὅτι P⁴ Bekk. Sus.: ἔδηλον ὅτι ἄρα P¹ ¹ ² ³ Sb V⁸, ἔδηλοντι ἄρα Ms⁶, and these MSS. may possibly be right; I would follow them if I were aware of any parallel to this use of ἔδηλοντι.

8. τοῦ before σπουδαίου om. Ms P¹ and possibly Ῥ. 18. ἀποδοκιμάζοναι] ẑ has reproband, not reprobrant as Sus. (is this a misprint?).

25. τὸ P⁴ Bekk. Sus., τῷ Ms P¹ ¹ ² ⁴, τῷ Ald. 28. ἐσποστείαν] ἐσποστήκιν P¹ and possibly Ῥ, for a c have despoticam, z despoticiam, and b despociam: despotica, however, represents ἐσποστεία in 1253 b 19.

29. αὐτὸ τὸ corr. P² (i.e. the scribe of P² in the same ink as the MS.), αὐτὸ τὸ Ῥ P¹ ¹ ⁴, αὐτὸ Ms Ald., αὐτὸ P⁸ pr. P². 36. ὅστε οὐ δει[] Sus. reads e conj. δειν in place of δει, but cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 5, where the indirecta oratio is similarly abandoned, though Aristotle is describing the views of others. 39. ὑπολογίζειν, the third Basle edition of Aristotle, followed by Sus. Sb, a MS. of very little authority, which Bekker follows, has ὑπολογεῖν: all the other MSS. ὑπολογεῖν.

The existence of the word ὑπολογεῖν is doubtful, for in Theopomp. Com., Inc. Fab. Fragm. 31 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 822 : 5. cxx) the true reading is not ὑπολογεῖν but ὑπολέγειν. The active ὑπολογίζειν is, however, extremely rare (see Liddell and Scott, s.v.). Richards doubts ὑπολογίζειν, especially with a genitive, and suggests that ὑπολογοῦν ἔχειν should be read in place of it.

1325 b 3. ψεῦδος is not rendered by Vet. Int. 7. ἐν is added before μέρη by Thurot and Sus. 20. αὐτῶν Vict. Bekk. Sus.: αὐτῶν Π Π. 22. καὶ before πράττειν om. P¹ and Julian, Ep. ad Themist. p. 263 D, but P¹ often omit καὶ, and other errors occur in Julian’s quotation. 37. γενέωθαί] Vet. Int. fore, but this probably stands for γενέωθα, as esse stands for γενέωθα in 1288 a 16. συμμετρον] Vet. Int. moderata: elsewhere συμμετρον is rendered by commensuratus (1327 b 6, 1298 b 25). Συμμετρία is always rendered by commensuratio. Moderatus represents μέτρου in 1267 b 13, moderatius metriωτερον in 1313 a 20, and moderate metriωs in 1315 b 15, so that
moderata may stand for μετρίας here, though μέτρος is more usually rendered by mediocris. 38. προϊστευθεῖσθαι] Vet. Int. praeeturonl, just as he renders δηρίσθαι by dividi in 1330 a 24, διωρίσθαι by distingui in 1330 b 15, and κατακεκισθαι by constitu in 1331 b 10.

1326 a 2. αὐτὴ Π1 Sus.: αὐτὴ Π2 Bekk. 6. τὸσονς τε] Vet. Int. quos quo, but perhaps two alternative readings have here together found their way into the text. 7. δοσιν Π Bekk.1 (Vet. Int. quantam may stand for either δοσιν or πώσην): πώσην Sylburg, Bekk.2, Sus.: see explanatory note on 1326 a 5. 10. ποία is added before μερᾶ in Γ M1 Bekk. Sus.: om. P1 P2. 14. οἰστέον ομ. Π1. 18. ποιητέον Camerarius (Interp. p. 279), Bekk.2, Sus.: oïstion Γ Π. 21. μερῶν Π2 Bekk.: μερῶν M1 P1 Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. partibus which reading he found in Γ. Μερῶν in M1 P1 may be repeated from μερῶν in the preceding line: this kind of error occurs not infrequently in Π1. 25. ἀλλὰ μὴν Π2 Bekk.: οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ Π1 Sus. (Vet. Int. non solum sed). 29. τε om. M5 P1: the reading in Γ is uncertain, for Vet. Int. seldom translates τε. 34. πῶλεις P1 P2: πῶλω Γ M5 Bekk. Sus. See explanatory note. 36. πῶλεος Π1 Sus.: πῶλει Π2 Bekk.

1326 b 4. ἐν τοῖς μὲν P2 1, 4 etc. Bekk.: ἐν μὲν τοῖς M5 P1 Ald. Sus. 12. ράδιον] All MSS. of Vet. Int. but z have facile est, but z omits est. 19. ἐν τῇ πολυανθρωπίᾳ τῇ λιαν] Vet. Int. in ea quae valde multorum hominum (ἐν τῇ πολυανθρώπῳ τῇ λιαν Γ?). I doubt, however, whether Vet. Int. found in his Greek text a different reading from that which we have in the MSS., for in 1302 b 28 he has eos qui sine ordine et sine principatu for τῆς ἀράξιας καὶ ἀναρχιών, and in 1310 b 21 he has conditores populi et prospectores for τῶν δημοσφαγίων καὶ τῶν θεωρίων. He seems now and then to allow himself a little laxity in his rendering of substantives in -α. 32. τῶν ὀρον om. P3 4 pr. P2, but erroneous omissions occur occasionally in the MSS. of the second family (e.g. of μη in 1335 b 25 and of ἐγκο in 1288 b 16), though not so often as in those of the first family, and here τῶν ὀρον can hardly be spared, for it would be difficult to supply it from 23. 34. νυμβαίνῃ] z has accidit probably rightly: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have accidet. 36. αὐτὴν] Richards suggests whether αὐτὴν should not be read, but perhaps αὐτὴν is defensible: see explanatory note on 1326 b 35.


1327 b 11. τῆς ναυτιλίας] Vet. Int. navigium, though elsewhere he rightly translates the word navigatio. 13. καὶ before τοῦτο om. Π¹ Sus., but the authority of these MSS. is weak in omissions, and especially in omissions of καὶ. 14. 'Ἡρακλεωτῶν] See explanatory note. 15. κεκτημένοι τῷ μεγέθει πόλεων ἐτέρων ἐμμελεστέραν] Vet. Int. aedicificata civitate magnitudine aliis contractiore (z artiore), which appears to represent κεκτημένης πόλεως τῷ μεγέθει ἐτέρων ἐμμελεστέρας. 16. πόλεων Γ.Π. Bekk.¹: πόλεως Congreve, Sus. Bekk.² brackets καὶ πόλεων. 17. διωρισμένα] διωρισμένον Λ⁶ Π³ Ald. corr. Π⁴, Bekk.²: for the reading of pr. Π³ see Sus.¹ and Sus.²: but these MSS. have little authority. For ἐστω διωρισμένα cp. I. I. I. 1258 b 39, ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστιν ἐνίοις γεγραμμένα περὶ τοῦτων. 28. Π¹ add μὲν after ἄρχομενα, probably repeated from the preceding line. 31. βάλτιστα Π: Vet. Int. maxime. 34. Μ⁴ Π² Bekk. add καὶ before πρὸς ἄλληλα: Γ. Π¹ omit it, probably rightly. Sus. brackets it. 35. τὶ Π²: τὲ Bekk.¹: om. Μ⁴ Π¹ Bekk.²: Sus. brackets it: the reading of Γ is uncertain, for Vet. Int. seldom translates τὲ. But the authority of Π¹ in omissions of τὲ is weak, for these MSS. often omit it. Τε may be merely a blundered dittography of the first syllable of the next word κέκρασαι. It can hardly be accounted for here in the way in which Stallbaum accounts for its presence in Plato, Meno 72 E, Phaedo 63 C, and Hipp. Maj. 282 B.

1328 a 2. ἄφεται] z tollitur: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. attollituri. But I doubt whether z is right here. 5. σὺ γὰρ δὴ παρὰ φίλων ἄπαγχειο] So Bergk, probably rightly, though Γ.Π. have οὐ in place of σὺ and all MSS. but Γ. Π³ have περὶ in place of παρὰ: ἄπαγχειο Π² ³ ⁴ ⁵ ⁶ Ald. Bekk., ἄπαγχετο P¹, ἄπαγχεια P¹ Sus., ἄπαγχεια Μ⁴, a lanceis perforationes Vet. Int., whatever that may represent (z has alancenis perforari omnes with a dot under the second n of alancenis to expunge it). Vet. Int. has enim here for γὰρ δὴ, as in 1284 b 29.
CRITICAL NOTES.

13. δεὶχν Π², δεὶ Μ⁸, δε̣ρ π. P¹: Vet. Int. does not render it. 14. ἐπιλαμβάνουν Π² Bekk. Sus.: νομίζουσι Μ⁸ P¹ and probably Γ (Vet. Int. μείνεται, which is his equivalent for νομίζουσι in 1302 a 25): νομίζουσι has evidently slipped in here from the line below and displaced ἐπιλαμβάνουν. 15. χαλεποὶ πόλεμοι γὰρ ἀδελφῶν Π², Plut. De Fraterno Amore, c. 5. 480 D, Sus. (πόλεμοι in place of πόλεμοι Γ): χαλεποὶ γὰρ πόλεμοι ἀδελφῶν Π² Bekk. In 1338 a 25 Π¹ give an unmetrical version, and in 1253 b 36 Γ Μ⁸. 16. πέρα Π² Bekk.: πέρα Μ⁸ P¹ Sus.: the reading of Γ is uncertain. φόδε Gomperz, Sus.⁸: φόδε Π Bekk. (except that P⁴ omits δε). 18. ὀπόσην Μ⁸ P¹ and possibly Γ, perhaps rightly (see critical note on 1326 a 7): the rest πόσην. 22. ταῦτα ΓII² Bekk.² Sus., ταῦτα Μ⁸ P¹, ταῦτα Bekk.¹ 26. δεὶ Π¹ P¹, δὴ the rest. ταῦτα Π² Bekk. Sus., τοῦτο Π². 28. δ’ Π¹, δ’ Π Bekk. Sus., δὴ Π². 40. τοῦ Π² Bekk., and probably Γ: τῶ Μ⁸ P¹, τῶ Sus.: Vet. Int. παλαμ quod hoc causa quare fiant civitatis species, which probably represents δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ’ αἰτίων τοῦ (not τό) γίνεσθαι πόλεως εἶδη (cp. 1305 a 10, where αἰτίων δὲ τοῦ τότε μὲν γίνεσθαι is rendered causa autem quare tunc quidem fieleat).

1828 b 4. ἐν τούτοις ἀν εῖν (ἀ) ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν] ἐν τούτοις ἀν εἶν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν Π² Bekk.: ἐν τούτοις ἀν εἰν, διὸ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν Μ⁸ P¹ Sus., who, however, marks a lacuna after διό: ἐν τούτοις ἀν εἰν διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν probably Γ, for Vet. Int. has in his utique crunt, properterea quod necessarium existere. Cp. 1333 b 20, where properterea quod exercitati fuerunt represents διὰ τὸ γεγυμνασθαι, 1282 b 5, 1338 a 39, 1339 b 34, 41, 1295 a 15, and many other passages. Vet. Int. renders διό by propter quod, not propter quae. I supply ἂ before ἀναγκαῖον, which might easily drop out: διὰ τὸ is of course impossible and διό seems to me unsatisfactory. 11. Schn. Bekk.² Sus. add τὰς before πολεμικὰς, but see explanatory note. 21. παρασκεύαζοντι Π²² Bekk. and perhaps Γ (Vet. Int. qui praeparent): παρασκεύαζοντι Μ⁸ Π¹ Sus. 22. ἀναγκαῖον] See explanatory note on 1328 b 22. 29. ταῦτα Sus.: τοῦτο Γ Π Bekk. 32. μὲν om. Π¹, but these MSS. often omit μὲν. 41. τὴν ἀφετήρῃ Μ⁸ P¹ Sus.: ἀφετήρῃ Π² Bekk.: the reading of Γ is uncertain. Μ⁸ P¹ may be right, for in 1329 a 1 Π have τῆς ἀφετήρης. See critical note on 1332 a 22. οὐδὲ δὴ Π² Bekk.: οὐδὲ δὲ π. Π¹ Sus. On οὐδὲ δὴ see Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 45.

1329 a 1. P⁴ L⁸ Ald. add πολλὰς after ἐσεθα, but these MSS. have little authority. For similar additions in them intended to complete the sense see critical notes on 1255 b 12, 1303 b 35,
1304 a 15, and 1332 a 30. 6. ἐὲ Π ² Bekk. Sus.: ἥ Π ¹. 11. τοῖς αὐτοῖς Bekk. Sus.: τοὺς αὐτοῖς Γ Π. Camerarius, commenting on τοὺς αὐτοῖς, remarks (Interp. p. 295), ἐλεητικῶς, scilicet ἐνα ἐδ. Eosdem esse oportet utroque, id est quibus ambo munera mandentur. Καταλληλότερον esset, si scriberetur τοῖς αὐτοῖς, nimirum ἀποδοτε σα, quod supra autor communiter posuerat.’ If τοῖς αὐτοῖς were retained, I should prefer to supply, not ἐνα ἐδ. (with Camerarius), but θετέω τοῖς προπολεμοῦτας καὶ τοῖς βουλευμένωσι καὶ κρίνοντας (cp. 5). 13. τὴν πολιτείαν ταύτην] See explanatory note. 16. ἐστίν] Lamb. Bekk. would exchange the places of this ἐστίν and ἐδ. 17. ἐνα is transferred by Camerarius to after τοῦτος, 18, and by Sus. to after ἐδ., 18. Vet. Int. adds videtur after his rendering for ἐνα, but it is not likely that he found ἐδ. in his Greek text; he sometimes seeks to mend defects in it by conjectures (see vol. ii. p. lxiv): cp. also his addition of vivere in 1265 a 34. Welldon reads δικαίων ἐστίν, perhaps rightly. 18. ἐδ. (ἐνα)] Vet. Int. oportet esse (ἐδ. εῖνα ἦ;) ἐδ. without ἐνα Π. Bekker adds ἐνα. See explanatory note on 1329 a 17. 20. γένος Π ² Bekk., μέρος Π ¹ Sus. Μέρος may possibly come from 23, μέρος τι. 26. ἡ before περίοικος is found in Γ Π, but Sus. is probably right in bracketing it: cp. c. 10. 1330 a 28 sq. 27. ιερεύον Γ Λ ² Ald., ιερόν the rest: ιερέων Bekk. Sus. 33. αὐτοῖς] Sus. αὐτοῖς? There is something to be said for this suggestion (cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 24, τιμᾶς ἀπονεμοντες τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀναπαύσας πορίζοντες μεθ ἥδων), but on the whole I incline to retain αὐτοῖς. 34. τοῦτοι ἀν εἰ ἦ ταῖς ἱερωσύναις ἀποδοτέον τοῦτοις Γ Π Bekk.: τοῦτοι nearly all other MSS., so far as they have been examined. Ταῖς ἱερωσύναις Γ Π Bekk. Bekker may be right in reading τοῦτος and ταῖς ἱερω- σύναις: cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 16, ἰδό ταῖς μὲν τοιαύταις ἀρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις μέλειτι θετέων τοῖς τὴν [θεατρικὴν] μουσικὴν μεταχειρισμένους ἄγωνοντες, where, however, χρήσης should probably be added before θετέων, and Isocr. Busir. § 15, τοῖς μὲν ἐπὶ τὰς ἱερωσύνας κατέστησεν. But as almost all MSS. have τοῦτοι, not τοῦτος, it seems better to substitute τὰς ἱερωσύνας for ταῖς ἱερωσύναις: ἀποδοτέοι thus regains its usual meaning. 38. ἥ Γ Π Bekk., ἧ Schn. Sus.

1329 b 2. ἐδ. is added after ἐτι in Π ¹. 4. νομοθετῆσαις] Vet. Int. lege statuit, but see critical note on 1286 b 10. 10. μετα- βαλόντας] Vet. Int. transssumentes, which represents μεταλαβόντας (cp. 1326 b 21, 1328 a 27, and 1339 a 35). 13. γὰρ Π ² Bekk.: ἐδ. Π ¹ Sus. 18. το μὲν πρὸς τὴν Τυρρηνίαν] Vet. Int. quod quidem apud
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_Tyrreniam_, which may possibly represent τὸ μὲν πρὸς τῇ _Tyrreniā_, for αὐτὸι represents πρὸς with the dative in 1331 B 10 and 1322 A 26. As to _Tyrreniā_ see critical note on 1280 A 36. 21. Χώνες Π¹, Χώνες P² ¹⁴ etc. The name of the race is Χώνες and the name of their country Χώνη in Strabo, p. 255: cp. Χώνων, Strabo, p. 264, and Χώνιαν, Strabo, p. 654, and Lycophron, Alex. 983. Συρίτων Göttling, Bekk.², Sus.: σύρτων Ms P¹ ²⁴ etc.: σύρτων pr. P³, Syrtim Vet. Int. ‘It seems certain that we should read Συρίτων for Σύρτων : Lycophr. Alex. 983’ (the late Sir E. H. Bunbury in Dict. of Greek and Roman Geography, Art. Chones). 30. καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας] z has et quae (should be quae) circa politias : all Susemih’s MSS. of the Vet. Int. have et circa politias. 34. εἰρημένοις] See explanatory note on 1329 B 33.


which no doubt represents οἰκεῖων, as in 1336 a 8 and 1312 b 13: οἰκεῖων, however, is probably a corruption of οἰκήσεων, an alternative reading for οἰκήσεων, which has displaced ήδον. 22. μέν om. Π, as often elsewhere. 23. καί om. Π Sus., but the authority of Π is very weak in omissions and especially in omissions of καί. 24. ἵπποδάμειον Μ Π Bekk. Sus.: ἵπποδάμειον Π: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. domatium equorum which reading he found in Γ. Π have ὄρινου wrongly for ὄρεινου in 1331 a 5. 27. τοῦτων ἀμφοτέρων Π Bekk. (cp. c. 13. 1331 b 37 and 2. 7. 1266 a 33): ἀμφοτέρων τούτων Π Sus. (cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 19). 28. γεωργοῖς See explanatory note. 31. καί πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ κόσμον Π: Π add πρὸς before κόσμον, but wrongly in all probability: cp. Metaph. A. 2. 982 b 23, καὶ πρὸς βαστώνη καὶ διαγωνή, and Pol. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 22, καὶ εἰς τὰς συννοισίας καὶ διαγωνίας, and 4 (7). 17. 1336 b 18, καὶ ὕπερ αὐτῶν καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυνακῶν, and see explanatory note on 1284 a 35. See Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 451. 1. 32. τὰς τῆς ἀρετῶν ἀντιποιούμενα πόλεις] z has virtuti contrafactas civitatis: perhaps contrafactos (Sus.) is a misprint. 1331 a 2. πρὸς τὰς πολυκρίας] Vet. Int. ad insultus, yet in 1267 a 37 he translates τῆς πολυκρίας correctly by ὀξισίον. Insultus, if right, will therefore hardly represent πολυκρίας, but what it represents is doubtful. 5. ὄρινοις Μ Π: ὄρινοι Π: the reading of Γ is uncertain. τὰς οἰκήσεις τὰς ἱδίας Π Bekk.: τὰς ἱδίας οἰκήσεις Μ Π and probably Γ (Vet. Int. propriis habitationibus). See critical note on 1288 a 39. 10. τὰς δὲ μὴ κεκτημένοις Γ Π Bekk.: τοῖς δὲ μὴ κεκτημένοις Aretinus' translation, followed by Bekk. and Sus. But it is more natural to speak of cities as κεκτημέναι τεῖχη than of peoples: cp. 9. ἵχνους, and 1330 b 32 sq. 21. δῆλον ... φιλακτηρίως om. Π. αὐτὰ Π Bekk. (it forms part of the passage which Π omit): αὐτὸ Bonitz, Sus. 24. θείος Γ (except Π, which has θεῖος), Bekk.: θεῖος Bekk. Sus., who says however in Qu. Crit. p. 409 n. 'at forsitan θεῖος servare licet.' 25. ἄρχειον] ἄρχων Π Ι Αld., ἄρχαιον the rest, except Π, which has ἄρχειον. 30. ἐρυμοτέρος] Vet. Int. eminenter, but Vet. Int. often renders the comparative by the positive (e.g. in 1283 a 35, 1287 b 9, 1333 b 10, and 1342 a 42). 32. ὄνομαύσωσιν Γ Π Bekk.: νοµίζωσιν Lamb. Bekk. Sus. and apparently Bonitz (Ind. 487 b 51). See however explanatory note on 1331 a 31. 34. τοιοῦτον Μ Π etc. Bekk.: τῶν τοιούτων Π and possibly Γ, for a ζ have ηαλίαμ, though the seven other MSS. of Vet. Int. which have been examined have
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iarem. Sus. reads τῶν τοιῶν, against the weight of MS. authority, it would seem. See critical notes on 1336 b 8 and 1314 b 26. 30. τῶν δὲ πρεσβυτέρως P1 Πγ, τὰ δὲ πρεσβύτερα Μ§, τὰς δὲ πρεσβυτέρας Σ? (Vet. Int. matronas autem).

1331 b 4. Πλήθος ἦν Should προεστὸς be read? Cp. Plato, Rep. 428 E, τῷ προεστῶτι καὶ ἄρχοντι, and 564 D, τὸ προεστὸς αὐτῆς (i.e. τῆς πόλεως). εἰς ἰερεῖς, εἰς ἄρχοντας] Schneider and Bekk. Following others, add καὶ before the second εἰς, perhaps rightly (cp. c. 14. 1333 a 30). Welldon reads καὶ in place of the second εἰς. But, if πλήθος is retained, some further change would appear to be necessary—the substitution (with Sus.) of ὀπλίτας or στρατιώτας for the second εἰς, or the addition of καὶ ὀπλίτας (with Welldon) after καὶ ἄρχοντας. Perhaps, however, πλήθος should be προεστός, and the classes referred to by Aristotle are those at the head of the State, which do not include the hoplites. 5. καὶ τῶν ἱερεῶν συστίτα] Should τὰ be added before τῶν? See, however, explanatory note on 1285 b 12, τῶν σχήματος ἐκανάτισι. τὴν-om. Μ§ P1 and probably Σ, but the authority of these MSS. is weak in omissions, and especially in omissions of the article. 8. τὴν after ἄλλην om. Μ§ P1: the reading of Σ is of course uncertain. 13. νενεμήσατι Π1 corr. P2 Bekk. Sus., νενεμήσατα over an erasure P1, μεμήσατι P3 pr. P2 etc. Bekk. 16. ἀναγκαῖον] z has necessarium: is necessarium in Sus. a misprint? 24. ἐκ before ποίων om. Π1 Bekk. Sus. So in 1275 b 17 Μ§ P1 have ἣ περὶ πάντων ἢ τιμῶν, where the rest have ἣ περὶ πάντων ἢ περὶ τιμῶν, and in 1275 b 32 P1 and perhaps Σ have τὸ ἐκ πολίτων ἢ πολίτεδος, where the rest have τὸ ἐκ πολίτων ἢ ἐκ πολίτεδος; so again in 1271 a 17, διὰ φιλοτιμίαν καὶ διὰ φιλοχρηστίαν, Η§ and perhaps Σ omit the second διὰ, in 1336 a 14, καὶ πρὸς ὄντες καὶ πρὸς πολεμικὰς πράξεις, Μ§ P1 omit the second πρὸς, and in 1340 a 6, εἰ πη καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἡδος σωτηείει καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν, Μ§ P1 omit the second πρὸς. See also the readings in 1322 b 32, where Π1 omit περὶ. See critical note on 1282 a 17. The first family of MSS. have little authority in omissions, and especially in the omission of small words. 26. πολεμεύσεωσι Coray Bekk. Sus. probably rightly: πολεμεύσεωσι Π. Vet. Int. has civitatem quae debet esse beata et politissare bene, which leaves it uncertain what reading he found in Σ. The letter ο is easily added or omitted between two vowels in verbs (see critical notes on 1255 b 24, 1274 a 5, 1298 b 20), as well as at the end of words. See Mr. T. W. Allen in Journ. Hellenic Studies, 15. 278, 281, 296, and 297. 27. ἐν τῷ τῶν σκοπῶν κείσαται καὶ τὸ τέλος
τῷν πράξεων ὄρθοις] η ἔχει in eo quod est intentionem et finem actionum poni recte, which is probably correct: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. omit est. 31. ἔκκειται] η has iacet rightly: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. lateret. καλῶς Μ8 Π2: καλός Γ Π1 (Vet. Int. bona). Sus.\(^3\) ascribes the reading καλῶς to Γ Μ8, but this is probably a misprint for Γ Π1 (see Sus.\(^1,\)\(^2,\)\(^4\)). 32. οὐτέ Π, except Π4, which has οὐτέ, and Π5, which has ἐνίσχυε and is followed by Bekker. 34. γὰρ om. Π1, but probably wrongly: see critical note on 1272 b 36, and compare the omission of γὰρ by Γ Π\(^1\) L\(^9\) in 1324 a 22. 41. τύχην ἡ φύσιν Π2 and perhaps Μ8, followed by Bekker: φύσιν ἡ τύχην Γ Π1 Sus., an order which suits δεῖται γὰρ κ.τ.λ. well, though on the other hand in Plato, Laws 747 C (which is probably present to Aristotle’s memory here) we have ἐπεὶ χαλεπῇ τύχῃ προσπεσοῦσα ἐπεὶ καὶ φύσις ἄλλη τις τοιαύτη. For a similar interchange in the order of two words see critical notes on 1333 b 36 and 1318 b 4.

1332 a 4. τὴν om. Μ8 Π1 and possibly Γ, but omissions of the article in these MSS. have little weight. 8. καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἱδικοῖς Π2 Bekk.: καὶ διωρίσμεθα ἐν τοῖς ἱδικοῖς Π1 Sus., but see explanatory note on 1332 a 7. 13. καὶ is added before ἀναγκαῖοι in Γ Μ8. 17. αἱρετικά] See explanatory note on 1332 a 16. 22. τὴν before ἀρσενὴν om. Μ8 Π1 and possibly Γ: contrast the reading of these MSS. in 1328 b 41. Their authority in omissions of the article is small. 23. τὰ before ἀγαθά is bracketed by Reiz and Sus., and omitted by Bekk.\(^3\) Sus. places a full stop after ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά and reads δῆλον δῆ in place of δῆλον δ’, but not, I think, rightly. Δῆλον δὲ... ἀπλῶς is part of the paragraph introduced by καὶ γὰρ, 21. 29. κατ’ εὐχὴν Γ Π Bekk., κατατυχεῖν Cor. Sus. 30. αὐτὴν is added after γὰρ in Π4 L Bekk., but see critical note on 1329 a 1. 32. Μ8 Π1 add τῆς before τύχης: we cannot tell whether Vet. Int. found τῆς in Γ. See critical note on 1270 b 19. In 30 we have ἡ τύχη (as in c. 1. 1323 b 28 and Eth. Nic. 6. 4. 1140 a 18), but in c. 12. 1331 b 21 sq. we have τύχης (ἔργον), not τῆς τύχης, and in 1273 b 21 Π have ἄλλα τοὺς ἐστὶ τύχης ἔργον, not τῆς τύχης. It is unlikely therefore that Μ8 Π1 are right. The best MSS. omit τῆς before τύχης in 1258 b 36. Cp. also 1323 b 27–29. 33. Μ8 Π1 are probably right in adding γε after σπονδαῖα: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. at vero whether he found ἄλλα μὲν or ἄλλα μὴν... γε in his Greek text, for he renders both the one and the other by at vero (see e.g. 1286 a 16 and 1287 a 41). τὸ Γ Ald. corr. Π2 (i.e. a correction in Π2 in the same ink as the MS.): Vet. Int. VOL. III. I
at vero studiosa civitas est in cives participantes politia studiosos esse: the rest ῥ.
41. οὖν ῖ Γ ΜPTS Π Ar. pr. P5: εἰτὰ Lamb., followed by Bekk. and Sus. (also a recent correction in P5, as to which see critical note on 1324 b 39). 42. τε Π Bekk.: Vet. Int. autem; hence Sus. reads δὲ in place of τε, but see critical notes on 1324 a 10, 1330 b 4, and 1336 a 5.

1332 b 1. μεταβαλέιν Π2 Bekk.: μεταβάλλειν Μ6 Π1 Sus. and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. transmutari). See for similar variations critical note on 1284 a 5. 8. τὴν μὲν τὸν φύσιν τὴν μὲν φύσιν δὴ Μ6 pr. Π1 and probably Γ, for Vet. Int. has quod quidem utique natura, where utique represents δὴ. 10. ἐδιζὸμενοι Π1 Bekk. Sus.: ἐδιζόμενα Π2. 13. δὴ Π2 Bekk.: εἰτα altered into δὴ Π1: τὸν Γ Μ6 Sus. 30. βουλήμενοι] See explanatory note on 1332 b 29. 36. διαφέρειν] αἱρέσειν Π Π Π Bekk.: διαφέρεσθαι Leonardus Aretinus, who translates nature enim ostendit quemadmodum haec distinguenda sint. Διαφέρεσθαι (which Bonitz approves, Ind. 18 b 52) is probably right: cp. 16, τὴν διαφέρεσθαι ταύτην, and c. 9. 1329 a 17, ἦς τὰ ἐὰν δὴ τῇ διαφέρεις τὸ κατ’ αἰσθαν (referring to the same matter), and c. 17. 1337 a 1, δὲ δὲ τῇ διαφέρεις τῆς φύσεως ἐπακολουθεῖν. ΔΙ might easily drop out before AV. αὐτὸ Π234 etc.: αὐτῷ Μ6 and after τῷ Π1: αὐτῷ Bekk. and (between brackets) Sus. 37. ταύτῳ Π2 Sus.: ταύτῳ Μ6 pr. Π1, om. Π: ταύτον Bekk. Vet. Int. natura enim dedit electionem faciens eadem generi hoc quidem iunius, hoc autem senius. τὸ μὲν . . . τὸ δὲ] τοῦ τοῦ μὲν . . . τοῦ δὲ Μ6 Π1. 40. τοῦτον τοῦ Π2 Bekk.: τῶν τοῦτον Π1 Sus. (Vet. Int. talem). See critical note on 1292 a 17.

1333 a 18. δυνάμενον] Vet. Int. poteis, but see above on 1286 b 10. 32. καὶ τῶν πρακτών κτ.λ.] See explanatory note. 40. τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων διαφέρεσιν] διαφέρεσιν Π Π Bekk. (δὲ αἱρέσεις Π4), αἱρέσεις Coray. In 1318 a 16 Schn. Bekk.2 and Sus. seem right in reading αἱρέσεις in place of διαφέρεσιν (unless with Lamb. we should read ἀρχαίρεσιῶν), and Sus. follows Coray in reading αἱρέσεις here. The change is not without plausibility, especially if we compare Isocr. De Pace § 106, τὰς αἱρέσεις τῶν πραγμάτων, but both Bekk.2 and Bonitz (Ind. 180 b 38) retain διαφέρεσις, and I incline on the whole to follow them, particularly looking to 30 sqq., διήρησε τῶν πρακτῶν τὰ μὲν εἰς τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρήσιμα τὰ δὲ εἰς τὰ καλά. 41. Vet. Int. fails to render μὲν, but he fails to render μὲν in μὲν γὰρ in 1300 b 34 also.

1333 b 2. δὲ before πράττειν om. Π1 Sus., but the authority of these MSS, in the omission of small words is weak. 7. βέλτινω
π² Bekk.: βελτίωσιν Π¹ Sus. 8. πάσας om. Π¹. 15. εὐθέλεγκται z has facile et redarguibilía: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. facile arguibilía. The addition of et in z is wrong, but redarguibilía may well be right, for εὐθέλεγκται immediately after is rendered sunt redargula and in 1330 b 34 ἀλεξουμένας is rendered redargulas, though in 1308 a 1 εὐθέλεγκται is rendered argumentur. 16. τὸν om. Π¹. 17. εὐθείοις ΓΠ: εὐθείοις Camotius, Bekker (approved by Sus.), but see explanatory note. τὸ Π¹ P² Sus., τῶν Π² Bekk. 18. θύμβρων Π² Bekk.: θυμβρῶν Π¹ Sus. ‘Praestare videtur forma θύμβρος, qua usus est Nicander, Alex. 568... Eandem varietatem in scriptura nominis proprii θύμβρων et θύμβρων deprehendas’ (Meineke, Analecta Alexandrina, p. 128). See also Meisterlans, Gramm. d. att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 65, who finds only the form θύμβρων in Attic Inscriptions. For the frequent interchange of ὧν and μύρο in MSS. see Mr. T. W. Allen in Journ. Hell. Studies 15. 275. 20. Schneider, Bekk.², and Sus. are probably right in adding τῆς before πολιτείας. 21. εὐπεθήν ἐνύ λῆς Π² Bekk. Sus.(Vet. Int. quoniam nunc quidem): εὐπεθήν γε ἐνύ Με Π¹. 30. τὸ Π Bekk.¹ Sus.: τὸ Scaliger. Bekk.² Γ probably had τὰ, for Vet. Int. translates ad principari super vicinos, whereas he commonly translates ἐπὶ with the dative by in or super. 33. διώκειν] z has persequi probably rightly, for this is the word by which Vet. Int. renders διώκειν: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have prosequi. 36. λόγων (om. Π⁴) καὶ νόμων Π² Bekk.: νόμων καὶ λόγων Π¹ Sus. See critical note on 1331 b 41. 37. ταῦτα Π² etc. Bekk. Sus., ταῦτα Π¹ P² etc. τῶν (τε) νομοδέτηρν I follow Thurot and Sus. in adding (τε) after τῶν. 41. εὐθείοις] Vet. Int. zelenti (εὐθείοις ΓΠ).
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tων ξύλων] μάλλον τῶν μαλακῶν, ἀνίγησι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μαλακοῖς ὤσπερ ἐλέχθη περὶ τῆς φιλάρασ, παρακονὴ δὲ μάλιστα ταύτα. But the weight of MS. authority appears to be on the side of ὀφιάστων.

14. ὑπάρχειν ἀν Ἰ π. Bekk.: ὑπάρχειν Sus. not, I think, rightly. 19. σώφρονα is bracketed by Sus., and it is true that Aristotle adds no proof of the indispensability of σωφροσύνη in the acquisition of necessities, as he does in regard to ἀνδρία and καρπερία, but that it is indispensable we have seen in the explanatory note on 1334 a 19 (cp. also 1334 a 24).

28. πολλῆς οὐν κ.τ.λ.] See explanatory note.


1334 b 2. γενέσθαι] See explanatory note on 1334 a 41 sub fin.

3. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.] See explanatory note on 1334 a 41. τὰ Π1. Vet. Int. adds before hacc, his equivalent for ταύτα, the words quam quae belli, which represent ἥ τὰ τοῦ πολέμου, and Μ8 has τὰ πολέμου in the same place, but here a gloss has crept into the text of τὸ Μ8, for Π2 gives in red ink the gloss τὰ πολεμικά. 12. εἴδων om. Γ Μ8 pr. Π. ὀμολογοῖ γ Μ8 Π234 pr. Π1: ὀμολογεῖ two or three inferior MSS. and marg. Π1, followed by Bekk. Sus. 23. καί is added after δὲ in Μ8 Π1 Sus.: om. Π2 Bekk. and perhaps Γ, for ζ and almost all the MSS. of Vet. Int. consulted by Sus. omit et.

27. τὴν δὲ τοῦ σῶματος τῆς ψυχῆς Π2 Bekk. Sus., τοῦ δὲ σῶματος τῆς ψυχῆς Π1, τοῦ δὲ τοῦ τρίτου τῆς ψυχῆς Μ8: Vet. Int. huius autem eorum quae animae = τοῦ δὲ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς. 30. γένοται Π2 Bekk.: γίνεται Μ8 Π1 Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. fiant which reading he found in his text, for fiant stands for γένωνται in 1303 b 20. See critical note on 1339 a 13.


1335 a 2. γὰρ after τε om. Π1. 5. μετέβημεν] Vet. Int. devenimus.

12. τὴν before τεκνοποιῶν om. Π3 Π2 Bekk., but probably wrongly: cp. 31, 39, 1335 b 23, 41, 1265 a 40, b 7, 1270 a 40. The article is absent only in 1335 b 7, 29. 13. ἐγγονα M8 Π1 Bekk.2 Sus.: we cannot tell whether Vet. Int. found ἐγγονα or ἐγγονα in his text: ἐγγονα Π2 Bekk.1, but in 1335 b 30 all MSS. have ἐγγονα, and the Index Aristotelicus gives no other instance of the form ἐγγονος, though many of ἐγγονοι, from the genuine writings of Aristotle. See Meisterhans, Gramm. der att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 83, on the two forms: the form ἐγγονος is the more common in Attic inscriptions.

14. ταῦτα τοῦτο Π2 Bekk.: autò τοῦτο Μ8 Π1 Sus.,
toû toû aitô perhaps γ (Vet. Int. hoc ipsum). 16. ἐπιχωριάζεται Π² Bekk. probably rightly (see explanatory note), ἐπιχωριάζει Μ⁸ Sus. and after a lacuna pr. P¹. Vet. Int. has lexatur (z et lexant: pr. a alatur); possibly allocatur or allaudatur (‘is allowed’) is the true reading, representing ἐπιχωριάζεται. 18. a) νέα Π² Bekk. Sus.: εἶναι Γ Μ⁸ pr. P¹. πονοῦσι τε Π² Bekk. Sus.: τε πονοῦσι Μ⁸ P¹: the reading of Γ is uncertain, for, as usual, Vet. Int. does not translate τε. 23. εἶναι om. Π¹, but these MSS. occasionally omit εἶναι. 25. δὲ om. Π¹, but these MSS. often omit δὲ. 26. οπέρματος] See explanatory note on 1335 a 24. 27. πληθυν] Μ⁸ has a contraction which perhaps stands for πλήθος, and Vet. Int. has multum (=πολύ). Göttling and Sus. are probably right in transposing ἦ μικρόν, 29, to after ἐτι, 27. 29. As to [ἠ μικρόν] see on 27. 30. τοσοῦτο Π¹ P² Sus., followed by Bekk. Sus.: τοῦτο the rest. 32. τοῖς μὲν ἀρχομένοις ἦσται τῆς ἀκῆς Μ⁸ P¹ Π² Sus.: Vet. Int. his quidem erit inchoante akmes, which probably stands for τοῖς μὲν ἀρχομένοις ἦσται τῆς ἀκῆς, and this is Bekker’s reading. Sus. believes ἀρχομένοις to be right, though he leaves ἀρχομένοις in his text. 37. δὲ χρῆσθαι οἷς Π¹ Sus. (χρᾶσθαι in place of χρῆσθαι Μ⁸ P¹): οἷς in place of δὲ χρῆσθαι οἷς Π² Bekk. The reading of Π² may be no more than an explanatory gloss on οἷς which has crept into the text and taken the place of οἷς, a thing which sometimes happens to this family of MSS. (see critical note on 1255 b 12), but it is also true that Π² occasionally omit, though less often than Π¹, and I incline on the whole to think that Π² are in fault here. 39. δὲ Π¹ Sus.: δὲ altered into δὴ Π³, δὴ the rest followed by Bekker. 1335 b 3. μάλιστ’ (ἀν)] μᾶλιστα ἀν Μ⁸ (if Schoell, who collated Μ⁸ for Susemilh, is right): μᾶλιστα Γ Π¹ Π² Bekk.¹: μᾶλιστ’ ἀν Cor. Bekk.² Sus. ‘In Graecis codicibus non rarò scribitur vitióse ἥκιστα, μᾶλιστα pro ἥκιστ’ ἀν, μᾶλιστ’ ἀν’ (Madvig, Adversaria Critica, 1. 41). 4. παι- δονομίας Π² Bekk. Sus.: παιδείας Γ Μ⁸ pr. P¹. 5. Sus. adds δὲ before εἰσείν. 6. οὐδὲ Coray, Bekk., Sus.: οὐτε Π. See explanatory note on 1272 b 38. 7. κακοποιητική] κακοποιητικὴ Μ⁸ pr. P¹: Vet. Int. male habens (καχεκτικὴ Γ’). 10. τῶν εὐευθέων Γ Π¹ Sus.: the rest, followed by Bekk., τῶν εὐευθέων. 11. ταῦτα Π² Bekk.: ταύτα Γ Μ⁸ Sus., ταῦτα Π¹. καὶ is added before ἀνδράς in Π¹ Sus. 15. τῶν εἰλη- χῶτων τὴν περὶ τῆς γενεσίως τιμήν] Vet. Int. his quae sortitae sunt eum qui de generatione honorem, but whether he found ταῖς εἰληχωίαις in his Greek text is doubtful. 18. τὰ γεννώμενα Π¹ Bekk.³ Sus. (Vet. Int. quae generantur): τὰ γεννώμενα Π² Bekk.¹ See critical note on
1256 b 13. 19. καὶ is added before τὰ φυόμενα in Π³ Bekk. 20. γενομένων Π² Bekk.¹, γενομένων Μ⁴ Bekk.²: γενομένων Ρ¹ Sus. The reading of Γ is uncertain (Vet. Int., gentilorum). 21. ἐὰν om. Π¹ Sus., but the authority of these MSS. is small in omissions, and especially in omissions of small words. τῶν ἐθνῶν] ζ alone of the MSS. of the Vet. Int. which have been examined has suetudinum: all the rest have gentium representing τῶν ἐθνῶν, but probably a had suetudinum originally, for its present reading gentium is written over an erasure in a recent hand (see Sus.¹). Schn. and Sus. take Leonardus Areinus to have found ἐθνῶν in his Greek text in place of ἐθνῶν, but his rendering, as it stands in MS. Ball. 242, is in aliis vero si nores instituatae civitatis prohibeant natos exponere, which seems to point to ἐθνῶν, not ἐθνῶν. 22. κολύνη] κολύνη Ρ²⁴ etc. and a recent hand in Ρ³ (Bekk. κολύνη), ι κολύνη (ut videtur) pr. Ρ⁹ (Sus.), κολύνε Π¹ Sus., but corr. Π¹ (i.e. a correction in Π¹ in the same ink as the MS.) gives κολύνη. ὀφίσθαΐ Γ, a correction in the margin of Π¹, and corr. Π¹ (i.e. a correction in Ρ² in the same ink as the MS.) Sus., ὀφίσθαι Μ⁸, ὀφίσθηναι pr. Ρ¹, ὀφίστα τι the rest followed by Bekker. 23. δει Μ³ pr. Ρ³ Sus., δε the rest followed by Bekker. 24. συνδιασβέστων Π: Vet. Int. combinatis, but it is doubtful whether Γ had συνδιασβέστων, for in 1336 a 9 Vet. Int. renders τηλικοῦτων by tantillos. 25. μὴ om. Π². 26. χρὴ Π² Bekk.: δει Μ³ Ρ¹ Sus. and possibly Γ (see however critical note on 1281 a 17). 30. καβάσερ τὰ τῶν νεωτέρων Π: Vet. Int. sicut et iuniorum: Sus. is inclined therefore to read καβάσερ καὶ τὰ τῶν νεωτέρων, but see critical notes on 1252 a 25, 1262 a 29, 1264 a 9, and 1284 b 32. 31. τῶν γεγραμένων Π² Bekk. Sus.: τῶν γηγραμένων Μ⁸ pr. Ρ¹: Vet. Int. decrepitorum, which probably represents τῶν γεγραμένων. 35. ὅστε Π² Bekk. Sus.: ὄς Π¹ (Vet. Int. ut... oportet), but a correction in Π¹ in the same ink as the MS. gives ὅστε. 39. ή Π² Bekk.: καὶ Π¹ Sus. 1336 a 5. φαϊνεται τε Π¹ Ρ², φαϊνεται τε Μ⁸: Vet. Int. appareat autem (φαϊνεται δὲ Γ?). But see critical notes on 1324 a 10, 1330 b 4, and 1332 a 42. 6. ἄγειν Μ⁸ Ρ¹ and perhaps Γ, for Vet. Int. has inducere, and though ἄγειν is usually rendered by ducere and sometimes by adducere in Vet. Int., it is rendered by inducere in 1306 a 3. Vict. placed ἐισάγειν in his text, taking inducere in Vet. Int. to represent ἐισάγειν, which no doubt it sometimes does (e.g. in 1320 a 14), but it does not always do so. No MS. appears to have ἐισάγειν: Ρ²³⁴ etc. have δει. Αγείν may be right: cp.
Aristot. Fragm. 627. 1584 a 16, τὸν δὲ ἀρχαίαν τῆς φύσεως Ἀριστοτέλης Ἀρίωνα φήσω εἶναι, ὃς πρῶτος τῷ κύκλῳ ἤγαγε χορών. Λαβεῖς (Plato, Rep. 591 B) or ἕχεω (Phaedr. 268 E), in addition to εἰσάγειν, would be possible alternatives for ἀγείν. 7. πλήθουσα Π, but the word is not included in the Index Aristotelicus and does not appear to occur elsewhere in Aristotle's writings: πληθουσα Vict. Bekk. and Sus. probably rightly (Sus., however, does not place it in his text). Πλήθεως occurs 'in Attic Prose only in the phrase ἀγοράς πληθούσης, ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ etc.' (Liddell and Scott); it is a poetical word; still it may have been used by Aristotle, for πόσις also (1253 b 6 and 1335 b 41) and τιμαλφείν (1336 b 19) are poetical words. 9. τηλικούτων Μ* P1 23 etc. Bekk. Sus.: τηλικοῦτο P4 6 Λ8: Vet. Int. tantillos, but it is doubtful whether he found τηλικούτους in Π (see critical note on 1335 b 24). 10. διαστρέφονται II 3 Bekk. Sus., διαφέρονται Π (for Vet. Int. has defluere, which perhaps should be diffluere), except that pr. P1 had διαφέρω. See critical note on 1287 a 31. 14. καὶ πρὸς ἰγνείαν καὶ πρὸς πολεμικὰς πράξεις Π2 Bekk. Sus.: Μ* P1 omit the second πρὸς (see critical note on 1331 b 24): about Π we cannot be certain, for Vet. Int. commonly repeats the preposition in sentences of this kind, whether he finds it in the Greek or not (see critical note on 1253 a 36). 17. ψυχρόν is bracketed by Sus., who follows P1 corr. P4 in reading ψυχρόν in place of μικρόν. ἄμπισχειν Μ* P1 4 Bekk. Sus., ἄμπισχειν P2 8. 18. ἀρχομένων Π1 3 Sus.: ἀρχομένω P2 8, ἀρχομένῳ Bekk. 20. ἔξις is here represented by habitude in Vet. Int., and not, I think, elsewhere in the Politics. 23. ἡλικίαν] Vet. Int. aelati (ἡλικίας Γ?). 24. ἦν] Vet. Int. in qua (ἐν ἦ γ?): cp. 1336 b 21. 26. δὲ om. Π1 P4 Bekk. 34. σπουδασομένων Cor. Sus.: σπουδασομένων ορ σπουδασθησομένων Γ (Vet. Int. studendorum) : σπουδασομένων Π Bekk. In 1328 b 21 some MSS. have παρασκευάζουσι and others παρασκευάζουσι, so that σπουδασομένων might easily take the place of σπουδασομένων. διατάσεις] Vet. Int. cohibitions: cp. 39, where διατάσεων is rendered qui cohibentur. 35. καὶ Π Bekk.: Vet. Int. in floritius, so that he probably found κατὰ in Γ, which Sus. reads instead of καὶ. τοὺς is added before κλαυθμοὺς in Μ* P1 Sus.: whether in Γ also, is uncertain. 38. τοῖς πονοῦσιν] τοῖς πνεύμοσιν? Ridgeway (see the 1894 edition of Sus5), a suggestion which I cannot follow Susemihl in adopting. See for the force of τοῖς πονοῦσιν explanatory note on 1336 a 37.

1336 b 2. ἀπολαίειν Μ* P1 Sus., ἀπολαβεῖν Γ (Vet. Int. absumere),
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απελαύνειν Π² Bekk. 3. ἀνέλυθηριαν] τῶν ἀνέλυθέρων Π⁵ L⁸ Ar. Ald. Bekk.² and pr. P¹, τῶν ἀνέλυθεριαν corr. P¹. Τῶν ἀνέλυθέρων is evidently a correction intended to suit the false reading ἀπελαύνειν. See critical note on 1340 b 14. For καὶ before τῆλικοῦτος ζ has etiam probably rightly: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. et. 8. τῶν ἀπγορευμένων Π² Bekk.: ἀπγορευμένον Π¹ Sus. See critical notes on 1331 a 34 and 1314 b 26. 14. ἐστιν Π¹ Ar. Bekk. Sus., esti Γ M⁸ Π⁴. 18. [τοὺς τὴν ἥλικιαν ἔχοντας ἐτι τὴν ἰκνουμένην]. These words, which I have bracketed, are found in M₈ P¹ and are inserted by Sus. in his text: Vet. Int. has eos qui habent aetatem amplius proiectam, which probably represents Bekker’s reading, τοὺς ἔχοντας ἥλικιαν πλέον προήκουσαν, a reading found only in P⁵ and there probably adopted from the Vet. Int. (πλέον over an erasure in P⁵): Π² omit the words, reading πρὸς δὲ τούτου ἀφίσιον ὁ νόμος καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν τιμάλφειν τοὺς θεοὺς, and I incline to think that Π² are right, and that the words added in M₈ P¹ and also those added in Γ P³ are merely a gloss intended to complete the sense, which has crept from the margin into the text. The MSS. of the first family occasionally admit glosses into their text (see vol. ii. p. lvii). "Eti in the reading of M₈ P¹ I do not understand. 19. καὶ γυναικῶν om. Γ M³ pr. P¹. τιμάλφειν Π² Bekk. Sus.: τιμαλφάν M₈ P¹ and possibly Γ. 20. νομοβετητέον Π² Bekk., βετητέον M₈, βετέον Γ P¹ Sus. (Vet. Int. ponendum): είναι εἰτέον conj. Jackson. 24. τοῦτον] τοῦτον P¹ and after εν παραδρομῇ: τοῦτον before these words P⁴ Ald.: τοῦτων after εν παραδρομῇ Γ M⁸ Ar. Sus., before these words the rest followed by Bekker. 27. ἰσως γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] See explanatory note. 30. θεστῶν Π² corr. P¹ Bekk.: θεάτρων Γ M³ pr. P¹ Sus. See critical note on 1338 b 23. 35. ἡ μοχθηρίαν ἡ δυσμενείαν] Vet. Int. infectionem aut inhaesionem, but probably these are two alternative readings, both of them incorrect, which have taken the place of infensionem, the true equivalent for δυσμενείαν, while malitiam, the true equivalent for μοχθηρίαν, has been omitted. The original rendering of Vet. Int. probably was aut malitiam au infensionem. 36. ἤδη om. Π¹. 38. τὴν before παύειν om. M₈ pr. P¹ and possibly Γ. μετά] See explanatory note on 1336 b 37. 39. μέχρι ήδης Π² Bekk.: μέχρις ήδης M₈ P¹ Sus. and possibly Γ. In 1319 b 12, on the other hand, M₈ P¹ and possibly Γ have μέχρι before a vowel: Π² μέχρις. In Attic inscriptions μέχρι does not become μέχρις before a vowel (Meisterhans, Gramm. der att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 180). Phrynichus’
rule is μέχρις καὶ ἀχρίς σὺν τῷ καὶ ἀδόκυμα: μέχρι δὲ καὶ ἀρχί λέγε. In
the 'Αθ. Πολ. this rule is observed, as will be seen from Dr. Sandys’
Index. In Eth. Nic. 7. 7. 1149 b 13, however, Kb and all the
MSS. appear to have μέχρις ενταῦθα.

1337 a 1. κακῶς Muretus, Bekk. Sus.: καλὸς Γ Π Bekk.1 In
1294 a 7 Π1 have καλῶς wrongly in place of κακῶς. 7. δεὶ] δεῖται
Ms: Vet. Int. oportet esse (δεὶ εἴναι Γ ?).

BOOK V (VIII).

1337 a 14. δεὶ γὰρ] Vet. Int. oportet autem (δεὶ δὲ Γ ?). παιδεύονται
Ar. Sus. (Aretinus’ translation being oportet enim ad singula guber-
nandi genera disciplinam accommodari): ποιδεύονται Γ Π Bekk. In
1341 a 1 ποιευμονέοις is erroneously read in Γ Ms in place of
παιδευμονέοις, and the same mistake appears to occur here. 18.
βέλτιστον] βέλτιστον Ms Ar. Sus. Bekk.2: the rest βέλτιστον followed by
Bekk.1 Bonitz (Ind. 403 a 15 sqq.) appears to accept βέλτιστον,
comparing Rhet. 1. 7. 1364 b 29 sq. 27. ἀμα δὲ οὗτος χρή νομίζειν
αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ τινα εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν] Vet. Int. simul autem neque oportet
pulare civitum ipsorum aliquem sibi esse, so that Γ probably had
αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ in place of αὐτῶν αὐτοῦ. Π1 has αὐτῶν αὐτό: Ms an am-
biguous contraction in place of αὐτῶν, followed by αὐτό: almost all
the other MSS. have αὐτῶν αὐτοῦ. 29. μόρον . . . πόλεως om. Π1.
34. κοινή Π2 Bekk.: κοινή Π1, κοινή οί κοινῶς Γ Ar. (Vet. Int. com-
muniler), κοινὸς Ms (Sus. κοινή). 36. περὶ Π2 Bekk.: διὰ Γ Ms pr.
P1 Sus. See explanatory note. 40. οὖν εἰ π2 Π3 etc. Bekk.: οὖνει
Π1 Π4 Sus.

1337 b 5. ὅτι δὲ οὐ πῶς κτ.λ.] See explanatory note. ἐλευ-
θερων] Schneider conjectures ἐλευθερίων, and perhaps Γ had
ἐλευθερίων, for Vet. Int. has liberalibus. 6. ἀνελευθερῶν] ἀνε-
λευθερῶν Π1 and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. illiberalibus, but illiberalis
commonly represents ἀνελευθερος). 11. η τῆς ψυχῆς is bracketed
by Sus., who says in Qu. Crit. p. 418, ‘si diāνως pars animae est,
expectas ηὸς pro ψυχῆ;’ but for the use of ψυχῆ in the sense of
ἡδος compare (with Bonitz, Ind. 866 a 3) c. 5. 1340 a 6; cp. also
c. 7. 1342 a 22, εἰς χ' ὡσπερ αὐτῶν (i.e. τῶν βασάνων καὶ θητῶν) αἱ
ψυχαὶ παρεστραμμέναι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔξως. An objection to the
addition of these words not noticed by Sus. is that there is no
reference to them in 11-15, as there is to τοῦ σώμα καὶ τῆς διάνως,
but for a similar inexactness of reference cp. 4 (7). r. 1323 b 33 sqq. and other passages. 12. τε om. Ms P¹ and possibly r, but P³ often omit τε. 16. 'το δὲ . . . 20, ἀνεξεύθερον om. P² 3 6 C 4 Sb Tb Lª Ald. pr. P⁴ (suppl. marg. P⁴),’ Sus.¹ τὸ δὲ προσθεδείειν Ms P¹ and possibly r (Vet. Int. assiduare autem) : om. pr. P⁵ in a lacuna, προσθεδείειν δὲ a recent correction in P⁵ followed by Bekker. But P⁵ is a MS. of little or no authority and a recent correction in P⁵ counts for even less than the MS. 17. πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν Ms P¹ marg. P¹ Sus.: the words fall within the passage omitted by P²: Vet. Int. ad perfectionem, which may perhaps represent πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν (though Vict. and Bekk. take it to represent πρὸς τὸ ἑπτάλεις and adopt this reading), for Vet. Int. translates εἰς ἀκρίβειαν by ad certitudinem in 1331 a 2, ἀκρίβειαν by certitudinem in 1328 a 20, and τὴν ἀκρίβεια by diligentia in 1274 b 7, and he may well have used a third equivalent here. εἰρημένως ἤθελεσαι P⁵. 18. οἱκεν Ms P¹ Sus.: χάρω P³ Bekk.: Π² omit 16–20: Vet. Int. gratia may represent either οἰκεν or χάρω. 19. τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν Ms P¹ Sus.: αὐτοῦ μὲν γὰρ P³ Bekk.: Vet. Int. ipsius quidem enim gratia may represent either reading. τῶν is added before φιλῶν in P⁵. 20. αὐτὸ τοῦτο] ταῦτα τοῦτο Richards. πράττων Ms P¹ Bekk. Sus.: πράσσων Π²: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. πολλάκις δὲ ἄλλας Π¹ Sus. probably rightly (see explanatory note on 1255 b 2): Π² Bekk. have δὲ ἄλλας πολλάκις. 22. ἐλέχθη Π² Bekk.: εἴρηται Ms P¹ Sus. and probably r (Vet. Int. dictum est). 25. τὴν μὲν . . . γραφικὴν om. r. Ms pr. P¹. 34. τῆς . . . 35, σχολάζεων om. Π². τέλος Γ Π, except that P⁵ has τελευταῖον: δῶς Vict. Bekk. See explanatory note on 1337 b 34. 36. ἀναγκαῖον] See explanatory note on 1337 b 35. 41. καιροφυλακοῦντας Π²: καιροφυλακοῦντα Π¹ Sus.: καιροφυλακοῦντας P³ Bekk. προσάγοντας Π³ Bekk.: προσάγοντα Π¹ Sus. 1338 a 8. αὐτῶν r and Π² (except P⁴ Ald., which have αὐτῶν) Bekk. Sus.: αὐτῶν Ms pr. P¹, αὐτῶν a correction in P¹ in the ink of the MS. 10. τὴν εἰ τῇ διαγωγῇ σχόλιῳ] See explanatory note on 1338 a 9. 16. καὶ πρὸς μάθησιν is bracketed by Sus., 'nisi corruptum potius est μάθησιν' (Sus.). 25. Π¹ place καλεῖν after ἐπὶ δαίτα. See critical note on 1328 a 15. Vet. Int. translates the line sed est guidem velut ad epulas vocari concaudere. Vocari may well represent καλεῖν (see vol. ii. p. lxiii, note 6), and concaudere probably stands for some corruption of βαλεῖν or else for a marginal gloss συνεφράινεσθαι. As to τῷ ἔτει see explanatory note on 1338 a 24. I propose to read μόνων in place of it. 26. οἱ κα-
lēouσv] See explanatory note on 1338 a 24. 27. δ] ὁς Π¹ (Vet. Int. tanquam delectantem omnes): ὅς Π⁴. I add δ before ὁδοσέουσ because the Homeric Odyssey is referred to. 28. ἄγαν κ.τ.λ.] Vet. Int. quando gaudentibus hominibus 'congregati super tecta audiant philomenam sedentes deinceps,' where congregati should perhaps be conveniati, and philomenam philomelam. He appears either to have found ἀγόνος in his Greek text in place of ὁδοῦ or to have misread ὁδοῦ as ἀγόνος. 31. ἀναγκαίαν Π¹ Bekk. Sus., ἀναγκείον Π². 33. μία Π² Bekk. Sus., μία Π¹. τῶν ἁρμοδόν Π² Bekk.: τῷ ἁρμοδῷ Μ⁸ Π¹ and probably Γ (Vet. Int. numer), Sus.

1338 b 1. ἡ μάλλον] ἀλλὰ μάλλον Reiz, Thurot, Sus.: μάλλον ἦ Postgate. See explanatory note. θεωρητικὸ π¹ Bekk. Sus.: θεωρητικήν Π². 3. ἁρμόστει Π² Bekk.: ἁρμόζει Μ⁸ Π¹ and possibly Γ, Sus. Μ⁸ Π¹ and possibly Γ have ἁρμόζουσα in 1288 b 24, where Π² Vat. Pal. have ἁρμότουσα, and the forms ἁρμόσει, ἁρμόσει are of course used by all MSS., but I have not noticed any other passages in the Politics in which the form ἁρμόστει is not used in all the MSS. 'In Attic inscriptions ἁρμότος is the only form in use: ἁρμόζω is nowhere found' (Meisterhans, Gramm. der att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 141). ἐλευθεροί] See explanatory note. 4. πρότερον corr.¹ Π¹ (i. e. a correction in Π¹ in the same ink as the MS. and therefore probably by the writer of it, Demetrius Chalcondylas): πρότερον Γ Π. 5. εἶναι om. Π¹, but these MSS. often omit εἶναι, and here the omission of εἶναι suits the erroneous reading πότερον, 4. 11. τὰ τὲ εἶδο] Vet. Int. et speciem, but see critical note on 1287 a 27.

23. ληστρικά Μ⁸ Π¹ L² Ald. (the reading of Γ is uncertain), ληστρικα Sus.: ληστικά Π², ληστικα pr. Π, ληστικα rec. Π⁸, ληστικα Bekk. Ληστρικά may be right, for in 1256 b 1, 5 (the only other passages of Aristotle to which the Index Aristotelicus refers for either of these words) the form used is ληστρικός. Τ and τρ are easily confused; thus in 1336 b 30 Π² have θεατῶν and Π¹ θεάτρων, and in 1274 a 39 we find γραφήν in Π² in place of ταφήν. On the whole, therefore, I incline to follow Ms Π³ and to read ληστρικά. Both forms, however, appear in the text of Thucydides—ληστικός in three passages and ληστρικός in two (see Von Essen's Index). 26. καὶ τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἄγονοι καὶ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς Π¹ Sus.: καὶ τοῖς γυμνασιοῖς καὶ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἄγονοι Π² Bekk. 28. τῷ μόνον] μόνον τῷ Ριζ, Richards, but possibly μόνον is here displaced as οὐ μόνον sometimes is, e. g. in De An. 3. 6. 430 b 4 sq. (Bon. Ind. s. v. μόνον). 30. οὐδὲ γὰρ Π¹ Sus.: οὐ γὰρ Π² Bekk. It is more likely that οὐδὲ
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has been changed into oβ than that oβ has been changed into oβε. Compare the readings in 1293 a 7 and see critical note on 1261 b 7. oβε των ἄλλων θηρίων] Vet. Int. neque aliarum ferarum aliqua, but whether he found τι added in Γ after θηρίων may well be doubted. Vict. and Bekk. add it without necessity. 33. ἀπαθαγώγους M§ P1 345 Sb Tb Ald. Sus.: ἀπαθαγώγητος P2 Bekk. In Eth. Nic. 4. 3. 1121 b 11 (the only other reference for either word given in the Index Aristotelicus) all MSS. have ἀπαθαγώγητος.


1340 a 6. M§ P1 omit the second πρὸς. See critical note on
1331 b 24. 12. Vet. Int. gives no equivalent for ἀκροφήνειν, a b m leaving a lacuna before the equivalent for τῶν μούμησαν: Γ probably omitted ἀκροφήνειν in a lacuna, for pr. M9 omits ρούμενοι in a lacuna. 13. pr. M9 leaves a lacuna between χωρίς and ρυθμῶν in which τῶν has disappeared, and there was probably a lacuna in the same place in Γ, for several MSS. of the Vet. Int. leave a lacuna between the equivalents for χωρίς and ρυθμῶν, but whether Γ omitted τῶν it is impossible to tell from Vet. Int. rhythmis. 27. καὶ αὐτὴν Π2 Bekk.1 Sus.: καὶ αὐτὴν Μ9 Π1, καθ’ αὐτὴν Γ (Vet. Int. secundum se). As to αὐτὴν ἑκείνην see explanatory note. 31. See explanatory note. 34. ταῦτ’ Π2 Bekk.: τοῦτ’ Π1 Sus. εἴπε Π2 Bekk.: ἀπὸ Π1 Sus. 'Ἐπὶ appears to be right: see Plut. Sympos. 9. 15. 2, quoted in explanatory note on 1340 a 34. 36. πάύσωνος Π1 Bekk. Sus., πάυσων Π2356 etc. and pr. Π4. But in Poet. 2. 1448 a 6 Λε has πάυσων and in Metaph. Θ. 8. 1050 a 20, where some MSS. have πάυσων or πάσωνος, E has παύσωνος. The artist referred to in this passage of the Metaphysics was a sculptor, and Pauson was a painter, but he may have been a sculptor also. For the frequent interchange of a and in MSS. see Mr. T. W. Allen in Journ. Hell. Studies, 15. 289. 37. καὶ εἰ [Vet. Int. et si, but see critical note on 1278 b 7. 41. καὶ μὴ] z has et non: all the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have sed non.

1340 b 6. παιδείαν Ar. Bekk. Sus., παιδίαν Γ Π. 7. δὲ Π1 Sus.: γὰρ Π2 Bekk. 8. τὰ om. Π2 pr. Π1: Bekk.2 brackets it. 10. ἐλευθερωτέρας] Vet. Int. liberiiores (ἐλευθερωτέρας Γ?). 11. ποιῶ τι] z has qualem quendam in agreement with rem animae: the other MSS. of Vet’Int. have qualem quendam. 14. ἐτι or ἐςτι Γ, ἐςτι Π1: ἕξει the rest. ἀρμοτονα] ἀρμοτονος Π4 Λ9 Ald. to suit the false reading ἔξει. See critical note on 1336 b 3, where these MSS. similarly correct ἀνελευθερίαν. 16. z has naturae rightly for φύσις: is naturae in Sus.1 a misprint? 17. As to ἡδονήμονον see explanatory note on 1340 b 16. 20. τοῦ is wrongly added before αὐτοῦ in Π1: z has eos for τοῖς αὐτοῖς, but the other MSS. of Vet. Int. are probably right in reading eosdem. 22. δὴ Π123: δὲ the rest (Vet. Int. autem), followed by Bekk. and doubtfully by Sus. 24. μὴ κοινωνήσαντας] Vet. Int. eos qui non communicaverunt, but this may well stand for μὴ κοινωνήσαντας: cp. 1281 a 30, where qui non honorantur stands for μὴ τιμωμένους, 1335 a 24, where quae usae fuerunt stands for χρησάμενα, 1336 a 39, where pueris qui cohibentur stands for τοῖς παιδίοις διατενομένοις,
and 1322 a 4, where *qui sustinent* stands for ὑπομείναντες. See critical note on 1269 a 18, though I have now little doubt that *qui mutaverit* there stands not for ὅ κυνής τας but for κυνής. 26. ἀρχύτου Π2 Bekk., and a correction in Π in the same ink as the MS.: ἀρχύτα Μ5 pr. P1 Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. Archytæ which form he found in his text. It is doubtful whether Aristotle wrote 'Ἀρχύτα, for though in 1311 b 4 all MSS. but one or two have δέρδα, they have ἀμύντων in the preceding line, and we find ἰσομνίου in Rhet. 2. 23. 1398 b 4 and εὐαγόρου in Rhet. 2. 23. 1399 a 4. In Pol. 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 23, again, all MSS. have χαρώνδου, not χαρώνδα as in Strabo, p. 539. As to the usage in Attic inscriptions Meisterhans (Gramm. der att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 94) reports, 'Foreign personal names ending in -as in Athenian public documents of the fifth and fourth century b. c. form the genitive in -ou, not -a (Περδικου, Ἀμύντου, Ἀρίβζου, and so forth). On the other hand -a occurs in a private inscription in the name of an Athenian (Χαρέδημου Φιλα in an Attic inscription of the fifth century b. c.).' On the whole the chances are in favour of ἀρχύτου. In the nominative we have ἀντιμενιδη, not ἀντιμενίδας, in 3. 14. 1285 a 36, and ἀλλανοκράτης, not ἀλλανοκράτας, in 7 (5). 10. 1311 b 17, though the forms in -as are the local forms. 32. καί om. Π1. 39. γενομένην Π2 Bekk. Sus.: γενομένην Μ5 P1: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. factam which reading he found in his Greek text, for in 1337 a 13 factum stands for γεγονός.

1341 a 8. πρὸς μὲν κ. η. λ.] See explanatory note on 1341 a 7. 13. καί om. Π1 Sus., but the authority of these MSS. is weak in omissions and especially in omissions of καί. 15. ΚΟΙΝΟΥ Π1 rightly: the rest ΚΟΙΝΟΥWARD. 18. τι is added in Π1 Sus. after ἄλλο. 19. ἐπερῶν ἐστιν Π2 (except corr. Π1, ἄλλο ἐπερῶν ἐστιν) and probably Γ (Vet. Int. all. ed.), for Vet. Int. usually renders ἐπερός by alter and ἄλλος by alius: ἄλλο ἐστιν Μ5 P1, ἄλλο ἐστιν Sus. ἄλλο is probably repeated from the preceding line. 29. τὴν which Bekker omits before ἄρτην is omitted only in a few MSS. of little authority. 33. αὐτὸς om. Π1.

1341 b 1. σαμβύκαι Gottling, Bekk., Sus.: σαμβύκαι Π2: ἵαμβοι Π1. 2. εὐλόγος [z has rationabiliter rightly: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have rationalitier. 3. δὴ om. Π1. 4. Vet. Int. has enim for μὲν οὖν (or possibly μὲν, for pr. M5 omits οὖν in a lacuna), but see critical note on 1252 a 24. 11. αὐτοῦ Γ (Vet. Int. suinet) Bekk. Sus.: αὐτοῦ Π. 19-26. I retain δ' after σκέπτεν, thinking that its
presence in the text is due simply to the fact that owing to the long parenthesis, 10–18, Aristotle has forgotten that his protasis needs an apodosis. I bracket καὶ πρῶς παιδείαν, because, as Bonitz points out (Aristot. Stud. 2 and 3, p. 97 sq.), there is no such limitation in the solution of the problem given in 1342 a 1 sqq. Πρῶς παιδείαν has probably been repeated from the line below. In 22 sq., η τρίτον δεί τινα ἔτερον, there is much to be said for the emendation of Sus., η τινα ἔτερον, τρίτον δε, but if we adopt this reading, it will be necessary, as Sus. sees, in order to obtain an apodosis, to translate καὶ, 25, ‘also,’ or else, which Sus. prefers, to expunge it. I feel inclined to suggest a greater change. Should not τρίτον δεί be bracketed and ἐτεί δε be read in place of ἐπειδῆ? Τρίτον δε (altered into τρίτον δεί) may be nothing more than a marginal gloss which has crept into the text, just as πρῶτον μέν has done in some MSS. in 1265 a 21. I have obelized τρίτον . . . ἐπειδῆ to indicate that the soundness of the text is doubtful. I thought better of the state of the text in 19–26 when I wrote vol. i. p. 366, than I do now. 23. z has quoniam autem for ἐπειδῆ (ἐπεί δὲ ?): the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have quoniam. 36. μέρος ΓΠ Bekk.: μελος Tyrwhitt, Sus. possibly rightly. 38. καὶ is added after γάρ in P124. 40. τρίτον δε κ.τ.λ.] See explanatory note.


CRITICAL NOTES.

1329 a 33): the rest, including probably \( \Gamma \) (Vet. Int. \textit{per tempus}), have \( \chiρόνου \). Bekk. reads \( \chiρόνου \), Sus. \( \chiρόνου \). 23. (\( \tau \phi \)) \( \Σωκράτει \)
So J. C. Wilson followed by Sus.: \( \sigmaωκράτει \) \( \Pi \). We expect \( \tau \phi \) \( \Σωκράτει \), as the Socrates of the Republic (398 E) is referred to. If in Rhet. 3. 14. 1415 b 30 we have \( \delta \) \( γάρ \) \( λέγει \) \( \Σωκράτης \) \( \epsilon\nu \) \( \tau \phi \) \( \epsilonπιταφίο\), in Rhet. 1. 9. 1367 b 8 (the same quotation) we have \( \delta \) \( \Sigmaωκράτης \).

26. As \textit{petulantia impetuosum} is the equivalent for \( \betaακχεντικόν \) in Vet. Int., the parenthesis in Sus.\(^1\) p. 371 which ends after \( \textit{magis} \) should begin before \textit{petulantia}, not before \textit{impetuosum}. 29. Schn. Cor. and Göttling place a colon, not a full stop, after \( \tauοιντών \), but see explanatory note. 33. \( \dot{\eta} \) is added after \( \acute{\alpha}ρ\muον\dot{\omega}ν \) by \( \text{P}^1 \) and corr.\(^1\) \( \text{P}^2 \) (i.e. a correction in \( \text{P}^2 \) in the same ink as the MS.), followed by Sus., who however places the mark of a lacuna after \( \dot{\eta} \). Göttling reads \( \dot{\eta} \) in place of \( \dot{\eta} \), comparing 2. 10. 1272 b 9. Schn. and Cor. omit \( \dot{\eta} \) and add \( \omega\nu \) after \( \delta\varepsilon\lambdaο\nu \). 34. I follow Vet. Int., Sus., and others in indicating a lacuna after \( \pi\varepsilon\sigmaο\nu \): see vol. ii. p. xxix.
NOTES.

BOOK III.

32. Τῷ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦντι, καὶ τίς ἐκάστη καὶ ποία τις. C. 1.
Attention has already been called (above on 1274 b 26) to the absence of any connecting particle. Πολιτείας is probably not the acc. plur., as some take it to be, but the gen. sing. as in 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 29, ἡμῖν δὲ τῶν μέθοδον εἶναι περὶ πολιτείας, 4 (7). 10. 1329 a 40, τοῖς περὶ πολιτείας φιλοσοφοῦσιν, 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 35, τῶν ἀποφαινομένων περὶ πολιτείας, and 2. 12. 1273 b 27, τῶν δὲ ἀποφημαμένων τι περὶ πολιτείας: cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1181 b 14, καὶ ἔλος δὴ περὶ πολιτείας, and Pol. 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 8, ἐν οἷς περὶ βασιλείας ἐπισκοποῦμεν. From what has been said at the end of the First and the beginning of the Second Book we expect to be invited here to inquire into the nature of the best constitution, not into the nature of each constitution (see vol. i. p. 226), but the programme of the Politics given at the close of the Nicomachean Ethics contemplates an inquiry into the due structure of each constitution, and it is clear from Pol. 1. 13. 1260 b 12, ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν πολιτείας, that Aristotle intends to study all constitutions, not the best only.

τίς ἐκάστη καὶ ποία τις. This inquiry is taken up in the Sixth and following chapters. The question τίς καὶ ποία τις is characteristic of Science (Eth. Nic. 1. 7. 1098 a 29, καὶ γὰρ τέκτων καὶ γεωμέτρης διαφερόμεναι ἐπίζητοντι τὴν ὀρθὴν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ὄσον χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ ἐργον, ὁ δὲ τί ἐστιν ἢ ποῖν τί· θεατὴς γὰρ τὰληδοὺς). The distinction between τίς and ποία τις recurs in Pol. 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 21 sqq. and 1. 3. 1253 b 7 sqq. As to its nature, if we refer to Eth. Nic. 2. 4. 1106 a 12, ὃ τι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τῷ γένει ἢ ἁρετή· ἐπιρρέα· δεὶ δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπέω, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποία τις, we shall be tempted to take τίς in the passage before us as asking what is the genus, and ποία τις as asking what is the differentia, but it would seem that the answer to τίς is rather the definition, while the answer to ποία τις is given in further illustrative details, and that the sense VOL. III.
of the words is 'what is the nature of each and how may each be described.' Cp. Plato, Gorg. 448 E, ΠΩΛ. οὐ γὰρ ἀπεκρύψας, ὅτι εἶ ἡ καλλίστη; ΣΩ. καὶ μάλα γε. ἀλλ' οὐδεὶς ἐρωτᾷ, ποιὰ τις εἶ ἡ Γοργιών τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τίς, καὶ άντικα δέοι καλεῖν τῶν Γοργίαν: Aristot. Metaph. Η. 3. 1043 b 23, ἀπὸ τὴν ἀπορίαν ἂν οἱ 'Ἀντιστώνεικοι καὶ οἱ οὕτω ἀπαίδευτοι ἔχει τινά καρδόν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν ὀρίσασθαι (τὸν γὰρ ὄρον λόγον εἶναι μακρόν), ἀλλὰ ποιῶν μὲν τί ἐστιν ἐνδεχεται καὶ διδαξαί, ὡσπέρ ἀργυροῦ, τί μὲν ἐστιν, οὕ, ὅτι δ' οἰον κατάτερος. Cp. also Plato, Symp. 201 E, Euthyphr. ΙΙ A, Meno 71 B, Rep. 328 E, and Aristot. Eth. Nic. Ι0. 3. 1174 a 13, τι δ' ἐστιν ὁ ποιῶν τι (ἁμ. ἡ ἡδονή), where Ramsauer thinks that ὁ ποιῶν τι is added because Aristotle feels that he fails in what follows to give a precise definition of pleasure. In Plato, Rep. 557 B sqq. in answer to the question ποία τις ἡ τοιαύτη πολιτεία a description of a State democratically governed is given.

33. περὶ πόλεως is of course to be taken, not with σκέψις, but with ἰδεῖν.

34 sqq. Aristotle gives three reasons for inquiring into the nature of the πόλις before passing on to the πολιτεία:—1. The nature of the πόλις is a disputed question. 2. The statesman and the lawgiver are concerned with the πόλις, hence an inquiry into its nature is not only needed but belongs to the province of the πολιτικὴ ἐπιστήμη. 3. The constitution (which is the subject of his treatise) is an ordering of those who dwell in the πόλις. As to the first reason, see c. 3. 1276 a 6 sqq. and notes, and compare also (with Eaton) Thuc. 3. 62. 4 sq. As to the second reason, cp. Eth. Nic. Ι. 13. 1102 a 7 sqq., δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὅ κατ' ἀλήθειαν πολιτικὸς περὶ ταύτην (i.e. τὴν ἀρετὴν) μαλακτὰ πεπονήσθαι, where a similar reason is given for the study of virtue. As to the third, we learn from c. 6. 1278 b 8 sqq., 6 (4). Ι. 1289 a 15 sqq., and 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 7 sqq. what kind of ordering a constitution is (Sus2, note 432 b: Sus4, 1. p. 354). Aristotle's inquiry into the nature of the πόλις and the citizen helps him to answer the question which he takes up later on, what a πολιτεία is, because it discloses that the πόλις is an aggregate of citizens, or in other words of men possessing access to office and therefore either actual or possible rulers, and thus leads on to the conclusion arrived at in c. 6, that the πολιτεία is an ordering of the offices of the πόλις and especially of its supreme office (1278 b 8 sq.). The fact that the πόλις consists of actual or possible rulers also suggests the further conclusion that it is
a κοινωνία τῶν ἰδευθέρων (c. 6. 1279 a 21), and that in the normal πολιτεία the kind of rule exercised is not the rule of a master over his slaves but rule for the common good. Thus the inquiry into the nature of the πόλις and the citizen is fruitful of important results. It also incidentally discloses the existence of a plurality of constitutions differing from one another. It will be observed that Aristotle conceives the statesman to be concerned only with the πόλις, not with the ἐθνος, an error into which he was possibly led in part by the use of the word πολιτικός to designate a statesman. The ἐθνος, whether in the form of an aggregate of cities or of villages, certainly deserved to be carefully studied by him. See as to the ἐθνος vol. i. p. 39 and note on 1326 b 3.

34. νόν, 'as it is,' without any special reference to the time at which Aristotle is writing.

36. τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ νομοθέτου πᾶσαν ὅρωμεν τὴν πραγμα-
τείαν οὕσαν πέρι πόλεως. Bonitz (Ind. 629 b 29) groups this passage with Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1105 a 10, ὡστε καὶ δὴ τοῦτο περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας πᾶσα ἡ πραγματεία καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ πολιτικῇ, and Metaph. K. i. 1059 b 16 sqq.

τοῦ πολιτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ νομοθέτου, often mentioned in the Politics in combination: see Bon. Ind. 488 b 11, where 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 4, 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 27, and 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 35 are referred to. See also Plato, Polit. 309 C.

38. ἐπεὶ δ᾿ ἡ πόλις κ. τ. λ. The πόλις is a compound in the sense of being a whole composed of many parts. Not all compounds are wholes: see Metaph. Z. 17. 1041 b 11 sqq., which, following Grote (Aristotle 2. 348), we may thus paraphrase—'Compoundse are of two sorts—aggregates like a heap (mechanical) and aggregates like a syllable (organic or formal). In these last there are not merely the constituent elements, but something else besides. The syllable ὑα is something more than the letters ὑ and ἄ; flesh is something more than fire and earth, its constituent elements . . . This "something more" is the essence of each compound—the First Cause of existence to each.' A whole is a compound of the second kind; in it, as in a syllable, there is over and above the constituent elements an essence which is its First Cause. 'Voce ἔθνον Aristoteles fere significat id quod per certam formam definitum ac consummatum est; cf. Metaph. I. 1. 1052 a 22, τὸ ἔθνον καὶ ἔχουν τινὰ μορφὴν καὶ ἐίδος: Δ. 6. 1016 b 12, ἄν μὴ τι ὀδον ὃ, τοῦτο δὲ ἄν μὴ το ἐίδος ἔχει ἐν: M. 2. 1077 a 28.
NOTES.

M. 8. 1084 b 30' (Bonitz on Metaph. A. 1. 1069 a 18). A whole is in fact a kind of ἐν (see the passages referred to in Bon. Ind. 223 a 25 sqq.), and thus, while the πόλις is termed a whole here and in 1. 2. 1253 a 20 and 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq., it is termed an ἐν in 2. 2. 1261 a 29. It is implied in the passage before us that there are wholes which are not composed of many parts, or perhaps of parts at all. A monad, a point, and a sound (φόργος) are given in Diog. Laert. 3. 107 as instances of things which are not compound. Are these wholes? As to the method of examining the parts in order to learn the nature of the whole, see above on 1252 a 17. The parts of the πόλις are here taken to be citizens: for other uses of the term see vol. i. pp. 98, 495, and Appendix A.

41. ἡ γάρ πόλις πολιτῶν τι πλήθος ἔστιν. Τι πλήθος is explained in 1275 b 20 by πλήθος ικανόν πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς, ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν. On this account of the πόλις see vol. i. p. 226 sq., and for other accounts of it given in the Politics, vol. i. p. 283 sq. Compare with the passage before us Justin 2. 12. 14, Themistocles ... persuadet omnibus patriam municipes esse, non moenia, civitatemque non in aestheticis, sed in civibus positam.


3. ἔστι γάρ τις κ.τ.λ. For instance the βάναυσος, who was not a citizen in the full sense in the Theban oligarchy (c. 5. 1278 a 25: 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 28) or probably in oligarchies based on birth, though he would often be so in oligarchies based simply on a property-qualification (c. 5. 1278 a 21 sqq.).

5. τοὺς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. ὁ ἄλλως ποιεῖ, 'in some other sense than the proper one,' opposed to κυρίως οὐκ ὀικεῖος: cp. Eth. Eud. 1. 5. 1216a 23, ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὐκ ἀληθῶς τυγχάνουσι τῆς προσηγορίας ὁμόγενος εἰς πολιτικοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀληθείαν, and Eth. Nic. 1. 4. 1096 b 11, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τούτων (i.e. τῶν καθ' αὑτὰ διοικομένων καὶ ἀγαπομένων) ἡ φυλακτικὰ ποιεῖν ὥσπερ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικὰ διὰ τούτα λέγεσθαι καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον. Ποιητικὸ πολιτέα were excluded at Athens from the archonship and from priesthoulds ([Demosth.] c. Neaer. c. 92), and often did not reside within the State which made them citizens: thus Dion was a ποιητὸς πολίτης of the Lacedaemonian State (Plut. Dion, cc. 17, 49). See as to ποιητοὶ πολίται Gilbert, Constitutional Antiquities of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 184 sqq.
7. οὖ τῇ οἰκείν που. See explanatory note on 1260 b 41. "In the Athenian use of language a resident alien was described in contrast to a citizen, not as a demot, but as a dweller in a deme—e.g. in Corp. Inscr. Att. 1. 324 we read Τείκρος ἐν Κυάθναιῳ οἰκῶν" (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 1. 170=Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 177). Whether the resident alien was termed μέτοικος, πάροικος, ἐνοικος, κάτοικος, σύνοικος, or ἐποικος (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 294. 1), his designation always expressed residence. Cp. Herondas 2. 94, ἀπασι τοῖς οἰκείοι τὴν πάλιν ζείνοις.

8. οὕδ' οί κ.τ.λ., 'nor are those citizens who, [as metoeci usually do] share in political rights to the extent of undergoing trial and suing.' It would have been more regular if Aristotle had continued ὀδὴ τῷ τῶν δικαίων μετέχειν κ.τ.λ. τοῖς ἀπὸ συμβόλων κοινωνίας, who are obviously not citizens of the State in which they possess these rights. Απὸ denotes the cause or origin of the association (Bon. Ind. 77 b 51 sqq.).

10. τοῦτο, i.e. τὸ τῶν δικαίων μετέχειν οὕτως ὡστε κ.τ.λ. οὗς ἀπὸ συμβόλων κοινωνίας, who are obviously not citizens of the State in which they possess these rights, which denotes the cause or origin of the association (Bon. Ind. 77 b 51 sqq.).

11. ταύτα, i.e. τὸ δικην ὑπέχειν καὶ δικάζεσθαι, and so τοῦτον, 12. The parenthetic remark, καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τούτους ὑπάρχει, seems needless, but for equally needless parenthetic remarks see c. II. 1282 a 36 sqq. and c. 12. 1282 b 39.

πολλαχοῦ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., 'nay in many places,' etc., so that in these places metoeci are still further removed from citizenship than in places in which they completely share in these rights. Μὲν οὖν has nothing to answer to it. It is here used in the sense of 'nay,' as in Rhet. 2. 23. 1399 a 15, 23. 'To what exact extent the resident aliens at Athens were obliged to allow themselves to be represented by their προστάτησ we have no means of saying, but it can be shown that they could plead their cause before a judicial tribunal themselves: this is proved by the speech of Demosthenes against Dionysodorus, where the speaker is a resident alien... In Herondas 2, again, the παρυφθοσκός, who pleads in person before a Coan court of justice, is obviously a μέτοικος, vv. 15, 40, 92 sqq.' (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 1. 170=Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 177 sqq.).

12. For νέμειν προστάτην, 'to take,' or 'choose,' 'a patron' (Liddell and Scott), cp. Isocr. De Pace, § 53, καὶ τοὺς μὲν μετοίκους τοιούτους εἶνα νομίζομεν, οὗν περ ἀν τοὺς προστάτας νέμωσιν, and Pollux 8. 35, τῶν οὖ νεμόντων προστάτην μετοίκων.
NOTES.

13. τῆς τοιαύτης κοινωνίας, 'of the kind of association which has just been described,' i.e. of the association which goes no further than a right to sue and be sued.

14. ἀλλὰ καθάπερ κ.τ.λ., 'but [we may dismiss these from consideration], just as,' etc.

15. ἐγγεγραμμένοις, i.e. at Athens in the ἀρχιρημικοί γραμματεῖοι, or list of citizens kept by the demarch, as to which see note on 1336 b 37. Boyhood is usually made to cease not, as here, on entry in this list, but at puberty (see note on 1333 b 3).

τοὺς γέροντας τοὺς ἀφειμένους. Cp. Plut. Tit. Flaminin., c. 21, ἄσπερ ὑπὸ γῆρος ἀπήναι καὶ κόλουρον ἀφειμένον ζην χειροπίδη τῶν Ἀμφαων ἄποκτείνας, and Plato, Rep. 498 C, ὅταν δὲ λήγῃ μὲν ἢ ρώμη, πολιτικῶν δὲ καὶ στρατευόμενος ἐκτὸς γίγνεται, τότε ἐδώ ἀφέτοις νέμεσθαι κ.τ.λ. It would seem that after a certain age old citizens were excluded from attendance at the assembly and the dicasteries, unless we take Aristotle to refer merely to their exemption from military service, as to which see Lycurg. c. Leocr. c. 40 and Diod. i. 74. 1 sq. That attendance at the meetings of the assembly was to a certain extent compulsory at Athens, we see from Pollux 8. 104, though the rich seem often to have escaped attendance (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 8). Giphanius (p. 292) compares the 'senes depontani, seu de ponte deiciendi, ut vocabant Romani,' who were excluded from the bridge which led to the Septa, the place where the comitia voted: see as to them Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht 3. 401. 3, and other passages referred to by Willems, Droit Public Romain, p. 167. 9.

16. φατέον εἶναι μὲν πως πολίτας, οὐχ ἀπλώς δὲ λιᾶν. Λιᾶν qualifies ἀπλῶς in the sense of 'very' or 'quite': cp. [Plato,] Eryx. 393 E, οὕτως ὃν βέλτιστα λιᾶν πράττοι τά τε αὐτῶς αὐτοῦ πράγματα καὶ τά τῶν φίλων. Λιᾶν alone (without any ἀπλῶς) stands in contrast to οὕτως in De Part. An. 3. 7. 669 b 36 sqq.

ἀλλὰ προστιθέντας κ.τ.λ. Supply φατέον εἶναι. For the case of προστιθέντας see Jelf, Gr. Grammar, § 613, Obs. 5, and cp. c. 3. 1276 b 10, 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 21 sqq., and 1324 a 2 sq. In 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 3, however, we have ἑπιστημάτως μὲν μᾶλλον λεκτέον κ.τ.λ. 'The dative and the accusative of the agent are both allowed with the verbal in -τέον' (Goodwin, Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb, ed. 2, § 926).

17. ἀτέλειας. Cp. c. 5. 1278 a 4, where οἱ παιδεῖς are said to be πολίται ἀτέλειας, and therefore πολίται εἴς ὑποθέσεως.
19. ἢπτούμεν γάρ κ.τ.λ. Vict. 'quarērimus enim hic civem simpliciter, et qui nullam quasi culpam in se contineat, quam oratione corrigere oporteat, ut factum est in superioribus generibus civium.' 'Εγκλήμα must here mean, not 'accusation,' but 'culpa' ('defect': Sus. 'Mangel'), for if we construe 'accusation, the accusation will be said to 'need correction,' which is not the sense required. Bonitz (Ind. s.v.) marks off the use of εγκλήμα in this passage from its ordinary use. 'Frohberger on Lys. 10. 23 quotes Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 34: Lys. 16. 10: Polyb. 2. 52. 4: Demosth. 1. 7, in all which passages εγκλήμα seems practically to mean "offence."' (Richards).

Γάρ, 19, probably refers not to what immediately precedes but to the general sense of the preceding passage (like ἐπεὶ ... γε in 2. 7.1267a 12, where see note), and especially to the clause suppressed in 14 ("we may dismiss these from consideration"). Οἱ ἄτιμοι καὶ φυγάδες are referred to as also being πως πολίται, being so far citizens that their disqualification was in the case of some ἄτιμοι incomplete, and in the case of all ἄτιμοι and φυγάδες reversible (see Schömann, Antiq. Iur. Publ. Graec. pp. 199, 234). For τῶν ἀπλῶς πολίτην cp. Antiphanes, Τρισταγωνιστῆς (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 121), τὴν ἀλήθος μονακήν. Καὶ, 20, 'also,' not 'both.'

22. πολίτης δ' ἀπλῶς κ.τ.λ. 'Ἀπλῶς is to be taken with πολίτης. For τῶν ἀπλῶς πολίτην, 19, followed by πολίτης δ' ἀπλῶς here, see note on 1276 b 28. As to κρίσεως, see vol. i. p. 230, note 1. Κρίσεις here seems to mean ἣ τῶν δικαίων κρίσεις (Plato, Laws 766 D). A Greek hardly felt himself to be a citizen if he was excluded from all share in judicial functions (Plato, Laws 768 B, δ' ἄν αὐκοινώνητον ὃν ἐξουσίας τοῦ συνδικάζειν ἦγετιν τὸ παράπαυ τῆς πόλεως οὐ μέτοχος εἶναι). 'Ἀρχή is a wider term than κρίσις and is made in what follows to include κρίσις (e.g. in 1275 b 18 sq.).

23. τῶν δ' ἄρχων αἱ μὲν εἰσὶ διηρημέναι κατὰ χρόνον, 'now of magistracies some are severed in point of time,' i.e. their tenure is severed, they cannot be held continuously. So Bernays, 'ein Theil der Aemter freilich erleidet zeitliche Unterbrechung.' For the contrast of διηρημένοις and συνεχῆς cp. i. 5. 1254 a 29, εἰτε ἐκ συνεχῶν εἰτε ἐκ διηρημένων, and Phys. 4. 4. 211 a 29. Compare also ἀδιαίρετον κατὰ χρόνον in Metaph. M. 8. 1084 b 14 sqq. Mr. Welldon translates, 'some offices of State are determinate in point of time,' but can other passages be produced in which διαιρεῖται bears this meaning? It would be easier to explain the passage thus if we read with Scaliger and Sus. διωρισμέναι in place of διηρημέναι.
24. ὁστ’ ἐνιάς μὲν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 37 sq. 'Eniás μὲν should have been followed by ἐνιάς δὲ, but it is in fact followed by ἤ, 25: compare the way in which in 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 24 ἤ μὲν is followed by ἦ δὲντα, 28, and in Poet. 3. 1448 a 21, 23, δὲ μὲν is followed by ἤ. See also note on 1338 b ι. The Lacedaemonian admiralship could not be held twice by the same person (Xen. Hell. 2. 1. 7), and the same was the case with many offices at Athens ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 62 sub fin.). At Thurii at one time a repeated tenure of the office of stratēgus by the same individual was prohibited except after an interval of five years (7 (5). 7. 1307 b 7). See on this subject Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 1. 206. 1 (=Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 215. 4) and 2. 320. 1.

26. δ' ὁ ἀδίκιος. We expect αἰ δ' ἀδίκιοι, but see note on 1258 b 26.

τάχα μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν is answered by ἀλλά, 29. Οὐδ' ἀρχόντας, 'not even magistrates, [to say nothing of their being magistrates unlimited in respect of time].' Philocleon in the Vespae of Aristophanes will not hear of the function of dicast not being a magistracy: see Vesp. 548–551 (Didot), 575,

ἀρ' οὖ μεγάλη τούτ' ἔστ' ἀρχὴ καὶ τοῦ πλούτου καταχὴν;

and 619 sqq. Plato in the Laws (767 A: cp. 768 C) holds that if a dicast is not in strictness a magistrate, he is in a sense a magistrate, and an important one too, on the day on which he decides a lawsuit. Cp. Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 233, ἀνὴρ γὰρ ἰδιώτης ἐν πόλει δημοκρατουμένη νόμῳ καὶ ἰσόφης βασιλεία. But dicasts and magistrates were no doubt commonly distinguished: Strabo, for instance (p. 665), speaks of δικασταί and ἀρχόντες, and Aristotle himself in the Sixth (old Fourth) Book distinguishes between ἀρχαὶ and τὸ δικαστικὸν (6 (4). 14. 1297 b 41 sqq.). When he speaks otherwise in 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 8 sq., he is referring to oligarchical constitutions in which the judge was really a magistrate. A member of the assembly, on the other hand, would be less likely to claim to be a magistrate. In c. 11. 1282 a 34 Aristotle says that dicasts and members of the Boulē and the assembly are not magistrates, but parts of a magistracy.

27. τοὺς τοιούτους, 'the above-mentioned,' i.e. dicasts and members of the assembly.

28. διὰ ταύτ', by reason of their being dicasts and members of the assembly.
toûs κυριωτάτους. Cp. c. ii. 1282 a 25 sqq. and 2. 12. 1274 a 4 sqq., and see Philocleon's description in the Vespeae of the greatness of his own position as dicast. The deliberative is described as 'supreme over the constitution' in 6 (4). 14. 1299 a 1 and 8 (6). 1. 1316 b 31 sq. (cp. 2. 6. 1264 b 33 sq.).

29. peri ónômatoς γαρ κ.τ.λ., 'for the dispute is about a name, for the difficulty arises from the fact that there is no single word in use to designate that which a dicast and a member of the assembly have in common, [and to tell us] what we ought to call the functions of both.' Cp. Meteor. 1. 4. 341 b 15, ἀνώνυμον γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ πάσης τῆς καπνώδους διακρίσεως. Τὰ δὲ ταῦτ' ἀμφω καλέων is perhaps added because ἀνώνυμος has much of the sense of ἀδήλος, which is coupled with it in Metaph. Z. 7. 1033 a 13, δὲ δὲ ἡ στήριξις ἀδήλος καὶ ἀνώνυμος. Compare, however, also such sentences as 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 15, πολιτεία μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τάξις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ peri τὰς ἀρχὰς, τίνα τρόπον νεόμυσα, and 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 5, ἵστοι δὲ πολιτικῆς χρησίμαι πρῶτον τὸ τε πλήθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πόσους τε καὶ πολίους τινὰς ὑπάρχειν δὲι φύσει κ.τ.λ.

31. διορισμοῦ χάριν, 'distinctionis causa' (Bon. Ind. 200 a 60, where 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 13 and Magn. Mor. i. 34. 1195 a 27 are referred to).

32. ἀόριστος ἀρχή. When an adjective and substantive are without the article, the substantive is usually in the Politics placed first and the adjective second (cp. for instance 1275 b 18, ἀρχής βουλευτικῆς ἡ κριτικῆς, c. 4. 1276 b 17, ἀνδρός ἄγαθον καὶ πολίτον σπουδαίον, and 1277 a 33, ἀρχὴ δεσμοτική), but now and then we find the reverse order adopted, e.g. in the passage before us and in c. i. 1281 b 35, ἵσταρι ἀνθρώπος. When under these circumstances the adjective is placed first, it is usually intended to be emphasized. Πολύς and some other adjectives are exceptions to this rule; they commonly precede the substantive with which they agree (7 (5). 10. 1312 b 25: 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 27, 30), and are placed after it when they are emphatic (3. 16. 1287 b 29: Plato, Phaedr. 274 E, ἀ λόγος πολύς ἄν ἐὰν διελθεῖν: Demosth. in Lept. c. 162).

τοὺς οὕτω μετέχοντας, those who share as ἀόριστοι ἀρχωντες, in tacit contrast to 1275 a 8, οἱ τῶν δικαίων μετέχοντες οὕτως ὡστε καὶ δικην ὑπέχειν καὶ δικαίωσθαι. Cp. c. 9. 1280 b 25, οὕτω κοινωνοῦντες.

33. ὁ μὲν οὖν μᾶλλον ἐν ἐφαρμόσας πολίτης κ.τ.λ. Πολίτης = διορισμοῦ τοῦ πολίτου. We are told in fact later that the definition
of the citizen which rests on extraction fails to suit persons whom nevertheless all would hold to be citizens (1275 b 32). 'Εφαρμόστειν is a word often used by Aristotle, but it would seem to be rather a poetical than a prose word, and it does not appear to occur in Plato, Thucydides, or the Attic orators, nor indeed in Xenophon, unless the Agesilaus is his work.

34. δεί δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν... 1275 b 5, πολιτείαν. See vol. i. p. 242 for an interpretation of this passage. The πολιτεία are the ἰποκείμενα of the citizen because they are the 'res ad quas refertur' πολίτων 'notio et a quibus suspensa est' (Bon. Ind. 798 b 59, cp. 799 a 16). I follow the interpretation of Bonitz, as do also Prof. Jowett (Politics, 2. 106) and Prof. J. A. Stewart (Class. Rev. 9. 455 sq.).

35. τῶν πραγμάτων is probably a partitive genitive after ὄας.


37. ἡ τοιαύτα, i.e. in the case before us 'as citizens.' The citizen of the best constitution and the citizen of an extreme democracy may have much in common with each other as animals, but little or nothing as citizens.

1275 b.

1. τὰς γὰρ ἡμαρτημένας κ.τ.λ. Bonitz (Ind. 652 a 51 sqq.) groups with the passage before us Categ. 12. 14 b 4 sqq. (see Waitz on 14 a 26) and Metaph. B. 2. 997 a 12, where προσέρα is conjoined with κυριωτέρα. Cp. also Pol. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 40, τῆς πρώτης καὶ θειοτάτης (πολιτείας), and Plut. Sympos. 2. 3. 3, καὶ λόγον ἔχει τοῦ ἄτελος φύσει πρότερον εἶναι τὸ τέλειον, ὡς τοῦ πεπρωμένου τὸ ἀλόκληρον καὶ τοῦ μέρους τὸ ὅλον.

2. τὰς δὲ παρεκβεβηκυίας κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has, however, already used the term παρεκβάσεις (2. 11. 1273 a 3).

5. ὁ λεχθεῖς. Cp. 1275 a 32. 'He who shares in the ἄριστος ἄρχη of the dicast and the member of the assembly.'

ἐν μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ μάλιστα. These words are to be taken together.

7. (ἐν) ἐνιαῖς γὰρ οὐκ ἐστι δήμος, sc. πολιτείας. Δήμος appears here to mean 'a people gathered in an assembly,' 'a body of ecclesiastae' (cp. c. 11. 1282 a 34 sqq., where ἐκκλησιαστὴς is said to be a μόριον of ὁ δήμος), while ἐκκλησία means the institution itself, the assembly.

8. συγκλήτους, such as, for instance, the 5000 at Athens, whom the 400 were to call together whenever they pleased (Thuc. 8.
67. 3). The contrast drawn implies that it was of the essence of an ἐκκλησία to meet at regular intervals, and not merely when the authorities of the State chose to convoke it. Compare the Pregadi at Venice. ‘C’est le nom qu’on donnait aux sénateurs, parce que dans l’origine, alors qu’il n’existait pas de jour fixe pour leurs séances, on allait à domicile prier chaque membre de vouloir bien se rendre au Palais Ducal’ (Yriarte, Vie d’un Patricien de Venise, p. 78). Schömann (Antiqq. Iuris Publ. Graec. p. 82, note 6) refers to the ἐπίκλητος instituted by Lysimachus at Ephesus (Strabo, p. 640, ἤν δὲ γεφυραία καταγραφομένη, τούτοις δὲ συνήθεον οἱ ἐπίκλητοι καλούμενοι καὶ διάφορον πάντα), but the nature of these ἐπίκλητοι is obscure. Perhaps we should compare with them the ἐπείσκλητοι of 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 30. l. 21 sqq. (ed. Sandys). The members of the council of the Aetolian League were called ἀπόκλητοι (see as to them Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 28. 4). Ἐγκλητοί would be officials, not ἀδίστοι ἀρχοντες.

κατὰ μέρος, ‘by sections’: cp. 6 (4). 16. 1301 a 1, τοσοῦτοι δ’ ἔτεροι καὶ οἱ κατὰ μέρος (τρόποι), opposed to τὸ πάντας κρίνεις. Lambinus adopts a different interpretation, ‘et lites controversiasque alias alii cognoscunt ac discceptant,’ and so Vict. and Bonitz (‘aliam alius magistratus,’ Ind. 455 b 7), but this rendering seems inconsistent with 11, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ Καρχηδόνα, for this does not appear to have been the plan followed at Carthage.

9. οἶνον ἐν Λακεδαίμονι τὰς τῶν συμβολαίων δικάζει τῶν ἐφόρων ἀλλος ἄλλας. This is confirmed by Plut. Apophth. Lac. Eurycratides, διὰ τί περὶ τὰ τῶν συμβολαίων δίκαια ἡκάτης ἡμέρας κρίνονσιν οἱ ἐφόροι.

10. ἔτερα δ’ ἵσως ἀρχή τις ἔτερας. E.g. the kings (Hdt. 6. 57, δικάζειν δὲ μούνας τοὺς βασιλείας τοσάδε μοῦνα πατρῴχου τε παρθένου πέρι, ἐς τὸν ἱεράτεια ἔχειν, ἢν ἡ περὶ ὁ πατήρ αὐτὴν ἐγγυηθή, καὶ ἰδίων δημοσίων πέρι).

11. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον κ.τ.λ. See note on 1273 a 19.

13. ἀλλ’ ἔχει γὰρ κ.τ.λ., ‘however [we need not give up] our definition of a citizen, as it admits of correction’ (Mr. Welldon).

14. ταῖς ἄλλαις πολιτείαις, i.e. other than democracy, as in 6. Surely, however, an assembly and dicasteries will exist in a polity? An assembly, indeed, appears to have existed in some oligarchies also, though members of it were required to possess a high property-qualification (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 3 sqq.) or it was made harmless in some way (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 26 sqq.), and not only an
assembly, but dicasteries of which the poor were at any rate nominally members (6 (4). 9. 1294 a 37 sqq.: 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 16 sqq.).

15. ὅ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὑπηρετόν, literally ‘he who is limited [in point of time] in respect of his office,’ i.e. the holder of office for a limited period. Cp. Plut. Pericl. c. 10, ὅ μὲν οὖν ἐξουσιασμὸς ὑπηρετοῦν εἴχε νόμον δεκαετίαν τοῖς φεύγουσιν.

16. τούτων, ἤ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὑπηρετῶν.

τισὺν, as at Carthage, so far at least as judicial authority is concerned, for a share of deliberative authority was accorded at Carthage to the popular assembly (2. 11. 1273 a 6 sqq.). In many oligarchies, probably, the power of deliberating about all matters and trying all suits was possessed by a part or the whole of the holders of office.

17. περὶ τινὸς. This would be characteristic of an aristocracy or a polity rather than an oligarchy (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 5 sqq.: 6 (4). 16. 1301 a 13 sqq.).

18. ὁ γὰρ ἑξουσία κ.τ.λ. Participation in either deliberative or judicial office is, it would seem, enough to constitute a citizen: thus if, as in some oligarchies, e.g. that of Heracleia on the Euxine (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 34), the dicasteries are recruited from those outside the ruling class, the members of them would be citizens. Aristotle’s view that full citizenship is constituted by access to deliberative and judicial office is quite in harmony with his description of the deliberative and judiciary of a State as ‘parts of the State in an especial sense’ (6 (4). 4. 1291 a 24 sqq.). In c. 5. 1278 a 35, however, we are told that ὅ μετέχων τῶν τιμῶν— not simply ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς ἡ κριτικῆς—is ὁ μάλιστα πολίτης. Still it would seem that a man may be a full citizen without access to ἀλ ἀρχαί strictly so called, for at Malis ὃι ἀσπλιγευκότες were citizens, though they were not eligible for ἀλ ἀρχαί (6 (4). 13. 1297 b 14). Whether the mere right to elect magistrates, which is distinguished from deliberative authority in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 21 sqq., would be sufficient in Aristotle’s view to constitute citizenship, may be doubted. We gather from 3. 14. 1285 a 25 sqq. and 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 7 that there are citizens in States ruled by kings, but Aristotle nowhere explicitly takes account of such citizens, nor does he explain their position.

19. ταύτης τῆς πόλεως, ‘of the State in which he possesses these rights’: cp. c. 3. 1276 a 15 and c. 11. 1281 b 29 sqq.
20. πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ἱωνία. So too in 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 24, cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 16, πρὸς ἱωνίαν αὐτάρκειαν, but in 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 8 we have αὐτάρκεια πρὸς τὸ ἐδ. ἱωνι (cp. 1. 2. 1252 b 28 sqq. and Oecon. 1. 1. 1343 a 10 sq.), and this is the exacter statement.

21. ὁρίζωντα ἐπὶ κ.τ.λ. After giving his definition of a citizen C. 2. Aristotle now proceeds to point out the weakness of a rival definition. The citizen was commonly defined as descended from two citizen-parents. Those who defined citizenship thus could appeal to laws existing at Athens (vol. i. p. 227) and Byzantium ([Aristot.] Oecon. 2. 1346 b 26 sqq.) and to the general feeling throughout Greece, that those descended from two citizen-parents were γυνήσιοι πολίται (c. 5. 1278 a 30). Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 297, 2) traces this feeling at Oreus, Cos, Rhodes, and elsewhere. Not only citizenship but other things also were held to pass most surely by descent from both parents—e.g. virtue (Eurip. Fragm. 524, ἤγιοσάμων οὖν, εἰ παραζεύξει τις χρηστῷ ποιημένα λέγρων, οὐκ ἂν εὐτεκνεῖν, εὐδοκοι δε ἂν ἀμφοῖν εὐθλόν ἂν φῶναι γόνον), nobility (1. 6. 1255 a 36 sqq.), and physical strength (Xen. Rep. Lac. 1. 4, νομίζων ἔς ἀμφοτέρων ἰσχυρών καὶ τὰ ἐγκόνα ἐρρωμενεστέρα γένεσθαι).

πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν, in tacit opposition to πρὸς τὴν γνώσιν: cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 9 sq.

23. οἷον is here explanatory (see above on 1255 b 38).

οἱ ἐπὶ κ.τ.λ., 'while others even carry this requirement further, for instance to the extent of two, three, or more ancestors.' Cp. c. 13. 1283 a 33, οἱ δ’ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ εὐγενεῖς ὡς ἐγγὺς ἀλλήλων πολίται γάρ μᾶλλον οἱ γενεαλότεροι τῶν ἐγγενῶν. Liddell and Scott compare Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 4. 47, οὐδὲ εἰς τρίτον πᾶσον ἀνενεγκεῖν ἥξει τὸ γένος: cp. also Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 4 (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 229), ἕμποροσίν τε τῶν πᾶσον ὅσον. It was usually in connexion with sacred offices that a pedigree of this kind was required (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 321. i: cp. Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr., No. 371), but civil offices were sometimes subject to a similar restriction—thus the Thesmophetae at Athens (Aristot. Fragm. 374. 1540 a 39 sqq.) and the τιμονικόν at Massalia (a senate of 600 life-members which ruled the State, Strabo, p. 179) were required to be διὰ τριγυνίας ἐκ πολιτῶν γεγονότες—and we learn from the passage before us that some even denied the name of citizen to those who had not these advantages of descent. A still narrower
view prevailed at one time at Apollonia on the Ionian Gulf, and at Thera, where the only persons regarded as ἐλεβέβροι were the descendants of the original settlers (6 (4). 1290 b 9 sqq.). Dio Chrysostom, on the other hand, sensibly remarks (Or. 41, 2. 181 R), τὸ γὰρ ἀποτέρω δυνών βαθμῶν ('further back than one's grandfather,' Liddell and Scott) ἔγει τὸ γένος οὐδεμίας ἑπεικῆς οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὔτω τὸ γε ἄλθες ἐξ οὐδεμίας εὑρέθησεται πόλεως. In a similar spirit a slave of three generations (τρίδουλος, Soph. O. T. 1062 sq., cp. ἑπτάδουλος) was thought to be especially a slave. We read of ἐκ τῆς ἑνέκα [ἐν] μυροπόλης in Hyperid. c. Athenogen. col. 9. 3.

25. πολιτικῶς. Cp. Poet. 6. 1450 b 7 and Polyb. 5. 33. 5, οὐδ' ἐφ' ὅσον οἱ τὰ κατὰ καροῦς ἐν ταῖς χρονογραφίαις ὑπομνηματιζόμενοι πολιτικῶς εἰς τοὺς τοίχους, where Schweighäuser explains 'populari, vulgari, simplici ratione, nude, sine arte,' and [Xen.] Ages. 8. 7, ἄκουσάτω δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ πολιτικὸν καννάθρου κατηγεί εἰς 'Αμύκλας ἡ θυγάτηρ αὐτοῦ. 'Compare also the πολιτικὰ ὑόματα of Isocr. Evag. § 10' (Richards).


ἀπορούσι τινες τὸν τρίτον ἐκείνον ἢ τέταρτον, 'some raise a question as to that third or fourth ancestor.' The 'third ancestor' is apparently the great-grandfather. For this 'anticipatory accusative,' see Dr. Holden on Xen. Oecon. 18. 9, and other passages. Anti-sthenes may have been one of these τινες, for we know that his extraction was made a subject of reproach to him, and a rejoinder of this kind would be quite in his vein (compare his rejoinder in Diog. Laert. 6. 4). It is interesting to note that he was a disciple of Gorgias, of whose views we hear in 26 sqq.

26. Γοργίας μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. 'Gorgias of Leontini, indeed, partly perhaps in a questioning way' (cp. ἀποροῦσι, 25), 'partly in a spirit of banter, said that as those are mortars which have been made by mortar-makers, so those are Larissaeans who have been made by the handicraftsmen, for that there were certain Larissa-making handicraftsmen; but [there is nothing to raise any question about;] the matter is simple,' etc. Τῶν δημιουργῶν must be translated 'the handicraftsmen' and δημιουργοί must be supplied after Λαρισσαῖοι, and then the added explanation, ἐνα γὰρ τινας Λαρισσαῖον, which Ridgeway and Sus. would omit, is not otiose. The 'Larissa-making handicraftsmen' referred to are of course the magistrates (δημιουργοί) of Larissa, the word δημιουργὸς meaning both 'handi-
craftsmen' and 'magistrate.' We expect Δαρισσαίοις in place of Δαρισσαίοις, and Camerarius reads Δαρισσαίοις, but since a city = its citizens, 'Larissa-makers' = 'makers of Larissaeans,' and Δαρισσαίοις, which (or rather Δαρισσαίοις) is the reading of Ρ Π Vat. Pal., may be used in preference to Δαρισσαίοις, partly because it is nearer in form to διμωσιών, and partly to convey a hint that the making of Larissaeans had been on so large a scale that it virtually amounted to a making of Larissa. Gorgias said that every one was a citizen who was made a citizen by the duly empowered magistrates, and thus went to the length of acknowledging all those as citizens who were made citizens by the authorities of the State, whatever the rights conferred on them; Aristotle, on the contrary, looks not merely to the persons who confer citizenship, but also to the rights conferred; if these are the rights which constitute citizenship, the persons made citizens are citizens, but not otherwise. He probably objects to Gorgias' view because according to it ποιητοί πολίται would be citizens. But Gorgias' view was in his opinion so far correct that it did not base citizenship on extraction, but traced it to the action of the State. It was quite in the spirit of Gorgias' philosophical teaching to make out that citizens and the State were manufactured, artificial products. He himself was a ξίνος at Larissa, and was no doubt not sorry to banter the Larissaeans nobles on their pride of birth (compare Matt. iii. 9, 'And think not to say within yourselves, We have Abraham to our father, for I say unto you that God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham'). We have seen that the word δημοσιώτες meant 'handicraftsman' as well as 'magistrate.' A line of Leonidas of Tarentum (Anth. Pal. 6. 305),

τῶς Δαρισσαίως κυτογιότορας ἐψητήρας,

lends some colour to the view that a further ἐγκύνομεν lurks in the saying of Gorgias, and that Δαρισσαίοις may well have borne two meanings in the minds of his hearers, 'Larissaeans' and 'pots,' but as the late Dr. Thompson has pointed out (see Prof. Ridgeway, Camb. Philol. Trans. 2. 136), it is not clear that Δαρισσαίος without a substantive could mean 'pot;' for it is linked with ἐψητήρ in the epigram, and indeed, if it could, we should expect Δαρισσαίοις in the clause which follows: Δαρισσαίοις, however, as has been said, is the reading of all the MSS. and of Vet. Int. The saying loses little or nothing, if this additional subtlety is withdrawn from
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it. Larissa was oligarchically governed, but it is perhaps hardly likely that even there the demiurgi of the State had the uncontrolled right of admitting citizens; more probably they acted under a commission empowering them to admit to citizenship persons who fulfilled certain conditions prescribed by the State. See Szanto, Das griech. Bürgerrecht, p. 30 sq. Prof. Ridgeway (Journal of Philology, 15, p. 164) makes the not improbable suggestion that the addition to the citizen-roll of Larissa to which Gorgias' saying refers was necessitated by the blow which the city received in b.c. 404 from Lycophron of Pherae (Xen. Hell. 2. 3. 4). It would seem from 35 that it was not preceded by any change of constitution. Gorgias was well known for his irony (Rhet. 3. 7. 1408 b 19, ἢ δὴ συν οὔτω δεῖ ἢ μετ' εἰρωνείας, ὡσπερ Γόργιας ἐποίει καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ). We see from Rhet. 2. 2. 1379 b 31 that εἰρωνεία implies slight contempt. Whether Meineke, Fragm. Comicorum Anonymorum, 183 (Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 649),

τῶν πολιτῶν ἄνδρας ὑμῖν δημιουργοὺς ἀποφαίνω,

has anything to do with Gorgias' saying, is more than I will undertake to decide.

32. καὶ γὰρ οὗτε δυναιτὸν κ.τ.λ., 'for it is not even possible [much less the fact] that the test of descent from a citizen-father or mother should apply in the case of those who were the first to dwell in the city or to found it,' and yet these would be citizens in an especial degree: compare 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 12 sq. and an inscription quoted by Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 167. 3, in which a Halicarnassian named Nireus is honoured διὰ τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ κλητοῖς καὶ τυρα[νν]οκτόνων τῆς πόλεως καθ' έκα[ς]δον τοὺς γυναικές αὐτοῦ εὐγενείαν: also Diod. 14. 98. 1, Εὐγορᾶς οἱ Σαλαμίνοι, ὁ θύμῳ τῶς ἐγενε- στατος, τῶν γὰρ κτισάντων τὴν πόλιν θύμῳ ἐπόγονοι. Susemihl translates 'auf die ersten Ansiedler und Staatsgründer,' but ἢ appears to distinguish between being the first to dwell in a city and being the first to found it. In 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 38, the only other passage in Aristotle's writings (except a fragment) to which the Index Aris- telicus gives a reference for the word κτίζεως, κ ἱσαστες is used of kings who founded cities, and I am inclined to think (with Sepulv. Vict. Lamb. and Giph.) that it is used in a similar way in the passage before us of the κτίσται of cities, who, while they would no doubt be themselves among οἱ πρῶτοι οἰκήσαντες, would be marked off from them by being their chiefs and leaders. Κτίζεως is especially used of these κτίσται or οἰκωταί, or else of the mother-
city, though it is occasionally used of the whole body of original settlers, as for instance in Thuc. 5. 16. 3. For οὐδὲ δυνατῶν, cp. c. 15. 1286 b 21, οὐδὲ ῥάδιων, and c. 16. 1287 a 10, οὐδὲ κατὰ φύσιν. I follow Bonitz (Ind. s. v.) in taking ἐφαρμότθεν here as intransitive, as in 1275 a 33, but it is quite possible that Sus., Liddell and Scott, and others are right in taking it as transitive.

34. ἀλλ' ἵνας κ. τ. λ., 'but perhaps this case lends itself more to debate, the case of those who acquired the rights of citizens after a change of constitution, such a creation of citizens, I mean, as that which Cleisthenes enacted at Athens, for he enrolled in the tribes many aliens and slave metoeci.' The question whether citizens who acquired citizenship after a change of constitution are citizens is a more difficult one than that just discussed, because the new citizens in this case are not made citizens by duly empowered magistrates of the old constitution, but by the introducer of the new one; besides, the citizens admitted by Cleisthenes were aliens and slave metoeci, and aliens and metoeci are the very opposite of citizens (c. 5. 1277 b 39). Euripides had made one of the characters of his Erechtheus say (Fragm. 362. II sqq.),

οὔτε δ' ἀπ' ἀλλής πόλεος οἰκίζει πόλιν,
ἀρμόδιον ποιηρός ὅσπερ ἐν ξύλῳ παγεῖς,
λόγῳ πολίτης ἐστι, τοῖς δ' ἔργοις οὐ.

As to ἐκεῖνο see critical note. For ἔχει ἀπορίαν, cp. Phys. 8. 2. 253 a 7, μάλιστα δ' ἂν δόξει τὸ τρίτον ἔχειν ἀπορίαν, and 1. 3. 186 a 8, μᾶλλον δ' ὁ Μελίσσου (λόγως) φορτικὸς καὶ οὐκ ἔχων ἀπορίαν, ἀλλ' ἐνος ἀτόπου δοθέντος τὰλλα συμβαίνει· τούτῳ δ' οὐδὲν χαλεπόν: also Pol. 3. II. 1281 a 41 and 3. 12. 1282 b 22. For ὅου Ἀθηναίοι ἐποίησε Κλεισθένης cp. 2. 7. 1266 b 16, οὗον καὶ Σωλῶν ἐναμοβέθησεν, and for ἐποίησε, 'enacted,' 2. 12. 1274 b 7. ὅουν κ. τ. λ. explains μετέχον. A suggestion, however, which well deserves notice, that οὗ should be added after ὅου, has been recorded in the critical note on 1275 b 35. For the plural in τὴν τῶν τυράννων ἐκβολῆν, cp. Diod. II. 55, μετὰ τὴν κατάλυσιν τῶν τυράννων τῶν περὶ Πεισιστρατοῦ, Thuc. 8. 68, ἐπειδὴ οἱ τύραννοι κατελύθησαν, Polyb. 3. 22. 1, μετὰ τὴν τῶν βασιλέων κατάλυσιν, and the words μετὰ τὴν κατάλυσιν τῶν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ βασιλέων (referring to the dethronement of the Ptolemies) in an inscription found at Philae and published in the Athenaeum for March 14, 1896. The displacement of the dynasty is expressed by the plural, as in 'pulsis regibus,' Tac. Hist. 3. 72. This is the sense which
the plural seems to bear in the passage before us, though oi τύραννοι is often loosely used where an act of only one of the tyrants is referred to (e.g. in 'Aθ. Πολ. c. 19. l. 13 and c. 20. l. 2, and in Demosth. c. Mid. c. 144). 'Εφυλέτευσε is stronger than πολίτας ἑποίμαστο would have been. As to δούλους μετοίκους see vol. i. p. 231 note. Cp. also [Plato,] Alcib. i. 119 A, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἢ τῶν ξένων δούλων ἢ ἑλεύθερον εἰσί, ὥστις αὐτίαν ξένοι διὰ τὴν Περικλέους συνοισίαν σοφότερος γεγονέα, where it is implied that the ξένοι include slaves, and Hecataeus, Fragm. 318 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 24). Bernays (Heraklitt. Briefe, p. 155) takes ξένους and δούλους as both of them adjectives and μετοίκους as the substantive common to them, referring to Aristoph. Eq. 347 Didot, εἰ ποι δικίδοιν εἶται εὖ κατὰ ξένου μετοίκου, which shows that the term ξένους μέτοικος was a recognized one, but on the other hand ξένου and μετοίκου are often distinguished (e.g. in c. 5. 1277 b 39), and perhaps it is hardly likely that Cleisthenes confined himself to enfranchising resident aliens. His object was to strengthen his own party among the citizens, the democratic party, and this was most effectually done by enrolling aliens and slave metoeci, for they were sure to side with him against the γυναῖκαν. At any rate they would not hold with the συνήθειαν at which he sought to strike a blow (8 (6). 4. 1319 b 26). Towards the close of the Peloponnesian War Athens enrolled not only metoeci but aliens also as citizens (Diod. 13. 97. 1). Not all aliens were absolute aliens; some were sons of a citizen-father by a mother not of citizen-birth, like the ξένου mentioned in c. 5. 1278 a 26 sqq. Those aliens and metoeci who had a touch of servile blood in their veins would be most unwelcome as citizens, for we learn in c. 5. 1278 a 33 that citizens of servile origin were the first to be extruded when the State could afford to get rid of them. How hateful the measure of Cleisthenes must have been to many, we see from Lycurg. c. Leocr. c. 41, πολλῶν δὲ καὶ δεινών κατὰ τὴν πόλιν γυμνέων καὶ πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν τὰ μέγιστα ἵτυχες, μάλιστ' ἀν τις ἠλθῃς καὶ ἔδικτην ἐπὶ ταῖς τῆς πόλεως συμφοραῖς ἥμιξ' ἄραν ἢν τοῦ δήμου ψυχρόσμενον τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἑλεύθερους, τοὺς δὲ ξένους Ἀθηναίους, τοὺς δ' ἀτύμους ἐντύμους' ὥσ πρῶτον ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτόχθονει εἶναι καὶ ἑλεύθερος ἐσεμνύστει. The 'happy city' of Lucian's Hermotimus, in which all are ἐπίπλωδες καὶ ξένοι, αὐθεντικὶς δὲ οὐδὲ εἰς (c. 24), is in designed contrast to the generally accepted ideal. The making of slaves and aliens citizens was a measure often resorted to by tyrants (see
vol. i. p. 547, note 2: Diod. ii. 72. 3, i4. 7. 4) and by extreme democrats (Xen. Hell. 2. 3. 48).

37. τὸ δ' ἀμφισβήτημα πρὸς τούτοις. Cp. c. 16. 1287 b 35.

1. ἄρ' εἰ μὴ δικαίως πολίτης, οὐ πολίτης, 'whether, if a man is not 1276 a. justly a citizen, he is not in fact no citizen at all.' This Aristotle will not admit: compare the line he takes in Eth. Nic. 3. 6. 1113 a 17 sqq. Cicero, on the contrary, in De Legibus 2. 5. 11-2. 6. 14 denies that faulty laws are laws at all.

ἀς ταῦτα δυναμένου τοῦ τ' ἀδίκου καὶ τοῦ ψευδούς. For the use of τε in sentences of this kind cp. c. 4. 1277 a 20 sq. and 4 (7) 10. 1329 b 1. Cp. also 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 19, ἵσον τε δειομένην σκυτέων τε καὶ γεωργῶν.

4. ἄρξῇ τινὶ, i.e. ἄρξῃ βουλευτικῇ ἣ κριτικῇ (c. 1. 1275 b 18).

7. τὴν εἰρημένην πρῶτερον ἀμφισβήτησιν, in c. 1. 1274 b 34 sq. C. 3.

The question whether these citizens are justly citizens or not is connected with the question whether they were made citizens by the State or not, a question which some identify with the question whether the constitution under which they have become citizens is based merely on force or exists for the common advantage, and if we deny that the acts of a tyrant or an oligarchy are acts of the State on the ground that the tyranny or oligarchy is based merely on force and does not exist for the common good, we must say the same thing of the acts of any democracy which is in the same position, so that we shall deny that those who are created citizens by a democracy of this kind are justly citizens. Aristotle appears to hint that the democracy introduced by Cleisthenes was a democracy resting on force and not for the common good, and that on the principle laid down by the persons to whom he refers the aliens whom Cleisthenes made citizens were not justly citizens, but he does not adopt the view that the acts of a constitution not for the common good are not acts of the State.

10. τότε γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for then some are not willing to discharge either (public) contracts on the plea that the tyrant, not the State, received the loan, or many other obligations of a similar kind, holding that some constitutions are based on superior force and are not for the common advantage, [and that the acts done by the authorities they constitute are consequently not acts of the State].'

These persons probably regarded democracies as in an especial degree constitutions for the common advantage: compare Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 76, where it is argued that democracies, unlike
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Oligarchies, are governed by laws conceived in the interest of the citizens. Our own use of the words 'republic' and 'common-wealth' indicates the prevalence of a cognate view (see Sir J. R. Seeley, Introduction to Political Science, p. 173). For an instance in which a public contract ran a risk of being thus repudiated, see vol. i. p. 231 sq. "Ovil alla pollla twv toov'tovn perhaps refers to the quashing of acts and judicial decisions; this happened after the fall of the Thirty at Athens (Aeschin. c. Timarch. c. 39: Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 56: Andoc. De Myst. c. 87). Questions of a similar nature have found their way into modern English law-courts.

'Given a revolutionary government which has been recognized by foreign States as a government de facto, but which has since been superseded by a more legitimate regime, are its acts and contracts to be held valid or not by the courts of those foreign States, as far as concerns the subjects over which they have jurisdiction? This was the issue which Mr. Justice Kay had to decide yesterday in the case of "The Republic of Peru v. Dreyfus" (Times, Feb. 21, 1888, where a report of the case will be found). This case, it will be noticed, applies only to revolutionary governments recognized by foreign States.

12. το χρατειν ουσια. Cp. De Gen. An. i. 18. 723 a 31, el touto bhsomven owtos bthn ou to apelthein apd ton to the, and such expressions as φύσει είναι or τὰς βία πραξεις (Plato, Polit. 280 D).

14. δημοκρατούνται κατά τὸν τρόπον τούτον, i.e. τό χρατειν ἄλλα ou diá to kaiν συμφέρων. Cp. Thuc. 8. 53. 1, Ἀλκιβιάδην καταγαγώσι καὶ μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων δημοκρατουμένως, and Plato, Polit. 291 E, ἰδημοκρατίας γε μήν, εάν τι ovd bhaios εάν τε ἐκουσίως τῶν τὰσ οὐσίας ἐχοντων τὸ πλῆθος ἄρχη, καὶ εάν τε τοῦς νόμους ἀκριβῶς φιλάττων εάν τε μή, πάντως τούνομα ουδεὶς αὐτής εἴσωθε μεταλλάττειν.

ἀρμοίως κ.τ.λ., 'we must say that the acts of the authorities set up by this constitution are to just the same extent and no more acts of this State as those proceeding from the oligarchy and the tyranny.' For ἀρμοίως καὶ cp. 2. 8. 1269 a 6, ἀρμοίως εἶναι καὶ τῶν τυχόντας καὶ τῶν ἀνώντων ('no better than'). Τῆς πόλεως ταύτης, i.e. the State of the times referred to: cp. c. 11. 1281 b 29, ὅταν γὰρ ἄτυχον πολλοὶ καὶ πέντε ἰπάρχοσι, πολεμίων ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πλήρη τὴν πόλιν ταύτην, and 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 40. For τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀλυγαρχίας (πραξεῖς) see Liddell and Scott s.v. ἐκ iii. 3, and see note on 1302 a 4. Cp. also 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 6, τὰς ἀμαρτίας τὰς παρ' ἀμφοτέρων τῶν πολιτείων, and Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 76, τὴν ἐκ τῆς ὀλυγαρχίας ἄδικαιν.
17. ἐδίκει δ' οἰκεῖος ὁ λόγος εἶναι τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης, πῶς ποτὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but the inquiry [to which we have just referred] seems to be cognate to this question, on what principle we ought to say that,' etc. With Sepulveda, Bernays, and Welldon I take πῶς ποτὲ κ.τ.λ. to explain τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης, and not ὁ λόγος, as Sus. Looking to τῆς ἀπορίας, 19, this seems to be the more natural interpretation, though it is true that τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης might refer to ἀποροῦντι, 8. Aristotle means that the question whether the contracts of those who are in power under a constitution resting on force and not for the common advantage are acts of the State and should be fulfilled by those who are in power after a change of constitution is cognate to the question under what circumstances the State is to be regarded as the same or not the same. He decides (1276b 10 sqq.) that after any change of constitution the State is not the same, but that the question as to the fulfilment of contracts is a separate one. As to πῶς ποτὲ, see Liddell and Scott, who refer to Soph. O. T. 1210.

19 sqq. 'The mode of dealing with this problem which lies nearest to hand is in connexion with the site and its inhabitants, for the site and the inhabitants may be divided into two or more sections, and some of the inhabitants may dwell on one site, and some on another.' Μέν ὁδὸν is taken up by μὲν ὁδὸν, 22, but it is difficult to say where the answering particle is to be found. For ἐπιστολαισιατήν, cp. Rhet. 3. 10. 1410 b 21, διὸ ωθε τὰ ἐπιστολαι τῶν ἐνυμμηστῶν εὐδοκμεῖ (ἐπιστολαι γὰρ λέγομεν τὰ παλί δῆλα καὶ ἄρρητα εἰς ζητήσας) κ.τ.λ. The words εὐθέται γὰρ διαξευχῆκας τὸν τόπον καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων have been interpreted in two ways. Vict. explains them, ‘contingit enim ut locus distinctus sit, hominesque codem pacto separati, ita ut hi hanc, alií vero aliam sedem habeant.’ Mr. Welldon, on the other hand, translates, ‘it is possible that the inhabitants should be divorced from the site and should come to dwell in different sites.’ Perhaps the former interpretation is to be preferred. As an instance of some inhabitants dwelling on one site and others on another, we may take the διοίκεσις of Mantinea by the Lacedaemonians (Paus. 8. 8. 9, ὃς δὲ εἶλε τὴν Μαντινεὰν (Ἀγριστόλις), ὁλόγον μὲν τι κατεληπτεις οἰκεῖοθαι, τὸ πλείστον δὲ εἰς ἰδαφος καταβαλὸν αὐὴς κατὰ κόμμα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους διψιστε). The question then is—will a change of this kind have destroyed the identity of the πόλις? Aristotle’s somewhat curt answer is that the word πόλις is used in many different senses, and that it is easy to solve the question if
that is borne in mind. His meaning perhaps is that if we take πόλις in the sense of 'an aggregate of human beings or citizens,' the Mantineans after the δοίκισις will still constitute the same State as before, but if we take it in the sense of 'an aggregate of human beings or citizens gathered on a given site,' they will no longer do so.

24. ὁμιως δε κ.τ.λ., 'and similarly [one might raise the question] in the case also in which the inhabitants occupy one and the same site, when we ought to consider the πόλις to be one.' Are we to say that it is one, however large the site may be and however varied in race the inhabitants, provided only that it is enclosed within one and the same wall?

26. ου γάρ δὴ τοις τείχεσιν, 'for surely it is not one πόλις in virtue of its walls.' For γάρ δὴ, cp. c. 9. 1280 b 24 and 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 32.

27. εἰ πόλις ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ περιβαλεῖν ἐν τείχοις. Aristotle probably remembers a famous taunt of the Athenians addressed to the Lacedaemonians, which is recorded in the Funeral Oration ascribed to Lysias, c. 44, ὡστερον δὲ Πελοποννησίων διατειχιστῶν τὸν Ἱσθμὸν... ὀφυσθέντες Ἀθηναίοι συνεβούλευσαν αὐτοῖς, εἰ ταῦτα τὴν γνώμην ἔχουν, περὶ ἄπασαν τὴν Πελοπόννησον τείχος περιβαλεῖν. A line in the Temenidae of Euripides (Fragm. 730) ran, ἄπασα Πελοπόννησος εὐτυχεὶ πόλις.

Polybius (2. 37. 9 sqq.) implies that in his day Peloponnesus was virtually one city, having the same magistrates, etc., the only want being a common wall.

tοιαύτη, 'like Peloponnesus with a wall round it.' Cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 3 sqq.

28. καὶ Βαβυλῶν... 30. πόλεως. As to Babylon, see note on 1326 b 3. The walls of Babylon according to Herodotus (1. 178) were 480 stadia in circumference, according to Ctesias (Diod. 2. 7) 360 stadia, and according to Cleitarchus (Diod. ibid.) 365 stadia. A still larger circuit of wall (1500 stadia) was to be found after Aristotle's time at Antiochia Margiana (the modern Merv), if we could trust Strabo (p. 516). Herodotus (1. 191) says that owing to the size of Babylon, when the outer part of it had been taken, the inhabitants of the centre were unaware of the fact and continued to celebrate a festival till they learnt it; he does not mention that the interval amounted to three days. Here, as in 2. 3. 1262 a 18 sqq., 3. 13. 1284 a 26 sqq., and 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 17 sq. (see notes on these passages), Aristotle mentions a circumstance also mentioned
by Herodotus, but mentions it with a slight variation. He may possibly quote Herodotus from memory. Megalopolis was taken by Cleomenes 'before the Megalopolitans were aware of the fact' (Plut. Cleom. c. 23), but then Megalopolis was 'a great desert' (Polyb. 2. 55. 2: 5. 93. 5). For the omission of πόλις after πάσα see note on 1266 b 1; its omission is facilitated by the occurrence of the word πόλεως in the next line. For the interposition of καὶ πάσα ... πόλεως between ἥς and its antecedent Βαβυλῶν, cp. Phys. 8. 6. 259 a 3, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἦττον ἡττι τι ὁ περιέχει, καὶ τοῦτο παρ' ἐκατον, ὃ ἔστιν αὐτίον κ.τ.λ., where καὶ·τοῦτο παρ' ἐκατον is interposed. Τὐνὸς μὲν τοι πολέως is interposed in a somewhat similar way in Pol. 3. 4. 1277 a 22 sqq., and καὶ κεκαλλοπισμέναι in Aristoph. Lysistr. 43 Didot, αἰ καθήμεθ' ἐξαιθασμέναι, κροκοτὰ φοροῦσι καὶ κεκαλλοπισμέναι καὶ Κιμβερί' ὠρθοστάδια καὶ περιβαρίδας.

31. εἰς ἄλλων καρύδων χρήσιμος, cp. 7 (5). ΙΙ. 1314 a 4, καὶ χρήσιμοι οἱ ποιηροὶ εἰς τὰ ποιηὴ. 32. περὶ γὰρ μεγέθους ... 34. πολιτικῶν. Supply συμφέρει after τὸ τε πόσον. The question πότερον ἔθνος ἐν Ἡ πλεῖον συμφέρει is probably suggested by the mention of Peloponnesus, of which Herodotus says (8. 73), οἰκεῖ ὁ δὲ τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἔθνεα ἐπτά. As to this question see vol. i. p. 295, note 1, where it has been pointed out that it is not dealt with in 4 (7). 4, though the proper size of the πόλεως is discussed there. The πόλεως consists ἐκ πλεῖων κομῶν (1. 2. 1252 b 27), and a question might naturally be raised whether it should not also consist of more ἔθνη than one. The colony of Thurii had been recruited from a variety of sources (Diod. 12. 10. 4: 12. ΙΙ. 3), and Plato had seen advantages in a citizen-body derived from more quarters than one (Laws 708).

34. ἄλλα κ.τ.λ. With the discussion of the question of the identity of the πόλεως which commences here should be compared the remarks of Plutarch on the same subject in De Sera Numinis Vindicta, c. 15: Plutarch, however, does not seem to have had this passage of the Politics before him. The question of identity had long been raised in reference to the individual. The speculations of Heraclitus and his doctrine of the flux of all things had drawn attention to this question, and Epicharmus had made a character in one of his comedies point to the increase and decrease in size which takes place in human beings and ask how this increase and
decrease was compatible with personal identity, and how a man whose identity had changed could be called on to pay his debts. See Diog. Laert. 3. 10–11, and Bernays’ essay on ‘Epicharmos und der αὐξανόμενοι λόγος’ in his Gesammelte Abhandlungen 1. 109–117, and Zeller, Gr. Ph. 1. 461. 1. Compare also the remarks of Diotima in Plato, Symp. 207 D. Aristotle is concerned in the passage before us not with the question of the identity of the individual, but with the question of the identity of the πόλις. In dealing with this question as with others, he steers a midway course. He agrees neither with Isocrates, who held that States are immortal (De Pace §120), nor with those who held that change in the individuals composing them destroyed their identity; their identity is according to him destructible, but it is destroyed by a change of constitution, not by a change of individuals.

37. ὁσπερ καὶ ποταμοῦς κ.τ.λ. Heraclitus had denied that they were the same (Fragm. 41 Bywater, ποταμοῖς διὸ τοῖς αὐτοῖς οίκ ἃ τῷ ἐμβαινῃ ἐπερέα γὰρ (καὶ ἐπέρα) ἐπηρρέει ὑδάτη, and Fragm. 81, ποταμοῖς τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐμβαινομέν δὲ καὶ οῖκ ἐμβαινομέν, εἰμέν τε καὶ οὐκ εἰμει). But Aristotle holds that the constant change of the watery particles of which a river is composed does not prevent its remaining the same. A river, however, is different from a πόλις. It is not an ὅλον or a σύνθεσις, like a πόλις or an ἄρμονα or a χορός, the identity of which depends on the arrangement of the parts (Metaph. A. 26. 1024 a 6, ὕδωρ δὲ καὶ ὅσα ὑγρὰ καὶ ἀριθμὸς πάν μὲν λέγεται, ὅλος δ’ ἀριθμὸς καὶ ὅλον ὕδωρ οὐ λέγεται, ἃν μὴ μεταφορᾷ). A river will remain the same so long as its particles consist of water, but a πόλις will not remain the same, so long as it consists of men of the same stock, if meanwhile a change should occur in its σύνθεσις or πολιτεία.

40. διὰ τὴν τοιαῦτην αἰτίαν, i.e. διὰ τὸ εἶναι τὸ γένος ταυτὸ τῶν κατοικοῦντων.

τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἐτέραν, ‘but the State different [if there is a change of polity]’ (Mr. Welldon, following Bernays).

1276 b. 2. κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας, ‘a sharing of citizens in a constitution.’ Bekker places a comma after πολιτῶν, but I follow Susemihl’s punctuation: cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 36, κοινωνοῦντων ἀπάντων μάλιστα τής πολιτείας ὁμοιώς. In c. 4. 1276 b 29 the πολιτεία, not the πόλις, is said to be a κοινωνία (see note on 1276 b 28).

γνωμομένης ἐτέρας τῷ εἰδει καὶ διαφερούσης. We may have here a mere tautology, like those collected by Vahlen in his note on
Poet. 1. 1447 a 17, but perhaps it is more likely that \textit{diaspereosis} refers to changes less complete than a change of kind.

3. \textit{anagogiavon elnav dotpeion an k.t.l.} The \textit{politeia} represents the \textit{eidos tis syntheiosis} (7) in the case of the \textit{polis} and thus constitutes its identity: compare the passages from the Topics which Bonitz (Ind. 729 a 51 sq.) groups with the passage before us—Top. 6. 13. 150 b 22, \textit{et eil mhe elrhe tov tropon tis syntheiosis}—\textit{ou gar aytarkes pros to} \textit{gnwrisai to eiptein ek touton}—\textit{ou gar to ek touton, alla to ouwos ek touton ekastou tou synthejon h ouxia, kathaper ep' oikias}—\textit{ou gar an opwsonon synthyh tauta, oikia estin, and 6. 14. 151 a 23, ou gar apoxepi to syntheion eiptein, alla kai poia tis prosothoristein}—\textit{ou gar opwsonon synthyenon tou tonon sparx ginetai, all' ouwosi mev synthyenon sparx, ouwosi 8' ousteon.} For the notion that a change of laws might affect the identity of a \textit{polis}, compare Plato Com., Fragm. 42 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 692). According to Plut. De Ser. Num. Vind. c. 15 the identity of the \textit{polis} remains \textit{mekris an h pouosis kai synthyousa taic epiploikais koumwnia tiv epopteta diafylatt}. 4. \textit{dotpey ge kai xorov k.t.l., 'as we say that a chorus also appearing at one time as a comic, and at another as a tragic, chorus is not the same.' 'The tragic chorus consisted of three files (stogxov) of five men each and of five ranks (yug'\) of three men each; the comic chorus of four files of six men each and of six ranks of four men each' (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 3. 2. 205, A. Muller, Die gr. Buhnenalt., where Pollux 4. 108—9 is referred to). Thus the \textit{eidos tis syntheiosis} was different in the case of a tragic and comic chorus. The numbers of the two kinds of chorus were also different, and, as Mr. Richards points out, it is remarkable that Aristotle takes no notice of this. He implies that in a Dorian and a Phrygian 'harmony' the sounds may be the same, but that even then the \textit{eidos tis syntheiosis} tov fubogvov will be different. It is not quite clear what this means. Does it mean that the sounds will be arranged in a different order? It is still less easy to say how a political constitution is an \textit{eidos tis syntheiosis} of the elements of the \textit{polis}. Does Aristotle mean that in each constitution the citizens of a \textit{polis} are arranged in a different way—that in an aristocracy the best men are at the head and in an oligarchy or democracy the rich or the poor? Perhaps so: compare 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 25 sqq. and 4 (7). 2. 1324 a 17, in the latter of which passages he appears to imply that a constitution is a \textit{diasheis polwov}. 3. 3. 1276 a 37—1276 b 4. 153
5. τῶν αὐτῶν πολλάκις ἀνθρώπων ὄντων. We expect rather τῶν ἀνθρώπων than ἀνθρώπων, but cp. i. 1. 1252 a 7, ὅσοι μὲν οὖν οἶνοι πολιτικῶν καὶ βασιλικῶν καὶ οἰκονομικῶν καὶ δεσποτικῶν εἶναι τῶν αὐτῶν: i. 2. 1252 b 9, ὅς ταῦτα φύσει βάρβαρον καὶ δουλόν ἄν: i. 8. 1256 a 10, ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὖχ ἡ αὐτή οἰκονομικὴ τῇ χρηματιστικῇ. Yet in 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 20 we have καὶ ὁ δημαυγώγος καὶ ὁ κύλαξ οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἀνάλογοι.

6. πᾶσαν ἀλλήν κοινωνίαν καὶ σύνθεσιν. Σύνθεσιν is the wider term. For πᾶσαν ἀλλήν κοινωνίαν, cp. 4 (7). 2. 1325 a 8, πόλιν καὶ γένος ἀνθρώπων καὶ πᾶσαν ἀλλήν κοινωνίαν.

7. ἡν εἴδος ἐτερον ἡ τῆς συνθέσεως. Not τὸ εἴδος, for with ἐτερος, as with αὐτός (see above on 5), the subject of the sentence often is without the article: cp. c. 4. 1277 b 13, 17, 24, 30 sq., and c. 6. 1278 b 13 sq.


10. For λεκτέων ... βλέποντας, see note on 1275 a 16.

11. ὁνόμα δὲ καλεῖν κ.τ.λ. According to Thuc. 6. 4. 5 (see however Freeman, Sicily 2. 115 and 486 sqq.), Zancle received the name Messana from Anaxilas of Rhegium when he expelled the Samians and peopled the city afresh. On the other hand, Catana retained its name, when Dionysius the Elder replaced its citizens by Campanians (Diod. 14. 15), and so did the Trachinian Heracleia, though its inhabitants were changed by the Thebans in b.c. 395 (Diod. 14. 82. 6, 7). The name of Corinth was replaced by that of Argos in b.c. 393 during the supremacy of a faction, though the inhabitants were unchanged (Xen. Hell. 4. 4. 6, ὄρασις δὲ τοὺς τυφλούσιν, ἀναθανάμοινοι δὲ ἀφαινομένην τὴν πόλιν διὰ τὸ καὶ ὄρον ἀνεπάσαθαι καὶ Ἀργος ἀντι Κορίνθου τὴν πατρίδα αὐτοῖς ὁνομάζεσθαι).

C. 4. 16 sqq. Aristotle passes on from defining the citizen to examine the nature of his virtue, just as after defining the slave he goes on in i. 13. 1259 b 21 sqq. to ask what is the virtue of the slave. He has there found that the virtue of the woman, child, and slave is not τελεία ἀρετή, but relative to the head of the household, and now he asks in effect whether the virtue of the citizen is τελεία ἀρετή, and whether it is identical with the virtue of the good man. Thucydides (2. 42. 2-4) makes Pericles argue in his Funeral Oration that those who had fallen gloriously fighting for their country were εὖ ἱππο proved to be good men, for their service to the State outweighed and cast into the shade all private faults. It is not, however, so much in correction of views of this kind
as in correction of the teaching of Socrates that the Fourth Chapter is written. Socrates had taught the unity of virtue, claiming that virtue is one and the same in all who possess it. Aristotle holds, on the contrary, that virtue varies with the work a person has to do, and that, as a citizen's work is relative to the constitution, his virtue varies with the constitution. To identify the virtue of the good citizen with that of the good man is therefore to ignore the difference between one constitution and another. It is also to ignore the difference between the ruling and ruled citizen in the best of constitutions. See vol. i. p. 234 sqq. as to the contents of the Fourth Chapter. Looking to the definition of a citizen which Aristotle has already given, we might expect him to say that the virtue of a citizen consists in the ability to deliberate and judge well, i.e. to rule well. But we learn in the Fourth Chapter that the work of a citizen consists not only in ruling but also in being ruled, and therefore that his virtue consists in knowing not only how to rule but also how to be ruled, with this limitation, however, that the only kind of rule which he needs to know is that which is exercised over freemen. To learn this he must be ruled first and rule afterwards—a principle which is not forgotten when Aristotle comes to construct his 'best State' (4 (7). 14. 1333a 11 sqq.). One remarkable conclusion, it should be noted, results from the Fourth Chapter. This is that the good man cannot be a good citizen (in the sense of contributing to the preservation of the constitution) in any constitution but the best without ceasing to be a good man in the strict sense of the words. The justice of Socrates, for instance, is not the imperfect kind of justice which tends to the preservation of a democracy (7 (5). 9. 1309 a 36 sqq.). But is Aristotle's account of good citizenship correct? Is not he a good citizen whose influence tends to the improvement of a constitution rather than he whose influence tends to its preservation? May not a man be all the better as a citizen because he is morally and intellectually somewhat in advance of the constitution under which he lives? Is a good citizen bound to do what contributes to the preservation of that constitution, even if it is a tyranny or an extreme democracy or oligarchy? See note on 1337 a 27.

18. ἄλλα μὴν... γε, 'but certainly': see above on 1271 a 20.

19. οὐκ ὁμοιότατον τινής, 'in some sort of outline,' cp. Plato, Phileb. 61 A, τῷ τοινύν ἄγαθον ἐποίησαν, καὶ τιμὴ τύπου αὐτοῦ ληπτεύων, and 32 B,
and Laws 718 C and 802 D sq., and for τόπῳ τινὶ λαβεῖν, Aristot. Top. i. 7. 103 a 7, ὡς τόπῳ λαβεῖν.

For πρόσων in the sense of πρότερον, see below on 1323 a 16.

21. τῶν πλωτήρων is in strictness in the gen. after ἐκάστου, 24.

22. ὁ μὲν γὰρ κ. τ. λ. For the relative rank of these personages cp. Aristoph. Eq. 541 Didot,

καὶ πρὸς τούτους ἐφασκεν

ἐρέτην χρῆναι πρῶτα γενέσθαι, πρὶν πηδαλίους ἐπιχείρειν,

κατ' ἐνενθέσθαι προφατεώντας καὶ τοὺς ἀνέμους διαγρῆσαι,

κάτα κυβερνάν αὐτῶν ἑαυτῷ,

a passage already referred to by Camerarius (Interp. p. 114). As to the κυβερνήτης, cp. c. 6. 1279 a 3.

24. δὴ δὲν ὡς κ. τ. λ. Translate, with Bernays (see also Sepulveda’s note on ‘perfectissima cuiusque ratio,’ p. 77 b), ‘it is clear that the most exact definition of the virtue of each will be special to the man.’ As to λόγος, ‘definition,’ see Bon. Ind. 434 b 6 sqq., where it is pointed out that λόγος is sometimes used in a wider sense than ὁμοιός, and as to the contrast of ὁμοιός and κοινός λόγος, see Bon. Ind. 339 a 55 and vol. i. p. 242 note.

25. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κοινὸς τις ἐφαρμόσει πᾶσιν. The phrase recurs in De An. 2. 3. 414 b 22, γένοιτο δ' ἄν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σχημάτων λόγον κοινός, δὲ εφαρμόσει μὲν πᾶσιν, ὁμοίος δὲ οὐδένος ἐστι τῶν σχήματος. ‘Ομοίως δὲ, ‘but equally.’


28. ἡ σωτηρία τῆς κοινωνίας ἠργον ἔστι, κοινωνία δ' ἐστὶ ἡ πολιτεία. Cp. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 19 sqq. ‘The safeguarding of the association’ seems hardly to answer to ‘the safeguarding of the voyage’; we expect rather ‘the safeguarding of the successful working of the State’; and though the πολιτικὴ κοινωνία is often, as here, identified with the πολιτεία (compare for instance 2. i. 1260 b 27 and 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 35), the πόλις is more usually said to be the κοινωνία (e.g. in c. 3. 1276 b 1). For the structure of the sentence, in which (with Stahr, Bern., Sus., and others) I take κοινωνία to be the subject and ἡ πολιτεία the predicate, cp. c. 6. 1278 b 10,
κύριον μεν γὰρ πανταχοῦ τὸ πολίτευμα τῆς πόλεως, πολίτευμα δὲ ἑστὶν ἡ πολιτεία: c. 7. 1279 a 25 sqq.: and c. 13. 1283 b 41, πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν' πολιτεία δὲ κ.τ.λ. See also note on 1275 a 22.

33. τὸν δ’ ἀγαθὸν ἀνδρὰ κ.τ.λ. Supply ἀγαθῶν with εἰσιν: cp. 35, τὴν ἀρετὴν καθ’ ἑν σπουδαιὸν ἀνήρ. Compare the line of an unknown elegiac poet quoted in Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 b 34, ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἄπλως, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοῖ, and Eth. Eud. 7. 2. 1237 a 30, ὁ δὲ σπουδαῖος τέλειος: also Pol. 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 3, τὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων ἄπλως κατ’ ἀρετὴν πολιτείαν καὶ μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν τινα ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν μόνην δίκαιον προσαγορεύων ἀριστοκρατικῶν. Τέλεια ἀρετὴ in the passage before us probably means ἀρετὴ μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν τινα. It turns out, indeed, on further investigation (1277 b 18 sqq.), that the virtue of the good man is not strictly one, but has two forms, the virtue of the ruler and the virtue of the ruled. As to φαμέν, see below on 1277 a 14.

34. μὲν δὲν is answered by οὗ μὴν ἀλλὰ, 36, as in 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 4 sqq. (Sus.) Ind. Gramm. s. v. Μέν, and also in 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 1 sqq.

36. οὗ μὴν ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ., ‘not but that it is possible in another way also to go over the same argument in reference to the best constitution by raising questions and debating them.’ ‘In another way,’ because hitherto the best constitution has not been made the subject of the inquiry. For ἐπελθεῖν τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων, cp. Phys. 8. 5. 256 a 21 (referred to by Bonitz, Ind. 267 a 39), ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὅστε τῶν αὐτῶν τοῦτον λόγον ἑστὶν ἐπελθεῖν. Lamb. translates, ‘veruntamen etiam alio modo eadem rationem pertractaret et persequeret licet de optima reipublicae administrandae forma dubitantibus’: thus he seems to take διαποροῦντας with περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας (as do apparently Stahr and Bernays), but not, I think, rightly. Διαποροῦντας (here = διερχομένους τὰς ἀπορίας, Bon. Ind. 187 b 11) is added to indicate to us the mode of investigation which Aristotle is about to adopt. That Aristotle ‘goes over the same argument’ we shall see if we bear in mind that he has just shown that the good citizen will not necessarily be a good man under any and every constitution, and now goes on to show that this is true of the best constitution also. For κατ’ ἄλλον τρόπον cp. 2. 2. 1261 b 10 and 2. 8. 1269 a 13, and (with Bonitz, Ind. 772 b 19) Meteor. 1. 3. 340 a 15.

37. εἰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., ‘for if it is impossible that a State should consist of members all of whom are good, and yet each member
must discharge his function well, and this proceeds from virtue, [so that, though all will not be good, all will possess virtue, i.e. the virtue of the citizen,] still, as it is impossible that all the citizens should be alike, there would not be one form of virtue belonging to the good citizen and to the good man; for the virtue of the good citizen ought to belong to all (for it is necessarily only in that way that the State will come to be the best State), but the virtue of the good man cannot possibly belong to all, unless all the citizens in the good State must necessarily be good, [which we have declared to be impossible].’ It is implied that the citizens will not be alike if they all possess the virtue of a citizen, but that they will, if they possess in addition the virtue of a good man. The virtue of the good man is one, whereas the virtue of the good citizen varies with the function discharged. Compare 2. 2. 1261 a 24, οὐ γὰρ γίνεται πόλις εἶ δήμοιον, a doctrine which may also be traced in 3. 12. 1283 a 18 sq. and 3. 11. 1281 b 34 sqq., and indeed in Fragm. 21 of the Aeolus of Euripides,

\[\delta\kappa\varepsilon\iota\nu\ \delta\nu\ \omega\kappa\kappa\iota\nu\ \gamma\alpha\iota\upsilon\nu, \varepsilon\iota \pi\nu\nu\zeta\ \\alpha\pi\sigma\iota\;\
\lambda\alpha\delta\sigma\ \pi\omega\lambda\iota\tau\iota\omega\iota\tau\omega\ \pi\lambda\omega\upsilon\iota\omega\iota\nu\ \alpha\tau\epsilon\rho\iota;\]
\[\ \omega\kappa\ \delta\nu\ \gamma\nu\nu\iota\tau\iota\nu\ \chi\omega\rho\iota\ \varepsilon\sigma\theta\lambda\alpha\ \kappa\alpha\kappa\alpha,\]
\[\ \alpha\lll\ \varepsilon\sigma\tau\iota\ \tau\iota\ \sigma\upsigma\gamma\kappa\rho\alpha\tau\alpha\iota\upsilon\iota\sigma\iota\upsilon, \ \alpha\sigma\tau\iota\ \varepsilon\chi\epsilon\nu\ \kappa\alpha\lambda\omega\sigma,\]

where Euripides perhaps has before him Heraclitus’ doctrine of the harmony of contraries. But is it Aristotle’s view that the citizens of the ‘best State’ cannot all be good men? This does not seem to be his view in 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 32 sqq., where we are told that all the citizens of the ‘best State’ will be good men (compare 7 (5). 12. 1316 b 9, where it appears to be implied that there may be States in which all the citizens are good men). Either we must admit a discrepancy between the passage before us and these passages and leave it unexplained, or we may seek to explain it by saying (with Zeller, Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. ii. p. 209, note 2: see my first volume, p. 236, note 2) that the passage before us is merely aporetic, or by supposing that the word ‘citizen’ is used in the passage before us (as seems sometimes to be the case, see vol. i. Appendix B) in a wider sense than in 4 (7).

13. 1332 a 32 sqq.


1277 a. 5. ἓτυ κ.τ.λ. This is a further thrust. In 1276 b 37–1277 a 5 it has been argued that though all the citizens of the best State will
be good citizens, they will not all be good men, but now it is
guessed that they will not all be good citizens in the same way
—one will be a good citizen in the way in which a ruler is a good
citizen, and another a good citizen in the way in which a ruled
person is a good citizen—and thus the virtue of all the citizens will
not be the same, so that if the various forms of the virtue of the
citizen are not identical with each other, they cannot all be
identical with the virtue of the good man. This argument leads
directly up to what follows in 1277 a 12 sqq., and I cannot agree
with Susemihl that it ought to be bracketed as an interpolation.
I did not see the relation in which 1277 a 5–12 stands to 1276 b
37–1277 a 5 so clearly when I wrote vol. i. p. 236 as I do now.
See also Prof. J. A. Stewart’s remarks in defence of the genuineness
of 1277 a 5–12 in Class. Rev. 9. 456.

8. κτήσις εκ δεσπότου και δουλού. Bernays brackets κτήσις, and
I do not feel sure that he is wrong. If we retain the word,
Aristotle’s meaning will apparently be that ownership of property
consists of master and slave, or in other words implies the existence
of an owner and a slave. Surely, however, ownership implies the
existence of things owned as well as of persons owned?

9. ἀλλων ἄνωτοις εἰδων, such as ruling and ruled citizens, and
soldiers in contrast with deliberators and judges.

11. ὄσπερ οὐδὲ τῶν χρεωτῶν κορυφαίου καὶ παραστάτου. As the
tragic chorus marched into the theatre in its five ranks and three
files (see above on 1276 b 4), its left-hand file was turned to the
audience and its right-hand file to the stage; the left-hand file was
consequently the most conspicuous of the three files. The κορυ-
φαίος was third in this file, the two παραστάται second and fourth,
and the two τρισκοστάται (Metaph. A. II. 1018 b 27) first and fifth.
See on this subject C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 3. 2. 206 sq. (A. Müller,
Die gr. Bühnenalt.). For the absence of the article before κορυφαίον
see note on 1285 b 12.

12. διότι μὲν τοίνυν ἀπλῶς οὐχ ἢ αὐτή, sc. ἀρετὴ πολίτου τε σπουδαίου
καὶ ἄνδρος σπουδαίων, for here the question raised in 1276 b 17
receives an answer.

13. ἀλλ’ ἄρα έσται τινὸς κ.τ.λ., ‘but will not the virtue of the
good citizen and the good man be the same in a particular citizen?’
By τινὸς is evidently meant ἄρχωντος, cp. 20 sqq. For the absence
of the article before ἀρετὴ, see note on 1276 b 5.

14. φαμέν δή κ.τ.λ., ‘we say that a good ruler (of any kind) is
good and prudent, and the man who is capable of ruling a State
(1278 b 3 sqq.) must necessarily be prudent.’ To be ἀγαθὸς is not
the same thing as to be φρόνιμος (cp. Top. 3. 1. 116 α 14, δ μᾶλλον
ἀν ἐλατο ὁ φρόνιμος ἢ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνήρ), though one cannot be φρόνιμος
without being ἀγαθὸς (Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1144 a 36), or indeed really
ἀγαθὸς without being φρόνιμος (1144 b 16, 31). Cp. c. i. 1281 b
4, ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονίσεως. As to δή, see note on 1252 a 24. Φαμέν
seems to be used by Aristotle when he recalls some well-known
principle of his philosophy (as in 1. 2. 1253 a 9, οὐδὲν γάρ, ὅς φαμέν,
μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ), or repeats what he has already said in the
same treatise (as in 3. 18. 1288 a 32) or in another (as in 4 (7). 13.
1332 a 7, φαμέν δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἡδυκοῖς), or gives utterance to some
generally accepted view. Φαμέν may here possibly refer to τ. i. 13.
1260 a 17, διὰ τὸν μὲν ἀρχοντα τελέαν ἔχειν δεὶ τὴν ἡθικὴν ἀρετὴν (i. e.
μετὰ φρονίσεως, see note on this passage), where the head of a
household is referred to, but the view was a commonly accepted
one (Xen. Hipparch. 7. 1, παντὶ μὲν οὖν προσεχεῖ· ἀρχοντι φρόνιμῳ εἶνα,
where the rule is applied to generals of cavalry: Plato, Rep. 433 C:
Isocr. De Antid. § 71: Xen. Cyrop. i. 6. 22). If every ruler needs
to be φρόνιμος, the ruler of a State does so especially; indeed we
are told in Eth. Nic. 6. 8. 1141 b 23 that πολιτικὴ καὶ φρόνισις
are the same habit. Cp. Plut. De Pyth. Orac. c. 22, ἄλλα καὶ τῶν Βάττων
... εἰς Διβύνην ἐπεμψαν οἰκιστῆν, ὅτι τραυλὸς μὲν ἦν καὶ ἵσχυόφωνος,
βασιλικὸς δὲ καὶ πολιτικὸς καὶ φρόνιμος.

16. καὶ τὴν παιδείαν δ' εὐθὺς κ.τ.λ., ‘and indeed the very educa-
tion of a ruler some make out to be different (from that of a ruled
person),’ i.e. not only his virtue, but the training by which it is
 imparted; or possibly not only the virtue of the fully-developed
ruler, but his very education, which begins in childhood and is the
first step in his development. Aristotle quite agrees that if the
rulers are to be throughout life different from the ruled, their
education will be different (4 (7). 14. 1332 b 12 sqq.), but the rulers
of his best State, unless it takes the form of an Absolute Kingship,
will be ruled first and rulers afterwards (1332 b 25 sqq.).

17. ὡσπερ καὶ φαινόνται κ.τ.λ., ‘as in fact we see that the sons of
kings are taught riding and the art of war.’ For καὶ φαινόνται,
see note on 1262 a 18. Compare Plut. De Adul. et Amic. c. 16,
Καρνεάδος δὲ ἐλεγεν ὅτι πλουσίων καὶ βασιλέων παιδεῖ ἐπιτεύχων μόνον,
ἄλλο δὲ οἶδεν εὗ καὶ καλὸς μανθάνων: Strabo p. 730, μένηται δ'
Οὐνείκριτος καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ Δαρείου τάφῳ γράμμα τόδε, ‘ Phiλ ἦν τοῖς
3. 4. 1277 a 16—19.

φίλοις ἵππεις καὶ τοξότης ἀριστος ἐγενόμην κυνηγών ἐκράτουν πάντα ποιῶν ἰδωνάμην": Plut. Pyrrh. c. 8, καὶ ὀλος τοῦτο (strategy) μελετῶν ἠθεὶ καὶ φιλοσοφῶν αἰτὶ διατελεῖν ὁ Πίρρος, ὡς μαθημάτων βασιλικώτατοι κ.τ.λ. The sons of the great at Athens were trained in riding (Isocr. Areopag. § 45: Plato, Meno 93 D, 94 B), but not Greek boys in general, as would seem from the passage before us and from 5 (8). 1337 b 23 sqq.; Persian boys, on the contrary, were taught to ride, to shoot with the bow, and to speak the truth (Hdt. i. 136).

19. καὶ Ἐὐριπίδης φησὶ κ.τ.λ. Occasionally (here for instance and in 1. 13. 1260 a 29), but not always (see 1. 6. 1255 a 36), Aristotle ascribes to the dramatic poet himself a saying placed by him in the mouth of one of his characters. The fragment before us is from the Aeolus and is preserved in a completer form by Stobaeus, Floril. 45. 13 (Eurip. Fragm. i6 Nauck),

λαμπροὶ δ' ἐν αἰχμαῖς "Ἀρεος ἐν τε συλλόγοις
μή μου τὰ κομψά ποικιλοι γενώιτο,
ἄλλ' δὲν πόλει δεῖ, μεγάλα βολεύοντ' αἰτὶ.

The lines are no doubt spoken by King Aeolus and relate to the princes his sons. Thus they are quite to the point. In τὰ κομψά Euripides probably has in view the varied subtleties which had been introduced into Greek education in the days which followed the repulse of the Persian invasion (5 (8). 6. 1341 a 28 sqq.), whether connected with musical art or with such subjects as geometry and astronomy (for in Xen. Mem. 4. 7 Socrates thinks it necessary to prescribe limits to these studies) and dialectic and philosophy. See note on 1337 a 39. Mr. Richards compares Thuc. i. 84. 5, μὴ τὰ ἀχρεὰ ἕωςοι ἄγαν ὀντες, τὰς τῶν πολεμίων παρασκευάς λόγῳ καλὸς μεμφόμενοι ἀνομοῖο ἐργὸ ἐπεξείωνα. In δὲν πόλει δεῖ κ.τ.λ. Euripides is thinking partly of prowess in arms, cp. Probl. 27. 5. 948 a 31 sqq.: Eurip. Suppl. 855 Bothe, 881 Dindorf,

ὅ δ' αὐ τρίτος τῶν ἢππομέδων τοιάδ' ἐφ' παῖς δὲν ἐτόλμησε εὐθὸς οὐ πρὸς ἴδιόνας Μουσῶν τραπέζηα πρὸς τὸ μαλακῶν βίου, ἄγροις δὲ ναών, σκηνή τῇ φύσει διδοῦσι ἐχαιρε πρὸς τάνδρεων, εἰς τ' ἄγρας ἱδὼν ἱπποῖς τε χαῖρον, τόξα τ' ἐπτείνον χειρῶν, πόλει παρασχεῖν σώμα χρήσιμον θέλων,

Eurip. Fragm. 284. 16 sqq., 362. 25 sqq., and a fragment of the Phaedo or Phaedrias of Alexis (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 497),

μάχιμοι γὰρ ἀνίρ, χρήσιμος δὲ τῇ πόλει.

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Compare also Antiphon, Tetral. 2. 2. 3, ἐδόκον μὲν οὖν ἐγώγε ταῦτα παυδείων τῶν ὑπὸν ἐξ ὑπὸ μάλιστα τὸ κοινὸν ὑφελείται, ἀμφότερον τί ἡμῖν ἀγαθὸν ἀποθέσεσθαι, where teaching boys how to hurl the dart is referred to. But Euripides probably has especially before him the teaching of Protagoras of Abdera, who claims in Plato, Protag. 318 D sqq. that he does not, like Hippias of Elis, carry boys back to the arts from which they have just escaped and make them study calculation, astronomy, geometry, and music, but teaches εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, ὡς ἄν ἁριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικῆσαι, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὡς τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατότατον ἄν εἰῃ καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν. Cp. Gorg. 491 A sq., where Callicles expresses similar views.

20. ἀρχοντος παυδείων. Cp. 2. 11. 1273 a 31, ἀμάρτημα νομοθέτου. ἀρετῆ, not ἡ ἀρετῆ, see note on 1276 b 5.

23. τινὸς μέντοι πολίτου. See note on 1276 a 28.

24. καὶ διὰ τοῦτ ἰδιως κ.τ.λ. Διὰ τοῦτο, because the virtue of a citizen is different from that of a ruler, a citizen having, at any rate occasionally, to become a private man, a part which Jason did not know how to play. The first question which arises as to this saying of Jason’s is as to the meaning of ὅτε μῇ here. ὅτε μῇ is used with the optative in Hom. II. 13. 319 and 14. 247 sq., etc. and Odys. 16. 197 in the sense of ‘unless,’ or, according to Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 512. 4 b, ‘except when,’ and Bern. and Sus. render it ‘unless’ in the passage before us (Bern. ‘er habe nichts zu essen, wenn er nicht Tyrann sei’; Sus. 4, ‘he must starve if he were not on the throne’). But if ὅτε μῇ meant ‘unless’ here, should we not have had πευκῆν ἄν rather than πευκῆ? I incline, therefore, to translate πευκῆν ὅτε μῇ τυραννῶν either ‘he was a starving man except when he was tyrant’ or (as Mr. Welldon) ‘he was a starving man whenever he was not tyrant’ (cp. Thuc. 2. 15. 2, ὅποτε μῇ τι δείσειν). The second of these two renderings is open to the objection that it implies that Jason was more than once tyrant of Pherec and that his tenure of the tyranny was not continuous, a fact which we do not learn elsewhere, and as the first is less open to this objection and also has the merit of giving the same meaning to ὅτε μῇ in the passage before us as it bears in Homer, perhaps it is to be preferred. A further question is whether Jason meant by πευκῆ literal starvation (his ignorance of the art of being a private man making it impossible for him to maintain himself in that capacity), or starvation in a metaphorical sense (compare such expressions as ‘auri sacra famæ’). I incline to
the latter view. A man who does not possess the virtue of an ἀρχόμενος is not thereby incapacitated for earning a living as a ruled person; he is only incapacitated for τὸ ἀρχεσθαι καλῶς. As to Jason see vol. i. p. 237, note 1. Isocrates (Philip. § 65) describes Dionysius the Elder as 'desiring monarchy in an irrational and frenzied way.' ‘The Venetian chronicler says of Giovanni Frangipane,’ who had resigned the position of Count of Veglia and had retired to Venice, ‘“He was no more able to live in a free city than night can abide the rising of the sun”’ (T. G. Jackson, Dalmatia, 3. 135).

ότε μὴ τυραννοῖ. "Ότε μὴ is always found in the best authors with the optative’ (Liddell and Scott s.v. οὔτε).

25. ἄλλα μὴν ἐπαινεῖται γε κ.τ.λ. Ἄλλα μὴν . . . γε, ‘but certainly,’ as elsewhere. Ἐπαινεῖται, ‘id est, virtus est: habitus enim laudabiles virtutes vocamus, ut ipse ait in fine libri primi Ethicorum’ (Sepulveda, who here refers to Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1103 a 9, τῶν ἔξεων δὲ τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς λέγομεν). Compare also Eth. Nic. 2. 4. 1106 a 1 and 2. 7. 1108 a 31, ἕ γὰρ αἰδώς ἀρετὴ μὲν οὐκ ἐστιν, ἐπαινεῖται δὲ καὶ ὁ αἰδήμων. Thus the transition from ἐπαινεῖται, 25, to ἡ ἀρετή, 26, is an easy one. Agesilaus was praised for knowing both how to rule and how to be ruled (e.g. in Xen. Ages. 2. 16); Lysander, on the other hand, is described by Plutarch (Lysand. c. 20) as τὸν οἶκον ζυγόν οὗ φέρων οὖθ' υπομένων ἀρχεσθαι. Plato had said (Laws 942 C), τοῦτο καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ μελετητέον εὐθὺς ἐκ τῶν παίδων, ἀρχεῖν τε ἄλλων ἀρχεσθαι θ' υφ' ἑτέρων.

26. καὶ πολίτου δοκίμου (δοκεί) ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι καλῶς. Aristotle here probably has before him Plato, Laws 6.43 E, τὴν δὲ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐκ παίδων παιδεῖαν ποιοῦσαν ἐπιθυμηθῆν τε καὶ ἐρασθῆν τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλεος, ἀρχεῖν τε καὶ ἀρχεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον μετὰ δίκης. Δόκιμος takes the place of τέλεος and καλῶς of μετὰ δίκης. As to the insertion of δοκεῖ see critical note.

28. τὴν δὲ τοῦ πολίτου ἀμφω, i.e. τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι καλῶς.

29. οὐκ ἄν εἴη ἀμφω ἐπαινετά ὁμοίως. "Ἀμφω, the two aptitudes just referred to. Aristotle hints that the citizen must in fact possess two different kinds of virtue unequal in praiseworthiness (see vol. i. p. 237)." He here anticipates the conclusion which he is slowly approaching. So Sepulveda, who has a note on ‘Non eodem modo utrumque laudabitur,—‘non erit eadem virtus.'
"ἐπεὶ οὖν . . . 32. κατίδοι τις. 'Since then it is occasionally held that the ruler and the ruled should learn different things and not the same, and that the citizen [who is both ruler and ruled] should understand both and share in both, one may see at a glance the further course of the inquiry.' The next step in it is to point out that the citizen should not learn the work of all kinds of ruled persons. Armed with this principle, we are able to reconcile the two contradictory views. Aristotle here, as often elsewhere, sets two conflicting opinions side by side and brings them into collision, in order to show that each contains an element of truth. One view is that the ruler and the ruled should learn different things; the other is that the citizen, who is in part a ruler, should learn both how to rule and how to be ruled, or in other words should learn the same things as the ruled. Both of these views are partly true. Those who hold that the ruler and the ruled should learn different things are so far correct that the citizen-ruler over citizens, and therefore the citizen, should not learn the work of unfreely ruled persons. Those who hold that the ruler and the ruled should learn the same things are so far correct that the citizen-ruler over citizens should learn to be ruled as a freeman is ruled. Thus the truth lies midway, Aristotle thinks, between the two opinions. For τούτονεδειχ. cp. c. 5. 1278 a 13, ἐνεθεὶ ἐκεῖν ἀπεκεπαθόμενος, and Plato, Symp. 217 E, μέχρι μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ δεύτερον τοῦ λόγου καλῶς ἀν ἔχοι καὶ πρὸς υἱὸς αὐτῶν λέγειν, τὸ δ’ ἐνεθεὶ κ.τ.λ. In Polit. 271 B, τὸ γὰρ ἐνεθεὶ, οἶμαι, χρὴ ἐχόμενον· ἐχόμενον γὰρ ἔστι κ.τ.λ., it is explained by ἐχόμενον (as in Aristoph. Eq. 131 sq. Didot by μετὰ τούτου): cp. Eth. Eud. 2. 6. 1223 a 1 sq.

31. ἀμφότερ' ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μετέχειν ἀμφότιν. This reversal in the order of words (a kind of Chiasmus) is not uncommon in the Politics. Compare for instance c. 14. 1285 b 30, ἐκαστον ἔθος καὶ πόλις ἐκάστη: 1. 1. 1252 a 4, μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦ κυριωτάτου πάντων ἡ πασῶν κυριωτάτη: 3. 6. 1278 b 11, λέγω δ’ οἶν ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατικαῖς κύριοι δήμοις, οἱ δ’ ἀλλοί τούτων ἐν ταῖς ἀληθείαις: 3. 11. 1281 b 11 sq.: 3. 17. 1288 a 3 sq.: 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 18, ὀσπερ ἐν τοῖς πνεύματος τῶν μὲν ἐξήρων τοῦ βαρέου, τῶν δὲ νότου τῶν εἰρείν: 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 19–21: 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 22 sq. See Kaibel, Stil und Text der Politieia 'Δημοκρατίαν des Aristoteles, p. 100, for similar instances from that work. The occasional occurrence in the Politics of this studied arrangement of words affords an argument
against the view that it is a pupil's hasty report of Aristotle's lectures.

33. ταυτίν δὲ τὴν περὶ τάναγκαία λέγομεν, 'and by this we mean the kind of rule which obtains in connexion with necessary services.' Τάναγκαία = τὰ ἀναγκαία ἔργα, cp. τὴν τῶν ἀναγκαίων σχολῆς in 2. 9. 1269 a 35. Λέγομεν, in much the same sense as λέγω, 36, though perhaps the 'we' in λέγομεν is the 'we' of a teacher (cp. c. 1. 1275 b 3, 19). The term δεσποτικὴ ἀρχή is not always used by Aristotle in the sense of 'the rule which obtains in connexion with necessary services'; it is not, for instance, in 3. 14. 1285 a 22. It should be noticed that by explaining δεσποτικὴ ἀρχή as ἡ περὶ τάναγκαία ἀρχή Aristotle is enabled to represent even freemen who do necessary work (e.g. βάναυσοι) as subject to δεσποτικὴ ἀρχή, and not merely absolute slaves.

34. ἄ ποιεῖν ἐπίστασθαι τὸν ἀρχοντ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλὰ χρήσαθαι μᾶλλον. In the case of δεσποτικὴ ἀρχή the ruler does not need to know how to do the things that the ruled do, but only how to use their services. Hence in this form of rule he does not need to learn how to be ruled in order to learn how to rule; he does not need to be a slave first in order to be a good master. In the case of πολιτικὴ ἀρχή, on the other hand, the ruler does need to know how to do what the ruled does, or in other words how to be ruled, for it is thus that he learns to be a good ruler. In δεσποτικὴ ἀρχή all that the ruler needs to know is how to use the services of slaves, and even this he hardly needs to know, for this knowledge has nothing exalted about it (4 (7). 3. 1325 a 24 sqq.: 1. 7. 1255 b 33 sqq.), and a master may dispense with it by employing a steward (1. 7. 1255 b 35 sqq.). But if in δεσποτικὴ ἀρχή the ruler does not need to know how to do the things that slaves do, still less does he need to be able to do them for another. Doing them for another stands on a far lower level than merely doing them and is fit only for slaves (cp. 1277 b 5 and 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 17 sqq.).

37. δούλου δ' εἰδὴ πλείω λέγομεν. Δούλου takes up ἄνδραποδῶδες, 35. Aristotle adds this in order to show that he regards as ἄνδραποδῶδες, not only the work of actual slaves, but also that of βάναυσοι τεχνίται and χερνητὲς generally. Λέγομεν is probably here used in the same sense as in 34, not in that in which it is used in c. 3. 1276 b 9, where it seems to mean 'men commonly say.' The βάναυσος τεχνίτης and the ἰδίς are implied to be closely allied to

38. òw k.t.l. òw refers to τῶν ἐγραστῶν according to Bonitz, Ind. 377 a 7. For òw μέρος κατέχουσιν, he (ibid.) compares 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 17 sqq. Χερνής is a rare, and apparently a poetical, word: Χειροτέχνης is the equivalent word in Attic prose.

οὕτως δ’ εἶσιν κ.τ.λ. Montecatino’s conjecture of αὐτῶν or αὐτό for αὐτοῦς is a tempting one (Richards would read αὐτοῖς), and one or other of these emendations may well be right, but it is also possible that as εἰσὶν immediately precedes, we are intended to supply εἶναι from it with αὐτοῦς, for Aristotle often omits εἶναι when it can readily be supplied from a neighbouring εἶναι, ἐστίν, or εἰσὶν, e.g. in 2. 12. 1273 b 40, 3. 4. 1276 b 20 sq., 1277 b 26 sq., 3. 15. 1286 b 35 sqq., 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 25 sq., and 4 (7). 15. 1334 b 17 sq.; indeed, he sometimes omits it where this is not the case (see notes on 1260 a 14 and 1327 a 34, and Vahlen on Poet. 24. 1459 b 7). Bonitz (Ind. s.v. σημαίνει) compares Phys. 4. 7. 213 b 30, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ποτέρως ἔχει δεῖ λαβεῖν τὶ σημαίνει τοῦνομα. As to the derivation of χερνής see Liddell and Scott s.v. To live by manual labour allied a man to the class of slaves (1. 11. 1258 b 38: 1. 5. 1254 b 17 sqq.: 1. 13. 1259 b 25).


In the passage before us βάναυσος τεχνίται are included under χερνῆτες, whereas in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 18–25 τὸ χερνητικόν is distinguished from τὸ περὶ τῶν τέχνων. Aristotle speaks of ὁ βάναυσος τεχνίτης, not simply ὁ τεχνίτης, because not all τεχνίται are χερνῆτες. In Eth, Nic. 1. 4. 1097 a 6 sqq. physicians and generals appear to be included under τεχνίται. He sometimes, however, uses the word τεχνίτης ‘ad significandos opifices’ (see Bon. Ind. s.v. τεχνίτης).

διὸ παρ’ ἐνίοις κ.τ.λ. Διό, because they are slaves (cp. c. 5. 1278 a 6 sqq.). Kässling (Tempora und Modi in des Aristoteles Politica und in der Atheniensium Politia, p. 72) remarks that the use of παρ’ here with an infinitive after a negative principal clause is contrary to the general rule. In παρ’ ἐνίοις Aristotle probably refers especially to Athens. If so, it would seem that handicraftsmen were excluded from office at Athens not only in the early days when it was confined to Eupatriae (Plut. Thes. c. 25: Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2. 8), but even down to the time when the
'ultimate democracy' was introduced (the time of Pericles or later). According to the 'Αθ. Πολ., c. 13, however, the board of ten archons appointed in the year after the archonship of Damasias included two demiurgi. Was Aristotle aware of this? That the fourth and lowest of the property-classes, τὸ ὑπερκλοῦς, was excluded by Solon from office is well known (2. 12. 1274 a 21: Plut. Solon c. 18). Did handicraftsmen belong to this class under Solon's legislation, even if they owned land enough to place them in one or other of the three higher classes? At Ragusa the artisans 'had no voice at all in the government, and were not admissible to any office' (T. G. Jackson, Dalmatia, 2. 309).

3. τὰ μὲν οὗν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὗν here, as in 2. 9. 1270 b 17 and elsewhere, is answered by ἀλλά (7). Sus. brackets τὸν ἀγαθὸν, and it is true that the question with which we have been concerned from 1277 a 29 onwards has been what the citizen and ruler should learn, not what the good man should learn. But the capability of rendering to another servile service has been said to be ἀνδραποδῶδες in 1277 a 35, and as the opposite of ὁ ἀνδραποδῶδης is ὁ ἐπίτειχής (Eth. Nic. 4. 14. 1128 a 17 sqq.: cp. 10. 6. 1177 a 6 sqq.), Aristotle's first thought is that this capability is not one which should be acquired by ὁ ἀγαθός, his next that it should not be acquired by ὁ πολιτικός (who is φρόνιμος, 1277 a 15, and therefore ἀγαθός), and his next that it should not be acquired by the good citizen. Compare the story of the captive Spartan youth in Plut. Apophth. Lac. Obscur. Vir. § 35, 234 B, who replied οὐ δοῦλεύσω, when a specially humiliating service was demanded of him.

5. εἰ μὴ ποτε κ.τ.λ., 'except occasionally to satisfy some need arising for him in relation to himself, for then it no longer happens that the one party (the party to whom the service is rendered) comes to be a master and the other (the party who renders the service) a slave.' A man who learns to do servile work for himself does not learn to do it for a master, and it is to the good man or good citizen learning to become a slave and to serve a master that Aristotle objects. 'Si quis usus sui gratia sordidum opificium discat, ut Alfonsus dux Ferrariensis, qui singulari industria et artificio aenea tormenta bellica conficere sciebat, is, quia sibi, non alteri, servit, non debet servus more artificum appellari' (Sepulveda). So Bern., 'ausser etwa für seinen persönlichen Bedarf, weil in diesem Falle das Herrn- und Sclavenverhältniss
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nicht mehr stattfindet.' Vict., however, explains οὐ γὰρ—δοῦλον otherwise, 'si debet qui regit haec discere, futurum esse ut distingui non possit servus ab ero,' and so Mr. Welldon, who translates, 'else the relation of master and slave ceases to exist,' and Mr. Richards, 'a citizen should not be thoroughly familiar with the ἔργα of a slave, for then the difference between a master and a slave vanishes.' I prefer the interpretation of Sepulveda and Bernays. Αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτῶν (a phrase recurring in 7 (5). 1. 1302 a 12 and 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 13) is to be taken with χρείας χάριν: cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 10, ἄτι χρημάτων τινὰ εἰσπορίσαν, ὅπως ἐξωστρεφέται καὶ πρὸς τάς καθ' αὐτόν χρείας καὶ πρὸς πολεμικὰς. For χρείας χάριν, cp. Thuc. 1. 136. 6, καὶ ἄμα αὐτὸς μὲν ἐκείνως χρείας τινὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐς τὸ σῶμα σωζόντων ἐνάντιωσιν. For the thought, see note on 1337 b 19, and cp. Rhet. 1. 9. 1367 a 31, καὶ τὸ μηθείων ἐργαίος μάχαντος πέτησαν ἐλέυθερου γάρ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλον ζητεῖ: also Plut. Praec. Reip. Gerend. c. 15, ἀλλὰ βοηθεῖ μοι· τὸ τοῦ ἀντισθέ- νους μημονεύομενον βαπτίζομεν γάρ τινος εἰ δι' ἀγαθῶν αὐτὸς φέρει τάραγον, Ἐμαυτῷ γε, εἶπεν ἐγώ δ' ἀνίσταλιν πρὸς τοὺς ἐγκαλοῦντας εἰ κεράμῳ παράστικα διαμετροῦμεν . . . οὐκ ἐμαυτῷ γε φήμα ταῦτ' οἰκονομεῖν, ἀλλὰ τῇ πατρίδῃ, where Plutarch makes a notable advance on the older view. It should be noticed that Aristotle's language in the passage before us is carefully guarded; the doing of menial work, even for one's own behoof, is only permitted if it is occasional, not habitual, and in satisfaction of a need.

7. ἄλλ' ἐστι τις ἄρχη κ.τ.λ., 'but there is a kind of rule which men exercise over those like themselves in birth and free, for it is of this nature that we say the political rule (the rule which obtains between citizens) is, which [unlike the rule over slaves] the ruler ought to learn while being ruled.' Ἀρχεῖ, sc. ὁ ἄρχων. That political rule is exercised over men free and equal, we see from 1. 7. 1255 b 20. Citizens are alike in birth, even though some of them are more nobly born than others, but kings are superior in birth to those over whom they rule (3. 13. 1284 a 11 sqq.: 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 12), and the master of a slave is of course superior in birth to his slave. When Aristotle says in 1. 12. 1259 b 15 that the king is the same τὸ γένει as those over whom he rules, he probably means 'in race.' Pericles was already familiar with the contrast between rule over freemen and other kinds of rule (cp. Plut. Praec. Reip. Gerend. c. 17, where we read that he said to himself, ἀναλαμβάνων τὴν χλαμύδα, Πρώσεξε, Περίκλεις, ἐλευθέρων ἄρχεις,
'Ελλήνων ἄρχεις, πολιτῶν 'Αθηναίων), and Lysander also, who said, when the Spartan harmost Callibius raised his staff to strike the athlete Autolycus, that 'he knew not how to rule over freemen' (Plut. Lysand. c. 15).

10. στρατηγεῖν στρατηγηθέντα καὶ ταξιρχῆσαντα καὶ λοχαγῆ-
σαντα. For the absence of καὶ before στρατηγεῖν see critical note on 1260 a 26, and cp. 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 16, μῦνον γὰρ ἡ μίξει στοχάζεται τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τῶν ἄπορων, πλούτου καὶ ελευθερίας. Καὶ ταξιρχῆσαντα καὶ λοχαγῆσαντα is added to show that one should not only have been under the command of a general before one becomes a general, for this might be said of a private soldier, but should have risen from the rank of a private to that of a lochagus, and from that rank to the rank of a taxarch (compare the saying ascribed to the comic poet Crates by Aristophanes in Eq. 541 Didot, quoted above on 1276 b 22, and the principle underlying the ordo magistratum at Rome). That the lochagus was sub-
ordinate to the taxarch, we see from 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 1 sqq.: see also Liddell and Scott, s.v. ταξιρχός.

11. διὸ λέγεται κ. τ. λ. Aristotle probably refers to a saying ascribed to Solon, ἄρχει πρῶτον μᾶθὼν ἄρχεσθαι (Diog. Laert. 1. 60), which Plato may have before him in Laws 762 E (quoted in vol. i. p. 238, note 1). Cp. also Cic. De Leg. 3. 2. 5 and M. Antonin. Comm. ii. 29. Καὶ τοῦτο, 'this also,' for Aristotle has already said that one should learn to rule freemen by being ruled, and now he goes further and says that it is not possible to rule them well without having been ruled. Alcibiades' experience of being ruled was probably far too short, for he figures as a leading statesman at Athens at a comparatively early age. Even good rulers have been thought to have lost somewhat through too rapid a rise in early life. Some traced Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's 'exceeding master-
fulness' to this cause. 'He was pushed up the easiest possible incline to almost the top of the ladder of diplomatic rank before he was twenty-four' (S. Lane-Poole, Life of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, 1. 80).

13. τούτων δὲ ἄρετῇ μὲν ἔτέρα κ. τ. λ. Τούτων, i.e. τοῦ ἄρχοντος καὶ τοῦ ἄρχομένου τὴν τῶν ἔλευθερων ἄρχην. Cp. 1. 13. 1259 b 32 sqq. Μάλιϊ, 'while,' as often elsewhere.

14. ἐπίστασθαι καὶ δύνασθαι. Δύνασθαι is a wider term than ἐπίστασθαι: knowledge is only one of the conditions of capability. Cp. Xen. Cyrop. 3. 2. 25, εἰσὶ δὲ τινες τῶν Χαλδαίων οἱ ληξώμενοι ξώσι
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15. ἀρετή. For the absence of the article before ἀρετή see note on 1253 b 11.

16. ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα, ‘on both sides,’ i.e. both as ruler and as ruled: cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 12. 1143 a 35, καί ὁ νοίς τῶν ἐνεχάτων ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα, and Plut. Lyurg. c. 18, ἐκοινώνου δὲ οἱ ἐρασταί τοῖς παυλὶ τῆς δόξης ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα (i.e. both when their repute was bad and when it was good).

καί ἀνδρὸς δὴ ἄγαθου ἀμφω, i.e. τὸ δύνασθαι ἁρχεῖν καὶ ἠρχεῖν τὴν τῶν ἐλευθερῶν ἁρχήν. Thus Aristotle’s ‘best State,’ which is composed of ἑστηκαί (4 (7). 13. 1332 a 32 sqq.), is also composed of men who have learnt to rule well by being ruled (4 (7). 14. 1333 a 2) and who interchange ruling and being ruled (1332 b 25 sqq.). As to καί . . . δὴ see above on 1253 a 18.

17. καί εἰ κ.τ.λ., ‘and if the temperance and justice appropriate to a ruler differ in kind [from the temperance and justice appropriate to a person ruled but free], for the temperance and justice of a person ruled but free are also different in kind [from those of a ruler], it is clear that the good man’s virtue, for instance his justice, will be of two kinds,’ [for the good man must have the virtue which fits him to rule and also the virtue which fits him to be ruled.] That the virtue of the ruler is different in kind from that of the ruled we have seen in 1. 13. 1259 b 32–1260 a 24, a passage with which that before us is nearly connected. For the suppression in 17 of ‘from the temperance and justice appropriate to a person ruled but free,’ cp. 1277 a 16, καί τὴν παιδείαν δ’ εἰδὼς ἐτέραν εἶναι λέγοντι τινες ἁρχητος, where ‘from that of the ruled’ is suppressed, and [Plut.] Consol. ad Apollonium, c. 23, ἀγροῦντες ὅτι ὁ δωρεὶς δόνατος, ὡς πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσιν, οὔδεν διαφέρει (sc. τοῦ ὀράματος). For the ellipse in καί γὰρ ἁρχημένου μὲν ἐλευθέρου δὲ see the examples collected by Bonitz, Ind. s.v. γὰρ (146 a 50 sqq.), and especially Eth. Nic. 3. 13. 1118 b 21, περὶ δὲ τὰς ἱδίας τῶν ἱδιῶν πολλοὶ καὶ πολλὰς ἁμαρτάνοντων τῶν γὰρ φιλοσοφοῦτων λεγομένων (sc. πολλοὶ ἁμαρτάνοντες) ἡ τῷ χαίρειν ὡς μὴ δεὶ κ.τ.λ. So here with καί γὰρ ἁρχημένου μὲν ἐλευθέρου δὲ we must supply ἐτέρον ἐτῶν εἴδος σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης, or possibly, as Mr. Richards suggests, ἐτί σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη. For the absence of the article before ἀρετή in τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀρετή, see note on 1285 b 12, τοῦ ἑπεκίνητου ἑπανάτασις. Aristotle had assumed for a moment in an aporetic
argument (1276 b 33) that the virtue of the good man is of one kind only, but he now arrives at a different conclusion. Plato had already so far distinguished the virtue of the ruler from that of the ruled as to say that ἕρωνντις exists only in the ruler (Rep. 433 C), but neither he nor Protagoras had drawn any distinction between the temperance and justice of the ruler and the same qualities in the ruled, when they said (Plato, Rep. 431 E–432 B, 433 D: Protag. 324 D–325 A) that justice and temperance should be possessed by all classes in the State. Aristotle’s principle is that ruling differs in kind from being ruled, and that therefore the virtue of the ruler differs in kind from the virtue of the ruled (1. 13. 1259 b 37 sq.). I do not remember any other passage in Aristotle’s writings in which this view is expressed with equal distinctness. He appears in what follows to connect the difference between the courage and temperance of the man and the woman with the more active and arduous nature of the functions of the man in household management.

20. καθ’ ἃ, cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 13, δύναμιν καθ’ ἣν ἐσται πρακτικός. ὡςπερ κ. τ. λ. This has been already said in 1. 13. 1260 a 21 sqq., where we are told that these virtues in the man are ἀρχικαὶ and in the woman ὑπηρετικαὶ. In Poet. 15. 1454 a 22 we read ἔστι γὰρ ἀνδρέιον μὲν τὸ ἱδός, ἀλλ’ οἷς ἀρμόστον γυναῖκι τὸ ἀνδρεῖαν ἡ δεινὴν εἶναι, but Αε has τῶι in place of the second τῷ with a blank space before it large enough for two letters, and Vahlen conjectures οὖτως. The article is absent before σωφρωσύνη in γυναῖκι καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἐτέρα σωφρω- σύνη καὶ ἀνδρία, just as it is often absent in similar sentences where οὗτος occurs: see above on 1276 b 5, 7, and 1277 a 13, and cp. 24, ἐπεὶ καὶ οἰκονομία ἑτέρα ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναῖκος.

22. καὶ γυνὴ λάδος, εἰ οὖτω κοσμία εἰς ὡςπερ ὁ ἄνηρ ὁ ἀγαθὸς. Looking to δεῖλος, 22, which is the opposite of ἀνδρείος, we might expect to find ἁκόλαστος, the opposite of σωφρόνων, in place of λάδος, and Susemihl on the strength of ‘inhonesta’ in Leonardus Aretinus’ translation places ἁκόλαστος in his text, but λάδος is probably right. Λάδος is often opposed to κόσμος, e.g. in Philem. Ἀδελφοί, Fragm. 2 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 5), οἶκ. ἂν λαδῇ τις μικρόν, ἐστὶ κόσμος, οὖθ’ ἂν παρεῦπται τις εἰς τήν γῆν βλέπων ὁ δ’ ἡλίκον μὲν ἡ φύσις φέρει λαδόν, μηδὲν ποιῶν δ’ ἀσχημον, οὖτος κόσμος. Λάδος, it is true, is found only in Π, but Π (except Π, which has
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Animal) have ἄλλος, which is frequently found in MSS. as a misreading for λάλος (see for instance Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 858: 3. 567). L. Schmidt has shown (Ethik der alten Griechen, i. 313) how nearly akin κοσμιότης is to σωφροσύνη. Compare with the passage before us Trag. Gr. Fragm. Adespota 364 (Nauck), ἄλλος γυναικὸς κόσμος, ἄλλος ὀρόσεων.

24. ἐπεὶ καὶ κ.τ.λ. For the transition here from ἀρετή to οἰκονομία, compare what Meno says in Plato, Meno 71 E, εἰ δὲ βοῦλει γυναικὸς ἀρετήν, οὐ χαλέπων διελθεῖν, ὅτι δὲι αὐτήν τὴν οἰκίαν εὑ οἰκείων, σώζοντι τε τὰ ἔνδου καὶ κατήκουν οὕσαν τοῦ ἀνδρός. Aristotle evidently has this passage before him, and probably also Xen. Oecon. 7. 25, ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ φυλάττειν τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα τῇ γυναικὶ προσέταξε, γεννώσκων ὁ θεός ὅτι πρὸς τὸ φυλάττειν οὐ κάκων ἦστι φοβερῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν πλείον μέρος καὶ τοῦ φόβου ἐδάσατο τῇ γυναικὶ ἣ τὸ ἀνδρὶ. Compare also [Aristot.] Oecon. 1. 3. 1343 b 26—1344 a 8. The account given there and in the passage before us of the household management of the man as being concerned with acquiring is, however, at issue with the usual teaching of Aristotle on the subject, which is that household management has to do with using: see above on 1256 a 11. To acquire is more difficult than to keep and demands a higher type of virtue (Demosth. Ol. 2. 26, πολὺ γὰρ μᾶς ἔχοντας φυλάττειν ἡ κτήσιςάθαι πάντα πέφυκεν: Dio Cass. Hist. Rom. 52. 18. 5, καὶ μακρῷ τὸ φυλάξατε τι τοῦ κτήσιαθαι ρᾷ ἐόντι πρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὸ τάλλω- τρια προσποίησασθαι καὶ πόνων καὶ κυνικῶν δεί, πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα σώσαι βραχεία φρονίμι ἀρκεῖ). 25. ἢ δὲ φρόνησις ἀρχοντὸς ἰδίος ἀρετῆς μονῆ, 'and moral prudence [is the only virtue which has not two kinds, for it] is the only virtue which is peculiar to the ruler.' This sentence is a continuation in a rough way of 18–21. The fem. form ἰδίος is used here, as in 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 12 and De Part. An. 2. 7. 652 b 2, in all three cases before a word commencing with a vowel (see note on 1283 a 33). Bonitz (Ind. 472 b 44) gives a number of instances in which the word μονῆς is placed at the end of a sentence, among them Eth. Nic. 7. 6. 1149 a 20. As to the ruler's need of φρόνησις see above on 1277 a 14. It has been already said (above on 17) that Plato treats φρόνησις as peculiar to the ruler in Rep. 433 C, a passage which Aristotle also has before him when he ascribes ἀδίκα διηθής to the ruled. Compare Timaeus 51 D sqq. and the contrast between ruler and ruled in Laws 734 E sqq. Yet in Laws 632 C Plato speaks of instituting guardians of the laws, τοὺς μὲν διὰ
The question raised here is probably C. 5. suggested by the mention in c. 4. 1277 b 1 of the fact that in some States handicraftsmen had no share in office till the 'ultimate democracy' came into being. Cp. Polyb. 10. 17. 6, where of πολιτικοί are distinguished from οἱ χειροτέχναι. But surely handicraftsmen even in those States shared in the ἄρχοντως ἄρχη access to which, according to c. 1. 1275 a 30 sqq., suffices to make a man a citizen? Aristotle now seems to require that the citizen shall share not merely in ἄρχοForty, but in ἄρχει strictly so called
He appears to hold that if a citizen does not do so, he cannot be said to possess the virtue of a citizen (36). Aristotle’s inquiry into the nature of citizen-virtue results, in fact, in a change in his standard of citizenship; at any rate we are told in 1278 a 35 that ὁ μᾶλλον πολίτης is to be found in ὁ μετέχων τῶν τιμῶν.

37. τὴν τοιούτην ἀρετήν, ‘the virtue which we have ascribed to the citizen’ (cp. 1278 a 9, πολίτου ἀρετὴν ἢν εἴπομεν), i.e. the virtue which fits men both to rule and to be ruled.

οὖσα γὰρ πολίτης. Οὖσα, i.e. ὃ μέτεστιν ἄρχειν. The addition of οὖσα γὰρ πολίτης seems unnecessary, but it is quite in Aristotle’s manner: cp. c. 1. 1275 a 11, and the addition of ὅ μὲν γὰρ θαρκὰ ἔχουσιν, ὁι δὲ ὑστέρας in De Gen. An. 3. 5. 755 b 20 sqq., and see notes on 1282 a 36 and b 39.

38. ἐν τίνι μέρει θετεῖς ἔκαστος; ‘in what class are we to place the individual handicraftsman?’ For ἐν τίνι μέρει see Liddell and Scott s. v. μέρος. Compare Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 23, εἰ σκέψασθ’ ἐν τίνι τάξει ποτ’ ἐστιν ὑπὲρ οὗ τὸ ψήφισμα εἰρήνη, πότερα ἔνος ἢ μέτοικος ἢ πολίτης ἐστίν.

39. διὰ γε τούτον τὸν λόγον, ‘by reason of this statement at any rate,’ i.e. the statement that δάναυσοι are not citizens nor metoeci nor aliens. Cp. Metaph. Α. 10. 1075 a 25, δοσὶ δὲ ἀδύνατα συμβαίνει ἢ ἀτόπα τοῖς ἄλλοις λέγοντι.

1278 a. 2. τῶν εἰρημένων, i.e. citizens metoeci and aliens.

tοῦτο γὰρ ἀληθὲς κ.τ.λ. The preceding sentence has pointed to the conclusion that δάναυσοι are not citizens, and γὰρ introduces a justification of this conclusion. For the thought cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq.

4. οὖσ’ οἱ παῖδες, ‘not even the children, [though they come nearer to being citizens than handicraftsmen do].’ For what follows cp. c. 1. 1275 a 14 sqq. The sons of citizens are said to be citizens ἵνα ἐποθήσεισθον, because they are citizens not absolutely but ‘on an assumption’—the assumption, namely, that they will become citizens when they grow older.

6. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἄρχαιοις χρόνοις κ.τ.λ. For the use of μὲν οὖν here see note on 1265 b 12. It is answered by δὲ, 8. The sense is—’Nay, in ancient times the handicraftsmen were in some States slaves or aliens, but the best State will not go so far as to make them slaves, it will refuse to make them citizens’ (cp. 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 33 sqq.). Handicraftsmen would be especially likely to be slaves in military States (Xen. Oecon. 4. 3, and Plut. Lycurg. et
Num. inter se comp. c. 2, αὐτὴν δὲ ἡ Δυνάμεις (διάταξις) καὶ ἀριστοκρατικὴ, τῶς μὲν βασιλέως ἀποκαθαίρουσα τέχνας εἰς οἰκετῶν καὶ μετοίκων χείρας, αὐτοὺς δὲ τοὺς πολίτας εἰς τὴν ἀστίαν καὶ τὸ δόμον συνάγουσα). In maritime and commercial States like Corinth, where handicraftsmen were less despised, there would be less eagerness to keep them outside the citizen-body. When Solon offered citizenship at Athens to persons immigrating with their families for the practice of a handicraft (Plut. Solon c. 24), he bade farewell to the old-fashioned policy of keeping handicraftsmen slaves and aliens, and aided in the creation of that numerous body of handicraftsmen, the existence of which made it possible for Themistocles a century later to build and equip a fleet (Diod. i 11. 43. 3). That handicraftsmen were often strangers in early days is implied in Hom. Odys. 17. 382 sqq., and it appears that the first makers of the peplos of Athena were two aliens, Aceseus of Patara and Helicon of Carystus (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. i. 22), but, according to Büchenschütz (Besitz und Erwerb, p. 321), we do not read in Homer of slaves employed in handicrafts.

7. διότερ οἱ πολλοὶ τοιούτως καὶ νῦν. That handicraftsmen were often aliens in Plato's day is implied in Laws 848 A, τὸ δὲ τρίτων δημοιουργῶς τέ καὶ πάντως τοῖς ἔξωις. Cp. also Andoc. ap. Schol. Aristoph. Vesp. i 107, where we read about Hyperbolus ὅς δὲ ἔξων ὄν καὶ βάρβαρος λυχνοποιεῖ, and Demosth. in Eubulid. c. 31, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀμοιλογοῦμεν καὶ ταυτάς πολεῖν καὶ ζῆν οὐχ ὅτινα τρίτων Βουλάμβαδο καὶ εἶ σοι ἐστι τούτῳ σημείον, ὡ Εὐδομιλίδη τοῦ μη Ἀθηναίου εἶναι ἡμᾶς κ.τ.λ. Even at Athens most handicraftsmen may have been slaves or aliens as late as the time of Aristotle, though the Athenian citizen-body undoubtedly comprised a large number of βάσανους.

9. εἰ δὲ καὶ οὕτως πολίτης, ἄλλα κ.τ.λ. For this use of ἄλλα in the sense of 'at any rate' in an apodosis after a conditional clause introduced by εἰ or εἰς, see Bon. Ind. 33 a 42 sqq., and cp. Phys. 6. 258 b 32—259 a 4.

10. λεκτέων ό υ παντὸς κ.τ.λ., εἰς εἶναι: see above on 1277 a 38.
11. τῶν δὲ ἀναγκαίων κ.τ.λ. The expression τῶν ἀναγκαίων presents much difficulty. It is possible that the word ἀναγκαίων has been repeated by a scribe's mistake from the preceding sentence and has displaced some other word (perhaps ἀλλων, which Bernays would read in place of it). Another possible view is Prof. Postgate's (Notes, p. 26), who construes τῶν δὲ ἀναγκαίων 'and with respect to necessary services,' but the sentence certainly reads as if τῶν
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ἄναγκαιον were masculine. If we take it as masculine, we may translate ‘the necessary people,’ so termed in contradistinction to ‘those who are quit of necessary services,’ and compare 6 (4). 1291 a 15, τοις ἄναγκαιοις βοσκήμασιν. It is thus that Lambinus appears to interpret τῶν ἄναγκαιων, for his rendering is ‘eorum autem qui operibus et munerebuis necessariis funguntur.’ Τὰ τοιαῦτα = τὰ ἄναγκαια ἔργα. In speaking of slaves as rendering services to an individual, Aristotle forgets the case of public slaves.

12. οἱ δὲ κοινὴ ἑ. τ. ἑ. Compare their name δημοφυγιον.

13. ἐντείθεν μικρὸν ἐπισκεψαμένοις, ‘starting from this point and carrying our investigation a little further.’ So we have in Meteor. 1. 3. 340 b 14 δεί δὲ νοεῖν οὕτως καὶ ἐντείθεν ἀρξάμενος. Ἐντείθεν should probably be taken, as Susemihl takes it, with μικρὸν ἐπισκεψαμένοις, and not with φανερόν, as Bernays, followed by Mr. Welldon, takes it.

14. αὐτῶν, i. e. βάναυσοι and δήπες.

αὐτὸ γὰρ φανέν τὸ λεχθὲν ποιεῖ δῆλον, ‘for that which has been said is enough by itself, when once made known, to render this manifest.’ Aristotle probably refers in τὸ λεχθὲν to what has been said in c. i. 1275 a 38 sqq. For φανέν, cp. Plato, Gorg. 508 E, ταῦτα ἡμῖν ἀνώ εἰκι ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν λόγοις οὕτω φανέντα, and Soph. O. T. 848,

ἀλλ᾽ ἀν φανέν γε τοῦτος ὃθ' ἐπιστασο,


εἰτ' αὐτὸ δηλοὶ τοῦργον, ἦ τεῖνει χρέων:

Androm. 261 Bothe, 265 Dindorf (for other references to Euripides see Liddell and Scott s. v. σημαίνω i. 2): Aristoph. Lysistr. 375 Didot: Cratin. Πολέα, Fragm. 9 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 114). See also Rhein. Mus. 42. 400.


17. γὰρ τὸς ἐστὶν κ. τ. λ. Cp. 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 9 sqq. and 2. II. 1273 a 25 sqq. Ἡν καλοῦσιν ἄριστοκρατικήν, for ἄριστοκρατία in the truest sense of the word implies something more than the
award of office according to virtue; it implies a constitution under which all the citizens, or at any rate all the citizens capable of rule, are men of full excellence (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 1 sqq.). Cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 31, ἄς καλοῦσιν ἀριστοκρατίας.

20. κατ’ ἀξίαν is here associated with κατ’ ἀρετήν, but we must not identify the two expressions. 'Αξία, as Hildemenbrand has already pointed out (Geschichte und System der Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie i. 294), attaches not only to virtue, but to property and to every other attribute which gives its possessor a special importance in relation to the life of the State. Τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν ἴσον is commonly contrasted with τὸ κατ’ ἀρετήν ἴσον (e.g. in 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 29 sq. and 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 3 sq.), whence we infer that constitutions not based on τὸ κατ’ ἀρετήν ἴσον, for instance oligarchy, are based in a sense on τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν ἴσον: indeed, democracy itself, though commonly represented as resting its claims on τὸ κατ’ ἀρετήν ἴσον (Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 25 sqq.: cp. Pol. 3. 17. 1288 a 20 sqq.). Wealth, virtue, high birth, education, and even ἔλευθερία, confer ἀξία (Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 25 sqq.). That the wealthy, the well-born, and the free-born have a real, and not merely a fancied, claim on the score of ἀξία, results, I think, from Pol. 3. 12. 1283 a 14 sqq. Their claim, however, cannot compare with that of men superior in virtue (3. 9. 1281 a 4 sqq.: cp. 7. 5. 1. 1301 a 39 sqq.), and hence κατ’ ἀξίαν is especially and most truly used in the Politics, as it is in the passage before us, of ἀξία conferred by virtue (see 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 15: 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 17: 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 33).


22. μέν, 'while,' as often elsewhere.


24. πλουτοῦσι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle perhaps has in his mind Homer. Odyssey. 17. 386, where δημοσεργοὶ are referred to, ὁδὸν γὰρ κλητοὶ γε βροτῶν ἐπ' ἀπείρων γαϊῶν, πτοχῶν δ' οὖν ἂν τις καλεῖ τρύψατα έ αὐτῶν.

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Still Plato (Rep. 406 C) contrasts οἱ δημοσιοὶ with οἱ πλοῦσιοι τε καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖς δοκοῦστε εἶναι. Καὶ intensifies οἱ πολλοί, 'quite the majority.' See Stallbaum's notes on Plato, Rep. 562 C and Laws 630 A.

25. ἐν Θῆβαις δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but in Thebes,' etc. Bern. translates δέκα ἐτῶν 'seit zehn Jahren' ('since ten years previously'), Sus. 'zehn Jahre lang' ('for the space of ten years'). In support of Bernays' rendering Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 418. 8 b, may be referred to. In Aristoph, Lysistr. 280 the Latin translation contained in Didot's Aristophanes renders Ξipi ε稷 αυτος 'inde a sex annis illotus.' But I should prefer Susemihl's rendering of δέκα ἐτῶν if parallel passages from Aristotle's writings can be adduced in support of it. It is conceivable, though perhaps hardly likely, that διά has dropped out before δέκα. 'Ἀπεισχμένον τής ἀγορᾶς appears to mean 'abstained from selling in the agora.' Aristotle no doubt refers to the time when Thebes was under an oligarchical constitution; he contrasts the oligarchy which existed at Thebes with other forms of oligarchy under which it was possible for a handicraftsman to find his way into office, and evidently prefers the strictness of the Theban oligarchy: cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 26, τὴν δὲ μετάδοσιν γίνεσθαι τῷ πλήθει τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἦτοι . . τοῖς τὸ τίμημα κτωμένοις ἢ, καθάπερ Θῆβαιοι, ἀποσχοιμένοι χρόνον τινά τῶν βαναύσων ἔργων κ.τ.λ. (It would seem, if we compare this passage with that before us, that abstaining from the practice of a handicraft and abstaining from selling in the agora were much the same thing; handicraftsmen would appear to have both manufactured their goods and sold them in the agora, cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 26–30). Xenophon may perhaps refer to Thebes as well as to the Lacedaemonian State when he says in Oecon. 4. 3, καὶ ἐν ἐνίας μὲν τῶν πόλεων, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐν ταῖς εὐπολέμωσι δοκοῦσαι εἶναι, οὔθ' ἐξετά τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδενὶ βαναυσικάς τέχνας ἐργάζεσθαι. Many oligarchies went further and enacted laws forbidding holders of offices to engage in any lucrative occupation (7 (5). 12. 1316 b 3 sqq.). Νόμος ἂν is probably emphatic, as in 2. 9. 1270 b 3; there was no concealment in the way in which Thebes excluded βαναυσοὶ from office, as there was in the methods followed by some States (1278 a 38 sqq.).

26. ἐν πολλαῖς δὲ πολιτείαις κ.τ.λ., 'but on the other hand in many constitutions,' etc. Here we pass from one extreme to another, from the extreme strictness of the Theban oligarchy to
the extreme laxity of other constitutions. Aristotle evidently holds,
in full agreement with current opinion, that to make aliens citizens
was worse than making handicraftsmen citizens. The constitutions
to which he refers were no doubt extreme democracies (cp. 8 (6).
and 1319 b 6—19), and it is noticeable that Aristotle does not charge
even them with commonly admitting absolute aliens to citizenship,
whatever they might do at special crises (see note on 1275 b 34);
he speaks in the passage before us of ‘some of the class of aliens’
(τῶν ξένων, not τοὺς ξένους), and refers in particular to ‘persons born
of a citizen-mother and an alien father,’ i.e. half-aliens. As he
distinguishes these half-aliens from νόθοι, he would seem to regard
them as born in wedlock. These half-aliens would differ much
among themselves; the alien parent would be in some cases
a Greek, in others an European or Asiatic barbarian, and a bar-
barian of high or low position. Cimon was the son of a Greek
father and a Thracian princess, Themistocles of a Greek father
and a Thracian or Carian woman of less exalted position, and this
would be much the commoner case. Many half-aliens would
probably be the offspring of marriages between poor citizen-
women and rich metoeci (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 299. 1). Similar
differences would exist in the ranks of the νόθοι. The term νόθος
was used in strictness to designate those who were not born in
wedlock, even if they were descended from citizen-parents (Gilbert,
Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 190). Thus
a νόθος might be more purely Athenian than the half-aliens of whom
we have been speaking, for he might be the offspring of an illicit
connexion between Athenians of full citizen status. Far more
frequently, however, he would be the offspring of an illicit con-
nexion between an Athenian citizen and a slave-woman; occa-
sionally he might be the offspring of an illicit connexion between
an Athenian woman and a slave. Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 299. 1)
holds that in the passage before us Aristotle intends to identify the
νόθοι with οἱ ἐκ δωάλων ἡ δωάλης (33), but perhaps we need not take
him to assert that these constituted the whole class of νόθοι: they
were no doubt the largest and least welcome portion of it. The
distinction between ξένοι and νόθοι is not always maintained: see
Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 297. 2, who refers to Pollux 3. 21, νόθος δὲ
ὁ ἐκ ξένης ἡ παλλακίδος . . . τῶν δὲ νόθων καὶ ματρόξενων ἐνοι καλοῦσιν,
and to Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 213.

29. οὗ μὴν ἄλλ' ἐπεί κ. τ. λ. Ἐπει, 'as' or 'seeing that.'
passage implies that all States which made aliens and bastards citizens did so for want of genuine citizens, a statement which seems to conflict with 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 6 sqq., where we are told that the founders of extreme democracies adopted measures of this kind, not because they could not help themselves, but with the view of making the demos strong. Aristotle leaves cases of this nature out of sight, for his object in the passage before us is to prove that States only make aliens and bastards citizens when they are forced by necessity to do so, and that, in fact, even the States which do this practically confess that some types of citizen are less authentic than others (vol. i. p. 241). Ποιοῦνται, 'make for themselves': contrast ποιήσει, 1278 a 8, and ποιούσιν, 34, and compare for a similar transition c. 16. 1287 b 29–31. Τοῦς τοιούτους, i. e. ἔως ὑπὸ νόδους. It would seem from Oecon. 2. 1346 b 13–29 that at Byzantium the law requiring both parents to be citizens was relaxed at a time of merely financial pressure.

31. οὕτω χρῶνται τοῖς νόμοις, 'they have laws of this nature' (literally, 'they have their laws thus'): cp. Aristot. Fragm. 155. 1504 a 25, πολλοὶ δὲ οὕτω χρῶνται τῶν βαρβάρων.

32. εὐποροῦντες δ’ ὀχλου κ.τ.λ. The occurrence of δέ in the apodosis here after a protasis introduced by ἐπεί raises a very difficult question. There is no doubt that in the writings of Aristotle, as in those of other Greek authors, δέ not unfrequently occurs in the apodosis after a protasis introduced by εἰ, when the apodosis or some part of it is opposed in sense to the protasis: see Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 770. 1a. We have instances of this in 3. 16. 1287 b 11 sqq.: Metaph. B. 4. 999 a 26 sqq.: Phys. 4. 8. 215 b 13 sqq. But the question is whether δέ occurs in the apodosis after a protasis introduced by ἐπεί in the genuine writings of Aristotle. It occurs after a protasis introduced by ὡς in the so-called Second Book of the Oeconomics (1349 b 12, ὡς δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο ἐταξίς, σφάξεσθαι ὡς δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας, εἰ δέ πάλιν ἵστατα ἐπιοίνυν, referred to in Bon. Ind. 167 a 38), but Bonitz (Ind. 167 a 34 sqq.) and Eucken (De Partic. Usu, p. 31) hold that in the genuine writings of Aristotle δέ does not occur in the apodosis after a protasis introduced by ἐπεί, and Sus.3 reads δῆ in the place of δέ in the passage before us. Neither Bonitz nor Eucken, however, notice this passage: see Bonitz' discussion of the question in Aristot. Studien, 3. 124 sqq., and Eucken's in De Partic. Usu, pp. 26–31. When in 3. 12. 1282 b 14 sqq. a long string of sentences connected
by δὲ and introduced by ἐπεὶ is followed, as it would seem, by an
apodosis in 21 introduced by δὲ, ποίων δὲ ἰσότης ἐστὶ καὶ ποίων ἀνισότης, δὲι μὴ λανθάνει, the presence of δὲ in the apodosis may
be accounted for by the anacoluthic character of the sentence.
The same reason may be given for the occurrence of δὲ in the
apodosis after a string of sentences introduced by ἐπεὶ in Rhet. 1.
1. 1355 a 3–14, where the best MSS. have δὲ in 10, though the Vet.
Int., supported by a few MSS. not of the best type, gives no equi-
valent for it. In the passage before us we make a nearer approach
to the structure of the passages in which δὲ occurs in the apodosis
after a protasis introduced by εἰ, for in this passage, as in those,
there is an opposition in sense between the protasis and the
apodosis, but here again the passage may be anacoluthic, the
insertion of the parenthesis, διὰ γὰρ ἀληγαυθροπίαι ὡντα χρώναι τοῖς
νόμοις, serving to break the grammatical connexion and leading to
the addition of δὲ in εὑπαροῦντες δὲ δχλοῦ. But whether we regard
the passage as anacoluthic or as a real instance of the occurrence
of δὲ in the apodosis after a protasis introduced by ἐπεὶ, there is no
need to follow William of Moerbeke in omitting δὲ or to substitute
δὴ for it.

κατὰ μικρὸν παραιροῦνται. Aristotle appears to be speaking
of a gradual change in the law of citizenship, not of such purga-
tions of the citizen-lists as occurred at Athens after the expulsion
of the Peisistratidae (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 13) and in b.c. 444 (Plut. Pericl.
c. 37) and 346 (Schaefer, Demothenes und seine Zeit, 2. 289 sq.).

33. τοὺς ἐκ δοῦλου πρῶτον ἢ δούλης. As to this class see above
on 1278 a 26, and cp. Diod. i. 80. 3, νόδον δ' οὔδενα τῶν γεννηθέντων
νομίζουσιν, οὐδ' ἄν ἐξ ἀργυρωνίτων μητρὸς γεννηθή, where Diodorus
is speaking of the Egyptians. If Antiochus' account of the Partheniae
of the Lacedaemonian State (ap. Strab. p. 278) is true, and they
were the sons of slaves, their enforced emigration to Tarentum
would be an illustration of what Aristotle says here. The children
of slaves were commonly thought to be morally below the mark
(Eurip. Fragn. 966: Theogn. 537–8).

eῖτα τοὺς ἀπὸ γυναικῶν, i.e. sons of a citizen-mother by an alien,
not a slave, father (Jowett). It will be noticed that sons of a
citizen-father by an alien, not a slave, mother were usually the last
to be excluded.

34. τοὺς ἐξ ἄμφοιν ἄστων. See above on 1275 b 21. For ἄμφοιν
ἀστῶν see below on 1310 b 5 and critical note on 1301 b 35.
NOTES.

Μεν οὖν κ. τ. λ. Μεν οὖν is not answered by ἄλλα, 38; it has, in fact, nothing answering to it, unless we take it to be eventually answered by δέ in 1278 b 6, επεὶ δέ ταύτα διάφωτα. In 1278 a 34–40 we have a summary of the results of the fifth chapter introduced by μεν οὖν, and in 1278 a 40–b 5 a summary introduced by another μεν οὖν of the results of the fourth chapter, this second μεν οὖν finding an answer in 1278 b 6, επεὶ δέ ταύτα διάφωτα. No doubt the fourth and fifth chapters form to a certain extent a connected whole, for the fifth chapter is added by way of supplement to the fourth, it being necessary to explain that there are citizens in whose case the definition of the citizen’s virtue given in c. 4 does not hold good, but still there is much awkwardness in the arrangement by which a summary of the results of the fourth chapter is added at the end of the fifth, all the more so as we have already had a brief mention (hardly a summary) of the results of the fourth chapter at the end of that chapter (1277 b 30 sqq.). It is doubtful whether the summary in 1278 a 40–b 5 is not an interpolation by some editor. It is not quite exact: see vol. i. Appendix B, and note on 1285 b 27. As to εἰδή πλεῖον πολίτου, there are citizens who share in office and there are citizens who do not share in office except under certain constitutions.

36. ὅσπερ καὶ κ. τ. λ. Καί, ‘for instance,’ as in i. 12. 1259 b 8. The quotation is from Hom. Il. 9. 648 and 16. 59, where Achilles complains of Agamemnon’s treatment of him. Aristotle quotes the words as if Achilles meant ‘excluded from office’ by ἄτιμος. The transition was easy for Greeks from the idea of exclusion from office to that of being dishonoured (cp. c. 10. 1281 a 29 sqq. and Thuc. 6. 38. 5).

37. ὅσπερ μετοικὸς γὰρ κ. τ. λ. Bonitz (Ind. s. v. μέτοικος) refers to Eth. Eud. 3. 5. 1233 a 28, διὸ καὶ οὐδεὶς ἀν εἰπού μετοικῆς, εἰ τις μετοικὸς ὃν ἄρχειν μὴ ἄξιοι εἰπόν ἄλλη ὑπείκει, ἄλλ’ εἰ τις εὐγενῆς ὃν καὶ ἑγωνύμενος μέγα εἶναι τὸ ἄρχειν. Cp. also Isocr. Paneg. § 105 and Xen. Hell. 4. 4. 6.

38. ἄλλ’ ὅποι κ. τ. λ., ’but where exclusion from office is concealed, [there is a bad motive present, for] this concealment is practised by those who resort to it with a view to deceive those who dwell in the same State.’ Aristotle uses the expression τῶν συνοικοῦντων, not τῶν συμπολιτευομένων, because those who are excluded from office can only be said κοινωνείν τῆς οἰκήσεως, like metoeci and slaves (c. i. 1275 a 7). How hateful a thing it was
to deceive one's fellow-citizens appears from the remark of Solon to Peisistratus (Plut. Solon, c. 30), οὐ καλῶς, ὦ παῖ Ἰπποκράτων, ὑποκρίνῃ τὸν Ὀμηρικὸν Ὀδυσσέα ταῦτα γὰρ ποιεῖς τοὺς πολίτας παρακρουόμενος, οἷς ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς πολεμίους ἑξηπάτησαν αἰκασίμενος ἕαυτὸν. At Athens to deceive the people was a crime (Hdt. 6. 136: Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 97). To wrong σύνοικοι is especially dangerous (Isocr. Panath. § 178). Most oligarchies openly excluded the many from office (7 (5). 8. 1308 b 33 sqq.), but there may have been some oligarchies, and certainly there were aristocracies, in which an attempt was made to conceal their exclusion from them (6 (4). 12. 1297 a 7 sqq.). To these aristocracies, as Susemihl has already remarked (Sus.², Note 518: Sus.², i. p. 379), Aristotle probably here refers.

40. πότερον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. As to this summary see above on 34. For the omission of ἀρετὴν, cp. 1. 13. 1260 a 24, and see vol. ii. p. li. note 4.

2. For the added explanation ὅτε κ.τ.λ. cp. 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 6 sq. 1278 b. The sentence, if complete, would apparently run, ὅτε τινός μὲν πόλεως ὁ σπουδαῖος πολίτης ὁ αὐτὸς ἐστι τῷ ἀνδρὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ κ.τ.λ.

3. κάκεινος οὐ πᾶς, 'and not every citizen of the State in which the two are the same.'

ὁ πολιτικός. With the account given of the πολιτικός here compare Xen. Mem. 4. 2. ii, where the word πολιτικό is conjoined with ἄρχειν ἱκανοῖ. Οἱ πολιτικοὶ are distinguished from οἱ δημοτικοὶ in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 24, from οἱ ἑργαστικοὶ in Polyb. 10. 16. 1, from οἱ χειρότεχνοι in Polyb. 10. 17. 6, and from οἱ δημοιουργοί and οἱ ἐχθροπόροι in Plato, Apol. 23 E (cp. Diog. Laert. 2. 39). In 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 11, ἐπεὶ δὲ πόλιτον καὶ ἄρχοντος τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν ἐκεῖν ἐμφαν καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρὸς, Aristotle substitutes ἄρχοντος for πολιτικοῦ.

4. καθ' αὐτῶν. Sus.² (Note 521: Sus.², i. p. 380) holds that Aristotle is thinking of ὁ βασιλικός, but we have been concerned in c. 4 with statesmen who understand both ruling and being ruled, and the reference probably is to magistrates held singly and not in conjunction with others: cp. Aeschin. c. Timarch. c. 109, ἀλλ' ἵσως καθ' αὐτῶν μὲν ἄρχον φαίνει ἣν, μετὰ πλειόνων δ' ἐπιείκεις. Cp. also c. 11. 1282 a 40, τῶν καθ' ἑνα καὶ κατ' ὀλέγους μεγάλας ἄρχας ἄρχοντων.

NOTES.

6. 'Ετείς δὲ κ. τ. λ. The question raised in c. i. 1275 a 1, τίνα χρή καλεῖν πολύτην καὶ τίς ὁ πολύτης ἐστί, has now been answered, and in strictness (cp. 1274 b 38 sqq.) the next question is τί ποτε ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις, but this has been answered already in c. i. 1275 b 20, and Aristotle passes on at once to the question as to the nature of each constitution which he has marked out for consideration in the first sentence of the Third Book. The citizen has been defined by access to office, and as access to office is regulated by the constitution, the question whether there are more constitutions than one, and, if so, how many there are and what differences exist between them, is 'next' (τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα) dealt with. Aristotle prefixes to his discussion of these questions (see c. 7. 1279 a 22 sqq.) an inquiry into two preliminary ones, what is the true end for which the πόλις exists, and what is the true nature of political rule. At the close of this inquiry he no longer troubles to ask whether there are more constitutions than one (he has, indeed, already assumed this in c. 5. 1278 a 15), but asks at once (c. 7 init.) how many there are.

7. κἀν εἰ πλείους. Eucken (De Partic. Usu, p. 61) remarks that κἀν εἰ is often used just as καὶ εἰ might be. 'Id iam apud Platonem, Demosthenem, alios inventur, sed apud nullum saepius quam apud Aristotelem . . . Inveniuntur loci, ubi nihil impedit, quominus ἄν ex verbo κἀν ad apodosin referamus' (he refers among other passages to De An. 2. 10. 422 a 11 sq.), 'sed multo saepius omnino nulla apodosis est ad quam ἄν referri possit, maxime in Politicis, in quibus, ut exemplum affерam, saepe compluribus rebus enumeratis postremo loco verbis κἀν εἰ aliquid additur quod magis generale est (cp. Pol. 1. 9. 1257 a 38) . . . Sed etiam alius rationibus κἀν εἰ eodem modo atque καὶ εἰ usurpatur' (Eucken cites the passage before us and 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 16 sqq.). 'Simili modo κἀν εἰ etiam in ceteris scriptis adhibetur, sed saepius praeter Politica in Metaphysicis tantum, rarius in ceteris, maxime in Rhetoricis, ubi semel (1. i. 1354 a 25) usurpatur.'

8. διαφορai τίνες αὕτων εἰςιν, 'what are the differences between them'? cp. Hist. An. 1. 1. 487 a 11, αἱ δὲ διαφορai τῶν ἐων εἰσὶ κατὰ τοὺς βίους καὶ τὰς πράξεις κ. τ. λ. This question is dealt with in c. 7, where the normal and the deviation-forms of constitution are distinguished, and also in c. 8. 1279 b 39 sqq. But it receives further consideration in the Sixth Book: cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 31, ἢτι δὲ τίνες αἱ διαφορai (τῶν πολιτειῶν) καὶ διὰ τίνα αὕτων συμβαίνει.
lowed by Sus. and Mr. Welldon, are probably right in translating, 'now a constitution is an ordering of a State in respect both of its other magistracies and especially of the magistracy which is supreme over everything' (πάντων is probably neuter, cp. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 26). Compare Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 27, τῷ δὲ κύρια διήρηται κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας’ ὅσα γὰρ αἱ πολιτεῖαι, τοσαῦτα καὶ τὰ κύρια ἔστων. See vol. i. p. 243, note 1, for other accounts in the Politics of the nature of a constitution. That implied in 3. 3. 1276 b 1 sqq., that it is the εἰδος τῆς συνθέσεως of the elements of the πόλις, should not be lost sight of. See note on 1276 b 4.

10. κύριον μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Γάρ introduces a proof that the constitution is an ordering of the supreme magistracy. It is so because it is an ordering of the πολιτεύμα and varies as this varies, and the πολιτεύμα is the supreme authority of the State. Τὸ πολιτεύμα, 'the supreme authority,' whether One Man or a Few or Many (cp. c. 7. 1279 a 25 sqq., and see vol. i. p. 243, note 2), usually not an individual, but a number of individuals, and thus we read of οἱ μετέχοντες τοῦ πολιτεύματος in 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 15 (cp. 24, τοὺς εἰς τὸ πολιτεύμα βαδίζοντας). It was, however, possible to be a member of the πολιτεύμα and yet not to share in the greatest magistracies, as we see from 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 12, καταλύονται δὲ καὶ ὅταν ἐν τῇ διλαγαρχίᾳ ἐτέραν διλαγαρχίαν ἐμποίωσαν τὸῦτο δ’ ἐστίν ὅταν τοῦ παντὸς πολιτεύματος διήγειν δύνατον τῶν μεγίστων ἀρχῶν μὴ μετέχοντι οἱ διήγη πάντες.

11. πολιτεύμα δ’ ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία, 'and the supreme authority virtually is the constitution.' With Sepulv., Vict., Giph., Heinsius, and Stahr I take πολιτεύμα to be the subject of the sentence (for the absence of the article before πολιτεύμα see above on 1276 b 28). Lamb., however, translates, ‘civitatis autem administrandae forma, quam politiam diximus a Graccis appellari, est administratio seu gubernatio civitatis’; thus he makes ἡ πολιτεία the subject of the sentence, and Bernays appears to do so too, for he translates, ‘die regierende Klasse bestimmt sich nach der Regierungsform’ (‘the governing class is determined by the form of government’). This rendering suits well with 8-10, but not so well with what follows in 11 sqq., and I prefer the other interpretation. Aristotle proves that the constitution is especially an ordering of the supreme authority by showing that the nature of the supreme authority is decisive of the character of the constitution, from which it follows that the main business of the constitution is to fix the supreme authority. The two words πολιτεία and πολιτεύμα are interchanged
in 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 6, kai tois ἡξω τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῷ πολιτεϊματι, and in 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 14 sqq., where τῆς πολιτείας δὲ ὀλίγων ὁθεὶς answers to τοῦ πρῶτον πολιτεϊματος ὀλίγου ὄντος.

12. For the omission of πόλεσι after τοῖς δημοκρατικάις see above on 1266 b i. We rather expect τοῖς ὀλιγαρχικάις to follow.

13. φαμέν δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘and we say that the constitution also (as well as the πολιτεϊμα) of these’ (i.e. of those who live under the supremacy of the demos and those who live under the supremacy of the few) ‘is different.’ It is not quite clear whether in φαμέν Aristotle refers to himself and his school or (as Bernays thinks) to the common use of language (cp. c. 7, 1279 a 33, καλείν εἰσώβαμεν). Perhaps ἐρωύμεν in the next line rather points to the former interpretation.

15. τῶν ἄλλων, ‘the others’ (in opposition to τοῖτων), i.e. those who live under the supremacy, not of the demos or the few, but of some other supreme authority. Or possibly ‘the other constitutions.’ Susemihl takes the words in the latter way, and he may be right.

16. τῆς ἀρχῆς εἰδη πόσα τῆς περὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὴν κοινωνίαν τῆς ζωῆς. We are concerned here only with the kinds of rule exercised in relation to man as a member of society before we can say how many forms of constitution there are or discriminate the normal forms from the deviation-forms. For in the normal forms the true end is aimed at and the true kind of rule exercised, and in the deviation-forms neither is the case.

17. κατὰ τοῖς πρῶτοι λόγοις. As to οἱ πρῶτοι λόγοι see vol. ii. p. xx sqq., and cp. Isocr. De Antid. § 71, where Isocrates, speaking of his own address to Nicocles, uses the words, ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ προσώμῳ καὶ τοῖς πρῶτοι λεγομένοις. The reference in the passage before us is to 1. 2. 1253 a 1 sqq.

19. καὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘among other things this also, that’ etc. The passage commencing here, together with c. 9. 1280 b 36 sqq. and perhaps 1. 2. 1252 b 12 sqq., seems to have been known to and used by an interpolator of Strabo, p. 419, where we read, ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπίνοια ἀυτή τῆς τῶν πόλεων κτίσεως καὶ τῆς τῶν κοινῶν ἱερῶν ἐκτιμήσεως· καὶ γὰρ κατὰ πόλεις συνήσαν καὶ κατὰ ἐθνος φυσικῶς κοινωνικοὶ ὄντες καὶ

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...as to μέν οὖν see above on 1252 b 27 sqq. Τωτότι, i. e. τὸ ζῷν καλὸς. For the thought cp. c. 9. 1280 a 31 sqq., where however it seems to be implied that men do not come together to form the State for the sake of life alone, which does not agree with 24 sqq.


25. ἦσος γὰρ κ. τ. λ., 'for perhaps there is an element of what is noble in life even if we take it by itself.' Εἰςεστὶ is probably not to be taken with κατὰ τὸ ζῷν αὐτὸ μόνον as if κατὰ meant 'in'; it means rather 'in respect of,' and τὸ ζῷον should be supplied with Εἰςεστὶ. In order to show that τὸ ζῷον may be the end with which the πόλις is formed and maintained, Aristotle shows that τὸ ζῷον has in it two characteristics of the end of human action, τὸ καλὸν and pleasurableness: cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 17, καὶ τὴν διαγωγὴν ὁμολογομένως δεὶ μὴ μόνον ἔχειν τὸ καλὸν ἄλλα καὶ τὴν ἥδονα τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν εἶ ἀμφοτέρων τοῦτων έστιν. Compare with the account of τὸ ζῷον in the passage before us Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 a 19, τὸ δὲ ζῷον τῶν καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἔδεως ὁμοίων γὰρ, τὸ δ' ὁμοίων τῆς τάγαθος φύσεως, 1170 a 25 sqq., and b i: Eth. Nic. 9. 7. 1168 a 5 sqq.: Rhet. i. 6. 1362 b 25 sqq. Aristotle follows here in the track of Sappho, Fragm. 79, ἐγὼ δὲ φίλημ᾽ αἶβροστιναν, καὶ μοι τὸ λάμπρον ἔρος . . . ἀελίω καὶ τὸ καλὸν λελογχεῖν,
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where Clearchus of Soli, who has preserved the fragment (ap. Athen. Deipn. 687 a: Clearch. Sol. Fragm. 4 in Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 304), adds, φαινέρων ποιώναν πάσιν ὡς ἡ τοῦ ζην ἐπιθυμία τὸ λαμπρὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν εἰχέν αὐτῇ, and in ἄν μὴ τοῖς χαλεποῖς κ.τ.λ. in the track of Aeschylus, Fragm. 171,

τὶ γὰρ καλὸν ζῆν βίον, ὃς λάτας φέρει;

(where we should read with Nauck ὃς βίος, or possibly ὃς βίος, or, with Richards, βίονοι, ὃς), and Soph. Aj. 473,

αἰσχρόν γὰρ ἀνθρα τοῦ μακροῦ χρῆσειν βίον,

κακοῖσιν οὕτως μηδὲν ἐξωλάσσονται.

Cp. also Aesch. Fragm. 392, Soph. Fragm. 445, 867, and Bacchylides i. 30 sqq. For τοῦ καλοῦ μόριον τι, cp. c. 9. 1281 a 9, μέρος τι τοῦ δικαίου λέγουσι, and 1. 11. 1258 b 28 sq. For τοῖς χαλεποῖς κατὰ τῶν βιῶν, cp. Rhet. 2. 17. 1391 a 32, τὰ κατὰ τὸ σώμα ἁγιάδα.

27. δήλον δὲ ὡς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle perhaps designedly refers to οἱ πολλοὶ rather than to οἱ σοφοὶ, thinking that their views are a better guide to what is natural (5 (8). 5. 1340 a 2 sqq. and 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 15 sqq.), but he might have said the same thing of some σοφοί: see as to the last days of Antisthenes and Speusippus Diog. Laert. 6. 18 sq. and 4. 3. For οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἄνθρώπων cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 24.

30. ἄλλα μὴν . . . γε, 'but certainly,' (see above on 1271 a 20).

τῆς ἀρχῆς τοὺς λεγομένους τρόπους, 'the forms of rule commonly spoken of.' Bonitz (Ind. 424 b 40) compares Categ. 12. 14 a 26, πρῶτερον ἐπίρου ἐπερον λέγεται τετραχῶς, and 14 b 9, οἱ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενοι τρόποι τοῦ προτέρου σχεδὸν τοιούτοι εἰσιν. He adds that Bernays translates the words otherwise ('die in Betracht kommenden Weisen der Herrschaft'), and refers to Bernays, Dialoge des Aristoteles, p. 53. Bonitz' translation seems to me to be the right one.

31. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις κ.τ.λ. 'Εξωτερικοὶ λόγοι are literally 'external inquiries,' i.e. probably inquiries external to philosophy, cp. Eth. Eud. 1. 8. 1217 b 22, ἐπέσκεπται δὲ πολλοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ τρόπους καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν. See Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 114 sqq. (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 110 sqq.) for a full discussion of the meaning of the expression (also Grote, Aristotle, i. 63 sqq., and Sus., 1. p. 561 sqq.). Zeller remarks (p. 119. 2: Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 115, note 4) that if we give an extended meaning to the 'we' of διορίζομεθα in the passage before us, it is possible to take εξωτερικοὶ λόγοι here as referring to views advanced outside the
Aristotelian school in the intercourse of ordinary life, but that the use of the term in other passages makes it probable that Aristotle here also refers to writings of his own of a popular kind (possibly to the πολιτικός and the περὶ βασιλείας).

32. ἡ μὲν γάρ δεσποτεία κ.τ.λ. Cp. 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 2. There is a striking resemblance between the passage before us and Dio Chrys. Or. 14. 439 R.

37. ἡ δὲ τέκνων ἀρχὴ κ.τ.λ. Οἰκονομικὴ ἀρχή is here used in a sense exclusive of δεσποτικὴ ἀρχή, though undoubtedly the rule of the master over the slave is usually treated in the Politics as a part of οἰκονομικὴ ἀρχή (cp. for instance 1. 3. 1253 b 1 sqq. and 1. 12. 1259 a 37 sqq., and see Sus.², Note 529: Sus.⁴, i. p. 383). We must bear in mind that Aristotle’s use of the word χρηματιστική also varies (see note on 1256 a 1), and that the free members of the household are its members in an especial sense, so that in 1. 13. 1260 b 8 sqq. the only members of the household mentioned are husband and wife, father and child. Thus in 1. 2. 1252 b 20 (cp. 3. 14. 1285 b 31 sq.) the household is said βασιλεύσεια, though the rule of its head over his slaves is of course not a kingly rule. Cp. Hom. Odys. 1. 397, where the οἶκος is distinguished from the δῶμες,

αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν οἰκον ἁναζ ήσορ' ἡμετέρω
καὶ δμώων οὔς μοι λήσσατο διὸς Οὐνυσεύς.

Younger brothers and sisters may be referred to in τὸς οἰκίας πάσης (‘the household as a whole,’ see above on 1253 b 33, πᾶς ὁ ἵππετης, and cp. also 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 34, πάντα τῶν δημον). In Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 8–17 (cp. 5. 15. 1138 b 7 sq.), τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον is distinguished from τὸ δεσποτικὸν δίκαιον, but is explained as existing between husband and wife only, not between father and child also.

38. ἢν δὴ. Δὴ ‘vim relati urguit,’ and means ‘just’ or ‘exactly’ (‘eben’ or ‘gerade,’ Eucken, De Partic.Usu, p. 43).

39. η κοινοῦ τινὸς ἀμφότιν, sc. ἀγαθοῦ.

40. ὁσπερ ὀρώμεν καὶ τᾶς ἄλλας τέχνας, sc. εἰναι.

2. κἂν αὐτῶν εἶεν, i. c. κἂν αὐτῶν χάριν εἶεν ἢ ἱατρικὴ καὶ ἢ γυμναστικὴ, 1279 a. See Schneider’s note.

οὖδὲν γὰρ κωλύει κ.τ.λ. Bonitz (Ind. 338 a 33) groups this passage with Metaf. Δ. 12. 1019 a 17, ἢ ἱατρικὴ δύναις οὔσα υπάρχου ἄν ἐν τῷ ἱατρευμένῳ, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἢ ἱατρευμένου.


4. ὁ μὲν οὖν παιδοτρίβης κ.τ.λ. takes up ὁσπερ ὀρώμεν καὶ τᾶς ἄλλας
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tέχνας, 1278 b 40: here as elsewhere (see above on 1252 b 27 sqq.) μεν οὖν ' usurpatur ubi notio modo pronunciata amplius explicatur.'

8. γίνεται, 'comes to be': see above on 1252 b 7 and 1264 a 14. παιδοτριβής οὖν, 'though he is a training-master.'

dιδ Κ.Τ.Λ., 'hence' (i.e. because rule over a household and the rule which is exercised in the arts is essentially for the good of the ruled, and only accidentally and in certain cases for the common good of ruler and ruled) men imply by their acts that rule in a State also is essentially for the good of the ruled, inasmuch as they claim that all should hold office in turn, at any rate when the constitution rests on a basis of equality, thus treating office as a burden which should be borne in turn by all. No doubt this is not the case now—on the contrary, men seek to be perpetually in office, inasmuch as office brings great gains—but we must judge by what was the case formerly, when the state of things was natural. It may be asked how, if ruling is a burden to the ruler, perpetuity of rule, such as exists in a kingship, is fair to the ruler. Aristotle would perhaps reply that the perpetual ruler receives a quid pro quo in 'honour and reward' (see vol. i. p. 244, note 4).

In τάς πολιτικάς ἀρχάς State-offices are referred to in contradistinction to such positions of command as those of the captain of a ship or a physician (cp. c. 16. 1287 a 37 and 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 19).

9. ὅταν ᾧ κ.τ.λ. The suppressed nom. to ᾧ is ἡ πόλις or ἡ πόλισις, probably the latter, for συνεστηκία points rather to it (6 (4). 3. 1290 a 25: 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 33, b 16, etc.), though we have in 4 (7). 4. 1325 b 36 περὶ τῆς μελλοντικῆς κατ' εὐχήν συνεστάναι πόλεως. For κατ' ἵστοτα συνεστηκία, cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32, βούλεται γὰρ ἐκατέρα κατ' ἀρετὴν συνεσταναι κεχορηγημένη.

10. πρότερον μὲν κ.τ.λ. Πρότερον, 'in former times.' As Susemihl has already pointed out (Sus.², Note 532 b : Sus.⁴, i. p. 384), Aristotle has before him Isocrates' picture of Athens in the days when the Areopagus was strong (Areopag. § 24)—αὐτῶν δ' ἦν τοῦ ταύτα τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν καὶ μή περιμαχήσεις εἶναι τᾶς ἀρχᾶς, ὅτι μεμαθηκότες ἦσαν ἐργαζόσθαι καὶ φείδεσθαι, καὶ μή τῶν μὲν οἰκείων ἀμελεῖν τοῖς ἀλλοτρίωις ἐπιβουλεύειν, μὴ εἰκών ἐν δημοσίων τὰ σφέτερ' αὐτῶν διωκέιν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰκών τῶν ἐκάστων ὑπαρχώντων, ὅπως δείχνει, τοῖς κουσάν οπάρκειν, ἐὰν ἀκριβότερον εἰδέναι τὰς ἐκ τῶν ἀρχείων προσόντως ἦν τὰς ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων γνωριμίαις αὐτῶς· οὕτω δ' ἀπείχουσε σφόδρα τῶν τῆς πόλεως ὥστε χαλε-πότερον ἦν ἐν ἕκενων τοῖς χρόνοις εὑρεῖν τους βουλομένους ἀρχεῖν ἢ νῦν τοὺς μηδὲν δεομένους· οὐ γὰρ ἐμπορίαν ἀλλὰ λειτουργίαν (cp. ΠΙ, λειτουργεῖν)
éνόμιζον εἶναι τὴν τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμέλειαν, οὔτ' ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης ἡμέρας ἐκκόπουν ἐλθόντες εἰ τι λήμμα παραλείποιασιν οἱ πρότερον ἀρχοντες, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ. Cp. also Isocr. Panath. § 145, and De Antid. § 145: also Hdt. i. 97. 2.


12. πάλιν answers to πρότερον in ὀσπέρ πρότερον κ.τ.λ., as it answers (coupled with ἔπειτα) to πρῶτον in 6 (4). 3. 1289 b 28 sq.

13. τὰς ἀφελείας τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς. This repeats Isocrates' phrases quoted above on io from Areopag. § 24, ἐκ τῶν δήμοσιών τὰ σφέτερ' αὐτῶν διοικεῖν and τὰς ἐκ τῶν ἀρχείων προσόδους: cp. also De Antid. § 145, τῶν μὲν ἀρχῶν καὶ τῶν ἀφελεῖων τῶν ἐπετείχεν γεγονότων. Profits derived from office are distinguishable from those derived from public property, for they would often come in the shape of bribes from individuals. It would seem from 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 20 sqq. that in an oligarchy, at all events, not all offices were lucrative.

14. βουλονται συνεχῶς ἀρχεῖν, as at Thurii (7 (5). 7. 1307 b 6 sqq.). Compare the reference to οἱ συνεχεῖς οἴδε in Demosth. Prooem. 55, p. 1461. The repeated tenure of the same office was no doubt often forbidden or discouraged in democracies, but even where that was the case, men might be perpetually in office, if they held different offices.

17. φανερὸν τοινυν κ.τ.λ. For ἄσαι μὲν ... αὔται μὲν compare (with Sus.1 Ind. Gramm. s. v. Μέν, p. 629 foot) 28–29 and i. 5. 1254 b 16–19: cp. also 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 8 sq., and see Bon. Ind. 454 a 23, where De Gen. et Corr. 1. 1. 314 a 8–9 is compared. Τὸ κοινῆς συμφέρουν, i.e. τῶν πολιτῶν (cp. 31 sq. and c. 13. 1283 b 40 sqq.). As to Aristotle's distinction of ὀρθαὶ πολιτεῖαι and παρεκβάσεις, see vol. i. p. 215 sq. Is it not, however, possible that in some cases the rule of the holder or holders of supreme power, though exercised exclusively in their own interest, may nevertheless be for the common advantage? Gibbon remarks (Decline and Fall, c. 5) that 'the true interest of an absolute monarch generally coincides with that of his people. Their numbers, their wealth, their order, and their security are the best and only foundations of his real greatness; and were he totally devoid of virtue, prudence might supply its place, and would dictate the same rule of conduct.' Is it not also possible that there are constitutions in which the rulers rule partly for their own and partly for the common advantage?
And are there not cases in which it is impossible to legislate for the advantage of all, the interest of one section of the population (for instance, producers or consumers) being entirely opposed to that of another? In 8 (6). I. 1316 b 39 sqq., again, we find constitutions mentioned which are partly aristocratic, partly oligarchical in their organization, and others which are partly organized as polities, partly as democracies. These constitutions then will be partly normal, partly deviation-forms.

18. \textit{κατά τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον}, 'according to the standard of that which is absolutely just.' \(τὸ \ ὀπλῶς \ \textit{δίκαιον}\) is opposed to \textit{δίκαιον τι} in c. 9. 1280 a 22, and to \(τὸ \ \textit{λίθῳ} \ \textit{συμφέρον} \ καὶ \ \textit{δίκαιον}\) in c. 13. 1284 b 24 sqq. \(τὸ \ \textit{δίκαιον},\) by which is no doubt meant \(τὸ \ \textit{ἀπλῶς \ \textit{δίκαιον}},\) is identified with \(τὸ \ \textit{κανὴ} \ \textit{συμφέρον}\) in c. 12. 1282 b 17. It is because the normal constitutions conform to the end for which the State came into being, and adjust their mode of rule to that which should prevail in communities of freemen, that they are pronounced normal according to the standard of absolute justice. \(\textit{Cp. Eth. Nic. 8. I. 1160 a 11 sqq.}\)

20. For the place of \textit{πᾶσαι,} see note on 1281 a 26.

C. 7. 23. \textit{πρῶτον τὰς ὅρθας αὐτῶν.} We find in fact that the normal constitutions are described first in 1279 a 25—b 10. On the other hand, in a later Book (6 (4). 8. 1293 b 31 sqq.) the study of the Polity, and indeed of the lower forms of Aristocracy, is designedly postponed till Democracy and Oligarchy have been studied.

26. \textit{πολίτευμα} \(\textit{δὲ} \ \textit{κ.τ.λ.}\) With all the translators and commentators, so far as I have observed, I take \textit{πολίτευμα} to be the subject of the sentence. For the absence of the article, see above on 1276 b 28 and 1278 b 11.

27. \textit{ἀνάγκη} \(\textit{δ' \ εἶναι} \ \textit{κύριον} \ \textit{ἡ} \ \textit{ἐνα} \ \textit{ἡ} \ \textit{ἄληγος} \ \textit{ἡ} \ \textit{τοὺς} \ \textit{πολλούς}.\) Aristotle leaves out of sight the possibility that the One, Few, and Many, or two of them, may share supremacy.

28. \(τὸ \ \textit{κοινὸν} \ \textit{συμφέρον},\) as in 33 and 37, not \(τὸ \ \textit{κανὴ} \ \textit{συμφέρον},\) as in 17 and 1278 b 21. \(\textit{Cp. Plut. Phocion c. 21, Arat. cc. 10, 24, where τὸ \ \textit{κοινὸν} \ \textit{συμφέρον} occurs.}\)

30. \(τὰς \ \textit{δὲ} \ \textit{πρὸς} \ \textit{τὸ} \ \textit{ἐδιον} \ \textit{k.τ.λ}.\) \(\textit{Cp. Plato, Laws 712 E and 832 B–D. Supply} \ \textit{συμφέρον} \ \textit{with τὸ} \ \textit{ἐδιον.}\)

31. \(\textit{ἡ γὰρ} \ \textit{k.τ.λ.}, \ 'for [they deviate from the true standard, inasmuch as they do not admit all the citizens to a share of advantage,
and] either those who share in the constitution are not to be called citizens or they should share in the advantages derivable from it.

33. καλεῖν δ' εἰὼθαμεν κ.τ.λ. Kingship exists for the protection of the ἐπικεφαλίας against the demos (7 (5). io. 1310 b 9 sq.), but still it rules for the common advantage. Ideally Kings are guardians both of the rich and of the demos against wrong (7 (5). io. 1310 b 40 sq.). Polybius (6. 4. 2), on the other hand, rests the distinction between Kingship and Tyranny on the willingness or unwillingness of the subjects, but this criterion comes to much the same thing as that of Aristotle (see 6 (4). io. 1295 a 19—23).

34. τὴν δὲ τῶν διλέγουν μὲν κ.τ.λ. We must apparently supply ἄρχην from μοναρχῶν (cp. 2. 12. 1274 b 24 sq., where νόμος must be supplied from νομοθέτης).

35. τοὺς ἀριστούς ἄρχειν. Cp. c. 18. 1288 a 33 sqq.: 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 1 sqq., 40 sq.: Rhet. i. 8. 1365 b 33 sqq.

36. ἡ δὲ τὸ πρός τὸ ἀριστον τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτῆς, i.e. τῆς πόλεως, cp. 4. (7). 2. 1324 a 15, ὅ δ' ἂν τοῦ συμπολιτεύσωσιν καὶ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως. In 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 19 we have τὸ γὰρ βίανυσον οὐ μετέχει τῆς πόλεως. A definition of Aristocracy by its aim is most in harmony with the method of c. 7: thus Kingship (33), Polity (37), and the παρεκβάσεις (1279 b 6 sqq.) are all classified by their aim in c. 7. Perhaps another object with which this alternative definition of ἀριστοκρατία is added is to include such aristocracies as those described in Rhet. i. 8. 1365 b 33 sqq. and 1366 a 5, where the ruling class is οἱ φανόμενοι ἀριστοί (cp. 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 12 sqq.). The similarity of the language used here to that used in c. 13. 1283 b 40 sqq. should be noticed.

37. ὅταν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος κ.τ.λ. The name πολιτεία was already used to designate democracy (Harpocr. s. v. πολιτεία. ιδιως εἰώθησι τῷ δυνατί χρῆσθαι οἱ ῥήτορες ἐπὶ τῆς δημοκρατίας, ὡσπερ ἵσωκρατής τε ἐν τῷ Πανηγυρίῳ καὶ δημοσθένης ἐν Φιλοπικόις, where the reference probably is to Isocr. Paneg. § 125 and Demosth. Phil. 2. c. 21).

38. συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως, i.e. ‘it happens reasonably’ that it bears the common name of all constitutions. It seems likely that we should supply these words, but it is by no means easy to explain why Aristotle thinks that this happens reasonably. Giph. (p. 335) explains the matter thus—‘cur autem huic reipublicae potius acciderit id quam aliis, ut suo vacans nomine dicatur communi, rationem reddit Aristoteles; quia vix accidat ut multi virtute praediti bonum

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spectent publicum: facilius unus aut pauci reperiuntur tales, multi difficillime. Quare factum est ut regnum et aristocratia essent nota vocabula, multorum respublica vix esse nota et proinde nomine vacans,' and he refers in confirmation of this to 6 (4). 7. 1293 a 39 sqq., where we are told that the polity was of rare occurrence. (Mr. Mark Pattison takes a somewhat similar view in a note written in his copy of Stahr’s edition of the Politics—'συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως, viz. that this form should appropriate to itself κατ' ἐξόχην the term which is common to all the forms, viz. πολιτεία, as it must be more rare than either of the other forms, in proportion as it is more difficult to find many virtuous than to find few or one.’) I am myself inclined to suggest whether Aristotle’s meaning is not rather this—it happens reasonably that the polity is called by the name common to all constitutions, and not by a special name indicative of exalted virtue in the rulers, such as Kingship (cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 41 sq. and 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 31 sqq.) or Aristocracy, because the Many who rule in the polity will not be possessed of exalted virtue. I can hardly think that Bernays’ view of the passage is right, but it deserves mention. He refers συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως to what follows, not what precedes, translating these words ‘bei diesem Verfassungsstaat tritt nun naturgemäß folgendes Verhältniss hervor.’ It would be more possible to refer συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως to what follows if we could suppose that the passage is anacoluthic, and that, when Aristotle began his sentence, he intended to write συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως κατὰ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον εἰναι τὸ προπολεμοῦν, but being led to interpose after συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως the parenthetic explanation ἐνα μὲν γὰρ—γέγρετα, prefixed διάσερ to the postponed completion of his sentence, thus making it anacoluthic. But this is hardly a likely supposition. The probability is that συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως refers to what precedes, not to what follows. Schmidt and Sus., on the other hand, transpose 1279 b 3, καὶ μετέχουσι αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ δῆλα, to before συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως, but not, I think, rightly. These words seem to me to be better placed where they stand in the MSS.

40. πλείους δ' ἡδῆ κ.τ.λ., 'but when we come to a larger number of men, it is difficult that they,' etc. See as to ἡδῆ note on 1268 b 21.

1279 b. 1. ἡκριβωθαί πρὸς πᾶσαν ἄρετήν, 'to be perfected in respect of every kind of virtue.' Compare such phrases as τέλεος πρὸς ἄρετήν (Plato, Laws 678 B, 647 D), and cp. Plut. De Solertia Animalium.

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c. 4, τῶν θηρίων αὐτοῦ ὁ μῆ καθαρὸν μηδ’ ἀπηκριβωμένον πρὸς ἄρετήν: Plato, Laws 810 B, πρὸς τάχους ή κάλλος ἀπηκριβωθαι. For πᾶσαν ἄρετήν, cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 15. 1138 a 5, τὰ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἄρετήν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου τεταγμένα.

ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τὴν πολεμικήν. Obviously we are not intended to carry on χαλεπῶν ἀπηκριβώθαι πρὸς, as we might naturally do, for this would give a false sense: what we must carry on is ἀνδρεύστηκα πρὸς. Compare Metaph. I. 7. 1057 a 37, τῶν δὲ πρὸς τι ἄσα μὴ ἐναντία, οὔκ ἔχει μεταξὺ: αὔτιον δὲ ὁκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐστὶν ὁ γὰρ ἑπιστήμης καὶ ἑπιστημονία μεταξὺ; ἀλλὰ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ (sc. ἐστὶ μεταξὺ), and Phys. 7. 4. 249 a 6, τογαροῦν οὐ καὶ μικροῦ κατὰ τοῦτο, οἷον πόστερον κεχρωμάτισται μᾶλλον, μη κατὰ τι χρώμα, ἀλλ’ ἡ χρώματ’, ἀλλ’ κατὰ τὸ λευκὸν (sc. κατὰ βασιλείαν).

2. αὕτη γὰρ ἐν πλήθει γίνεται, 'for this kind of virtue arises in a mass of men.' See note on 1330 b 38.

3. μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ διπλα. Cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 1, 2. 6. 1265 b 28, and 3. 17. 1288 a 12 sq.

5. τυραννίς μὲν βασιλείας. In 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 39 sqq. tyranny is implied to be a παρέκκλεσις of the πανβασιλεία.

6. ἢ μὲν γὰρ τυραννίς κ. τ. λ. Cp. 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 2 sqq. and Thuc. 1. 17. 'It is but justice to Meg Dods to state that though hers was a severe and almost despotic government, it could not be termed a tyranny, since it was exercised upon the whole for the good of the subject' (Sir Walter Scott, St. Ronan's Well, p. 13). The Scholiast on Aristophanes, speaking of the terms βασιλείας and τυραννίς, remarks (Acharn. 61), χρωται δὲ αδιαφόρος ἐνιοί τοῖς ὅνομαις. 'Ὑποκαὶ μὲν βασιλέα Πίνδαρος καλεῖ τὸν Συρακοσίου τοῦ τυραννον, Ἐπιδόλες δὲ ἐν Δήμοις εἰςάγει τοῦ Πεισίστρατον βασιλεία.

7. ἢ δ’ ὀλυαρχία κ. τ. λ. We should naturally supply ἐστὶ μοναρχία, but of course ἐστὶ only must be supplied.


11. τίς ἐκάστη τοῦτων τῶν πολιτείων ἐστί, i.e. apparently the C. 8. three deviation-forms (cp. 16—19), though tyranny soon drops out of view. For the question τίς ἐκάστη cp. c. 1. 1274 b 32.


15. δηλοῦν, 'to make fully manifest'; see note on 1253 a 10.  
16. ἐστὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'now tyranny is, as has been said' (in c. 7. 1279 b 6 and c. 6. 1279 a 21) 'a form of monarchy ruling over the political association as a master rules over his slaves.' Τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας appears to be in the genitive after δειοτικῆ (see Liddell and Scott, s. v. δειοτικός, who compare 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 19 and Xen. Oecon. 13. 5). In c. 6. 1279 a 21 the πόλις is said to be an association of freemen; hence tyranny is evidently wrong and receives no further consideration. 
17. ὀλιγαρχία δὲ κ.τ.λ. This agrees with Plato, Rep. 550 C, except that Plato adds that the poor have no share in office.  
δημοκρατία δὲ κ.τ.λ. In the first form of democracy the law refuses to give supremacy either to rich or to poor, still, as the poor are in a majority, supremacy necessarily falls as a matter of fact to them (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 31–38).  
19. οἱ μὴ κεκτημένοι πλῆθος οὐσίας ἄλλ' ἀποροι. This shows that the ἀποροι in the Politics are not altogether without property, but have not much property. Cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 20, where οἱ ἀποροι are opposed to οἱ ἔχοντες τίμημα, and 3. 12. 1283 a 17 sqq. They must not be confused with οἱ λιαν ἀποροι and οἱ σφόδρα πένητες, of whom we read in 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 32 sqq., 2. 9. 1270 b 9, and 1271 a 30, but they do not appear commonly to have had any slaves (8 (6). 8. 1323 a 5 sqq.), and unless they received pay from the State (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1 sqq.), they were obliged to work hard for the support of themselves and their families (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 4 sqq). As to οἱ πένητες see note on 1297 b 6.  
20. πρῶτη & ἀπορία πρὸς τὸν διοιρισμὸν ἐστίν. Sepulv. 'est autem prima de definitione controversia,' and so Vict, Giph, Bern. and Sus. ('the first difficulty affects the definition'); Lamb., however, 'prima autem difficilis ac dubitatio ad superiorem distinctionem pertinet est haec.' The former interpretation is probably to be preferred. For the absence of the article with πρῶτη ἀπορία, cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 30, δημοκρατία μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ πρῶτη μὲν ἡ λεγομένη μάλιστα κατὰ τὸ ἵσον. For πρῶς, cp. c. 13. 1283 b 13, ἐστὶ δὲ ἀπορία τις πρὸς ἀπαντὰς τους διαμφισβητοῦτας περὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν τιμῶν, and Metaph. Z. 6. 1032 a 6, οἱ δὲ σοφιστικοὶ ἐλεγ- χοι πρὸς τὴν θέσιν ταύτην φανερῶν ὅτι τῇ αὐτῇ λύνονται λύσει. The definition of oligarchy and democracy given in the foregoing (c. 7.
1279 b 6—c. 8. 1279 b 19) has represented the former as a constitution in which a few rich rule and the latter as a constitution in which many poor rule, and has failed to make it clear whether both characteristics (the fewness and the wealth of the rulers in the case of oligarchy, and their numbers and poverty in the case of democracy) are essential features of the two constitutions, or, if not, which of them is so. This question, however, requires an answer. A similar inquiry as to the nature of oligarchy and democracy occurs in 6 (4). 4. 1290 a 30 sqq. (where, however, no reference is made to the earlier discussion), but the inquiry contained in the chapter before us is far the more satisfactory of the two. See note on 1290 a 30. It should be noticed that though constitutions in which the rich, being a majority, rule on the ground of their wealth are here implied to be oligarchies, and constitutions in which the poor, being a minority, rule are implied to be democracies, no place is made for oligarchies and democracies of this type in the classification of forms of oligarchy and democracy contained in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 30 sqq. and 6 (4). 5. 1292 a 39 sqq.

22. +συμβαίνητ. See above on 1260 b 31, and critical note on 1279 b 22.

32. τὴν ἐν ἢ πλείους εὐποροῦ, 'that in which there is a majority of rich men.' For τὴν ἐν ἢ Bonitz (Ind. 495 a 14 sq.) compares Anal. Post. i. 24. 85 b 36, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ὑστεραί αἰτία ὑπόσω ὅσ ὧν ἐνεκα κ.τ.λ.

38. διὸ καὶ οὐ συμβαίνει κ.τ.λ. With τὰς ῥηθεῖσας I supply αἰτίας (not πολιτείας, as Bernays), and take these words to refer to πλῆθος and ἀληθύτης, translating thus—'hence' (i.e. because πλῆθος and ἀληθύτης are accidents and not differentiae) 'it also does not happen that the causes we have mentioned' (πλῆθος and ἀληθύτης) 'come to be causes of a difference between oligarchy and democracy.' Prof. Jowett (Politics 2. 124) and Prof. J. A. Stewart (Class. Rev. 9. 456) have anticipated me in this view of the passage. One αἰτίας is made to serve for two, much as one μετέχειν is made to serve for two in 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 35, ἑστὶ γὰρ καὶ πάλιν ἐξείναι τοῖς ἀνυπευθύνοις κατὰ τὸ γένος (σ. μετέχειν), μετέχειν μέντοι δυναμένους σχολάζειν. See also note on 1326 a 34. For αἰτίας διαφοράς cp. 1280 a 5 and 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 33, τοῦτο μὲν οὖν εἰδος ἐν δημοκρατίας διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας. A definition of a thing must not be built on a distinguishing feature which is only an accident and not present in every case (Top. 6. 6. 144 a 23, σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὑπάρχει τῷ ὑποξομένῳ ἡ
diaphora: oüde mia γὰρ διαφορὰ τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὑπαρχόντων ἐστὶ, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τὸ γένος οὔ γὰρ εὐδέχεται τὴν διαφορὰν ὑπάρχειν τινὶ καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν).

1280 a. 1. μὲν, answered by ἀλλὰ, 3, marks the antithesis between which is necessary and τὸ συμβεβηκὸς: it is on the former that the real διαφορὰ between oligarchy and democracy rests.

διὰ πλοῦτον, cp. 5, δὲ ἀσίτια (i. e. εὐπορίαν καὶ ἔλευθερίαν) ἀμφισ-βητοῦσιν ἀμφότεροι τῆς πολιτείας, and Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1161 a 2, οὐ δὴ γίνονται κατ’ ἀρετὴν αἱ ἀρχαί, ἀλλὰ διὰ πλοῦτον καὶ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις.

C. 9. 7. Ληπτέων δὲ πρῶτον κ. τ. λ., ‘we must first ascertain what distinguishing principles of oligarchy and democracy men put forward’ [before we go on to examine their soundness], ‘and what is the oligarchical and the democratic version of what is just.’ Cp. c. 6. 1278 b 15, ὑποδείγματος δὴ πρῶτον, and 7 (5). 2. 1302 a 17, ληπτέον καθάλον πρῶτον τὰς ἀρχὰς κ. τ. λ. Liddell and Scott render ἔρος in passages like that before us as ‘end’ or ‘aim,’ comparing Rhet. 1. 8. 1366 a 2 sqq., but perhaps its meaning here is rather ‘mark’ or ‘distinguishing principle’ (id quo alicuius rei natura constituitur et definitur,’ Bon. Ind. 529 b 44): cp. Plato, Polit. 292 A.

8. τὸ δίκαιον τὸ τε ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ δημοκρατικὸν. For the absence of the article before δημοκρατικῶν, cp. 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 37, μέρη δὲ τῆς πόλεως τὸ τε ὀπλιτικὸν καὶ βουλευτικὸν.

9. πάντες is explained by Sus. as here—ἀμφότεροι. See Sus.4 on the passage before us and on 1273 a 8. So in 40 πᾶσιν means ‘for both’: for this use of πάντες, ‘ubbi de duobus tantum agitur,’ see Bon. Ind. 571 b 50 sqq.

ἀπαντάται δικαίου τινός. Bonitz (Ind. 89 b 56) compares Eth. Eud. 2. 10. 1227 a 1, εἶ γὰρ καὶ μὴ διακριθοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἀπαντᾶται γε τῇ τής ἀληθείᾳ: De Gen. et Corr. 1. 7. 324 a 15, ἀπεσθαί τῆς φύσεως. Cp. also Plut. De Gen. Socr. c. 21, καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ λίαν ἄκριβος, ἀλλ' ἐστιν ἄπτη ψαύτη τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὸ μυθόδες. Δικαίου τινός, ‘a just ground of claim,’ ‘a principle which is in a degree just.’ Δικαίου τι is here contrasted with τὸ κυρίως δίκαιον, as in 22 with τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον.

10. μέχρι τινός, ‘[only] to a certain point’: see note on 1282 a 36.

11. οἷον δοκεῖ ἵππον τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι. To show that the views of democrats and oligarchs as to what is just are only partially correct, Aristotle takes first a view prevalent among democrats and then (in
12) a view prevalent among oligarchs, and points out that neither is completely true. For ólou dôkei ἵσον τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, cp. c. 12. 1282 b 18, Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 12, εἰ οὖν τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, τὸ δίκαιον ἱσον ὅπερ καὶ ἄνευ λόγου δοκεῖ πάσιν, and Eurip. Phoeniss. 513 Bothe (547 Dindorf),

σοὶ δ’ οὖν ἀνέξει δωμάτων ἐξων ἵσον,
καὶ τὰ όδ' ἀπονεμεῖς; κἀτα ποῦ 'στιν ἡ δίκη;


12. καὶ τὸ ἄνισον δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι. Cp. 2. 7. 1267 a 1, where see note.

14. ἀφαιροῦσι, 'take away,' 'strike off': ἀφαίρεῖν is here, as often elsewhere, opposed to προστιθέναι. It would seem, however, from 19, τὸν δὲ οἷς ἀμφισβητοῦσι, that the advocates of oligarchy and democracy did not ignore the fact that the determination of what is just involves a question of persons, but that they each gave a different answer to this question and, as it turns out, a wrong one.

15. σχέδον δὲ κ.τ.λ. For the thought cp. c. 16. 1287 b 2 sq. and Xen. Hell. 5. 3. 10, λεγόντων δὲ τῶν κατεληλυθότων, καὶ τὸν αὐτὴ δίκη εἰπ, ὅποιν αὐτοῖ οἱ ἀδικοῦντες δικάξοιει, οὐδέν εἰσήκουν.

16. ὁστ' ἔτει κ.τ.λ., 'and so, since what is just is relative to persons and is divided in the same way in respect of the things distributed and the persons who receive them' (i.e. since a just allotment of things to A and B will correspond with and follow the just claims of A and B respectively), 'as has been said before in the ethical discussions, they agree as to the equality of the thing, but differ as to the equality of the persons.' Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 14–24, and esp. 20, καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἔσται ἰσότης, οἷς καὶ ἐν οἷς. For διήρηται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον κ.τ.λ., cp. (with Jackson and Stewart) Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 b 3, ἐστι δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τέταρτῳ ἐλαχίστῳ, καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός' διήρηται γὰρ ὁμοίως, οἷς τε καὶ ἃ (i.e. if the one person stands to the other in the proportion of two to one, a just distribution will make the things stand to each other in the same proportion). Both in this passage and in that before us we have the perfect, not the present—διήρηται, not διαμείναι: as to this use of the perfect see Vahlen on Poet. 5. 1449 b 9 (p. 114), quoted below on 1282 b 24. I have translated τὴν μὲν τοῦ πράγματος ἰσότητα ὁμολογοῦσι, τὴν δὲ οἷς ἀμφισβητοῦσι, 'they agree as to the equality of the thing, but differ as to the equality of the persons,' but there is a further question what these words exactly mean. Perhaps 'they agree as to what constitutes equality in the thing,
but differ as to what constitutes equality in the persons.' For τὴν τοῦ πράγματος ἵσότητα cp. 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 19, τῆς ἱσότητος τῆς πολιτείας.

20. διότι. 'Διότι non raro usurpatur pro verbo ὅτι, veluti ... Pol. 3. 9. 1280 a 20 (quamquam ibi causalem vim habere potest),' observes Bonitz, Ind. 200 b 43 (see his remarks in 45 sqq.). Bernays and Susemihl render διότι by 'because' in the passage before us, but I incline (with Bonitz and Mr. Welldon) to the rendering 'that': διότι may well be used in place of ὅτι because ὅτι precedes.

22. οἱ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 28 sqq., which agrees with what is said here. Cp. also Plato, Protag. 331 E, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τὰ ὁμοίων τε ἕχωντα ὁμοία δίκαιον καλεῖν, οὖθε τὰ ἄνομοι τε ἕχοντα ἄνομα. κἂν πάνω συμερὼν ἔχῃ τὸ ὁμοιον.

24. ἐξευθεία. See vol. i. p. 248, note i, as to the meaning of this word.

25. τὸ κυριώτατον evidently is the aim with which the πόλις was founded.


26. ἐκουσώνησαν καὶ συνήλθον. Κοινωνία is possible without τὸ συνελθέν : cp. 1280 b 17 sqq., and esp. 1280 b 25.

27. οἱ τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν λόγοι. Cp. 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 39 sqq. Οὐ γὰρ εἶναι κ.τ.λ., sc. ἑαυτικ, appears to explain οἱ λόγοι.

30. οὔτε τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὔτε τῶν ἐπιγνομένων, 'neither of the original sum nor of the accruing profits,' for Bernays can hardly be right in rendering these words 'whether it be the first founders of the company or their successors' ('mögten es nun die ersten Begründer der Gesellschaft oder deren Rechtsnachfolger sein'). These words seem to be expegetic of τῶν ἐκατόν μοῦν, 29, and to be, like them, in the gen. after μετέχειν. Sharing in the hundred minae includes sharing not only in the sum originally contributed, but also in the profits accruing from it. The word ἐπιγένημα is often used in the Revenue Laws of Ptolemy Philadelphus in the sense of 'surplus.' Cp. also ἐπιδαμβή in i. 11. 1259 a 27 sq.

31. εἰ δὲ μὴτε τοῦ ζήν μοῦν ἐνεκέν κ.τ.λ. Yet in c. 6. 1278 b 24 we are told συνερχονται δὲ καὶ τοῦ ἕκατον αὐτοῦ, and in 1. 2. 1252 b 29 the πόλις is said to come into existence for the sake of life, though it exists for the sake of good life. The protasis which
begins here expires in 36 sqq. without being succeeded by an apodosis. If an apodosis had followed, it would evidently have been to the effect of διάσπερ χωρὶς κ.τ.λ., 1281 a 4 sqq.

32. καὶ γὰρ ἄν κ.τ.λ. For τῶν ἀλλῶν ἔφον see above on 1254 b 23, and cp. ‘Αθ. Πολ. c. 57, line 31. Slaves do not share in εὐδαι-μονία (compare—with Mr. Congreve—Eth. Nic. 10. 6. 1177 a 8, εὐδαιμονίας δ’ οὐδεὶς ἄνδραι τοῦτον μεταδίδοντα, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίον), nor in life in accordance with προαίρεσις: in this they might share without sharing in εὐδαιμονία (they might live, for instance, in accordance with a vicious προαίρεσις, which would not bring them εὐδαιμονία). That slaves have not προαίρεσις, we see from Pol. 1. 13. 1260 a 12 (cp. Phys. 2. 6. 197 b 6, καὶ διὰ τούτο οὔτε ἄψυχον οὐδὲν οὔτε θηρίον οὔτε παιδίον οὐδὲν ποιεῖ ἀπὸ τύχης, ὅτι οὔκ ἔχει προαίρεσις). The citizen of the best State is ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαιρούμενος ἀρχηγός καὶ ἄρχει πρὸς τῶν βίων τῶν καὶ ἀρετῆς, and no citizen can act the part of a citizen without προαίρεσις. The notion of a ‘city of slaves’ is as old as Hecataeus (Fragm. 318: Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. ii. 24), and there was a proverb ἐστὶ καὶ δοῦλων πόλις, ἐπὶ τῶν πονηρῶν πολεμοῦμένων (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. i. 411) and a counter-proverb οὐκ ἔστι δοῦλων πόλις: διὰ τὸ ὀπίσων ἐίρημα (ibid. i. 324, 433). Just as there were those who knew where to look for the mythical land ‘where mice eat iron’ (Herondas 3. 75: Crusius, Untersuchungen zu den Mimiamben des Herondas, p. 73), so there were those who found a ‘local habitation’ for ‘the city of slaves.’ Hecataeus said that it was in Libya (Fragm. 318), and was followed by Ephorus (Paroem. Gr. i. 433, note: cp. 2. 371); others placed it in Crete or Egypt; in a fragment of the Σερίβας of the elder Cratinus (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 2. 133) we read

ἐνα Σάκας ἄφικνει καὶ Σιδινίους καὶ Ἑρέμβοις,
ἐσ τε πόλει δούλων, ἄνδρῶν νεοπλουτοπονηρῶν,
αἰσχρῶν, Ἀνδροκλῶν, Διονυσιοκοντιουργῶν,

on which see Meineke’s note, and cp. Fragm. Com. Gr. 2. 506. On the other hand, Anaxandrides, who was a senior contemporary of Aristotle, placed in the mouth of one of the characters of his Ἀγχίσθης the lines (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 3. 162),

οίκ ἔστι δοῦλων, οἷς 'γάθ', οἰδαμοῦ πόλις,
τύχη δὲ πάντα μεταφέρει τὰ σώματα,

and perhaps they are present to Aristotle’s memory here. Meineke (Fr. Com. Gr. 5. xi) refers to Lehrs, Ep. Qu. p. 85 on the subject,
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which I have not seen. Aristotle again dismisses the idea of a city composed wholly of slaves in c. 12. 1283 a 18 sq.: compare also c. 6. 1279 a 21.

34. μήτε συμμαχίας ἐνεκεν, ὅπως ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἀδικῶνται. In strictness the term for an engagement for mutual defence against attack was ἑπιμαχία, but συμμαχία was often used in this sense, as here (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 387, who refers to Thuc. i. 44 and 5. 48). We have in the passage before us ὅπως ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἀδικῶνται, but in 39 σύμβολα περὶ τοῦ μη ἀδικεῖν and in 1280 b 4 ὅπως μηδὲν ἀδικήσουσιν ἄλληλους. The two things are not the same. To say that the πόλις is formed for protection against wrongs inflicted by all and sundry is not the same thing as to say that it is formed to protect its members against wrongs inflicted on them by each other. It is evident that Aristotle has the latter view of the origin of the πόλις before him in 39 and in 1280 b 4: hence it is not quite certain that he is thinking of the former in the passage before us, though his language is such as to admit of this interpretation. The view, however, that the πόλις was formed for protection against attacks from those outside it is a very tenable one, and deserved more consideration than it here receives. The rise of the πόλις out of a collection of scattered villages was probably often due to a wish for better protection against hostile attack than the village régime could offer. Thus the Athenian general Demosthenes was encouraged to invade Aetolia because the Aetolians lived in scattered and unwalled villages (Thuc. 3. 94. 4), and Megalopolis was founded to protect South-West Arcadia against Lacedaemonian attack (Paus. 8. 27. 1). Another and probably still more common origin of the πόλις in early times was that described by Lucretius (5. 1108),

Condere coeperunt urbes arcemque locare
Praesidium reges ipsi sibi perfugiumque.

To cases of this kind Aristotle makes no reference.

35. μήτε διὰ τᾶς ἄλλαγάς κ.τ.λ. This is the origin which Plato imagines for the πόλις in Rep. 369 A sqq. (see vol. i. p. 36). Cp. also 8 (6), 8. 1321 b 14 sqq., where Aristotle says that the buying and selling of necessaries is thought to be the original cause which brings men to group themselves under one constitution.

36. As to the relations of the Etruscans and Carthaginians see Meltzer, Geschichte der Karthager i. 168 sqq. and Mommsen, History of Rome, Eng. Trans., i. 153. The Phocaeans settled
about B.C. 560 at Alalia (Aleria) in Corsica, opposite to Caere, and about twenty-five years later (Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 753–755) they were expelled by a combined fleet of Etruscans and Carthaginians—an evidence of the alliance of which Aristotle here speaks. According to E. Meyer, Gesch. des Alterthums 2. 708, Aristotle refers to treaties concluded between Carthage and each of the Etruscan seacoast cities separately, not between Carthage and a central Etruscan authority; this may be so, but one would hardly have guessed it from Aristotle’s language. His words appear to imply that States which were not connected by σύμβολα did not commonly trade with each other.

38. εἰς γοῦν αὐτοῖς συνθήκαι περὶ τῶν εἰσαγωγίμων καὶ σύμβολα περὶ τοῦ μη ἄδικείν καὶ γραφαί περὶ συμμαχίας. Not all συνθήκαι between States had to do with exports and imports, but when a State had surplus products to export or needed to import products, it made a συνθήκη with States willing to take exports from it or to supply it with imports, the object of the συνθήκη being to facilitate and regulate this trade. Compare Rhet. i. 4. 1360 a 12, ἦτε δὲ περὶ τροφῆς, πόση διαπάνη ικανή τῇ πόλει καὶ ποιὰ ἡ αὐτοῦ τε γεγομένη καὶ εἰσαγωγίμος, καὶ τίνων ἡ ἐξαγωγή δέονται καὶ τίνων εἰσαγωγής, ἵνα πρὸς τούτοις (i.e. those who will receive exports and send imports) καὶ συνθήκαι καὶ σύμβολα γίγνονται πρὸς δύο γὰρ διαφιλάττειν ἀναγκαῖον ἀνεγκλήτους τοὺς πολίτας, πρὸς τούς κρείττους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς εἰς ταῦτα χρησίμους, and see for an example of such συνθήκαι Hicks, Manual of Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 74 (p. 129). When States were linked together by a mutually advantageous commerce of this kind, it was important that provision should be made for the peaceful settlement of disagreements arising between individual citizens belonging to them, and hence σύμβολα were concluded between them in addition to the συνθήκαι. Σύμβολα may indeed have occasionally existed between States not linked together by συνθήκαι περὶ τῶν εἰσαγωγίμων. These σύμβολα established a form of legal process for the trial of offences committed by members of the one State against those of the other, in order that sufferers by those offences, or the State to which they belonged, might no longer be obliged, if they wished to obtain redress for them, to resort to forcible reprisals. The provisions of these σύμβολα were probably very various; a common one in those concluded by Athens was that offenders were to be proceeded against in the courts of the State to which they belonged, though the prosecutor
might appeal from their decision to a third State (ἐκκλητος πόλις). What the provisions of the σύμβολα between Etruria and Carthage were, we have no means of knowing. As to σύμβολα see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. i. 2. 432, ed. Thumser, and Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 432 sqq., and Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 380 sqq. Τραφαί περὶ συμμαχίας, for not all alliances were in writing (Polyb. 3. 25. 3).

40. ἀλλ' οὖν ἄρχαί κ.τ.λ. Peloponnesus is regarded by Polybius (2. 37) as in his day all but one πόλις, inasmuch as it had the same laws, weights and measures, and coinage, and also the same magistrates, councillors, and dicaists, the only thing wanting being a common wall. Πάνω, 'for both,' see above on 1280 a 9. 'Επὶ τούτων is rendered by Sus. and Welldon 'to secure these objects' (cp. i. 2. 1253 a 14), but Bonitz (Ind. 268 b 8) groups this passage with 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 22, τῶς ἄρχας τὰς ἐφ' ἐκάστοις τεταγμέναι, and evidently interprets ἐπὶ τούτων 'over these things,' 'charged with jurisdiction over these matters.' I incline on the whole to follow Bonitz. Cf. 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 37, ἐπὶ πάσι τούτων ἄρχαί πλείους εἰςίν.

1280 b. 1. For the construction, if τοῦ is omitted before ποιοῦν (with Ms P1 Vat. Pal. and perhaps 1), cp. Eth. Eud. 3. 5. 1232 b 6, καὶ μᾶλλον ἄν φρονισθειν ἄνηρ μεγαλόφυχος τί δοκεῖ ἐνι σπουδαῖῳ η πολλοῖς τοῖς τυχαῖοι, but the construction with the genitive is far more usual. For the thought cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 10. 1099 b 29, τὸ γὰρ τῆς πολιτικῆς τέλος ἀριστον ἐπίθεμεν, αὕτη δὲ πλείστην ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖται τοῦ ποιου τιμα καὶ ἀγαθοῖς τοὺς πολιτίσ ποιώρα καὶ πρακτικοῖς τῶν καλῶν. That members of the same State seek to make each other good had been pointed out in a famous passage of the discourse of Protagoras in Plato, Protag. 327 A sq., where the speaker says, λυστελεῖ γὰρ, οἴμαι, ἕμυν ἣ ἄλλην δικαιούσῃ καὶ ἀρετή.

5. περὶ δ' ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας πολιτικῆς διασκοπούσιν ὅσοι φροντίζουσιν εὐνομίας. Πολιτικῆς, not συμμαχικῆς. The word is emphatic, and there can be little doubt that ἐὰν Ms pr. P1 are wrong in omitting it. These MSS. are prone to omit words; they also give the next word διασκοπούσιν in a corrupt form. For ἀρετῆς πολιτικῆς cp. 1281 a 6, κατὰ δὲ τὴν πολιτικήν ἀρετὴν ἀνίσοις, where, as in the passage before us, κατὰ ἀρετῆν follows in the next line, and 5 (8). 6. 1340 b 42, τοῖς πρὸς ἀρετῆν παιδευομένως πολιτικῆς (where see note). Cp. also Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 232, αὕτω δὲ ό κυκλίων χορῶν κρατή λαβεστη-κότες, ἄλλα νόμων καὶ πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς, and Plato, Protag. 322 E. We expect οἱ μᾶς πολέως πολίται in place of ὅσοι φροντίζουσιν εὐνομίας,
but Aristotle probably remembers that not all πόλεις cared for the promotion of virtue in their citizens. Hence he prefers to appeal here, as he does in 2. 5. 1263 a 31 sq. and Rhet. i. i. 1354 a 18 sqq., to the practice of those who care for εὐνομία, or in other words of those who are truly πολιτικοί, for εὐνομία is the end of the political science (see above on 1253 a 37, and Eth. Nic. 3. 5. 1112 b 14, Eth. Eud. i. 5. 1216 b 18), and of any πόλις which deserves the name (6 sqq.). For διασκοπεῖν, 'to consider carefully,' cp. Eth. Eud. i. 8. 1217 b 16, where it is contrasted with συντόμως εἰπεῖν, and Thuc. 7. 71. 6.

6. ἥ καὶ φανερῶν κ.τ.λ. For the construction περὶ ἀρετῆς ἑπιμελεῖς εἶναι κ.τ.λ., Bonitz (Ind. 275 a 43 sq.) compares Hist. An. 3. 3. 513 a 14, εἰ τινὶ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἑπιμελέσας, and Metaph. E. 2. 1026 b 4. Not all πόλεις are regarded by Aristotle as making the promotion of virtue a matter of public concern (Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 24 sqq.: Pol. 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 12, ἐν ταῖς μὴ ποιομέναις κοινῆς ἑπιμέλειαι ἀρετῆς: 4 (7). 11. 1330 b 32), but he evidently thinks that all πόλεις which deserve the name should do so. Still, even where the πόλις failed to do this, much was done for virtue by other agencies at work within it, as we see from the address of Protagoras in Plato, Protag. 325 C sqq. So that Aristotle's view that a πόλις omitting to make the promotion of virtue a matter of public concern becomes a mere 'alliance' does not seem to be altogether true.

8. γίνεται γάρ κ.τ.λ., 'for otherwise;' etc. Sus., following Conring, reads συμμαχίων in place of συμμάχων, which is the reading of Γ.Π., but τῶν ἀποθεν συμμαχίων is an awkward phrase needing to be justified by parallel instances, and we should probably supply τῆς συμμαχίας before τῶν ἀλλῶν τῶν ἀποθεν συμμάχων. Cp. Plato, Rep. 375 Λ, οὐ εὖν τι . . . διαφέρειν φύσιν γενναίου σχῆματος εἰς φυλακὴν νεανίσκον εὐγενεῖς; We have perhaps in συμμάχων a similar irregularity to that which often occurs in comparisons (see note on 1267 a 5, μείζων ἑπιθυμίων τῶν ἀναγκαίων, and cp. Meteor. i. 4. 342 a 30, σημείων ἡ ἰδεώρησις αὐτῶν ταχυτῆς ὁμολογία ὀδηγά τοῖς ἐφ' ἡμῶν ὑποτευμένους, and Xen. Cyrop. 5. 1. 4, καὶ τούτων ὀμοίων τὴς δούλαιας εἰς τὴν ἐσθήτα). For τῶν ἀποθεν συμμάχων cp. Plut. Aquae et ignis comparatio, c. 11, τῶν ἐξοθεν συμμάχων.

10. καὶ ὁ νόμος συνθήκη κ.τ.λ. See vol. i. p. 389. As to the sophist Lycophron see above on 1255 a 32, and see Sus. 3, Note 552 (Sus. 4, i. p. 393). In Aristot. Fragm. 82. 1490 a 10 he is
spoken of as a writer. 'O σοφιστής is added to distinguish this Lycophron from others who bore the same name. This view of the object of law was inherited by Epicurus: see Zeller, Stoics Epicureans and Sceptics, Eng. Trans., p. 462 sq., who refers to Diog. Laert. io. 150, τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιον ἐστὶ σύμβολον τοῦ συμφέροντος εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν ἄλληλους μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι: Stob. Floril. 43. 139, οἱ νόμοι χάριν τῶν σοφῶν κείμεναι, σὺχ ἵνα μὴ ἀδικώσων, ἄλλ' ἵνα μὴ ἀδικώσωται: Lucr. 5. 1143 sqq. To Schopenhauer 'the State is in essence nothing more than an institution designed for protection against external attacks directed against the whole and against internal attacks made by individuals on each other' (see the references in Frauenstädt's Schopenhauer-Lexikon 2. 343 sq.).

12. ἀγαθοῦς καὶ δικαίους. Καὶ δικαίους is added partly to explain ἀγαθοῦς, partly to sharpen the contrast with τῶν δικαίων in the preceding line. In much the same way we have ἄρετήν καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἐν ἑαυτῇ πολιτείᾳ τήν πρὸς τήν πολιτείαν in 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 36, where καὶ δικαιοσύνην is added because Aristotle is about to prove that ἄρετή relative to the constitution exists by proving the existence of δικαιοσύνη relative to the constitution. Another reason for adding καὶ δικαίους in the passage before us may be that bravery is often connoted by ἀγαθός more than anything else (see note on 1338 b 31). Cp. Demosth. Prooem. 55. p. 1461, ἐξ ἵδιων σπουδαίων καὶ δικαίων ἄνδρων, Plato, Protag. 327 B, ἡ ἄλληλων δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἄρετή, Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 36, and Poet. i3. 1453 a 8.

ὅτι δὲ τούτον ἔχει τῶν τρόπων, i.e. that the πόλις is not really a πόλις, if it does not care for the promotion of virtue. Aristotle proves this by showing that nothing short of participation in good life constitutes a πόλις, or at any rate what would be accepted as a πόλις by close inquirers (οἱ ἀκριβῶς θεωροῦντες, 1280 b 28)—that unity of site is not enough, even if combined with intermarriage, nor nearness, or even unity, of site combined with the exchange of products and laws for the punishment of persons wronging each other in that exchange.

14. τῶν τόπων, 'the sites of two cities.'

16. ἐπιγαμίας, plural, as in 36 and in Rhet. i. 14. 1375 a 10, and these are the only passages in Aristotle's writings in which the Index Aristotelicus notes the occurrence of the word.

τῶν ἰδίων ταῖς πόλεσι κοινωνιμάτων, 'one of those acts of communion which are characteristic of States.' As to the right of intermarriage see Hdt. 5. 92 and Thuc. 8. 21, referred to by Eaton,
passages which show that it did not always exist between members of the same *polis*. See also Plut. Thes. c. 13, from which it would seem that it did not exist between the two Attic demes Pallene and Hagnus, whether permanently or not, we are not told. Nor was it exclusively possessed by members of the same *polis*, for it was often granted by Greek States to the citizens of States on friendly terms with themselves (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 378 sq.). The word *koinónyma* occurs occasionally in Plato's writings, but the Index Aristotelicus gives no other instance of its occurrence in those of Aristotle.

19. ἂλλ' εἶχαν αὐτοῖς νῦμοι τοῦ μὴ σφάς αὐτοὺς ἀδικεῖν κ.τ.λ., ‘but they had laws for the sake of preventing the infliction of mutual wrongs.’ For the ‘genetivus causalis et finalis,’ τοῦ μὴ σφάς αὐτοὺς ἀδικεῖν, see Bon. Ind. 149 b 13 sqq. Cf. Oecon. i. 4. 1344 a 8, πρῶτον μὲν οὖν νῦμοι πρὸς γυναίκα, καὶ τῷ μὴ ἀδικεῖν’ οὖτος γὰρ ἄν οὖδ᾽ αὐτὸς ἀδικοῖτο.

20. οἷον εἰ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has in his mind Plato's supposition in Rep. 369 A sqq.: cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 10 sqq. Καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἰεν μῦροι is added, because he is not content with the four or eight members which Plato had implied were enough to constitute a *polis*, and wishes to place the αὐτάρκεια ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις of the imagined community beyond all question.

25. οὕτω κοινωνοῦντες, i.e. κοινωνοῦντες ἀλλαγῆς καὶ συμμαχίας. Cp. c. i. 1275 a 32, τοὺς οὕτω μετέχοντας.

26. καὶ σφάνων αὐτοῖς κ.τ.λ. We expect the optative of *bothein* in place of *bothesin*, but Aristotle continues the sentence as if χρόμενοι μέστα τὰς ἰδίας οἰκίας ὡσπερ πόλεσιν had preceded, and not ἔκαστος μέντοι χρότο τῇ ἴδιᾳ οἰκίᾳ ὡσπερ πόλει.


30. τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν σφάς αὐτοὺς καὶ τῆς μεταδόσεως χάριν. Τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν, like τῆς μεταδόσεως, is dependent on χάριν: it is not dependent on κοινωνία.

32. οὐ μὴν οὕδε ‘his tantum locis inveni, Pol. 1280 b 32, Eth. Nic. i. 10. 1173 a 13’ (Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 10).

33. ἂλλ' ἢ τοῦ εἴ ξῆν κοινωνία κ.τ.λ. Supply (with Bernays and others) ἦν πόλεις ἐστίν. Aristotle often insists, as he does here, that the necessary conditions of a thing are not the thing (this is implied, for instance, in c. 5. 1278 a 2 sq. and 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq.). What is exactly meant by the phrase ‘the communion of
households and families in living well'?

It stands in opposition to

25, ἐκαστὸς μὲντοι χρώτο τῇ ἄδια οἰκία ὁσπερ πόλει, and means that the several households and families do not live well singly, each within itself, but that they, as it were, throw their 'living well' into a common stock so that all share in it, and live well as members of a larger whole, the πόλις. The dative καὶ ταῖς οἰκίαις καὶ τοῖς γένεσι designates the sharers: cp. 6 (4). i. 1289 a 15, πολιτεία μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τάξις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ περὶ τῶν ἄρχας, and see Bon. Ind. 166 a 61 sqq.

for instances of a similar dative. The πόλις is not an union of single individuals but of οἰκίαι and γένη (κοίμαι): cp. i. 2. 1252 b 27 sqq., 2. 5. 1264 a 5 sqq., and the closing sentences of the interpolation in Strabo, p. 419, quoted above on 1278 b 19.

35. τούτο, i.e. ἡ τοῦ εἴδ. ζην κοινωνία κ.τ.λ.

36. διὸ κ.τ.λ. 'Hence,' i.e. because ἡ τοῦ εἴδ. ζην κοινωνία cannot be realized without dwelling in the same place and intermarrying, or in other words without τὸ συζήν, various forms of τὸ συζήν came into being in States. Κηδείαι, φρατρίαι, θυναι, and διαγωγικ τοῦ συζήν bring together the households and γένη of which the πόλις consists, and enable them to realize 'communion in good life.' The omission of any mention of the tribe is significant. It was probably too large, and at Athens too scattered, to be of much value as a means of τὸ συζήν.

There may well have been some who regarded τὸ συζήν as the end of the State (cp. Eth. Eud. 7. i. 1234 b 22, τῆς τε γὰρ πολιτικής ἔργων εἶναι δοκεῖ μάλιστα ποιῆσαι φιλίαν, καὶ τὴν ἁρετὴν διὰ τούτῳ φιλίαν εἶναι χρήσιμον; οὐ γὰρ ἐνεξεσθαι φίλους ἐπειδὴ εἶναι τοῦς ἄδικομένους ὑπ’ ἄλλαξων): hence the pains which Aristotle takes to point out that it is only a means to that end. Compare his language in c. 6. 1278 b 20 sqq. and Eth. Nic. 8. ii. 1160 a 19, ἐναι δὲ τῶν κοινωνίων δὲ ἥδονα δοκοῦσα γίγνεσθαι, βιαστῶν καὶ ἐραστῶν αὐτὰ γὰρ υπεραχράει ἕνεκα καὶ συννοοεῖσας. τὰς αὐτὰ ὑπὸ τὴν πολιτικήν ἐνίκασιν εἶναι οὐ γὰρ τοῦ παρόντος συμφέροντος ἡ πολιτικὴ ἐφίσταται, ἀλλ’ εἰς ἀπαντα τῶν βιῶν. There was a risk that the πόλις might be regarded as existing for the sake of pleasure like βιάσως and ἔρασως, or at any rate might be bracketed with marriage and the phratry as a means primarily to τὸ συζήν. Aristotle is all the more anxious to show that the end of the πόλις is not τὸ συζήν but τὸ εἴδ. ζην, because he is thus enabled to draw the conclusion which he draws at the end of the chapter, that virtuous men have a claim to a larger share in the πόλις than the rich or the ἐλεύθεροι. Just as Plato had spoken of festivals in Laws 653 D as a means by which men correct
and complete their education (cp. 828 A, where he takes up the subject of festivals for treatment immediately after that of education), so Aristotle regards affinities and phratries and sacrifices and ways of passing time pleasantly together as aiding in the realization of a ‘communion in good life.’ Another use of social ties of this kind was that they served to protect the individual from wrong, as we see from Plato, Laws 729 E, ἐρήμος γὰρ ὄν ὁ ἔξος ἑταῖρων τε καὶ ἐγγυγενῶν ἐλευθερός ἀνθρώποις καὶ θεοῖς, but a reference to this would not be to the point here. Compare the enumeration of social ties in Aeschin. De Fals. Leg. c. 23, ἡμέις δὲ, ὅσι ἱερὰ καὶ τάφος προγόνων ὑπάρχουσιν ἐν τῇ πατρίδι καὶ διατριβαὶ καὶ συνήθειαι μεθ’ ἐμῶν ἐλευθεροί καὶ γάμοι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ ηθοῦσαν καὶ τέκνα κ.τ.λ. I take diagnostai τοῦ συζυγοῦ to mean ‘modes of passing time belonging to social life’: cp. (with Bonitz, Ind. 710 a 38) Eth. Nic. 4.13.117 a 17, ἐν δὲ τῷ συζύγῳ οἱ μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ὑμιλοῦντες εἰρηνται. Διανογοι τοῦ συζυγοῦ are tacitly contrasted with διανογοι not τοῦ συζυγοῦ, such as, for instance, solitary contemplation. I prefer this interpretation to those of Stahr (‘Vereine für den Zweck heiterer Geselligkeit’) and Bernays (‘Belustigungen zur Beförderung des Zusammenlebens’), in which τοῦ συζυγοῦ is taken to mean ‘for the purpose of social life.’ Common sacrifices and festivals were all the more necessary to ancient City-States, because their citizens usually dwelt scattered over the territory, and not concentrated in the city, like those of many mediaeval City-States.

38. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον φιλίας ἔργον. The point of this remark, which is not at first sight evident, becomes so if we translate, ‘but that which has just been mentioned’ (i.e. τὸ συζυγοῦ) ‘is the business of friendship, [not the end of the πόλις].’

40. κυμάω is added in explanation of γενών (cp. i. 2. 1252 b 16 sqq.).

1. τοῦτο, i.e. ζωὴ τελεία καὶ αὐτάρκης. 1281 a.

ὁς φαμέν, cp. Eth. Eud. 2. 1. 1219 a 38, εἰ ἂν ἡ εὐδαμονία ζωῆς τελείας ἑνέργεια κατ’ ἀρετὴν τελείαν.

4. διότι κ.τ.λ. Compare 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 39 sqq. Τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν, i.e. τὴν τῶν καλῶν πράξεων χάριν συνεστηκών κοινωνίαν.

8. ὅτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Πάντες here means ‘both,’ as in 1280 a 9, and μέρος τι τοῦ δικαίου, ‘only a part of what is just.’ For the suppression of ‘only’ see below on 1282 a 36.

11. "Ἐξελ 8' ἀπορίαν κ.τ.λ. So far the question discussed has C.10. been who have the best claim to a superior share in the πόλις, but VOL. III.
now Aristotle asks what the supreme authority of the State should be, for we have been told in c. 6. 1278 b 8 sqq. that the nature of the constitution depends on the award made of supreme authority in the State. In the discussion which commences here Aristotle probably has before him Xen. Mem. i. 2. 42 sqq., where Pericles is compelled by Alcibiades to admit that a law imposed by force whether by a tyrant, the few, or the many, is not law but lawlessness. Compare also Plutarch, Ad Princ. Inerudit. c. 4, oί παλαιόι οὕτω λέγουσι καὶ γράφοντι καὶ διδάσκοντι, ὅσ αὐνη δίκης ἄρχειν μηδε τού Δῶς καλὸς δυναμένου.

12. For ἦ γάρ τοι Eucken (De Partic. Usu, p. 72) compares Phys. 8. 3. 254 a 18, adding that τοι appears to belong to ἦ, not to γάρ.

13. For the juxtaposition of ἐνα πάντων cp. c. 13. 1283 b 18, c. 14. 1285 a 2, c. 16. 1287 a 11, and 6 (4). i. 1288 b 15.

ἡ τύραννος. If we hold that the Good should be supreme, then we shall have to allow that the One Best should be supreme, and so again, if we hold that the rich should be supreme, we shall have to allow that the One Richest, or in other words a tyrant, should be supreme: cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 22, εἴ μὲν γάρ ὃ τι ἢν οἱ διήγοι, τυραννῖς (καὶ γάρ ἔον εἶς ἑξί πλείο τῶν ἀλλῶν εὐτόρων, κατὰ τό δισαρχικῶν δίκαιων ἄρχειν δίκαιος μόνον).

ἀλλὰ ταύτα πάντα ἐχεῖν φαίνεται δυσκολίαν. Compare the very similar sentence in 2. 8. 1268 b 3, ταύτα δὲ πάντα πολλὴν ἐχει ταραχήν, where also we have the emphatic order ταύτα πάντα (‘every one of these things’). See critical note on 1282 a 40.

14. εἴν οἱ πέντεσε  κ.τ.λ. Cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 24 sqq. and Xen. Mem. i. 2. 43 sqq. Τοῦτ’ οὐκ ἄδικον ἄστων; ‘is this not unjust?’ The answer to this question is given by a supporter of the supremacy of the Many—‘No, for by Zeus it was justly decreed by the supreme authority’—to which Aristotle replies, ‘Then what are we to say is the extreme of injustice, if not this?’ Δίκαιος, not ‘with full legal validity’ (as Sus. ‘auf durchaus rechtsgültige Weise’), but ‘justly,’ for what the supreme authority decides is ipso facto just. Δίκαιος is severed from ἐδοξε, the word which it qualifies, for the sake of emphasis: see notes on 1255 a 21, 1265 b 15, and 1323 a 36, and Holden on Xen. Oecon. 2. 8. Vict. and some others take τῷ κυρίῳ δίκαιος together (‘summam potestatem habenti iustè’), but not, I think, rightly. Νὴ Δία occurs also in c. ii. 1281 b 18, but the Index Aristotelicus gives no other
instance from Aristotle’s writings. In both these passages the expression is used asseveratively to introduce a statement which may be strongly affirmed.

17. πάλιν τε πάντων λησθέντων, ‘and again, taking men as a whole, irrespective of wealth and poverty.’ For πάντων λησθέντων see above on 1254 b 15, and cp. λαμβανόμενον, c. 13. 1283 a 42. Bernays, followed by Susemihl, translates these words ‘nachdem [den Reichen] Alles genommen worden,’ but I cannot think that they are right. Mr. Welldon translates rightly, ‘take the whole body of citizens.’ Aristotle here, in fact, turns to consider the case of the Many despoiling the Few of their property, whether those Few are rich or poor.

19. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὔχ ἣ γέρη ἑ.τ. λ. ‘but certainly it is not virtue that destroys the thing which possesses it,’ so that the measures of spoliation just referred to cannot be the outcome of virtue. Cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 a 15, ῥυπέρον οὖν ὅτι πᾶσα γέρη, οὐ δὲ ἢ γέρη, αὐτὸ τε εὖ ἔχων ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτὸν εὖ ἀποδίδωσι, and Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 12 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 235),

μεράκιον, οὐ μοι κατανοεῖν δοκεῖ ὅτι ἐπὶ τῆς ἰδίας ἐκαστὰ κακὰς σφέτεαι.

20. οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον πόλεως φθαρτικόν. Cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 30, τὸ ἱσον τὸ ἀνίπτεσθόν ὁδὸν σῶζει τὰς πόλεις. The just is the political good (c. 12. 1282 b 16), and ‘the good of each thing preserves it’ (2. 2. 1261 b 9 : cp. Plato, Rep. 608 E sqq.).

21. καὶ τὸν νόμον τοῦτον, i.e. the law by which supreme authority is given to the majority, no less than that by which supreme authority is given to the poor. So we read in c. 17. 1288 a 14, κατὰ νόμον τὸν κατ’ ἀξίαν διανέμοντα τοῖς εὐφόροις τὰς ἀρχὰς. Where a depreciatory meaning is intended to be conveyed, as perhaps here, ὀντας is often placed by Aristotle after its substantive—e. g. in 2. 3. 1262 a 13, 2. 6. 1265 b 16, 18, 1266 a 1, 2. 9. 1271 a 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 28, and 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 23. But ὀντας is often placed after its substantive where this is not the case.

ἐν καὶ τὰς πράξεις κ.τ.λ. This was the greatest of paradoxes, for a tyrant was commonly regarded as the incarnation of injustice (4 (7). 2. 1324 a 35 sqq. : Plato, Rep. 344 A).

26. διαρπάζων. Bernays takes διαρπάζειν to be here used absolutely (‘rauben’), but Susemihl supplies τὸ πλήθος (‘das Volk plündern’), and Bonitz (Ind. s. v.) τὰ κτήματα τοῦ πλήθους. I incline to follow Bonitz (see also Liddell and Scott), for Aristotle some-
times introduces a necessary word later than we expect: see for instance 5 (8). 3. 1337 b 31 and 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 1, where δύνασθαι comes in late; also 2. 6. 1264 b 35 (μετέχουσι), 3. 6. 1279 a 20 (πᾶσαι), 3. 8. 1279 b 15 (τι), and 1. 2. 1252 a 33 (φύσει).

28. οὖν επιεικεῖς, who will not plunder anybody. As to the danger arising from a mass of δύτιμος see note on 1281 b 28.

34. ἄλλ' ἰσως φαίη τις ἄν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably refers to Plato, Laws 713 E sqq., where States are advised to place themselves under the rule of law, since a god is no longer forthcoming, as in the days of Cronus, εἰ δ' ἀνθρώπος εἰς ἡ δηλογραφία τις ἡ καὶ δημοκρατία ψυχήν ἔχουσα ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμίων ὑπερημένην καὶ πληροῦσαι τούτων δειρεμένην, στέγουσαν δὲ οὐδέν, ἄλλ' ἀνηνύτω καὶ ἀπληστῷ κακῷ νομήματι ἐξενεχομένην, ἀρξεί δὴ πόλεως ἢ τῶν ἰδίωτων καταστάσεις ἢ τοιοῦτος τοὺς νόμους ... οὐκ ἔστι σωτηρίας μηχανή. Cp. also c. 15. 1286 a 16 sqq. Long before Plato, however, Pittacus had declared in favour of the rule of law (Diod. 9. 27. 4: Diog. Laert. 1. 77). See below on 1286 a 7.

36. ἄν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Plato had omitted to guard himself by explaining that the rule of law which he recommended must be the rule of good law. 'The Englishman in America will feel that this is slavery—that it is legal slavery, will be no compensation, either to his feelings or his understanding' (Burke, Speech on American Taxation: Works, ed. Bohn, 1. 433). Burke goes still further elsewhere when he says that 'bad laws are the worst sort of tyranny.' Aristotle, however, finds in the Sixth Book (6 (4). cc. 4–5) and elsewhere a great difference between democracies or oligarchies in which law (i.e. democratic or oligarchical law) is supreme and those in which it is not.

C. 11. 40. οὗτος δὲ δεῖ κ.τ.λ. Λύσοθαι has been translated in many different ways. Vict. translates δόξεων ἄν λύσοθαι 'videretur solvi,' and Lamb. 'videatur esse expeditum ac solutum.' Bernays translates the words in what I take to be a similar way ('scheint sich befriedigend zu erledigen'). Bonitz appears to explain λύσοθαι here as 'to be refuted' (which is also the rendering of Mr. Welldon), for in Ind. 439 a 20 sqq. he groups the passage before us with passages (Eth. Eud. 2. 8. 1224 b 6: Eth. Nic. 5. 15. 1138 a 27 and 7. 13. 1153 a 29) in which the word bears this meaning, but, if we interpret λύσοθαι thus, it seems to be little in harmony with the words which follow immediately. Sus. translates 'gegen die angeregten Bedenken vertheidigen zu lassen' ('to be susceptible
of defence against the doubts raised about it'), but it is not easy to get this meaning out of the Greek, and he does not seem himself to be satisfied with his rendering, for he holds that the text is unsound in λύσθαι—ἀλήθειαν. If we retain λύσθαι, I should be disposed to follow Vict. in his rendering of the word and to translate, 'but [the apparent paradox] that the Many ought rather to be supreme than the Few Best would appear to receive a solution' (cp. Metaph. Λ. 7. 1072 a 19, ἐπεὶ δ' οὖτω τ' ἐνδέχεται, καὶ εἴ μὴ οὕτως, εἴ νυκτὸς ἔσται καὶ ὁμοί πάντων καὶ εἴ μὴ ὄντος, λύσθαι ἡν ταύτα, where Bonitz explains 'diremptae sunt hae quæstiones,' and Grote, Aristotle, 2. 377, 'we may consider the problem as solved'). But there is some strangeness in ὅτι δὲ δὲι κ.τ.λ. followed by λύσθαι in this sense, and I strongly suspect either that some word has dropped out before or after λύσθαι, such as δεῖ, or that λύσθαι is corrupt. Perhaps we should read λείπεσθαι ('to remain as a possible alternative') in place of it. The Few Best had found a panegyrist in Heraclitus (Fragm. 11ο Bywater, τίς γὰρ αὐτῶν νόος ἢ φρήν; [δήμοις] ἀδικοίῳ ἔστοι καὶ διδασκάλῳ χρέωνται ὡμίλη, οὐκ εἰδότες ὅτι πολλοὶ κακοί ἄλγος δὲ ἠγαθοί: αἱρέσται γὰρ ἐν αὐτία πάντων οἱ ἀριστοί, κλέος ἄεισαι νηπίων, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ κεκόρησαν δεκαπεν κτίνεα: cp. Eurip. Fragm. 358, (ἐσθλοῦς ἐγώ)

ἄλγους ἐπαυρίῳ μᾶλλον ἡ πολλοῦ κακοῦ,

where ἐσθλοῦς ἐγώ is added e coni., but probably rightly, by Hense, and 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 16, οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ μᾶλλον ἄρεγονται τοῦ κέρδους ἡ τίς ἑμῖν). But it is especially because Plato in the Republic had placed his ideal State in the hands of the Few Best (see Rep. 503 A sqq.) that Aristotle takes pains both here and in c. 13. 1283 b 20–35 to show that if superior virtue gives a claim to political power, the Many have solid claims on that ground to such political power, at any rate, as they can exercise when gathered in an assembly and converted as it were into a single human being. We must not take him, however, to assert that a constitution in which the Few Best and a popular assembly of good type divide the powers of the State between them in this fashion is the best possible constitution; on the contrary, the best constitution is that in which all the citizens are men of complete excellence (4 (7). 13. 1332 a 32 sqq.: 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 1 sqq.). His aim in the Eleventh Chapter, as in the Ninth, is in the main a negative and critical one—to overthow the exclusive claims of the Few Best, just as in
the Ninth he overthrows the exclusive claims of the rich and the ἐλεύθεροι.

41. καὶ τιν’ ἔχειν ἀπορίαν. See above on 1275 b 34.

42. κἂν. ‘Ipsum κἂν non sequente εἰ ita usurpatur ut a simplex κἂν vix distinguatur’ (Bon. Ind. 41 a 36, where instances of this are given).

τοὺς γὰρ πολλοὺς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here probably remembers Hom. II. 13. 237,

εὐμφερτή δ’ ἄρετὴ πέλεις ἀνδρῶν καὶ μάλα λυγρῶν.

1281 b. 1. σπουδαῖος ἀνήρ. See vol. i. p. 293.

ὁμος stands in opposition to δὲν ἑκατός ἐστιν οὐ σπουδαῖος ἀνήρ. Compare its use in 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 12, καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μη ποιομένας κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἄρετῆς εἰσί τοῦ ὁμος τινὸς οἱ εὐδοκιμοῦντες καὶ δοκοῦντες εἶναι ἐπιεικεῖς, and in De Part. An. i. 5. 645 a 7 sqq., in both which passages the opposition is of a similar indirect character.

2. ἐκεῖνος, ‘the Few Best.’


4. πολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων κ.τ.λ., ‘for each of them, numerous as they are, may have a share of virtue and prudence, and the Many, when they have come together, just as they become one man with many feet and many hands and many senses, may likewise become one man with many excellences of character and intelligence.’ Supply ἐνδέχεται from 1 with ἔχειν, 4. ‘Ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως is taken up by τὰ ὅθη καὶ τῶν διάνοιας, 7. For συνελθόντων, where συνελθοῦντας might have been used (it is the reading of some of the less good MSS.), see notes on 13 and 1335 b 19, and cp. De Gen. An. 2. 6. 744 a 15 sqq. and De Gen. et Corr. 1. 4. 319 b 10 sqq. As to the gain of having many eyes, ears, hands, and feet, see c. 16. 1287 b 26 sqq. The Lacedaemonians dedicated a statue of Apollo with four hands and four ears, as he had appeared to the combatants in a battle near Amyclae (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 22: 2. 264); the Erinnys is conceived by Sophocles (Electr. 488) as having many hands and feet; we read of beings like Geryon (see vol. i. p. 256, note 5, and Stallbaum’s note on Plato, Laws 795 C); and Aristotle imagines the same multiplicity extended to moral and intellectual gifts. He perhaps remembers in the passage before us Aristoph. Ran. 675 Didot,
3. 11. 1281 a 41—1281 b 7.

Μοῦσα, χορῶν ιερῶν ἐπίθεσι καὶ ἡθ' ἐπὶ τέρψιν ἀοιδάς ἐμᾶς,
τὸν πολὺν ὑφομένη λαῶν ὄχλου, οὐ σοφίας
μυρίας κάθηται.

Compare also Eurip. Bacch. 359 Bothe (427 Dindorf),

σοφῶν δ' ἀπέχειν πραπίδα φρένα τε περιοσῶν παρὰ φωτῶν
τὸ πλῆθος δ' τι τὸ φαυλότερον
ἐνόμεσε χρῆται τε, τόδε τοι λέγομ' άν,

and Xen. Cyrop. 4. 3. 21, where Chrysantas says that the mounted horseman gets the advantage of his horse's ears and eyes as well as his own, and thus comes to be something better than a centaur, for a centaur has only two eyes and two ears. The thought that the Many gathered in an assembly become, as it were, one man recurs in 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 11 sqq. Plato had already (Rep. 493 A sqq.) compared the Many under these circumstances to a θρέμμα μέγα καὶ λαχυρόν, but had regarded the opinions of this great creature, whether on questions of drawing, or music, or politics (493 D), as the reverse of wise, and the Sausage-seller in the Equites of Aristophanes (752 sqq. Didot) finds the Athenian Demos far cleverer at home than in the Pnyx (cp. Demosth. Prooem. 14. p. 1427). On the other hand, bodies of men acting as a whole have sometimes been credited by good observers with a superiority to the individuals composing them taken singly. Thus 'Canning used to say that the House of Commons as a body had better taste than the man of best taste in it, and I am very much inclined to think that Canning was right' (Letter of Lord Macaulay, Feb. 1831: Life and Letters, i. 174). 'The quick and correct feeling of the House of Commons as a body is very striking' (Lord Stratford de Redcliffe in 1820: Life by S. Lane-Poole, i. 294). The House of Commons, it is true, is a more or less picked assembly. Compare, however, also Plin. Epist. 7. 17. 10, opinor, quia in numero ipso est quoddam magnum conlatumque consilium, quibusque singulis iidicii parum, omnibus plurimum.

7. τά ήθη καὶ τήν διάνοιαν. For the distinction between τά ήθη and ή διάνοια, which evidently repeats ἁρετῆς καὶ φρονίσεως, 4, Bonitz (Ind. 185 b 61) compares 5 (8). 2. 1337 a 38 sq.

διὸ καὶ κρίνουσιν ἁμεινον κ.τ.λ., 'hence' (i.e. because they possess as a Whole these manifold excellences of character and intelligence) 'the Many [not only are better than the Few, but] also judge better both works of music and works of the poets.' Socrates was of a different opinion (Diog. Laert. 2. 42: 3. 5), and Plato also (Rep.
NOTES.

493 A sqq.: Laws 670 B, γελοίος γάρ ὃ γε πολὺς ὅχλος ἑγαμένος ἱκανός γιγνώσκειν τὸ τε εἰάρμοστον καὶ εὕρωμον καὶ μῆ, and 700 A–701 B). Aristotle here (speaking to some extent aporetically) echoes the compliments which it was the fashion for comic poets to shower on their audiences (Cratin. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 51: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 192),

χαίρ’, ὃ μέγ’ ἀχρεώγελως ὄμιλε, ταῖς ἐπίβδαις, τῆς ἡμετέρας σοφίας κριτῆς ἀριστε πάντων.

10. ἀλλὰ τούτῳ κ.π.λ., ‘but it is just in this that men of complete excellence differ from each individual of the Many.’ I follow Vict. Giph. Bern. and Sus. in my rendering of διαφέρωσιν. Sepulv. Lamb. and Welldon render it ‘are superior to,’ but the former rendering suits 16 sq. and 19 sq. better. Plato had claimed (Rep. 484 sqq.: compare the picture drawn of Theaetetus in Theaet. 144 A sq.) that there was an union of many great qualities in the philosophic nature, and Aristotle says the same thing of the σπουδαίως. For οἱ σπουδαίοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν cp. Isocr. De Antid. § 316, τῶς καλοῖς κάγαθοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν.

11. ὥσπερ κ.π.λ., ‘as indeed men say that beautiful persons differ from those who are not beautiful and pictures done by art from the original objects.’ For other instances of the chiasmus which we note in ὥσπερ, 11—ἀληθινῶν, 12, see note on 1277 a 31. For τῶν ἀληθινῶν, cp. 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 19, τᾶς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις. Sus.² (Note 566: Sus.⁴, 1. p. 399) has already referred to the remark addressed by Socrates to Parrhasius in Xen. Mem. 3. 10. 2, and Vict. and Giph., followed by many others, to the mode in which Zeuxis obtained the ideal of womanly beauty which he depicted in his Helen. See Brunn, Geschichte der griech. Künstler 2. 80, 88 (referred to by Vahlen and Sus.), and Overbeck, Antiken Schriftquellen Nos. 1667–9, where Cic. De Invent. 2. 1. 3 is quoted, tum Crotoniatae publico de consilio virginibus unum in locum condixerunt et pictori, quam vellet, eligendi potestatem dederunt. Ille autem quinque delegit . . . Neque enim putavit omnia quae quaereret ad venustatem in corpore uno se reperire posse ideo quod nihil simplici in genere omnibus ex partibus perfecta natura expolivit.

13. ἔπει κεκωρισμένων γε, ‘since if we conceive them’ (i. e. τὰ συνηγμένα εἰς ἐν) ‘to be separated from each other.’ Here, as often elsewhere (see above on 1254 b 34), ἔπει . . . γε ‘justifies what precedes by pointing out what would result if the contrary were
the case.’ As to the genitive absolute κεχωρισμένων, see Bonitz on Metaph. A. 9. 990 b 14, νοεῖν τι φθαρέντος, ‘Omissi in genitivis absolutis subjicii exempla ex Aristotele congressit Waitz ad Heron. 10. 19 b 37, ex aliis scriptoribus Krüger, Gr. Gr. § 47. 4. 3. Usur- pantur autem genitivi absoluti, cum per leges grammaticas videatur participium ad nomen quoddam ipsius enunciati primarii referen- dumuisse (νοεῖν τι φθαρέντος idem quod νοεῖν τι φθαρέντοι), quo maiore vi participium, seicultum illud ab enunciatione primaria, pronun- cierung, cf. Matthiae, Gr. Gr. § 561, Krüger l. l. § 47. 4. 2. Exempla Aristotelica contulit Waitz ad An. Pr. 2. 4. 57 a 33.’ Thus in the passage before us κεχωρισμένων might well have taken the place of κεχωρισμένων, and this reading is actually given by Γ and in a blundered form by Μ, but κεχωρισμένων is certainly right. Waitz on De Interp. 10. 19 b 37 compares among other passages Probl. 35. 4. 965 a 1, τὰ σώματα θυγατρῶν ψυχεινότερῶς ἐστὶν τοῦ θέρους ἢ τοῦ χείματος: see also Bon. Ind. 149 b 37 sqq.

15. εἰ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν here introduces a slight qualification of what has been said (see above on 1252 b 27 sqq. and 1253 a 10): it is answered by δὲλα, 20. For περὶ πάντα δήμου καὶ περὶ πάν πλῆθος, cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 12, ἐκ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τοῦ πλῆθους, and other passages in which the two words are used in much the same sense, e. g. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 24 sq. and 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 19 sq. The almost tautological repetition is for the sake of emphasis (see notes on 1323 b 29 and 1325 b 10). Aristotle probably remembers a remark of Socrates recorded in Diog. Laert. 2. 34, πρὸς τὸ οὖκ ἀξίωσον πλῆθος ἐφασκε (Σωκράτης) ὥμοιον εἰ τις τετράδραχμον ἐν ἀποδοκιμάζων τὸν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων σορῶν ὡς δόκιμον ἀποδέχοσται, and see vol. i. p. 256, note 1.

18. For ἥ Δία see above on 1281 a 14. ἐνών, sc. δήμων, and so ἐνοι, 20.

ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς κ.τ.λ., ‘for [if we claimed that every kind of demos possesses this superiority over the Few Good,] the same argument would hold in the case of brutes also, [which is absurd:] and yet what difference is there, so to speak, between some kinds of demos and brutes?’ Aristotle refers in ἐνοι especially to cases in which the demos is composed of βάναυσοι ἄγοραίοι and θῆτες, and is therefore of a servile type (cp. 1282 a 15, ἀν ἢ τὸ πλῆθος μὴ λιν ἀνδραποδῶδες, and 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 24 sqq.). The βάναυσοι and the θῆται have been ranked with slaves in c. 4. 1277 a 37 sqq., and the slave comes very near to the brute (1. 5. 1254 b 24 sqq.). The Many had been compared to brutes by Heraclitus (Fragm. 111, quoted above on
1281 a 40), by Plato (Rep. 496 C sq.), and by Aristotle himself (Eth. Nic. 1. 3. 1095 b 19 sq.).

21. διὸ καὶ τὴν πρότερον εἰρήμενην ἀπορίαν λύσειν ἂν τις διὰ τούτων κ.τ.λ. The question referred to is that raised in c. 10. 1281 a 11, τι δεῖ τὸ κύριον εἶναι τῆς πόλεως. Isocrates had already declared for a similar solution of the question (Areopag. § 26, ὥσ ἐν συντόμῳ εἰπεῖν, ἐκεῖνοι διάγγειλότες ἦσαν ὅτι δεῖ τὸν μὲν δήμον ὀπτερ γένος καὶ τοὺς ἄρχας καὶ κολάζειν τοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνοντας καὶ κρίειν περὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητομένων, τοὺς δὲ σχολήν ἀγείν δυναμένους καὶ βιῶν ἰκανῶν κεκτημένους ἐπιμελείσθαι τῶν κοινῶν, ὀπτερ ἀκέτας ... καὶ τὸν ἄν τις εὑρεῖ τάτης βεβαιοτέραν ἢ δικαιοτέραν δημοκρατίαν, τῆς τοῦς μὲν δυνατώτατοι ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις καθιστάσης, αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὸν δῆμον κύριον ποιοῦση;). Half the interest of the chapter before us lies in this, that in it Aristotle supports the views of Isocrates against those of his master Plato. There are no doubt some expressions in the passage just quoted of which Aristotle would not approve; he would also, it would seem, wish the magistracies to be in the hands of the Few Best rather than of or σχολήν ἀγείν δυναμένου καὶ βιῶν ἰκανῶν κεκτημένου, though this is not quite clear, for in 1282 a 31 sq. he connects the ἐπισκεψις of 1282 a 26 with the possession of high property-qualifications.

24. ὅσοι μὴ τοῦτοι πλούσιοι κ.τ.λ. For the omission of εἰν ὡν see Vahlen on Poet. 24. 1459 b 7, where Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1144 b 5, καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι καὶ σωφρόνες καὶ ἀνθρώποι καὶ τάλα ἔχουσιν, εὑρέθη ἐς γενετῆς, is compared among other passages. For ἄξιωμα ἔχοντι ἀρέτὴς μηδὲν, ‘possess no ground of claim in respect of virtue,’ cp. 2. 5. 1264 b 8 sqq. and Plut. De Adulatore et Amico, c. 33, μηδὲ ἔχων ἀρέτης ὅμοιογλυκόμενον ἄξιωμα καὶ δόξης.

25. τὸ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. If we supply φύσειν ἂν τις εἶναι with ouk ἀσφαλεῖς from λύσειν ἂν τις, 22, we shall thus be able to explain the infinitives ἀδικεῖν ἂν (which Sus., following Rassow, would alter into ἀδικεῖν ἀνάγκη) and ἀμαρτάνειν. Aristotle is still expressing the views which the imaginary τις of 22 might entertain. See notes on 1259 a 39 and 1280 a 27. Vahlen, Beiträge zu Aristot. Poet. 1. 51, explains these infinitives as ‘dependent on the thought contained in what precedes,’ and refers to Waitz on Hermen. 19 a 23. The strong language here used as to the ὀφροσύνη and ἀδικία of the Many as individuals recalls the language of the Persian Megabyzus in Hdt. 3. 81, ὡμολογεῖσθαι ἀρχηγὸν οὔδ' ἐστι ἀδευνεύτερον οὐδ' ὑβριστάτερον, and that of Plato in Rep. 496 C sq., where μανία and ἀδικία are ascribed
to them; Aristotle himself, if he were expressing his own views, would perhaps use milder terms.

28. τὸ δὲ μὴ μεταδίδοναι μὴ deceived μετέχειν φοβερὸν. Supply ἀρχή with μεταδίδοναι and μετέχειν, and εἰναι with φοβερὸν. For the risks attending the presence in a Greek State of many ἀτιμοὶ see [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 3. 12 sq. and Plut. Ages. c. 30. Cp. also 2. 12. 1274 a 17, μὴ γὰρ τοῦτο (i.e. τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρεῖσθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν) κύριος δὲν ὁ δήμος δοῦλος ἄν εὕ καὶ πολέμως, and 3. 15. 1286 b 18 sqq.

31. λείπεται δὴ κ.τ.λ. For τὸ βουλεύσθαι καὶ κρίνειν, cp. c. 1. 1275 b 18, ἀρχής βουλευτικὴς ἡ κριτικὴ, where κριτικὴ = δικαστικὴ, as appears from 1275 b 16, τὸ βουλευόμεθα καὶ δικάζειν. Hence τὸ κρίνειν in the passage before us probably means ‘judging,’ but as Aristotle is speaking of functions exercised by the whole demos gathered in one assembly, and not broken up into a number of dicasteries, he must refer to the judicial functions which fell to the popular assembly (6 (4). 14. 1298 a 3 sqq.). When the holders of magistracies are said in 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 25 sqq. βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τῶν καὶ κρίνειν καὶ ἐπιτάττειν, the word κρίνειν is used in a different sense. In saying that, if the ἐλεύθεροι are excluded from the greatest offices, the only remaining course is to give them rights of deliberating and judging, Aristotle forgets that it would be possible to admit them to minor offices, a course suggested by him under certain circumstances in 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 27 sqq. and 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 11 sqq.

32. Σόλων. Cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 15—21, 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 7, and Plut. Solon, c. 18. As Solon gave the assembly no more power than this, it is difficult to understand why he took the trouble to institute a Boule of 400 to aid it in the performance of these light duties. Aristotle points out in 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 30 sqq. the risks besetting oligarchies in which οὐχ οὗτοι αἱροῦνται τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐξ ὧν οἱ ἄρχοντες εἰσὶν. Was not the Solonian constitution exposed to similar risks? Contrast with Solon’s policy that of the founder or founders of the Lacedaemonian Ephorate; this great office was made accessible to all the citizens. It is possible that Solon legislated on this subject in intentional opposition to them. The passage before us reads as if Solon was the first to give the right of electing magistrates to τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν at Athens. If this is Aristotle’s meaning, we must suppose that in 2. 12. 1273 b 41 sqq., where he says that Solon found the magistrates already appointed by electors, he means that, though they were thus appointed before Solon’s time,
they were not elected by the people. On the question whether Aristotle’s statements as to Solon here and in 1282 a 25 sqq. and 2. 12. 1274 a 15 sqq. are reconcilable with 'Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 8, τὰς δ’ ἄρχας ἐποίησε (sc. ὁ Σόλων) καθώτις έκ προκρίσεως, [ό]τ’ [ἐκάσ’]τη προ-
κρίσει τῶν φυλῶν προσκρίνει δ’ εἰς τοὺς ἐννέα ἄρχοντας ἐκάστη δέκα, καὶ
tου[τοίς] [πεκ]ήρουσιν (ορ καὶ [ἐκ] τού[των ἐκ]ήρουσι), Gilbert (Const.
Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 136. 1) and Busolt
(Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 275. 1) take opposite views, the former thinking
that they are and the latter that they are not. To me the latter
view seems to be the true one.

τῶν ἄλλων τυνές νομοθετῶν. Hippodamus allowed the demos in
his ideal State the right of electing the magistrates (2. 8. 1268 a
11), but (so Aristotle thinks) excluded the cultivators and artisans
from the most important offices (1268 a 20 sqq.). In some oligar-
chies the demos, though excluded from office, had the right of
electing the magistrates (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 30 sqq.).

τάττουσιν ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχαιεσίας κ.τ.λ. Cp. Isocr. Philip. § 151,
ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς πράξεις σὲ τάττουσι, νομίζοντες τούτων μὲν σὲ κάλλιστ’ ἄν
ἐπιστατῆσαι κ.τ.λ. (Liddell and Scott s. v. τάσσω ii. 1). Aristotle
speaks here as if to give the Many the right of electing the magis-
trates was equivalent to giving them deliberative authority; he
distinguishes the two things, however, in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 23 sqq.
As to ἐπὶ τε κ.τ.λ. see note on 1284 a 35.

34. κατὰ μονα. See vol. i. p. 257, note 2, and cp. Plato, Polit.
292 B, κατὰ πρώτας. The expression probably includes magis-
tracies administered by Boards in addition to those held by single
individuals.

35. For the order of the words in ἴκανην αἰσθησιν see note on
1275 a 32.

μηγνύμενοι τοῖς βελτίωσιν, cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 20, βουλεύονται γὰρ
βελτίων κοινὴ βουλευόμενοι πάντες, ὃ μὲν ὅμοις μετὰ τῶν γνωρίμων, ἀλλ’ ὃ δὲ με-
τὰ τοῦ πλήθους. Dr. Arnold has already compared the passage
before us with Thuc. 6. 18. 6, where Alcibiades says, καὶ νομίζατε
νεότητα μὲν καὶ γήρας ἀνεν ἄλληλων μὴ δεῖν δύνασθαι, ὅμως δὲ τὸ τε φαιλόν
καὶ τὸ μέσον καὶ τὸ πάνυ ἄκριβες ἄν ἔνεκραθεν μάλιστ’ ἄν ἵσχυεν. See
also above on 1276 b 37.

36. ἡ μὴ καθαρὰ τροφή. Food in a more or less raw state,
standing in need of some further working-up to fit it for consum-
tion, is termed ‘impure food’ in De Gen. An. 1. 20. 728 a 26, ἐστι
γὰρ τὰ κατομήνια σπέρμα οὐ καθαρὸν ἄλλα δεόμενον ἐργασίας, διότερ ἐν τῇ
perὶ τοὺς καρποὺς γενέσει, ὅταν ἡ μῆτις διητημένη (διατημένη Ζ, followed by Aubert and Wimmer, ‘sifted through,’ from διατάω), ἐνεστὶ μὲν ἡ τροφή, δειταί β’ ἐργασίας πρὸς τὴν κάθαρσιν: διὸ καὶ μιγνυμένη ἐκείνη μὲν τῇ γούνῃ, αὐτὴ δὲ καθαρὰ τροφὴ, ἡ μὲν γενικῶς, ἡ δὲ τρέφει. Ὁσ. De Gen. An. 1. 18. 725a 14, τῆς μὲν οὖν πρώτης τροφῆς περίττωμα φλέγμα καὶ εἰ τι ἄλλο τουτοῦτον· καὶ γὰρ τὸ φλέγμα τῆς χρησίμου τροφῆς περίττωμα ἔστιν· σημεῖον δ’ ὅτι μιγνυμένον τροφῆ καθαρὰ τρέφει καὶ πονοῦσι καταλίσκει. In Athen, Deipn. 109 c a καθαρός ἄρτος, or ‘loaf of pure meal,’ is opposed to a συγκομιστὸς ἄρτος, or ‘loaf of unbolded’ (i.e. ‘unsifted’) ‘meal,’ and in Hippocr. De Victus Ratione (vol. i. p. 673 Kühn) καθαρὰ ἄλευρα are opposed to συγκομιστὰ ἄλευρα. Aristotle evidently thinks that a large quantity of pure and impure food together is more nutritious than a smaller quantity of pure food. He was much interested in questions about diet (Plut. Alex. c. 8, δοκεῖ δὲ μοι καὶ τὸ φιλιστρεῖν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ προστρίψασθαι μᾶλλον ἐτέρων· Ἀριστοτέλης, οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὴν θεωρίαν ἡγασάμεν, ἄλλα καὶ νοσοῦν ἐβοήθει τοῖς φίλοις καὶ συνετάτω τερασείας τινὰς καὶ διαιτὰς, ὡς ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστολῶν λαβεῖν ἐστιν).


41. I have not traced elsewhere the construction ποιήσαι ὑγία τῆς νόσου τῆς παροῦσης, though Liddell and Scott give ὑγιασθεῖν τῷ τράφειμοι ἀπὸ Anon. ap. Suid. s.v. ὑγιασθεῖν.

42. οὕτος δ’ ἐστὶν ἱατρός. Μὴ Π’ and possibly Γ add ὁ before ἱατρός, but probably wrongly: see above on 1253 b 11 and cp. c. 4. 1277 b 15, αὐτὴ ἄρετῆ πολίτου, and 5 (8). 3. 1337 b 32. See also Bon. Ind. 546 a 51 sqq.

ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. We must apparently supply ἔχει. For similar omissions of ἔχει see Bon. Ind. 306 a 16 sqq.

1. τὰς ἄλλας ἐμπειρίας καὶ τέχνας. See note on 1297 b 20. 1282 a. The two words are conjoined also in 1. 9. 1257 a 4 and 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 21.

3. ἱατρὸς δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘and we give the name of physician to the executant, and to the man of directing skill, and thirdly to the man who is merely cultivated in the science.’ For the contrast of δημιουργὸς καὶ ἀρχιτεκτονικός, cp. Polyb. 8. 9. 2, Ἰέρωνος μὲν χρησιγοῦ
NOTES.

γεγονότος, ἀρχιτέκτονος δὲ καὶ δημιουργὸς τῶν ἐπισημάτων Ἀρχιμήδους. In 1. 3. 1253 b 38 the ἀρχιτέκτον ων is contrasted with the ὑπηρέτης and in Metaph. A. i. 981 a 30 sqq. and b 31 sq. with the χειροτέχνης. As to ὁ πεπαθεμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην, Coray compares Plato, Protag. 312 B, ὅπερ ἡ παρὰ τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ ἑγένετο καὶ καθαριστὸ καὶ παιδο- τρίβον τούτων γὰρ σὺ ἐκάστην οὐκ ἐπὶ τέχνη ἐμαθες, ὡς δημιουργὸς ἐσώμενος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παιδεία, ὧς τῶν ἰδιώτην καὶ τῶν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει, and Bonitz (Ind. 558 a 4), De Part. An. i. 1. 639 a 1, περὶ πάσαν θεωρίαν τε καὶ μέθοδον, ὁμοίως ταπεινοτέραν τε καὶ τιμωτέραν, δύο φαίνονται τρόποι τῆς ἐξεως εἶναι, ὅν τὴν μὲν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πράγματος καλῶς ἔχει προσαγο- ρεύειν, τὴν δ' ὁδὸν παιδείαν των' πεπαθεμένου γὰρ ἔστι κατὰ τρόπον τὸ δύνασθαι κρίνειν εὐστόχαις τί καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἀποδιδὼς ὁ λέγων.

4. εἰσὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. See critical note on 1282 a 5.

7. τὴν ἀρέσειν, 'the election' of magistrates and other masters of an art, as well as the review of their conduct.

8. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἔλεοςθαί ὁρθῶς κ.τ.λ., 'for choosing rightly also [no less than judging rightly] is the work of those who know the particular science or art.' The force of καὶ is here retained in καὶ γὰρ. Compare the remarks of Cicero in Pro Plancio 3. 7 and 4. 9.

10. εἰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for if in the case of some kinds of work and some arts some non-scientific persons also do share in the ability to make a good choice, they do not do so in a higher degree than the scientific.' Supply τοῦ ἔλεοςθαί ὁρθῶς with μετέχουσι. Coray, followed by Bekk., would read οὗ τοι in place of οὗ τι, but οὗ τι seems to be right here: see Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 70, who remarks, 'hoc videtur praemittendum esse, οὗτοι ita distare ab o票据, ut illud senten- tiam restringi significet, cum τι ad οὗ addito nihil aliud nisi particulae negantis vis prematur.' See also Bon. Ind. 539 b 18 sqq. The passage before us was perhaps present to the memory of Dionysius of Halicarnassus in De Thucyd. iud. 4, οὗτος γὰρ τὰς Ἀπελλοῦ καὶ Ζεύξιδος καὶ Πρωτογένους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων γραφέων τῶν διωνυσιακῶν τέχνας οἱ μὴ τὰς αὐτὰς ἔχοντες ἐκείνοις ἁρετὰς κρίνειν κεκώλυται οὗτος τὰ Φείδου καὶ Πολυκλείτου καὶ Μύρανος ἔργα οἱ μὴ τηλικούτων δημιουργοί: εἴ γὰρ λέγειν, ὅτι πολλῶν ἔργων οὐχ ἢττων τοῦ τεχνίτου κρίνεις ὁ διώκτης.

15. ἄν ἢ τὸ πλῆθος μὴ λίαν ἀνδραποδῶδες. In a passage of the Laws (701 A) which Aristotle probably has before him here Plato had said that the ὑπεροκρατία which sprang up at Athens after the Persian War would have mattered less if the demos had consisted of ἐλεύθεροι ἄνδρες.
18. peri enwv, sc. techvwn. Aristotle would not say this of geometry, for instance.

μόνον δ' ποιήσας. See critical note.

20. allla kai belyviou k.t.l. Cp. Plato, Rep. 601 D, oukouv aretē kai kallos kai erthn de ekastou skeneous kai eph kai praxeous ou prose allo ti ou ti h' xreiai eisai prōs h' an ekastou he petoiménon he pevukos; Oútō. Polllē āra ánagn k' tōn xhōmennou ekastou empeirótatov te einai kai aggelon gínnehsai tō pouhē oía ágath h' kaka' pouiei en t' hreiai o' χρήται' óion aulhtis pou aullopou exaghelei peri tōn aulhōn o' an úpferetōsun en tō aulein, kai epipasei oious dei pouiein o' δ' úpferetēsai, and Cratyl. 390. Yet if the user is a better judge of the excellence of some articles than the maker, it does not follow that some users are not better judges than others.

22. kai thvntin δ' dautumwv all' oux δ' mágeiros. For the thought see vol. i. p. 258, note 1. Cp. also Alexis, Fragm. Δίων (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 3. 444),

καὶ τῶν μὲν ὑποκριτῶν πολὺς

κράτιστος ἐστὶν ὑψωτάτης, ὥς δοκεῖ

τῶν χρωμένων, τῶν δ' ὑψωτῶν ὑποκρίτης.

25. dokēv yap k.t.l. This probably refers to Plato, Laws 945 B sqq.: see vol. i. p. 258.

26. aI δ' euqhvas k.t.l. Cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 25, το δικαίων πάντων καὶ ἐκ πάντων καὶ περὶ πάντων ὃ περὶ τῶν πλείστων καὶ τῶν μεγίστων καὶ τῶν κυριατάτων, οἷον περὶ εὐθυνῶν κ.τ.λ.

27. δισπερ εἰρηται, in 1281 b 32.

28. As to τοῖς δήμοις and ἡ ἐκκλησία, see above on 1275 b 7.

29. kaitoiv k.t.l. introduces a proof that members of the assembly, etc., are φαύλοι (26). So much mixed up is the conception of ἡμίποτις and ἐπικέκαυ with wealth and poverty. It is here implied that the Boulé is not one of aI μεγισταί ἄρχαι, whereas in 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 30—b 17 it is grouped with the offices of stratēgus and euthynus and logistēs and counted among the most important magistracies. Notwithstanding what is said here, a high property-qualification was sometimes required for membership of the assembly, and sometimes none at all (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 3 sq.). At Athens no one could be a member of the Boulé or the Heliaea till he was thirty years of age (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., pp. 265, 392), but Aristotle would perhaps regard this as ἡ τυχοῦσα ἥμικλια. We read of Solon in 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 7, τὰς μ[εν ντ]ν ἄρχαν ἀπενεμεν ἄρχεν ἐκ πεντακοσιομεδίκων καὶ ἵππων καὶ ξενυτῶν, τοὺς
1. εἰνεά ἄρχωντας καὶ τοὺς ταμίας . . . τοὺς δὲ τὸ θητικὸν τελοῦσιν ἐκκλησίας καὶ δικαστηρίων μετέδωκε μῶνον. Solon, in fact, required the ταμίαι τῆς Ἀθήνας to be Pentacosimiemedimni, and the law was the same in Aristotle’s day, but it was no longer observed (’ Ἀθ. Ποι. c. 47 init.: c. 7 sub fin.: c. 8. l. 7). It does not appear that there was any property-qualification for the office of stratégus at Athens, for the stratégει are said to be elected ‘from all’ (Gilbert, ibid. p. 230).

33. καὶ ταοτη', i.e. the giving of greater powers to men possessed of a small property-qualification only and youthful in years than to men possessed of a high property-qualification, no less than the giving to unskilled persons of the right to elect magistrates and to review their conduct in office.

36. μόριον ἐστὶ τούτων, ‘is only a part of these.’ For the suppression of ‘only’ cp. c. 9. 1281 a 9, c. 11. 1282 b 4, and c. 15. 1286 b 8, and see notes on 1336 b 26, 1340 a 34, and 1292 a 32.

λέγω δὲ μόριον κ.τ.λ. This explanation seems unnecessary, but see above on 1277 b 37 and below on 1282 b 39. See also Vahlen on Poet. 13. 1453 a 4.

40. πάντων τούτων, i.e. the members of the demos, the Boulê, and the dicastery.

tο τῶν καθ' ἕνα καὶ κατ' ἀλήγους κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 5. 1278 b 4, κύριος ἤ καθ' αὐτὸν ἦ μετ' ἄλλων τῆς τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμελείας.

1282 b. 

1. ἡ δὲ πρώτη λεχθείσα ἀπορία, i.e. the discussion on the ἀπορία raised in c. 10. 1281 a 11, τί δεῖ τὸ κύριον εἶναι τῆς πόλεως. This discussion has made it clear that the check of law is necessary to prevent the Many or the Few committing injustice, and that law must be just law if it is to do this.

4. περὶ τούτων, ‘only about those things’ (see above on 1282 a 36).

εξαδυνατοῦσιν, ‘are wholly unable.’

7. τὸ πάλαι διαπορηθέν, i.e. τί δεῖ τὸ κύριον εἶναι τῆς πόλεως.

8. ἄλλα γὰρ κ.τ.λ., ‘but it must needs be also that as the constitutions [to which laws belong] are bad or good and just or unjust, so the laws also are the same—this, however, is clear that the laws must be adjusted to the constitution, [not the constitution to the laws]—but if this is so, it is evident that laws in accordance with the normal constitutions must necessarily be just and laws in accordance with the deviation-forms not just.’ For the view that laws vary with constitutions, cp. Plato, Laws 714 B sq. Cp. also 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 13, πρὸς γὰρ τὰς πολιτείας τοὺς νόμους δεῖ τίθεναι καὶ τίθεναι πάντες, ἄλλα οὖ τὰς πολιτείας πρὸς τοὺς
vómos. Demosthenes insists on this also: see Hug, Studien aus dem classischen Alterthum, p. 79, where Demosth. c. Androt. c. 30 is referred to, ἀιτίων τοίνυν, ὁ ἄνδρες 'Αθηναῖος, καὶ τὸν θέντα τὸν νόμον ἔξετάσας Σώλωνα, καὶ θεάσασθαι δοσὶν πρόνωμαν ἐποίητο ἐν ἄπασιν ὦς ἐτίθει νόμοις τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ δοσὶ περὶ τούτου μᾶλλον ἐσπούδαξεν ἢ περὶ τοῦ πράγματος αὐτοῦ ὄν τιβεί τὸν νόμον, and also Demosth. in Lept. cc. 105-109, where the variation of the laws respecting rewards under different constitutions is traced. Sus. has already referred to Isocr. Areopag. § 14, ταύτη (i. e. τῇ πολιτείᾳ) καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τοὺς ῥήτορας καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἀναγκαίον ἐστιν ὁμοιοθεία, καὶ πράττειν ὁποῖος ἐκάστους ὀναντίρ ἢν ταύτην ἔχουσιν. Εἰ τούτο (I I), sc. φανερῶν ἐστι.

14 sqq. Aristotle's inquiries have so far led him to the conclu-
sion that the true supreme authority is to be found in 'laws in accordance with the normal constitutions,' and we expect him (see vol. i. p. 259) to go on and ask what laws are in accordance with the normal constitutions, but perhaps he feels that he has not yet sufficiently studied how normal or just constitutions should be organized, and that till he has done this he cannot decide what laws are in accordance with them. At all events, instead of asking this question, he makes a new start in the Twelfth Chapter and learns from a renewed inquiry into the nature of Political Justice, (1) that a just or normal constitution will recog-
nize in its distribution of power all attributes which contribute to the being and well-being of the State, and not one of them only, and (2) that when given circumstances the conclusion at which he has arrived in favour of the supremacy of law does not hold at all, and that Justice may require that the State shall be ruled not by law, but by the will of an Absolute King supreme over all law. To this extent then the conclusion reached at the end of c. 11 needs to be modified. In teaching that account ought to be taken of other things besides virtue in the award of political power, and that superiority in virtue alone, unless it is transcen-
dent, gives no just claim to exclusive political supremacy, Aristotle differs from the language held by Plato in Laws 756 E-758 A, and especially 757 C, where we read of the nobler of the two kinds of λαότης (ἡ ἀλήθεστάτη καὶ ἀρίστη λαότης), τῷ μὲν γὰρ μείζον πλείον, τῷ δ' ἔλαττον συμκράτερα νέμει, μέτρια διδούσα πρός τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἐκάτερα, καὶ δὴ καὶ τιμᾶς μείζον μὲν πρὸς ἄρετήν ἀνεί μεῖζον τοῖς δὲ τούσαντων ἔχουσιν ἄρετῆς τε καὶ παιδείας τὸ πρέπον ἐκάτερος ἀποφέρει κατὰ λόγον ἢστι γὰρ δὴ ποι καὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν ἡμῖν ἂν τούτ' αὐτό, τὸ δίκαιον. He probably has

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3. 11. 1282 a 33—12. 1282 b 14.

C. 12.
also before him Rep. 540 D, ὅταν οἱ ἰδίως φιλόσοφοι διψάτωσιν, ἃ πλείους ἢ εἷς, εἴν πόλει γενόμενοι, τῶν μὲν τῶν τιμῶν καταφρονησάωσιν . . . τὸ ὀρθὸν περὶ πλείους πουράσμενοι καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τούτων τιμᾶς, μέγεθον δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαίωτατον τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τούτῳ δὴ ὑπηρετοῦντες τε καὶ ἀδέξουτες αὐτὸ διασκευασθῶσιν τὴν ἑαυτῶν πόλιν. Cr. Isocr. Archid. § 35.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Here begins a long string of protases introduced by ἐπεί, which lack an expressed apodosis to take them up: compare 1. 12. 1259 a 37 sqq. The virtual apodosis perhaps comes in 21, ποίων δ' ἱσότης κ.τ.λ., unless we supply after τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον 'we shall do well to inquire what the just is.' Compare Magn. Mor. 1. 1. 1182 b 1, ἀλλὰ μὴ γε πολιτικὴ βελτίστη δύναμις, ὅση τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἢ εἴπα ἁγαθῶν. For ἁγαθῶν (not τὸ ἁγαθὸν) see Stallbaum on Plato, Hipp. Maj. 293 E. For μάλιστα see note on 1252 a 4. That τὸ πολιτικὸν ἁγαθὸν is τὸ δίκαιον might be guessed from Pol. 2. 1261 a 30, διὰπερ τὸ ἱσόν τὸ ἀντιπεποθὸς σώζει τὰς πόλεις, taken with 1261 b 9, καίτοι τὸ γε ἐκάστου ἁγαθὸν σώζει ἑκαστόν. As to ἡ πολιτικὴ δύναμις, 'αι μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεις idem fere sunt ac τέχναι et ἐπιστήμαι, itaque saepe δύναμις vel coniungitur cum verbis τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη vel pro synonymo usurpatur' (Bon. Ind. 207 b 4 sqq.). The three terms are already used in conjunction by Isocrates in Panath. § 30, ἐπειδὴ τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἀποδοκιμάζω.

17. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον, 'and by the just I mean that which is for the common advantage.' Cp. i. 9. 1257 a 19, εἰν μὲν οὖν τῇ πρώτῃ κοινωνίᾳ (τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν οἰκία). Aristotle adds this remark because he has already explained in c. 6 that the common advantage is the end for which the State originally comes into being and the end of all normal constitutions: cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a ii sqq. and Rhet. i. 6. 1362 b 27 sq.

18. ἅκουε δὲ πᾶσιν ἱσόν τι τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι. Cp. c. 9. 1280 a 11 (where see note). By ἱσόν τι is probably meant ἱσόν κατ' ἀναλογίαν: cp. 7 (5). i. 1301 a 26, πάντων μὲν ὁμολογοῦσιν τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἵσον.

19. τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφικῶς λόγοις, εἰς οὓς διώρισται περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν. The reference appears to be to Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 9 sqq. Popular opinion is distinguished from 'philosophical inquiries' very much as in Eth. Eud. i. 8. 1217 b 22, ἐπισκέπτεται δὲ πολλοὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τρόπους καὶ εἰ τῶς ἐξωτερικῶς λόγους καὶ εἰ τῶς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν: cp. De Part. An. i. 1. 642 a 4, τῶν μὲν γὰρ δύο τρόπων οὐδέτερον οἶδαν τε ὑπάρχειν, τῶν διωρισμένων εἰ τῶς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν. See Bon. Ind. 821 a 18 sqq., and cp. Plato, Symp. 218 A, τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγων.
20. τι γάρ και τισι τὸ δικαίων, 'for that which is just is a thing and has to do with persons,' or, in other words, justice involves an assignment of a thing to persons.

22. ἔχει γάρ τούτ' ἀπορίαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν πολιτικὴν, 'for this inquiry is productive of questions and of philosophical speculation on politics.' For ἔχει see above on 1268 b 24. It is a merit in inquiries to give rise to aporetic discussion: see above on 1275 b 34. Bonitz (Ind. 820 b 58 sqq.) compares Phys. 1. 2. 185 a 17, ὅπερ ὁμοιότατα ἐπείδη περὶ φύσεως μὲν οὐ, φυσικὰς δὲ ἀπορίας συμβαίνειν λέειν αὐτοῖς, ἵνα ἔχει καλῶς ἐπὶ μικρὸν διαλεξῆναι περὶ αὐτῶν' ἔχει γάρ φιλοσοφίαν ὥς σκέψις, and Eth. Eud. 1. 1. 1214 a 12, ὅσα μὲν οὐν ἔχει φιλοσοφίαν μόνον θεωρητικὴν, λεκτέων κατὰ τὸν ἐπιζάλλοντα καυρὸν, διὰ τι περὶ οἰκεῖων ἢ τῆς μεθόδου. Cp. also 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 30.

23. ἦσος γάρ ἂν φαίη τις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle perhaps has before him the discussion in Plato, Gorg. 490 B sqq. He may possibly have thought that Plato lent some countenance to the view criticized by him when he said of true Justice in Laws 757 C, τὸ μὲν γάρ μείζον πλείων, τῷ δὲ ἔλαττον σμικρότερα νέειν, μετρία διδοῦσα πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἐκατέρω, yet it is likely that Plato's language in Rep. 454 C (esp. ἐκείνο τὸ εἴδος τῆς ἀλλοιωσεως τε καὶ ὀμοιώσεως μόνον ἐφυλάττομεν τὸ πρὸς αὐτὰ τεῖνον τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα) suggested to Aristotle the distinction between attributes contributing to the work to be done and others. See also below on 27.


25. μηδὲν διαφέροιεν ἄλλ' ὁμοιοι τυγχάνοιεν ὀντες. For this 'abundantia contraria copulandi,' see Vahlen on Poet. 1. 1447 a 17, who refers among other passages to Pol. 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 41, ἄλλωσ διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔχειν τρόπον.

26. τὸ δικαίων καὶ τὸ κατ' ἄξιον. Καὶ τὸ κατ' ἄξιον is added in explanation of τὸ δικαίων (see note on 1257 b 7) and to show that the kind of τὸ δικαίων referred to is that which rests on ἄξιον, for
there is another kind of to dikaios (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 3, kai yar to dikaios to demotikov to 'ison xhein esti katha arphmouv alla mu kat' aixian). That this kind alone is truly just we see from 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 16, oùkoun òntos amphwv nenemphsati symberei kai dikaiow einai' xhei yar avtì ò diaprèsis to kat' aixian.

27. allà mu' k.t.l. In correcting this error (cp. 1283 a 11-14) Aristotle probably has before him a saying of Solon (Diod. 9. 2. 5, ò Solon ògeito toûs mèn pûktas kai stadeis kai toûs allous òthnìas òmbwv òxíoikoung symbállexetai tais pûleis pros swthrian, toûs ðe frounìsai kai òréthi diaférontas muwos dýnasthai tâs patrídës en toûs kudûnos diafûlástew), a saying which Xenophanes virtually repeats in the well-known lines (Fragm. 2. Bergk),

oûte yar ei pûktês ògamós laoísi meteîn
ou' ei pevnathléum, ouïte palaiomorphvni,
ou'de mèn ei tawntîti podôw, to pèr òstî pròtîmou
'ómhs òsòs' òndrôw erç' en ògion pèlèi,
tôvnèken ðn ðh málloû en euformiâ pòlis eîn'
sýmkrôn ð' ãn to pûleî xârmì génot' ëpì tâ,
ei tis òxthèlwv nîkò Písas par' òxhbas' ou yar tiaîni tâwta muchwv pûlew.

(cp. Isocr. Paneg. § 1 sq.). Plato had lent some momentary countenance to the opposite view in Laws 744 B (see vol. i. p. 260, note 1), but he anticipates Aristotle in Laws 696 B, ou yar ðh ðei kathà pûlon ge eînai tâs timâs ùperexhôsas, ònti tis òstî ploutô diafârêw, ëpeti ou'de ònti tachws ò kalos ò isxurôs òneu toûs òréthìs ou'de òréthìs òs wv sôfroûnình ìppì (where he perhaps remembers the saying of Solon and the lines of Xenophanes), except that Aristotle thinks that the rich man has a better claim to office than the swift or handsome or strong man. The Ethiopians were said to make the biggest and strongest man among them their king (Hdt. 3. 20: Pol. 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 4 sqq.) or else the handsomest (Athen. Deipn. 566 c: Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 142 in Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 463), other barbarians honoured swiftness of foot in the same way (Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 138: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. ibid.), and Euripides had put in the mouth of one of his characters the lines (Fragm. 1035),

òstis kat' isxhì prôtos òwomâçetro
ò tôxa pûlloû ò máçh òdorù sbeénw, tòuton týrænei tòw kaiwvùk eîpòv.

Indeed, Aristotle himself speaks in 1. 5. 1254 b 34 sqq. and 4 (7).
3. 12. 1282 b 27—1283 a 3.

14. 1332 b 16 sqq. as if a great physical superiority conferred a title to rule.

30. φαινον μ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων. Cp. c. 13. 1284 b 7, δῆλον δὲ τούτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν.

31. τῶν γὰρ ὁμοίων κ.τ.λ. Aristotle first takes the case in which the essential attribute (skill in flute-playing, in the illustrative parallel which he has chosen) is shared by several individuals in an equal degree, and he says that these individuals must be awarded flutes of equal excellence; extraneous qualifications like that of high birth must not be allowed to turn the scale in favour of any one of them (cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 8, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἵσον τοῖς ἴσοις καὶ τὸ μὴ ἴσον τοῖς ἴσοις παρὰ φύσιν οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν καλόν). He next passes on (34 sqq.) to the case in which one individual possesses the essential attribute in a far higher degree than the rest, and as to this case he tells us that no inferiority of this individual in respect of higher but non-essential things must lead us to deny him the superior award of flutes which is his due.

35. ἔτι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ προσαγαγοῦν, 'if we push it still further.' Cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 7. 1098 a 22, δὰξεν δ' ἅν παντὸς εἶναι προσαγαγεῖν καὶ διαμβρώσατα τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα τῇ περιγραφῇ: Eth. Eud. 2. 8. 1224 a 8, μικρὸν προσαγαγοῦτε τὸν λόγον.

38. εἰ καὶ μείζον κ.τ.λ. How little respect was felt for the art of flute-playing, we see from 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 18 sqq.

ἔκαστον here takes the place of ἔκατερον, as in Poet. 6. 1449 b 25 (see Vahlen's note on this passage: he says 'ἔκαστον hic ut alibi est pro ἐκατέρον' and refers to his Aristot. Aufsätze, 2. 50).

39. λέγω δὲ κ.τ.λ. For this really needless explanation see above on 1277 b 37 and 1282 a 36.

κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν, 'if we compare the two ratios,' i.e. the ratio in which noble birth and beauty excel the art of flute-playing and the ratio in which the surpassing flute-player excels his fellows. Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 31, ἥ γὰρ ἀναλογία ἴσοτης ἐστὶ λόγον καὶ ἐν τέταρτοις ἐλαχίστοις.

2. In place of τοῦ πλοῦτου we expect τοῦ κάλλους, but see below 1283 a. on 1323 b 35.

3. ἔτι κατὰ γε τούτον τὸν λόγον κ.τ.λ., i.e. the λόγος of the imagined opponent in 1282 b 23 sqq. Things that differ very much are not commensurable (Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133 b 18, τῇ μὲν οὖν ἀληθείᾳ ἀδύνατον τὰ τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα σύμμετρα γενέσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρείαν ἐνδείχεται ἴκανός, and 1133 a 19, διὸ πάντα συμβλητά δεὶ πως
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εἰναι, έν ἑστὶν ἀλλαγῇ, where πῶς = πρὸς τὴν χρείαν: Phys. 7. 4. 249 a 3 sqq.

4. εἰ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τί μέγεθος. Montecatino (vol. iii. p. 191) translates, 'si magis imperiorum et principatus civitatis esse particeps debet,' etc., and so Sus., 'for if a given bodily stature [confers political privileges] more [than a certain amount of wealth or good birth].' These interpreters apparently supply δεὶ μετέχειν τῶν ἀρχῶν, or something similar, with μᾶλλον (cp. i 282 b 23 sqq.). Stahr, on the other hand, translates, 'denn wenn eine bestimmte Körpergrösse für irgend etwas höheren Werth verliehe (confers a higher value for anything whatever),' and Bernays, 'denn wenn z. B. einem gewissen Maass von Körpergrösse im Vergleich zu Reichthum und freier Geburt irgend etwas in höherem Grade zukommt.' Prof. Ridgeway brackets μᾶλλον, and another critic would read εἰμάλλον in place of it, and Sus. mentions these suggestions, though he still retains μᾶλλον in his text. I am myself inclined to supply ἄγαθον with μᾶλλον from the preceding sentence ('more a good'), and to translate, 'for if a given amount of size is more a good than [a given amount of some other good, such as wealth or free birth].'

καὶ ὅλως ἐν κ.τ.λ., 'size would also generally' (i.e. apart from its amount) 'be capable of being matched against wealth and free birth.'

6. ὅστε εἰ κ.τ.λ., 'and so, if this man excels in size more than this man in virtue' (or in other words, if this man's amount of size is superior to this man's amount of virtue), 'and size generally' (i.e. apart from questions of amount) 'is superior in a higher degree than virtue, everything would be comparable [whatever its amount], for if such an amount is better than such an amount, such an amount will evidently be equal.' I have followed Sus. in bracketing μέγεθος, 8, which may have been repeated by mistake from the preceding line, though it is possible that instead of bracketing μέγεθος we should read ἄγαθον in place of it. The difficulty of retaining μέγεθος arises from this, that, if we do so, we have to translate, 'for if such an amount of size is better than such an amount [of something else], such an amount will evidently be equal,' and it is doubtful whether we have any right to supply 'of something else.' Aristotle probably means by εἰ ὅν συμβλητά πώτερα, 8, that all goods would be comparable, not everything, for this is all that his argument proves. For τοσοῦτο χάρ κ.τ.λ., cp. Phys. 7.
4. 248 a 11, eti eti pasas (sc. kynsis) sympletrac to ev iso

chrwvo istor koumenv, esto peripheris tois isoi euvdeia, kai meizou dhi kai elatwv. Kretinov in 9 must mean 'better.'

9. epei de tout' adynaton. See above on 3.

10. kai epi tovon politikov, 'in the case of things political also,' no less than epei tovs allwv eti stmwmwv kai dunwmwv (1282 b 30). For ta politika, cp. 2. 6. 1266 a 11.

11. ei yap . . . 14. ton timh. Here the fragment of Xenophanes quoted in part above on 1282 b 27 is especially present to Aristotle's mind. Ovdov is to be taken with dein, as in Eth. Nic. 9. 10. 1170 b 27, ovdov oon dein autwv. Tn timh, 'the honour which falls to them.'

13. h tovton diafora, 'the superiority possessed by these men.'

14. allo' exi xwv k. t. l. 'EFin tovton is 'in respect of these things': cp. Rhet. 2. 2. 1379 b 1, epithebain yap asfodra owhnai uparxewn (sc. autovs) ev tovtois ev ois skapontai, oih froutizouv, and Poet. 2. 1448 a 16, ev aithi de tij diafora kai h trapogdia pros ton koumwdan dieiastheve. See also Stallbaum on Plato, Gorg. 452 E, kai tois ev tausth tij dynmi deoudon men exei tov iatroy, dooulon de ton paideiriznon. The polis is regarded by Aristotle as composed of wealth, free birth, nobility, culture, etc.: cp. 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 17, esti de pasas polis ek te ton pouoi kai posov: legis de poui mhn eleuberaian plouton paideian eugeneian, posov de tihn ton plithous uperogh.

16. tis timh, cp. tihn timh, 14, which answers to ton arxwv, 11.

17. dein yap k. t. l., 'for free birth and wealth are things of which the polis is composed,]' for' etc. Cp. Eurip. Fragm. 21 (quoted above on 1276 b 37). In 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 33 Aristotle mentions tois ois evsias leitourgian, o kaloumen eiptorous, as a necessary part of a State. It is true that in Crete the State defrayed the liturgies which were elsewhereborne by rich men (see above on 1272 a 17), and that this might have been made the general rule, but even then rich men would be needed to contribute to the eisphora. Aristotle says nothing about oi eugeneiv, though he has mentioned them in 16, probably because he includes them under oi eileideroi (cp. 33 sqq.).

Timhma fereontas, i.e. contributing to the State a rateable quota of property. Cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 20, tois eixoun timhma, and for ferein, 2. 5. 1263 a 3, tois de karpois elis to kouw fereontas anapankeiv. For the contrast implied here between oi aporoi and oi timhma fereontes, see note on 1279 b 19.

18. ou yap xwv eni k. t. l. See above on 1276 b 37 and 1280 a 32. Is there a tacit reference here to the latter passage, in which it was
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shown that there could not be a πόλις wholly composed of slaves? If so, we have something to add to the other evidence (see vol. i. Appendix C) that cc. 12 and 13 were placed where they stand by Aristotle.

19. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ. τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 24 sqq. (where military prowess and judicial virtue are again mentioned together) and 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 18 sqq. Tyrtaeus had long ago said (Fragm. 12. 15),

ένυν δ' ἐσθλὸν τούτο πόλη τε παντὶ τε δήμω,

δοσις ἀνήρ διαβάς εὖ προμάχουι μένῃ

νολεμέωσ κ. τ.λ.,

and as to justice Protagoras had gone farther than Aristotle, for he makes it essential to the very existence of a State (Plato, Protag. 324 D sq., and 326 E, τούτῳ τοῦ πράγματος, τῆς ἀρετῆς, εἰ μέλλει πόλις εἶναι, οὐδένα δὲι ἰδίωτεύειν).

21. μὴν κ. τ.λ. For the contrast here drawn between εἶναι πόλιν and οἰκεῖονα καλῶς, cp. 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 6 sqq.

C.13. 24. πρὸς μέντοι ζωὴν ἁγαθὴν ἢ παῖδεια καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ μάλιστα δικαίως ἀν ἀμφισβητηθοῖσαν. Ζωῆς ἁγαθῆ is taken as the standard in 1. 8. 1256 b 32, and said to be the end which the lawgiver should set before him in 4 (7). 2. 1325 a 7 sqq. Παιδεία and ἀρετή are here conjoined as in Plato, Laws 757 C, and in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 29 and 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 26 sqq. Παιδεία, 'culture,' is connected with aristocracy in 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 24 sq., where the offices in an aristocracy, which are usually said to be filled ἐκ τῶν ἀριστῶν (3. 7. 1279 a 35), are said to be filled ἐκ πεπαιδευμένων. In 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 38 sqq. it is opposed to βαναυσία and treated as a note of oligarchy (cp. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 37). Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective, s.v. ἀμφισβητέω, notes the rare occurrence of ἀμφισβητηθοῖσαν, adding however that ἀμφισβητηθὸν occurs in Plato, Euthyd. 296 E, and ἀμφισβητοῖεν in Menex. 242 E (see also Demosth. Prooem. 46. p. 1453 for ἀμφισβητῆσειν). Ἀμφισβητηθεῖσειν is used in Pol. 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 24 and 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 12.

26. καθάπερ ἐφίσταται καὶ πρότερον, in c. 9. 1281 a 4 sqq.

ἐπεὶ δὲ κ. τ.λ. This has been already said in substance in c. 9. 1280 a 21 sqq., and it is repeated in 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 25 sqq. For πάντων ἵνα ἔχων, 'to have an equal share with others of everything,' cp. Eth. Eud. 7. io. 1242 b 30, ἵνα ἴσουν ἦ τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ ἦ τῆς λειτουργίας, and Eurip. Phoeniss. 513 Bothe, 547 Dindorf,

σὺ δ' οὐκ ἀνέξει διωμάτων ἔχων ἴσουν;
§ 29. εἴρηται μὲν οὖν καὶ πρότερον κ.τ.λ. This was said in c. 9. 1280 a 9 sqq. Μέν οὖν has nothing to answer to it. Aristotle's original intention probably was, after interposing an explanation of the grounds on which the different claimants base their claims, to continue, ἄλλα τούτο ἣν σκεπτόντω, εἶ πάντες εἶνεν ἐν μιᾷ πόλει, τίνας ἁρχεῖν δεῖ. In adding this explanation, however, he allows his attention to be diverted and the strict sequence of the passage to be broken (just as in 1. 12. 1259 a 37 sqq.), and thus it happens that μέν οὖν has nothing to answer to it. Μέν οὖν here, as elsewhere, introduces a more particular and detailed treatment of the subject.

§ 30. ὅτι διαμφισβητούσι τρόπον τινά δικαίως πάντες, ἀπλῶς δ' οὕτω πάντες δικαίως. For the repetition of πάντες, cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 1, φανερῶν ὅτι χρηστέον μὲν πάσαις ταῖς ἀρμονίαις, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον πάσαις χρηστέον.

§ 31. οἱ πλούσιοι μὲν κ.τ.λ. In the passage 31–42 Aristotle bears in mind the rule which he has laid down in c. 12. 1283 a 14 sq. that claimants for political power must rest their claims on attributes entering into the composition of a State. The different claimants are represented as doing so. This is indicated by κοινῶν (32), πρὸς τὰ συμβόλαια πιστοὶ μᾶλλον (32), πολίται μᾶλλον (34), οἶκου τίμιοι (36), βελτίων (36), and κοινωνικὴν ἀρετὴν (38). Κοινῶν, 32, 'a public thing,' or in other words, one of the things which are essential to the State: cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 5 sqq. Compare also Eth. Nic. 8. 16. 1163 b 5, οὔτω δ' ἐξειν τούτο καὶ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις φαίνεται οὐ γὰρ τιμᾶται ὁ μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν τῷ κοινῷ πορίζον· τὸ κοινὸν γὰρ δίδοται τῷ τὸ κοινὸν εὐφρενεύοντι, ἡ τιμὴ δὲ κοινῶν. It is implied in the passage before us that the rich will be owners of land, and this may have commonly been the case in Greece; still there were other forms of wealth besides wealth in land (2. 7. 1267 b 10 sqq.), and most of Nicias' wealth was in silver (Plut. Nic. c. 4).

§ 32. ἐτει κ.τ.λ. So the Syracusan Athenagoras, though he was the leader of the demos, admits that the rich are the best custodians of money (Thuc. 6. 39): that this was a common view we see from such passages as Rhet. ad Alex. 9. 1429 a 34, τοὺς γὰρ πλείστους
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'ἐστιν ἵδειν νομίζοντας τοὺς πλουτοῦντας δικαιοτέρους εἶναι τῶν πεισμένων,
and Pol. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 38 sqq. and 2. 11. 1273 a 21 sqq. (cp. also
Fragm. Trag. Adesp. 92 Nauck). Aristotle does not agree with
this view; he requires virtue in a custodian of money (7 (5). 9.
1309 b 6 sqq.).

33. οCipher for 'ελεύθεροι καὶ εὐγενεῖς κ.τ.λ., 'and the free-born and
noble claim as not being far from each other, inasmuch as [if the
free-born claim on the strength of their citizenship,] those who are
better born are citizens in a higher degree than the low-born, and
nobility is in every State locally prized; and again because it is
likely that those descended from better ancestors will be better,
seeing that nobility is excellence of race.' The ελεύθεροι and the
εὐγενεῖς are classed together in 1283 b 16 as οCipher for κατὰ γένος ἀξιοῦντες
ἀρχῶν: the εὐγενεῖς are in a superlative degree what the ελεύθεροι are
in a positive degree (cp. 1283 b 19 sq.). In some places the word
ελεύθερος appears to have been used to designate the noble (6 (4). 4.
1290 b 9 sqq.), none but οCipher for διαφέροντες καὶ εὐγενείαν καὶ πρώτοι κατά
σχῆμας τὰς ἀποκαίς being accounted ελεύθεροι. The well-born were
citizens in a higher degree than the low-born, for they could reckon
more generations of citizen descent, and this was with many a test
of citizenship (c. 2. 1275 b 21 sqq.). The fact that nobility is παρακαταστάσεις οὐκοί τίμαισ
is insisted on, because this shows it to be of
importance to the πολιτικὴ κοινωνία, and therefore a just ground of
claim. Its champions might have gone further and urged that
Greek nobility is recognized everywhere (1. 6. 1255 a 32 sqq.), but
this would not have been equally to the point. The sophist
Lycophron would not admit that nobility belonged to the class of
τίμαι καὶ σπονδάια (Aristot. Fragm. 82. 1490 a 9 sqq.). The fem.
form τίμας is used in the passage before us (possibly because it is
followed by έτει: see note on 1277 b 25): in De Part. An. 1. 5.
644 b 24 we have περὶ μὲν ἱκείνας (sc. τὰς ουσίας) τιμᾶς οὐσίας καὶ θείας.
For έτει διὰτι βελτίως εἰκός τοὺς ἐκ βελτιῶνων, cp. Rhet. 1. 9. 1367 b 29,
οἷον εὐγενεῖα καὶ παιδεία: έκός γὰρ εἶ γαθὸν γαθὸν καὶ τὸν οὕτω τραφέντα
toμοῦντο εἶναι. For the definition of εὐγενεία as ἀρετῆ γένους cp. Rhet.
2. 15. 1390 b 22, έτει δὲ εὐγενεῖς μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ γένους ἄρετὴν, γενναίον
dὲ κατὰ τὸ μὴ εξίστασθαι τῆς φύσεως: ὁπερ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὐ συμβαίνει
tοῖς εὐγενεῖσι, ἀλλ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ εὐτελεῖσι: φορὰ γὰρ τὸς εἶναι εὖ τῆς
γένεις ἄνδραν ὁπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὰς χώρας γευμένως, καὶ ἐνιότε ἀν
ἀγαθὸν τὸ γένος, ἐγγίνονται διὰ τὸν χρόνον ἄνδρες περιτοῖς, κάπηκεν πάλιν
ἀναβίωσιν ('deficit,' Bon. Ind. s.v. ἀναβιόων): Hist. An. 1. 1. 488 b
18 sqq.: Aristot. Fragm. 85. 1490 b 43, ἥ μὲν εὐγένεια ἔστιν ἄρετὴ γένους, ἥ δ᾽ ἄρετὴ σπουδαίων σπουδαίων δ᾽ ἐστὶ γένος ἐν ὧν πολλοὶ σπουδαίοι πεφύκασιν ἐγγίνοσθαί. These passages show that ἄρετὴ γένους means 'excellence of race' in the sense that the race to which the εὐγένεις belongs has produced in the past a number of virtuous men (cp. Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 33, ἥ κατ᾽ ἱδίαν ἄρετὴν ἥ κατὰ γένος), so that the εὐγένεις stands at any rate a better chance of being virtuous than one who is not εὐγένεις. We must bear in mind that this definition of εὐγένεια is here placed in the mouth of οἱ εὐλεύθεροι καὶ εὐγενεῖς, who would be likely to take the most favourable view of εὐγένεια. We see from Rhet. 1. 5. 1360 b 34 that εὐγένεια did not, in the ordinary acceptance of the word, necessarily imply descent from ancestors remarkable for virtue; it might imply only descent from ancestors remarkable for wealth or other social advantages; nor did it necessarily imply a frequent occurrence in the family of virtuous individuals, but only of individuals distinguished in some way or other (ἐπίφανεις). Cp. Diog. Laert. 3. 88. Still the view that εὐγένεια is ἄρετὴ γένους is not far from that of Aristotle. In the Rhetoric (2. 15. 1390 b 22 sqq.), as we have seen, it is distinctly adopted by him, though he holds that, owing to the occurrence from time to time of degeneracy in families, most εὐγενεῖς are men of little worth. Compare the view taken in the fragments of the possibly genuine Περὶ εὐγενείας (Aristot. Fragm. 82–85. 1490 a 1 sqq.). Here, however, we find (1490 a 31 sqq.) a reference to the contention that οἱ ἐκ πάλαι πλουσίων may be εὐγενεῖς no less than οἱ ἐκ πάλαι ἄγαθων (cp. Julian, Or. 2. p. 81 B, φασὶ γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ τοὺς ἐκ πάλαι πλουσίων εὐγενεῖς), and in the Politics Aristotle seems to adopt as his own the doctrine that εὐγένεια implies descent from ancestors not only virtuous but rich (6 (4). 8. 1294 a 21, ἥ γὰρ εὐγένεια ἔστιν ἀρχαῖος πλοῦτος καὶ ἄρετῆ: 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 3).

37. δομοῖος δὴ κ.τ.λ., 'we shall say then that in a similar way virtue also prefers a just claim, for we say that justice, which is necessarily accompanied by all the other virtues, is virtue operative in social relations [and therefore essential to the State: so that virtue as a whole has as good a claim to recognition as justice].' I take the antecedent to ἢ to be τὴν δικαιοσύνην, not κοινωνικὴν ἄρετὴν. For the omission of ἄρετὰς after τὰς ἄλλας, cp. 1. 13. 1260 a 24: 3. 5. 1278 a 40. Aristotle introduces his own view with δὴ, just as he introduces it with ὅν in c. 3. 1276 a 13 sqq. For δομοῖος, cp.
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1283 b 16, 19, 31: it is not to be taken with δικαίως. That justice is virtue operative in social relations we see from Eth. Nic. 5. 3. 1129 b 25-1130 a 5, and from the definition of virtue ascribed with whatever truth to Plato in Diog. Laert. 3. 91, ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη (αἰτία) τοῦ ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις καὶ τοῖς συναλλάγμασι δικαιοπραγεῖν: cp. also Plut. De Defect. Orag. c. 24, εἰσίν οὖν ἐκτὸς ἔτεροι θεοὶ καὶ κόσμοι, πρὸς οὖς χρήται (ὁ θεός) ταῖς κοινωνίαις ἀρέταις οὐδὲ γὰρ πρὸς αὐτῶν οὐδὲ μέρος αὐτοῦ χρήσις ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνης ἢ χάριτος ἢ χρηστότητος, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄλλοις. That there is a close connexion between justice and the other virtues, we see from Aristot. Fragm. 75. 1488 b 5, ap. Plut. De Stoic. Repugn. c. 15, (ὁ Χρύσιππος εὖ τῷ γ ἐπὶ δικαιοσύνης . . .) Ἀριστοτέλει περὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀντιγράφων οὐ φησιν αὐτῶν ἀρθῶς λέγειν ὅτι, τῆς ἡδονῆς οὖν τέλους, ἀναρέεται μὲν ἡ δικαιοσύνη, συναρέεται δὲ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ἐκάστη, and from Plato, Laws 631 C, ἐκ δὲ τοῦτων (i.e. φρονίμεσοι καὶ σωφροσύνης) μετ' ἀνδρείας κραθεῖτων τριτῶν ἀν ἐν δικαιοσύνη.

40. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. Here, as Eaton points out, Aristotle has before him Plato, Gorg. 488 D.

42. λαμβανομένων. Cp. c. 10. 1281 a 17, πάντων ληφθέντων.

ἀρ' οὖν εἰ πάντες εἶν ἐν μιᾷ πόλει κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle perhaps has before him Plato, Gorg. 490 B, εἰών εὖ τῷ αὐτῷ δμεν, ὄσπερ νῦν, πόλει αὐρώς ἄνθρωποι κ.τ.λ. 'Ἀρ' οὖν is repeated in πάσας for the sake of clearness, the parenthetic sentence λέγω δὲ . . . πολιτικῶν having intervened: compare the way in which δῆλον ὅτι takes up δῆλον ὅσε in 1283 b 17 sqq. after an intervening hypothetical sentence.

1283 b. 2. οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ εὔγενεῖς. The article is omitted before εὔγενεῖς because the rich and noble are classed together in contradistinction to the good: cp. 1283 a 33, οἱ ἐλείθεροι καὶ εὔγενεῖς.

ἐτὶ δὲ πλῆθος ἄλλο τι πολιτικῶν, 'and further outside their ranks a mass composed of citizens.' Πολιτικῶν is added because there is such a thing as a non-citizen πλῆθος (4 7). 4. 1326 a 18, ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ εὖ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἵσως ὑπάρχειν καὶ δούλων ἀριθμῶν πολλῶν καὶ μετοίκων καὶ ξένων).

5. τοίς γὰρ κυρίοις διαφέρουσιν ἄλληλων, 'for it is just in respect of the supreme authority they constitute that they differ from each other' (Bernays).

6. τῷ δὲ διὰ πλουσίων. For the omission of the article, cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 24, οίον ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις ἐκ πεπαθημένων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλγαρχίαις ἐκ τῶν πλουσίων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἐκ τῶν ἐλευθέρων, and see note on 1310 a 6.

8. ἀλλ' ὃμως σκοπούμεν ὃταν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ταῦθ' ὑπάρχῃ χρόνον. These constitutions settle the matter in their own way, but still we persist in asking how it ought to be settled. Ταῦτα refers to οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ εἰγενεῖς, ἐτὶ δὲ πλῆθος ἀλλο τι πολιτικὸν: for the gender, see above on 1263 a 1.

9. εἰ δὴ...13. εἴς αὐτῶν. 'Well, if those who possess virtue are quite few in number, in what way should we determine the question? Or perhaps we should [not trouble about their number in itself, but] consider the expression "few" in relation to the work they have to do, [and ask] whether they are able to govern the State, or whether they are numerous enough to constitute a State?' Thurot (Études sur Aristote, p. 47) and Susemihl think that this paragraph should be transposed so as to precede εἰ δὲ τίς ἐστιν, 1284 a 3, but it seems to me to be in its right place. The discussion of the question just raised is introduced by δὴ, as often elsewhere (e.g. in c. 4. 1277 a 14-16 and c. 15. 1286 a 7 sqq.). Τίνα δὲ διελεύν τρόπον, 10, takes up πῶς διοριστέων, 9. Aristotle's first impulse is to challenge the claims of the good to rule on the score of the smallness of their number, as he has already done in c. 10. 1281 a 28 sqq. But he drops this ground of attack, probably because he feels that paucity is no bar to a claim to rule. Even a single individual may have a just claim to rule, if his virtue is transcendent. Hence he passes on in 13 sqq. to deal with another objection, the discussion of which brings out this fact. The claims of the good have a weak point which they share with those of the rich and noble. Just as the claims of the rich and noble to rule may be defeated by those of one man who is richer or nobler than all the rest, so the claims of the good may be defeated by those of one man who is better than all the rest. And the claims of the Many may be defeated in a similar way. If this superiority of One Man or of a Few not numerous enough to constitute a State is overwhelming, the fact that they are not numerous enough for
this must not stand in the way of our giving him or them supreme authority.

16. οἱ κατὰ γένος, i. e. οἱ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ εὐγένεις.

δήλων γὰρ κ. τ. λ. 'Aliquoties enunciatio per ὡς introducta per ὅτι continuatur, e.g. in Phys. 6. 2. 233 a 13 sqq.: I. 7. 190 b 17 sqq.: 8. 7. 260 a 23 sqq.' (Bon. Ind. 872 a 1). For the repetition of δήλων, see vol. ii. p. li, note 6. For the thought, cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 22 sqq.

Eis πλουσιότερος ἀπάντων seems to have been almost a proverbial expression: see Plut. Solon, c. 14, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν διὰ μέσου πολιτῶν, τὴν ὑπὸ λόγου καὶ νόμου μεταβολὴν ὀρῶντες ἐργάδη καὶ χαλεπὴν οὖσαν, οὐκ ἔφευγον ἐν τῷ δικαιώτατον καὶ φρονιμίωτατον ἐπιστήσατο τοῖς πράγμασιν: Plut. De Cupid. Divit. c. 7, ἦ, καθάπερ λέγουσιν, εἰς ὁ πονηρότατον ἐν τῷ γίνετε γενέμενος καταφάγῃ τὰ πάντων. In Pausan. 7. 12. 1 we read βεβαιῶ θῇ τὸ λεγόμενον, ὡς ἂρ ἢ καὶ πῦρ ἐς πλέον ἄλλου πυρὸς καίων, καὶ λύκος ἄγριότερος λύκου ἄλλων, καὶ ὄκυτερος ίδρας ἴδρακος πέτεσθαι.

17. κατὰ τὸ αὖτὸ δίκαιον. Cp. c. 17. 1288 a 19 sqq.

18. For the juxtaposition of τὸν ἔνα καὶ ἀπάντων, see notes on 1281 a 13 and 1285 a 3.

23. οὐκοῦν κ. τ. λ., 'therefore if the Many also really ought to be supreme because they are stronger' (κρείττονες, not ἄμελοι) 'than the Few.' Cp. 1283 a 40 sqq. Aristotle has before him Plato, Gorg. 489 E sqq. (Eaton). For ei ... γε, cp. Plato, Rep. 433 C, ei δέοι γε κρύαι.

27. πάντα δὴ ταύτα κ. τ. λ. 'Ὀροι are here 'criteria,' such as wealth or virtue, on the strength of which men claim political supremacy. Plato had already used the expression ὀρθὸς ὄρος in Polit. 293 C, ταύτῃ θήσομεν, ὡς ὁμι, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλῃ, τούτον ὄρον ὄρθων εἶναι μοῦνα ἀτρικῆς καὶ ἄλλης ἡττωσοῦν ὄρχης. Aristotle's conclusion is not convincing. It does not follow that a claim is bad because it does not hold under all circumstances.

30. καὶ γὰρ δή, 'for surely.'

31. For κυρίοις τοῦ πολιτεύματος, an expression which does not, I think, occur elsewhere in the Politics, cp. Diod. 15. 45. 2, τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς Δακεδαμονίας ἐπιστατὰς κυρίοις γεγονότε οὐ τοῦ πολιτεύματος.

32. ἔχοτεν ἄν is in the plural, though τὰ πλήθη is neuter, possibly because Aristotle is thinking of the individuals of whom τὰ πλήθη are composed (cp. 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 2, ἐφ' αἷς τὰ πλήθη χαλεπαίνουσιν). He often, however, uses a plural verb with a neut. plur. nominative, even where this explanation does not hold good: see Waitz on Anal. Pr. 2. 26. 69 b 3, and Bonitz on Metaph. Λ. 4. 985 a 27.
3. 13. 1283 b 16—40.

τὰ πλήθη, as in 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 2 and Diod. 9. 24. 2, οὐ μὴν τὰ πλήθη κατεπλάγη αὐτοῦ τὴν βαρύτητα: so also in Plato, Gorg. 452 E and Soph. 268 B (Liddell and Scott).

35. ἄθροίους, not άθρόνοι: cp. 1. 2. 1252 b 14, οἶκος . . . ὅς κ.τ.λ.
dio καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπορίαν κ.τ.λ. Καὶ appears to mean that we are not only led to the conclusion stated in 27 sqq., but are enabled to solve an ἀπορία which is raised by some persons. Τοῦτων τῶν τρόπων, ‘ on this basis,’ i.e. on the basis of a recognition of the claims both of the Better and of the Many. Who were the persons who raised this ἀπορία? It is difficult to say, though some approach is made to the question by the disputants in Plato, Gorg. 488 B sqq.: cp. also 483 B, ἀλλ’, οἷς, οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους οἱ ἀθηναῖοι ἀνθρωποὶ εἰσι καὶ οἱ πολλοί: πρὸς αὐτούς οὐ καί τὸ αὐτοῖς συμφέρον τοὺς τε νόμους τίθενται καὶ τοὺς ἐπαύομαι ἐπαινοῦσι κ.τ.λ., and Laws 757 D. Andocides says in c. Alcib. c. 6, καίτοι τάτα διέγραφαται ἄριστα τῶν δογμάτων, ἄ κα τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ τοῖς ὅλοις ἀρμόττοιται μᾶλιστα τυχάνει καὶ πλείστους ἐπαινούμεθα ἔχει.

38. τίθεσθαι. We expect rather τίθεναι (Harpocr. s. v. θέσθαι, ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν νόμων λέγεται ὡς ἔθηκε μὲν ὁ νομοθέτης, ἔθετο δὲ ὁ δήμος). So we have ἐτίθησα νόμον in 2. 8. 1268 a 6: cp. 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 36.

39. ὅταν συμβαίνῃ τὸ λεγθέν, i.e. when the Many taken collectively are better than the Few. The contrary case is dealt with in 1284 a 3, εἰ δὲ τίς ἐστών εἰς κ.τ.λ. Bern. and Sus. take ὅταν συμβαίνῃ τὸ λεγθέν with ἐνδέχεται ἀπαντάν, thus making the sentence ἀποροῦσι, 36 . . . πλείστων, 39, parenthetical, but the length of the parenthesis by which on this view these words are parted from the words which they qualify makes against this interpretation, and it seems preferable to take them, as Bekker and others do, with ἀποροῦσι γὰρ τινες κ.τ.λ.

40. τὸ δ’ ὅρθων ληπτέον ἵσως, ‘but [the advantage of neither is to be studied exclusively, for] we must determine that which is correct and normal in a fair and equal fashion.’ For ληπτέον, cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 a 36, τὸ δ’ ἐπὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὕς οὕτω ληπτέον. ‘Omnino λαμβάνειν est animo concipere, ita quidem ut modo investigandi (Waitz ad Anal. Post. 1. 4. 73 a 24), modo inveniendi cognoscendi definiendi intelligendi vim habeat’ (Bon. Ind. 422 b 38). ἰσως is used in the sense of ‘equally’ in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 22, κληρωτοῦς ἰσως ἐκ τῶν μαρίων.

NOTES.

1. 25. 85, omnino qui rei publicae praeputi sunt duo Platonis praecepta teneant: unum, ut utilitatem civium sic tueantur, ut quaecumque agunt ad eam referant oblitii commodorum suorum; alterum, ut totum corpus rei publicae curent, ne, dum partem aliquam tuentur, reliquas deserant. Cicero perhaps refers to Plato, Rep. 420 B. Solon claimed that he had endeavoured to be fair both to the Few and to the Many (Fragm. 5).

42. πολίτης δὲ κ.τ.λ. For the absence of the article, see note on 1276 b 28. Compare with the form of the sentence which commences here 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 7, ταύτην μέντοι τὴν ἱδιον υικέτι τὴν αὐτὴν τιθέασιν, ἄλλα καθ’ ἑαυτοῦ ἔκαστος καὶ τὴν ἐξήν τὴν αὐτῶν, ὥ δὲ ἄριστος τὴν ἄριστην καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν καλλίστων. The statement that the citizen in general is he who shares in ruling and being ruled is based on c. 4: in c. 1, on the other hand, the citizen is defined as οὗ ἔξουσία κοινωνεῖν ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς ἡ κριτικῆς.

1284 a. 1. πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἄριστην, 'and to suit the best': cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 11, δεξιοτείται μὲν ὄν τὸ βουλευόμενον πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας τούτον τὸν πρόσων. Aristotle takes it for granted here that the citizens of the 'best State' will both rule and be ruled, and thus anticipates the conclusion at which he arrives after a discussion in 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 12 sqq.

3. τῶν βίων τὸν κατ’ ἄρετην. For virtue is the main source of 'the most desirable life,' which the citizens of the best State are said to live in 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 14 sqq. Cp. also 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 30 sqq. εἰ δὲ τίς ἐστιν εἰς κ.τ.λ. - This sentence is closely connected with what precedes; it deals with the contrary case to that supposed in ἢ τῶν συμβαίνῃ τὸ λεγθεῖν, 1283 b 39. The sense is, 'but if there is one man or a few of transcendent virtue, we must not treat them as citizens on a level with the rest, or expect them to be content with ruling and being ruled; their part is to rule.' To insert 1283 b 9-13 between πρὸς τῶν βίων τὸν κατ’ ἄρετην and εἰ δὲ τίς ἐστιν εἰς κ.τ.λ., as Sus. does, is to destroy the connexion. Aristotle probably has before him Plato, Rep. 540 D, ἢ τῶν οἱ ὄν ἄληθῶς φιλόσοφοι διωκότα ἡ πλείους ἡ εἰς κ.τ.λ.

4. μὴ μέντοι δυνατοὶ πληρωμὰ παρασχέσθαι πόλεως. These words are added because Aristotle is now dealing only with the case in which the Good exist in the same community with those possessing other attributes essential to the State (cp. 1283 a 42 sqq.). If the Good are numerous enough themselves to constitute a State, as in
the case of the State sketched in the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books, then the State will consist of equals, and they may each of them be treated as part of it and subjected to law.

6. τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν τὴν πολιτικὴν. Translate (with Bern. and Sus.) here and in io, 'their political capacity,' and τὴν δυνάμει, 13, 'in capacity.' So Plut. Cic. c. 4, ἀνέκινη τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν. Sepulveda explains, 'facultatem civilem vocat quicquid opis in homine est quod faciat ad civilem societatem iuvandam tuendamque, sive administrandam.' Δύναμις πολιτική answers to δυνάμεος, 2, as ἀρετῆι answers to προοράμεος. For the distinction implied between virtue and political capacity, cp. 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 33 sqq., where virtue is distinguished from δύναμις τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἀρχῆς, and 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 10 sqq., where it is distinguished from δύναμις ἡ πρακτικῆ τῶν ἀριστῶν. Δυνάμει is used in a different sense, that of 'political influence,' in 20, and πολιτικὴ δύναμις often bears this sense (e.g. in Eih. Nic. 1. 9. 1099 a 33 sqq. and Plato, Rep. 473 D), but not, I think, here.

8. ὀυκέτι θετέον τούτους μέρος πόλεως, i.e. we must not treat them as mere fellow-citizens of the rest (cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 20), and expect them to take their turn with the rest of ruling and being ruled. Men of this transcendent excellence stand to their inferiors as a whole stands to its part (3. 17. 1288 a 26 sqq.).

9. διδικῆονται γὰρ ἀξιόμενοι τῶν ὦσών. Τῶν ὦσών refers to 1283 b 40, τὸ δ’ ὄρθων ληπτέον ὦσω. ‘Classic authorities always use the future middle διδικῆομαι as passive in place of διδικῆσομαι’ (Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective s.v.).

10. ὡσπερ γὰρ κ.π.λ. Θεοὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπους stands in tacit contrast to θεῶν ἐν θεοῖς. A god among men is in a position of transcendent superiority not enjoyed by a god among gods. For the meaning of θεῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις, cp. Plut. Alex. c. 51, "οὐ δοκοῦσιν," εἶπεν, "ὡς ὁ άλλος ἐν τῶν Μακεδόνων ὡσπερ ἐν δηρίοις ἡμῖν ἐφιπτοννον," Θεοὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις was a proverbial expression: cp. Theogn. 339,

χούτος δὲν δοκεώμεν μετ’ ἀνθρώπους θεῶν εἶναι, 
εἰ μ’ ἀποτησάμενον μοιρὰ κῆνός ἥπατον,
and (with Crusius, Untersuchungen zu den Mimiamben des Herondas, p. 3) Antiphanes, Τριστασιοτής (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 121),

θεῶς ἐν ἀνθρώπουσιν ἢν ἑκείνοις, εἰδὼς τὴν ἀληθος μουσικήν.

See Crusius ibid. Cp. also Plato, Rep. 360 C.

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11. οὖν, because treating them as part of a State involves injustice.

12. καὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν, 'legislation no less than treating men as part of a State.' Aristotle still has the lawgiver in view whom he has imagined in 1283 b 36 sqq., and is still advising him as to the course he should adopt. If men of the type described exist in the State, he must abstain from meddling with them; he must not attempt to fetter them by legislation.

tοὺς ἰσοὺς καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, 'equals both in race and in capacity.' Gods are superior to men in both these respects: as to kings, cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 12. Proportional equals are no doubt included under τοὺς ἰσοὺς: we may infer this from Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 a 26, τούτο δὲ (i. e. τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον) ἐστιν ἐπὶ κοινωνίᾳ βιῶν πρῶς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ ἰσων ἡ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἡ κατ' ἀριθμόν: ὅστε ὅσοι μὴ ἐστὶν τούτο, οὐκ ἐστι τούτου πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ τι δίκαιων καὶ καθ' ἀρμοδίτητα ἐστὶ γὰρ δίκαιων οἶς καὶ νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς. Contrast with this view of law as existing only between equals or proportionate equals the Stoical view set forth by Cicero in De Legibus i. 7. 23, est igitur, quoniam nihil est ratione melius estque et in homine et in deo, prima homini cum deo rationis societas. Inter quos autem ratio, inter eosdem etiam recta ratio est communis. Quae cum sit lex, lege quoque consociati homines cum dis putandi sumus. Inter quos porro est communio legis, inter eos communio iuris est.

13. κατὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστι νόμος. This expression recurs in St. Paul, Galat. v. 22–23, ὁ δὲ καρπὸς τοῦ Πνεύματος ἐστιν ἀγάπη χαρᾶ εἰρήνη. . . κατὰ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστι νόμος, where the meaning of κατὰ is no doubt 'against,' but of κατὰ in the passage before us among others Bonitz says (Ind. 368 a 34), 'saepissime per κατὰ τινος ea res significatur de qua aliquid dicitur vel cogitatur.' See for instance 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 2, ὅπερ εἰρήνη ἐν τοῖς πρότερον καθόλου κατὰ πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν. Still Aristotle may remember here the expression of Callicles in Plato, Gorg. 488 D, where he says of the Many, οἱ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νόμους τίθενται ἐπὶ τῷ ἐν, and κατὰ may be used (and not περι, as in περὶ τοὺς ἰσοὺς, 12) because unfavourable laws are especially thought of, laws, for instance, enforcing on the persons referred to an equality of rights (cp. κατ’ αὐτῶν, 15). I incline to think that 'against' is nearer to the meaning of κατὰ here than 'concerning.' Bern. Sus. and Welldon translate in a more neutral fashion 'for.'
14. αὐτῶ γὰρ εἰσὶ νόμοι. Σφ. c. 17. 1288 a 2, οὔτε μὴ νόμων ὄντων, ἀλλ' αὐτῶν ὃς ὤντα νόμοι. This is as much as to say that they are Absolute Kings. The Persian King was a law to the Persians (Plut. Artox. c. 23, χάρινες εὖσαντα δόξας Ἑλληνῶν καὶ νόμους, Πέρας δὲ νόμον αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ δικαιωτὸν αἰσχρῶν καὶ καλῶν ἀποδεδειγμένου. This explains the exclamation of Anaxarchus to Alexander, when the latter had murdered Cleitus and was lying speechless from remorse, οὐτὸς ἄτρος Ἀλέξανδρος, εἰς ὃν ἡ οἰκουμένη νῦν ἀποβλέπει' ὁ δὲ ἔρριστα κλαίων ὡσπερ ἀνθράποδων ἀνθρώπων νόμον καὶ ψόγων δεδοκικός, οἰς αὐτῶν προσήκει νόμος εἶναι καὶ ὄρον τῶν δικαίων (Plut. Alex. c. 52). So Xenophon (Cyrop. 8. 1. 22) says of his Cyrus, τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἀρχοντα βλέποντα νόμον ἀνθρώπους ἐνόμισεν, ὅτι καὶ τάττεν Ικάνος ἐστι καὶ ὅραν τὸν ἀτακτοῦντα καὶ καλλίζειν. It was claimed in Justinian's time that to the power of the Roman Emperor αὐτοῦ ὁ θεὸς τοὺς νόμους ὑποτέθηκε, νόμον αὐτὴν ἐξηνχυον καταπέμψας ἀνθρώποις (Nov. 105. c. 4, quoted by Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 2. 713. 2, ed. 1).

15. λέγοιεν γὰρ ἄν κ.τ.λ. Coray remarks on this passage, "ἐντευθέν ὁ μόνος, ἡ μᾶλλον τὸ μίσθον λείψανον τοῦτο, προσετέθη τῇ Συναγωγῇ τῶν Αἰσχυνείων μίσθων" (Μύθ. 347 εἰς ἐκθέσεως)." See Fabulae Aesopicae, ed. Halm, Fab. 241, The lions asked the hares, 'Where are your claws and teeth?' (Camerarius, Interp. p. 132). Cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 b 4, δὲ γὰρ ἱπποῦς τὸ ἱσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οἱ ήττον, οἱ δὲ κρατοῦντες οὐδὲν φροντιζοῦν, and the words of Callicles in Plato, Gorg. 483 ε, πλάτυντες τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἐρρωμενεστάτους ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες, ὡσπερ λέοντας κατεπάθοντες τε καὶ γοητεύοντες, καταδολοῦμεθα λέγοντες, ὡς τὸ ἱσον χρῆ ἐχει καὶ τοῦτο ἐστι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. Cp. also Philemon, Inc. Fab. Fragm. 3 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 32), ἀπαντες οἱ λέοντες εἰσὶν ἄλκαμοι, δειλοὶ πάλιν ἐξῆς σάντες εἰσὶν οἱ λαγοί. Antisthenes may have related the fable here alluded to in his 'Cyrus, or on Kingship," a work mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, 6. 16. Had he before him a version of the fable of the Lion and the Wild Ass (Babrius, Fab. 67) in which lions and hares joined in hunting and fell into a dispute as to the division of the spoil? Compare the fragment of the lyric poet Cydias preserved by Plato, Charmides 155 δ, ἐνόμισα σοφότατον εἶναι τὸν Κυδίαν τὰ ἐρωτικά, ὃς εἶπεν ἐπί καλοῦ λέγων παιδός, ἄλλα ὑποτθέμενοι, εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ κατέναντα λέοντος νεβρῶν ἐλθόντα μοίραν αἱρέσθαι κρέων' αὐτὸς γὰρ μοι ἐθάκον ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιοῦτον θρέματος ἐκλεικέναι. See Bergk on Cydias, Fragm. 1.
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17. διὸ καὶ τίθενται κ.τ.λ., 'hence' (i.e. from a sense of the immense superiority of certain men) 'States democratically constituted also institute the ostracism [in addition to adopting other democratic measures] for the reason which has been mentioned' (i.e. because they feel that these men are too superior to the rest to be treated as equals). It appears indeed later on (35) that oligarchies also got rid of over-powerful individuals, and in a less humane way than democracies, for they exiled them and put them to death. The democratically constituted States referred to include (in addition to Athens) Argos (7 (5). 3. 1302 b 18), Miletus, and Megara (Schol. Aristoph. Eq. 855). At Syracuse the ostracism was for a time represented by the petalism, which, it may be noted, would seem to have been introduced when the constitution of Syracuse was not a democracy, but what Aristotle variously terms an ἀριστοκρατία (7 (5). 10. 1312 b 8) or a πολιτεία (7 (5). 4. 1304 a 27 sqq.). The account given in the passage before us of the object of the ostracism resembles that given in 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 15 sqq. and (in substance) the more detailed account given in Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 22, and it is probably correct. It is accepted by Schömann, Gr. Alt. 1. 188 sqq. and by Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 151 sqq., though Grote (Hist. of Greece, 3. 197 sq.) and Susemihl (Sus. Note 603: Sus.4, i. p. 415) conceive the object of the ostracism to have been to put an end to dangerous rivalries between two leading statesmen by removing one of them beyond the limits of the State. Aristotle's account of its object receives confirmation from Thuc. 8. 73. 3, from Philochorus, Fragm. 79 b (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 1. 396), and from Diod. ii. 55 and 19. 1 (compare Diodorus' account of the object of petalism, ii. 86. 5–87. 2). See also Plut. Aristid. c. 1, Pericl. c. 7, and Themist. c. 22. At Athens, however, and probably elsewhere (cp. 1284 b 20, τὰς πόλεις), the ostracism ceased after a time to be used for the object for which it was instituted and was perverted into an instrument of faction (στασιαστικῶς, 22). Aristides was not ostracized because he was disproportionately powerful, but because he was an opponent of whom Themistocles wished to be rid. Damon the musician was not ostracized because he was dangerous to the State, but because he was a friend of Pericles. Aristotle regards the original object of the ostracism as not wholly illegitimate. He would indeed prefer that the constitution and the laws should be so framed as to prevent the rise within
the State of any disproportionately powerful person (7 (5). 3. 1302 b 18 sqq.: 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 10–18)—with this end in view he would avoid creating great offices held for long terms (7 (5). 8. 1308 a 18 sqq., b 10 sqq.: cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 20 sqq.), and would seek to equalize property (2. 7. 1266 b 14 sqq.: 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 23 sqq.) and to increase the number of the moderately well-to-do (6 (4). 11. 1296 a 1–5)—but, if measures of this kind should fail of their object, he recommends (7 (5). 8. 1308 b 19) that any sentence of removal inflicted on disproportionately powerful men shall be a sentence of removal beyond the limits of the State, in other words he recommends something very like the ostracism. That both the petalism and the ostracism had the evil effect of discouraging the participation of the more distinguished citizens in political life, we see from Diod. 11. 87. 3 sqq. and from Plutarch’s Life of Pericles (c. 7). If there is any truth in Plutarch’s view that in choosing the side of the Many Pericles was influenced to some extent by a dread of the ostracism, the institution gave a decisive turn at that moment to the constitutional development of Athens.

19. αὐταὶ γὰρ δὴ κ.π.λ., ‘for these, I suppose, are thought to pursue equality more than anything else’: cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 34 sq. and 8 (6). 2. 1318 a 3 sqq. Aristotle says ‘are thought,’ because democracies pursue only one kind of equality, arithmetical equality, and lose sight of equality based on desert (7 (5). 1. 1301 b 29 sqq.). ‘Even now one discovers a tendency in the United States, particularly in the West, to dislike, possibly to resent, any outward manifestation of social superiority. A man would be ill looked upon who should build a castle in a park, surround his pleasure-grounds with a high wall, and receive an exclusive society in gilded saloons’ (Bryce, American Commonwealth, 3. 315).

20. διὰ πλούτον ἢ πολυφιλίαν ἢ τινα ἄλλην πολιτικὴν ἱσχὺν. Cp. Soph. O. T. 540,

δὴ οὖχι μῶρόν ἐστι τούχαληρμα σου,

ἀνευ τε πλῆθους καὶ φίλων τυραννίδα

θηράν, ὃ πλῆθει χρήμασιν θ’ ἀλισκεται;

Plato, Rep. 434 B, ἔπειτα ἐπαιρόμενος ἢ πλούτος ἢ πλῆθει ἢ ἱσχύς ἢ ἄλλῳ τῷ ποιοτῷ εἰς τὸ τοῦ πολεμικοῦ έδώς ἐπιχειρή λέω: Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 13, οἱ μὲν ἐν ἑπεροχαῖς εἰπεχημάτων ἄντες, ἱσχύος καὶ πλούτου καὶ φίλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων. That the possessor of these advantages was not unlikely to be ostracized, we see from what is said of Pericles in Plut. Pericl. c. 7, πλούτου δὲ καὶ γένους προσάντοσ αὐτῷ
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We learn what Aristotle means by *tina állon politikín ísoú* from Plut. Aristid. c. i, τῷ δ’ ὀστράκῳ πάς ὁ διὰ δόξαν ἢ γίνοις ἢ λόγου δύναμιν ὑπέρ τοῦ πολλοῦ νομιζόμενον ὑπέπιστευ, though he may perhaps hint that even virtue, as in the case of Aristides, was a cause of ostracism at Athens.

21. *μεθώτασαν*, the technical word used in cases of ostracism: cp. Philoch. Fragm. 79 b (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. i. 396), τούτων ἐδει... ἐν δέκα ἡμέραις μεταστήναι τῆς πόλεως ἐτη δέκα: Diod. ii. 55. i: [Demosth.] c. Aristog. 2. 6. The same word is used of the banishment of involuntary homicides (Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 45, τῶν ἐπ’ ἀκούσιφ φῶν λέγει μεθεσθηκόντων). It is used in contrast to φυγαδεύειν and is a milder term than even ἐκβάλλειν.

22. *χρόνους ὁρισμένους*. Cp. c. i. 14. 1285 a 34 and 4 (7). 16. 1335 a 27. Ten years, or, according to Philoch. Fragm. 79 b, originally ten, and afterwards five. Diodorus (i. 55. 2) makes the term five years. In the petalism it was five (Diod. ii. 87. i). A temporary absence from the State would not indeed make the ostracized person less wealthy or less well-born, but it would sever him from his friends and followers, and so tend to diminish his influence.

*μυθολογεῖται δὲ κ.τ.λ.* See Sus.², Note 604 (Sus.⁴, i. p. 416), who refers to Pherecydes of Leros, Fragm. 67 (ap. Schol. Apollon. i. 1290: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 88), Ἀντίμαχος ἐν τῇ Λύδῃ φησίν ἐκθεισθέντα τῶν Ἡρακλέω διὰ τὸ καταβαρέσθαι τὴν Ἀργῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἤρωος. Τούτῳ καὶ Ποσειδίππος ὁ ἐπιγραμματογράφος ἱκολούθησε καὶ Φερεκίδης, and Apollodor. Bibliol. i. 9. 19, Φερεκίδης αὐτῶν ἐν Ἐλέαταις τῆς Θησσαλίας ἄπολεψις ἀρίστη λέγει, τῆς Ἀργοῦς φθεγματικῆς μὴ δύνασθαι φέρει τὸ τούτον βάρος. See also Prof. Robinson Ellis' note on Catullus 64. 23, where the expression 'mater' probably refers to the Argo—'the idea is not unnatural in itself and agrees with the recurring representations of the Argo as an animate being ('Ἀργῷ a proper name, like Eidô, Hypso, Aphro, Brimo, Ioulo), possessed of voice and reason and in part divine. Philo Iud. vol. ii. p. 468 (quoted by Nauck, Fr. Aesch. 20), οὗτος ἡ Ἀργῷ ναυαρχοῦς ὕδασον ἐπέτρεψεν ἐπιβαίνειν οἰκέταις μεμιαραμένη καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ λογισμοῦ, φύσις οὕσα φιλελεύθερος ὢν καὶ Δίκυλος ἐπ’ αὐτῆς εἶπε: Πού δ’ ἐστίν Ἀργοὺς ἰερὸν ἄδασσον (rather ἄδδασον) ξύλον; Apollod. i. 9. 19’ (quoted above), 'cf. i. 9. 24, places which all seem to refer to the piece of speaking timber (ἄδδην δόρυ) which Athene built into the cut-water, and which
Apollonius describes as urging the start from Pagasae (i. 525) and warning the Argonauts to expiate the murder of Absyrtus by a visit to Circe (iv. 580 sqq.).


26. *διὸ κ.τ.λ. Καὶ τοὺς ψέγουτας*, 'among others those who blame.' *In τοὺς ψέγουτας κ.τ.λ.* Aristotle probably refers to Sosicles the Corinthian and the speech which he is represented in Hdt. 5. 92 to have addressed to the representatives of the Lacedaemonians and their allies gathered in council, in which, while recounting the misdeeds of the tyrants of Corinth, he dwelt especially on the hint given by Thrasybulus tyrant of Miletus to Periander tyrant of Corinth to get rid of the men who overtopped the rest. Compare Eurip. Suppl. 433 Bothe, 447 Dindorf,

> τῶς οὖν ἐτ' ἄν γένοιτ' ἄν ἵσχυρα πόλις,  
> ὅταν τις, ὡς λειμώνος ἤρινον στάχυν,  
> τὰλμας ἄφαιρῇ κατολωτίζῃ νέους;

Herodotus, as has been said, makes Thrasybulus give the hint to Periander, whereas Aristotle here makes Periander give the hint to Thrasybulus, but any one who compares the two narratives will see that the story as told by Aristotle is a shortened version of that of Herodotus. How then are we to account for the inversion in it of the parts played by Periander and Thrasybulus? We have already noticed other instances in which a slight divergence from a narrative of Herodotus is observable (see above on 1262 a 19 and 1276 a 28), and the same thing occurs again in 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 17 sq. Aristotle's memory may have betrayed him, as it did in the mention of Hector in Eth. Nic. 3. 11. 1116 a 33 (see below on 1285 a 12) and of Calypso in Eth. Nic. 2. 9. 1109 a 31, where Hom. Odys. 12. 219 is referred to, but, if this was so, the slip must have been something more than a mere momentary one, for it recurs in 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 20. It is natural that Aristotle should credit Periander with the advice, for he believed that many of the traditional maxims of tyranny came originally from Periander (7 (5). 11. 1313 a 36). We notice that Herodotus, a Greek of Asia Minor, ascribes the famous hint to a tyrant of Miletus, while Aristotle, a Greek of Europe, ascribes it to a tyrant of Corinth. For the dative ὑπενθεύοντος dependent on the substantive συμβουλίαν, cp. De Part. An. 2. 17. 660 a 35, καὶ χρόνων τῇ
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γλώστη καὶ πρὸς ἑρμηνεύαν ἀλλήλοις, καὶ ἴνθ, καὶ see Bon. Ind. 166 a 61 sqq. In 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 20 we have τὸ Περιάνθρου πρὸς Θερσίβουλον αὐθεντεύειμα.

28. τὸν πεμβόλν τήρικα περὶ τῆς συμβουλίας. For the order of these words, cp. 1284 b 8, τὸν ὄπερβάλλοντα πόδα τῆς συμμετρίας, and c. 12. 1282 b 31, τῶν ὀρηεύων ἀὐλητῶν τῆν τέχνην, and see Vahlen on Ποικ. 15. 1454 b 16, τὰς ἀκολούθουσας αἰσθήσεις τῇ ποιητικῇ.

30. ὠμαλώναι. Ὀμαλώνει is a rare word, but it is used by Plato in Tim. 45 E.

35. καὶ περὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τὰς δημοκρατίας. In sentences of this kind the preposition is usually repeated in the Politics before the second substantive (e.g. in 1. 8. 1256 b 17 we have καὶ δίὰ τὴν χρῆσιν καὶ διὰ τὴν προφήτη), and this is so whether ‘both . . . and’ is expressed by καὶ . . . καὶ or by τε . . . καὶ, but sometimes the preposition is not thus repeated (e.g. in the passage before us and in 38: in 2. 12. 1274 b 24: 3. II. 1281 b 33: 4 (7). 7. 1328 a 20: 5 (8). 7. 1341 b 19: 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 29 and b 25 sq.: see also critical note on 1330 b 31). I have not noticed that the preposition is similarly omitted in the Politics when ἦ . . . ἦ, οὔτε . . . οὔτε (οὐ μήτε . . . μήτε), ἐίτε . . . ἐίτε, or πόστερον . . . ἦ are used, except that in 3. 1. 1275 b 17 M* P omit the second περὶ in ἦ περὶ πάντων ἦ περὶ τινῶν.

37. τρόπον τινά. See above on 1255 a 13.


39. οἱ άθηναῖοι μὲν κ.τ.λ. It is clear from this that the Samians, Chians, and Lesbians were the most powerful States of the Athenian alliance. They had been the leaders in the transfer of the headship of the maritime league against Persia from the Lacedaemonians to Athens (Plut. Aristid. c. 23). Miletus was no longer their equal. We read in Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 24, πεοβόντες δὲ ταύτα καὶ λαβόντες τὴν ἀρχήν (οἳ 'Αθηναίοι) τότε τε συμμάχους δεσποτικοτέρους ἧχόντα πλὴν Χιόν καὶ Δεσβίων καὶ Σαμίων τούτους δὲ φύλακας εἰχον τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἐδώσες τὰς τε πολιτείας παρ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀρχεῖν δὲν ἐν τυχών ἀρχοντες. This remark is obviously not true of the period subsequent to the revolt and subjugation of Samos in B. C. 440, and it probably refers to the Athenian Confederacy in its earlier days before it was converted into an Empire. If we understand it thus, it is not inconsistent with the passage before us. But it is not easy to say what were the infractions of treaties to which Aristotle
alludes. He appears to refer to humiliations inflicted by Athens on Samos, Chios, and Lesbos at a comparatively early period of her ascendancy, 'as soon as she had taken a firm grip of her rule.' He can hardly refer, therefore, to humiliations which followed the suppression of revolts, for Samos did not revolt till B.C. 440, nor Mytilene till B.C. 428, nor Chios till B.C. 412. Besides, he seems to be speaking not of humiliations brought about by disloyalty on the part of these States, but of humiliations prompted by Athenian jealousy of their greatness. Athens may have prohibited wars between one of these States and other members of her alliance (see the speech of Hermocrates in Thuc. 6. 76)—it was a prohibition of this kind that led to the revolt of Samos (Thuc. i. 115) —or demanded the removal of fortifications (compare the case of Chios in B.C. 425, Thuc. 4. 51), or meddled with their territory (as in the case of Thasos, Thuc. i. 100). No doubt, the Mytilenean envoys in Thuc. 3. 9 sqq. (see Grote, Hist. of Greece, 6. 309), speaking in B.C. 428, do not charge Athens with any infractions of treaties; on the contrary, they speak of their State having been 'honoured' by Athens, and ascribe their revolt to fear of ultimate subjugation, not to actual wrongs inflicted on Lesbos in the past. Still Plutarch implies in Aristid. c. 25 (where he perhaps follows the same authority as Aristotle does in the passage before us, for he uses the words, ὤστερον δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων ἄρχειν ἐγκρατεύστερον, ὡς ἔκακεν, ἐκβαζόμενον, cp. Thuc. i. 76. 1) that Athens was guilty of infractions in her relations with her dependent allies, and it is likely enough that Samos, Chios, and Lesbos did not escape. That a time did come when Athens changed her original easy-going headship into a firm imperial control, we see from Thuc. 6. 76 and Diod. ii. 70. Diodorus (who may here represent Ephorus, a witness likely to be favourable to the dependent allies, as he belonged to the Aeolic Cyme) dates the commencement of this change from the time when Athens became aware that the Lacedaemonians had abandoned all thought of attempting to regain the headship of the maritime league by war. This happened as early as B.C. 475, if Diodorus' chronology is to be trusted (Diod. ii. 50. 8).

41. Ὅ δὲ Περσῶν βασιλεὺς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably refers not only to severities inflicted by the Persians on the Medes, Babylonians, and others after the suppression of revolts (see as to Babylon Hdt. i. 183 and 3. 159 and Arrian, Anab. 3. 16. 4 and
7. 17. 2), but also and more especially to induced evidences of distrust like that mentioned in Diod. 11. 6. 3, τὴν δὲ δύναμιν ἀναλαβὸν (ὁ Σεβίρης) ἦκεν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐν Θερμοπολίαις Ἑλλήνας προτάσας ἀπάντων τῶν ἐθνῶν Μῖδος, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀνθρεῖαν προκύπται αὐτῶν ἐστε καὶ βουλόμενος ἀπαντᾶς ἀπολέσαι εἰνή γὰρ ἔτι φρόνημα τοῖς Μῖδοις, τῆς τῶν προγόνων ἡγεμονίας οὐ πάλαι καταπεπονημένης: cp. Xen. Cyrog. 7. 5. 69, μυσθὸν δὲ καὶ τοίτους (i. e. τοῖς φρουροῖς) Βαβυλώνιον ἠταξεν (ὁ Κύρος) παρέχειν, βουλόμενος αὐτῶν ὡς ἀμηχανώτατος εἶναι, ὡς ὅτι ταπεινώτατοι καὶ εἰκαθεκτότατοι εἶναι. Egypt is probably referred to in τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς πεφρονηματισμένους διὰ τὸ γενέσθαι ποτ' ἐπ' ἄρχης: cp. Diod. 17. 49, οἱ γὰρ Αὐγούστοι, τῶν Περσῶν ἀνεβηκότων εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ καὶ βιαῖοι ἀρχάριον, ἀσμένοι προσεδέξαντο τοὺς Μακεδόνας. Compare Plato's picture of Persian rule in Laws 697 D, which explains Alexander's triumph.

1284 b. 2. πεφρονηματισμένοις. 'A word occurring in the Politics alone of Aristotle's writings, but not very uncommon there, is προφυλακί-ζωσι. It occurs later in Polybius and is certainly un-Attic. It is entirely absent from the 'Αθ. Πολ., where ἄρρητος takes its place' (Kaibel, Stil und Text der Politieia 'Athnaios des Aristoteles, p. 37).

επέκοπτε. 'Επικόπτω is a rare word; the passage before us is, so far as I know, the earliest prose passage in which it occurs. It is a technical term of arboriculture, to 'lop' or 'pollard' (Theophr. Caus. Plant. 5. 17. 3, περὶ δὲ τῆς ἐπικοπῆς καὶ τῆς κολούσεως ἐν ὁλίγω ἢ σκέψις ... καλοῦσι δ' ἐπικοπὴν, ὅταν ἀφαιρεθέηται τῆς κόμης ἐπικόψῃ τις τὸ ἄκρον), and its metaphorical meaning in the passage before us agrees pretty closely with that of ἐπικοπέων in 1284 a 41.

3. περὶ πάσας τὰς πολιτείας, καὶ τὰς ὅρθας, 'with regard to all constitutions, even the normal ones.' Cp. De Gen. An. 4. 2. 767 a 32, καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἐκτὸς τροφῆς τούτο (i. e. τὸ ὕδωρ), καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔρημοι. We gather from 25 sqq. that the best constitution will expel, if necessary, men who are disproportionately superior in wealth or political influence, though not men disproportionately superior in virtue. As to the importance of συμμετρία in the members of a State, see 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 33 sqq.

4. μὲν is answered by οὐ μὴν ἄλλα, as in c. 4. 1276 b 34, c. 6. 1278 b 19, and 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 39 sqq.

5. πρὸς τὸ ἦδον ἀποσκοποῦσα. The opposition between πρὸς τὸ ἦδον ἀποσκοποῦσα and τὰς τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπισκοποῦσα will be noticed. The Index Aristotelicus gives no other instance of the use of ἀποσκοπεῖν by Aristotle. 'Επισκοπεῖν is also rare in the sense in which it is used in 6. It is not perhaps necessary to supply
άγαθων from the next line with τὸ ἱδίον: cp. Rhet. ad Alex. 30. 1437 a 36, καὶ γὰρ οὕτως ἐνεκά τινος ἱδίου δοκεῖ παρὰ τὸ ἱθος δημιουργεῖν (referred to by Bonitz, Ind. 339 a 22).

7. δήλον δὲ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 12. 1282 b 30. Τοῦτο, i.e. the fact that a part of a whole which is disproportionate to the whole to which it belongs is not tolerated.

8. οὔτε is here followed by οὔτε and οὐδὲ δὴ (‘nor yet surely’). See above on 1272 b 38, and compare the somewhat similar sequence in c. 17. 1288 a 24 sqq. In the passage before us the change from οὔτε . . . οὔτε to οὐδὲ δὴ is enough to cause the future εάσει to take the place of the optative εάσειν ἄν.

10. οὔτε καυσηγὸς πρῶμαι κ.τ.λ. We must apparently supply εάσειν ἄν ὑπερβάλλειν τῆς συμμετρίας.

13. οὔτε διὰ τοῦτο μὲν κ.τ.λ. ‘[The teacher of a chorus does not fall out with his chorus because he excludes from it a disproportionately excellent singer, for his rule over his chorus is beneficial to it, as being exercised for the advantage of the ruled (c. 6. 1278 b 39 sqq.),] and thus, so far as this practice at any rate is concerned, there is no reason why monarchs should not be in harmony with the States they rule, if, when they resort to it, their rule is beneficial to their States.’ For μὲν solitario see above on 1262 a 6 and 1270 a 34. Τά τοὺς πόλεως I take to mean ‘the States ruled by them’: cp. 33, οὔτε βασιλείας εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους αἰδίους ἐν τοῖς πόλεως. For τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς, cp. 21, and 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 26, τὰς οἰκείας γυναῖκας.

15. διὸ κ.τ.λ., ‘hence in relation to acknowledged superiorities the argument in favour of the ostracism is not without a certain element of political justice.’ Διὸ introduces an inference from the fact that constitutions which aim at the common good and practitioners of the arts resort to measures akin to the ostracism. Whatever restores the symmetry of the constitution is in a certain degree just. Κατὰ τὰς ὁμολογομένας ὑπεροχάς (cp. 26, οὐ κατὰ τῶν ἀλλων ἀγαθῶν τὴν ὑπεροχήν, οἷον ἵσχύος καὶ πλούσιον καὶ πολυφιλίας, ἀλλ’ ἐν τοις γένηται διαφέρων κατ’ ἀρετὴν) is added to exclude the application of the ostracism to cases in which there is no acknowledged superiority (such, for instance, as that of Hyperbolus). For the phrase τὰς ὁμολογομένας ὑπεροχάς cp. Plato, Rep. 569 B and Meno 96 B, and Isocr. Hel. § 12. ὑπεροχάς is in the plural because there are more kinds of superiority than one (Bon. Ind. 793 a 40, ὑπεροχαῖ, i.e. varia τῆς ὑπεροχῆς genera’); there is superiority in
virtue, in wealth, in command of friends, in birth, and so forth. For ὁ λάγος ὁ περὶ τῶν ὀστρακισμῶν, cp. c. 9. 1280 a 27.

17. βελτιών μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. 'True, it is better,' etc. The same thing is said in 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 18 sqq. For the means by which Aristotle would effect this, see above on 1284 a 17.

19. δευτέρος δὲ πλοῦς κ.τ.λ. On the proverb δευτέρος πλοῦς, see Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 359 and 2. 24, where the lines of Menander are quoted (Θρασυλέων, Fragm. 2. ap. Stob. Floril. 59. 9: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 139),

ὁ δευτέρος πλοῦς ἐστὶ δήπου λεγόμενος,
ἀν ἀποτύχῃ τις οὐρίον, κόπαισι πλείον
(oπιον Grotius, πρώτον, ἐν or simply ἐν MSS.: see Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 5. celi). "Αν συμβῇ, sc. τὸ δεύτερον τουαύτης λατρείας. Διορθούν, sc. τὴν πολιτείαν.

20. ὅπερ οὖκ ἐγίνετο περὶ τὰς πόλεις, 'which did not come about in connexion with the States' (see note on 1327 b 7), a softened way of saying 'which was not done by the States.' Greek States did not use the ostracism to heal a defect in the constitution.

22. τοῖς ὀστρακισμοῖς, plural in the sense of 'acts of ostracizing,' ἐν μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., 'in the deviation-forms of constitution, then, that the practice of removing persons disproportionately superior is of advantage to each form severally and just according to their several views of justice, is evident, and perhaps this also is evident that it is not absolutely just.' It is not absolutely just, because it is resorted to in the interest of the holders of power, not in the common interest of all the citizens (4 sq.). Μὲν οὖν is answered by ἀλλά, 25.

26. οὗ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἄγαθῶν τὴν ὑπεροχήν. Τῶν ἄλλων ἄγαθῶν is emphasized by being placed before τὴν ὑπεροχήν: cp. c. 14. 1285 b 18, τῶν πολεμικῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν, and 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 25, τῶν εὐπόρων τὰ κτήματα, and 34, τῶν μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίων αἱ μεταβολαί.

27. ισχύος must mean 'political strength': cp. 1284 a 21, ἦ τινα ἄλλην πολιτικὴν ἴσχυν.

28. ἐν τις γένναται διαφέρων κατ᾽ ἀρετῆν. Cp. c. 17. 1288 a 16, συμβῇ ἀναφέροντα γενέσθαι κατ᾽ ἀρετῆν.

οὐ γὰρ δὴ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle no doubt remembers, as Vict. points out, Heraclitus' indignant censure of the Ephesians for their expulsion of Hermodorus (see vol. i. p. 263, note 2). Compare the language ascribed to the Persian King when Themistocles was driven from Greece to his court (Plut. Themist. c. 28, μακαρίσας δὲ
πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ἕαυτῶν, ὡς ἐὰν εὐτυχία μεγίστη, καὶ κατευθύμενος ἐδίκη τοῖς πυκνοῖς τοιαύτας φρένας διδόναι τῶν Ἀρμάνου, ὅπως ἐλαύνωσι τοὺς ἀφίστους ἐξ ἑαυτῶν κ.τ.λ.). Athens was popularly credited with 'envy of the good,' as we see from the epitaph on Aeschylus in Anthol. Pal. 7. 40,

τὴν φθόνον, αἴ αἴ,

Ὀθνείδας ἀγαθῶν ἐγκοτὸς αἰὲν ἔχει;

Theseus was believed by some to have been ostracized at Athens (Theophr. Fragm. 131). A current proverb ascribed a similar jealousy to the Megarians—μηδέποτε μηδείς Μεγαρέων γένοιτο σοφό-τερος (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 528). Observe that ὁ τοιοῦτος recurs four times in 28–34. This is probably intentional. As to repetitions of this kind see notes on 1331 b 18, 1317 b 5, 1307 a 14, and 1325 b 11, and compare the frequency with which τοῖς ἥθεσιν οἷς τῶν ἥθων recurs in 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 28–39.

30. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. ἄλλα μὴν ... γε, 'but certainly,' as elsewhere. Supply φαίειν ἐν δεῖν. A question then arises as to the construction and punctuation of the sentence. Hampke (followed by Sus., though not without a good deal of hesitation) places παραπλησίαν γὰρ κἂν εἰ τοῦ Δίως ἅρχειν ἄξιονεν in a parenthesis, and takes μερίζοντες τὰς ἁρχὰς with ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἅρχειν γε τοῦ τοιοῦτον (φαίειν ἐν δείν), but Susemihl doubts with some reason whether, if we adopt this view of the construction of the sentence, μερίζοντες should not be μερίζοτας. In any case perhaps the more natural course is (with Bernays) to take μερίζοντες τὰς ἁρχὰς with what immediately precedes, i.e. with παραπλησίαν ... ἄξιονεν, and not with ἀλλὰ ... τοιοῦτον. But then the further question arises, what is the meaning of μερίζοντες τὰς ἁρχὰς? Some have fancied that there is a reference to the 'distribution of offices' by Zeus among the other gods, when he had won supremacy in heaven (cp. Hesiod, Theog. 881–5, 112, and Aesch. Prom. Vinct. 228 sqq.), and have translated the passage, 'for to do so would be much the same thing as if men were to claim to rule over Zeus, distributing the offices (as he did when he succeeded to power).'</t>
Compare with this passage 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 23-27 and 3. 16. 1287 a 16-18, and we shall find that the three passages lend support to Bernays' rendering of μερίζωντες τὰς ἄρχας, 'by a rotation in their tenure of the offices' ('gemäss einem reihenweisen Wechsel der Aemterbekleidung'), in which he is anticipated by Sepulveda, who however erroneously supplies οἱ θεοί as the nom. to ἄξιοι. Sepulveda, in fact, explains the passage in his commentary thus—' simile, inquit, esset ac si Dii statuerent inter se, ut sic per omnes aut aliquos ipsorum iret imperandi vicissitudo, ut Iuppiter modo imperium teneret, modo esset sub imperio, quod esset absurdissimum.' But does μερίζων bear this sense in any other passage? I am not aware that any such passage has been produced, and till it has, it will be safer to translate μερίζωντες τὰς ἄρχας in the ordinary way, 'distributing the offices,' i.e. distributing them among themselves and Zeus, and treating him as on a level with themselves in the matter of ruling, or, in other words, as partly ruling and partly ruled, instead of making him sole ruler. Cp. 1284 a 9, ἀδικήσονται γὰρ ἄξιοί μενοι τῶν ἱερ. I take μερίζωντες τὰς ἄρχας to mean the same as ἄξιοί μενοι τῶν ἱερ. In Aristoph. Aves 467 sq. and 1225 sqq. (Didot) the Birds go further and claim to rule over Zeus and the gods without giving them even a turn of office. Bonitz remarks (Ind. 41 a 31) on the construction παραπλήσιον κἂν εἰ 'insolentior videtur usus formulæ κἂν εἰ ubi καί pertinet ad vocabulum similitudinem significans (παραπλήσιον, ὅμως, τὸ αὐτό), as in the passage before us, with which he compares Phys. 8. 5. 257 a 7 sqq. and (a passage very similar in structure to ours) περὶ ἀναπνοῆς 9. 475 a 11, παραπλήσιον γὰρ συμβαίνει κἂν εἰ τίς τινα τῶν ἀναπνόντων πνεύμων, τὸ στόμα κατασχέων. The difficulty of getting the better of Zeus was proverbial (Hom. II. 1. 396 sqq. and 8. 209 sq.), and indeed the difficulty of ruling over the gods (Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1145 a 10 sq., already referred to by Eaton: Aesch. Prom. Vinct. 49, 356 sqq., Pers. 749: Hom. II. 8. 18 sqq.: Aristoph. Plut. 141 sqq. Didot: Diod. 17. 41. 1).

32. λειπεταὶ τοίνυν κ.τ.λ. When willing obedience is rendered to a man, it is a sign that he is a natural King (Xen. Cyrop. 5. 1. 24 sqq.). Cp. 1. 12. 1259 b 10, ἢ δὲ τῶν τέκνων ἄρχῃ βασιλικῇ τὸ γὰρ γεννήσαν καὶ κατὰ φιλίαν ἄρχον καὶ κατὰ πρεσβεῖαν ἔστιν, ὧπερ ἐστὶ βασιλικῆς εἶδος ἄρχης. Is the passage before us present to Milton's memory in the address to Cromwell in the Defensio Secunda,
where we read, 'We all willingly yield the palm of sovereignty to your unrivalled ability and virtue, except the few among us who are either...or who do not know that nothing in the world is more pleasing to God, more agreeable to reason, more politically just, or more generally useful, than that the supreme power should be vested in the best and the wisest of men' (Prose Works, i. 288 Bohn)?

33. βασιλεύς αδιός. 'Forma accusativi pluralis plerumque βασιλεύς, veluti 2. 9. 1271 a 26: 2. 11. 1272 b 37: 3. 14. 1285 a 26: 3. 15. 1286 b 11, sed βασιλεύς legitur 3. 13. 1284 b 33' (Bon. Ind. 135 a 21 sqq.), and also in 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 24. βασιλεύς is the form found in Attic Inscriptions, though βασιλεύς appears after B.C. 307 (Meisterhans, Gramm. d. att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 110). The acc. plur. of ἰέρεις in the Politics is ἰέρεις and of ἱππεὺς ἱππεῖς. For the meaning of αδίος see above on 1271 a 40. Not mere temporary kings, like the βασιλεύς mentioned in 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 29, but perpetual kings.

35 sqq. μεταβήναι, because a transition is now made from C. 14. a question affecting all constitutions to the study of a single constitution, Kingship. Aristotle had said in c. 7. 1279 a 23 sqq. that he would discuss the normal constitutions first, and Kingship is a normal constitution. The inquiries of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Chapters have had reference to the question of Justice, but now Aristotle asks whether Kingship is expedient, not whether it is just; the two questions, however, do not lie far apart, and when he at length arrives at the end of the inquiry in c. 17. 1287 b 36 sqq., we find that an answer is given to both of them (1287 b 39, δίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον: 1288 a 1, ὅτε συμφέρον ὅτε δίκαιον: 1288 a 18, δίκαιον: 1288 a 30, πότερον οὐ συμφέρει ταῖς πολέσεω ἡ συμφέρει). The question of the expediency of Kingship cannot be discussed until the various kinds of Kingship have been distinguished, for it may well be that one and the same answer will not hold good of all. Besides, Aristotle is not sorry to seize the opportunity which his classification of Kingships affords him of describing the various forms of Kingship and of correcting the error of those who regarded the Lacedaemonian Kingship as Kingship in a truer sense than any other Kingship according to law (1285 a 3 sqq.); for he holds that the Lacedaemonian Kingship is, in fact, the least of those according to law. It is the expediency of the Absolute Kingship, however, that he really wishes to discuss. In his account of this form Aristotle
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probably has the Persian Kingship before him (see notes on 1284 a 14 and 1287 a 1). Socrates had described Kingship as always according to law (Xen. Mem. 4. 6. 12, βασιλείαν δὲ καὶ τυραννίδα ἀρχὰς μὲν ἀρφοσέρας ἥγετο ἐκεῖνος, διαφέρει δὲ ἄλλακτων ἐνόμιζε· τήν μὲν γὰρ ἐκόνταν τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κατὰ νόμους τῶν πόλεων ἀρχὴν βασιλείαν ἥγετο κ.τ.λ.). Aristotle takes a different view. Just as in the classification of democracies and oligarchies in the Sixth (Fourth) Book forms in which law is supreme are marked off from those in which it is not, so here in the classification of Kingships the same is the case; but while the democracies and oligarchies in which law is not supreme are the worst, the form of Kingship in which law is not supreme is the best and highest. Aristotle's classification of Kingships would have been simplified, if he had first divided them into Kingships according to law and not according to law, and had then subdivided the class of Kingships according to law. His study of Kingship would probably have been fuller and more complete if he had not studied Kingship according to law on the way, as it were, to an examination of the question as to Absolute Kingship. We are grateful to him for studying barbarian Kingship as well as Greek, for in the case of other constitutions he is silent as to the non-Greek world, if we except his notice of the Carthaginian ἀρωτοκρατία, and not entirely for want of material, for non-monarchical constitutions appear to have existed, for instance, in Lycia (see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 185); but his treatment of barbarian Kingship is cursory in the extreme. It makes no pretence of being exhaustive, for the kind of barbarian Kingship which Aristotle selects for notice is said by him to exist only among 'some of the barbarians' (c. 14. 1285 a 17). It should also be noted that in the inquiry respecting the downfall and the preservation of Kingship and Tyranny contained in the Seventh (Fifth) Book no notice is taken of the distinction drawn in the Third between different kinds of Kingship, or of that drawn in the Sixth (Fourth) between different kinds of Tyranny. So again in 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 10 Aristotle evidently implies the existence of Kingships not κατὰ γένος, but it is not easy to say to what Kingships he there refers (see note on 1313 a 10). One remark may be added. Aristotle classes under the head of βασιλεία dignities to which we should not allow the name of Kingship. The Aesymneteship, for instance, might be held for only a few months or years, yet it is treated by Aristotle as a form of βασιλεία. It is so because it is
exercised over willing subjects and is invested with large powers, for these are the two characteristics of βασιλεία (7 (5). 10. 1313 a 5). Βασιλεία may or may not be according to law, may or may not be κυρία πάντων (c. 14. 1285 a 4, b 29), may or may not be elective, may or may not be hereditary, may even be for a less term than life, but these two characteristics are always found in connexion with it.

37. σκεπτέον δὲ πότερον κ.τ.λ. Compare the question raised in 2. 1. 1261 a 2, ἀλλὰ πότερον ὅσον εὐθέχεται κοινωνίᾳ, πάντων βέλτιον κοινωνεῖ τὴν μελλονταν οἰκήσεσθαι πόλιν καλῶς, ἢ τινῶν μὲν τινῶν δὲ οὐ βέλτιον; Τῇ μελλούσῃ καλῶς οἰκήσεσθαι καὶ πόλει καὶ χώρᾳ stands in opposition to τις μὲν συμφέρει τις δὲ οὐ συμφέρει, therefore it must mean 'broadly to any city and country which is to be well-constituted politically.' We have been told in the preceding chapter that in some cases the best constitution must assume the form of a perpetual Kingship, but that does not preclude the raising of the question whether Kingship is advantageous to any political community which desires to be well-constituted or only to some. Aristotle's readiness to consider the question whether Kingship is expedient or not would be little in harmony with popular opinion in Greece, which was no doubt unfavourable to the institution: cp. Demosth. Philip. 2. 25, βασιλείας γὰρ καὶ τύραννος ἀτας ἔχρος ἐλευθερία καὶ νόμοις ἑναντίον. Even Isocrates, though he praises Kingship in his Nicocles and Ad Nicoclem—he could hardly do otherwise in works written for a King—speaks of it in his Oration to Philip (§ 107) as little suited to Greeks, though indispensable to barbarians, and allows in his Nicocles (§ 24) that the Lacedaemonians and Carthaginians reserve it for use in war and are oligarchically governed at home. Xenophon's praises of Kingship in his Cyropædia refer, at any rate nominally, to a Persian King. Plato, however, had been bolder in his Republic and Politicus, for he certainly has Greeks in view when he advocates in those dialogues Kingship of the most thorough-going kind. See on this subject vol. i. p. 277.

38. καὶ πόλει καὶ χώρᾳ. χώρᾳ probably here means not 'a territory occupied by villages,' as in Strabo, p. 336, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀλλοί τῶν τῶν κατὰ Πελοπόννησον πλην ἄλλον, οὐς κατέλεξεν ὁ ποιητής, οὐ πόλεις ἀλλὰ χώρας νομίζεις δεί, ανατίματα δήμων ἔχουσαν ἐκάστην πλείω, εἰ δὲ ύστερον οἱ γνωρίζομεν πόλεις συνφιλικάθησαν, but 'a territory occupied by an ἔθνος or ἔθνη,' as in Xen. Anab. 4. 8. 22, VOL. III.
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ἐν τῇ Κόλχων χώρᾳ, for in c. 14. 1285 b 30 we have δισπερ ἐκαστὸν ἔθνος καὶ πόλις ἐκάστη, and in 1285 b 33 πόλεως καὶ ἔθνους ἐνὸς ἡ πλείονος. Nothing, however, is said of the χώρα or ἔθνος in the recapitulatory summaries in c. 17. 1288 a 30 sqq. and 6 (4). ιο. 1295 a 6 sqq.

41. ἡ πλείον ἐχει διαφοράς, 'or has several different forms': cp. 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 33, οὐ γὰρ οἶον τε τατότων ζῴων ἐχειν πλείον στόματος διαφοράς.

1285 a. 2. τῆς ἀρχῆς ὁ τρόπος. In some forms of Kingship (the barbarian Kingdom and the Aesymneteship) the τρόπος τῆς ἀρχῆς is despotic (1285 a 22, b 2 sq.), in others not; in some the King is supreme over more things than in others (c. 15. 1285 b 35 sqq.).

3. πασῶν, sc. τῶν βασιλείων. For the juxtaposition of εἰς and πασῶν see note on 1281 a 13.

ἡ γὰρ ἐν τῇ Λακωνικῇ πολιτείᾳ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle places first and second in his enumeration of forms of Kingship two existing forms, the Laconian and the barbarian, and then passes on to two obsolete forms, the Aesymneteship, which existed in the ancient days of Greece, and the Kingship of the heroic times.

δικεῖ, 'is thought,' by whom we are not told: possibly Plato's language in Laws 691 D–692 B respecting the Lacedaemonian Kingship is present to Aristotle's mind. He does not agree with this view; he sees that there are Kingships according to law (the barbarian Kingdom and the Aesymneteship) which are supreme over more things than the Laconian, and therefore are Kingships in a fuller sense, for the true King is κύριος πάντων (c. 17. 1288 a 18 sq.; cp. Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 37). In Diog. Laert. 3. 82 a classification of Kingships into Kingships κατὰ γένος and Kingships κατὰ νόμων is ascribed with very doubtful correctness to Plato, and the Lacedaemonian Kingship is brought under the former head, so that it is implied not to be κατὰ νόμων.

5. διὰν εξελθῇ τὴν χώραν, sc. ὁ βασιλεύς. ἢξιφρομαι rarely takes the accusative (see Liddell and Scott).

ἠγεμόν ἐστι τῶν πρὸς τῶν πόλεων, 'he is the leader in all matters relating to war': cp. 1285 b 18, τῶν πολεμικῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν, and Hdt. 9. 33, Λακεδαίμονος δὲ ... μισθὸ ἐπειράντο πείσαντες Τισαμενὸν ποιεσθαι ἄρα Ἑρακλείδεων τοῖς βασιλεύσι ἡγεμόνα τῶν πολέμων. For τῶν πρὸς τῶν πόλεων, cp. Xen. Mem. 3. 12. 5, ἡ πόλις οὐκ ἀσκεὶ δημοσίᾳ τὰ πρὸς τῶν πολέμων; Anab. 4. 3. 10: Συγορ. 1. 2. 10. Ἦγεμον τῶν πρὸς τῶν πολέμων στάνδες in tacit contrast to ἡγεμονία πολιτική, of which
we read in c. 17. 1288 a 9. In Philip. § 33, Ἀλκεδαμόνων δὲ τοῖς ἀπ’ ἐκεῖνον γέγονοι καὶ τὴν βασιλείαν καὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν εῖς ἄπαντα τὸν χρόνον βεθώκασι, Isocrates appears to distinguish between the Kingship and the ἡγεμονία. According to Hdt. 6. 56 the Lacedaemonian Kings had the right to determine against whom war should be made (πόλεμον ἐκφέρειν ἐπ’ ἧν ἄν βουλωμαι χώρην), and Gilbert holds (Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 46) that there are some indications that this right remained to them even in Xenophon's time (Xen. Hell. 5. i. 34: 2. 2. 7: 4. 7. 1), but Xenophon implies in Rep. Lac. 15. 2, καὶ στρατιῶν ὅποι ἄν ἡ πόλις ἐκπέμψῃ, ἥγεσθαι, that the State and not the Kings possessed it.

6. ἐτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς (cp. 1285 b 23) answers to τὰ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον. Something more is meant by this phrase than the offering of sacrifices to the gods, sacrifices such as the Kings of the heroic times offered (1285 b 10: cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 26 sqq.), and it probably includes the right of the Lacedaemonian Kings to name the officers called Pythii, through whom the Delphic oracle was consulted (Hdt. 6. 57. 2), and to have the custody of oracles (6. 57. 4). We learn from Xen. Rep. Lac. 15. 1, ἐθυμη γὰρ θυεῖν μὲν βασιλεία πρὸ τῆς πόλεως τὰ δημόσια ἄπαντα, ὡς ἄνθροπος ὅστα, why it fell to the Lacedaemonian King to sacrifice. It was natural that the same authorities should be charged with matters relating to the gods and to war, for success in war was held to be given by the gods. In his account of the prerogatives of the Lacedaemonian Kings Aristotle omits to notice their share in deliberative authority as members of the senate, and also the judicial authority which, as we know from Hdt. 6. 57, they possessed in a particular class of cases (this had perhaps been narrowed: see above on 1270 a 21).

7. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ βασιλεία κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν is taken up by ἐν μὲν οὖν τούτ' εἰδος βασιλείας, 14, and then at length finds a δέ to answer to it in παρὰ ταύτην δέ, 16. Αὕτη ἡ βασιλεία (cp. 14) means 'this kind of Kingship,' as αὕτη ἡ δικαιοσύνη in Eth. Nic. 5. 3. 1129 b 25 means 'this kind of justice,' for the Lacedaemonian Kingship is not the only Kingship included in the class, as we see from 15, τοῦτον δ’ αἱ μὲν κατὰ γένος εἰσίν, αἱ δ’ αἰτηταί. It appears, in fact, from 10 sqq. that the Kingship held by Agamemnon as leader of the Greek forces before Troy is included in it, a Kingship which we must not confuse with his Kingship of Mycenae, for his Kingship of Mycenae belongs to the fourth class of Kingships, αἱ κατὰ τοὺς
NOTES.

Aristotle may well have also referred to this class the Kingship, or Leadership, of Greece, which was held for a time by Agesilaus and for life by Philip and Alexander of Macedon. Compare Plut. Ages. c. 40, where Agesilaus is said to have been regarded until the defeat at Leuctra as σχέδων δικής τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἥγεμον καὶ βασιλεύς, with Ages. c. 6, where we read that in a dream which Agesilaus had at Aulis before embarking for Asia, he heard a voice addressing him thus, ὅ βασιλεὺς Δακεδαμονίων, ὅτι μὲν οὐδὲς τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὁμοί συμπάσχει ἀπεδείξθη στρατηγὸς ἢ πρότερον Ἀγαμέμνον καὶ σὺ νῦν μετ’ ἐκέων, ἐννοεῖς ἄδιστοι, and with Isocr. Panath. § 76. At a later time Philip of Macedon was elected by the Congress at Corinth ἥγεμον (or στρατηγὸς) αὐτοκράτωρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος (Diod. 16. 1, 89, 91: Arrian, Anab. 7. 9. 5: cp. Demosth. De Cor. c. 201 and Justin, 9. 4, and see Schäfer, Demothenes, 3. 1. 51. 3), and on his death his son Alexander was elected by the Congress to the same dignity (Diod. 17. 4. 9: Arrian, Anab. 1. 1. 2: Schäfer, Demothenes, 3. 1. 90. 1). Thus the office of ἥγεμον, or στρατηγὸς, αὐτοκράτωρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος in the hands of Philip and Alexander was an elective office and tenable apparently for life. Long before the time of Agesilaus and Philip, Gelon had asked to be appointed στρατηγὸς τε καὶ ἥγεμον τῶν Ἑλλήνων πρὸς τῶν βάρβαρον (Hdt. 7. 158). Aristotle can hardly intend to include the Carthaginian Kingship under this form of Kingship, for in 2. 11. 1273 a 30 he distinguishes between the offices of King and General at Carthage. He would seem to omit the Carthaginian Kingship from his enumeration, for it cannot fall under the head of the barbarian Kingship, though the Carthaginians were non-Greeks, inasmuch as its authority was by no means of a ‘despotic’ type. Would such an office as that of the ταγός of the Thessalians be classed by Aristotle under this form of Kingship?

στρατηγία τις αὐτοκράτωρ καὶ ἀδιός. Ἀδίός is explained by διὰ βίου in 15. A στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ καὶ ἀδιός evidently had not the power of life and death. Vict. would read αὐτοκράτωρ in place of αὐτοκρατόρας, partly because the rendering of Vet. Int. is ‘imperialis,’ and Schneider and Sus., adopting his suggestion, place αὐτοκράτωρ in their text (see critical note on 1285 a 8). But, though στρατηγία αὐτοκράτωρ is a recognized title, I do not remember to have met with στρατηγία αὐτοκράτωρ. With στρατηγία τις αὐτοκρατόρων may be compared 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 18, δυναστείαν τῶν ἐπίχειρησάντων νεωτερίζειν. A στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ differed from
an ordinary στρατηγός in having authority to deal with many questions for himself as to which an ordinary στρατηγός would have to consult the popular assembly or other supreme authority: cp. Polyb. 3. 87. 7, ὅ ὶ δὲ δικτάτωρ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ὑπάτων τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπάτων ἑκατέρῳ δώδεκα πελέκες ἀκολουθοῦσιν, τούτῳ δ' ἔκοσι καὶ τέταρται, κἀκείνῳ μὲν ἐν πολλοῖς προσδέονται τῆς συγκλήτου πρὸς τὸ συντελεῖν τὰς ἐπιβολὰς, οὕτως δ' ἔστιν αὐτοκράτωρ στρατηγός. So in Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 37 A. § 4, συναγωγῆς δὲ τῶλ λογιστῶν ἡ βουλή αὐτοκράτωρ ἔστω, the word αὐτοκράτωρ is explained by Mr. Hicks to mean 'not bound to consult the popular assembly.' Cp. also Thuc. 6. 26 and 5. 27. It was the practice of Greek States to create στρατηγοὶ αὐτοκράτορες to deal with crises, just as the Romans created a dictator, but the στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ had not, like the dictator, the power of life and death, and more στρατηγοὶ than one could be declared αὐτοκράτορες, whereas the dictatorship was always confined to a single individual, though on one or two occasions we find two dictators in existence at the same time (Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 2. 131, ed. 1). Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in fact, identifies the Roman dictator, not with the στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ, but with the αἰσιμνήτης (Ant. Rom. 5. 73). Still the position of sole στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ was often the first step to a tyranny in the hands of men like Phalaris (Rhet. 2. 20. 1393 b 10 sqq.; cp. Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 28), Aristodemus of Cumae (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 8), and Dionysius the Elder (Diod. 13. 94. 6).

8. ei μὴ ἐν τινὶ βασιλείᾳ κ.τ.λ., 'except in a particular Kingship, as for instance [in the Kingdom existing] in the time of the ancients, on warlike expeditions by right of force.' ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ is probably to be rendered 'manuum iure' (Lamb, 'lega ea quae est in manibus et armis posita'). It is opposed to ἐν δίκης νόμῳ (Liddell and Scott s. v. νόμος). Where a person is slain by an exercise of the right which superior force confers, he is said to be slain ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ, whether he is slain by his adversary on the battlefield or, as in the passage before us, by his King for cowardice in presence of the enemy. Eaton compares Thuc. 3. 66, οἷς μὲν ἐν χειρῶν ἀπεκτείνατε, οἷς ὄμοιος ἀλγοῦμεν (κατὰ νόμον γὰρ δὴ τινὰ ἐπανχοῦ): compare also the word χειροδίκαι in Hes. Op. et Dies, 189 ('men who use the right of might'). Bernays translates ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ 'als standrechtliches Verfahren' ('by process of martial law'), and Mr. Welldon follows him, but the use of the word χειροδίκαι does not support this translation. In the kind of Kingship of
which Aristotle is speaking the King had, I conceive, the right to put to death with his own hand any of his warriors who showed cowardice on a warlike expedition; he had not the right to put any of them to death by judicial process. Sus. renders ἐν χείρος νόμῳ ‘im Handgemenge’ (‘in the mêlée’), but I much prefer the interpretation given above. How would the King be able to slay one of his own men while himself engaged in a hand-to-hand fight with the foe? For ἐν τινι βασιλείᾳ, cp. c. 5. 1278 a 17, ἐν τινι πολιτείᾳ, and 1278 a 28, ἐν τισὶ δημοκρατίαις. Sus.: ‘ἐν τινι βασιλείᾳ seclusit Gifanius, βασιλείᾳ eodem tempore secluserunt Bernaysius et Susemihlius.’ The suggestion of Bern. and Sus. is not without plausibility, but I do not think that any change is called for. Aristotle’s meaning is that the class of Kingship of which the Lacedaemonian Kingship is the type does not possess, as a class, the power of life and death, but that particular Kingships falling under the class do possess it, and he gives an instance of this. It is doubtful whether, as the emendation of Bern. and Sus. would imply, the Lacedaemonian King possessed the right to put a Spartan citizen to death ‘in a certain case’; we expect also to be told what case is referred to, but the only case mentioned is that of οἱ ἄρχαίοι. The Lacedaemonian King does not appear to have possessed the power which Kings of this type possessed ἐπὶ τῶν ἄρχαίων; the punishment provided by the Lacedaemonian law for οἱ τρέσαντες seems, on the contrary, to have been a severe form of ἀτυμία (Plut. Ages. c. 30).

11. κακῶς μὲν ἀκοῦων κ.τ.λ. ‘For instance, in II. 1. 225 sqq.’ (Sus., Note 618: Sus., I. p. 422). See also II. 2. 224 sqq.

12. ἐξελθόντων δὲ καὶ κτεῖναι κύριος ἤν. For ἐξελθόντων see above on 1281 b 4, 13. Καὶ κτεῖναι, not merely not to tolerate, but even to put to death.

λέγει γοῦν κ.τ.λ. The quotation is from II. 2. 391, where Agamemnon says,

"ὅν δὲ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης ἐθελοντα νοήσω μιμαξεῖν παρὰ νυσλι κορονίσαν, οὗ οἱ ἐπείτα ἄρκιον ἐσσείται φυγόειν κύναις ἑδο ὀλυνούς." ὡς ἐφαμ: Ἀργεῖοι δὲ κ.τ.λ.

In Eth. Nic. 3. 11. 116 a 32 these threats are ascribed to Hector, for there we read, ἀναγκάσομαι γὰρ οἱ κύριοι, ὅσπερ ὁ Ἑκτόρ δὲ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης πτῶσσοντα νοήσω, οὗ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐσσείται φυγόειν κύναις.
Aristotle probably remembered the similar threats placed by Homer in the mouth of Hector in II. 15. 348 (cp. II. 12. 248 sqq.),

\[\text{δὲ \ άν \ ἐγὼν \ ἀπανευθε \ νεών \ ἐτέρωθε \ νάσω,\n αὐτοῦ \ οἱ \ θάνατον \ μητίσομαι, \ συνέ \ νυ \ τάγμεν\n γνωτι \ τε \ γνωταί \ τε \ πυρός \ λελάχωι \ θαυμάτα,\n ἀλλὰ \ κώνες \ ἐρύουσι \ πρὸ \ ἄστεος \ ἡμετέρωι,}\]

and was thus led into the error of ascribing the lines quoted by him to Hector, and not to Agamemnon. It will be seen that Aristotle abbreviates this passage of Homer in quoting it both here and in Eth. Nic. 3. 11, that in the latter passage he substitutes πτώσοντα for ἐθέλοντα μμνάζειν παρὰ νησί κορωνίσων, and that in the passage before us he adds πάρ γάρ έμοι θάνατος after οἴωνοις, words which do not appear in our text. There is nothing surprising in the abbreviation or the substitution to which reference has been made, but the addition of πάρ γάρ έμοι θάνατος is remarkable. The passages in which the text of Homer as quoted by Aristotle differs from the text handed down in the extant MSS. and other authorities are very numerous. A list of them will be found in Bon. Ind. 507 a 29 sqq. In some of them Aristotle’s memory may well be at fault (compare his inaccurate quotation from Isocrates in Rhet. 3. 9. 1410 a 1, and see Prof. Butcher in Class. Rev. 5. 310 sq.), and if the addition before us stood alone, we might be tempted to account for it by supposing a confusion with αὐτοῦ οἱ θάνατον μητίσομαι in the similar passage, II. 15. 348 sqq. But it does not stand alone.

In 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 25 Aristotle attributes to Homer the line (which is not to be found in our Homer),

\[\text{ἄλλ' οἴον μὲν ἔστι καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαίτα θαλεἴν,}\]

and in Rhet. 2. 9. 1387 a 33 sqq. he adds after II. 11. 542,

\[\text{Ἀπανευθε \ δὲ \ ἄλεινε \ μάχην \ Τελάμωναδαο,}\]

the following line, which does not occur in the MSS., but which Plutarch also found there (see De Audiend. Poet. c. 6. 24 C and c. 14. 36 A),

\[\text{Ζεὺς \ γάρ \ οἱ \ νεμέσασχ', \ ἕτε \ ἀμείνοι \ φωτὶ \ μάχοιτο.}\]

So again, as we learn from Soph. El. 4. 166 b 6 sqq. (cp. Poet. 25. 1461 a 22) Aristotle found the words δίδομεν δέ οἱ εὐχος ἀρέσθαι in the address of the Dream to Agamemnon (II. 2. 23 sqq.), but they are not to be found there now, though the words δίδομεν δέ τοι
Strabo, whether it "hardly ov^i O/jiT)pov to down same the possessed Homer discoveries of given time as perhaps, that in the time of Alexander, and even earlier, more texts than one of Homer were current, with not a few varieties of reading. Recent discoveries of Homeric papyri add to the likelihood of this. See as to them Mr. F. G. Kenyon 'On the Geneva Fragments of Homer' in Class. Rev. 8. 134 sqq., and also in Class. Rev. 11. 406. The text of the quotations from the Homeric Hymn to Apollo given in Thuc. 3. 104 differs widely from that of our MSS. (see Mr. T. W. Allen in Journal of Hellenic Studies, vol. 15. p. 309).

13. οο οι ἄρκιν έσσειται φυγέειν, 'it shall not be a sure thing for him to escape'—perhaps a Litotes for 'he shall have no hope of escaping.'

15. τούτων δὲ κ.τ.λ. Κατὰ γένος does not perhaps necessarily imply that the Kingship passed from father to son, but only that it was confined to members of a given family. In place of αιπεραί we have in c. 15. 1285 b 39 κατὰ μέρος, a wider term, for an office held κατὰ μέρος may be filled by election or otherwise. See below on 1285 b 39. To what elective Kingships of the Lacedaemonian type does Aristotle refer? Hardly to the Carthaginian (see above on 1285 a 7); perhaps, among others, to the office of ἡγεμών αὐτο-κράτωρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος held for life, as we have seen (above on 1285 a 7), by Philip of Macedon and Alexander: whether he refers to the office of ταγός of the Thessalians, is doubtful, though this office was elective.

16. παρὰ ταύτην δὲ κ.τ.λ. Μοναρχίας εἶδος, as in 29 sq., not βασιλείας, as in 15, while in 1285 b 4 we have εἶδος μοναρχίας βασιλείας. Yet in the recapitulation, 1285 b 20 sqq. (cp. c. 15. 1285 b 34, 1286 a 5), all the forms which Aristotle enumerates are classed as βασιλείας εἶδη. Perhaps he is in doubt whether the
barbarian Kingship and the Aesymneteship are really forms of Kingship or of Tyranny; in 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 7 sqq. they are treated as forms of Tyranny shading off into Kingship, and we are there told that the barbarian Kingship was elective, which we do not learn here, unless it is implied in 1285 b 2 sq. (see note). He speaks of the ‘barbarian’ form of Kingship as existing only among ‘some’ of the barbarians of Europe and Asia. Other barbarian races perhaps had hereditary Kings whose power was more limited. Others again were not ruled by Kings at all; we hear, for instance, of Θράκες ἐβασιλεύτων in Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 17. The Kingship of the Thracians, Illyrians, Phoenicians, and Ethiopians may have been of the type here described by Aristotle. Hardly the Molossian Kingship (7 (5). 11. 1313 a 23 sq.), or the Macedonian, for the Macedonians were very outspoken to their King (Polyb. 5. 27. 6, ἔχον γὰρ ἐν τὴν τιμαίτων ἱππορίαν Μακεδόνες πρὸς τοὺς βασιλέας), and the Macedonian people seem to have been the judges in capital cases in time of peace (Abel, Makedonien vor König Philipp, p. 136, note).

18. ἐξουσί 8' αὐταὶ κ.τ.λ. It is natural to expect that when the power of a Kingship is great, it will not be governed by law and hereditary. Tyranny is regarded by Aristotle as not hereditary, for though tyrannies often passed from father to son, the inheritor of a tyranny was apt to lose it (7 (5). 10. 1312 b 21 sqq.). Πατρικὸς is apparently not used by Aristotle elsewhere in the sense of ‘hereditary,’ and in 24, 33, and 1285 b 5, 9 we have πάτριος used in this sense, but πατρικὸς often bears this meaning (e.g. in Thuc. 1. 13). As to the extent of the authority of barbarian Kings, cp. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 74, κατ’ ἀρχὰς μὲν γὰρ ἄπασα πόλις Ἑλλάς ἐβασιλεύτω, πλῆν ὢν τὸ ἄστερ τὰ βάρβαρα ἑβην δεσποτικός, ἀλλὰ κατὰ νόμον τινὸς καὶ ἔθνων πατρίους (this is perhaps based on Theophrastus, but Aristotle would say that the barbarian King also governed according to law): Plut. Reg. et Imp. Apophth. Antig. 8. 182 C: Eurip. Hel. 246 Bothe, 276 Dind.,

tὰ βαρβάρων γὰρ δοῦλα πάντα πλὴν ἐνὸς.

19. διὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is added to explain how it happens that the law in these countries authorizes a despotic rule and that these Kingships are hereditary. As to the slavishness of barbarians, cp. Trag. Gr. Fragm. Adespota 291 Nauck,

ιὼ τυραννί βαρβάρων ἄνδρῶν φίλη,
and Isocr. Philip. § 107. Aristotle advised Alexander in ruling his empire τοὺς μὲν “Ελλησιν ἡγεμονικῶς, τοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους δεσποτικῶς χρὴσαί (Aristot. Fragm. 81. 1489 b 27 sqq.: see note on 1324 b 36). That Asiatics were especially slavish, we see from 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 27 sqq. and Plut. De Vitiis. Pud. c. 10, πάντες οἱ τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντες ἐνὶ δουλεύουσιν ἀνθρώπων διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι μίαν εἰσίν τὴν Ὀὐ συλλαβῆν.

22. τὴν δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν, not, as in c. 6. 1278 b 30 sqq., in the sense of ‘rule exercised for the advantage of the master’ (for then this form of Kingship would not be a normal constitution, as it is), but ‘despotic rule,’ as in 6 (4). ii. 1295 b 21 (cp. 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 3).

23. τυραννικαῖ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., ‘thus while they are of a tyrannical type for the above-mentioned reason, they are safe’ (and therefore unlike tyrannies), ‘because they are hereditary and in accordance with law.’ Does ‘for the above-mentioned reason’ mean because the subjects are slavish, or because the power of the King is as great as that of a tyrant? Bernays and Welldon take the former view, but, looking to 1285 b 2 sq. and 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 15 sqq., I lean rather to the latter. It is easy to understand why conformity to law confers safety, but why are Kingships the safer for being hereditary? Probably because men more willingly submit to rule when it has come down to the ruler from his ancestors and has become traditional. Thus ἐκόντων takes the place of πάρμαι in 27.

24. καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The bodyguard of a barbarian King is composed of natives of the State for the same reason for which his tenure of power is safe, i.e. because it is hereditary and in accordance with law, and therefore willingly submitted to. We see that Kings no less than Tyrants and Asyrmnetes (c. 15. 1286 b 37 sqq.) had a bodyguard—usually at any rate, though perhaps not invariably (c. 15. 1286 b 6 sqq.)—but the King’s bodyguard was not intended, like the Tyrant’s, to secure his throne, but merely to enforce obedience on any of his subjects who might be for the moment recalcitrant (c. 15. 1286 b 27 sqq.).

25. οἱ γὰρ πολίται κ.τ.λ. Cp. 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 7 and Isocr. Hel. § 37. The Lacedaemonian Kings were guarded by citizens (Isocr. Epist. 2. 6).

26. τοὺς δὲ τυράννους ἕξενικὸν. According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Ant. Rom. 7. 8), Aristodemus of Cumae had
three bodyguards, one of the lowest of the citizens, another of manumitted slaves, and a third of hired barbarians.

30. ἑτέρον δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and another which existed among the ancient Greeks, [the monarchy of those] who are called Aesymnetes.' The εἰδος μοναρχίας is loosely explained by the name given to those who held it: compare 2. 11. 1273 a 30, τὰς μεγίστας (ἀρχαίς), τοὺς τε βασιλείς καὶ τοὺς στρατηγούς, and 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 10. Pittacus and, it would seem, Peisistratus (7 (5). 5. 1305 a 7 sqq.) are counted by Aristotle among the ancient Greeks, but not of course Dionysius the Elder (3. 15. 1286 b 37 sqq.). 'We find the word αἰσιμυνήτηρ correctly explained in Etym. Magn. αἰσιμύνας ἢ ἢ τὸ αἰσίων μνήμην ποιεῖσθαι' (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 280. 1). The title αἰσιμυνήτης was not confined to the extraordinary magistrates to whom Aristotle here refers. At Cyme (we are not told which Cyme) the magistrates generally were called by this name (Aristot. Fragm. 481. 1556 b 44 sqq.); in Hom. Odys. 8. 258 the αἰσιμυνηταὶ are umpires in contests for prizes; and in Megara and her colony Chalcedon and also in Chersonesus, a colony of the Pontic Heracleia, which was itself a Megarian colony, the functions of the αἰσιμύνατα or αἰσιμύνοντες seem to have been those of the πρωτάνες at Athens (see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 72. 3. 188. 1, 194. 5, 280. 1). We are here concerned, however, only with the extraordinary Aesymnete. The nature of his office may be gathered from Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 54 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 389), which refers to Miletus, Ἐπιμενῆς μετὰ ταῦτα αἰσιμυνήτης ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου χειρονοεῖται λαβῶν ἐξουσίαν κτείνειν οὐ δεύκεται καί ὃς τῶν μὲν παιδῶν Ἀμμενίτητος οὐδένος ὀδός τι ἐν ἐγκρατείᾳ γενέσθαι ὑπεξῆλθον γάρ παραχρήμα δείκνυται τά δὲ ὅτα αὐτοῦ ἐδήμευε, καί ἀργύριον ἐκήρυξεν, εἰ τις αὐτοῦς κτείνειν τῶν δὲ κοινῶν τοῦ φόνου τρεῖς ἀπέκτεινε, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις φυγὴν προσέπεσεν οἱ δὲ ἄχουτον. Οἱ μὲν δὴ Νηλείδαι κατελύθησαν οὔτε. This is the earliest extraordinary Aesymnete we hear of, unless the Aesymneteship of Tynnondas in Euboaea (Plut. Solon, c. 14) was still earlier. The μόναρχος ἐξουσία which the Athenian Aristarchus held at Ephesus at the time of the overthrow of the Medes by Cyrus (b.c. 559) may possibly, as Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 141, points out, have been that of an Aesymnete, but this is not certain. The Aesymnete had larger powers than any Greek King—larger than even the Greek King of heroic times, for the administration of the State lay wholly in his hands. He is, in fact, commonly described as a tyrant (31: cp. c. 15. 1286 b 38: Plut. Solon, c. 14: Theophrast. ap. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 73),
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though Pittacus is not unnaturally spoken of as a king in the popular ditty (Bergk, Poet.-Lyri. Gr., Carm. Popul. 43),
āleι μύλα ἄλει
καὶ γὰρ Πιττάκος ἄλει,
megálas Miltiádas βασιλείων.

Thus tyrants in early days were called Aesymnetes (Aristot. Fragm. 481. 1557 a 5 sqq.). The Aesymnete ruled κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην
(6 (4). i. 1295 a 16), though his office is implied in 1285 a 32 to be κατὰ νόμον: the law, in fact, empowered him to rule κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ
gνώμην. Like the tyrant, he had a bodyguard, though his bodyguard would be smaller than the tyrant's (c. 15. 1286 b 35 sqq.) and composed of citizens, like the bodyguard of the king, not of mercenaries, like that of the tyrant. Aristotle evidently conceives a resemblance to exist between the Aesymneteship and the barbarian Kingship (32), and it is possible that the Greeks borrowed this great office from the barbarians, for we are told in 6 (4). i. 1295 a II
that elective αὐτοκράτορες μόναρχοι existed among some of the barbarians. Dionysius of Halicarnassus finds its equivalent in the Roman Dictatorship (Ant. Rom. 5. 73, ἕστι γὰρ αἱρετὴ τυραννὶς ἡ
diktatoria δοκοῦσι δὲ μοι καὶ τοῦτο σαρ 'Ελλήνων οἱ 'Ρωμαίοι τὸ πολίτευμα
λαβεῖν' οἱ γὰρ Αἰσιμυβήτα καλούμενοι σαρ "Ελλησ τὸ ἄρχαίον, ὡς ἐν τοῖς
περὶ βασιλείας ἱστορεῖ Θεοφραστος, αἱρετοὶ τινες ἦσαν τύραννοι' ἤροιντο δὲ
αὐτοὺς αἱ πόλεις οὐ' εἰς ἀόρατον χρώμαν οὐτε συνεχώς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς καυροὺς,
ὅπως δοξεὶς συμφέρειν καὶ εἰς ὀπόσων χρώμαν' ἄστερ καὶ Μιττυληναίοι ποθ
ἐιλοντο Πιττακῶν πρὸς τοὺς φυγάδας τοὺς περὶ Ἀλκαίον τὸν ποιητή, where
Theophrastus evidently has this passage of the Politics before him, though he says nothing of the Aesymnetes mentioned by Aristotle who held office for life). The Aesymneteship resembled the Roman Dictatorship in being called into play 'in asperioribus bellis aut in civili motu difficiliore' (Speech of the Emperor Claudius in the Lyons Tables, 1. 28: Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 2. i. 140), but there were some important differences between the two offices. The Aesymnete, for instance, was elected by the people, whereas the dictator was named by one of the consuls. The dictator held office for not more than six months; Pittacus, on the contrary, remained Aesymnete for ten years (Diog. Laert. 1. 75), and Aristotle knew of Aesymnetes who held office for life. The dictator was always created to deal with some specified business; this was frequently, but not always, it would seem, the case with the Aesymnete. The Aesymnete was master of
the State in civil no less than in military affairs; the civil authority of the dictator was less extensive (Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 2. i. 141 sqq.). It is not surprising that the Aesymneteship soon fell into disuse. It might not have done so if its power had been less, or if its tenure had been limited, like that of the Roman dictatorship, to six months. Pittacus surrendered it after holding it for ten years and retired into private life, but there were not many Greeks of his stamp, and there must always have been a risk of Aesymnetes declining to retire. Hence the Greek States allowed the office to disappear, and made shift with στρατηγοί αυτοκράτωρες in its place. Indeed, the creation even of a sole στρατηγὸς αυτοκράτωρ was sometimes attended with peril to the State, for the risk of the establishment of a tyranny was always greater in Greece than at Rome. Still Greece probably lost something by allowing the Aesymneteship to fall into disuse. It was an office which in the hands of good men was a means of suppressing tyranny.

32. τῆς βαρβαρικῆς, sc. μοναρχίας.

34. μέχρι τινῶν δρισμένων χρόνων ἢ πράξεων, 'till the expiration of some definite time or the performance of some definite actions.'

36. τῶν φυγάδας ὧν προειστήκεσαν κ.τ.λ. Compare the very similar expression in Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 19, οἱ φυγάδες, ὧν οἱ Ἀλκμεωνίδαι προειστήκεσαν.

'Αυτιμεινίδης καὶ Ἀλκαῖος ὁ ποιητὴς. In a passage of Diogenes Laerlius based on Aristotle (2. 46: Aristot. Fragm. 65. 1486 b 34) we find the form 'Αυτιμεινίδας, which is the correct Lesbian form. He was a brother of Alcaeus, and another brother was named Kikis (Alcaeus, Fragm. 137), Kikos meaning 'strength,' so that the names of all the three brothers were indicative of strength and prowess. See note on 1311 b 29.

37. δηλοὶ δ' Ἀλκαῖος κ.τ.λ. Aristotle evidently anticipates that his statement that Pittacus was elected tyrant by the Mytileneans will hardly be credited by his own contemporaries—an elective tyranny would seem to them to be a contradiction in terms—and he supports it with the strongest testimony he can find, that of the foe whom Pittacus was elected to put down. The fact would hardly have been forgotten if the songs of Alcaeus had not, like those of Simonides (Aristoph. Nub. 1353 sqq.), passed somewhat out of fashion. Alcaeus, however, can only have known of Pittacus' election by hearsay, for he was an exile when it took place. His scolon, or convivial song, was probably composed in the camp of
the exiles leagued against Mytilene, but it would not be long in finding its way into the city. It would be sung with most zest by others than the Mytileneans, for it satirized them as ἔθελόδουλοι, a grave reproach to Greeks (cp. Hdt. 3. 143 and 1. 62 sq., and Theogn. 847-850).

39. τὸν κακοπάτριδα Πιττακὸν κ.τ.λ. Alcaeus, Fragm. 37 A Bergk. There is a reference to this fragment in Eth. Nic. 9. 6. 1167 a 30 sqq. 'Respicit Plutarchus, Erot. c. 18, κοινὴ τὸν ἔρωτα συνεγγράφουσιν εἰς θεοὺς ποιητῶν οἱ κράτίστοι καὶ νομοθετῶν καὶ φιλοσόφων ἄθροι φωναὶ μέγα ἐπαινεώτες, ὄσπερ ἐφι τὸν Πιττακὸν ὁ Ἀλκαῖος αἰφείσθαι τούς Μεσολογνίους τύραννοι, ubi cum Reiske ἄθροι φωνὰ conieicisset, illud ipsum Schneidewin Alcaeo tribuit' (Bergk). The epithet κακοπάτρις, 'born of a mean father,' is no doubt applied to Pittacus because his father was a Thracian and perhaps a slave. As to his Thracian extraction cp. Duris, ap. Diog. Laert. i. 74: we see from Thuc. 4. 107 that Pittacus was a Thracian name. Τὸν κακοπάτριδα closes a line, and then follow two complete lines. In the second of these, 'Εστίσαντο κ.τ.λ., the second syllable is long, but this syllable may be either long or short in this metre, and thus we are not obliged to regard the a of Πιττακὸς as long. Ahrens (De Graec. Ling. Dial. i. 246) accentuates Πιττακον: he remarks (1. 10), 'Grammatici uno ore testantur, Aeoles accentum in ultima acutum fugientes retraxisse in priores syllabas, exceptis tantummodo, ut accuratiores moment, praepositionibus et conjunctionibus.'

In place of πόλεως and ἐπαίνεωτες Alcaeus probably wrote πόλιος (Ahrens, i. 116) and ἐπαίνετες (Ahrens, i. 142), but it is doubtful whether Aristotle did so in quoting his lines. Not much dependence can be placed on our MSS. in this matter, but it deserves notice that even when in citations from non-Attic writers they in the main preserve the dialect, as they do here—and this is often not the case (see for instance the quotation from Heraclitus in 7 (5). ii. 1315 a 30 sq.)—they allow Attic forms to slip in: thus we have ἐσθλῶν (not ἐσλῶν) in the quotation from Sappho in Rhet. i. 9. 1367 a 8 sqq., and Simonides may have written ἄμαρτα and καλέων in the passage (Fragm. 12) quoted from him in Hist. An. 5. 8. 542 b 7 sqq. See also critical note on 1340 b 26. Ἐπαίνετες is not only the correct Lesbian form, but it is required by the metre, unless the third and fourth syllables of ἐπαινεώτες can be regarded as coalescing. It may possibly be a technical word for the expression of assent to the election of a magistrate (cp. Alcaeus,

Fragm. 128, Hesych. 'Επαίνους' τάς κρίσεις καὶ τάς συμβουλίας καὶ τάς ἄρχαρεσίας: Σοφοκλῆς Θεότης Σικυώνικα κ᾽ Αλκαίος (MSS. ἀλκέοι) ταῖς ἐπανήτεσσων, but see Bergk on this fragment.

ἀχόλω, 'meek,' 'lacking gall.' Compare [Demosth.] c. Aristog. 1. 27, καὶ οὕτει ὑμῶν χόλην οὕτε ὀργήν ἔχουν φανερεῖται ἐφ᾽ οἷς ὁ βθελνύως καὶ ἀκαδὴς ἀνθρωπος οὕτοι βιωῖται τοὺς νόμους; and a passage quoted from Plutarch by Eusebius, Praep. Evangel. 3. 1. 3 (referred to by Liddell and Scott), ὥς δέον ἄθυμου καὶ ἀχόλου καὶ καθαιρεύουσαν ὀργῆς καὶ πικρίας ἀπάσης τὴν γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρός εἴναι συμβίασιν. Compare also Aristoph. Lysistr. 463, 

πότερον ἐπὶ δούλας των ἠκεῖ εὐνύμισας, ἡ γυναιξίν ὅπω σεῖς
χόλην ἐνεῖνας;

where the proverb ἐνεῖνα καὶ μίρυμα χόλη (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 111) is alluded to. Hamlet's 'I lack gall To make oppression bitter' is familiar.

2. αὐταὶ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Ἀδηνα, 'these monarchies' (cp. αὐταὶ, 1285 b. 1285 a 18 and 6 (4). Ι.Ο. 1.295 a 14). Ἐστὶ perhaps refers to the barbarian Kingship (cp. 17, εἰς), and ἤσαν to the Aesymneteship (cp. 30, ἄν). If so, the barbarian Kingship is here implied to have been elective, which we have not been told before, though we learn the fact in 6 (4). Ι.Ο. 1.295 a 11 sq.

4. τέταρτον ἐδοξὸς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle does not tell us whether he includes only Greek Kingships in this class, but probably this is his meaning, for he makes ἡ βαρβαρική βασιλεία a separate kind. Κατὰ νόμου should be taken with γιγνώμεναι ('which arose in accordance with law in the heroic times, voluntary and hereditary in character'); these Kingships are said to arise in accordance with law, because they do not, like tyranny, owe their origin to the arbitrary action of an individual (compare the contrast of κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βουλήσιν and κατὰ νόμου in c. 16. 1287 a 1 sqq. and c. 15. 1286 b 31 sqq.); they owe it, in fact, as is explained in the next sentence, to their subjects' gratitude for benefits conferred. Cp. 7 (5). Ι.Ο. 1.310 b 7, ὑπάρχει δὲ ἡ γένεσις εὐθὺς εἰς ἐναντίων ἑκάτερα τῶν μοναρχῶν κ.τ.λ. Τοῖς ἣρωικοῖς χρόνοισι, 'the times of the heroes,' the times of Heracles (Probl. 30. 1. 953 a 13 sq.) and Priam (Eth. Nic. 1. 10. 1100 a 7 sq.). Thus Isocrates (Evag. § 65) calls the Trojan War 'the war of the heroes.' The 'heroic times' seem to come to an end before, or perhaps with, the Dorian invasion of the Peloponnese (Paus. 7. 17. 1, Ἀργος μὲν ἐς πλείστον
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άφικομένην δυνάμεως πόλει ἐπὶ τῶν καλουμένων ἡρώων ὁμοῦ τῇ μεταβολῇ τῇ ἐς Δωρίας ἐπέλυσε τὸ ἐκ τῆς τύχης εὐμένες). As to 'the heroes,' cp. Probl. 19. 48. 922 b 17, ἣκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ ἡρώων μυμπταὶ οἱ δὲ ἡγεμόνες τῶν ἀρχαίων μῶν ἦσαν ἠρώες, οἱ δὲ λαοὶ ἄνθρωποι.

6. διὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Γάρ justifies ἐκφυσαίᾳ τε καὶ πάτριαι γεγονόμενα κατὰ νόμου by introducing an explanation in detail of the way in which this came about.

tοὺς πρῶτους, 'the first kings of each dynasty,' 'the founders of dynasties.'

tοῦ πλήθους εὐεργέτας. The founders of the heroic Kingships won their thrones, according to Aristotle, by services to the people, just as it was the revolt of the people that overthrew Kingships (15). Thurot (Études sur Aristote, p. 84) has already pointed out that this account is hardly consistent with 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 9 sq., where Kingship is said to have come into being for the protection of the ἐπισκεφτῶν from the demos. However, the origin of Kingship generally (including the Persian Kingship, for Cyrus is referred to) is traced in a very similar way in 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 31 sqq. Aristotle refers the origin of Kingship to the will of the people, but the Kings themselves would probably claim that they owed their thrones 'to Zeus, from whom they sprang (see Schömann, Gr. Alt. 1. 23).

7. κατὰ τέχνας, 'in connexion with arts.' Bernays translates 'by the invention of arts,' and no doubt services of this nature are especially present to Aristotle's mind, but the phrase is wide enough to include cases like that of Melampus, who was made joint-king of Argos with his brother and the previous King Anaxagoras for healing the Argive women of their madness (Paus. 2. 18. 4). As to Kings who won their thrones by discoveries in connexion with the arts, we may compare the words of Atreus in Eurip. Fragm. 853,


\[
deίδας γὰρ ἄστρων τὴν ἐναντίαν ὄδον
dήμους τε ἐσωτα καὶ τόπων νόμων,
\]

where Nauck refers to Strabo, p. 23 (Polyb. 34. 1. 4 sqq.), καὶ Πολιτείς δ' ὄρθως ὑπονοεῖ τὰ περὶ τῆς πλάνης τῶν γὰρ Άιλοι τῶν προσημαῖόντων τῶν ἐκπολέος ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τῶν πορθμῶν τῶν ἀμφιθρώμων οὖσι καὶ δυσέκπλοις διὰ τῶν πολὺροιας ταμάν τε εἰρήθαται τῶν ἀνέμων καὶ βασιλεία νεομίσθαι φησι, καθάπερ Δαναῶν ἡμῶν τὰ ὑδάτα τὰ ἐν "Αργος παραδείγματα, 'Ατρέα δὲ τοῦ ἄρολον τὴν ὑπεναντίαν τῷ ὑπαγόντι δρόμον, μάντεις τε καὶ ἱεροσκοπομένους ἀποδείκνυσθαι βασιλείας, τοὺς δ' ἵππεις τῶν Διαντίων


Aristotle no doubt remembers the way in which Bellerophon came to be King of the Lycians (Hom. II. 6. 189 sqq.).

§ 8. καὶ τῶν θυσιῶν, ὅσια μὴ ἱερατικά. The sacrificial functions of the Kings passed to the βασιλείας or ἀρχοντες or πρωτάνες, as to whom see 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 26 sqq., and note on that passage. The Egyptian King was a priest according to Plato, Polit. 290 D sqq.; not so the Greek King of heroic times. The sacrificial and judicial prerogatives of early Greek Kings were no doubt sources of profit to them, and their military position would bring them plunder.

καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὰς δίκας ἔκρινον. Did the King try all the actions that were brought? If so, there cannot have been many of them, especially as the King would be from time to time absent.
on campaigns. Gilbert (Beiträge zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des griech. Gerichtsverfahrens und des griech. Rechtes, p. 445) thinks that in the earliest days of Greece the whole people sat in judgement on offences affecting the collective interests. He infers this from the practice in historical times of the Macedonians (see note on 1285 a 16), the Epirots (Polyb. 32. 21 Hultsch), and the Acarnanians (Liv. 33. 16). But he holds that the right of trying these offences passed to the King in those States of Eastern Greece in which, as at Mycenae, a powerful Kingship came into existence, though the King may probably have exercised it with the advice of his γέροντες (p. 446).

11. τούτο δ' ἐποίοιν οἵ μὲν οὐκ ὄμνύοντες, οἳ δ' ὄμνύοντες. In times later than the heroic Greek judges and dicasts probably always adjudicated on oath (cp. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 47, ἄπαντι δὲ προσετάττετο παροικία καθάπερ ἐν δικαστήριῳ μεθ' ὄρκου τὴν ψήφον ἐπιφέρειν): the oath of the Athenian dicast is well known (see vol. i. p. 273, note 1, and below on 1287 a 25). Hence Aristotle's mention of the fact that some Greek Kings in the heroic times adjudicated unsworn. Those Kings who adjudicated on oath would no doubt swear to judge justly, and possibly to judge according to the laws. We must not assume that the Kings who adjudicated unsworn did not take an oath from time to time to rule according to the laws. The Lacedaemonian Kings swore to the Ephors every month that they would so rule (Xen. Rep. Lac. 15. 7), but we do not hear of their adjudicating on oath, though they may have done so. Plutarch in Quaest. Rom. 44 speculates why the priest of Jupiter at Rome was not allowed to swear—πότερον ὅτι βάσανος τὸς ἐλευθέρων ὁ ὄρκος ἑστὶ, δεί δὲ ἀδιασάνωτον εἶναι καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ἱερέως; ἢ ὅτι περὶ μικρῶν ἀπιστεύοιται τὸν τὰ θεία καὶ μέγιστα πεπιστευμένον οὐκ εἰκὸς ἑστὶν; ἢ ὅτι πᾶς ὄρκος εἰς κατάραν τελευτᾷ τῆς ἑπιορκίας, κατάρα δὲ δύσφημον καὶ σκυθρώττων; . . . ἡ κοινὸς ὁ τῆς ἑπιορκίας κίνδυνος, ὅν ἄν άσεβῆς καὶ ἑπιορκός εὐχῶν κατάρχηται καὶ ἱερῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως; That the oath was a check on the King we see from Soph. Fragm. 428, ὄρκοι δὲ προσετάττος ἐπιμελεστέρα
ψυχή κατέστη διεσά γὰρ φιλαύτερα,
φιλων τε μέμψιν κεῖς θεοὺς ἀμαρτάνειν.

The Athenians out of respect for Xenocrates would not allow him to give his testimony on oath (Cic. ad Att. 1. 16. 4). We have ὄμνύοντες here, as we have ὄμνύοντι in 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 9 and in
12. ὁ δ' ὅρκος ἦν τοῦ σκηντροῦ ἑπανάτασις. The article is absent before ἑπανάτασις, as is often the case when the genitive comes first: cp. Thuc. 4. 12. 2, τῶν τε χαρίων χαλεπότητι, and 3. 58. 4, ἐς πατέρων τῶν ὑμετέρων θήκας (Richards). Cp. also 3. 4. 1277 a 11 sq., b 19, 4 (7). i. 1330 b 29, τῶν ἰμπέλων συντάδας, and see critical note on 1331 b 5. Ἐπανάτασις, not simply ἄνάτασις, because the sceptre is lifted up in a particular direction. For the fact see Hom. II. 7. 412: iο. 321. Compare the oath of Abraham (Gen. xiv. 22, And Abram said to the king of Sodom, I have lift up mine hand unto the Lord, the most high God, the possessor of heaven and earth, that I will not take from (thee?) a thread even to a shoe latchet, and that I will not take anything that is thine). The lifting-up of the sceptre perhaps signified that the King staked his sceptre on the honesty of the judgement. No words needed to be uttered, no gods to be named; in both these respects the oath referred to differed from ordinary oaths, in which it was common to name three gods (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 2. § 21. 9). Cp. Alexis, Fragm. Ὑπετίωσε (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 420), ὅρκος βιβαίος ἐστιν ἄν νεύσω μόνον, and Cratin. Χείρωνε, Fragm. 11 (Meineke, 2. 155),

οἷς ἦν μέγιστος ὅρκος

ἁπαντὶ λόγῳ κύων, ἑπείτα χήν θεοῦς δ' ἐσίγων,

where see Meineke's note.

13. οἱ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Οἱ ἀρχαῖοι χρόνοι include οἱ ἡρωικοὶ χρόνοι, in which these Kingships came into being, but also far later times (see above on 1285 a 30). For ἀρχεῖν with the accusative of the matters over which rule is exercised, cp. c. 16. 1287 a 9, where Π have ἀρχεῖ τάντα. If we read with all the MSS. (except M, which omits the first τά, and P, which adds κατά before ἐνθημα) καί τά κατὰ πόλιν καὶ τά ἐνθημα καὶ τά ὑπερφόρα (St. Hilaire and Sus. would omit the first καί), we shall probably be right in translating, with Bernays, 'both matters in the city and matters in the territory and matters beyond the frontier, though τά ἐνθημα usually means 'home-affairs,' and it would be possible to take it in this sense here, translating 'both matters in the city and home-affairs generally and matters beyond the frontier.' Those who strike out καί before τά κατὰ πόλιν translate 'the affairs of the State, both home-affairs and affairs beyond the
the frontier.' Ta kata polw might probably mean 'the affairs of the State' (cp. Plato, Polit. 287 B, D, 295 E, 305 E, and see Holden on Xen. Oecon. 11. 14), but ta kata twn polw (Isocr. De Pace, § 49) or ta ev twn polw (Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1145 a 11) is more commonly used in this sense, ta kata polw meaning rather 'matters in the city' in contradistinction to 'matters in the country': compare for the contrast of kata polw and kar' agrwv Xen. Oecon. 11. 14 and Cyneget. 13. 15, Plato, Theaeat. 142 A and Rep. 475 D, and Menand. 'Ydpla Fragm. i (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 207). If we are right then in taking ta kata polw in the sense of 'matters in the city,' the three-fold division in the passage before us will answer to that in Plato, Phaedrus 230 C, ovwv ev tov dsteos ouv' eis twn uperopian apodmeis, ouv' efwo teixwv efmoige dokeis to parapwv efwina.

14. suxevos raries, unlike the later basileis (8. 6. 8. 1322 b 24 sqq.), who were annual officers.

vstepon de k.t.l. As to the circumstances attending the fall of Kingship compare 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 38 sqq. and Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 74, where Theophrastus is probably followed, as in the passage immediately preceding. Both Dionysius and Polybius (6. 7. 6–9) speak as if the Kingship of heroic Greece always passed into a tyranny before it fell (cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 10 sqq.), but we gather from the passage before us and from 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 40 sq. that this was not always the case.

15. ta mves astwn parinevwv twv basilewv. Aristotle probably refers in the first place to Theseus (Plut. Thees. cc. 24, 25), but also to Theopompos the Lacedaemoniax King (7 (5). 11. 1313 a 26 sqq.) and to the Kings of the Molossians (1313 a 23 sqq.).

ta de twv oklwv paraiwmewn. The diminution of the powers of the Kingship is commonly attributed by the authorities to oi polloi or o thewos. Cp. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 74, arxaiwnw de twwn ev twis efwouiai plhmerelain, kai vomois evn oligna cheironewn, twis de eauton gnwmiai to polla dioukoluntws, duxheparantes blon to prajma ooi polloi kagelusas men tw basileik plieituma, vomois de katasthsmewnoi kai arxai aposdeiawtes, tautes efworw twv polleon filakiais. Pausanias speaks of o thewos in 4. 5. 10 and 2. 19. 2. Polybius also assigns the chief part in the overthrow of monarchy to the plhrous (6. 8. 1), and so does Lucretius (5. 1136 sqq.). Their view is confirmed by the fact that in the Achaean cities Kingship was succeeded by democracy (Polyb. 2. 41. 4 sq.). Aristotle speaks of Kingship as designed to protect the epiekeis from the thewos (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 9), and it is
natural that he should regard the Many as the agents in its overthrow. If we ask how it happened that, though Kingship was overthrown by the Many, it was nevertheless usually succeeded by the supremacy of the Few, Polybius has an answer ready; the Many effected the overthrow of Monarchy by means of προστάται, and they allowed these προστάται to rule over them (Polyb. 6. 8. 1 sq.).

16. αἱ πατριῶι δυναί are so termed in contradistinction to αἱ ἐπίθεται ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 3: Isocr. Areopag. § 29). The Kingship was reduced to priestly functions at Cyrene (Hdt. 4. 161) and Ephesus, where we read of the descendants of Androclus in Strabo, p. 633, καὶ ἐτὶ νῦν οἱ ἐκ τοῦ γένους ὀνομάζονται βασιλεῖς ἔξοντες τινας τιμάς, προεδρίαν τε ἐν ἄγωσι καὶ πορφύραν ἐπίσημον τοῦ βασιλικοῦ γένους, σκίπωνα ἀντὶ σκύπτρου, καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ τῆς Ἑλευσίναις Δήμητρος.

20. μὲν οὖν is taken up by μὲν οὖν, 28, and then answered by πέμπτον δὲ κ.τ.λ., 29.

22. ἐπὶ τις δ' ὀρισεῖν, 'but held on certain fixed conditions.' Though the submission rendered to the heroic Kingship by its subjects was a willing submission, it was not unconditional. Aristotle conceives the heroic Kingship to have been granted to the Kings by the people on the condition that they should be generals and judges and supreme over matters relating to the gods. This form of νομικὴ βασιλεία resembles νομικὴ φιλία (Eth. Nic. 8. 15. 1162 b 25, ἔστι δὴ νομικὴ μὲν (φιλία) ἢ ἐπὶ βητοῖ κ.τ.λ.).

24. ἐκ γένους, literally 'resulting from family,' 'by right of family.' 'Ex here signifies the 'origo et causa' of the ἀρχή (Bon. Ind. 225 b 15). Cp. [Plato,] Menex. 238 D, oὐτοὶ δὲ (i. e. βασιλεῖς) τοτὲ μὲν ἐκ γένους τοτὲ δὲ ἄφροτοι. Elsewhere we have κατὰ γένος.

26. For τετάρτη τοῦτων, 'fourth of these which I am enumerating,' cp. 2. 11. 1272 b 28, and see Vahlen on Poet. 3. 1448 a 19.

27. αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle forgets that he has included under the Lacedaemonian type of Kingship not only hereditary but also elective Kingships (1285 a 15: cp. also c. 15. 1285 b 39). His recapitulations are not always exact: see vol. i. Appendix B, and above on 1258 a 17 and 1278 a 34.

29. πέμπτον δ' εἶδος κ.τ.λ. Πάντων is here neuter (though in c. 16. 1287 a 11 we have τὸ κύριον ἐνα πάντων εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν): cp. Magn. Mor. 1. 35. 1198 b 13, ὅτι γὰρ πάντων κύριος καὶ πάντα διοικεῖ, and Demosth. Ol. 1. 4, τὸ γὰρ εἶναι πάντων ἐκείνων ἐνα ὄντα κύριον καὶ ῥήγων καὶ ἀπορρήτων. It is characteristic of Monarchy to be supreme over
everything (Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 37 sq.), though all Kings were not so (1285 a 4). Compare with Aristotle's language here the address of the Chorus to the King of the Argives in Aesch. Suppl. 370 sqq. Sus. appears to take παίνων with τῶν κοινῶν, reading ὀπέρ in place of ὀπέρ with Buecheler, but Bernays seems right in following Bekker, who places a comma after ὀν and takes ὀπέρ ἐκατον ἔθνος καὶ τοιοῦτον κοινὰν together.

30. τῶν κοινῶν, 'public matters,' as in c. 5. 1278 b 4 (not 'public property,' as Bern.).

31. τεταγμένη κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομικὴν, sc. ἄρχην, 'answering to household rule.' Supply βασιλεία from εἶδος βασιλείας (cp. 34). Bonitz (Ind. 748 b 18 sqq.) explains τάτειν here as used 'de notionum ordine logicum,' and refers among other passages to 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 32, ἡ βασιλεία τέτακται κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν, Eth. Nic. 5. 5. 1130 b 18, ἡ κατὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν τεταγμένη δικαιοσύνη, and Top. 5. 7. 137 a 30 sqq., where τὸ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι λεγόμενον is used synonymously with τὸ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι τεταγμένον.

ὁπέρ γάρ κ.τ.λ. Supply ἄρχη with ἡ οἰκονομικὴ. In saying that the rule over a household is a kind of Kingship (see above on 1278 b 37), Aristotle is thinking of the relation of the father to his children, not of that of the husband to his wife or of the master to his slaves.

32. οὕτως ἡ βασιλεία κ.τ.λ. Sus. would read παραβασιλεία in place of βασιλεία, but Aristotle speaks of the fifth kind of Kingship simply as Kingship (cp. τὴν βασιλείαν, c. 16. 1287 b 35), because it is Kingship κατ' ἔσχην. Πάλινως καὶ ἔθνος ἐνὸς ἡ πλείων ἐς is of course dependent on οἰκονομία, not on βασιλεία.

C. 15. 33 sqq. Aristotle seems to take it for granted that if he discovers whether the two extreme forms are expedient or not, he will have solved the question of the expediency of the intermediate forms. In just the same way Hippocrates in his treatise De Aere, Aquis, Locis sketches the extreme variations of the human race under the influence of climate and region, closing the treatise with the words, οἱ μὲν ἐπιστήμων καὶ οὓς ἱεράσθησαν τὰ λαντά ἐνθυμεῖται, καὶ οὐχ ἄμαρτήσῃ. Aristotle may also have felt that a discussion of the expediency of the heroic Kingship and the Aesymneteship would have only an historical, and a discussion of the expediency of the barbarian Kingship only a scientific, interest for Greeks.

35. τῶν ἄλλων αἱ πολλαί. Aristotle probably refers to the heroic
Kingship and possibly also to the barbarian Kingship, for the power of the Aesymnete seems to have been quite unbounded.

36. ἔλαττόνων μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For the late appearance of εἰσὶ in this sentence cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 35 sqq. and see note on 1332 b 42.

τῆς παμβασιλείας, literally ‘Kingship over everything’ (cp. παμ-μίτωρ = πάντων μήτηρ), as we see from c. 16. 1287 a 8 sqq. It would seem from the expression τῆς παμβασιλείας καλομένης, 1287 a 8, and from the absence of any remark in the passage before us, that the word was not coined by Aristotle, as Schneider thinks, but was a recognized Greek word. Παμβασιλεύς does not occur in Aristotle’s writings, though it occurs in Σωφία Σειράχ 50. 15 and in C. I. G. 4725. 6 (Liddell and Scott).

39. ἢ κατὰ γένος ἢ κατὰ μέρος. See above on 1285 a 15, where we have τοὺς ὅς αἱ μὲν κατὰ γένος εἰσίν, αἱ δ’ αἱρεταί. Tenure ‘by family’ is opposed to tenure ‘by turns,’ because tenure ‘by turns’ makes the office accessible to all, not indeed simultaneously but successively. Tenure ‘by turns’ is a wider term than tenure ‘by election,’ because, when tenure ‘by turns’ is the rule, the dignity may pass by election or it may not.

2. τὸ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., ‘now to inquire as to the kind of Generalship 1286 a. we have mentioned is to enter on an inquiry belonging in species rather to inquiries respecting laws than to inquiries respecting constitutions.’ The inquiry started by Aristotle in c. 14. 1284 b 35 sqq. is an inquiry respecting Kingship as a constitution (cp. 1284 b 39, ἢ οὕ, ἀλλ’ ἀλλὰ τις πολιτεία μάλλον). So too in 3. 1. 1274 b 32 it is taken for granted that the subject for consideration is the constitution: cp. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 29, ἢμιν δὲ τὴν μέθοδον εἶναι περὶ πολιτείας. For ἐχει εἶδον Bonitz (Ind. 218 b 17) compares Rhet. 2. 22. 1395 b 20, περὶ δ’ ἐνθυμημάτων καθολου τε εἰπωμεν, τίνα τρόπον δεί ζητεῖν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τοὺς τόπους ἄλλο γὰρ εἶδος ἐκατέρου τοὺς ἐστίν. Notwithstanding what he says here, Aristotle describes in 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 17 sqq. an attempt to abolish the Lacedaemonian Kingship as an attempt to alter ‘a part of a constitution.’

4. ἐν ἀπάσας γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 16. 1287 a 4 sqq. and see note on that passage.

For τοῦτο referring to τῆς τοιαύτης στρατηγίας, see notes on 1263 a 1 and 1291 a 16, and cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 25, where ταῦτα refers to φθοραί and σωτηρίαι.
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5. ὡστ' ἀφείσθω τὴν πρώτην. Aristotle evidently intended to treat of laws some time or other: cp. 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 11 sqq.

7. ἀρχὴ δ' ἔστι κ.τ.λ. This is the initial inquiry; it is followed by the further inquiries, τίσι συμφέρει καὶ πῶς (c. 17. 1288 a 30 sqq.). The question whether the rule of men or of law is best was as old as the time of Pittacus, if we may trust Diod. 9. 27. 4 and Diog. Laert. 1. 77 (see above on 1281 a 34), and of Solon, to judge by Plut. Solon, c. 14, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν διὰ μέσου πολιτῶν τὴν ὑπὸ λόγον καὶ νόμου μεταβολὴν ὑπὸντες ἐργῶδη καὶ χαλεπὴν οὔσαν, οὔκ ἐφευγὼν ἐνα τῶν δικαίωτατον καὶ φρονιμῶτατον ἐπιστῆσαι τοῖς πράγμασιν. Athenian public opinion had long decided the question in favour of law; it identified Democracy with the rule of law and Monarchy and Oligarchy with the rule of persons (vol. i. p. 494, note), and it is in this spirit that Theseus speaks as the representative of Democracy in Eurip. Suppl. 415 sqq. Bothe (429 sqq. Dind.): cp. also Hyperid. Or. Fun. col. 9. 23, ο[ῦ] γὰρ ἀνδρὸς ἀπειλή, ἀλλὰ νόμου φονῆν κυριεύειν δεῖ τῶν εἰδαμόνων.

The teaching of Socrates, however, gave new life to the discussion. No one rendered a more willing obedience to the laws than he, yet his view that he who knows is the true ruler, and that a parallel exists between the ruler of a State and the master of an art, furnished Monarchy, or at any rate Monarchy in the hands of a scientific ruler, with a fresh ground of claim. For what master of an art would be prepared to fetter his practice of his art by written rule? It does not appear that Socrates himself ever raised this question, but his views undoubtedly suggested those to which Plato gives expression in Polit. 294 A sqq. and Laws 874 E sqq. See as to Plato's views vol. i. p. 270 sqq. Aristotle in his first inquiry on the subject, contained in c. 15, is led, after a brief discussion (1286 a 9-21) of the question whether the best man or the best laws should rule, to suggest a compromise—let the best man promulgate laws and let laws rule except where they deviate from what is right, or in other words let the best man rule in subjection to law, except where right requires that he shall overrule law. But at the beginning of c. 16 Aristotle discovers that a ruler in this position would not be an Absolute King, whereas it is the claims of Absolute Kingship that he has promised to examine. Hence the compromise has to be abandoned and a fresh inquiry into the subject undertaken in c. 16 with the result that law should rule in some cases and the One Best Man in others.

agrees that the law from its inevitable generality is unable to regulate some things and fails to regulate others well (1286 a 24), even when the utmost possible degree of ἀκρίβεια is imparted to it. Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 14. 1137 b 13–32: Pol. 2. 8. 1269 a 9 sqq.: 3. 11. 1282 b 1–6: 3. 15. 1286 a 36 sqq.: Rhet. 1. 13. 1374 a 18 sqq. Law is said in c. 16. 1287 b 22 to be unable to regulate things about which men deliberate. For πρὸς τὰ προσπλήστωτα ἐπιτάττειν cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 5. 16, πρὸς τὸ συμπάττων ἀδιατάτων ἐπορεύετο.

12. For ἄρχειν, used of the master of an art, cp. c. 6. 1279 a 4 sqq.

καὶ ἐν Ἁγύπτῳ κ.τ.λ., ‘and in Egypt it is permissible for the physicians to change’ (i.e. to depart from) ‘the rules of treatment prescribed by law after four days’ treatment, while if a physician does this before, he does it at his peril.’ Bonitz (Ind. 391 a 7) is probably right in supplying τῶν γεγραμένων νόμων with κινεῖν, unless indeed we should rather supply τὰ γράμματα from 12. With μετὰ τὴν τετράμερον Prof. Postgate (Notes, p. 7) supplies μελέτην: perhaps, however, ἑρπασία is the word which is suppressed (cp. c. 16. 1287 a 40, τὴν ἐκ τῶν γεγραμάτων ἑρπασίαν). For ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ (not αὐτῶν) κυνδέω, cp. c. 16. 1287 b 30, τοὺς γὰρ τῇ ἄρχῇ καὶ αὐτοῦ φίλους ποιοῦσα (οἱ μόνοι) συνάρχους, and Eth. Nic. 3. 1. 1110 a 9, ἀπλῶς μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀποβάλλει ἐκών, ἐπὶ σωτηρία δ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀπαντεῖ ὁ νόμος ἔχουσε. As to the fact Camerarius (Interp. p. 136) refers to Diod. 1. 82. 3, κατὰ δὲ τὰς στρατείας καὶ τὰς τῆς χώρας ἐκδημίας ἑρπασοῦσαν πάντες οὐδεὶς μισθὸν ἵδια διδόσας: οἱ γὰρ λατρεῖ τὰς μὲν τρόφοις ἐκ τοῦ κοινοῦ λαμβάνοντες, τὰς δὲ ἑρπασίας προσάγουσι κατὰ νόμον ἐγγραφαῖς, ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ διδοξασμένων λατρῶν ἄρχαιοι συγγεγραμένων καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ιερᾶς βίβλου νόμους ἀναγνωσκόμενοι ἀκολουθήσαντες ἀδυνατήσωσι σώσας τὸν κάμποντα, ἄθοφο παντὸς ἐγκλήματος ἀπολύσαντες, ἐὰν δὲ παρὰ τὰ γεγραμένα θνησκοῦσι, βανατὸν κρίσιν ὑπομένουσιν, ἵγουσιν οὖν τὸ νομοθέτου τῆς ἐκ πολλῶν χρόνων παρατητηρημένης ἑρπασίας καὶ συνεπαγμένης ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων τεχνίτων ἠλίθους ἅν γενέσθαι συνεπτωτέρους. The authority followed by Diodorus does not seem to have been aware that the physicians in Egypt were free after four days to depart from the treatment prescribed by law, if desirable. The reason why they were allowed to do so may have been that a crisis in the disease was thought to occur on the fourth day: cp. Hist. An. 5. 20. 553 a 9, αἱ δὲ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται τοῖς πλείστοις κατὰ τριήμερον ἢ τετράμερον, διαπερ καὶ αἱ τῶν νόσων συμβαινοῦσι κρίσεις. See also Hippocr. De Morb. 4. vol. ii. p. 347 sqq. Kühn, where the
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writer explains that the crisis in fevers occurs on days uneven in number, the third, fifth, seventh, or ninth, and adds, μεθεῖε δὲ τὸ πῦρ ἐν τῇ σε περισσοτέρα διὰ τόδε, ὅτι ἐν τῇ σε ἀρτιότιοι τῶν ἁμερῶν ἐλκεί τὸ σῶμα ἀπὸ τῆς κολής, ἐν δὲ τῇ σε περισσοτέρα ἀρκεῖ, but this teaching hardly agrees with that of the passage just quoted from the History of Animals. Or the view may have been that the full effect of the drugs administered would not be experienced by the patient till the third day: see Hippoc. De Morb. 4. vol. ii. p. 341 Kühn.

16. διὰ τὴν αὐτῆν αἰτίαν, for the same reason for which ἡ κατὰ γράμματα καὶ νόμους θεραπεία is not the best—the reason being that the ἀρκετὰ καὶ νόμοι may be unsuitable in the given case.

ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. This is the rejoinder of an advocate of law. 'But yet [if it is made an objection to law that it embodies an universal principle,] that universal principle too [no less than other things] must be possessed by the rulers, [so that their sway is open to the same objection,] and that from which the affective element is wholly absent is better than that in which it is innate. Now the affective element finds no place in the law, whereas every human soul must have it. [Hence the law is a better ruling authority than a man.]' Κακείνων τῶν λόγων τὸν καθόλου takes up 10, τὸ καθόλου μάνου λέγειν. That without τὸ καθόλου λόγος a ruler cannot rule aright, we see from i. 13. 1260 a 17, διὸ τὸν μὲν ἄρχοντα τελείων ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν ἑδύκην ἀρετήν (τὸ γὰρ ēργον ἐστὶν ἄπλος τοῦ ἀρχιστέκτονος, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἀρχιστέκτων), and Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 b 20–28: cp. Plut. Ad Princ. Inerud. c. 3, τῆς οὖν ἁρχής τοῦ ἄρχοντος, ὁ νόμος, ἡ πάνω βασιλεία βουτών τε καὶ ἀδικώτων, ὡς φης Πίνδαρος, οὐκ ἐν βιβλίοις ἐξο γεγραμμένοι, οὐδὲ τοσὶ ἐξόλους, ἀλλ' ἐμφύχορον ὡς ἐλεύθην λόγος, ἀεὶ συνοικῶν καὶ παραφυλάττων καὶ μηδέποτε τὴν ψυχήν ἑών ἴμημοι ἴμημοιας.

17. κρείττον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 b 26 sqq. and Plato, Laws 713 E sqq. As to τὸ παθητικὸν see above on 1254 b 8, and compare c. 16. 1287 a 28 sqq., where τὸ παθητικὸν is represented by ἐπιθυμία. For δὲ συμφύνεις cp. Plato, Timaeus 70 E, καὶ κατέδησαν δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον (i.e. τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν) ἐνταῦθα ὡς βρέμα ἄγριαν, τρέφειν δὲ ξυνημένων ἀναγκαίων, εἴπερ τι μέλλον τὸ βουτών ἐσεβαθαί γένος.

19. ψυχήν ἀνθρωπίνην. Cp. c. 10. 1281 a 34 sqq., and Xen. Cyrop. 1. 3. 18, καὶ ὁ σὸς πατήρ πρῶτος τὰ τεταγμένα μὲν ποιεῖ τῇ πάλι, τὰ τεταγμένα δὲ λαμβάνει, μέτρον δὲ αὐτῷ οὐχ ἡ ψυχή ἀλλὰ ὁ νόμος ἐστίν. Ἀνθρωπίνη is probably added because the proposal was to put a man in the place of the law.

20. ἄντι τούτου, perhaps rather 'in return for this' than 'in
compensation for this' ("pro eo quod affectibus non caret," Bon. Ind. 63 a 57). The presence of an affective element in the individual human being is the price he pays for his deliberating better about particulars. Cp. Hdt. 3. 59, παρὰ δὲ ἔρμονέων νῆσον ἀντὶ χρημάτων παρέλαθον.

21. ὅτι μὲν τοῖνυν κ.τ.λ. Ἀριστοτέλον, i.e. τὸν ἀριστοῦν ἀνδρα. Aristotle here follows in the track of Plato, Polit. 295 D–E, 300 C. He draws the provisional conclusion that it will be best to have a Lawgiver-King content in general to leave supremacy to the law which he has made, but ready to overrule it when it is well that he should do so. (Compare c. II. 1282 b 1 sqq., where a similar arrangement is suggested.) Plutarch describes in Ages. c. 30, how Agesilaus after Leuctra, seeing how numerous those were who had lost courage in the battle (οἱ τρόսαντες), advised that the laws which imposed a severe form of ἀμιία in such cases should 'sleep for a while.' Aristotle, however, goes much further than this, and asks that his Lawgiver-King shall overrule the law not only in critical times, but whenever it deviates from the right. We may compare the powers of overruling law possessed by the Roman Senate, and afterwards by the Emperor, even before the Principate became an Absolute Monarchy (Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 2. 823 sqq., ed. 1), and also the dispensing power of the Popes and the English Kings (Macaulay, Hist. of England, c. 6). Cowell in the earlier editions of his 'Interpreter, or Law Dictionary,' writing in the reign of James I, who found it necessary to suppress the work by proclamation, said under the title 'King,' 'And though at his coronation he take an oath not to alter the laws of the land, yet, this oath notwithstanding, he may alter or suspend any particular law that seemeth hurtful to the public estate' (Hallam, Const. Hist. of England, c. 6). It must be borne in mind that the King whom Aristotle would invest with powers of this nature is ex hypothesi an ἀνήρ ἀριστος.

24. ὅσα δὲ κ.τ.λ. The antecedent to ὅσα is τοίνυν or ταῦτα (after ἄρχειν). Κρίνειν, 'to decide,' as in 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 29.

26. καὶ γὰρ τῶν κ.τ.λ. Συμβολές takes up πάντας (cp. c. II. 1281 b 34, πάντας . . . συνελθόντες). Κρίνονσιν, 'come to decisions.' Both judicial and deliberative decisions are probably referred to, whereas in c. II. 1281 b 31, 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 5, and 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 4 κρίνειν refers only to the former. The point of the addition, αἰτεῖ δ' αἰ κρίσεις εἰσὶ πάσαι περὶ τῶν καθ' ἔκαστον, will become clear if we supply
after τῶν καὶ έκαστον the words 'which are just the things that the law cannot deal with.'

28. μέν οὖν, 'true.' This passage seems to be based on c. i1. 1281 a 42 sqq.

29. ἀλλ' ἐστίν ἢ πόλις ἐκ πολλῶν, 'but the State is made up of many individuals, [and therefore is better than any single individual].'

Cp. c. ii. 1282 a 38 sq.

30. μιᾶς καὶ ἀπλῆς. An ἐστίασις συμφορητός is really a number of ἐστίασεις, and it is compound, not ἀπλῆς.

διὰ τούτο. For the asyndeton cp. 6 (4). II. 1295 b 33, διὰ τούτο καλῶς ἡμέρα ὑψιτάτῳ Ψευδολίδης: 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 11, αὐτή ἡ πολιτεία διαφέρει τε ἀμφότεροι κ.τ.λ.: 7 (5). II. 1314 a 12, ταύτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τυραννικά μὲν καὶ σωτηρίᾳ τῆς ἀρχῆς: Rhet. 2. 6. 1384 a 36, διὰ τούτο τοὺς άι παρεσομένους μάλλον αἰσχύνονται: Magn. Mor. 2. ii. 1209 a 24, ταῦτ' οὖχ ὁμοίως λέγονται.

καὶ κρίνει ἁμείνον, 'also decides better' [besides being better].

31. Τοῦ μάλλον . . . 33. ἀδιαφθορώτερον. A numerous body not only arrives at better decisions than a single individual or a few, but is also less likely to be led astray from the just conclusions at which it arrives. For the structure of the sentence see above on 1253 b 35-37. μάλλον ἀδιαφθορον, 'less easily seduced': cp. Plato, Laws 768 Β, δικαστάς ἐκ τοῦ παραχρήμα ἀδιαφθόρου ταῖς δεήσει δικάζου, where the word is explained in Bekk. Anecd. 1. p. 343 by τὸ μὴ παρακεκιμένου τῆς ὀρθῆς γνώµης (see Stallbaum on the passage). For the thought, cp. 'Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 41, καὶ τοῦτο δοκοῦσι ποιεῖν ὀρθὰς' εὐδιαφθορώτεροι γὰρ (οἱ) ὀλίγοι τῶν πολλῶν εἰσίν κ[α]ί κέρδει κ'[α]ί χάρισιν, and Bryce, American Commonwealth, 2. 78, 'The legislator can be "got at," the people cannot ... The legislator may be subjected by the advocates of women's suffrage or liquor-prohibition to a pressure irresistiblible by ordinary mortals, but the citizens are too numerous to be all wheedled or threatened.' Yet the Constitution of the United States looks, and not in vain, to the President to act as a check on the tendency of Congress to yield to pressure from a section of its constituents or to temptations of a private nature' (Bryce, 1. 75 sq.).

33. τοῦ δ' ἐνὸς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has just been pleading that the decisions of a multitude are less easily seduced by the wrongful influence of others than those of one man, and now he goes on to plead that they are less easily warped by internal passion. Sus. reads γάρ e conj. in place of δ', which is the reading of ΠΠ, but not,
I think, rightly. When a whole people did come to be mastered by anger, to appease it was impossible; the only thing possible was to let its anger have full course in the hope that it would exhaust itself after a time (Eurip. Orest. 678 sqq. Bothe, 696 sqq. Dindorf).

36. ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ πλήθος οἱ ἐλεύθεροι κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Laws 701 Α, εἰ γὰρ δὴ καὶ δημοκρατία ἐν αὐτῇ τις μόνον ἐγένετο ἐλευθέρων ἀνδρῶν, οὐδὲν ἀν πάνυ γε δεινὸν ἦν τὸ γεγονός, c. II. 1281 b 15 sqq., 23 sq., and c. 15. 1286 b 31 sq. Aristotle evidently connects the overriding of law with the rule of a πλῆθος of the kind which bears sway in extreme democracies (6 (4). 4. 1292 a 15, 23 sqq.: 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1 sqq.), a πλῆθος including other elements than οἱ ἐλεύθεροι (6 (4). 6. 1292 b 38 sqq.).

38. εἰ δὲ δὴ κ.τ.λ. Τοῦτο, 'this abstinence from overriding of the law.' A high degree of virtue is not attainable by the Many (c. 7. 1279 a 39 sqq.: 4 (7). II. 1330 b 39). 'ΑΛΛ' εἰ πλείους κ.τ.λ., 'still if there were a plurality of persons good both as men and as citizens.' This is the characteristic of true ἀριστοκρατία (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 5 sq.). For ἄλλα cp. c. 5. 1278 a 9.

1. ἄλλ' οἱ μὲν κ.τ.λ. As Giph. points out (p. 395), this view is 1286 b. implied in the argument of Darius in favour of Monarchy (Hdt. 3. 82): compare also the answer of Alexander to the proposal of Darius to share the Persian Kingship with him (Diod. 17. 54. 5). In the quaint story preserved in Stob. Floril. 10. 50 Aristotle hints that even in an individual the right side may fall out with the left. And if the One Man does escape internal discord, his rule may nevertheless be productive of στάσις, for others will be apt to fall out with him (Xen. Anab. 6. 1. 29).

2. ἄλλα κ.τ.λ. Good men do not fall out among themselves (Eth. Nic. 8. 4. 1156 b 11 sq.). Σπουδαῖοι τὴν ψυχήν, cp. Thuc. 2. 40. 5.

3. εἰ δὴ κ.τ.λ. This is suggested by Plato, Rep. 445 D, ἐγγενομένου μὲν γὰρ ἀνδρὸς ἐνός ἐν τοῖς ἀρχοντὶς διαφέροντος βασιλεία ἐν κληθέιν, πλείους δὲ ἀριστοκρατία. (Contrast the account given of ἀριστοκρατία in Plato, Polit. 301 A.) Aristotle is speaking aporetically in the passage before us. It is not his deliberate view that Kingship differs from Aristocracy in being the rule of one good man, while Aristocracy is the rule of several. The true King is one who surpasses in virtue and political capacity all the rest of the citizens put together. No such superiority is possessed by the individual rulers of an Aristocracy.
8. καὶ μετὰ δυνάμεως κ.τ.λ., 'both when the Kingly office is accompanied with a bodyguard and when it is not.' It was a drawback to Kingship that it usually involved a bodyguard, and Aristotle says that Aristocracy would be better than Kingship, even if the King had no bodyguard. That Kingship is an αρχή, we see from 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 8.

7. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ., 'and it was perhaps only owing to this that,' etc. 'Only' is often left unexpressed by Aristotle: see above on 1282 a 36 and b 4. The account of the succession of constitutions given in the passage which commences here is aporetic only, and is not in agreement with Aristotle's deliberate opinion on the subject. A quite different account is given in 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 16 sqq., where constitutional changes are connected with changes in the art of war ; indeed, in the criticism of Plato which is 'tacked on' (see vol. i. p. 519, note) at the close of the Book on Revolutions (7 (5). 12. 1316 a 1 sqq.) Aristotle seems to deny that there is any regular succession of constitutions (1316 a 20 sqq.). The object of the review here given of the succession of constitutions appears to be to show that the days of Kingship were long past, and that it was in place only when States were small and a few much surpassed the rest in virtue. When States became larger, its place was naturally taken, first by an equal constitution, and then by degenerate forms of this ending in democracy, and when they became larger still, democracy came to be the only constitution which could easily be introduced.

8. For σπάνιον with the infinitive see Liddell and Scott.

9. ἄλλος τε καὶ τότε μικρὰς οἰκούντας πόλεισ. Πόλεις here seems to mean 'States,' not 'cities': see notes on 20 and 1310 b 17. It is implied in the latter passage that States were small when Kingship prevailed.

10. έτε δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'besides, men instituted their Kings in consequence of benefit conferred, and benefits are the work of good men, [and good men were then rare].' 'Από in ἀντὶ εὐεργεσίας marks the 'origo et causa' (Bon. Ind. 77 b 51 sqq.). For the fact, cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 10 sqq. That benefits are the work of good men is implied in Xen. Cyrop. 3. 3. 4, ὁ δὲ 'Ἀρμένιος συμπροέπεμε (τὸν Κύρον) καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ἀνδρῶποι, ἀνακαλοῦντες τὸν εὐεργέτην, τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἀγαθὸν. In an inscription found at Lycosura and published by Cavvadías in his 'Lycosura' we read ὅπως ἦ πάσιν ἀνδρῶποις γνωστὰ ἂ τε τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν εὐεργεσία ἂ τε τὰς πόλιος εἰς τοὺς ἄξιον ἐξορίσται.
Complimentary decrees declaring individuals εὐεργήται often speak of them as ἄνδρες ἁγαθοὶ (see e.g. Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 92 and No. 138, line 40).

12. οὐκέτι ὑπέμεινον κ.τ.λ., 'they no longer endured [to be ruled by Kings], but sought for something shared in common by all, and established a constitution.' Cp. Plato, Polit. 301 C (quoted on 1287 a 22), Isocr. Hel. § 35, μετὰ δὲ ταύτα (Θησεύς) κοινὴ τὴν πατρίδα καταστήσας καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν συμπολιτευομένων ἐλευθερώσας ἐξ ἤτοι τὴν ἁμαλλαν αὐτοῖς περὶ τῆς ἄρετῆς ἐποίησε κ.τ.λ., and Paus. 9. 5. 16, τὸ δὲ ἐντεῦθεν διὰ πλείων πολιτείαν ἡμὶδὲ ἀπ’ ἄνδρὸς ἐνὸς ἠρήσθαι τὰ πάντα ἀμείνον ἐφαίνετο τοῖς Θηβαίοις. We should infer from the passage before us that the constitution established after the fall of Kingship was one which gave supreme power to 'many' (cp. 12, πολλοίς ὁμοίως πρὸς ἄρετην), but we are told in 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 16 sqq. that it was an oligarchy of knights. For κοινῶν τι, cp. c. 3. 1276 b 1, εἴπερ γὰρ ἐστὶ κοινομία τις ἡ πόλις, ἐστὶ δὲ κοινομία πολιτῶν πολιτείας: Plut. Aristid. c. 22, γράφει τίτικα (Ἀριστείδης) κοινὴ εἶναι τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ τοὺς ἀρχόντας ἐξ ἀδημοιῶν πάντων αἱρέσθαι: and (with Bon. Ind. 399 a 60) Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 29 sqq. In the passage before us, as often elsewhere when the object is easily supplied, 'accusativus eius rei, quam quis οὕτως, οmittitur' (see Bon. Ind. 800 b 61, where Hist. An. 9. 12. 615 b 18 is referred to among other passages). It is indeed quite in Aristotle's way to suppress the accusative governed by a verb: see below on 18, and see note on 1273 b 18. Here, as in the Seventh (Fifth) Book, Monarchies, or at any rate Kingships, are marked off from Constitutions (see vol. i. p. 521 and vol. ii. p. xxvii).

14. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Rep. 550 D sqq., which is corrected in 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 39 sqq. The meaning of ἐντιμον γὰρ ἐποίησαν τὸν πλοῦτον will be clearer if we translate 'for they made wealth [and not virtue] the honoured thing.' In an aristocracy virtue should be honoured above wealth, if it is to be durable (2. 11. 1273 a 37—b 1). That τὸ ἐντιμον ποιεῖν τὸν πλοῦτον is a sign of oligarchy, we see from Eurip. Fragm. 628,

δημοὶ δὲ μὴν πάν ἀναρτήσεις κράτος
μὴν αὖ κακώσεις, πλοῦτον ἐντιμον τιθεῖς.

Cp. also Plato, Rep. 564 D.

16. ἐκ δὲ τούτων κ.τ.λ. Plato in the Republic (555 B sqq.) had made oligarchy pass into democracy and democracy into tyranny, but Aristotle here makes oligarchy pass into tyranny and tyranny
into democracy, ingeniously suggesting that tyranny is an intensification of oligarchy, both these constitutions resting on a sordid love of gain (cp. 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 8 sqq.), but differing in this that tyranny claims for one man what oligarchy claims for a few (cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 22 sqq.). Oligarchy did often pass into tyranny (7 (5). 12. 1316 a 34 sqq.), and tyranny into democracy (1316 a 32), but in 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 20–39 Aristotle appears to reject anything like a fixed succession of constitutions. We are also there told that constitutions less often change into cognate forms than into opposite forms (1316 a 18 sqq.), so that we do not expect oligarchy often to pass into the cognate form, tyranny.


18. άιει γάρ κ.τ.λ. For the omission of the object of ἀγοντες see above on 12: τήν πολιτείαν is probably to be supplied, cp. 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 36, έτι δ' οταν έννοι εἰς ἑλάττους ἔλκωσι τήν ὀλιγαρχίαν, and 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 25, οί τά μέσου ἐκβαίνοντες καθ' αὐτούς ἀγονίς τήν πολιτείαν. For the risks attaching to the exclusion of a large number of citizens from office see above on 1281 b 28. For ἵσχυρότερον τό πλῆθος κατέστησαν, cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 7, τόν δέμον ποιεῖν ἵσχυρόν.

20. έπει δέ κ.τ.λ., ‘but now that States have come to be even larger [than they were when it first happened that many were alike in virtue], perhaps it is no longer even easily possible, [much less suitable to the circumstances,] for any other constitution than democracy to come into existence.’ έπει δέ καὶ μείζον εἶναι συμβέβηκε τάς πόλεις answers to 11, έπει δέ συνέβαινε γίγνεσθαι πολλοίς ὁμοίους πρὸς ἀφετέρους. I translate τάς πόλεις ‘States’ (with Sus. and Welldon), not ‘cities’ (as Bernays), because the words must apparently bear the same meaning as in 10, where I render πόλεις ‘States.’ Cp. 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1 sqq., 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 22, and 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 17 sq. Compare also Isocr. Areopag. § 62, where the word πόλεων seems to mean ‘States,’ not ‘cities.’ In [Demosth.] c. Neae. c. 75 it is not clear whether ἕν πόλις means ‘the State’ or ‘the city.’ In 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 18 sqq. τάς πόλεις evidently means ‘the cities.’ For οὐδὲ ράδιον, cp. c. 16. 1287 a 10, οὐδὲ κατὰ φύσιν, 1287 b 8, οὐδὲ ράδιον, and c. 2. 1275 b 32, οὐδὲ δυνατόν.
23. πότερον καὶ τὸ γένος δεὶ βασιλεύειν; Bonitz (Ind. 150 b 4) explains τὸ γένος here by τὰ τέκνα, but perhaps it means the descendants generally (cp. Thuc. i. 126. 12, 13).

25. κύριος ὃν, 'although he has the power to do so.'

26. ἄλλα ὀφεκτές κ.τ.λ., 'but here we reach a statement which it is no longer easy to believe,' 'here we pass the point at which belief is easy.' For ὀφεκτές cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 3 sqq. Aristotle's friend Antipater, however, refrained on his deathbed from passing on his regency to his son Cassander and appointed Polypceron, who was not related to him, regent instead (Diod. 18. 48. 4: Thirlwall, Hist. of Greece, 7. 238). Marcus Aurelius, on the other hand, shrank from excluding his son Commodus from the succession, 'and his weakness must reflect strongly on his memory. He may have judged, indeed, that the danger to the State from a bad prince was less than the danger from a disputed succession, especially in the face of the disasters accumulating around it' (Merivale, Hist. of the Romans under the Empire, 8. 348). Giphanius (p. 397) thinks that Aristotle is led by the difficulties which he raises in the passage before us to reject hereditary Monarchy altogether, but this is not the case, for he believes in the existence of families in which surpassing virtue is hereditary, and in their case he approves of hereditary Monarchy (c. 17. 1288 a 15 sqq.).

27. ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν κ.τ.λ., 'there is matter for debate, again, in the question with respect to the bodyguard also [as well as in that with respect to the children], whether,' etc. "ἔχει is here used impersonally: see Bon. Ind. 305 b 31 sqq., where Phys. i. 2. 185 b 11, ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν περὶ τοῦ μέρους καὶ τοῦ δόλου... πότερον ἐν ἡ πλείω τὸ μέρος καὶ τὸ δόλον, is referred to. The Lacedaemonian Kings had a bodyguard (Isocr. Epist. 2. § 6), and in Hom. II. i. 324 Agamemnon says of Achilles,

εἰ δὲ κε μὴ δόμησιν, ἔγὼ δὲ κεν αὐτὸς ἑλθομαι
ἔλθων ἔιν πλένεσαι τὸ οἶ καὶ μίγιον ἐσται.


34. μὲν οὖν is answered by δὲ, c. 16. 1287 a 1.

τὸν βασιλέα τὸν τοιούτον, i.e. τὸν κατὰ νόμον βασιλέα.

35. δεὶ γὰρ αὐτὸν μὲν ἔχειν ἴσχὺν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν really belongs to ἴσχὺν, but 'interdum non ei additur vocabulo in quo vis oppositionis VOL. III.
cernitur’ (Bon. Ind. 454 a 20, where 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 12 sqq. is referred to: cp. also 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 32 sqq.).

36. ὡστε κ.τ.λ. For the suppression of εἶναι, see Vahlen on Poet. 24. 1459 b 7, where reference is made to Poet. 15. 1454 a 34, ζητεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τὸ εἰκός, ὡστε τῶν τοιούτων τὰ τοιαύτα λέγειν ἢ πράττειν ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκός (sc. εἶναι). See also notes on 1277 a 38 and 1327 a 34.

ἐκάστου καὶ ἐνός καὶ συμπλειόνων. Cp. Plato, Laws 932 C, εἰς δικαστήριον εἰσαγόντων αὐτοὺς εἰς ἐνα καὶ ἐκαστὸν τῶν πολιτών, οἶτινες ἢν ὡςι πρεσβύτατοι ἀπάντωσι, where ἐνα καὶ ἐκαστὸν seems to mean much the same thing as ἐνα ἐκαστὸν. No other instance of the occurrence of the word συμπλειόνων in Aristotle’s writings is given in the Index Aristotelicus, and it is an extremely rare word. Σύμπολλοι occurs in Plato, Polit. 261 E and elsewhere.

37. τοῦ πλήθους, ‘the whole body of citizens’: cp. 4 (7). 6. 1327 b 18, περὶ δὲ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλήθους.

καθάπερ κ.τ.λ., ‘after the fashion in which the anciently grant bodyguards, whenever they set up one whom they called Aesymnète or tyrant of the State.’ Bonitz (Ind. 779 b 52) is probably right in making τύραννον as well as αἰσιμηνῆν in the accusative after ἐκάλουν and not taking τύραννον with καθισταίειν. As to οἱ ἀρχαῖοι see above on 1285 a 30. For ὅτε καθισταίειν, ‘whenever they set up,’ cp. 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 7, 21. The contrast with ὅτε ἦτε illustrates Eucken’s remark (De Partic. Usu, p. 67), ‘ὅτε utrum cum indicativo an cum optativo ponatur, ab Aristotele accurate distinguitur.’


C. 16. 1. τοῦ βασιλεῶς τοῦ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βουλήσειν πάντα πράττοντος. 1287 a. Aristotle is thinking of a King like the King of the Persians (Hdt. 3. 31, ἄλλον μέντοι ἐξευρήκειν νόμον, τῷ βασιλείοντι Περσῶν ἐξείναι ποιεῖν τὸ ἄν βούλησαι).

4. καθάπερ εἰπομεν, in c. 15. 1286 a 2 sqq. ἐν πάσαις γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The example of the Lacedaemonian ἀριστοκρατία shows that a perpetual, and indeed an hereditary, generalship might exist in an ἀριστοκρατία. Perpetual magistracies were also not unknown in democracies, though the tendency there was to clip their wings (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 41 sqq.). As to Thessaly, cp. Diod. 15. 60. 2, διότι οἱ Θεταλοὶ προστηρόμενοι τῶν ἄλων ἡγεμόνα ἰῶσαν τούτῳ τὰ κατὰ τῶν πάλαιν ἑπέτρεψαν. We are reminded of the Stadholders of Holland, as to whom see Lord Macaulay, Hist. of England, c. 2. ‘The Stadholder,’ he says, ‘commanded the forces of the common-
wealth, disposed of all military commands, but a large share of the civil patronage, and was surrounded by pmp almost regal.'

6. καὶ πολλοὶ ποιοῦσιν ἕνα κύριον τῆς διοικήσεως, 'and many make one man supreme over the internal administration of the State'—the opposite province to that of a perpetual general—and thus virtually constitute a Kingship according to law of a different kind. Διοικήσεως is here opposed to στρατηγία, as Sus. ἕξ (Index s.v.) has already pointed out: cp. Isocr. Panath. § 128, καὶ κατὰ πόλεμον καὶ περὶ διοικήσεως τῆς πόλεως, and 'Ἀλ. Πολ. 43 ἐπίλ., where αἱ περὶ τὴν ἐγκύκλων διοικήσεων ἀρχαί are distinguished from αἱ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον.

Cp. also Deinarch. c. Demosth. c. 97, τὸν μὲν ἐν ταῖς πολεμικαῖς πράξεων ἀπιστον γεγενεμένον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν οἰκονομίας ἄχροστον. As to Epidamnus, cp. 7 (5). Ι. 1301 b 25. Epidamnus and Opus were both of them oligarchical States (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 39 sqq., 236). Some oligarchies went further and placed the greatest offices—both military and civil, it would seem—in the hands of one man: (7 (5). Ιο. 1310 b 22). Pharsalus was probably an oligarchy when it placed the administration in the hands of Polydamas (Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 2, οὗτος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ Θεσσαλίᾳ μᾶλλον εὐδοκιμεῖ, καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ τῇ πόλει οὗτος ἐδόκει καλῶς τε κάγαθος εἶναι ὡστε καὶ στασιάσαντες οἱ Φαρσαλοί παρακατέθεντο αὐτῷ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, καὶ τὰς προσόδους ἑπέτρεψαν λαμβάνομεν, ὥστε ἐγέραστο ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, εἰς τῇ ἑρα ἀναλίσκειν καὶ εἰς τὴν ἄλλην διοικήσεων). But the same tendency is traceable even in democracies. For instance, we find a great authority wielded at Athens by ὁ ἐπί τῇ διοικήσει (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 248).

This important office, however, to judge by the silence of the 'Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία, did not exist at the time when this treatise was written (Gilbert, ibid.), and very possibly did not come into existence till after Aristotle's death. A multiplicity of magistrates (ἡ πολιορχία), with the attendant 'circumlocution' and rivalries, often did harm to Greek States, as we can judge from Xen. Anab. 6. 1. 18 and Plut. Camill. c. 18, and they often gained by placing power in the hands of one man, thus anticipating on a small scale the experience of the Romans in relation to the Empire.

7. καὶ περὶ Ἐπίδαμνον, 'at Epidamnus for instance' (see above on 1266 b 22, καὶ περὶ Λευκάδα). καὶ περὶ Ὀποῦτα δὲ κατὰ τὶ μέρος ἔλαττον, 'and indeed at Opus to a certain smaller extent': cp. Plato, Laws 757 D, el μελετε στάσεων ἐαυτῇ μὴ προσκομιωθήσειν κατὰ τὶ μέρος, and Tim. 86 D, τὸ δὲ
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ληθές, ἢ περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια ἀκολογία κατὰ τὸ πολὺ μέρους διὰ τὴν ἐνὸς γένους ἔχει ὡς πᾶν μανότιτος ὤταν ἐν ὁμοιότητι μισθοῖ καὶ ῥᾳδινοῦσαν νόσος ψυχῆς γέγονε: Diog. ap. Stoī. Florīl. 9. 49, οὗ γὰρ πειράσεται αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲ καθ' ἐν μέρος. Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 41. 1) thinks that the office at Opus referred to is that of the ἄρχοις mentioned in an inscription (Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 63, p. 118), but this is uncertain. The office of κοσμόπολει, to which Sus.2, Note 671 (Sus.4, p. 439), takes Aristotle to refer, existed at the Epizephyrian Locri (Polyb. 12. 16. 6, 9), but we do not know that it existed among the Opuntian Locrians.

8. περὶ δὲ τῆς παρμαθελείας καλουμένης κ.τ.λ. Susemihl places the mark of a lacuna after ὁ βασιλεὺς, 10, but not, it would seem, rightly, for a sentence constructed in a very similar way occurs in 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 40, περὶ δὲ τοῦ κουμωνεὶς τῆς μουσικῆς, οὐ διὰ ταῖς μόνης, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς τὰς ἀναπάυσις, ὥς οὐκεὶ—οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ θητητέον μὴ ποτὲ τοῦτο μὲν συμβεβήκε κ.τ.λ. We should probably supply ποιήτων τῆς σκέψεων after βασιλεὺς, 10, from 2.


10. ἑαυτοῦ. In 1287 a 1 all MSS. have αὐτοῦ (except those which have wrongly αὐτοῦ), and this form 'longe frequentius apud Aristotelem exhibetur' (Bon. Ind. 211 b 45). In 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 17 all MSS. have κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν γνώμην.

οὐδὲ κατὰ φύσιν, 'not even natural,' much less expedient, and the question raised at the commencement of c. 14 was whether Kingship is expedient. Cp. Eurip. Fragm. 172 (from the 'Ἀντιγόνη'),

οὐτ' εἰκός ἄρχειν οὐτ' ἔχρην ἄνων νόμων (εἶναι νόμον λιβρὶ)

τύραννον εἶναι μορία δὲ καὶ θελεῖν,

ὅς τῶν ὁμοίων βουλεῖται κρατεῖν μόνος.

11. For ἔνα πάντων see note on 1281 a 13.


14. ὡστέ εἰπερ . . . 16. τοῖς ἰσοῦς. For the structure of this sentence see above on 1253 b 35–37. Goettling and Sus. add καὶ ε ἐνοχ. before οὖνω, but without necessity. The pleonastic addition of τῶννων in the apodosis, 16 (Πι omit it, but in all probability wrongly), is quite Aristotelian (see περὶ ὑπνοῦ καὶ ἐγρηγορεῖσθαι 2. 455 a 12–26 and Bonitz, Aristot. Studien, 2. 72 sq.), no less than the similar use of ὁν in the apodosis, as to which see Bon. Ind. 540 b 15 sqq. and Bonitz, Aristot. Stud. 2. 59 sqq. *Ἐξεῖν is to be supplied with τὸ ἀντιστὸ ἰσοῦς in 16.
trophiν ή ἐσθήτα. As to τροφήν, Mr. Broughton has already referred to Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 a 36 sqq. (cp. also Plato, Laws 691 C). As to ἐσθήτα, a big man in a small garment would suffer physically from cold, and a small man in a large garment from heat.

16. διότερ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 32 sqq. The subject of ἀρχεῖν is τοὺς ἰσόν supplied from the preceding sentence.


tὸν ἄρα νόμον κ.τ.λ. ‘Inter articulum et nomen ἄρα collocatum legitur in De Caelo 4. 4. 311 b 27, τὸ ἄρα πῦρ οὐδὲν ἔχει βοῶς’ (Bon. Ind. s.v.). ἀλλὰ is occasionally used by Aristotle not only in the same clause with a comparative (as in Plato, Polit. 259 C sub fin.), but also, it would seem, in close connexion with it (e.g. in Hist. An. 9. 1. 608 b 5, μᾶλλον φαινότερα : see other instances given in Bon. Ind. 402 b 53 sqq.), and it may be so used here (cp. Top. 3. 1. 116 b 23, καί ὁδός τὸ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ βίου τέλος αἱρετάτερον μᾶλλον ἤ τὸ πρὸς ἄλλο τι, οἷον τὸ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν συντείνων ἢ τὸ πρὸς φράνησιν).

But as Bonitz says of the passages in which μᾶλλον is used with a comparative, ‘saepè dubites utrum μᾶλλον “magis” an “potius” signifit,’ and μᾶλλον ἢ may mean ‘potius quam’ in the passage before us.

20. κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘and in accordance with this same contention, even if it should be better that certain individuals should rule [and not the law alone], it will be right to make these individuals guardians of the laws and ministers to the laws, [for otherwise the law will not rule].’ Magistrates who are only guardians of the laws are contrasted with Kings by Plato in Polit. 305 C, καὶ τὴν τῶν δικαστῶν ἄρα ρώμην ἀνευρίσκομεν οὐ βασιλικὴν ὀδυνά, ἀλλὰ νόμοι φύλακα καὶ ὑπηρέτων ἑκεῖνης: compare what Plutarch says of Theseus in Thes. c. 24, τοῖς δὲ δυνατοῖς ἀβασιλευτον πολιτείαν προτείνων καὶ δημοκρατίαν αὐτὸν μόνον ἀρχοντάτι πολέµον καὶ νόμων φύλακι ἐργοσυμείνη. Cp. also Plato, Laws 715 C–D. The archons at Athens swore συμφυλάξειν τοὺς νόμους (Pollux, 8. 86).

22. ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Magistrates are necessary, because there are things which the law cannot regulate (1287 b 19–25).

With ἕνα τοῦτον (cp. c. 17. 1288 a 19) supply ἀρχεῖν, and cp. Plato, Polit. 301 C, οὕτω δὴ τύραννον τε γέγονε, φαμέν, καὶ βασιλεὺς καὶ δικαρχία καὶ ἀριστοκρατία καὶ δημοκρατία, δισεχερακώντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸν ἐν ἑκείνοις μόναρχον.
23. ἄλλα μὴν κ.τ.λ. See on this passage vol. i. p. 273, note 2, where the view which Bernays takes of it has been explained. His rendering is, ‘[hier wendet vielleicht Jemand ein: gegen die Lückenhaftigkeit des Gesetzes helfen Beamte nicht, denn] wo das Gesetz ausser Stande scheint, etwas Bestimmtes zu verordnen, wird auch wohl kein Mensch im Stande sein, sich ein festes Urtheil zu bilden.’ I still prefer the explanation which has been given in vol. i. p. 273. I take ἄλλα μὴν . . . γε to introduce not an objection proceeding from an advocate of the claims of the One Best Man—objections are commonly introduced by ἄλλα, as in c. 15. 1286 b 24, 26—but a still more cogent argument in favour of the claims of Law than those which have hitherto been urged. (’ άλλα μὴν . . . γε introduces a similar transition from a statement advanced with less emphasis to a statement advanced with more in 2. 9. 1271 a 18–22, 3. 13. 1284 b 30, and 3. 16. 1287 a 41.) Aristotle has been reminded by what he has just said, ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ εἶναι τινας ἀρχὰς (22), that there are things which the law cannot regulate, so that as to them the law cannot rule, as he has said in 18 sqq. that it ought to do, and now he adds that with respect to these things the law is no worse off than a human being would be. They are as much beyond the cognizance of a human being as they are beyond definition by the law. But the law does all that can be done in relation to them, for it educates the magistrates to supply its own defect of particularity, and it also allows of its own amendment.

25. ἂλλ᾽ ἐπίτιθες κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1287 b 25, κρίνει γὰρ ἐκαστὸς ἀρχῶν πεπαιδευμένος ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καλῶς. It has already been pointed out (vol. i. p. 273, note 1), that Aristotle here has before him the oath taken by the Athenian juror. See Demosth. in Lept. c. 118. A similar oath is prescribed to be taken by jurors in an inscription from Eresus in Lesbos (Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 125, p. 211). The expression κατὰ γνώμα τῶν δικαστῶν occurs also in an inscription from Calymna and in the oath of the Delphian Amphictyons (Dareste, Inscriptions Juridiques Grecques, i. 170). Its meaning may be gathered from Demosth. in Eubulid. c. 63, ἐκ τε γὰρ τοῦ ὄρκου ἐξῆλθαν τὸ ψυχεῖν τῇ γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ καὶ οὔτε χάριτος ἕνεκ᾿ οὗτ᾿ ἔχθρας. The term τοὺς ἄρχοντας, however, includes not only jurors (cp. 1287 b 15 sq.) but office-holders generally, as may be inferred from the words κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν. For ἐφίστησιν κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν τοῖς ἄρχονται Schneider compares Isocr. Areopag.
§ 37, ὡστε τὴν ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλήν ἐπέστησαν ἐπιμελείσθαι τῆς εὐκοσμίας. Τὰ λοιπά, 'whatever it cannot regulate in detail.'


28. ὁ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. I take οὖν here to contain an inference, as in τ. 1. 1252 a 7 (see note), and translate 'therefore.' Attention has been drawn in what precedes to the reasonableness of law. The contrast of ἥδος and θηρίων and of both with ἀνθρώπως is familiar to us from τ. 2. 1253 a 27 sqq. The rule of law had been represented by Plato (Laws 713 C–714 A) as an approach to the rule of the διαμονές of Cronus, νόμος being explained as νοῦ διανομή (cp. Laws 674 B). Reason is, in fact, often identified with God, e. g. in Eurip. Fragm. 1007,

ὁ νόοις γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐστιν ἐν ἐκάστῳ θεῶς:

cp. Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. i. 281, νῷ πείθου: ὅμοια τῇ, πείθου θεῷ. Aristotle conceives a human being as an union of a god in the shape of reason (cp. Eth. Nic. io. 7. 1177 b 26 sqq.) with a brute, much as Plato in Rep. 588 C sqq. conceives the human soul as three shapes under the external aspect of a man, the shape of a many-headed animal, the shape of a lion, and the shape of a man, representing respectively desire, θυμός, and reason. That a brute is present in every human being was suggested by such phrases as those used by the Chorus of Women in the Lysistrata of Aristophanes (683 sq. Didot),

εἰ νὴ τῷ θεῷ μὲ ζωτυρήσεις,
λύσω τὴν ἐμαυτῆς ἐν ἐγὼ δή,

where a proverb is alluded to (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. i. 318).

31. καί ὁ θυμὸς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably remembers Hom. Il. 9. 553;

ἀλλ’ ὅτε δὴ Μελέαγρον ἐδυ χόλος, ὡστε καὶ ἄλλων

oidánei ἐν στήθεσι νόον τύκα περ φρονεύσθων,

and Pindar, Olymp. 7. 27–31. The remark would gain in interest if it was suggested by the complicity of Dion in the murder of Heracleides at Syracuse (Plut. Dion, cc. 47, 53) or by Alexander's murder of Cleitus in B. C. 328, but it would be rash to assume this.
For διαστρέφει cp. Polyb. 8. 24. 3. Καύρος ὁ Γαλάτης, ὃν τάλλα ἀνήρ ἄγαθός, ὅπως Σωστράτου τοῦ κάλακος διαστρέφετο.

32. διόπερ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἔστιν, 'hence' (i.e. because Law is God and Reason unmixed with anything else) 'Law is Reason without appetite,' and Reason without appetite is better than Reason with appetite (c. 15. 1286 a 17 sqq.). Cp. De An. 3. 10. 433 a 26, νοῦς μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὄρθος' ὀρέξεις δὲ καὶ φαντασία καὶ ὀρθή καὶ οὐκ ὄρθή. Anaxagoras had said that it is by virtue of being ἀμφίγις and pure that νοῦς subdues everything (Fragm. 6 in Mullach, Fragm. Philos. Gr. 1. 249: Aristot. Phys. 8. 5. 256 b 24 sqq.: De An. 3. 4. 429 a 18 sqq.).

33. τὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν κ.τ.λ. This corrects the argument used in c. 15. 1286 a 11 sqq. 'Oni κ.τ.λ. gives, in explanation of τὸ τῶν τεχνῶν παράδειγμα, the parallel which the whole of the arts is adduced to prove.

34. For καὶ αἱρετῶτερον cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 9. 1179 a 6, οἱ γὰρ ἑνώπιόν τῶν δυνατῶν οὐκ ἠττοῦσιν τὰ ἐπίκειται πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον, Pol. 2. 4. 1262 a 30, and 5 (8). 7. 1341 b 37. See critical note.

35. οἱ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for [it is better to be treated by physicians rather than by written rule only because] physicians do not do anything contrary to right reason for the sake of friendship.' I follow Bernays in thus completing the reasoning. For παρὰ τῶν λόγων cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 11. 1151 b 34, ὅ ἐν γὰρ ἐγκρατῆς οἶος μηδὲν παρὰ τῶν λόγων διὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ἥδους ποιεῖν καὶ σώφρον κ.τ.λ., and 4. 11. 1125 b 33 sqq.

37. οἱ δὲ ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plut. Aristid. c. 4, where Plutarch says of Aristides, οὕτω μόνον δὲ πρὸς εὖνοιαν καὶ χάριν ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ὄργαν καὶ πρὸς ἔχθραν ἴσχυρότατος ἢν ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων ἀντιστήματι. As to ἐπίτευξιν see note on 1311 a 37.

38. ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ. This passage may be rendered in two different ways. 1. With Liddell and Scott (who compare Strabo, p. 259, πρὸτειν δὲ νόμοις ἐγγύατοι χρησαθαι πεπιστευμένοι εἰσι) and others, we may take διαφθείρειν as in the infinitive after πιστευθέντας τοὺς ἐκθροίς, and translate 'since when [the case is otherwise and] patients suspect physicians of being commissioned by their enemies to destroy them for the sake of gain.' 2. We may (with Bernays) take διαφθείρειν as in the infinitive after ἐποπιστευοντο τοὺς ἐκφθροίς. I incline to prefer the latter rendering, especially as διὰ κέρδος comes in a little awkwardly, if we adopt the former. Aristotle has
before him here Plato, Polit. 298 A, καὶ δὴ καὶ τελευτῶντες ἤ παρὰ ξυγγενῶν ἢ παρὰ τινῶν ἔχθρων τοῦ κάμνοντος χρήματα μισθῶν λαμβάνοντες (οἱ ἱστροὶ) ἀποκτανώσων: indeed, he only repeats what Plato himself in effect says in Polit. 300 A. If it was not clear that he has this passage of Plato before him, we might be tempted to imagine that he alludes to a well-known incident in Alexander's career, the relation of which in Plutarch's Life of Alexander (c. 19) begins thus, ἐν τούτῳ δὲ Παρμενίων ἐπέμψεν ἐπιστολὴν ἀπὸ στρατοπέδου, διακελεύμανος αὐτῷ (i. e. Ἀλεξάνδρῳ) φυλαξάσθαι τῶν Φιλίππων (his physician Philip the Acarnanian) ὦς ὑπὸ Δαρείου πεπεισμένον (cp. πιστευθέντα τοῖς ἔχθροις) ἐπὶ δωρεᾶς μεγάλαις (cp. διὰ κέρδος) καὶ γάμῳ θυγατρῶς ἀνελείν Ἀλεξάνδρον: compare Arrian, Anab. 2. 4. 9, ἐν τούτῳ δὲ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ δοθήναι ἐπιστολὴν παρὰ Παρμενίωνος φυλαξάσθαι Φιλίππων' ἀκούσει γὰρ διεφθάρας ὑπὸ Δαρείου χρήμασιν ὡςτε φαρμάκῳ ἀποκτείναι Ἀλεξάνδρον. This happened in b. c. 333.

40. τὴν ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων θεραπείαν, 'the treatment prescribed by the writings,' like τὸν ἐκ τῶν νόμων χρόνων in Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 28.

41. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ. τ. Λ. 'Αλλὰ μὴν... γε, 'but certainly,' as elsewhere. 'Ιστρῶν εἰσάγεις τινί, to call in a physician for another, Xen. Mem. 2. 4. 3, Demosth. c. Everg. et Mnesib. c. 67, but in Med. of the physician himself when ill' (Liddell and Scott, who refer to the passage before us). 'Εφ' ἑαυτοὺς, 'to take charge of themselves' (see note on 1273 b 19, ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις). Not only do patients prefer a written scheme of treatment to treatment by physicians whom they regard as corrupted by their foes, but physicians themselves show distrust even of medical advice which is simply wanting in dispassionateness, for, when they are sick, they do not treat themselves, but call in other physicians. They do so because they feel that they are themselves at such a time under the influence of emotion, and that they need the guidance of a neutral dispassionate authority.

3. διὰ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τε οἰκείων καὶ ἐν πάθει δινέτες. Cp. Thuc. 1. 1287 b. 63, παρῆλθε παρὰ τὴν χειλῆ διὰ τῆς θαλάσσης βαλλόμενος τε καὶ χαλέπως, and see Mr. W. H. Forbes, Thucydides Book i. p. 151. For ἐν πάθει δινέτες cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 8. 1150 a 27 sqq. and 7. 5. 1147 b 9 sqq. Aristotle seems to think that not only sick physicians, but also gymnastic trainers, when engaged in gymnastic exercises, would be ἐν πάθει.

ὡςτε δὴλον κ. τ. Λ. Supply οἱ τῶν νόμων ξητοῦντες as the nom. to
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In 1287 b 23 we have to supply in a similar way 'the advocates of the supremacy of law.' 'And so it is clear that [those who seek for written law] in seeking for that which is just seek for that which is neutral, for the law is that which is neutral.' This is made clear by the practice of physicians to which reference has just been made. So that the parallel of the arts, far from telling against the use of written law in the State, as some claimed that it does, in reality furnishes an argument in favour of its use. That the way to the just lies through the neutral, we see from Eth. Nic. 5. 7. 1132 a 19 (already compared by Eaton), ἄδικα καὶ ἄνωθεν τῶν, ἐπί τῶν δικαστῶν καταφεύγουσιν τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν ἵναι ἵναι ἐστὶν ἐπί τὸ δίκαιον ὃ γὰρ δικαστὴν βουλεῖται εἶναι οἷον δίκαιον ἐμφυχφον καὶ ξητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ καλοῦσιν ἐνοίς μεσιδίους, ὃς ἐὰν τοῦ μέσου τύχωσι, τοῦ δικαίου τευχόμενον. Sus., following Thurot, reads ὃ δὲ νόμος in place of ὃ γὰρ νόμος without MS. authority and not, I think, rightly.

5. ἐπὶ κυριώτεροι κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has just been asserting the value of written law (cp. 1287 a 34, κατὰ γράμματα, and 40, τὴν ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων θεραπεῖαν), and now he says that the case is even stronger in favour of unwritten law. For the distinction between οἱ κατὰ γράμματα νόμοι, 'laws resting on writings,' and οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθη, 'laws resting on (unwritten) customs,' cp. Diog. Laert. 3. 86 (a passage professing to record Plato's views), νόμοι διαφέρεισ εἶναι ὃ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ γεγραμμένοι, ὃ δὲ ἄγραφοι· ὃ μὲν εἰν ταῖς πύλαις πολιτείας, γεγραμμένοι ἐστὶν, ὃ δὲ κατὰ ἔθη γενόμενοι, οὗτοι ἄγραφοι καλεῖται, and Plato, Polit. 299 A, κατηγορεῖν δὲ τῶν βουλόμενων, ὅσον κατὰ τὰ γράμματα τὸν ἐναυστὸν ἐκδιήγησα τάς νόις, οἰδὲ κατὰ τὰ παλαιὰ τῶν προγόνων ἔθη. For οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθη νόμοι, which are here implied to be unwritten (as ἔθη are in Plato, Polit. 295 A, 299 A, and Laws 841 B), cp. 8 (6). 5. 1319 b 40 sq. On ἄγραφοι νόμοι see Cope, Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric, pp. 239–244, where he concludes (p. 244) that customs are 'what we are to understand principally by the νόμοι ἄγραφοι in the Politics,' so that the term is used in the Politics in a wider sense than it is when it refers, as it sometimes does (see Cope), to 'the great fundamental conceptions and duties of morality,' such as 'the worship of God, duty to parents, gratitude, the requital of benefits,' and the like. For the fact that more important matters are dealt with by unwritten than by written laws, cp. Plut. Apophth. Lac. Zeuxidam. 1, 221 B, Ζευξίδαμος, πυθομένου τινός διὰ τὶ τοὺς περὶ ἄνδρεις νόμους ἄγραφους τηροῦσι, καὶ τοῖς νεώς ἀπογραφήμενοι οὐ διδάσκων ἀναγνώσκειν, ὁτι, ἔθη, συνεβίζεσθαι [δεῖ] ταῖς
3. 16. 1287 b 5—15.

andragathiai krepitov ἡ ταῖς γραφαῖς προσέχειν. As to ἄφαλέστερος see vol. i. p. 270, note. We have oi kata τὰ ἔθη in 6 and τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἔθος in 7. Compare the change from ἔθος in 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 14 to ἔθεσιν in 1292 b 16.

8. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ., 'then again, it is not even easy, [much less well,] for the one man to keep an eye on many things.' Eurip. Phoeniss. 692 Bothe (745 Dindorf), εἰς ἀνὴρ οὐ πάντω ὄρφ., had passed into a proverb (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 378). Cp. also Xen. Oecon. 4. 6, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀμφὶ τὴν ἐαυτοῦ ὄψιν (sc. τῶν μυστικόρων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰς ὁπλισθαι προστέτακτοι) αὐτῶν (i.e. ὑγαλεῖς) ἐφόρη, τοὺς δὲ πρόσω ἀποκούντας πιστοὺς πέμπει ἐπισκόπεων, and Cyrop. 8. 2. 11, εἰ δὲ τις οὕτω ἐκαίρετο εἰναὶ ὄφαλμον βασιλεῖ, οὐκ ὅρθος οὔτως ὀλγα γὰρ εἰς γ' ἄν ἔδω καὶ εἰς ἀκούσει. Were the Lacedaemonian ephors at their origin designed to be the 'eyes' of the Kings? The word ἐφοροῦ is used in the sense of 'spies' by Megasthenes ap. Strab. p. 707 (see note on 1313 b 12).

10. τοῦτο, i. e. τὸ πλείονας εἰναὶ ἄρχοντας.

11. πρότερον, in c. 15. 1286 b 3 sqq.

12. εἴπερ κ.τ.λ. In τοῦ ὀν ὀνο κ.τ.λ. the apodosis is introduced by δὲ. For the use of δὲ in the apodosis after a conditional sentence introduced by εἰ or εἰν, see above on 1278 a 32.


14. καὶ ἡ εὐχή κ.τ.λ. Hom. II. 2. 372, where Agamemnon is speaking of Nestor (Sus. 2, Note 651).

15. εἰς δὲ καὶ νῦν κ.τ.λ. This takes up 1287 b 8, δείησεν ἄρα . . . 11, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, in which words the suggestion is made that the powers which it is proposed to entrust to the One Man should rather be given to a plurality of magistrates. "Ωσπέρ ὁ δικαστής, for
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it was well known from the terms of the dicast's oath (see above on 1287 a 25) that he had to regulate matters as to which the law was silent. Aristotle has already implied in 1287 a 25 sqq. that the magistrates have to do so too in relation to some matters. Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 32 sqq.

18. ἄρξει καὶ κρίνειν. Cp. 1287 a 26, κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν.

20. διαπορεῖν καὶ ξητεῖν. Διαπορεῖν here = ἀπορεῖν according to Bon. Ind. 187 b 1 sqq., where Ἐθ. Εὐδ. 1. 5. 1216 a 11, διαπορεοῦντα τοιαῦτ' ἄττα καὶ διερωτῶντα τίνος ἕνεκα κ.τ.λ., is placed next to the passage before us.

23. οὗ τοῖνυν κ.τ.λ., 'nay, [the advocates of the supremacy of law] do not make this counter-assertion that' etc. οὗ τοῖνυν is used in self-correction: see above on 1267 a 5 and compare in addition to the passages there referred to Plato, Rep. 603 B, and Strato, Fragm. Φωικίδης, 31 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 546), "οὗτω λαλεῖν εἶσθε." μή τοίνυν λαλεί οὗτος παρ' ἐμοί γ' ὄν.

24. ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐχ ἐρα μόνον, sc. εἰναι δει τῶν κρισοῦντα περὶ τῶν τοιούτων.

26. ἀτοπόν τ' ἤσως κ.τ.λ. For the thought compare Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 10–12, a passage which seems to be present to Aristotle's memory here. ἤσωσ evidently suits διμασὶ only, not ἄκοας or what follows, but Aristotle 'often expects us to supply a word from a previous clause which is not altogether suitable': see above on 1257 a 21. For ἄκοας in the sense of 'organs of hearing' see Bon. Ind. s.v.

27. δυοῖν is apparently the reading of all extant MSS. (one cannot tell from 'duobus' what reading Vet. Int. found in his text), but the Index Aristotelicus gives no other instance of its occurrence in Aristotle's writings as the dative of δῶ—it is common enough in them as the genitive, but δυοῖ or δὼ are the forms of the dative mostly used by Aristotle—and here it strikes us as all the more strange because it is followed by δυοῖν and δυοῖ. According to Meisterhans, Grammatik der att. Inschriften, p. 124 (ed. 2), δυοῖν is used as the genitive and dative in Attic Inscriptions down to B.C. 329, δυεῖν from B.C. 329 to B.C. 229, and δῶ as the genitive, δυοῖ as the dative, in Roman times. Thus, if the MSS. are to be trusted, Aristotle often departs in this matter from the usage of the Attic Inscriptions of his time.
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29. ἔπει καὶ νῦν κ.τ.λ. Πολλοῦς is emphatic (see note on 1275 a 32): cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 11, ἐκ τοῦτον δὴ καὶ πολλοὶ ένωμῖσθησαν βασιλεῖς ὁφθαλμοὶ καὶ πολλὰ ὡτα· εἰ δὲ τις ὑπέται ἕνα αἵρετον εἶναι ὁφθαλμῶν βασιλεῖς, οὐκ ὁρθῶς ὑπεταί ὀλίγα γὰρ εἰς γ’ ἄν θεοὶ καὶ εἰς ἀκούσεις κ.τ.λ., where Xenophon probably intends to correct Hdt. 1. 114, δὲ αὐτῶν διέταξε τοὺς μὲν ὅλικα οἰκοδομεῖν, τοὺς δὲ δορυφόρους εἶναι, τὸν δὲ καὶ τινα αὐτῶν ὁφθαλμὸν βασιλεῖς εἶναι τῷ δὲ τινὶ τὰς ἀγκελίας ἔσφερεν ἔδιον γέρας, ὃς ἕκαστον ἔργον προστάσσον. The messengers mentioned by Herodotus would be included among the ‘King’s feet’ referred to by Aristotle here. The ‘many ears and eyes’ of a King became proverbial: cp. Lucian, Adv. Indoct. c. 23, οὐκ οἴσαθα ὃς ὡτα καὶ ὁφθαλμοὶ πολλοὶ βασιλεῶς; The important fact that Cyrus had fallen in the battle of Cunaxa was discovered and reported to Artaxerxes by an ‘eye of the King,’ Artasuras (Plut. Artox. c. 12). Institutions as unlike as the ὄτακουσταί of Hiero I of Syracuse (7 (5). 11. 1313 b 13 sqq.: cp. Plut. De Curiositate, c. 16) and the ‘younger members’ of the Nocturnal Council of Plato’s Laws (964 E: see vol. i. p. 448 sq.) were probably suggested by this Persian institution. According to Megasthenes (ap. Strab. p. 707) a similar institution existed in India: see his account of the ἐφοροὶ.

30. τοὺς γὰρ τῇ ἁρχῇ καὶ αὐτοῦ φίλου ποιοῦται συνάρχους. Aristotle probably remembers the words of Achilles to his friend Phoenix in Il. 9. 616,

Ἄσον ἐμοὶ βασιλεῦε καὶ ἦμουν μείρεο τιμῆς.

Cp. also Plut. De Fraterno Amore, c. 18 sub fin., καὶ τὸ Δαρείον γῆνος ἐβασιλευσεν, ἀνθρός οὐ μόνον ἀδελφόις, ἀλλὰ καὶ φίλους ἐπισταμένου κοινωνίᾳ πραγμάτων καὶ δυνάμεως, and Thuc. 2. 97. 3, where we read of οἱ παραδυναστευόντες τε καὶ γενναίοι 'Οδρυσῶν (i.e. associates of the King of the Odrysae in his rule). Monarchs expect of those whom they make partners in rule not only friendliness to their rule but also friendliness to themselves. The two things are not the same. Alexander, we remember, called Craterus φίλο-βασιλεὺς and Hephacestion φιλαλέξανθος (Plut. Alex. c. 47: Diod. 17. 114): cp. Plut. Brut. c. 8, λέγεται δὲ βρόντοις μείν τὴν ἁρχὴν βαρύνεσθαι, Κάσσιος δὲ τὸν ἁρχοντα μυσεῖν, where Julius Caesar is of course referred to. Τῆς ἁρχῆς φίλων should probably be read (with Casaubon and Richards: see critical note) in place of τῆς ᾑρχῆς φίλων, though this expression is used in an unfavourable sense in Lucian, Catapl. c. 11, ἐγνοεῖς ὅτι πάντες οἱ καὶ προσκυνοῦντες καὶ τῶν λεγομένων
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In Duebner i., see Qu. C. 17. Politics tophanes 3 Eng. above of p. Dynasty originally Duebner, wrongly aτού (MSS. wrongly aτού) Sus. would read aτόιν, which is found in the version of the passage given by the Aldine edition of the Scholia on Aristophanes (Achamn. 92: Duebner excludes this quotation from the Politics from his text of the Scholia—see Dindorf’s Preface, pp. iv–v Duebner, as to the Aldine edition), but not, I think, rightly: see above on 1286 a 12. The title ‘friend of the King’ probably came originally from Egypt, where we trace it as early as the Twelfth Dynasty (see Maspero, Histoire Ancienne des Peuples de l’Orient, p. 104, ed. 1), and even the Sixth (Erman, Life in Ancient Egypt, Eng. Trans., p. 72). The Macedonian Kings made those whom they raised to the dignity of ‘friends’ so far partners in rule that they consulted them on the most important matters and employed them on the most important commissions (see Spitta, De Amicorum, qui vocantur, in Macedonum Regno Condicione, p. 38, who refers among other passages to Diod. 17. 54, and Arrian, Anab. 1. 25. 4). Ποιούνται here takes the place of ποιούνται, 29, just as in c. 5. 1278 a 34 ποιούνται takes the place of ποιούνται, 1278 a 30.

31. μὴ φίλοι μὲν οὖν ἄρχησε κ.τ.λ., ‘[friends indeed they must of necessity be, for] if they are not friends,’ etc.


34. οἱ εἰς δεῖν ἄρχειν, sc. ὁ βασιλεύς.

35. οἱ διαμφισβητούντες πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν. Cp. 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 24, where see note.


37. ἐστι γὰρ τι φύσει δεσποτὸν κ.τ.λ., ‘for there is that which is marked out by nature to be ruled by a master, and another to be ruled by a King, and another marked out for free government, and it is expedient and just that each should be thus ruled.’ For καὶ δίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον, cp. 41, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν εἰρήμενων χε φανερῷ ως ἐν μὲν τοῖς ὡμοίοις καὶ ἱσοῖς οὕτε συμφέρον εὔτιν οὕτε δίκαιον εὔνα κύριον εὔνα πάντων, 1. 6. 1255 b 6 sqq., and 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 16 sq. I prefer the rendering which I have given of καὶ δίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον to that of Sepulveda, ‘et horum imperiorum cuiusque aliud est ius et alia commoditas,’ though Bernays translates the passage in a somewhat
similar way. Richards would add τοῦτο after δίκαιον, 39. For ἦστι γάρ τι φύτει δεσποστῶν, cp. i. 6. 1255 b 6 sqq. and 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 36 sqq. Πολιτικῶν in 38, καὶ ἄλλο πολιτικῶν, appears to be used in reference to the kind of free government which obtains in a Polity, for Aristotle is evidently speaking of normal constitutions only, and he can hardly refer in πολιτικῶν to Aristocracy. Of course, if we regard 1288 a 6–15 as authentic and as placed where it stands by Aristotle, we have an additional reason for taking πολιτικῶν to refer to the Polity, for it clearly refers to the Polity in 1288 a 7, 12.

40. οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτείων, ‘nor any of the other constitutions.’ For the genitive, cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 30, and Diod. 5. 21. 2, οὔτε γὰρ Δίωνυσον οὔδ’ Ἡρακλέα παρειλήφαμεν οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων ἥρων ἡ δυναστῶν ἔστησεμένου ἐπ’ αὐτὴν.

41. ἄλλ’ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων γε κ.τ.λ. See as to this passage vol. i. p. 274–5. In 1288 a 1 we have a μὲν solitarium (see above on 1262 a 6).

2. πάντων is here masculine (cp. c. 16. 1287 a 11, τὸ κύριον ἐνα 1288 a. πάντων εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν). This is clear from 3, οὔτε ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθῶν κ.τ.λ.

3. ἄλλ’ αὐτῶν ὡς ὑτα νόμον. Supply κύριον ὑτα after αὐτῶν. As to the chiasmus in οὔτε ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθῶν οὔτε μή ἀγαθῶν μή ἀγαθῶν, see note on 1277 a 31.

4. οὔδ’ ἐν κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἀμείνων ἡ may be added to correct a dictum of Plato to Dionysius the Elder recorded in Diog. Laert. 3. 18, ὦ δὲ διαλεγόμενοι περὶ τυραννίδος καὶ φαύκων ὡς οὐκ ἦστι τοῦτο κρείττον ὡς συμφέρει αὐτῷ μόνῳ, εἰ μή καὶ ἀρετῇ διαφέρει, προσέκρουσον αὐτῷ. Cp. also Xen. Cyrop. 8. 1. 37.

6. πρότερον, in c. 13. 1284 a 3 sqq. πρῶτον δὲ . . . 15. ἀρχάς. Susemihl brackets this paragraph as an interpolation, and it looks at any rate like a subsequently added passage. It may well be from the pen of Aristotle—its contents do not seem to be seriously at variance with his teaching elsewhere (see vol. i. Appendix D)—but it is doubtful whether it was placed where it stands by his hand or by that of another. A similar doubt arises as to other passages in the Politics (see for instance vol. i. p. 569 and p. 519, note). The position of this paragraph in relation to its context is certainly remarkable. Aristotle is discussing Kingship, and in particular is about to describe what degree of superiority over those he rules an Absolute King should possess: why should he pause at this point to explain
who are fit subjects for Kingship, Aristocracy, and Polity, when he is concerned for the moment only with Kingship? And why is it necessary to enter into this question as to Aristocracy and Polity first (πρῶτον, 1288 a 6), before stating what degree of superiority over those he rules an Absolute King should possess? Then again, though the recapitulation in 1288 a 30 sqq. makes it clear that in what has preceded it has been explained for whom Kingship is an expedient institution, this may refer only to what has been said in 1288 a 15–19. On the other hand, it may be urged in defence of the paragraph that it is after a long argument in favour of Aristocracy (in the sense of the rule of a plurality of good men) that Aristotle interposes his closing remark in 1287 b 36 sq., ‘but perhaps these things are so in the case of certain persons and not in the case of others,’ and that therefore he may naturally wish to explain before he goes further who are the persons in whose case the arguments in favour of Aristocracy hold good, no less than who are the persons in whose case the arguments in favour of Kingship hold good. Nor is it altogether surprising that he should add a similar explanation as to Polity, for he has implied in 1287 b 37 sqq. that there are those who are marked out by nature for each of the normal constitutions. Still it must be admitted that the paragraph has an intrusive look where it stands.

8. τὸ τοιοῦτον here refers not to anything preceding, but to what follows. See for other instances of the same thing note on 1337 b 6. As to φέρειν, see vol. i. p. 290, note i. The case is omitted in which Kingship falls to a single individual, not a γένος.

9. πρὸς ἡγεμονίαν πολιτικήν. Πολιτικήν is added to show that a mere fitness for ἡγεμονία πολεμική is not enough. Cp. πολιτικὴν ἀρχὴν in 12 and πλῆθος πολεμικῶν in 13. The King is to be capable of πολιτικῆ ἡγεμονία, the rulers in an aristocracy of πολιτικῆ ἀρχῆ. The word ἡγεμονία belongs especially to Kingship: cp. Rhet. ad Alex. i. 1420 a 21, where οἱ ὑπὸ τὴν τῆς βασιλείας ἡγεμονίας τεταγμένοι are contrasted with οἱ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ πολιτευόμενοι, and Plut. adv. Colot. c. 31, οὐχ οἱ τὸν τῆς ἀναρχίας στέφανον ἀσύμβλητον εἶναι ταῖς μεγίσταις ἡγεμονίαις λέγοντες; οὐχ οἱ τὸ βασιλεύειν ἀμαρτιάν καὶ διάπτωσιν ἀποφαίνοντες; Cp. also Plato, Laws 711 C, τῇ τῶν δυνατοτυπῶν ἡγεμονία.

ἀριστοκρατικῶν δὲ . . . 15. τὰς ἀρχὰς. See vol. i. Appendix D.
11. κατ’ ἄρετὴν ἥγεμονικῶν, and not κατὰ πλοῦτον καὶ δύναμιν, as in oligarchies (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. i 161 a 2 sqq.).

12. πολιτικὴν ἄρχην, the rule which is exercised over persons ὄμοιοι τῷ γένει καὶ ἐλεύθεροι (c. 4. 1277 b 7 sqq.).

πολιτικῶν δὲ πλῆθος κ.τ.λ. The law in a polity gives office to the well-to-do, just as in an aristocracy office falls to the γνώριμοι (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 2). Does κατ’ ἄξιαν imply that office will be elective in a polity? If so, cp. 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 10 sqq. and contrast 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 8-11 and 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 34 sqq., passages which, however defective the text of the latter may be, seem to show that magistrates might be appointed by lot in a polity (see vol. i. pp. 509, 573).

15. As to τῶν ἄλλων see critical note.

18. καὶ κύριοι πάντων is added because not all Kings are κύριοι πάντων (c. 14. 1285 a 4).


20. τὸ δίκαιον, i.e. τὸ καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν δίκαιον, cp. c. 13. 1283 b 17, κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον.

22. πάντη γὰρ κ.τ.λ., ‘for they entirely claim on the basis of superiority, though not the same superiority.’ Aristotle’s account in Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1331 a 25 sqq. of the ‘superiority’ on which the partisans of democracy base their claims does not agree with the account given in Pol. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 3 sqq., for in the former passage (cp. Pol. 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 28 sqq.) they are said to base their claims on ἄξια— the ἄξια, in fact, which ἐλευθερία confers—and in the latter not on ἄξια but on number. Still, whichever of the two passages we follow, they base their claims on a ‘superiority.’

24. ἄλλα καὶ κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον λεξιθέν, i.e. because no other course is becoming or in accordance with nature: cp. c. 13. 1284 b 28 sqq.

28. τοῦτο, i.e. to constitute the whole of which the rest are parts.

31. πῶς, ‘under what conditions’ (so Bern.). Cp. c. 3. 1276 a 17, ἔσοικε δ’ οἰκεῖος ὅ λόγος εἶναι τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης, πῶς ποτὲ χρὴ λέγειν τὴν πάλιν εἶναι τὴν αὐτήν ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτήν ἄλλα ἐτέρων.

32. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. At this point a transition is made from the C. 18. question what are the different forms of Kingship and for whom Kingship is advantageous to the question how a Kingship or an Aristocracy (for the two forms turn out in 34 sqq. to be nearly related, cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 31 sqq. and 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 2 sqq., 31 sq.) is to be brought into being. For a similar transition cp. 6 (4).

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8. 1294 a 25 sqq. The reasoning of the paragraph which commences at ἐπὶ δὲ is—the best State is an aristocratical or Kingly State, but the virtue of a citizen of the best State is the same as the virtue of a good man; hence the virtue of a citizen of an aristocratical State or of a man of Kingly mould is identical with the virtue of a good man; hence to institute an aristocratical or Kingly State it is necessary to have recourse to the education and customs which produce good men. This preface prepares us to find in the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books what we do find there—inquiries directed to the discovery of the education and customs which produce good men. As to the transition from the Third to the Fourth Book see vol. i. p. 292 sqq.

34. The use of the word οἰκονομομένη indicates the completeness of the control exercised: cp. c. 14. 1285 b 31 sqq.

37. ἐν δὲ κ.τ.λ. See vol. i. Appendix B.


41. ὀστὶ ἐσται κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle corrects the view expressed by Plato in his Politicus that the essence of the βασιλικός and the πολιτικός is to possess a certain science. Just as he had said in 1. 7. 1255 b 20 that ὁ δεσπότης οὐ λέγεται κατὰ ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιῶτῳ εἶναι, so he now implies the same thing as to the βασιλικός and the πολιτικός. The education which is to produce them is not the communication of a science; it is the communication of an ἔξε. Contrast Plato, Polit. 292 B, τῷ βασιλικῷ ἀρχῆν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἶναι των ἔφαμεν, αἰμα, and 292 E; also 259 B. Aristotle, however, allows in 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 10 sqq. (cp. 3. 13. 1284 a 5 sqq. and 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 33 sqq.) that the ruler should possess not only virtue but also political aptitude. In 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 8 certain πολεμικαὶ καὶ πολιτικαὶ ἀσκήσεις are referred to which find a place apparently in Aristotle's scheme of education, though their exact nature is left obscure, and these πολιτικαὶ ἀσκήσεις may perhaps be one means by which he would seek to develop this political aptitude, but he probably thought that the art of ruling was mainly acquired in the course of being ruled (3. 4. 1277 b 8 sqq.).

1288 b. 1. καὶ παίδεια καὶ ἔθη. Cp. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 16, εἰδυνάμενοι καὶ πεπαθευμένοι, and Menex. 241 C, μαθώντας καὶ θυσιάζοντας μὴ φοβεῖσθαι τῶν βαρβάρων. In 4 (7). 13. 1332 b 10, on the other hand, it is implied that παίδεια comprises an element of habitation.
2. In place of πολιτικῶν we expect ἀριστοκρατικῶν, but the rulers in the best State have already been spoken of as πολιτικοί in c. 5. 1278 b 3.

4. τίνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι τρόπον καὶ καβίστασθαι πῶς. The same two questions are raised as to the Polity in 6 (4). 9. 1294 a 30 sqq.

BOOK IV (VII).

14. Compare the very similar sentence in De An. 2. 4. 415 a 14, C. 1. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ τούτων σκέψεων ποιεῖσθαι λαβεῖν ἔκαστον 1323 a. ἀυτῶν τί ἐστιν. For μέλλω with the aor. infin. Bonitz (Ind. s.v.) compares Eth. Nic. 2. 3. 1105 b 11, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν τῶτα οὐδεὶς ἢ οὐδὲ μελέτησε γενέσθαι ἁγάθος. Phrynichus condemns as un-Attic the use of μέλλεω with the aor. infin., but that it is so used by Attic writers is undoubted: see Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, § 74. Schanz remarks in his Prolegomena to Plato's Symposium, § 5, 'aorist infinitivi cum μέλλεω a Platone copulati exempla apud Platonem exstant, quae haud facile quispiam in dubitationem vocare possit.' He refers among other passages to Protag. 312 B, μέλλεις παρασχεῖν, and Gorg. 512 E, δυ μέλλον χρόνον βιώναι, and 525 A. It is natural that Aristotle should find the clue to the best constitution in the inquiry what is the most desirable life, for we read in 6 (4). ii. 1295 a 40 that 'the constitution is the mode of life chosen by the State.' See vol. i. p. 209 sqq. An instructive commentary on the first chapter will be found in the second of Vahlen's Aristotelische Aufsätze, Über ein Capitel aus Aristoteles' Politik, from which I shall frequently have occasion to make quotations.

16. For πρώτον in the sense of πρῶτον Vahlen (Aristot. Aufs. 2. 5, note) compares 3. 4. 1276 b 19.

17. ἄριστα γὰρ πράττειν κ.τ.λ., 'for [the best constitution and the most desirable life go together, inasmuch as] it is fitting that those who live under the best constitution their circumstances enable them to attain should fare best, unless something contrary to expectation happens.' It has already been pointed out (vol. i. p. 294, note 2) that the reasoning latent in the Greek cannot be fully expressed in English. For the thought cp. Plato, Laws 828 D, ὥς ἐσθ ἡμῶν ἡ πόλις ὡς ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκ τῶν ἀνθρώπων αὐτῶν, καθάπερ ἐν τῇ ἄνθρωπῃ, καθιστῶν, εἰναὶ ἄνθρωπον, ἐν μὲν εἰ. We hardly expect Aristotle to add the
qualification 'their circumstances enable them to attain' (ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτοῖς), for those who fare best must be those who live under the absolutely best constitution, which is contrasted in 6 (4).

1. 1288 b 25 sq., 32 with the best attainable under given circumstances (ἥ ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστη, ἡ ἐνδεχόμενη ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων).

20. πᾶσιν ὅς εἶπεῖν, 'all individuals, so to say,' for πᾶσιν corresponds to ἐκάστῳ, cp. 1323 b 21. Aristotle first discusses the question what is the most desirable life for the individual (1323 a 21–b 29), and then the same question as to the State.

21. χωρίς, i.e. ἐκάστῳ, 'for the individual': cp. 1323 b 40, καὶ χωρίς ἐκάστῳ καὶ κουφὴ ταῖς πόλεσιν, 3. 6. 1278 b 24, and Soph. Fragm. 521, νῦν δ' οὐδέν εἰμι χωρίς ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ἕξελεψα ταύτη τὴν γυναικείαν φύσιν, ὡς οὖν οὐδέν ἐσμεν, where, as Gomperz remarks (Die Bruchstücke der griech. Tragiker, p. 33), χωρίς (= idία, 'privatim, 'seorsum') serves to distinguish the individual lot of the speaker from the general lot of women.

νομίσαντας οὖν ... 23. αὐτοῖς, 'holding then that many of the things said in the non-scientific inquiries also respecting the best life are adequately said, we must now too make use of them.' On the question what 'non-scientific inquiries' are here referred to, something has been said in vol. i. p. 299, note 1. The expression ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι, when used by Aristotle, does not necessarily refer to non-scientific inquiries of his own, still less to writings of his own, but it probably refers to writings of his own in the passage before us, for, besides that, as Zeller remarks (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 119. 2: Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 115, note 4), the contents of the passage are quite Aristotelian in spirit, it seems to be implied in the words καὶ νῦν, 'now too,' that Aristotle has himself said these things before (cp. Meteor. 1. 3. 339 b 36, ἐξήρθα μὲν οὖν καὶ πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ ἄνω τόπον θεωρήματι, λέγομεν δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγον καὶ νῦν, and 341 a 12 sqq.). Whether, as Bernays held (Dialoge des Aristoteles, p. 69 sqq.), a Dialogue of Aristotle is here 'used,' is uncertain, for the non-scientific writings of Aristotle were not all of them Dialogues (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 123: Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 119 sq.). What is the exact meaning of χρηστέων? The word recurs in Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 a 26, λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς (i.e. τῆς ψυχῆς) καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις ἁρκοῦντο ἑνα, καὶ χρηστέων αὐτοῖς, where χρηστέων seems to introduce merely a statement of results, but it does not follow that it always means no more than
this. Bernays thought that we have in \textit{1323 a 24 sqq. a verbatim} extract from the non-scientific composition made use of. Against this Vahlen argues in the second of his Aristotelische Aufsätze. Zeller holds (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. \textit{119. 2: Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 115, note 4}) that the contents of the non-scientific composition are reproduced, not indeed \textit{verbatim}, but pretty closely ('ziemlich eng an zuschliessen scheint'), and we are certainly conscious (with Bernays) of a freer flow of periods in the first chapter than we often meet with in Aristotle's writings, though Vahlen has shown that many of the expressions used occur elsewhere in them. Bernays takes the use of the \textit{εξωτερικος λόγοι} to extend to the end of the first chapter, and it would seem from the words \textit{περὶ τῆς ἀριστῆς ζωῆς in 23} that all that is said on this subject is based on them, so that they will have been used at any rate down to \textit{σώφρον}, 1323 b 36. If we ask why Aristotle has recourse on this subject to the \textit{εξωτερικος λόγοι}, and not, as in c. 13. 1332 a 7 sqq. and 21 sqq., to the Nicomachean Ethics—Zeller finds teaching to the same effect in Eth. Nic. i. 6 sqq., io. 6 sqq.—the answer probably is that he prefers, when he can, to refer to the more popularly written and more generally accessible class of compositions. Zeller (\textit{Hermes}, 15. 553 sqq.: see vol. ii. p. x, note 1) thinks that the passage 1323 a 21 sqq., in addition to Eth. Nic. i. 8. 1098 b 9 sqq., was before the writer of Eth. Eud. 2. i. 1218 b 32, \textit{πάντα δὴ τάγαθα ἢ ἐκτὸς ἢ ἐν ψυχῇ}, καὶ τούτων αἵρετωτερα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καθάπερ διαφορώμεθα καὶ ἐν τοῖς \textit{εξωτερικοῖς λόγοις} ἐφ' ἄρπησι γὰρ καὶ ἄριστη καὶ ἠδονή ἐν ψυχῇ, ὡν ἐνα ἢ πάντα τέλος εἶναι δοκεῖ πάσων, but perhaps the passage in the \textit{εξωτερικοὶ λόγοι} was itself before him. For the aorist \textit{νομίσαντι,} cp. c. 7. 1328 a 3 and 5 (8). 7. 1341 b 27, and see above on 1271 b 4.

As to the case of \textit{νομίσαντι} see note on 1275 a 16.

24. \textit{ὅς ἀληθῶς γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for in truth against one division [of goods] at any rate no one would contend,'} etc. \textit{Γὰρ} introduces a justification of the use of the \textit{εξωτερικοὶ λόγοι} on the ground of the absence of dissent. For \textit{ἀμφισβητήν in πρῶς,} cp. 3. 16. 1287 b 35: Isaeus 11. 9, \textit{ἀμφισβητήσαι πρὸς τὰς ἐκείνου διαθήκας:} Demosth. in Phorm. c. 33, \textit{ἀμφισβητεῖσ πρῶς ἐν ῥήμα τῶν ἐν τῇ συγγραφῇ:} Polyb. 2. 2. 10, \textit{ἀμφισβητοῦσαν πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα.} But how would an assertion that the happy need not possess all three kinds of goods run counter to the division of goods into these three kinds? Apparently in this way. The division implies that all the three kinds of goods are goods, and it is taken for granted that those who are to
be happy should possess all goods (4 (7). 15. 1334 a 28 sqq.). There were other divisions of goods—among them a division into ἐπαυετά, τίμω, and δύναμες (Eth. Nic. 1. 12). As to the division into external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul, see vol. i. p. 299, note i. That wealth should be accompanied by virtue had often been said by the poets (Sappho, Fragm. 81; Pindar, Olymp. 2. 53 sqq. and Pyth. 5. 1 sqq.: Eurip. Fragm. 163: compare Lysander's remark to the younger Cyrus in Cic. De Senect. 17. 59, recte vero te, Cyre, beatum ferunt, quoniam virtuti tuae fortuna coniuncta est), and Simonides (Fragm. 70) had said that health should accompany wisdom. Cp. also Rhet. 1. 5. 1360 b 14 sqq. and Eth. Nic. 7. 14. 1153 b 17 sqq. When Aristotle sought to show in the inquiry which commences here that the chief ingredient in ἐπιθυμία is virtue, his work was half done for him by the ordinary use of the Greek language. To the Greeks ὶ ἐπιθυμῶν was ὶ εὖ πράττων (1323 b 29 sqq.), and ὶ εὖ πράττων was ὶ τὰ καλὰ πράττειν, and τὰ καλὰ πράττειν implied virtue. Our word 'happiness' has no such link with virtue.

27. οὐδεὶς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The word μακάριος is used throughout the first chapter as interchangeable with ἐπιθυμῶν, but it is a slightly stronger word, as we see from Eth. Nic. 1. 11. 1101 a 6-8. Aristotle offers no proof that the happy should possess external goods and the goods of the body, no doubt because he considers it unnecessary to do so; the only question likely to be raised is whether they need possess the goods of the soul. Compare Plato, Phileb. 21, which is evidently present to his memory. For φαύνη μακάριον without εὖν cp. 2. 3. 1261 b 22.

29. δεδιότα μὲν τὰς παραπετομένας μυνίας. We read in a fragment of Plutarch (Libr. Perdit. Fragm. 7. 10), φαρμακοπώλην δὲ τινα εἴδεναι ὑπὸ μὲν δρακόντων καὶ ἀσπίδων μηδὲν πᾶσχειν, μόνως δὲ φεύγειν μέχρι βοής καὶ ἐκστάσεως, but Aristotle is thinking not of gadflies, but of harmless flies. As to cowardice of this kind see Eth. Nic. 7. 6. 1149 a 4 sqq.

30. ἀπεχόμενον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Τῶν ἐσχάτων is in the gen. after μηδενός. To act thus is to be like a wild beast: cp. Plato, Laws 831 D, μηδὲν δυσχεραίνοντα, εάν μόνον εὖ δύναμιν καθάπερ θηρίῳ τοῦ φαγεῖν παντοδαπὰ καὶ πιεῖν, ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀφροδισίων πάσαν πάντως παρασχεῖν πλημμονὴν, which is imitated in Epist. 7. 335 A sq. For ἐπιθυμία τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ πιεῖν Vahlen compares Xen. Mem. 3. 6. 16, τοῦ ἐπιθυμεῖν ἐπιθυμεῖν, and i. 7. 3, and Xen. Oecon. 14. 9.
32. Ὑμοίως δὲ κ.τ.λ. Ὑπ. Νεικ. 10. 2. 1174 a 1, οὐδεῖς τ᾽ ἂν ἐλοιτο ζην παίδιον διάνοιαν ἔχων διὰ βιού, ἡδόμενος ἐρ᾽ οἷς τὰ παιδία ὡς οἴεν τε μᾶλιστα. Φορὰ παρά τὴν διάνοιαν οὕτως ἄφρονα καὶ διερθέον ὑπάρξειν Vahlen compares Phylarch. ap. Athen. Deipn. 536 ε, οὕτως ἐξαπατηθῆναι τὴν διάνοιαν... ὡστε τῶν πάντα χρώμων ὑπολαβέων βίωσεσθαί καὶ λέγειν ὅτι μόνος εὖροι τὴν ἀθανασίαν. Ἡ ὑπ. παιδίον, cp. 1323 b 8, δραγανον τι, and see Bon. Ind. 763 a 16 sqq., where Meteor. 3. 3. 372 b 13, καὶ διώτι περὶ τῶν ἥλιων ἢ τὴν σελήνην, ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀστρων, is referred to.

34. ἀλλὰ ταύτα μὲν κ.τ.λ., 'but these things almost all men would admit when said; they differ, however, in respect of the quantity they desire of each good and in respect of their relative superiority.' Άs to λεγόμενα Vahlen remarks that it is to be taken in close connexion with συγχωρήσειαν, and compares among other passages Eth. Nic. 6. 1. 1138 b 32, διό δει καὶ περὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκείναι μὴ μόνον ἀληθῶς εἰναι τούτα εἰρημένον: Plato, Rep. 436 E, οὔδεν ἄρα ἡμάς τῶν τοιούτων λεγόμενον ἐκπλήξει: Hdt. 2. 1. 46, τούτων ἃν ἀμφιτέρων πάρεστι χράσθαι τοῦτι τε πείσεται λεγομένους μᾶλλον, and 4. 11, ἐστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλος λόγος ἕχων διδε, τὰ μᾶλλον λεγομένον αὐτὸς πρόσκειμαι. For ὅσπερ πάντες, where ὅσπερ = 'ferē,' Vahlen compares Rhet. 1. 6. 1363 a 11, ὅσπερ γὰρ πάντες ἤδη ὁμολογοῦσιν, εἰ καὶ οἱ κακῶς πεπονθότες, perhaps not quite conclusive parallel. Closer ones may be found in Plato: see Ast, Lex. Platon. s.v., who refers in illustration of the use of ὅσπερ in the sense of 'ferē' to Protag. 346 Α, ὅσπερ ἀσμένους, among other passages. For ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς cp. 1323 b 14, κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν. Α different interpretation of ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς from that given above is, however, possible; it might mean 'in respect of the excess they desire of this or that good' (cp. τὴν ὑπερβολὴν, 38, and 1323 b 8), but 'superiority,' not 'excess,' is probably the meaning. Ὑπεροχαῖς appears to be in the plural because three different sorts of goods are measured against each other, so that whichever sort is preferred will conceivably possess one degree of superiority over the second and another over the third.

36. τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς κ.τ.λ. Ὡποσονοῦν is severed from τῆς ἀρετῆς by the whole length of the sentence for the sake of emphasis: see above on 1281 a 14. Aristotle here remembers Plato, Apol. Socr. 29 D, ὁ ἀριστε ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναίοις ὡν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐδοκιματάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἴσχυν, χρηστῶν μὲν ὧν αἰσχίνει ἐπιμελοῦμενοι, ὡσποὶ σοι ἔσται ὡς πλείστα, καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡσπο ὃς βελτίστη ἔσται, ὧν
NOTES.

επιμελείς οὖν θρονίζεις; and 29 Ε, ὀνειδίῳ ὅτι τὰ πλείστου ἄξια περὶ ἐλαχίστου ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φαυλότερα περὶ πλείονος.

37. For πλούτου καὶ χρημάτων Vahlen compares 1. 9. 1257 b 7, ποιητική γὰρ εἶναι τοῦ πλούτου καὶ χρημάτων. Πλούτος is explained in i. 13. 1259 b 20 as ἡ τῆς κτήσεως ἄρετή. Cp. also c. 5. 1326 b 33, περὶ κτήσεως καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας.

38. ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτοίς ἐρώμενεν. See vol. i. p. 295, note 2. Vahlen compares the use of ἡμεῖς δ' ἐρωτήσομεν in De An. i. 3. 406 b 22, also Metaph. γ. 5. 1010 a 15, ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ πρὸς τούτον τὸν λόγον ἐρώμενεν, and Pol. 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 16 sqq. As to ἡμεῖς see above on 1270 a 9.

39. ὅτι βάδιον μὲν κ.τ.λ. Μέν is taken up by οὐ μὴν ἄλλα, 1323 b 6 (see note on 1284 b 4). Περὶ τούτων, i.e. whether it is right to be content with a small amount of virtue and to seek an unlimited amount of external goods. In place of διαλαμβάνειν Lambinus followed by Bekk. reads λαμβάνειν (Sus. and Bonitz, Ind. s.v., also bracket the δια), and it is true that in 2. 3. 1262 a 17 we have ἀναγκαῖον λαμβάνειν περὶ ἀλλήλων τὰς πίστεις, and that no parallel has hitherto been adduced for the expression διαλαμβάνειν τὴν πίστιν, but it is not perhaps absolutely certain that διαλαμβάνειν is wrong.

Many verbs compounded with δια are occasionally used in a sense but little removed from that of the simple verb, e.g. διαναγκάζειν, διαπορεῖν, διαλαμβάνειν, διαφυλάττειν, etc.

40. ὅρωτας ὅτι κ.τ.λ. So that those who possess the virtues have the means of acquiring external goods in addition, whereas those who possess external goods have not necessarily the means of acquiring the virtues, whence it follows that the virtues are to be sought in preference to external goods. A little later, however, Aristotle says that external goods are the gift of fortune (1323 b 27 sq.). He continues here to make use of the Apology of Plato, 30 Α, οὐδείν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέχομαι ἡ πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους μῆτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μὴ τε χρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα, ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὁ ἄριστος ἔσται, λέγων ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἄρετὴ γίγνεται, ἄλλ' ἐκ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τάλα ἄγαθα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀπαντά καὶ ἴδια καὶ δημοσία. Compare the definition of εἰδαμονία in Rhet. i. 5. 1360 b 16 as εἰδοτικά κτημάτων καὶ σωμάτων μετὰ δυνάμεως φιλακτικῆς τε καὶ πρακτικῆς τούτων: Isocr. De Pace, § 32, τοῖς γὰρ ἀγαθοῖς οἷς ἔχομεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τούτους κτάμεθα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὀφέλειας δὲν δεύομεν τυγχάνομεν· ὥστ' οἱ τῆς αὐτῶν διανοιῶν ἀμελοῦντες λεῖθισαν σφᾶς αὐτοῦς ἅμα τοῦ τε φρονεῖν ἀμείνον καὶ τοῦ


1. τὸ χαίρειν ἦδον, as in De Gen. An. 1. 18. 724 a 1 (referred 1323 b. to in Bon. Ind. s. v. χαίρειν). Protarchus in Plato, Phileb. 21 A sqq. finds the Good to be τὸ χαίρειν or pleasure. The word μακάριος was supposed to be derived from χαίρειν (Eth. Nic. 7. 12. 1152 b 6 sqq., quoted by Vahlen). Tyrants were thought to be εὐδαιμόνες καὶ μακάριοι if they were seen to be in the daily enjoyment of bodily pleasures (7 (5). 11. 1314 b 28 sqq.).

2. εἰτ’ ἐν ἀμφότεροι. Cp. Eth. Eud. 2. 1. 1218 b 34, φρονήσεις γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἐν ψυχῇ, δεῦν ηὴ πάντα τέλος ἐκαί δοκεὶ πάσιν. Εὐδαιμονία is said to be a combination of τὸ καλὸν and pleasure in 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 19: see vol. i. p. 296, note i.

ὅτι μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει κ.τ.λ. Compare the remark of Solon quoted in Eth. Nic. 10. 9. 1179 a 9, καὶ Σόλων δὲ τοὺς εὐδαιμόνες ἰδοὺς ἀπεφαίνετο καλῶς, εἰπών μετρίως τοῖς ἐκτός κεχορηγημένους, πεπράγγειτα δὲ τὰ κάλλιαθ’, ὡς φησί, καὶ βεβιακότας σωφρόνως εὐδεχείται γὰρ μέτρια κεκτημένους πράττειν ἂ δει, and Plato, Euthyd. 281 B, ἃρα γε ὑμίναι... ἀν ἄνθρωπος πολλὰ κεκτημένος καὶ πολλὰ πράττων νοῦν μὴ ἔχων; ἡ μᾶλλον ὀλίγα νοῦν ἔχων; (cp. Laws 660 E). Compare also the remark of Bias to Croesus, made in support of Solon (Diod. 9. 27. 3), τὰ γὰρ ἐν σοὶ βούλεται (ὁ Σόλων) θεωρήσας ἄγαθα διαγροῦναι, νῦν δὲ τὰ παρὰ σοὶ μόνον ἐόρακεν ἐκαί δὲ ἐκείνα μᾶλλον ἡ ταύτα τοὺς ἄνθρωπους εὐδαιμόνες, and two lines variously ascribed to Antiphanes (Inc. Fab. Fragm. 63: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 154), Alexis (Inc. Fab. Fragm. 41: Meineke, 3. 521), and Menander (Inc. Fab. Fragm. 175: Meineke, 4. 273),

ψυχὴν ἔχων δὲι πλοῦσιαν τὰ δὲ χρήματα
taip’ ἐντείν ὄνος, παραπάρισια τοῦ βίου.

NOTES.

Ξω πράξεις τῶν αὐτῶν ἄλλα περὶ τὴν ἐντὸς ὧς ἀληθῶς, περὶ ἑαυτῶν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, μὴ ἐπαύσατα τὰ τάλατρα πράττειν ἐκατον ὑπὸ αὐτῆς μηδὲ πολυπραγμονεῖν πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένη, and Aristot. De Gen. An. 3. 3. 754 a 33, to τῶν βατράχων φῶν μόνον στερεόν ἐστι καὶ στυφρῶν πρὸς τὴν ἔξω σωματικά.

5. πλείω τῶν χρησίμων, cp. Pol. i. 9. 1257 a 16, τῷ τὰ μὲν πλείω τὰ δ' ἐλάπτω τῶν ἰκανῶν χρησιν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους (Vahlen), and Isocr. De Pace, § 90, πλείω τῶν ἰκανῶν.

τούτως, i.e. τοῖς περὶ τὸ ἱθος καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἄγαθοις, or (as in 10) τοῖς περὶ ψυχήν ἄγαθοις.

6. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα κ.τ.λ. Aristotle proves that it is not well to be content with a small amount of virtue and to seek an unlimited amount of external goods by showing (1) that the goods of the soul are not, like external goods and ὁργανα generally, harmful or useless when in excess, but on the contrary increase in utility with every increase in their amount; (2) that the best state of the soul is as much more precious (τεμιωτέρου) than the best state of property and of the body as the soul is more precious than property and the body; (3) that external and bodily goods are desirable for the sake of the soul, not the soul for the sake of external and bodily goods. On all these three grounds it is clear that the goods of the soul are to be sought to a far greater extent than the goods of the body and external goods.

7. ὡσπερ ὁργανόν τι, cp. 3. 16. 1287 b 16, ὡσπερ ὁ δικαστής. That instruments have a limit, we see from i. 8. 1256 b 35 sqq. and 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 35 sqq.

8. πὰν δὲ τῷ χρήσιμον κ.τ.λ., 'and everything that is useful' (not merely external goods but bodily goods also, vol. i. p. 299, note 2, and εἴσυχα as a whole, Eth. Nic. 7. 14. 1153 b 21 sqq.) 'belongs to the class of things whose,' etc. Supply τούτων with εἴσυ (with Giph.). Τὰ χρήσιμα (or ὁφέλιμα) are goods that are desirable for the sake of other goods (Eth. Nic. 1. 4. 1096 b 13 sqq.: 1. 3. 1096 a 7, χρήσιμον γὰρ καὶ ἀλοιχ χάριν: 8. 2. 1155 b 19). Cp. Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 3 sqq. and De Part. An. 2. 5. 651 a 36 sqq.

9. ἀναγκαῖον. 'In the first chapter of the Fourth Book of the Politics, which Bernays is probably right in believing to be taken over (herübergenommen) from an ethical dialogue, ἀνάγκη and ἀναγκαῖον are interchanged in such a way that the latter stands where the use of ἀνάγκη owing to its being followed by a vowel would have produced an hiatus' (Kaibel, Stil und Text der Πολιτεία
'Ἀθηναίων' des Aristoteles, p. 10). Kaibel has apparently overlooked the fact that the same rule is followed throughout the Politics: see for instance 3. 11. 1282 b 8–13 and 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 39–b 1. I have noticed only one passage in the Politics in which ἀνάγκη stands before a vowel, 2. 4. 1262 b 14, ἢπταίθα μὲν οὖν ἀνάγκη ἀμφοτέρους ἐφθάρσατι τὸν ἔνα, and the reason why it is used there probably is that ἀναγκαῖον occurs in the next line, unless indeed τοὺς should be added before ἀμφοτέρους. On the other hand there are several passages in which ἀναγκαῖον stands before a consonant.

For αὐτῶν used pleonastically in addition to the relative, cp. Plato, Rep. 395 D, and Stallbaum’s notes on this passage and on Gorg. 452 D. The same usage occurs in English, e. g. in ‘Who is the poet but lately arrived in Elysium whom I saw Spenser lead in and present him to Virgil?’ (Lyttelton’s Dialogues of the Dead).

10. τῶν δὲ κ.τ.λ. With εἰσιν supply ἀναγκαῖον from 9. Δὲ answers to μὲν in 7, τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔκτοσ, and we expect in ἐν not χρήσιμον εἰσιν, but χρήσιμον ἐστίν. See however Vahlen, Aristot. Aufs. 2. 24 sqq., who adduces other passages (Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 2 sqq.: 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 9 sqq.: De An. 2. 5. 417 a 22 sqq.) in which the second limb of an antithesis suffers a similar change, and is caught into the structure of an intervening sentence.

11. εἰ δὲι κ.τ.λ. Menand. Monost. 579 is in the same spirit: νοῦς ἐστι πάντων ἡγεμὼν τῶν χρησίμων.

13. ὁλως τε κ.τ.λ., ‘and broadly it is manifest that we shall say that the best state of every individual thing, if we match one against another, corresponds in respect of superiority to the distance between the things of which we say that these very states are states,’ i.e. if we match two things one against the other, the superiority of the best state of the one thing over the best state of the other corresponds to the distance between the one thing and the other. ὁλος marks a transition from statements as to this or that class of goods to a broad universal proposition as to ἔκαστον πράγμα: see above on 1262 b 3. For ἔκαστον πράγματος πρὸς ἄλληλα Vahlen compares among other passages Poet. 23. 1459 a 24, ὃν ἔκαστον ὡς ἐντυχεῖ ἥξει πρὸς ἄλληλα. Ἡπερ εἶληφε διάστασιν = τῇ διαστάσει ἡπερ εἶληφε, and τῇ διαστάσει is dependent on ἀκολουθεῖν. In Pol. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 15 sq. and Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 b 23 we find ἀκολουθεῖν followed by κατά, and many have connected it here with κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν, but Vahlen (whose interpretation I have
followed) is probably right in connecting ἁκολουθεῖν with τῇ διαστάσει (understood), and not with κατὰ τὴν ῥήσειν. That εἰληφε διάστασιν is a perfectly possible phrase (no less than εἰληφε διάστασιν, the reading of Π1) is shown by Vahlen (Aristot. Aufs. 2. 30), who compares among many other passages Plato, Tim. 65 A, ὅσα δὲ κατὰ σμικρῶν τὰς ἀποχωρήσεις έαυτῶν καὶ κενώσεις εἰληφε, τὰς δὲ πληρώσεις άδρόας καὶ κατὰ μέγαλα.


ψυχής γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔστι τιμῶτερον,
she means by ψυχή 'life.'


καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀρίστην ἐκάστου. Πλούσιος is said to be the ἀρετὴ of κτῆσις in 1. 13. 1259 b 20.

22. ἀρέτης καὶ φρονήσεως, 'moral and intellectual virtue': cp. 1323 a 27–34 and 1323 b 2, τὸ ἰδίον καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν.

καὶ τοῦ πράττειν κατὰ ταύτας. An important addition. Hitherto we have been told only this, that those who are to be happy must possess as much virtue as possible, but now we are told that action in accordance with the virtues is also essential to happiness, and this is not lost sight of in the sequel (cp. 31–36, 41 sqq.).

23. μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμένοις, 'appealing to the happiness of the Deity in proof of this.' Vict. 'quod inquit posse nos hoc videre utentes Deo teste, non intellextit debere nos adhibere ipsum testem et quasi invocare ut hoc confirmet, sed uti illo tanquam signo quodam certo et exemplo huici rei claro atque illustri.' Μάρτυρι χρησταί τωι is commonly used in the sense of 'producing some one as a witness,' as in Rhet. 1. 15. 1375 b 30, 'Αθηναίων 'Ομήρῳ μάρτυρι ἐχρήσαντο περὶ Σαλαμίνος, but here, as Vahlen points out, μάρτυς has the same meaning as in Plato, Phileb. 67 B, τὸν θηρίον ἔρωτας οὕστατοι κυρίους εἶναι μάρτυρας μᾶλλον ἢ κ.τ.λ. or as 'testes' in Cic. De Fin. 2. 33. 109. Cp. also Metaph. Λ. 1. 1069 a 25.

24. δὲ εὐδαίμων μὲν ἔστι καὶ μακάριος κ.τ.λ. As to the source and nature of the happiness of God, cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 12. 1245 b 18, ἀντιον ὅ ὅτι ἡμῖν μὲν τὸ εὖ καθ' ἐστεροῖ, εἰκόνον ὅ (τ.ε. τὸ θεό) αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τὸ εὖ ἐστίν, and Plut. De Is. et Osir. c. 1, ὥσεγ ἄργυρῳ καὶ χρυσῆς μακάριον τῷ θείῳ, οὐδὲ βροντάι καὶ κεραυνοί ισχυροί, ἀλλ' ἐπιστήμη καὶ φρονήσει. As to the phrase εὐδαίμων καὶ μακάριος see note on 1314 b
28. 'In the earlier days of Greece εἰδαίμων would hardly be used of a deity, as we can easily understand if we look to the original meaning of the word; later also it appears to have gone out of use again to some extent as an epithet of the gods. On the other hand we often find it thus used by Plato and other writers of his time (see Ast, Lexicon Platonicum). I have found it elsewhere in Aristoph. Aves 1741, τῆς τ' εἰδαίμωνος Ἰρασ, in Aristot. Eth. Nic. 10. 8. 1178 b 8, τούς θεοὺς γὰρ μᾶλλα ὑπελήφαμεν μακαρίους καὶ εἰδαίμωνος εἶναι, and' in the passage of the Politics before us (Heinze, Der Eudäonomismus in der griech. Philosophie, i. 663).

26. ἐπει καὶ κ.τ.λ., 'since it is just on account of this' (i.e. because happiness does not spring from external goods) 'that prosperity also differs from happiness [no less than external goods differ from goods of the soul], for the spontaneous and fortune are the cause of goods external to the soul [the abundance of which constitutes prosperity], whereas no one is just or temperate [or consequently happy] from fortune or owing to fortune.' Ἐπει introduces a justification of the statement that the happiness of the individual is proportionate to his virtue and moral prudence and to the degree in which he acts in accordance with them: if this were not so and his happiness sprang from external goods, it would not differ from prosperity. That prosperity consists in an abundance of external goods, we see from Rhet. 1. 5. 1361 b 39, εὐνυχία δ' ἐστιν, δω ἡ τύχη ἀγαθῶν αἰτία, ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπάρχειν ἡ πάστα ἡ τὰ πλείστα ἡ τὰ μέγιστα. That it was identified by many with happiness we see from Eth. Nic. 1. 9. 1099 b 7 sqq. and 7. 14. 1153 b 21 sqq.

28. As to ταῦταμαν καὶ ἡ τύχη see vol. i. p. 21 sqq.


29. ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τύχην. This expression is used for the sake of emphasis: cp. Plut. De Fortuna, c. 1, πότερον οὐδὲ δικαιοσύνη τὰ θετῶν πράγματα, οὐδὲ ἱσότης, οὐδὲ σωφροσύνη, οὐδὲ κοσμιότης, αὐτ' ἐκ τύχης μὲν καὶ διὰ τύχην 'Ἀριστείδης ἑνεκαρτέρησε τῇ πενίᾳ ... ἐκ τύχης δὲ καὶ διὰ τύχην Φιλοκράτης ιαβδῶν χρυσῖον παρὰ Φιλίππου τόρνους καὶ ἱστὸς ἠγέραζε:

ἐξήμενον δ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ., 'and next in order, and calling for the same arguments to establish it, comes the truth that the best State also is happy and does well.' But it cannot do well—Aristotle in effect proceeds—unless it does noble things, and it cannot do noble things without moral and intellectual virtue, and the courage,
justice, and wisdom of a State are identical in nature with the same virtues in an individual, so that the happiness of a State, like that of an individual, cannot exist apart from the moral and intellectual virtues and action in accordance with them; its happiness is inseparable from the very same virtues with which happiness is associated in the individual. Bernays and Susemihl, who substitute γάρ in 31 for the de of the MSS., regard the passage ἄδικατον, 31–σώφρων, 36, as containing the proof of the preceding sentence ἐκάμενον, 29–καλῶς, 31, but Vahlen has already pointed out (Aristot. Aufs. 2. 45 sq.) that the former passage is rather a deduction from latter. The arguments used in the passage 31–36 are not the same as those used in 1323 a 38–b 29, nor do they prove that the best State is happy; what is proved in 31–36 is that the happy State will possess the same courage, justice, temperance, and wisdom which are possessed by the virtuous individual. One can conceive that the State might be happy without possessing the virtues of the virtuous individual; the object of 31–36 is to show that this is not the case, and that any happy State must possess these virtues, and thus to supplement and complete 29–31. It follows that the best State will possess them. In saying that the courage, justice, temperance, and wisdom of a State are identical with the courage, justice, temperance, and wisdom of an individual Aristotle follows in the track of Plato, Rep. 435 B sq. and 441 C sq. With ἄδικατον de καλῶς πρᾶττειν κ.τ.λ. compare the reasoning in Plato, Gorg. 507 C.

34. ἔχει, not ἔχουσι, cp. 8 (6). I. 1316 b 34 sq. and Plato, Phileb. 64 E, μετρώτης γάρ καὶ ἔκμετρία κάλλος δῆποι καὶ ἀρετὴ πανταχοῦ ἔμβατεν γίγνεται.

35. μορφήν. Bonitz (Ind. s.v.) remarks of this passage, ‘μορφήν idem fere quod δύναμις significat.’

The suppressed antecedent of ὅν must be τῆς ἀνδρίας καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ φρόνησις: we expect therefore ἀνδρείας καὶ δικαιος καὶ φρόνιμος in place of δίκαιος καὶ φρόνιμος καὶ σώφρων, but Aristotle is not careful of exact correspondence in enumerations of this kind, as Vahlen shows by comparing Eth. Nic. I. 13. 1103 a 4–9, Pol. I. 13. 1259 b 39–1260 a 2, Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 6–9, and Pol. 3. 12. 1282 b 36–1283 a 3, where we expect τοῦ κάλλους in place of τοῦ πλοίου in 1283 a 2. The same thing is observable in Plato: see Stallbaum on Plato, Rep. 490 C.

37. μέν is probably answered not by de in νῦν δε ἱποκείεσθω, 40,
but by δέ in πότερον δέ κ.τ.λ., ι324 ι 5 (see Vahlen, Aristot. Aufs. 2. 25).

πεφρομιμαστένα. Not only what has been said on this subject, but the whole contents of the first three chapters are introductory, because they merely prepare the way for the inquiry with which Aristotle is mainly concerned, the inquiry as to the best constitution (cp. c. 2. ι324 ι 19 sqq., c. 4. ι325 b 33 sqq.).

38. θεγγάνειν ‘is rare in the best Prose (/aptomai being the common verb), but is used by Xenophon, Cyrop. ι. 3. 5, 5. 1. 16, 6. 4. 9, and by Aristotle’ (Liddell and Scott s. v.). See also Rutherford, New Phrynichus, pp. 169, 391. ‘Επεξελθεῖν (aor. infin.) is used though θηγγάνειν (pres. infin.) has preceded, probably because έπεξέρ- xenēai is not used in this sense.

39. έτέρας σχολής, i.e. έτέρας μεθόδου (Sus. Ind. s. v. σχολή), cp. ι324 a 2, ἐπί τής νῦν μεθόδου, and 21, ἡμεῖς δέ ταύτην προηρήμεθα νῦν τήν σκέψην. Compare also Plut. Pericl. c. 39, ἄλλα ταύτα μὲν ἵσος έτέρας δάξει πραγματείας εἶναι. Νῦν δέ, 40, is in opposition to έτέρας σχολῆς.

40. μέν should rather follow ἵπποκείσθο, but ‘μέν interdum non ei additur vocabulo in quo vis oppositionis cernitur’ (Bon. Ind. s. v.).

41. κεχωρηγημένης κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. ι. 9. 1099 a 32 sq. and ι0. 9. 1179 a 4 sqq. Xenocrates, on the other hand, had identified the good and the happy life, and his view is consequently corrected here (Top. ι. 1. 152 a 7, καθάπερ Σεισκράτης τῶν εὐθαμονα βίων καὶ τῶν σπουδαίων ἀποδείκνυε τὸν αὐτόν, ἐπειδή πάντων τῶν βιῶν αἱρετῶτας ὁ σπουδαῖος καὶ ὁ εὐθαμῶν ἐν γὰρ τὸ αἱρετῶταν καὶ μέγιστον), and also that of the Cynics, for they held that virtue needed only the addition of the strength which Socrates possessed to be sufficient for happiness (Diog. Laert. 6. ι1, αὐτάρκη γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐθαμονίαν, μηδὲνος προσδεομένην ὅτι μὴ Σωκρατικής ἴσχύος).

1. The suppressed subject of μετέχειν probably is, not τῶν βιῶν, but ι324 a. ἐκαστὸν καὶ τὰς πόλεις.


5. Πότερον δέ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has just said that the courage, C. 2. justice, etc., of a State are the same as the corresponding virtues in an individual, and now he asks whether this is also true of happiness. The question marked out for inquiry in ι323 a 20 sq., πότερον ὁ αἱρετῶτας βίων κουή καὶ χωρὶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἐπείροσ, has been so
far answered that we have been told that the most desirable life both for the State and for the individual is μετ’ ἀρετῆς, but we have not yet learnt whether the happiness of the State resembles the happiness of the individual (1323 b 21 sqq.) in springing from virtue and being proportionate to it, and, till we know this, we cannot affirm that the happiness of the State and that of the individual are the same. We are now told that this is the case (1324 a 13, καὶ πόλεως εὐδαιμονεστέραν φήσει τὴν σπουδαιοτέραν). Plutarch claims that Lycurgus was already aware of this (Lycurg. c. 31, ὥσπερ ἐνός ἀνδρὸς βίω καὶ πόλεως θλῆς νυμίζων εὐδαιμονιῶν ἀπ’ ἀρετῆς ἐγγύνεσθαι καὶ ὁμοιόνας τῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν, and Ages. c. 33). He often seems tacitly to defend Lycurgus against Aristotle’s criticisms (see notes on 1270 a 4, 19, and 1324 b 7).

12. ἀποδέχεται, ‘accipit cum assensu, probat’ (Bon. Ind. s.v.).

Cp. 2. 6. 1265 a 25.

14. ἐν μὲν κ.τ.λ. For συμπολιτεύομαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως see note on 1293 a 4, κοινονοῦσα καὶ πολιτεύομαι. As to the question here raised and the parties to the discussion, see vol. i. p. 305 sqq. In using the words ὁ ἤεικνος καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ἀπολελυμένος Aristotle probably has before him not only the language of Aristippus in Xen. Mem. 2. 1. 13, ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ τοι... οὐδ’ ἐις πολιτείαν ἐμαυτῶν κατακλῆτο, ἀλλὰ ξένος πανταχοῦ εἰμὶ, but also the example of Anaxagoras, who lived many years at Athens, though a Clazomenian, and when he was forced to leave it, did not return to his native city, but preferred to live a stranger’s life at Lampsacus and died there (Rhet. 2. 23. 1398 b 15).


18. κοινωνεῖν πόλεως = συμπολιτεύεσθαι, to take an active share in a State (cp. 15).

19. εἴτε καὶ τις μὲν μὴ τοῖς δὲ πλείονοις. For καί, cp. c. 9. 1329 a 7, τρόπον μὲν τινα τοῖς αὐτοῖς, τρόπον δὲ τινα καὶ ἑτέροις.

ἐπεί δὲ κ.τ.λ. The best MSS. have ἐκείνο μὲν γάρ in 22, though Π. Ῥ. omit γάρ and Vet. Int. has no equivalent for it (Vet. Int. occasionally fails to render γάρ: see vol. ii. p. lxiii). Γάρ should probably be retained in the text, and if we retain it, we must place the apodosis at ὅτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., 23. After a string of protases introduced by ἐπεί, the apodosis is often introduced by οὖν in Aristotle’s writings (see Bonitz, Aristot. Studien, 2. 59 sqq.). In c. 13. 1331 b 26 sqq. and in De An. 1. 4. 408 a 5 sqq. the
apodosis is introduced by μὲν οὖν after a protasis introduced by ἐτεὶ or εἰ.

τῆς πολιτικῆς διανοίας καὶ θεωρίας. Cp. c. 3. 1325 b 20, θεωρίας καὶ διανοήσεις. Bonitz (Ind. 186 a 28) explains διανοία here as 'cogitandi actio' (i.e. 'thought'), referring to Metaph. E. i. 1025 b 6, πάσα ἐπιστήμη διανοητικὴ ἢ μετέχουσα τι διανοίας, Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 b 11 sq., and De Interp. 14. 23 a 32 sq.


24. κἂν ὀστισσοῦν, whether πρακτικὸς οὐ θεωρητικὸς.


27. ὁ πάντων τῶν ἐκτός ἀπολελυμένος, οὗ θεωρητικὸς τις, ὁν μόνον τινός φασιν εἶναι φιλόσοφον. Aristotle was on the point of saying ὁ φιλόσοφος, as in 32, but he substitutes this long phrase, because he declines to identify this kind of life exclusively with the philosophic life. He selects three strong assertions for review, each containing the word μόνον, and this is the first of them. The other two are μόνον γὰρ ἀνδρὸς τῶν πρακτικῶν εἶναι βιον καὶ πολιτικῶν, 39, and οἱ δὲ τῶν δυσποτικῶν καὶ τυραννικῶν τρόπων τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι μόνον εἰδαίμονα φασιν, 1324 b 2. As to the passage before us cp. c. 3. 1325 a 18, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀποδοκιμαζόντες τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχὰς, νομίζοντες τὸν τε τοῦ ἐλευθέρου βιον ἐτερών των εἶναι τοῦ πολιτικοῦ καὶ πάντων αἱρετῶτατον, οἱ δὲ τοῦτον ἀριστον. Πάντων τῶν ἐκτός ἀπολελυμένων, however, means something more than a mere rejection of political office; Aristotle probably has Anaxagoras in his mind, his refusal to be cumbered even with property, his passion for θεωρία and ἐλευθερία: compare the account of Anaxagoras in Plut. Pericl. c. 16, where ἀνδράγανον καὶ ἀπροσδή τῆς ἐκτός ὅλος ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς κυνεῖ τὴν διάνοιαν may be compared with πάντων τῶν ἐκτός ἀπολελυμένων, in Himer. ap. Phot. Biblioth. 1088 R (quoted by Menage on Diog. Laert. 2. 6), where πάσης ἑαυτοῦ τῆς ἐξουθὲν ἀσχολίας ἐλευθερώσαντες may be compared with the same phrase, and in Diog. Laert. 2. 6, οὗτος (i.e. Ἀνάξαγόρας) εὐγενείᾳ καὶ πλούτῳ διαφέρον ἢν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μεγαλοφροσύνῃ, ὅς γε τὰ πατρίδα παραχώρησε τοῖς οἰκείοις, αἰτιαθεῖς γὰρ ἐπ’ αὐτῶν ὡς ἀμέλεων, "Τι οὖν," ἐφη,
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"οὐς ὑμεῖς ἐπιμελεῖσθε;" καὶ τέλος ἀπέστη καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν φυσικῶν θεωρίαν ἦν, οὐ φροντίζων τῶν πολιτικῶν. See also Clemens, Strom. 2. 416 D (quoted by Zeller, Gr. Ph. I. 912. 5), 'Ἀναξαγόρας...τὴν θεωρίαν φάναι τοῦ βίου τέλος εἶναι καὶ τίνι ἀπὸ ταύτης ελευθερίαν: Eth. Nic. 10. 9. 1179 a 13 sqq.: Eth. Eud. I. 4. 1215 b 6 sqq. and I. 5. 1216 a 10 sqq. Aristotle, however, may also be thinking of Empedocles (cp. Diog. Laert. 8. 63, quoted below on 1325 a 19). 'Ον μόνον τῶν φαιν εἶναι φιλόσοφον perhaps contains a reminiscence of Plato, Theaet. 175 D, οὗτος δὴ ἐκατέρω τρόπος, ὁ Θεόδωρος, ὁ μὲν τῷ ὠντι ἐν ελευθερίᾳ τε καὶ σχολῇ τεθραμμένου, οὐ δὴ φιλόσοφον καλεῖς, and Rep. 476 A, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ δὲν ὁ λόγος, οὐς μόνον ἂν τις ὀρθῶς προεἰσποι φιλοσόφους: cp. Plut. De Facie in Orbe Lunae, c. 30, αἱ σόφοφων (ψυχαί) μετὰ σχολῆς ἀπράγμανα καὶ φιλόσοφον αὐτέχθεται βίων. Aristotle hints in these words that it is possible to lead a philosophic life without withdrawing altogether from politics; he probably remembers that Socrates, Archytas, and Epaminondas had done so. Cp. Plut. An Seni sit gerenda Respublica, c. 26, much of which chapter is thought by Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 892. 1 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. ii. p. 441, note 1), to be based, in substance at any rate, on Dicaearchus, Ἐκράτης γοῦν οὗτε βάβρα βεῖς οὗτ' εἰς θρόνων καθίσας οὗτε ἄραν διατριβής ἦ περιπάτου τοὺς γνώριμοι τεταγμένην φιλάττων, ἀλλὰ καὶ παῖς, οὗτ τύχοι, καὶ συμπίνων καὶ συντρατευμένων ἐνώις, καὶ συναγοράζων, τέλος δὲ καὶ συνωδεμένοι καὶ πίνων τὸ φάρμακον ἐ'φιλοσόφει, πρῶτος ἀπόδεικτος τοῦ βίου ἀπαντᾷ χρόνω καὶ μέρει καὶ πάθει καὶ πράγμασι ἀπάλω ἀπασὶ φιλοσοφιὰν δεχόμενον, and Cic. de Orat. 3. 34. 137, septem suisse dicuntur uno tempore, qui sapientes et haberentur et vocarentur. Hi omnes praeter Mileesium Thalen civitatibus suis praefuerunt. Plato, again, though he speaks of the true philosopher as scorning political office (Rep. 521 A sq.), will not hear of his philosophic class refusing political office, at any rate in his ideal State. Cp. also Gorg. 500 D. Chrysippus was so far from thinking the συχλαστικὸς βίος the only one fit for a philosopher that he classed it as an ἠθικός βίος (Plut. De Stoicor. Repugnantiis, c. 2).

29. σχεδὸν γάρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. i. 7. 1255 b 36, οὕτω δὲ πολιτεύονται ἢ φιλοσοφοῦσιν. For οἱ φιλοτιμώτατοι πρὸς ἄρετίν, cp. (with Eaton) 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 29, μεγαλοψυχότεροι πρὸς τὴν ἄρετίν. Φαίνονται προαρούμενοι, 'evidently choose.'

31. καὶ τῶν προτέρων (e.g. Anaxagoras and, as we shall see, Gorgias) καὶ τῶν νῦν (e.g. Isocrates and Epaminondas). οἱ
πρότερον does not, I think, occur elsewhere in the Politics (οἱ πρότερον is the usual phrase), but it occurs in Plato, Phaedr. 274 B and Menex. 241 D.

Λέγω δὲ δῦνο κ.τ.λ. See critical note.

32. διαφέρει δὲ οὐ μικρὸν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably has before him the words of Socrates in Plato, Gorg. 500 Κ, οἰς γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τοῦτον εἶναι ἡμῖν οἱ λόγοι, οὐ τί ἢν μᾶλλον σπουδάσεις τις καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχων ἀνθρώπων, ἦ τοῦτο, ὡστε ὑπό τρόπον ζῆν, πότερον ἐπὶ δὲ σὺ παρακαλεῖς ἐμὲ (the political life) . . . ἡ ἐπὶ τόνδε τὸν βιον τὸν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ.


35. νομίζομεν δ' οὐ μὲν κ.τ.λ. It is possible that Anaxagoras had expressed himself to this effect: he seems at any rate to have implied in his account of the happy man that he was not a δυνάστης (Eth. Nic. ιο. 9. 1179 α 13 sqq.). Isocrates had said in his Letter to the Sons of Jason (§ 11), ἐμοὶ γὰρ αἱρετότερος ὁ βίος εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ βελτίων ὁ τῶν ἰδιωτεύοντων ἢ ὁ τῶν τυραννοῦντων, καὶ τάς τιμᾶς ἥδιος ἤγομαι τάς ἐν τάς πολιτείας ἢ τάς ἐν τάς μοναρχίας: compare the spurious Fourth Philippic ascribed to Demosthenes, c. 70. As Eaton points out, Plato had already made Thrasymachus in Rep. 344 A sqq. speak of τυραννις as ἡ τελεοτάτη ἀδικία: cp. also Gorg. 478 Ε, Polyb. 2. 59. 6, αὐτὸ γὰρ τούνομα (of tyrant) περιέχει τὴν ἀσεβεστάτην ἔμφασιν, καὶ πάσας περείληφη τάς ἐν ἀνθρώπως ἀδικίας καὶ παρανομίας, and Paus. 8. 27. 11, τούτῳ τῷ 'Αριστοδήμῳ καὶ τυραννοῦτι ἐξεγένετο ὁμοί ἐπικληθήναι Χρηστῷ, and 8. 36. 5. In μετ' ἀδικίας τινὸς εἶναι τῆς μεγάττης (‘accompanied with injustice of the very greatest kind’) τινὸς lends emphasis: cp. Xen. Mem. 1. 3. 12, ὡς ἱππική τυχ έλεγες δύναμιν τοῦ φιλήματος εἶναι (‘how very terrible’), and Soph. O. C. 560, and see Liddell and Scott, s. v. τίς Α. ii. 8.

37. πολιτικῶς δὲ, i.e. if rule is exercised as it should be exercised over men free and equal (cp. 3. 4. 1277 b 7 sqq.: 1. 7. 1255 b 20).

38. ἐμπόδιον ἔχειν τῇ περὶ αὐτοῦ εὐμερεία, and so not to be productive of τὸ ἄριστα πράττειν καὶ τὸ ζῆν μακαρίως (24). As to ἐμπόδιον ἔχειν see above on 1266 a 27. Τῇ περὶ αὐτοῦ εὐμερεία, in contrast to ἡ ἐκτὸς εὐμερεία (health, food, etc.), Eth. Nic. ιο. 9. 1178 b 33 sqq.

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toúton δὲ κ.τ.λ.  As Bonitz points out (Ind. 247 b 23), ἐὰς ἑναρίας
takes a dative in Pol. 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 31.

39. μόνον γάρ κ.τ.λ. This was the view of Gorgias as expressed
by Meno in Plato, Meno 71 E, αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἄνδρος ἀρετῆ, ἰκανὸν ἐιναι
tὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν (and perhaps also of Prodicus and Protagoras,
Rep. 600 C sq.): compare what Socrates says to Callicles, the
friend of Gorgias, in Gorg. 500 C, ὡστια χρῆ τρόπον ζῆν, ποῦτερον ἐπί
όν σὺ παρακαλεῖς ἐμε, τὰ τοῦ ἄνδρος δὴ ταῦτα πράττοντα, λέγοντα τε ἐν τῷ
δήμῳ καὶ ρητορικῆν ἀσκοῦσα καὶ πολιτεύομενον τούτων τῶν τρόπων, ον υμεῖς
νῦν πολιτεύεσθε, ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν τῶν βίων τῶν ἐν ἐιδοσοφίᾳ, and what Callicles
himself says in Gorg. 485 D of one who continues to study
philosophy after he has ceased to be young, ὑπάρχει τοῦτῳ τῷ
ἄνθρωπῳ, κἂν πάνω εὑρήσῃ ἡ, ἀνίδρομο γενέσθαι φεύγονται τὰ μέσα τῆς
πόλεως καὶ τὰς ἁγοράς, ἐν αὐτῷ ἐφ’ ὁ ποιήσῃ τὸν ἄνδρας ἀριστερεῖς
γίγνεσθαι κ.τ.λ., and Hipp. Maj. 281 B sq.  Gorgias formed himself
(Hipp. Maj. 282 B) and his disciples (Xen. Anab. 2. 6. 16) on this
model; his ideal of human life stood in the strongest possible
contrast to that of Anaxagoras. Nowhere can it have found more
sympathy than at Athens (cp. Thuc. 2. 40). The added remark
(c. 3. 1325 a 21 sqq.), ἀδύνατον γάρ τῶν μηδὲν πράττοντα πράττειν εὖ,
τίν δ’ εὔπραγμαν καὶ τίν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι ταῦτάν, may also be due to
Gorgias. In 2. 2. 1261 b 1 (cp. 3. 6. 1279 a 8 sqq.) Aristotle
leaves the question open whether ruling is a good thing
or not.

40. ἐφ’ ἐκάστης γάρ κ.τ.λ. This was not the general view: cp.
Eth. Nic. 10. 9. 1179 a 6, τούτο δ’ ἐστιν ἑδὲν ἐνυργός: οἱ γὰρ ἱδώντι
τῶν δυναστῶν οὐχ ἤπτον δοκοῦσι τὰ ἐπιεική πράττειν, ἄλλα καὶ μᾶλλον.
Aristotle, however, seems to have said, if the προτερτικός ascribed to
him was really his, that Kings were favourably circumstanced for
philosophizing (Fragm. 47. 1483 a 41 sqq.): compare the view of
Marcus Aurelius (Comm. 11. 7), and contrast Plut. Ad Princ.
Inerud. c. 5, where Plutarch suspects that Alexander was half
inclined to regard his own splendour and power ὡς κάλπην ἄρετης
καὶ ἁγχολαίν.  For ἕπι with the gen. in the sense of ‘in respect of,’
cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 17, and Plato, Rep. 460 A, ὡς τὸν φαῖλον ἑκέινον
ἀιτίασθαι ἐφ’ ἐκάστης συνεργεῖος τύχην.

1324 b.  2. οἱ δὲ κ.τ.λ. By ‘the despotic and tyrannical form of the
constitution’ Aristotle means a form of constitution devised πρὸς τὸ
κρατεῖν καὶ δεσπόζειν τῶν πέλας.  No notice is taken of those who
praised the life of the tyrant, probably because no one would claim
that the tyrant was alone happy. For τρόπον τής πολιτείας, cp. 2. 5. 1264 a 11, ὁ τρόπος τής δήλως πολιτείας, and 2. 7. 1267 a 17, ὁ τρόπος τής Φαλέων πολιτείας. Thibron and other writers on the Lacedaemonian constitution are probably referred to (see c. 14. 1333 b 18 sqq.), for they seem to have called the Lacedaemonian State happy because it ruled over many, and to have ascribed its happiness to the framer of its constitution (1333 b 22 sq., 29 sqq.). Aristotle may have thought that Alexander needed warning on the subject (cp. Plut. De Tranq. An. c. 13: Aristot. Fragm. 614. 1581 b 18 sqq.).

3. παρ' εύνους δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and in some States this is the distinctive aim both of the constitution and of the laws, that the members of the State may exercise a despotic rule over others.' In the Lacedaemonian and Cretan States, for instance, both constitution and laws were framed with this end in view (c. 14. 1333 b 5 sqq.). For ὄρος τής πολιτείας cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 10 sq. Compare also the use of ὑπόθεσις in 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 27 sqq.

5. διὸ καὶ τῶν πλείστων νομίμων χύδην ὡς εἰπεῖν κειμένων παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις. Καὶ = 'though': cp. Xen. Hell. 3. 5. 2, Ἀθηναίοι δὲ καὶ οὐ μεταλαβόντες τούτου τοῦ χρυσίου ὁμος πρόθυμοι ἦσαν εἰς τῶν πόλεμον, and see Liddell and Scott s.v. καὶ B. ii. 4.

νομίμων = νόμων: cp. 2. 8. 1268 b 42 and 1269 a 1, and see Bon. Ind. s.v. νόμων.


7. δωσινερ κ.τ.λ. The same thing is said in 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 5 sqq. and of Lacedaemon in 2. 9. 1271 b 2 sqq.: cp. also 1325 a 3, and Plato, Laws 626 A, καὶ σχέδων ἀνευρόκειται οὐτω σκοπῶν τῶν Κρητῶν νομοθέτην, ὡς εἰς τῶν πόλεμον ἀπαντά δημοσία καὶ ἴδια τὰ νόμα μὴν ἀποβλέπων συνετάζω. We should hardly have guessed that this was so from the part of the Code of Gortyna which has come down to us, but the account of Cretan institutions given in Strab. p. 480 on the authority of Ephorus so far bears out the testimony of Plato and Aristotle, that it represents the development of courage in the young citizens to have been one main aim of the constitution. Plutarch probably has similar charges before him when in Lycurg. c. 31 and Ages. c. 33 he tries to make out that the aim of Lycurgus was very much that which Plato and Aristotle said that it ought to have been (see above on 1324 a 5). For ἦ τε παιδεία καὶ τὸ τῶν νόμων πλήθος, cp. c. 14. 1333 b 9, τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν παιδείαν. For τὸ
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tων νόμων πλήθος, 'most of the laws,' Bonitz (Ind. 603 b 17 sqq.) compares 6 (4). 4. 1290 a 31, 32 and 2. 5. 1264 a 13.

9. ἐπὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and further in all the non-Greek nations that are capable of winning at the expense of others warlike prowess is honoured.' Aristotle has before him Hdt. 2. 167, ὀρέων καὶ ῥημάκας καὶ Σκύθας καὶ Πέρσας καὶ Λυδοὺς (he substitutes the Celts for the Lydians) καὶ σχέδον πάντας τοὺς βαρβάρους ἀποσιμοτέρους τῶν ἄλλων ἡγημένους πολιτείων τοὺς τάς τέχνας μανδάνοντας καὶ τοὺς ἐγκύνους τούτων τοὺς δὲ ἀπαλλαγμένους τῶν χειρωναξίων γενναίους νομιζόμενους εἶναι, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ἀνεμένους. μεμιθήκαι δ' ἂν τοῦτο πάντες οἱ Ἑλληνες, καὶ μάλιστα Λακεδαιμόνιοι, where there is a transition from the barbarians to the Lacedaemonians, just as in the passage before us there is a transition from the Lacedaemonians to the barbarians. He probably also has before him Plato, Laws 637 D, πότερον, ὅσπερ Σκύθαι χρώνται καὶ Πέρσαι, χρηστέων, καὶ ἐτί Καρχηδόνιοι καὶ Κέλτοι καὶ Ἰππικαὶ καὶ Θράκες, πολεμικὰ ἑξίματα δύνατα ταῦτα γένη, ἣ καθάπερ ὕμεις (i.e. the Lacedaemonians and Cretans), and perhaps Xen. Mem. 2. 1. 10. Cp. also Isocr. Paneg. § 67, ἐστὶ γὰρ ἀρχικώτατα μὲν τῶν γενῶν καὶ μεγίστας δυναστείας ἐξουσια Σκύθαι καὶ Θράκες καὶ Πέρσαι. The phrase τοὺς δυναμένους πλεονεκτεῖν recurs in 8 (6). 3. 1318 b 4, where οἱ κρατοῦντες takes its place in the next line: cp. Demosth. De Chers. c. 42, ἐστὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς οὐκ αὐτοὶ πλεονεκτήσαι καὶ κατασχεῖν ἀρχὴν εὖ πεφυκότες. No doubt among the barbarians of Europe in Aristotle's day, as among those of Africa in our own, there were raiding and raided races. 'Ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις, i.e. ἡ πολεμικὴ δύναμις, referring to πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους, 8 (cp. τὴν ἁρέτην ταύτην, 13). Thus πολέμουν is emphatic in 16 and 18, and τῶν πολέμων in 20. For the perfect τετίμηται see above on 1280 a 16, διήρητα, and see Holden's note on Xen. Oecon. 9. 4, ἀναπέστηται.

12. καὶ νόμοι τινὲς εἰσι, 'laws also' providing for the giving of honours, as well as honours. The honours might be given apart from any provisions of law.

13. καθάπερ ἐν Καρχηδόνι κ.τ.λ., 'as for instance at Carthage men receive, we are told, their decoration composed of armlets with as many armlets as they have served campaigns.' Coray would read ἐκ τοσοῦτων κρίκων, but Vahlen (Aristot. Aufs. 2. 34) rightly disapproves of this attempt to secure a more exact correspondence between antecedent and relative. I translate κρίκων 'armlets,' not 'rings,' for the κρίκων which Demosthenes wore was not a ring but an armlet (Plut. Demosth. c. 30, Ἐρατοσθένης δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν κρίκῳ
Compare till tumque parallel Zus quoted to with also the possibly requirement a McKfdoviq Trans, halter military been anulum barbamque youth Damasc. slaying caede was TT(pi@paxi6viov Similar armillae service Trans, by 10. brave 15. be sqq. Carthaginian service in decoration intended that not metal, given by Greece. We may given to Roman soldiers for brilliant seats of arms (Liv. ro. 44 : Guhl and Koner, Life of the Greeks and Romans, Eng. Trans. p. 586). We hear very little of similar rewards for gallant service in Greece. It was with land that Pittacus was rewarded for slaying his antagonist Phrynon (Plut. De Herod. Malign. c. 15). It was not by rewards given to the brave but by the education of youth that the Lacedaemonians and Cretans developed military prowess in their citizens. The Carthaginian custom may have been derived from the Libyans around them (cp. Hdt. 4. 176), or possibly from Egypt (Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. Hypotyp. 3. 201, p. 168. 25 sqq. Bekker). It seems likely from the passage before us that the decoration of kríkou was confined to citizens of Carthage and was intended to induce them to serve in war and not to leave military service to mercenaries.

15. ἵνα δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and there was at one time a law in Macedon also that he who had slain no foeman should be girded with his halter (instead of a belt).’ A man girded with a halter would cut a sorry figure beside one girded with a handsome belt adorned with metal, and possibly golden, buckles (Guhl and Koner, Eng. Trans. p. 235). Among the Cappadocians to wear a belt meant to be an officer (Anth. Pal. 11. 238 : Liddell and Scott s.v. ἴων). Compare the Macedonian custom mentioned by Hegesander, quoted in Athen. Deipn. 18 a, Ἡγεσάνδρος δὲ φίλοι ὡδὲ ἐδός εἶναι ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ κατακλίνοντι τινα ἐν δείπνῳ, εἰ μὴ τις ἤδω λίγων ἐν κεντήσεις ἢσω δὲ τότε καθήμενοι ἐδείπνουν, where we read that Cassander, though a brave man and a skilful hunter, had not been able to fulfil this requirement at the age of thirty-five and still sit at dinner. A closer parallel may be found in the iron ring worn by many of the Chatti till they had slain an enemy in war (Tac. Germ. c. 31, et aliis Germanorum populis usurpatum raro et privata cuiusque audentia apud Chattos in consensum vertit, ut primum adoleverint, crinem barbamque submittere, nec, nisi hoste caeso, exuere votivum obligatumque virtuti oris habitum ... Fortissimus quisque ferreum insuper anulum (ignominiosum id genti) velut vinculum gestat, donec se caede hostis absolvat. Plurimis Chattorum hic placet habitus). Similar customs are traceable among the Sauromatae (Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 122 : Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 460). 'It is a rule
among all the tribes' [of the head-hunting Malays of Borneo] 'that no youth can regularly wear a mandau (sword) or be married or associate with the opposite sex, till he has been on one or more head-hunting expeditions. A mandau is presented to him probably at his birth or when he receives a name, but not till he has washed it in the blood of an enemy can he presume to carry it as part of his every-day equipment' (Bock, Head-hunters of Borneo, p. 216). Under Cetewayo, a Zulu who had not 'washed his spear,' that is, who had not killed an enemy, could not marry. We light on a more genial form of the same custom in the island of Skye. 'In Dunvegan Castle is kept an ox's horn, hollowed so as to hold perhaps two quarts' (of what liquid?) 'which the heir of Macleod was expected to swallow at one draught as a test of his manhood, before he was permitted to bear arms or could claim a seat among the men' (Dr. Johnson's Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland, Works, 8. 289).

17. ἐν δὲ Σκύθαις κ.τ.λ. Now we pass from laws to customs (cp. 22). The result is attained by law at Carthage and in Macedon, by custom among the Scythians and Iberians. Eaton compares Hdt. 4. 66, where however there is no mention of the ἄκωφος περιψεφόμενος, so that it is doubtful whether Aristotle derives his statement from this source. See however above on 1262 a 19, 1276 a 28, and 1284 a 26. The ἄκωφος was used by herdsmen and country people (Athen. Deipn. 498 f) and is quite in place among the Scythians: some, in fact, imagined an etymological connexion between ἄκωφος and Σκύθης (Athen. Deipn. 499 f). For πίνειν ἄκωφον Eaton compares Hom. II. 8. 232,
πίνουσας κρητήρας ἐπιστεφέως οὖνοι.

18. ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἰβηρισί κ.τ.λ. Why have we ἐν δὲ Σκύθαις in 17, and ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἰβηρισί here? Cp. 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 21, where see note. A similar custom existed among the Sindi, a Scythian race dwelling at the foot of the Caucasus on the East coast of the Euxine (Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 121 : Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 460, Σωμοὶ τοσοῦτοι ἴχθος ἐπὶ τοὺς τάφους ἐπιβάλλοντοι, ὡς (ἀν) πολεμίους ὁ βαπτόμενος ἀπεκτόνως ἦ). For καταπηγώσαντες περὶ τὸν τάφον, cp. Thuc. 5. II. 1, περιέρζαντες αὐτοῦ τὸ μνημεῖον (with Arnold's note). The word ὀβελίσκος is usually explained here as meaning 'an obelisk,' but this use of it is rare, and if we explain it thus, we must suppose that a long pointed stone is referred to, for soldiers after a battle would not find it easy to set up real obelisks at the grave
of a comrade. It is possible that the word should be translated here 'a small spit.' This is its usual meaning, and every soldier had a small spit ready to hand (Plut. Reg. et Imperat. Apophth., Scipio Minor i6, 201 B). Spits might be thought likely to be useful to the dead man, like the fish thrown on the grave by the Sindi. I am glad to see since the foregoing words were written, that Dr. Jackson also translates δεμελεκτος 'spits' (see his note in Sus.4). Professor Ridgeway (Academy, Aug. 29, 1885), rendering the word 'obelisk,' makes the interesting suggestion that the passage before us throws light on the original purpose of stone circles. I read in the Athenaeum for Dec. 14, 1895, that 'at Monte Pitti in the province of Pisa, near some remains of ancient walls, an Etruscan necropolis has been discovered, the tombs of which are enclosed in circles of rude stones.' See also Dr. Thurnam, Ancient British Barrows in Archaeologia 42, p. 211, quoted by Prof. Boyd Dawkins, Early Man in Britain, p. 285, and the remarks of Mr. Arthur Evans quoted by Prof. Windle, Life in Early Britain, p. 54 sq. We expect διεφθάρκως γε, not διαφθείρῃ, for the destruction of the foe must necessarily precede the fixing of the δεμελεκτον, but compare the use of the present participle in 2. 8. 1268 a 8, καὶ τῶν παιστῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τελευτῶν ἐκ δημοσίου γίνεσθαι τὴν τροφῆν. The present is probably used in these passages because a thing occurring frequently is referred to. That the Iberians were a warlike race, had been remarked by Plato, Laws 637 D, and by Thucydides (6. 90, ἱσθρᾶς καὶ ἀλλος τῶν ἐκεί όμολογουμένω νῦν βαρβάρων μαχιμοτάτους): compare the story told in Diod. 14. 75. 8 of their gallant behaviour when deserted by the Carthaginians. Aristotle mentions the fact, partly in confirmation of the statement in 10 that it is among warlike races that these customs prevail, partly because the Iberians were little known to the Greeks, though they had been mentioned by Hecataeus, Herodotus, and Thucydides. They must have become better known in Greece after their employment as mercenaries by Dionysius the Elder, and still more after the arrival in Greece of a contingent of Celtic and Iberian mercenaries sent by him in B.C. 369 to aid the Lacedaemonians against the Thebans (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 20). It is possible indeed that an Iberian belonging to this contingent may have been buried in Greece in the manner here described by Aristotle.

20. καταπηγγυόσι. The forms πηγγύο, καταπηγγύο are 'rare in classical authors' (Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective,
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S.v. πήγωμι). We find ἀπολλύοντι in 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 12 (in 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 23 some MSS. have ἀπολλύοντι and others ἀπολλύοντι). As to δεικνύοντι see Bon. Ind. 167 b 50 sqq., and cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 36. As to ὑπονύοντι see note on 1285 b 11.


24. The suppressed nominative to ἀρξη is probably not ὁ πολιτικός, but τις: see as to this use of the third person singular Bon. Ind. 589 b 47 sqq.

26. πῶς γὰρ ἂν κ.τ.λ. Ἡ νομοθετικῶν is added to strengthen the argument, for it is still more difficult to suppose that what is not νόμων is νομοθετικός than that it is πολιτικός. Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 3. 1129 b 12, τὰ τὲ γὰρ ὄρισμα ὑπὸ τῆς νομοθετικῆς νόμων ἔστι, καὶ ἐκαστὸν τῶν τῶν δικαίων εἶναι φαρὲν, and Eurip. Ion 404 Bothe (442 Dind.),

πῶς οὖν δίκαιον τοὺς νόμους ὑμᾶς βρατοῖς
gράψαντας αὐτοὺς ἀνομλὰν ὀφλισκάνειν;

27. οὖ νόμων δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘and it is not lawful to rule not only justly but unjustly, and it is possible to conquer [and so to acquire rule] unjustly as well as justly,’ so that it is possible to rule over unwilling subjects unjustly. This is added because some held that Might is Right (1. 6. 1255 a 18). Conquering (τὸ κρατεῖν) is the first step to ruling over others (c. 14. 1333 b 30). Οὐ νόμων δὲ, as always, like οὐ καλὸς δὲξει (c. 7. 1328 a 8), οὐ ρήδιον δὲ (c. 10. 1330 a 6), οὐκ ἔστι δὲ (6 (4). 1. 1289 a 9), οὐκ ἐμπίπτει δὲ (6 (4). 16. 1300 b 34), etc.

29. τοῦτο, i.e. that it is the function of the master of the art to rule over unwilling, no less than willing, subjects.

30. τὸ ἡ πείσαὶ ἡ βιάσασθαι, which are the characteristics of rule over the unwilling, for they are the characteristics of despotic rule: cp. Isocr. Nicocl. § 22, τὰς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ πλευνείας ἀπάσας (αἱ μοναρχίαι) περιελίφασιν καὶ γὰρ παρασκεύασασθαι δυνάμεις καὶ κράτειας ταύτας, ὡστε καὶ λαθεῖν καὶ ὀφθηναι, καὶ τοὺς μὲν πείσαι, τοὺς δὲ βιάσασθαι . . . μᾶλλον αἱ τυραννίδες τῶν ἄλλων πολιτείων οίᾳ τ' εἰσίν. Plato contemplates the use of persuasion and force by the physician in Laws 720 D and Polit. 296 B (cp. Gorg. 456 B), but perhaps
he would not dispute what Aristotle here says, that the function of
the physician, qua physician, is not to persuade or coerce, but to

32. ἀλλ' ἐδίκασε κ.τ.λ. Cp. Isocr. De Pace, § 91, ἐν ἀμελήσαντες
οἱ γενόμενοι μετ' ἐκείνους οὐκ ἄρχεν ἀλλὰ τυπανεῖν ἑπεβήμασαν, ἂ δοκεῖ μὲν
τὴν αὐτήν ἤχεν δunameν, πλεῖστον δ' ἀλλήλων κεχώρισται.

33. καὶ ὅπερ κ.τ.λ. Τούτο, the antecedent to ὅπερ, = τὸ ἄρχεν μὴ
Βουλομένων, or τὸ δεσποτικὸς ἄρχεων. Cp. 3. 17. 1287 b 41 sqq.

36. ἄτοπον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 17. 1287 b 37, ἐστὶ γάρ τι φύσει δεσπο-
στῶν, and 1. 6. 1255 b 6 sqq. Thus Aristotle urged Alexander to rule
the Greeks ἱγειμονικός and the barbarians only δεσποτικός (Aristot.
Fragm. 81. 1489 b 27 sqq.), perhaps remembering the advice of
Isocrates to Philip (Philip. § 154, φημὶ γὰρ χρήσαι σε τοὺς μὲν "Ελληνας
εἰρηγετεῖν, Μακεδόνων δὲ βασιλείες, τῶν δὲ βαρβάρων ὡς πλείστων ἄρχειν).

40. ἦστι δὲ θηρευτῶν, sc. πρὸς τούτο, i.e. ἐπὶ θούσῃ ἢ θυσίᾳ, for as
a rule only animals fit to be eaten were offered in sacrifice, though
it is true that dogs were sacrificed to Hecate and that some other
exceptions to the rule occur (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 2. § 26).

41. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle no doubt has before him the State
sketched in the Laws of Plato (704 C, Ἄθ. γείτων δὲ αὐτὴς πόλις ἃρ'
ἐσται τις πλησίον; Κλ. οὐ πάνω διὸ καὶ κατοικίζεται παλαιά γάρ τις
ἐξοίκησις ἐν τῷ τόπῳ γενομένη τὴν χώραν ταύτην ἔρημον ἀπείρασται
χρώνων ἀμήχανον ὅσον). The Islands of the Blest (to which Aristotle
playfully compares his best State in c. 15. 1334 a 28 sqq.) lay far
away from men: cp. Hesiod, Op. et Dies, 167,

τοὺς δὲ δίχ' ἀνθρώπων βίοτον καὶ ἡθὲ ὀπάσσας
Ζεὺς Κρονίδης κατένασε πατήρ ἐς πείρατα γάις.

It was a situation of this kind that the Phaeacians were taught by
experience to seek out: cp. Hom. Odysse. 6. 2,

αὐτὰρ Ἀθήνη
βῆ β' ἐν Φαείκων ἀνδρῶν δὴμον τε πόλιν τε,
οί πρίν μὲν ποτ' ἔναυον ἐν εἰρυχόρῳ Ὑπερείη,
ἀγχοῦ Κυκλώσων, ἀνδρῶν ὑπερηψορεύτων,
οἱ σφαιρα σφαίρακον βηθβε δὲ φέρτεροι ἴσαν.
ἔθελεν ἀναστήσας ὅγε Ναυσίθους θεοείης,
ἐλευθερεύειν τοὺς ἰδίον ἑχάς ἀνδρῶν ἀλήθεσταν.

4. ἦστατ. For the future cp. 2. 7. 1267 a 18, 2. 8. 1267 b 1325 a.
34 sqq., etc.

5. τοιούτον, i.e. πολέμου.
δῆλον ἢρα ὅτι κ.τ.λ., 'it is evident, then, that while all cares and studies with a view to war are to be considered noble, they are not to be so considered as being the highest end of all, but as existing for the sake of that end.' That they are not the highest end of all, or in other words that they do not constitute happiness, is evident because happiness is attainable by States in which they are not practised, and also because they are not the ἔργον τοῦ πολιτικοῦ (1324 b 22 sqq.), whose end is to produce happiness. There were probably those who regarded 'cares and studies with a view to war' as the highest end of all; thus an admirer of the Lacedaemonians claims in Isocr. Panath. § 202 that gratitude is due to them, ὅτι τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἐπιτηθευμάτων εὐφόρτες αὐτοῖς τε χρώνας καὶ τοῖς ἄλλως κατέδειξαν, and explains in § 217 that he refers to τὰ γυμνάσια τάκει καθεστῶτα καὶ τὴν ἀσκησιν τῆς ἀνδρίας καὶ τὴν ομόνοιαν καὶ συνόλος τὴν περὶ τῶν πόλεμων ἐπιμέλειαν. As to δῆλον ἢρα ὅτι see critical note.

7. τοῦ δὲ νομοθέτου κ.τ.λ., 'and the good lawgiver's business is to see with respect to a State and a race of men and every other association how they are to share [not in conquest, but] in good life and the measure of happiness attainable by them.' Cp. Plato, Laws 631 B, where happiness is implied to be the end of laws, and Rep. 521 Α, οἱ τῶν ὅντι πλούσιοι, οὐ χρυσίον, ἄλλ' οὐ δεῖ τὸν εἰδαίμονα πλουτεῖν, ὥσπερ ἄγαθός τε καὶ ἐμφρονος. Γένος = ἔθνος, as in 2. 9. 1269 b 25 sq. (cp. Plato, Gorg. 483 D, τῶν ἀνθρώπων ēν ὅλαις τοῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς γένεσιν). Aristotle keeps both πόλεις and ἔθνη in view here, because he has had both in view in his criticisms (1324 b 3 sqq.). It should be noticed that he regards the ἔθνος as a kind of κοινωνία. Ζωὴς ἄγαθός is emphasized by its position in the sentence: cp. Plato, Rep. 413 C, τοῦτο ὡς ποιητέων.

10. διοίσει μέντοι κ.τ.λ., i.e. though this will always be the end at which he aims, the laws by which he seeks to attain it will differ according as his State has neighbours or not. If it has no neighbours, his laws will be less directed to the encouragement of military prowess than in the contrary case. For τῶν ταττομένων ἐνα νομίμων cp. Plato, Laws 743 E, τῶν προστατωμένων αὐτοθί νόμων.

11. καὶ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ., 'and it is the province of the legislative art, if the State has neighbours, to consider this, [not how to subjugate them all indiscriminately, but] what sort of studies should be practised in relation to each sort of neighbour, or how the State is to adopt the measures which are appropriate in relation to each of
its neighbours. Τὸς νομοθετικὸς takes up τοῦ νομοθετοῦ τοῦ στραταρχοῦ. Πρὸς ποίους and πρὸς ἕκαστος are emphatic. The lawgiver should not lay down one indiscriminating rule, as the Lacedaemonian lawgiver had done, but rather a rule varying according to the character of the neighbours with whom the State has to deal. Ποῖα means πολεμικά ή εἰρημικά. We may infer from c. 14. 1333 b 38 sqq. that the lawgiver will teach his State to practise military studies in relation to aggressive neighbours or neighbours who deserve to be enslaved, but not in relation to others. Πῶς τοῖς καθήκοντι πρὸς ἕκαστον χρηστίον is a wider inquiry than ποῖα πρὸς ποίους ἀσκητέον, and includes the whole subject of the action of the State in relation to its neighbours both in peace and in war, which of them should be ruled ἣγεμονικῶς and which δεσποτικῶς, how war should be waged with them, if they are Greeks (cp. Plato, Rep. 471 A sqq.), and other questions of the same kind. Aristotle evidently does not agree with Isocrates when he says that laws affect only the internal organization of States, and not their mutual relations (De Antid. § 79: see vol. i. p. 552).


19. τὸς πολιτικός ἀρχαῖς, so termed, as we see from 3. 6. 1279 a 8 C. 3. (where see note), in contrast to the ἀρχαὶ of the head of a household, a ship-captain, or a training-master, and the like, and also to priesthoods (6 (4). 15. 1299 a 18).

τὸ έλευθέρον, cp. Diog. Laert. 8. 63, φησι δ' αὐτῶν (i.e. Empedocles) καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐλευθέρον γεγονέναι καὶ πάσης ἀρχῆς ἀλλότριον, εἰ γε τὴν βασιλείαν αὐτὸ διδομένην παρατήσατο, καθάπερ Ζάνθος ἐν τοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγει, τὴν λιτότητα δηλούστι πλέον ἀγαπησας: Clemens, Strom. 2. 416 D (quoted above on 1324 a 27), Ἀναξαγόραν ... τὴν θεώριαν φάναι τοῦ βίου τέλος εἶναι καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ ταύτης ἐλευθερίαν: Plut. De Exil. c. 12, οὕτω τῆς φυγῆς πρὸς ἐν μέρος τὸ άδικον ἐνενόμενοι παρορμῶμεν τὴν ἀπαγομοσύνην καὶ τὴν σχολήν καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν.

20. With τοῦ πολιτικοῦ supply βίου, as with τοῦ δεσποτικοῦ in 24.

21. οἱ δὲ τούτων ἀριστον, sc. εἶναι νομίζοντοι.

άδύνατον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Gorgias may probably have used this argument. Aristotle is of the same opinion: cp. 1325 b 14 sqq. and Eth. Nic. 1. 3. 1095 b 32 sqq.

22. τὴν δ' εὐπραγίαν κ.τ.λ., so that one who does nothing cannot be happy. Cp. Phys. 2. 6. 197 b 5, ἡ δ' εὐδαιμονίᾳ πραξις τις.
NOTES.

_εὐπραξία γὰρ, and Rhet. i. 5. 1360 b i4, where _εὐδαιμονία is said to be often defined as _εὐπραξία μετ’ ἀρετῆς._

24. _οἱ μὲν δὲ κ.τ.λ._ Τοῦ ἔλευθερον = the man who avoids political offices. Cp. Isocr. Epist. 6. § 11, ἐμοὶ γὰρ αἱρετῶτερον οἱ βίοι εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ βελτίων οἱ τῶν ἱδωτευόντων ἢ οἱ τῶν νυμανεύστων, a proposition in favour of which Xenophon often makes Hiero argue (e.g. in Hiero i. 2, 7 sqq.).

25. _οὔδὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ._ Ἡ ἐπίταξις ἡ peri τῶν ἀναγκαίων is implied to be the function of ὁ δεσποτικὸς (cp. i. 7. 1255 b 33 sqq.: 3. 4. 1277 a 33 sqq.).

27. _τὸ μέντοι νομίζειν κ.τ.λ._ It is apparently implied that those who rejected political office regarded all rule as despotic, yet in c. 2. 1324 a 35 sqq. they are said to have distinguished between despotic and constitutional rule.

28. _οὐ γὰρ ἔλαττον κ.τ.λ._ Cp. c. i4. 1333 b 27 sq.

30. _ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι λόγοις_, in i. 7. 1255 b 16 sqq. This reference to the πρῶτοι λόγοι might well be taken to show that the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books do not fall within them, were it not that a similar reference occurs in 3. 6. 1278 b 17 sq., a chapter which certainly seems to form part of the πρῶτοι λόγοι (see vol. ii. p. xxi).

32. _ἐτὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ._, ‘and further the actions of the just and temperate have in them the perfect realization of many things that are noble’: cp. Plato, Tim. 90 D, ὀμοίωσαντα δὲ τέλος ἡξειν τοῦ προτεβέντων ἀνθρώπων ἢτο θεῶν ἀρίστου βίου, and Epinomis 985 A, θεῶν μὲν γὰρ δῆ τοῦ τέλους ἡξοντα τῆς θείας μοίρας ἡξω τούτων εἶναι, λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς. Πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν τέλος ἡξονυν stands in contrast to οὔδενος μετέχει τῶν καλῶν (26).

34. _καίτοι τάχ’ ἀν κ.τ.λ._ The tyrant Jason is here alluded to (see vol. i. p. 237, note 1). A saying of his is mentioned in Rhet. i. 12. 1373 a 25 (cp. Plut. Praec. Reip. Gerend. c. 24 and De Sanitate Tuenda, c. 22), δεῖν ἀδίκειν ἐνα, ὅπως δύνηται καὶ δίκαια πολλὰ ποιεῖν, which no doubt referred to the acquisition of a tyranny. Jason was a great admirer of Gorgias (Paus. 6. 17. 9), and it is possible that Gorgias’ praises of the practical and political life may have influenced him. Be that as it may, Aristotle evidently fears that his own identification of _εὐδαιμονία_ with _τὸ εὐ πράττειν_ (for this is what he means by τοῦτων ὁτω δικαιορισμένω, cp. 1325 b 14 sq.) may lead some one to the same conclusion as Jason, but he hastens to explain that absolute power does not bring with it _τὸ εὐ πράττειν_, except in the hands of one who is as superior to those he rules as
a master is to his slaves (1325 b 3 sqq.). Aristotle does not dispute that political power makes it easier to do noble things (cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 9. 1099 a 32 sqq.), but then political power must not be out of proportion to the worth of its possessor.

36. πλείστων καὶ καλλιστῶν...πράξεων. This takes up πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν, 32.

Ωστε οὐ δεῖ κ.τ.λ. Susemihl reads e conj. δεῖν for δεῖ, but cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 5, where the indirecta oratio is similarly abandoned, though Aristotle is describing the views of others. In the Phoenissae of Euripides Eteocles, who has deprived his brother Polynices of his share of the Kingship, or Tyranny, of Thebes, refuses to give up the Tyranny to him, and Aristotle no doubt has his famous speech in his memory. He says (470 sqq. Bothe, 504 sqq. Dindorf),

αὐτρῶν ἄν ἐλθομι ἥλιον πρὸς ἄντολας
καὶ γῆς ἐνερέθε, δυνατός ὄν δρᾶσαι τάδε,
τὴν θεῶν μεγίστην ὁστ' ἐχειν τυραννίδα.
τοῦτ' οὖν τὸ χρηστόν, μήτερ, οὐχὶ βούλομαι
ἀλλὰ παρεῖναι μᾶλλον ἢ σάζειν ἐμοὶ.

38. καὶ μὴτε πατέρα παῖδων κ.τ.λ. This reads as if Aristotle were quoting from some solemn covenant for the establishment of a tyranny: compare the oath taken in support of Drusus in Diod. 37. 11, τὸν αὐτὸν φίλον καὶ πολέμιον ἡγήσεσθαι Δρούσῳ, καὶ μὴτε βίον μὴτε τέκνων καὶ γονέων μηδεμάς φειάσεσθαι ψυχής, ἐὰν (μή) συμφέρῃ Δρούσῳ τε καὶ τὸς τὸν αὐτὸν ὄρκον ὑμᾶσαν. Polybius (7. 8. 9) dwells with emphasis, and perhaps with a little surprise, on the loyalty of Gelon to his father Hiero II, tyrant of Syracuse.

39. ἄλως, 'broadly,' not only fathers and children (who are one kind of friends), but friends of all sorts.

As to ὑπολογίζειν see critical note.

πρὸς τοῦτο, 'in comparison with this': cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 8. 1108b 16, αἱ μέσαι ἐξεις πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἐλλείψεις ὑπερβάλλουσιν, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς ἐλλείπουσιν.

1. τὸ τῶν ὄντων ἀρετῶτατον, i.e. τὸ εὖ πράττειν. Isocrates had 1325 b. called τυραννίς in Evag. § 40 τὸ κάλλιστον τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν θεῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων μέγιστον καὶ σεμνότατον καὶ περιμαχητάτον.

2. ὑποτίθενται τοῦτο θεοῦ, 'in assuming this as the foundation of their argument they assume what is false.'

3. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ κ.τ.λ. The reply of the Chorus to the speech of
Eteocles referred to above on 1325 a 36 (Eurip. Phoeniss. 492 sq. Bothe: 526 sq. Dind.) is perhaps present to Aristotle’s memory:

οὐκ εἶναι λέγειν χρῆ μὴ 'πιτ τοῖς ἐργαῖς καλοῖς
οὐ γὰρ καλὸν τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ τῆς δῆκη πικρῶν.

Compare also the remark of Plato to Dionysius the Elder quoted above on 1288 a 4, Hdt. 3. 142, and Eurip. Fragm. 172.

7. τοῖς γὰρ ὠμοίωσι κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 16. 1287 a 10 sqq. Τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ μήκανον εἶναι λέγειν ἀποκαλύφει τὸ κράτος ἐμοῦ, ὡς περιήλθεν εἰς αὐτοῦ ἡ ἀρχὴ, παρέδωκε Μιλτιάδης διάδοκας τοὺς συνάρχοντας ὅτι τῷ πείδευσαί καὶ ἀκαλυκτοῖς τοὺς εἴρηκαν εἰκὸς καὶ ἀποτελοῦν ἀλλὰ σεμαντικά καὶ σωτηρικά). Aristides behaved in just the same way to Themistocles also, serving under him willingly and accepting the second place in the State (Plut. Aristid. c. 8: Aristid. et Cat. inter se comp. c. 5).

καὶ ἔρευν καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν πρακτικὴν τῶν ἀριστῶν, ‘in virtue and in the power which is capable of effecting the best things’: cp. Eth. Nic. i. 10. 1099 b 31, πρακτικὰ τῶν καλῶν. Some take τῶν ἀριστῶν after κρείττων and as masc., ‘superior to the best men,’ but not, I think, rightly. For ἔρευν καὶ δύναμις see above on 1284 a 6. The repetition of κατὰ may be for the sake of emphasis (κατὰ is not repeated in 3. 13. 1284 a 9, ἄνωτεν τοιοῦτον καὶ ἔρευν ἄντες καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν). That Aristotle attaches importance to the presence of both qualifications is evident from 12 sqq. Compare the effect of the repetition of prepositions in 3. 11. 1281 b 15, περὶ πάντα δήμου καὶ περὶ πᾶν πλῆθος, and in 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 4, οἴον ἐν Μασσαλίᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἰστρῷ καὶ ἐν Ἰρακλείᾳ καὶ ἐν ἄλλαις πόλεσι συμβεβηκεν.

11. For the repetition of τοῦτω see notes on 1317 b 5 and 1284 b 28.

12. δὲ δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘but [if a man is to be followed and obeyed as a sovereign,] he should possess,’ etc. So in 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 33 sqq. Aristotle requires of those who are to hold the more important magistracies that they shall possess not only virtue, but δύναμις μεγιστῇ τῶν ἐργαί τῆς ἀρχῆς and attachment to the
existing constitution. Compare Callicles' description of οἶκος κρείττονος in Plato, Gorg. 491 A sq.

15. εὐπραγίαν. Aristotle uses both εὐπραγία and εὐπραξία: 'in Attic prose εὐπραγία was preferred' (Liddell and Scott).

16. ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. Two separate assertions are here made—(1) that activity is not necessarily in relation to others, and (2) that it is not necessarily a means to something else, but that thoughts which are an end in themselves may be of an active type. The first of these two assertions does not seem to be quite in harmony with the spirit at any rate of Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 a 30 sqq., but still we gather from Eth. Nic. 5. 3. 1129 b 31 sqq. that there is an use of virtue not πρὸς ἄτερον but καθ' αὐτόν (τῆλεία δ' ἐστίν (sc. ἡ δηλή δικαιομομίνη), διότι ο ἡχῶν αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς ἄτερον δύναται τῇ ἀρετῇ χρησταίναι, ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον καθ' αὐτόν). The second of them clearly conflicts with De An. i. 3. 407 a 23, τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρακτικῶν νοῦσεων ἔστι πέρατα (πάσαν γὰρ ἐτέρον χάρων), αἱ δὲ θεωρητικαὶ τοῖς λόγοις ὁμοίως ἀρίσταται. But Zeller has already remarked (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 368. 1: Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 400, note 1) that Aristotle sometimes uses the word πράξις in the Nicomachean Ethics in a wider sense than usual, and includes even pure thought under it—e.g. in Eth. Nic. 7. 15. 1154 b 24, ἐπεὶ εἴ τον ἡ φύσις ἀπλὴν εἶπ, δεὶ ἡ αὐτή πράξις ἡδιστὴ ἔσται, where he must refer in ἡ αὐτή πράξις to contemplative activity.

17. καθάπερ οἴονται τίνες. Aristotle probably refers to the persons whose opinion is stated in 1325 a 21 sqq., for they appear to have held that a man who lives a contemplative life does nothing and is not πρακτικός. Epaminondas was regarded at the outset of his career as ἀπράγμων because he was a philosopher, and was consequently despoised (Plut. Pelop. c. 5).

18. For the severance of ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν from τῶν ἀποβαινόντων χῶρων, on which it depends, compare c. 4. 1326 b 8, ὃ πρῶτον πλῆθος αὐτωρκεῖ πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζην ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, where κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν is similarly severed from πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζην. As here πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζην, so in the passage before us τῶν ἀποβαινόντων χῶρων is emphasized by its position in the sentence. Cp. also Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 179. τὰ ἐξενεγχεῖντα ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἵππα ἀγιλίματα ὑπὸ τῶν Πειριῶν.

20. θεωρίας καὶ διανοήσεις, cp. c. 2. 1324 a 19, τῆς πολιτικῆς διανοίας καὶ θεωρίας.

21. ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία κ.τ.λ., 'for doing well is the end, and there

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fore there is a kind of action which is the end, [so that there is nothing strange in thoughts which are an end in themselves being active,] and we predicate action also [as well as thought] in the truest and fullest sense, even in the case of actions done in relation to others, of those who as master-agents direct action by their thoughts, [and whose thoughts are therefore more an end in themselves than those of the journeymen they direct].’

That the thoughts of a master-agent are more an end in themselves than those of a subordinate, we see from Eth. Nic. i. 1. 1094 a 14.

Aristotle corrects Plato, who in Polit. 259 C, E had identified practical with chiefothekoi, and had said that the aristéktōn is ἀγωστικός, not πράττωκος (Greek, τής δή γνωστικής μάλλον ἢ τής χειροτεχνικής καὶ δλώς πρακτικής βασιλέα τῶν βασιλεῶν φύσεις οἰκειότερον εἶναι; and ΣΕ. καὶ γὰρ ἀριστέκτων γε πάς οὐκ αὐτός ἐργατικός, ἀλλὰ ἐργατῶν ἄρχων. NE. ΣΩ. ναί. ΣΕ. παρεχόμενος γέ ποι ὀρθῶν, ἀλλ' οὐ χειρούργων. NE. ΣΩ. οὔτω. ΣΕ. δικαίως δή μετέχειν ἐν λεγοντι τής γνωστικῆς ἐπιστήμης). In Eth. Nic. 6. 8. 1141 b 24 sqq., however, the word πράττωκος is used in the narrower sense in which Plato had used it in the Politicus, for here ἡ ἀριστετουκάκη φρόνησις is marked off from another kind which is said to be πρακτική (cp. Eth. Eud. i. 6. 1217 a 6, τῶν μητρ' ἐχόντων μήτε δυναμένων διάνοιαν ἀριστετουκάκην ἢ πρακτικήν). For ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος, ὅστε καὶ πράξεις τίς, cp. Phys. 2. 6. 197 b 5, ἢ δ' εὐδαιμονία πράξεις τίς' εὐπραξία γάρ, and De An. 3. 2. 426 a 27, εἰ δ' ἡ συμφωνία φωνή τίς ἐστιν.

23. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle, after proving the second of the two assertions contained in 16 sqq. (οὖν δὲ διανοίας κ.τ.λ.), takes up and proves the first of them (τῶν πρακτικῶν οὐκ ἀναγκαίον εἶναι πρὸς ἑτέρους). States situated by themselves have already been said not to be necessarily unhappy (c. 2. 1324 b 41 sqq.), and now they are shown not to be necessarily inactive.

25. οὔτω, i.e. καθ' αὐτάς and not πρὸς ἑτέρους.

ἐνδέχεται γάρ κ.τ.λ., ‘for this also [as well as other things] can take place by sections [and not alone between whole States].’

Τούτο = τὸ πράττειν. For καὶ τούτο cp. c. 4. 1326 a 13, καὶ πάλεσον. For κατὰ μέρη cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 27 sqq. Among the ‘other things’ referred to rule would be included, for it was a familiar fact
that rule might be exercised by successive sections of the citizen-
body (1325 b 7 sq.).

26. πολλαὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. It is implied that, if there are κοινωνίαι
(‘relations’) between the parts of the State, activity will exist. We
may suppose that when the parts of the State have relations with
each other, inter-action results or co-operative action or both.
What is meant here by the expression ‘the parts of the State’?
Among the parts referred to are probably rulers and ruled: cp.
c. 4. 1326 b 12, ἐστὶ γὰρ αἱ πράξεις τῆς πόλεως τῶν μὲν ἀρχόντων τῶν δ’
ἀρχομένων, and c. 14. 1332 b 12, ἐστὶ δὲ πάσα πολιτικὴ κοινωνία συνε-
στηκεν ἐξ ἄρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων.

27. ὁμοίως δὲ κ.τ.λ. Τοῦτο = τὸ μὴ αὐτόγκαιον ἐνυμ ἀπρακτεῖν τὸν ζην
καθ’ αὐτὸν προηρμηνεύον. For ὑπάρχειν κατὰ τινος, cp. De Interp. 3.
16 b 13 and Anal. Pr. 2. 22. 67 b 28.

28. σχολή γὰρ κ.τ.λ., ‘for otherwise God and the whole universe
[could hardly be active, and so] could hardly be well circumstanced
[which all agree that they are], seeing that they have no actions
external to them over and above their internal actions.’ That God
is well circumstanced we see from De Caelo, 2.12. 292 a 22, ἐσκε
γὰρ τῷ μὲν ἀριστὰ ἐχοντε ὑπάρχειν τὸ εὖ ἀνευ πράξεως. The universe
consists according to Aristotle of concentric spheres with the earth
in the centre (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 447 sqq.: Aristotle and the Earlier
Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 487 sqq.), and God, who is an
incorporeal being distinct from the universe, is outside its outer-
most sphere, so far as an incorporeal being can be said to be in
any particular place. He is the First Mover of the universe, but
he moves it passively, as the object of love (Metaph. Λ. 7. 1072 b
3, κινεῖ δὲ ὃς ἐρωμένον); he does not act upon it otherwise. Action
is not to be predicated of him (Eth. Nic. Ιο. 8. 1178 b 8 sqq.: De
Caelo, 2. 12. 292 a 22 sq., quoted above); at least not action in the
ordinary sense of the word, for it would be beneath him; his only
activity is thought, and as his thought must be exercised on what
is best, it must be exercised on himself (Metaph. Λ. 9. 1074 b 33,
αὐτὸν ἄρα νοεί, ἐπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἐστὶν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις).
Acts of thought exercised by God on himself, therefore, are the
οἰκεῖαι πράξεις ascribed to God in the passage before us. But if
God has no ἐξωτερικά πράξεις, neither has the universe, for in
Aristotle’s view there is but one universe in existence (De Caelo,
1. 8. 276 a 18 sqq.: Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 446 sq.—Eng. Trans.,
vol. i. p. 485 sq.); there is nothing corporeal outside the universe,
and therefore nothing on which it can act. Plutarch maintains the opposite view, arguing for a plurality of worlds, in De Defect. Orac. c. 24, εἰσιν οὖν ἐκτὸς ἔτεροι θεοὶ καὶ κόσμοι, πρὸς οὓς χρῆται (ὁ θεὸς) ταῖς κοινωνικαῖς ἀρεταῖς, οὐδὲ γὰρ πρὸς αὐτῶν οὐδὲ μέρος αὐτοῦ χρῆσις ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνης ἢ χάριτος ἢ χρηστότητος, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄλλους. For ο θεὸς καὶ πᾶς ὁ κόσμος cp. Plato, Laws 821 A, τῶν μέγιστων θεῶν καὶ ἄλων τῶν κόσμων. For the contrast here of οἰκεῖος and ἐξωτερικὸς cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 3. 1129 b 33, where ἐν τοῖς οἰκεῖοι stands in opposition to ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ἔτερον: cp. also Plato, Rep. 521 A, οἰκεῖος οὖ καὶ ἔνδον ὁ τοιοῦτος πόλεμος.

32. τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, = τοῖς πολῖταις, cp. c. 4. 1326 a 6, where τῶν ἀνθρώπων corresponds to τοῖς πολῖταις cp. c. 4. 1325 b 40, and also Isocr. Archid. § 81, οὗ τὸ μεγέθει τῆς πόλεως οὐδὲ τῷ πλήθει τῶν ἀνθρώπων,

33. περὶ αὐτῶν, cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 4. 1140 a 2, πιστεύομεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις.

34. καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας κ.τ.λ. This would seem to refer to the contents of the Second Book: cp. 2. 1. 1260 b 29, δεῖ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπισκέψασθαι πολιτείας.


38. διὸ δεῖ κ.τ.λ. See above on 1265 a 17, where the same remark occurs. We read in Plato, Rep. 456 C, οὐκ ἄρα ἄδυνατα γε οὐδὲ εὐχαίρις ὁμοια ἐνομοβετούμεν, and in Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 68, ἐὰν γὰρ αὖ καλῶς μὲν ἔχω, μὴ δυνάτων δὲ τὰ φράτζα, εὐχήλε, οὐ νόμου, διαπράττοιτ' ἐν ἔργον, and these passages agree with that before us in implying that men often pray for impossibilities: yet εὐχὸν δυνάτα is one of the Precepts ascribed to the Seven Wise Men in the Collection of Sosiades (Stob. Floril. 3. 80 : Mullach, Fragm. Philos. Gr. 1. 217). Προϋποτεθεῖσθαι is middle; the perfects τέθειμαι, ἐντέθειμαι are used more commonly in a middle than in a passive sense (see Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective, pp. 635, 636). The reason of this is, as Richards points out, that κείσθαι is used in their place to express the passive.

39. λέγω δὲ οἴον περὶ τε πλῆθους πολιτῶν καὶ χώρας, sc. δεὶ πολλὰ προϋποτεθεῖσθαι, εἰναὶ μὲντοι μὴ δὲν τούτων ἄδυνατον. Plato, who begins the construction of his State in the Laws (737 C sqq.) with arrangements respecting these matters, had in Aristotle’s opinion (2. 6. 1265 a 10 sqq.) fixed the number of the citizens at an impossibly high figure.
40. Ὄσπερ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Laws 709 C sq. (which Aristotle probably has before him), and Xen. Hipparch. 6. 1, ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδὲν ἄν τις διόνυστο πλάσας οἷον βουλέται, εἰ μὴ εἶ δὲν γε πλήθυστο παρεκκειμένα εἰρή ὃς πειθεσθαι τῇ τοῦ χειροτέχνου γνώμης οὖδε γ' ἄν εἰς ἀνδρῶν, εἰ μὴ τίνι βοὴν οὖσω παρεκκειμένοι έσονται ὡς φιλικῶς τε ἔχειν πρὸς τὸν ἄρχοντα κ.τ.λ.

4. τῷ πολιτικῷ καὶ τῷ νομοθέτη. See note on 1274 b 36. 1326 a.

5. ἔστι δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and under the head of political equipment falls first [for consideration] the body of men composing the State, how many and what sort of men they should be by nature,' etc. Compare the similar sentences in 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 4, ἕχει γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μόρον τῆς πολιτείας πολλάς διαφοράς, πόσαι τε ἄρχαι, καὶ κύριαι τίνων κ.τ.λ., and 4 (7). 16. 1334 b 30-32. Πολιτική χρηστία, 'the equipment necessary to a State' (answering to τὴν οἰκείαν ὅλην, 4), is different from the equipment necessary to an individual, but both are the gift of Nature and Fortune (c. 13. 1331 b 40 sqq.: 1332 a 29 sqq., 39 sqq.: 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 27 sqq.). Nature supplies men possessing the needful qualities of body and soul (1332 a 40 sqq.), and Fortune supplies external and bodily goods (c. 1. 1323 b 27 sqq.). Τῶν ἀνθρώπων = πολείω, 1325 b 40, and τῶν πολιτειομένων, c. 7. 1328 a 17. Aristotle is not here concerned with the number or quality of the slaves of the State or of its metoeci. As he says that the question of the characteristics of the men and the territory is the first which needs consideration under the head of 'political equipment,' we infer that there are others which need consideration, and what are they? Probably the questions which arise as to the subsidiary classes of cultivators and artisans; these are dealt with in cc. 8-10. Τῶν in 6 seems to belong both to πόσους and to ποίους, and τῶν in 8 both to ὅσην and to ποιαν, cp. c. 7. 1328 a 17, περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πολιτειομένων, πόσους τε ὑπάρχειν δεῖ καὶ ποίους των τὴν φύσιν, ἢτι δὲ τὴν χώραν πόσην τὲ τῶν καὶ ποιον τῶν, διάφορα τι καὶ πολλά των, διάφορα καὶ πολλά τις εἴναι τὴν χώραν (so apparently Bonitz, Ind. 533 a 59 sqq.). For κατὰ τὴν χώραν, 7 ('in connexion with the territory'), cp. Oecon. 1. 3. 1343 b 7, τῶν δὲ περὶ τούς ἀνθρώπους ἢ κατὰ γενεάκα πρώτη ἐπιμέλεια. Ἀσφη, 7, is probably right: see Stallbaum's note on Plato, Crito 48 A, and cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 18, τῷ δὲ ἑρώτημα τι προβάλει πεφρονισμένης δείημον ἀποκρίσεως, οἷον ὅστις ἀριστοὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνδριάσιν ἢ ποιά τε τῇ τοῦτο πράξει, and Herondas 2. 28, ὅστις ἐστι κακὸν ποιον Πηλοῦ πεφήρηται. Ms P1 have ὅποσην, not πόσην, in 1328 a 18.
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8. οἷοντα μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has before him Plato, Laws 742 D, ἕστι δὴ τοῦ νοῦ ἔχαντος πολιτικοῦ βούλευσις, φαμέν, οὐχ ἤπειρ ἄν οἱ πολλοὶ φιάσετε, δειν βούλευσθαι τὸν ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην ὡς μεγίστην τε εἶναι τὴν πόλιν, ἢ νοῶν εὖ νομοθετοῦ, καὶ δὲ τὶ μάλιστα πλουσίαν: cp. also Rep. 460 A, where there may be an allusion to the name of Megalopolis founded in B.C. 369 shortly before the time when many think that the Republic saw the light. See also Rep. 423 A sq. (referred to by Eaton) and Laws 737 D.

11. τῶν ἐνοικοῦντων, 'of the inhabitants,' not merely of the citizens, so that according to these authorities a city would be μεγάλη which included a large number of slaves, metoeci, and aliens.

12. δεὶ δὲ μάλλον κ.τ.λ. Cp. De Caelo, 1. 5. 271 b 11, τούτων δ' αἵτων ὁτι ἡ ἄρχη δυνάμει μεῖζων ἡ μεγέθεις, and Xen. Anab. 7. 7. 36, οὐ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς ἐστίν ὁ ὀρίζων τὸ πολὺ καὶ τὸ ὀλύν, ἀλλ' ἡ δύναμις τοῦ τε ἀποθεόουσας καὶ τοῦ λαμβάνοντος. Eucken (De Partic. Usu, p. 32) remarks that δὲ in eis δε δύναμιν is used in the same sense as ἀλλά, and compares Metaph. K. 3. 1061 a 23, μὴ τοῦ ὀλοῦ λόγου, τοῦ τελευταίου δὲ ἔδον, and De An. 1. 5. 409 b 28.

13. καὶ πόλεως, 'of a State also [as well as of other things]': cp. c. 3. 1325 b 25, καὶ τοῦτο.

18. οὖ κατὰ κ.τ.λ., 'it is not in respect of any and every multitude that we must do so.' Φοιτήτων τοῦ τυχόν πλήθος cp. 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 26 and 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 11 sqq. It is evident from what follows that Aristotle counts βάλανσοι here among δοῦλοι, just as he does in 3. 4. 1277 a 37 sqq. Camerarius (Interp. p. 279) has already referred to the story told of Agesilaus by Plutarch in Ages. c. 26. The allies of the Lacedaemonians had contrasted the large number of troops which they contributed to the army of Agesilaus with the small number of the Spartans, and Agesilaus by way of reply ordered all the potters, smiths, carpenters, masons, and other βάλανσοι τέχνηται in his army to stand up successively. Nearly every man in the contingent of the allies stood up, but not a single Spartan, and Agesilaus remarked, with a smile, ὅρατε, δὲ ἄνδρες, δόρο πλείονας ὑμῶν στρατιώτας ἐκπέμπομεν ἡμεῖς. Aristotle may remember this story.

ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This would be especially the case in a State like that which Aristotle is constructing—a State in which the citizens are not allowed to practise handicrafts or to till the soil. It would also be the case in a State like that of Plato's Laws (848 A). But even in actual Greek States ἔνων were numerous.
Many handicraftsmen were ξένοι (3. 5. 1278 a 7). Ξένοι were especially numerous in seaports (4 (7). 6. 1327 a 11 sqq.), but even at Sparta there were ξένοι (Plut. Agis, cc. 8, 10), not merely slaves. The rapid development of the arts and of commerce in ancient Greece was largely due to the ease with which its chief cities drew metoeci and other aliens from the Greek colonies in Asia and elsewhere and from Asia generally (see as to Sidonian residents in Athens Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, p. 157). Many of these metoeci were skilled craftsmen. Asia and probably Egypt were especially numerous in seaports (4 (7). 6. 1327 a 11 sqq.), but even at Sparta there were ξένοι (Plut. Agis, cc. 8, 10), not merely slaves.

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27. τῶν γοῦν δοκουσῶν κ.τ.λ. Ἀνειμένην πρὸς τὸ πλήθος, ‘set free in the direction of number’: cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 10, διαφθείροντα ἁμα τὸς ἰδέας τὰ σώματα πρὸς πᾶσαν ἐπιθυμιάν ἀνειμένα καὶ πλησιμοῦν. Carthage must have been an exception, unless we suppose its citizen-body to have been smaller in Aristotle’s day than it afterwards became (see vol. ii. Appendix B). As to the Lacedaemonian State, cp. Isocr. Archid. § 81, where Archidamus is made to say, τῶν Ἐλλήνων διεννύχαμεν οὗ τῷ μεγέθει τῆς πύλης οἷδὲ τῷ πλήθει τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ., and as to Athens, which was in the contrary plight, De Antid. § 172, διὰ γὰρ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ πλήθος τῶν ἐνοικούντων οὐκ εὐσυνοπτὸς ἐστιν οἷδ’ ἀκριβῆς κ.τ.λ.

29. δὲ τε γὰρ νόμος τάξεις τις ἐστι. ‘Id etiam conversum posuit libro tertio’ (3. 16. 1287 a 18), ‘ἡ γὰρ τάξεις νόμος’ (Camerarius, Interp. p. 280).

32. θεῖας γὰρ δὴ κ.τ.λ., ‘for surely this’ (i.e. the ordering of a great number of things) ‘is [beyond the power of man and] is the function of divine power, which is such as to hold together even the vast universe in which we live; the beautiful, in fact, [which is closely allied with order,] is commonly found in connexion with a given number and magnitude.’ For θεία δύναμις Bonitz (Ind. 324 a 1) compares the spurious De M undo, 6. 397 b 19. Aristotle clearly has before him Xen. Cyrop. 8. 7. 22, ἀλλὰ θεῶς γε τούς ἀεὶ ὄντας καὶ πάντ’ ἐφορώντας καὶ πάντα δυναμένους, οἷο καὶ τῆς τῶν ἄλων τάξεων συνέχουσιν ἀτριβῆ καὶ ἀγέραστοι καὶ ἀναμάρτητοι καὶ ὑπὸ κάλλους καὶ μεγέθους ἀλληγήτοι, τοστοῖς φοβοῖμεν μὴ ποτε ἀσέβες μηδὲν μηδὲ ἀνόσιον μὴτε ποιήσητε μὴτε βουλέυσητε: cp. also Plut. Dion, c. 10, πρὸς τὸ βεστάτουν ἄφομωσθεῖς παραδείγμα τῶν ὄντων καὶ κάλλωσιν, καὶ τὸ πάν ἡγουμένῳ πειθόμενον ἐξ ἀκοσμίας κόσμος ἐστι, and for τὸ τοῦ πάν, Plato, Polit. 269 C, τὸ γὰρ πάν τάδε τοτε μὲν αὐτός ὁ θεὸς ἑξαποδηγεῖ πορευόμενον καὶ συγκυκλεῖ, τοτε δ’ ἀνήκεν, and Gorg. 508 A, καὶ τὸ δόλον οὕτω διὰ τάτα κόσμον καλοῦσιν. Ὑπέκειτο is used as equivalent to ἐνοικεῖν in De An. 1. 5. 410 b 10, ἀπορθήσει δ’ ἀν τις καὶ τί ποι’ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνοικεῖν αὐτά (i.e. τὰ στοιχεῖα): ὡς γὰρ ἐοικε τά γε στοιχεῖα κυριότατον γὰρ ἐκείνο τὸ συνέχον δ’ τί ποι’ ἐστιν, and to μίαν ποιεῖν in De An. 1. 5. 411 b 6 sqq.: cp. Polyb. ii. 19. 3. Aristotle probably regards God as holding the universe together passively by being the common object towards which everything strives: see above on 1325 b 28. That the beautiful is closely allied with order we see from Metaph. M. 3. 1078 a 36, τοῦ δ’ καλοῦ μέγιστα εἰδὴ τάξις καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὀρισμένον: cp. Plato, Phileb. 64 E, μετρίωτης γὰρ καὶ
34. διὸ καὶ πόλις κ.τ.λ., 'hence a State also,' as well as other things. For the 'nominativus pendens' πόλις, see Bon. Ind. s. v. Anacoluthia, where 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 9 sqq. is referred to among other passages, and see Stallbaum on Plato, Cratylus 403 Α, δε "καθηγητής, οἱ πόλεις μὲν μας δοκοῦσιν ὑπολαμβάνειν τὸ ἄθετος προσεκρητεῖαι τῷ ὀνόματι τούτῳ, and Riddell, Apology of Plato (Digest of Idioms, § 271 b), who quotes among other instances Theaet. 173 D and Rep. 565 D—E. Cp. also De Gen. An. 4. 1. 765 b 31 sqq. and De Part. An. 3. 8. 671 a 12 sqq., and see Vahlen on Poet. 4. 1449 a 19. Bekker and Sus. have πόλις in place of πόλις, but all MSS. except Γ have πόλις, and there can be little doubt that πόλις is right, for this 'nominativus pendens' is a not uncommon form of anacoluthon.

35. διὸ ἦτο τι κ.τ.λ., 'but in fact [apart from questions of beauty and good order] there is a due measure of size for a State also, as well as for everything else.' Not only will too large a State fail of being well-ordered and beautiful, but it will fail also to be able to discharge the function of a State and to realize self-completeness in respect of good life, and the same thing may be said of too small a State likewise. Cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 10. 1170 b 29, τούς δὲ σπουδαίους πότερον πλείστους κατ᾽ ἀριθμόν, ἦ ἦτο τι μέτρων καὶ φιλικοῦ πλήθους, ὡσπερ πάλαις; οὐτὶ γὰρ ἐκ δεκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτ' ἢ πόλις οὐτ' ἢ δεκα μιράδων ἔτι πόλις ἦτοίν: De Gen. An. 2. 6. 745 a 5, ἦτοι γὰρ τι πάντα τοῖς ἔσχις πέρας του μεγαθέους, διὸ καὶ τῆς τῶν ὁστῶν αὑτήσεως: De An. 2. 4. 416 a 16, τῶν δὲ φύσει συνισταμένων πάντων ἔτι πέρας καὶ λόγους μεγαθέους τε καὶ αὑτήσεως: De An. Motione, 3. 699 a 34, ἦτοι γὰρ τι πλήθος ἵσχυς καὶ δυνάμεως καθ' ἵν μένει τό μένου.
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Plut. Sympos. 5. 5. 1, καὶ γὰρ συμποσίων μέγεθος ικανόν ἐστιν, ἄχρι οὗ συμπόσιον ἑδέλθη μὲνεν' ἐὰν δὲ ὑπερβαλῇ διὰ πλῆθος, δος μηκέτι προσόγγορον ἐαυτῷ μηδὲ συμπαθεῖ εἰναι ταῖς φιλοφροσύναις μηδὲ γνώριμον, οὔτε συμπόσιον ἐστὶ. Compare also Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 21–35. As to ὀργανος, see i. 8. 1256 b 35 sq. We note that a State is distinguished by Aristotle from an ὀργανος. It is not a mere ὀργανος πρὸς ἀγαθὸν ζωὴν for the individual, but a moral being like the individual, only nobler and greater than he (Eth. Nic. 1. i. 1094 b 7 sqq.).

39. ἐστερεμένον ἦσται τῆς φύσεως. Compare such expressions as εξιστασθαί τῆς φύσεως (Meteor. 4. ii. 389 b 10, φθειρόμενα καὶ εξιστάμενα τῆς φύσεως) or χαρίζεσθαι τῆς φύσεως (Meteor. 4. i. 379 a 14), which stand in contrast to ἔχειν τὴν φύσιν (Poet. 4. 1449 a 15, ἔσχεν ἢ τραγῳδία τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν).

41. δυοὶ νταδίων, cp. Poet. 7. 1451 a 2, οἷον εἰ μυρίων νταδίων εἶν' ξόφον. εἰς δὲ τι μέγεθος ἐλθὼν, 'but when it has assumed a measured size.' Cp. Meteor. i. 14. 352 a 6, ἔξωαν ὅμοιοι γὰρ οἱ τόποι ἔρχονται εἰς τὸ καλὸς ἔχειν.

1326 b. 2. η μὲν ἔξις ὀλίγων λίαν οὐκ αὐτάρκης. Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a ii sqq., where the view expressed by the Platonick Socrates in Rep. 369 D, εἰς δ' ἄν ἦγε ἅγανυκαυτάτη πόλις ἢ τεταράων ἢ πέντε ἄνδρων, is corrected.

3. η δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν ἀγαν κ.τ.λ. Α ἢ πόλις consisting of too large a number of citizens is not a πόλις because a πόλις is a κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας (3. 3. 1276 b 1), and a constitution cannot easily exist in a very large πόλις, for magistrates cannot easily exist in it, and a constitution implies the existence of magistracies (6 (4). 1. 1289 a 15, πολιτεία μὲν γὰρ ἐστι τάξις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ περὶ τὰς ἄρχας, τίνα τρόπον νεώμερται). It seems to be implied that the constitution is the source of 'completeness in respect of good life.' Aristotle's argument here throws some light on his reference to Babylon in 3. 3. 1276 a 27 sqq., where it is implied that Babylon covered too large a space to be one city. He would probably also say that its inhabitants were too numerous to possess a constitution or to be marshalled by a general. When he says that an ἐθνος possesses only 'completeness in respect of necessary,' is he speaking of ἔθνος composed of πόλεις (see note on 1261 a 27), as well as of ἔθνοι composed of villages? As to Aristotle's account of the ἔθνοι something has already been said in vol. i. p. 39. We should have been glad if he had told us more on the subject (see note on 1274 b 34 sqq.).
The ἐθνὸς appears to be a κοινωνία (cp. 4 (7). 2. 1325 a 8, πόλις καὶ γένος ἀνθρώπων καὶ πᾶσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν): it has νόμιμα or νόμοι (4 (7). 2. 1324 b 9 sqq.); it is bound together not only by internal trade and by united action against external foes, but also by intermarriage and common sacrifices; it is often ruled by a King, and may even have an Absolute King at its head (3. 14. 1285 b 31 sq.), but it is too large to have a constitution—we must suppose that the word 'constitution' is here used in a sense exclusive of Kingship—apparently because it is too large to be controlled by common magistrates (cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 40). We may conjecture that in Aristotle's view the members of an ἐθνὸς have not that desire to promote the virtue of their fellows which is to him one distinguishing mark of a citizen (3. 9. 1280 b 1 sqq.). An ἐθνὸς is, in fact, rather a συμμαχία and something more than a πολιτική κοινωνία.

7. did κ.τ.λ. Here again, as in 2, the Platonic Socrates is corrected (see above on 2). Cp. c. 8. 1328 b 16 sq. and 2. 2. 1261 b 12. Take πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν together (see note on 1325 b 18). Κατὰ seems to mean 'in connexion with': cp. c. 2. 1324 a 15, διὰ τοῦ συμπολιτεύεσθαι καὶ κοινωνίαν πάλιν (βίος) ἡ μάλλον ὁ ξενικὸς καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ἀπολελυμένος. For τοσοῦτον followed by δ', see above on 1267 a 24.

9. ἐνδέχεται δὲ κ.τ.λ. Μεῖζω is bracketed by Schneider, Bekker², and Susemihl, but it appears to be correct: cp. De Gen. An. 4. 4. 771 b 33, ἀλλ' ὁσπερ καὶ τελευμένων τῶν ζώων ἐστιν ἐκάστου τι μέγεθος καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζων καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐλαττων, ὃν οὔτ' ἀν μείζων γένοιτο οὔτ' ἐλαττων, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ διαστημάτω τοῦ μεγέθους λαμβάνουσι πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν ὑπεροχήν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην, καὶ γίνεται μεῖζων ὁ δ' ἐλάττων ἀνθρωπός καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ὀτιῶν, οὔτω καὶ κ.τ.λ. A man must be of a certain minimum size, if he is to be a man at all; if he exceeds that minimum and does not exceed the maximum, he is a larger man; if he exceeds the maximum, he ceases to be a man. The same thing, we are told in the passage before us, holds of the πόλις.

11. ὁσπερ εἴπομεν, in 1326 a 34 sqq.

14. ἀρχόντος δ' ἐπίταξι καὶ κρίσις ἔργον. Κρίσις here refers especially to judicial decisions (cp. τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων in the next sentence). In the similar passage, 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 25 sqq., on the other hand (μάλιστα δ' ὅς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἄρχας λεκτίον ταύτας, ὅσας ἀποδέδοται βουλεύσασθαι τε περὶ τῶν καὶ κρίνας καὶ ἐπίταξας), κρίναι does not refer to judicial decisions, for here Aristotle is speaking of ἄρχα in
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a sense exclusive of τὸ δικαστικόν, of which he treats in another chapter of the Sixth (old Fourth) Book (c. 16).

πρὸς δὲ κ. τ. λ. Τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν δικαιῶν seems to be given as an instance of αἱ τῶν ἀρχῶν πράξεις, and τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς διανέμειν καὶ ἀξίαν as an instance of αἱ τῶν ἀρχημέων. Aristotle here follows in the track of Plato, Laws 738 D, ὅπως ἄν...φιλοφρονώτατε τε ἀλήθειας μετὰ θυσίων καὶ οἰκεῖωτα καὶ γνωρίζωσιν, οὐ μείζον ουδὲν πόλει ἀγαθὸν ἢ γνωρίμους αὐτοὺς αὐτοὶ εἶναι ὅπως γὰρ μὴ φῶς ἀλήθειας ἐστὶν ἀλήθειαν ἐν τοῖς τρόποις, ἀλλὰ σκότος, οὗτ' ἄν τιμὴς τῆς ἀξίας οὗτ' ἀρχῶν οὔτε δίκης ποτέ τις ἄν τῆς προσηκούσης ὀρθῶς τυγχάνοι: cp. also Laws 751 D and 766 E. Dr. Johnson says of the lairds' courts in the Highlands of Scotland (Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland, Works, 8. 320)—'When the chiefs were men of knowledge and virtue, the convenience of a domestic judicature was great. No long journeys were necessary, no artificial delays could be practised; the character, the alliances, and interests of the litigants were known to the court, and all false pretences were easily detected.' See also vol. i. p. 314, note 3. In ὅσ ὅπως τοῦτο μὴ συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι κ. τ. λ. Aristotle probably refers to Athens, for though in addressing an Athenian audience Hyperides says (Pro Lycophr. col. xii. 5, ed. Blass), λαβεῖν γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ἑμέτερον οὐκ ἐν οὔτε ποιημένω ἀλλὰ οὐδένα τῶν ἐν τῇ[湿润] πόλει οὔτε ἐπ[湿润] ἑκάτην, Isocrates describes Athens in De Antid. § 172 as too large to be ἐνυσώποτοι (cp. Thuc. 8. 66. 3, already referred to by Eaton). Still even at Athens owing to the publicity of men's life in ancient Greece fellow-citizens knew each other far better than they do in a modern city of the same size: see Haussoullier, Vie Municipale en Attique, p. 179 sq., who however goes too far when he says, 'tout se savait, tous se connaissaient à Athènes.' It is, indeed, difficult to understand how even in a citizen-body of (say) 5,000, with all the help derivable from frequent festivals, every citizen could be known, either personally or by repute, to his fellows. Yet Aristotle seems to imply that the citizens of a State ought to be acquainted with the character of every member of their body, if not with his person. The experience of the United States fully confirms the view of Plato and Aristotle that where fellow-citizens are not well acquainted with each other's characters, offices will not be well filled. 'In moderately-sized communities men's characters are known, and the presence of a bad man in office brings on his fellow-citizens evils which they are not too numerous to feel individually.... In large cities the results are different because the
circumstances are different' (Bryce, American Commonwealth, Part 3, c. 62). 'City governments begin to be bad when the population begins to exceed 100,000 and includes a large proportion of recent immigrants. They are generally pure in smaller places, that is to say, they are as pure as those of an average English, French, or German city' (ibid. Part 3, c. 67: vol. ii. p. 521, ed. 1. See also c. 61, vol. ii. p. 435). Aristotle would, of course, think a citizen-body even of 100,000 ten times more numerous than it ought to be. As to London, compare a remark made by a member of the County Council of London at its first meeting. 'Provincial corporations could easily proceed to elect aldermen, because in the provincial towns persons knew all about each other, but it was quite different in the metropolis' (Times, Feb. 1, 1889).

20. ἦτι δὲ ξένους καὶ μετοίκοις κ.τ.λ. This frequently happened at Athens. The register of citizens was kept by the deme: 'L'assemblée du dème est peu fréquentée; c'est un petit nombre de voix qu'il faut acheter, et quelques drachmes suffisent: ici cinq drachmes par tête, ailleurs peut-être moins encore.' See Haus-soullier, Vie Municipale en Attique, p. 32 sqq., who refers to Demosth. in Eubulid. c. 59, oὔτοι γὰρ, ὠ ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναίοι, βουλομένους τινὰς ἀνθρώπους ξένους πολίτας γενόσθαι, Ἀναξιμένην καὶ Νικάντατον, κοινὰ διανεμομένοι πέντε δραχμὰς ἐκατὸς προσεθέξαντο. Those whose names got upon the register in this or in other unlawful ways were called παρέγγρατοι. The larger the State was, the less check there would be on the registering authority. The Attic demes of Halimus, Sunium, and Potami, all of them on the coast, were especially credited with a readiness to admit aliens to the register (Hug, Studien aus dem classischen Alterthum, p. 32). It will be noticed that Aristotle speaks only of aliens and metoeci, not of slaves.

22. δῆλον τοῖνυ κ.τ.λ. See vol. i. p. 314.
24. εὐσύνοπτος must apparently mean 'easily within the view of the magistrates and the citizens' (cp. i. 14 sqq.).

26. Παραπλησίως δὲ κ.τ.λ. 'Similarly,' because Aristotle has just C. 5. said that the larger the State is, the better, if only it is εὐσύνοπτος, and now he goes on to say that the most self-complete territory is the best, and one which is large enough to support its citizens in a life, not temperate only, but temperate and liberal, though it must be εὐσύνοπτος (1327 a 1). Λὐταρκεστάτην, 27, takes up
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αὐτάρκειαν, 24. For τὰ περὶ τῆς χώρας, cp. 3. 15. 1286 b 23, τὰ περὶ τῶν τέκνων. We more often have the acc. after περὶ in phrases of this kind in the Politics.

περὶ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For περὶ in the sense of 'quod attinet ad,' see Vahlen on Poet. 23. 1459 a 16, who quotes Rhet. 1. 15. 1375 b 25, καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν νόμων οὕτω διωρίσθω: περὶ δὲ μαρτύρων, μάρτυρες εἰσὶ διετοί, and Phys. 7. 4. 249 a 29. With ποίαν τινὰ supply δὲι εἰναὶ τὴν χώραν. In his preference for a territory as self-complete as possible Aristotle follows Plato, Laws 704 C, ἈΘ. τί δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς ἡ χώρα; πότερα πάμφωρος ἢ καὶ τινῶν ἐπιδείης; Κλ. σχεδὸν οὐδενὸς ἐπιδείης, and Critias 110 E, and also Solon (Hdt. 1. 32, ὡσπερ χάρη οὐδεμίη καταρκεῖ πάντα ἐωτὴ παρέχουσα, ἀλλὰ ἅλλο μὲν ἔξει, ἑτέρου δὲ ἐπιδείεται: ἡ δὲ ἐν τὰ πλείστα ἔχει, ἀρίστη αὐτῆς). Hesiod, indeed, had already said of the just (Op. et Dies, 236),

θάλκουσιν δ' ἀγαθοῖς διαμπερές' οὐδ' ἔπι νηῶν νίσσονται, καρπὸν δὲ φέρει ζείδωρος ἄρωμα,

with which Virgil's lines (Ecl. 4. 38 sq.) may be compared,

Cedet et ipse mari vector, nec nautica pinus

Mutabit merces: omnis feret omnia tellus.

Thessaly was famed for the variety of its produce; it was rich in corn and wine and timber, and in pasture for horses cattle and sheep (Bursian, Geographie von Griechenland, 1. 47); Cyprus was rich in corn, wine, oil, timber, and copper (Strabo, p. 684). We read of the χώρα πάμφωρος of the Tyrrenians in Diod. 5. 40. 3, and of the νῖσος εὐδαιμόνιν καὶ πάμφωρος of Sardinia in [Aristot.] De Mir. Auscult. 100. 838 b 22. Isocrates speaks of Egypt in Busir. § 12 as πλείστα καὶ παντοδαπὰ φέρεων δυναμεῖν. Messenia (Eurip. Fragm. 1068) and Laconia (E. Curtius, Peloponnesos, 2. 218) were remarkable for the variety of their produce. All these were fertile regions, but there were countries which were at once πάμφωροι and rugged, and it is a territory of this kind that Plato prefers (Laws 704 D). Aristotle would hardly follow him in this. He would hardly be satisfied with a territory like the Attic, which comprised much poor land (Plut. Solon, c. 22), though it is called παμφωρωτάτη by Xenophon (De Vect. 1. 3: cp. Plato, Critias 110 E, and Antiphanes, Fragm. ὅμωνυμοι: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 98). The main reason which leads both Plato and Aristotle to prefer a πάμφωρος territory is that in a State possessing such a territory importation and exportation are reduced to a minimum, and consequently also the commercial class. States with a barren territory
have often in the history of the world been forced to become commercial in order to exist—e.g. Aegina (above on 1258 a 34), Phocaea (Justin, 43. 3. 5), Elea (Strabo, p. 252). As to Chios see note on 1291 b 20. Much of the territory of Corinth was infertile, and this helped to make her a commercial State (Curtius, Peloponnesos, 2. 516). 'It was on a bare rock surrounded by deep sea that the streets of Tyre were piled up to a dizzy height' (Macauley, Hist. of England, c. 24). As to Venice see H. F. Brown, Venice, p. 251. 'Nuremberga, cuius agro nihil magis sterile fieri potest, omnium tamen Germaniae urbium populosisissima et opificem multitudine florentissima putatur' (Bodinus, De Republica, p. 518). The word παντοφόρος appears to be extremely rare: πάμφυρος is common enough.

30. πλήθει δὲ καὶ μεγέθει κ.τ.λ. With τοσαύτην we should probably supply, not πάς τις ἀν ἐπανόειε, but δεῖ εἶναι as with peri μὲν γὰρ τοῦ πολίων τινα, 26 (cp. c. i. 1330 a 41 sqq.). See 2. 6. 1265 a 28–38, where the same standard is adopted, in correction of Plato, Laws 737 D, γῆς μὲν ὅποιη πόσους σώφρονας ὄντας ἵκας τρέψειν. Yet Plato's language in Critias 112 C, τὸ μέσον ἰππερθαναι καὶ ἀνελεθηρίας μεταδιώκοντες κοσμία ἄφοδομοντο ἀληθεῖς, is quite in the spirit of that of Aristotle here. Aristotle does not wish the citizens of his 'best State' to live either like the people of Myconus, who were charged with stinginess (Cratin. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 6: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 175), or like the Boeotians, of whom the comic poet Eubulus said (Meineke, 3. 222),

κτίζε Βοιωτών πόλιν
ἀνδρῶν ἀρίστων ἐσθίειν δὲ ἡμέρας.

See also vol. i. p. 316, note I. For the use here of πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει, cp. c. 6. 1327 b 3, peri δὲ πλήθουσ ἡδη καὶ μεγέθους τῆς δύναμεως ταύτης. We have meiçoun καὶ πλείων used in a somewhat similar way in Meteor. 2. 5. 363 a 15, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τῶν τόπων εἶναι πολύ πλεῖο ἐκείνων καὶ ἀναπεπταμένων μείζων καὶ πλείων καὶ μᾶλλον ἀλεοῦς ἄνεμος ὁ νότος ἐστὶ τοῦ βορέων, and in Aen. Poliorc. c. 8, προσδεχόμενον πλεῖω καὶ μεῖζω δύναμιν πολεμίων. Σχολάζονται, 31, 'though at leisure.'

33. ὅστερον. This is one of the promises of future investigations which are not fulfilled in the Politics as we have it (see vol. ii. p. xxvii sqq.).

peri κτήσεως καὶ τῆς peri τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας. Καὶ is explanatory, καὶ τῆς peri τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας being added to make it clear in what sense κτήσεις will be dealt with. Κτήσεις has been dealt with from
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another point of view in i. 8. 1256 a i sqq. Compare what Plato says on the subject in Rep. 591 D sq. For τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας cp. 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 3, προσόδων εὐπορίας, and Isocr. Panath. § 7, τῆς περὶ τὸν βίον εὐπορίας. See also below on 1327 a 8, τῆς περὶ εξελα ὑλῆς.

35. πῶς δεῖ καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν αὐτῆς, 'how and in what way it should stand to the use made of it': cp. Diog. Laert. 3. 99, εὐπορία δ' ἐστὶν ὅταν τις πρὸς τὰς ἐν τῷ βίῳ χρήσεις ὄντως ἔχῃ ὡστε καὶ φύλους εὐ ποιῆσαι καὶ φιλοτήμον καὶ εὐπόρους ἀπολειτουργήσαι, and Xen. Hiero, 4. 8, οὐ γὰρ τῷ ἀρίθμῳ ὀστε τὰ πολλά κρίνεται οὐσὶ τὰ Ικανά, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις' ὡστε τὰ μὲν ἑπερβάλλοιτα τὰ Ικανά πολλά ἐστι, τὰ δὲ τῶν Ικανῶν ἐκλείποντα ὁλίγα. For πῶς καὶ τίνα τρόπον, cp. Phys. 8. 5. 257 a 31, ὡστε τούτῳ σκεπτέων λαβώντων ἄλλων ἀρχήν, εἰ τι κινεῖ αὐτὸ αὐτό, πῶς κινεῖ καὶ τίνα τρόπον: Hippocr. De Capitis Vulneribus, vol. iii. p. 356 Kühn, χρὴ δὲ καὶ ἑρωτάν τὸν τετρωμένον ὅπως ἐπαθῇ καὶ τίνα τρόπον: Plato, Laws 964 D, πῶς ὄν ἀν καὶ τίνα τρόπον, ὡς ξίνε, ἀπεκκύκουστος αὐτὸ τοιοῦτο τοι μέγαμεν; and Polyb. i. 32. 2, πῶς καὶ τίνι τρόπῳ γίγονεν, and 2. 31. 7, οὕτω καὶ τοῖτο τῷ τρόπῳ: see also Stallbaum's note on Plato, Laws 681 D, οὕτω τε καὶ ταύτη. Αὐτὴν is added to τὴν χρήσιν to contrast 'the use itself' with τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν: cp. c. 13. 1331 b 24, περὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς, where 'the constitution itself' is tacitly contrasted with matters preliminary to the constitution and not falling within it. Vet. Int. wrongly refers αὐτὴν to τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας, translating 'qualiter oportet habere et quo modo ipsam ad usum.'

36. πολλαὶ γάρ κ.τ.λ. 'for there are many disputes on the subject of this inquiry, arising because of those who,' etc. For ἐκαίνειν εἴθε ἔκκατέρω τὴν ὑπερβολήν, cp. 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 22, ἐλκουσαί εἰς τὴν ὑπερβολήν, and Plato, Laws 890 A, ἐλκόντων πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν ὁρὸν βίον. Should τὴν χρήσιν be supplied with ἐλκουσαῖ; On the side of γλυκαρχώτης were the Pythagoreans (see a fragment of Aristophon in Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 362, and fragments of Alexis, ibid. 3. 474, 483), the Cynics (Diog. Laert. 6. 8 sub ἑν.: 6. 25: Diog.Cynicus, Fragm. 273 Mullach), and writers like Ephorus (see above on 1265 a 3O), to say nothing of the lawgivers of Sparta (Xen. Rep. Lac. 2. 5 sq.: Plut. Lycurg. c. 17) and Crete (2. 10. 1272 a 22); while on the side of τρυφῆ were Aristippus (Diog. Laert. 2. 68, 69, 84) and others (vol. i. p. 301, and p. 302, note 1: also p. 199, note 1).

39. τὸ δ' εἴδος τῆς χώρας κ.τ.λ. Wyse, followed by Sus., is
probably right in placing δεί δ’ ένια—έμπειροις in a parenthesis and making ὅτι κ.τ.λ. dependent on εἰπεῖν. Τὸ εἶδος τῆς χώρας, 'the character of the territory,' i.e. its geographical character, as distinguished from the character of the soil, which has been dealt with in 1326 b 26–30. Cp. Plato, Laws 625 C, τὴν γὰρ τῆς χώρας πάσης Κρήτης φύσιν ὀρᾶτε, ὡς οὐκ ἔστι, καθάπερ ἡ τῶν Θεταλῶν, πεδίας, and 834 C.

δεί δ’ ένια κ.τ.λ., 'and we must be guided in respect of some matters by the opinion also of those who are experienced in questions of generalship [as well as that of those who look especially to the supply of commodities, the subject which has just been before us].’ Aristotle may probably have before him the work of Aeneas Tacticus entitled Στρατηγικά βιβλία or περὶ τῶν στρατηγικῶν ὑπομνήματα, of which we possess a part in the Commentarius Poliorceticus of Aeneas (see below on 1331 a 16): cp. c. 8, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα εἰς τὴν χώραν προσδεχόμενον πλέει καὶ μείζον δύναμιν πολεμίων πρότον μὲν τὴν χώραν δυσείσβολον τοῖς πολεμίοις καὶ δυσστρατοπεδευτοῦ καὶ δυσπορευτοῦ κατασκευάζει καὶ τοὺς ποταμοὺς δυσδιάβατους καὶ δυσπλοὺς, and c. 16. 16 sqq. Aristotle learns something from generals in 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 16 sqq. as well as here.

40. δι’ Χρῆ μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις εἶναι δυσέμβολον, αὐτοῖς δ’ εὐέξοδον. Compare what is said of the city in c. 11. 1330 b 2 sqq. and 1331 a 3 sqq. Egypt (see vol. i. p. 316, note 2, and Srabo, p. 819) and Persis (Plut. Alex. c. 37) were difficult of access to foes, and Socrates claimed (vol. i. p. 316, note 2) that Attica was so, but Laconia is probably especially present to Aristotle’s mind, for it was δυσεμβολωτάτη (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 24: Eurip. Fragm. 1068: see Curtius, Peloponnesos, 2. 217, 311). Boeotia, on the contrary, lay comparatively open to the foe (Plut. Reg. et Imp. Apophth. Epaminond. 18. 193 E, καὶ τὴν χώραν ὑπείραν οὕτως καὶ ἀναπεπταμένην πολέμου ὀρχήστραν προσηγόρευεν, ὡς μὴ δυναμένους κρατεῖν αὐτὴς, ἀν μὴ τὴν χεῖρα διὰ πάρπακος ἔχωσι), and of Elis we read in Curtius, Peloponnesos, 2. 6, 'No region of the Peloponnese is less protected against attacks from without. A broad river-valley leads, like an open entrance-road, from the interior into the midst of Elis; the mountains at the back of the territory afford little protection, because they are only the lower ranges of higher mountains. The level coast-line offers the easiest of approaches from the North and the South; the plains and the villages are exposed on all sides to landings from a hostile fleet.’ That a country might be at once
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hard of entrance to foes and easy of exit for friends we see from Plato, Laws 761 A, δοσβατα δε δη παντα ποιειν τοις ἐχθροῖς, τοῖς δὲ φίλοις ὤ τι μάλιστα εὕβατα, ἀνθρώπως τε καὶ ὑποξυγίους καὶ βασικήματιν, ὀδὼν τε ἐπιμελουμένους κ.τ.λ. Another characteristic which the territory should possess, but which is not noticed here, is that it should be such as to favour the unity of the State (7 (5). 3. 1303 b 7 sqq.). ἡρη τοῖς μὲν, not χρη μὲν τοῖς, is the logical order, but τ' μὲν interdum non ei additur vocabulo, in quo vis oppositionis cernitur' (Bon. Ind. 454 a 20): see above on 1268 b 12.

1327 a. 2. οὕτω καὶ τὴν χώραν, sc. εὐσκύπτων εἶναι δεί.

3. τῆς δὲ πόλεως τὴν θέσιν κ.τ.λ. The recommendation that the territory should be well within reach for purposes of protection leads on naturally to the question as to the site of the city. This question is here dealt with only so far as the position of the city with reference to the territory and the sea is concerned; other matters come up for consideration in c. 11. 1330 a 34 sqq. The city should be placed where it will be readily able to protect the territory and to receive supplies of commodities. For both purposes it must be near the sea, yet it must also be well situated with respect to the territory. Whether Aristotle’s opinion was known to Alexander when he founded Alexandria in b.c. 332, it is impossible to say, but at any rate the site of this city in many respects fulfilled Aristotle’s requirements. Cp. Strabo, p. 798, τῆς δ’ εὐκαρπίας τῆς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν τὸ μέγιστον ἐστιν ὅτι τῆς Λιγύπτου πάσης μόνος ἐστὶν οὕτως ὁ τόπος πρὸς ἀμφω περὶκύκλῳ εὖ, τά τε ἐκ βαλάντις διὰ τὸ εὐλιμένου, καὶ τά ἐκ τῆς χώρας ὅτι πάντα εὐμαρῶς ὁ ποταμὸς πορθμεύει συνάγει τε εἰς τοιούτων χωρίων ὅπερ μέγιστον ἐπιτόμου τῆς οἰκουμένης ἐστὶ. (No doubt Aristotle would not rejoice in the greatness of Alexandria as an emporium or in its close contiguity to the sea.) Some cities had the fault of being at a great distance from their territory (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 32 sqq.). In not a few cases part of the territory was cut off from the city by mountains (this was the case with the Thyrean territory of Argos and the Lepreate territory of Elis), or by an arm of the sea (as when island cities held territory on the adjacent mainland). On the other hand, there were cities like Sparta, which were too far from the sea. Sparta is probably especially present to Aristotle’s mind in 1327 a 3-27. It was evidently in his opinion not situated so well either for the protection of its territory or for the transmission of produce from its territory, as it would have been if it had been nearer to the sea,
Nor was it (18 sqq.) easily within reach of rescue by sea or capable of striking a blow by sea, nor could it well receive by sea commodities lacking to it or send away by sea its surplus produce. The cities of Elis and Messene were also too far from the sea. Cp. Polyb. 2. 5, ταύτας γάρ ἂν τὰς χώρας (i.e. τὴν Ἱλείαν καὶ τὴν Μεσοπηνίαν) Ἰλλυριοὶ πορθοῦντες διετίλουσι διὰ γάρ τὸ μήκος τῆς παραλίας καὶ διὰ τὸ μεσογαίους εἶναι τὰς δυνατεύοντάς ἐν αὐτάς πόλεις μακρὰ καὶ βραδείᾳ λιαν ἐγίνοντο τοὺς προερημένους αἱ παραβοῆθειαι πρὸς τὰς ἀποβάσεις τῶν Ἰλλυρίων, οὕτω οὖσον ἐπέτρεχον καὶ κατέσυρον ἂν τὰς χώρας. In Aristotle’s view the ideal site for a city was one which placed it in easy communication with both land and sea. Rome, according to Cicero (De Rep. 2. 5. 10), was marked out for empire by a position of this kind, and much the same thing may be said of London. We learn, indeed, from c. 11. 1330 a 34 sqq. that a city should be in easy communication, not only with its own territory and with the sea, but also with the mainland on the verge of which it lies. Such was the situation of Athens: cp. Xen. De Vect. 1. 7, καὶ μὲν ὃν περίρρυτός γε ὁδός (ἡ Ἀττικὴ) ὡςπέρ ἐσπερ ὑψος πᾶσιν ἀνέμοις προσάγεται τε δὲν δεῖται καὶ ἀποπέμπεται δ ἂθικεὰς ἀμφιθάλαστος γάρ ἐστι. καὶ κατὰ γῆν δὲ πολλὰ δέχεται ἐμπόρας ἡπειρος γάρ ἐστιν. Aristotle evidently prefers the site of Athens to that of Sparta, and indeed to those of most other Greek cities. It is easy to see from 1327 a 3–27 that Greek cities at a distance from the sea, and especially those whose communications with the coast were difficult—such cities, for instance, as Tegea and Mantinea—were neither very secure from foes nor very well supplied with commodities, and that cities immediately on the coast—and most Greek colonies were thus situated—tended to become denationalized and disorderly owing to the multitude of aliens which flocked to them, and also to suffer an increase in the number of their citizens not conducive to efficient government. In this matter as in others Aristotle favours a mean; the city should be neither on the sea nor too far from it.

4. πρὸς τε τὴν θάλασσαν κ.τ.λ. For the order of the words cp. c. 11. 1331 a 12 sqq. and c. 16. 1335 b 5 sqq. ‘Τε... τε, ut apud omnes prosarios, apud Aristotelem quoque raro in usum venit’ (Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 16, who gives as another instance in the Politics c. 10. 1329 b 2 sqq.).

5. εἰς μὲν ὁ λεξίθεις ὄρος. We expect μὲν οὖν in place of μὲν, but cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 1. 19, εἰς μὲν τρόποις διδασκαλίας ἤν αὐτῷ οὕτως τοῦ

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παρείναι ἄλλος δὲ κ.τ.λ., and Thuc. 2. 97. 2, τὰ μὲν πρὸς θάλασσαν τοσαυτὴ ἦν.

7. ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς κ.τ.λ., i.e. ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς ὅρος ἐστὶ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι εὐπαρακόμιστον κ.τ.λ. I follow the punctuation of Jackson, Welldon, and Sus. The fact that Athens lay near the coast must have greatly facilitated and cheapened the transport to it of the produce of its territory, and especially the transport of heavy commodities like timber, stone, marble, and metals.

8. ἐτι δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and further, of material for timber and for any other industry of the kind that the territory may possess.' Aristotle passes from τῶν γυμνών καρπῶν, 7, to commodities like wood, stone, and metals which are ἀκαρπα μὲν χρήσιμα δὲ (1. 11. 1258 b 27 sqq.: cp. Xen. De Vect. 1. 5, ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ γῆ ἡ στειρομένη μὲν οὐ φέρει καρπόν. ὄρυγμα οὖ δὶ πολλαπλασιών τρέφει ἢ εἶ σιτον ἐφερε). Attica was rich in marble and silver (ibid. 1. 4 sqq.). For ἐργασίαν, cp. Thuc. 4. 105, κτησὶν τε ἔχειν τῶν χρυσεῖων μετάλλων ἐργασίαν ἐν τῇ περὶ ταύτα Θράκη. For τῆς περὶ ἔξω υλῆς, cp. 1326 b 34, τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐπορίας, and Top. 2. 7. 113 a 31, διὰ γὰρ τῆς περὶ τὴν ὅψιν αἰσθήσεως τὴν ἐν ἐκάστῳ μορφῇ γνωρίζουμεν, and see Bon. Ind. 579 b 43 sqq.

C. 6. 11. Περὶ δὲ τῆς πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν κοινωνίας κ.τ.λ. The persons referred to here held that nearness to the sea was prejudicial to orderly government in two ways—(1) it involved the residence in the city of aliens bred up under other laws and likely to exercise an unfavourable moral influence on the citizens; (2) it involved the existence of a very numerous citizen-body, inasmuch as the numbers of the citizen-body would be swollen by a body of merchants, who, it is taken for granted, would be citizens. (That the word πολιονθρωπία refers to the number of the citizens appears from 1327 b 7–9, where it is explained that in Aristotle's 'best State' there will be no πολιονθρωπία in connexion with the oarsmen of the fleet, οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦς μέρος εἶναι δὲ τῆς πόλεως.) Aristotle contends, on the contrary, that nearness to the sea does not necessarily involve either of these results. The city might be placed at a little distance from the sea and might possess a port on the coast, whose inhabitants might be restrained from free communication with the inhabitants of the city; and this port should be a small port, intended for the supply of the needs of the members of the State, not of those of the world in general. Who were the critics whose views are here controverted? Possibly Plato is referred to, but this is not certain, for though he objects
to nearness to the sea in Laws 704 D sqq. (see Stallbaum on this passage, who refers to Cic. De Rep. 2.3.5 sqq., and cp. Laws 949 E sqq., 952 D sqq.) on account of the risk of evil influences from aliens, he does not object to it on the ground of its involving πολυανθρωπία. In all probability the views here controverted were those of persons oligarchically inclined. That πολυανθρωπία is unfavourable to good government we have already seen (c. 4. 1326 a 25 sqq.). Many Greek cities were much exposed to the influence of aliens. Byzantium was overrun with them (Aelian, Var. Hist. 3.14: cp. Athen. Deipn. 526 e), and at Agrigentum in its palmy days, if we may trust Diodorus (13.84.4), there were 180,000 aliens, while the citizens numbered somewhat more than 20,000. Haussoullier (Vie Municipale en Attique, p. 189) shows how foreign worships were instituted at the Peiraeus by aliens for their own behoof, and some of these probably spread to the citizens. We know that the seaports of Dundee and Leith were the channels through which the Reformation found its way into Scotland. "The knowledge of God," says Knox, "did considerably increase within the realm, and this was chiefly effected by merchants and mariners belonging to Dundee and Leith," who imported the reformed doctrines from abroad' (Academy, Feb. 11, 1893). That contact with aliens might have ill results, we see from Cic. De Leg. Agrar. 2.35.95, Carthaginenses fraudulentii et mendaces non genere, sed natura loci, quod propter portus suos multis et variis mercatorum et advenarum sermonibus ad studium fallendi studio quaestus vocabantur. Contact with aliens even of a satisfactory type might well affect the fidelity of the citizens of a Greek State to its traditions, and many of the aliens who crowded to Greek seaports were Asiatics of a type the reverse of satisfactory. The people of Epidamnus found that those of their citizens who had much communication with their Illyrian neighbours became demoralized (Plut. Quaest. Graec. 29, γνωσμένους πονηρούς). We read of the Spartan Callicratidas in Diod. 13.76.2, οὕτως δὲ νέος μὲν ἡν παυτέλῳ, ἀκάκος δὲ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπλοῦ, ἀπὸ τῶν ξενικῶν ἡθῶν πεπειραμένος, δικαίωτας δὲ Σπαρτιατῶν. Machiavelli in his Discourses on the First Decad of Livy (1. 55) ascribes the integrity and piety of the Germans of his day in part to the fact that 'they have never had much commerce with their neighbours, being seldom visited by them and seldom going abroad themselves, but live contented with the food and clothing that are the product of their own country, thereby preventing
all opportunities of evil conversation that might corrupt their manners.' It should be noticed that the argument here reproduced by Aristotle assumes that aliens did not take up their abode in inland cities; this does not, however, seem to have been invariably the case, for we hear of metoeci at Thebes (Diod. i7. 11: Lys. Or. 23. 15) and under the name of πάροικοι at Thespiae (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 294. 1). Indeed, Aristotle himself speaks in c. 4. 1326 a 18 sqq. as if a body of aliens and metoeci was a necessary appendage to every Greek State.

15. γίνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., sc. τὴν πολιναθροσίαν. With διατέμ-\[ ...\] comparat De Part. An. 4. 5. 681 a 28, έχει δὲ τοῦτο τὸ ζηνόν δύο πόρους καὶ μίαν διαίρεσιν, ἡ τε δέχεται τὴν ύγρότητα τὴν εἰς τροφήν, καὶ ἡ πάλιν διατέμει τὴν ὑπολειπόμενην ἴκμαδία.

18. μὲν οὖν appears to be answered by δέ, 32.

19. πρὸς εὐπορίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων. States in command of the sea were for one thing less exposed to famine than States which were not ([Xen.] De Rep. Ath. 2. 6). See also Plato, Laws 705 A (quoted in the next note). We can imagine with what anxiety cities at a distance from the sea, for instance those of Arcadia, watched the prospects of the corn-harvest. The worship of Demeter and of Zeus, the giver of rain, would be especially congenial to such localities. They no doubt kept a vigilant eye on their rivers and the catabothra through which they in some cases flowed off to see that no flooding occurred and that they were not interfered with by rival neighbouring States. Greek colonies, on the other hand, were mostly at no great distance from the sea, and their command of necessaries must consequently have been much superior to that of many districts of Greece proper.

μετέχειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν χώραν τῆς θαλάττης, cp. 25, ἀμφιτέρων (i.e. γῆς καὶ θαλάττης) μετέχουσιν. Susemihl, following Bojesen, reads μετέχειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ τῆς χώρας καὶ τῆς θαλάττης, referring to c. 5. 1327 a 3 sqq. and to c. 11. 1330 a 34 sqq., but compare on the other hand 32, ἐπει δὲ καὶ νῦν ὁρῶμεν πολλάς ὑπάρχουσαν καὶ χώρας καὶ πόλεων ἐπίνεια καὶ λιμένας κ.τ.λ., and Plato, Laws 705 A (a passage perhaps present to Aristotle's mind here), πρόσοκοις γὰρ θαλάττα χόρα τὸ μὲν παρ' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν ὥδι, μᾶλα γε μὴν ὅστοι ἄλμυρον καὶ πικρὸν γειτόνια. The territory no less than the city may be said μετέχειν τῆς θαλάττης, for it draws part of its supplies from the sea and sends part of its
surplus produce away by sea, besides being more easily protected against foes. Aristotle had advised in c. 5. 1327 a 3 sqq. that the city should be well placed in relation both to its territory and to the sea. No one had disputed that it should be well placed in relation to its territory, but a doubt had been raised whether it ought to stand in any relation whatever to the sea. Hence what is uppermost in Aristotle's mind is to show that it should not be far from the sea. That it will be well placed in relation to its territory, he takes for granted.

21. καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For evidence of this fact, see vol. i. p. 317. Compare also Thuc. 5. 82. 5 sq. The successful resistance of the seaport Stralsund to the besieging army of Wallenstein illustrates Aristotle's remark. 'The problem of overcoming the resistance of a fortress open to unlimited succours by sea is one of the most difficult in the whole art of war' (S. R. Gardiner, Thirty Years' War, p. 107). The Duke of Wellington preferred Calcutta to Agra as the seat of British Government in India (Lord Stanhope's Conversations with the Duke of Wellington, p. 306). For πρὸς τὸ βῆςφοιντοὺς πολέμους (for so we should probably read with Sylburg in place of τοὺς πολέμους, which is the reading of ΓΠ), cp. 2. 7. 1267 a 27, πόλεμον ὑπενεγκείν, and 2. 9. 1270 a 33, μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν ὀχὺ ὑπήνεγκεν ἡ πόλις.

23. καὶ πρὸς τὸ βλάψαι κ.τ.λ., 'and with a view to injuring assailants, if it should not be possible [to be easily succourable] both by land and by sea, the State will be more in a position to be so by one or the other, if it shares in both.' I do not think with Susemihl (Bericht über Aristoteles, etc., in the Jahresbericht für Altertumswissenschaft, lxxix. 1894, p. 273) that Argyriades is right in bracketing πρὸς before τὸ βλάψαι. The suppressed nom. τὸ δύνατὸν (ἐτὶν) is not τὸ βλάψαι, but τὸ εὐβοιαθέτους εἰσι. Greece defended itself in both ways against Xerxes, and Syracuse against Athens. Agrigentum, on the other hand, had no fleet when it was besieged by the Carthaginians (Diod. 13. 85 sqq.: Holm, Griech. Gesch. 2. 592). Athens would have had little prospect of success in the Peloponnesian War if she had only been able to strike at her assailants by land. The Lacedaemonian State suffered from not being able to attack its Theban invaders by sea. Compare a saying of Epaminondas (Aristid. Leuctr. 1. p. 421, 18, quoted by Schäfer, Demosth. 1. 104. 4), λέγειν γὰρ ἔφη πρὸς αὐτοὺς Ἐπαμεινόνθαν ὡς οὐδὲν ἄφελος τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ πλεονεκτημάτων, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὴν βαλλαταν δὴ αὐτῶν ἔχουσιν.
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25. ὅσα ἄν κ.τ.λ. It seems to be implied that the import and export of commodities was only possible by sea: Athens, however, imported many commodities by land (Xen. De Vect. 1. 7, καὶ κατὰ γῆν δὲ πολλὰ (ἢ 'Αττικῆς) δὲξεται ἐμπόριον), and that there was traffic by land in Greece we see from Plato, Polit. 289 E, οἱ δὲ πόλιν ἐκ πόλεως ἀλλάττοντες κατὰ θηλασταν καὶ πεζ. But the land-trade of Greece was not comparable in extent to its trade by sea (see Büchsenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 444 sqq.).

27. αὐτῇ γὰρ ἐμπορικὴν κ.τ.λ. takes up and justifies ὅσα ἄν μὴ τυγχάνῃ παρ’ αὐτῶς ὅσα κ.τ.λ. A State may do things for itself which it would demean itself by doing for others (cp. 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 19 sqq. and 3. 4. 1277 b 5 sqq.).

29. οἱ δὲ παρέχοντες κ.τ.λ. This remark is directed against Athens. Isocrates had claimed that in instituting a great mart at the Peiraeus, Athens had done Greece a service (Paneg. § 42); Aristotle, however, asserts that Athens had had the increase of her revenue in view. No doubt she derived a large revenue from the Peiraeus (see Xen. De Vect. 3. 12 sqq., 4. 40, and [Aristot.] Oecon. 2. 1346 a 5 sqq.), but the existence of a great emporium there also added largely to her influence; we see how bitterly the Megarians felt their exclusion from it (Thuc. 1. 67, 139). Among the chief sources of revenue at Athens were the fiftieth on exports and imports, the duty on sales, and the impost paid by metoeci (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 350 sqq.); the existence of a great emporium at the Peiraeus would largely increase the receipts from these and other sources. The revenue of States which did not possess an emporium must have been much smaller than the revenue of those which did. The revenue of inland States especially must have been limited, and few inland democracies can have been able to provide pay for attendance at meetings of the assembly and dicasteries.

30. τοιαύτης μετέχειν πλεονεξίας, ‘to share in greed of this kind,’ i.e. greed for revenue, for πλεονεξία probably does not mean ‘gain’ here, though it often bears this meaning. Cp. Plato, Tim. 27 C, πάντες ὅσοι καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ σωφροσύνης μετέχουσιν.

32. πολλαῖς . . . καὶ χωραῖς καὶ πόλεσιν, e.g. the territories and cities of Athens, Corinth, Megara, etc.

33. ἐπίνεια καὶ λιμεναὶ. ‘Epíneia are port-towns: cp. Suidas s.v., πόλιμα παραθαλάσσιοι, ἐνθα τὰ νεώρα τῶν πόλεων εἶσιν, Ὄσπερ Πειραιῶς τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ Νίσαια τῆς Μεγάρως’ δύνασαι δὲ ἐπὶ παντὸς
elmostion kai paraathalassion chreiasathai to denvomatou thitbfi, d vyn oii pollloi katamboio kaloqin.

euphous keimeva. Cp. Diod. 13. 85. 4, lophon... kata the polveis euphous keimeon.

34. wste mhte to autd vemev asu mhte porrow liau, sc. einai, 'so as neither to occupy the same city [as the buildings of the city] nor to be very far away.' The subject of vemev appears to be epitheia kai liemeas understood, unless we supply touto evnoikoivnas. 'Asu is used of the central city of the State lying round its central acropolis, in contradistinction to other cities comprised within the territory. For the omission of einai, see above on 1277 a 38 and 1286 b 36. Cyllene, the port of Elis, and Gytheium, the port of Sparta, would be thought by Aristotle to be too far from Elis and Sparta.

35. allia krateisbhai k.t.l., 'but to be held in subjection by walls and other similar defences' (such as trenches, cp. Xen. Anab. 2. 4. 22).

36. dia the konwias auton, 'through participation in them,' i.e. in ports and harbours.

37. e te ti blaberoq k.t.l. Aristotle has before him Plato, Laws 952 D sqq. Compare the plan adopted by the people of Epidamnus of appointing a politeia, through whom alone all purchases from, and sales to, their Illyrian neighbours were to be made (Plut. Quaest. Gr. 29).

41. beldioton, thus used, is less common in the Politics than bletian, but we have it in Plato, Gorg. 500 C.

ou yar monon k.t.l. We read of Dionysius the Elder in Diod. 14. 107. 4 that he required Rhegium to surrender to him its fleet of seventy triremes, deilambane yar the kata thalassan botheias apokleisheis radios ekpolioseis tin polin. For autous fobereo einai, cp. c. 8. 1328 b 7-10 and 3. 15. 1286 b 27-31. Sections of the citizen-body were often the originators of stasis (7 (5). 3-4) and might need to be controlled.

3. peri de plhous edh kai megdevous k.t.l., 'but when we come 1327 b. to the amount and magnitude of this force, with respect to that,' etc. For plhous kai megdevous, see above on 1326 b 30.

4. ei men yar k.t.l. That a Greek State could not live a life of hegemony without possessing a fleet, is virtually implied by the view, which dates back as far as the days of the Persian Wars, that a hegemony confined to the land is a 'lame hegemony' (Diod. 11.
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50. Epaminondas held this view (see above on 1327 a 23, and also Grote, Hist. of Greece, 10.416-419, and Schäfer, Demosthenes, i. 104 sq.).

5. πολιτικῶν, 'spent in relations with other States,' not a solitary life, like that of the States referred to in c. 3. 1325 b 23 sqq. Cp. 2. 6. 1265 a 22. Πολιτικῶν is a broader term than ἱγμονικῶν, for a State may have political relations with others without standing to them in a relation of hegemony.

7. τὴν πολιονθρωπίαν τὴν γιγνομένην περὶ τῶν ναυτικῶν ὄχλον, 'the excessive number of citizens which arises in connexion with the mass of trireme-oarsmen.' So Sus. 'jene Pöbelmenge die aus dem Schiffsvolk entspringt.' For γιγνομένην περὶ τῶν ναυτικῶν ὄχλον, cp. 3. 13. 1284 b 20, ἐπερ οὐκ ἐγίγνετο περὶ τὰς πόλεις. Γίγνεσθαὶ περὶ with the acc. means 'to happen to' in Plato, Protag. 309 B, and in Polyb. i. 16. 7, i. 22. 1, and 5. 110. 7, but I do not think that this is what it means here. As to πολιονθρωπία, see above on 1327 a 11. The Athenian demos was largely composed of trireme-oarsmen (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 23).

11. πλῆθους δὲ κ.τ.λ. The connexion of this sentence with that which precedes it would have been clearer if it had run, 'but the oarsmen need not be ciιtizens, for, as a mass of perioeci and cultivators of the territory will be forthcoming, there will necessarily be no lack of sailors also.' Would Aristotle's serfs, who are not to be θομοεἰεῖς, make good sailors? His plan of employing serfs as oarsmen had been anticipated not only at Heracleia on the Euxine, but also by Jason of Phere (Xen. Hell. 6. i. 11, ἀνδρῶν γε μὴν ταύτας (sc. τὰς ναύς) πληροῦν πότερον Ἀθηναίοις ἡ ἡμᾶς εἰκός κάλλος δύνασθαι, τοιούτους καὶ τοιούτους ἑχοντας πενήσεις;). 'Quod idem nostras quoque aetate Veneti factitant, qui ad instruendas classes in agris delectum habere et valentiores agricolas triremibus adscribere consuerunt' (Giph. p. 945). Even at Athens, where a large section of the demos was composed of trireme-oarsmen (see above on 7), metoeci and aliens, and occasionally slaves, were also thus employed (Thuc. i. 143, 3. 16, 8. 73: Isocr. De Pace, §§ 48, 79). The oarsmen of the Lacedaemonian fleet were Helots or hired men (Xen. Hell. 7. i. 12).

13. ὅρμαιν δὲ κ.τ.λ. takes up 1327 a 32 sqq. Καὶ τοῦτο, 'this also,' i.e. τὸ ἀδερμαί ναι ναυτῶν, as well as favourably situated ports and harbours. As to the fleet of the Pontic Heracleia, see Grote, Hist. of Greece, 12. 623. 3. Heracleia waged a vigorous
naval war with Leucon, prince of the Cimmerian Bosporus, who
reigned from about b.c. 392 to 352. In later days (b.c. 280) her
ships of war with five and six banks of oars and her one great
Δόκτωρ helped Ptolemy Ceraunus to defeat the fleet of Antigonus
Droysen, Gesch. des Hellenismus 2. 2. 332).
14. Ἰχνέα. P 4. b V b have Ἰχνεατών, but the forms
 Ἰχνεατής, Ἰχνεατικὸς appear elsewhere in Aristotle’s writings
without any recorded variant. Ἰχνεατής is the earlier form (see
Meisterhans, Grammatik der att. Inschr., p. 34, ed. 2) and appears
in an Attic inscription prior to b.c. 403, but Aristotle probably
used the form Ἰχνεατής, which is found in an Attic inscription of
b.c. 298.
15. τῷ μεγέθει, i.e. in respect of the number of its citizens.
16. λιμένων is placed next to χώρας, because the harbours were
to be outside the city, not, as was often the case, within it.
πόλεων, i.e. the ἄστυ and its ἐπίνειον or port.
17. ἐστώ διωρισμένα. Cp. i. ii. 1258 b 39, ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστίν ἐκεῖνος
gεγραμμένα περὶ τούτων.
19. πρότερον, in c. 4. 1326 b 22 sqq.
21. βλέψας κ.τ.λ. A similar contrast is drawn between αἱ ἐπιφα- C. 7.
νέσταται πόλεις and ἡ άλη οἰκουμένη in Polyb. 1. 4. 6. The change in
the preposition (ἐπὶ—πρὸς) finds many parallels in Aristotle’s way
of writing. Cp. c. ii. 1330 b 16, χαρίς τά τε εἰς τροφὴν ὤδατα καὶ τά
πρός τήν ἄλλην χρείαν: 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 38, ὅσον εἰς γηδίου κτήσιν, εἰ δὲ
μὴ, πρὸς ἀδορίμων ἐμπορίας καὶ γεωργίας: 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 17, οὕτε γὰρ
ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ᾿Αθανατίοις οὕτ’ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν. See also 2. 8. 1267 b 27,
22. ὡς διειλήπται τοῖς ἐθνεῖσι, literally ‘how it is divided into
sections by nations’: cp. c. 12. 1331 a 20, and Plato, Laws 886 A,
tά τῶν ὀρὼν διακεκοσμημένα καλῶς ὄντως, εἰμαντοῖς τε καὶ μηδείς διειλήμενα,
and Phaedo 110 B, ἡ γῆ αὕτη . . . ποικίλη, χρώμασι διειλημένη.
23. τὰ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., ‘for the nations inhabiting cold countries,
and in particular those in Europe,’ etc. Καὶ introduces an explanation
and limitation of τά ἐν τοῖς ψυχρῶις τόποις ἐθνη, as in i. 9. 1257 b
9, τὸν χρηματιστικὸν καὶ τὸν καπηλείκην. Aristotle here follows in the
track of Plato, Rep. 435 E, and of Hippocrates, De Aere, Aquis,
Locis, vol. i. p. 547 sqq. Kühn, and esp. p. 553 (as Giph. points out,
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Gr. i. 375). Aristotle probably held that a connexion exists between coldness of climate and abundance of θυμός. He may have traced the connexion thus. Cold hardens the animal frame and makes it dry and earthy, not watery (De Gen. An. 5. 3. 783 a 15 sqq.), and animals in whose blood the earthy element predominates are spirited in character (De Part. An. 2. 4. 650 b 33 sqq.), whereas those whose blood is of a more watery nature have a more subtle intelligence, and, if this wateriness is extreme, are cowardly (650 b 18 sqq.). See vol. i. p. 319, note i, and De Part. An. 2. 2. 648 a 2–11. A different explanation may be deduced from passages in the Problems ascribed to Aristotle, which are not, however, one of his authentic works (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 100: Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 96). θυμός is connected with internal warmth (De Part. An. 2. 4. 650 b 35, θερμότητος γὰρ ποιητικῶν ὁ θυμός: cp. Probl. 10. 60. 898 a 5, ἥ δε οἱ θυμοί μετὰ θερμότητος: ὁ γὰρ φάβος κατάφυτες· ὅσον ὄν (sc. ξύνον) τὸ αἷμα ἑνθέρμαν ἔστι, καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ θυμοειδή), and a cold climate, according to Probl. 14. 16. 910 a 38 sqq., makes the flesh close and solid, and so prevents the escape of the internal heat. As to the 'spirit' of the barbarians to whom Aristotle refers, cp. Eth. Eud. 3. 1. 1229 b 28, διὰ θυμῶν, οἷον οἱ Κελτοὶ πρὸς τὰ κύματα ὅπλα ἀπαντῶσι λαβώντες, καὶ οἷος ἡ βαρβαρικὴ ἀνδρεία μετὰ θυμοῦ ἑστίν: Polyb. 2. 35. 3, διὰ τὸ μὴ τὸ πλέιον ἄλλα συνάξεσθην ὡσποδὸ τὸ γενόμενον ἐπὶ τῶν Γαλατῶν θυμὸ μᾶλλον ἡ λογισμῷ βραβεύωσθαι: Seneca, De Ira, 1. 11, quid Cimbororum Teutonorumque tot millia superfusa Alpibus ita sustulit ut tanta cladin notium ad suos non nuntius sed fama pertulerit, nisi quod erat illis ira pro virtute, and 2. 15 (referred to by Giph. p. 948), 'ut scias,' inquit, 'iram habere in se generosi alicund, liberas videbis gentes quae iracundissimae sunt, ut Germanos et Scythas...' Deinde omnes istae feritate liberae gentes, leonum luporumque ritu, ut servire non possunt, ita nec imperare. Non enim humani vic ingenii, sed feri et intractabilis habent: nemo autem regere potest, nisi qui et regi. Fere itaque imperia penes eos fuere populos qui mitiore caelo utuntur. As to the meaning of Εὐρώπη here, see vol. i. p. 318, note 3. In Hom. Hymn. in Apoll. 250 sq., 290 sq. Εὐρώπη is distinguished from the Peloponnese and the islands, but not from Hellas.

25. διόπερ κ.τ.λ., 'hence they continue comparatively free, but devoid of constitutional organization and unable to rule their neighbours.' They are free in comparison with Asiatics (3. 14.
1285 a 21). Aristotle can hardly include the Macedonians among the 'nations of Europe,' for they were not unable to rule over others, but does he regard them as Greeks? He is probably thinking of the Scythians, Thracians, and Illyrians among other European races: cp. Xen. Cyrop. i. 1. 4, and γάρ τοι τοσούτον διήρεγε (Κύρος) τῶν ἄλλων βασιλέων ... διότι ο’ μὲν Σκύθης, καὶ περὶ παμπάλλων ὄντων Σκύθων, ἄλλοι μὲν οὐδενὸς δύνατι’ ἐν ἑδυναμεῖσι, ἀγαπήθη δ’ ἐν εἰ τού ἄναυτον ἑδυναμεῖσι ἀρχον διαγένουσι, καί ὁ Θρᾷς Θρᾷκων καί ὁ Ἰλλυριός Ἰλλυρίων, καί τὰλλα δὲ ὡσαυτῶς ἑνῆ ἀκοῦόμεν τὰ γοῦν ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ ἔτι καὶ νῦν αὐτόνομα εἶναι καὶ λειτύθαι ἀπ’ ἄλληλων. Contrast Isocr. Paneg. § 67, where the Scythians and Thracians, as well as the Persians, are described as ἄρχοκόσμα τῶν γενόμεν καὶ μεγάτας δυνατείας ἐχοντα. 27. τὰ δὲ περὶ τήν Ἀσίαν κ.τ.λ. For ἄθυμα, cp. Hippocr. De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 553 Kühn, περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀθυμίας τῶν ἄνθρωπων καὶ τῆς ἀναθρείτης, ὅτι ἀπολεμώτεροι εἰσιν τῶν Εὐρωπαῖων οἱ Ἀσινοὶ καὶ ἡμερώτεροι τὰ ἥβαλ κ.τ.λ. Hippocrates, however, in the same treatise (p. 554 Kühn) says justly enough, εἴρησες δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἀσινοὺς διαφερομενούς αὐτοὺς ἐνωτέον τοὺς μὲν βελτίωνας τοὺς δὲ φαυλοτέρους ἐνωτα. Would Aristotle say of the Persians (cp. c. 2. 1324 b 11) what he says of the Asiatics here? Modern observers take much the same view of Asiatic character. 'The Asiatic is as clever as the European with his hands and wits, though he lacks initiative and the power of government' (Speech of Sir H. H. Johnston, Times, Nov. 7, 1894). Aristotle's account of the Asiatics was hardly flattering to Alexander as the conqueror of Asia, nor did it lend support to his scheme of fusing Greeks and Asiatics. See on the subject vol. i. p. 319, note 3. Aristotle traces similar contrasts between animals to those which he here traces between the nations of Europe and Asia (Hist. An. i. 1. 488 b 12, διαφέρουσι δὲ (τὰ γάρ) καὶ ταῖς τοιαίσδε διαφοράς κατὰ τὸ ήθος· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ πρᾶξ καὶ δύσθυμα καὶ οὐκ ἐνστατικά, οὖν βοῦς, τὰ δὲ θυμάδη καὶ ἐνστατικά καὶ ἀμαθή, οὖν ὡς ἄγριος, τὰ δὲ φρόνμα καὶ δειλά, οὖν ἔλαφος, δασύπους κ.τ.λ.). 28. διότι όρχόμενα καὶ δουλεύοντα διατελεί, i.e. enslaved to their rulers. Kingship prevailed over most of Asia (Hippocr. De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 553 Kühn), and in many places of a despotic type (3. 14. 1285 a 16 sqq.). 29. τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος κ.τ.λ. Contrast Isocrates' account of the difference between Greeks and barbarians in De Antid. § 293, καὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ προέχετε καὶ διαφέρετε τῶν ἄλλων οὐ ταῖς περὶ τῶν πύλημον ἐπιμελείαις, οὖδ’ ὅτι κάλλιστα πολιτεύεσθε καὶ μάλιστα φυλάττετε
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tous nomous oves umi oi prōgoiωn kateleitov, alla toutoioi oı̂steri η φουiη η
των ανθρωпов των ἀllaωn ζουων διήρεγκε kai to genov to tωn 'Ellhnon
tων barbárov, το kai prōs tηn phróposin kai prōs tous lóguos ámeinou
pepaideúvseis των ἀllaωn.

Oı̂steri meseidei kata touσ topous. To όμφαλοs at Delphi was
regarded as the centre both of Greece and of the habitable earth,
(Strabo, p. 419, tηs γαρ 'Ellhados en meσho pws esti tηs syμpasηs, tηs
tεn enoσοi 'Iσθμοι kai tηs ekτos, enomísithi de kai tηs oικομενης, kai ekálλeuan
tηs γηs όμφαλοs k.t.l.). Xenophon claims the same position for
Athens (De Vect. 1.6), and Strabo for Italy (p. 286). Cp. also
[Plato,] Epinomis 987 D, tòde ge μην διανοηθηναι χρη πάντ' άνδρα
'Ellhna, ós tópos έξομεν τον των 'Ellhnon prōs ἀρετην εν τοις σχεδον
άριστον. το 8' ἐπαινετων αυτω χρη λέγειν, ὅτι μέσοs ἐν εἰη χειμώνων τε και
της δημης φύσεως.

32. kai dynameinon árkein πάντωv, mias tughanou politeias. See
vol. i. p. 321, note 1, and compare also the exclamation
of Agesilaus in Plut. Ages. c. 16, and Isocr. Paneg. § 131. For
c. 24, πάσαν 'Arkádaion eis miαn δύναμιν συνεστησαν, and Diod. 15. 59,
έπεσε τοις 'Αρκάδας eis miαn συντέλειαν ταξιθηνα. : Demosth. De Fals.
Leg. c. 263, οπδω χαλκον πάντωv ειν εν συνφιλαμένων. What kind
of 'unity of constitution' Aristotle has in his mind is not clear; he
may be thinking of the establishment of a common council of
Greece by Philip of Macedon after the battle of Chaeroneia (vol. i.
p. 321, note 1), or of an union of the free States of Greece, not
under the headship of Macedon, but under some Federal bond.
The latter kind of union would be more truly an union of Greeks
than an union under the headship of Macedon, and it is of an
union of Greeks that Aristotle speaks.

34. tà μεν γαρ έξει την φυσιν μονόκωλον. Among Hellenic races
possessed only of thumos Aristotle probably counted the Arcadian
(Curtius, Peloponnesos, 1. 168) and Aetolian, and possibly also the
Boeotian (see above on 1274 a 32), and among those possessed
only of diáos some of the Ionians of Asia Minor.

36. fanevōn toînou k.t.l. Compare for the phrase eisagōγous τω
nomobéthi Plato, Laws 671 B. Plato had claimed (Rep. 376 A sqq.)
that the mildness of the dog to those whom he knows is due to the
philosophic element in his nature, and had concluded (376 B),
ουκον θαρρουντες τιθωμεν και εν ανθρωπη, ει μελει προς τοις οικεων και
γνωριμου πραδος τις έσεσαι, φύσει φιλόσοφον και φιλομαθη αυτων δειν
4 (7). 7. 1327 b 32—1328 a 1. 367

eμας; Aristotle claims, on the contrary, that what Plato ascribes to the philosophic element is really due to θυμός (38 sqq.), inasmuch as it is θυμός that makes men loving. Few ruling races have possessed in perfection the combination of qualities which Aristotle demands in the citizens of his best State. In most perhaps there has been more θυμός than δίανοια.

38. διπέρ γάρ κ.τ.λ., 'for as to what,' etc. The reference is to Plato, Rep. 375 D sqq. Plato is referred to as τινες also in c. 10. 1329 b 41 sq. and in other passages collected by Zeller, Plato, Eng. Trans., p. 62, note 41. Plato's remark that dogs are fierce to those whom they do not know was no doubt suggested by Heraclitus, Fragm. 115 Bywater, κυνες καὶ βαθύζουσί δυν ἂν μὴ γνώσκοι. The connexion of θυμός with affectionateness appears also in Hist. An. 1. 1. 488 b 21, τὰ δὲ (τῶν ζωφῶν) θυμικὰ καὶ φιλιτικά καὶ ἵππεοτα, ὅιον κυνών. Compare also Top. 2. 7. 113 a 35 (referred to by Schneider), οὗτοι εἰ τὸ μίσος ἑπεσθαί ὀργῇ ἐφήσετο, εἰς ἂν τὸ μίσος ἐν τῷ θυμοειδεί. οἷοὶ γὰρ ἡ ὀργή σκεπτεόν ὦν εἰ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐν τῷ θυμοειδεί, ἡ φιλία: εἰ γὰρ μὴ, ἔλλ' ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ ἐστιν ἡ φιλία, οὐκ ἂν ἐποτε μίσος ὀργῇ. Camerarius (Interp. p. 289) remarks that Theognis had already connected love and hatred with θυμός (Theogn. 1091, ἄργαλεος μοι θυμός ἔχει περὶ σῆς φιλότητος' οὕτε γὰρ ἐχθαίρεω ὡστε φιλέει δύναμαι).

41. For ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμις, cp. De An. 2. 3. 414 a 29 sqq.: Περὶ νεότητος καὶ γῆρος 1. 467 b 16 sqq.: and other passages collected by Bonitz, Ind. 207 a 46 sqq.

1. οὐκέτιον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 42, οὐκέτιον γὰρ ὦν μικρὸν 1328 a. οὗτος δύναται τούτῳ παρασκευάζειν' ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὀλυμπιονικαῖς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle finds an indication that θυμός is the faculty of love in the fact that when it is stirred it is more stirred in relation to those we love than in relation to those who are unknown to us. Is the following fragment of the Medea of Neopron (Fragm. 2), a tragic poet of the time of Euripides or possibly somewhat earlier, based on the passage of Archilochus of which Aristotle quotes a part?

εἶναι τι δράσεις, θυμεῖς βούλευεσαι καλῶς
πρὶν ἡ ἐξαμαρτεῖν καὶ τὰ προσφιλέστατα
ἐχθαστα βέσθαι. ποιι ποι' ἐξεῖσα (cp. αἰρέται), τάλας;
κάτασχε λήμα καὶ θένας θεσπυρεῖς.
καὶ πρὸς τι ταῦτα δύρομαι ψυχήν ἐμῆν
ὀρὸς' ἐρήμον καὶ παρημελημένην (cp. ὀλυγωρείσθαι)
πρὸς ὄν ἐχρήμη ἡκιστα;
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Cp. also Plato, Laws 717 D, θυμοκρέας τε οὖν (τοὺς γονεῖν) ὑπείκειν δεῖ καὶ ἀποτιμᾶσαι τὸν θυμόν ... ἐνυγγυρώσκοντα ως εἰκότως μᾶλλον πατὴρ νιεί δοξάζων ἀδικεῖσθαι θυμοῖς ἀν διαφερόντως, and (with Eaton), Rhet. 2. 2. 1379 b 2, καὶ τοῖς φίλοις (ὀργίζουσι) μᾶλλον ἦ τοῖς μὴ φίλους· οὕτων γὰρ προσήκειν μᾶλλον πάσχειν εἰ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ἡ μῆ. For ὁ θυμὸς αἱρεταί, cp. Probl. 27. 3. 947 b 32, διό καὶ τὸ ἀναξίωμα καὶ τὸ ὀρίσεσθαι τῶν θυμῶν καὶ ταραττέσθαι, καὶ σοὶ τοιαύτα λέγουσιν οὐκάκως ἄλλῳ οἰκεῖο, ἀν καὶ τὸ πάντα ἀπαφήμι ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἡ διάστασις τῆς προφητείας, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς τοῦ καρδιάκου · and also Fragm. Trag. Gr. Adespota, 321 Nauck, παοῦν ὁ θυμὸς τῶν φρενῶν ἀνωτέρω.

3. διὸ καὶ Ἀρχιλόχος κ.τ.λ., 'hence Archilochus for instance' (see above on 1255 a 36), 'when he complains of his friends, fittingly enough discourses to his spirit [which is closely connected with friends, saying,] "For thy tortures surely were from friends."

See Archil. Fragm. 66, 67. For ἄπαγχεο, cp. Aristoph. Vesp. 686 Didot, ὁ μᾶλλον μ’ ἀπαχύξει ('excruicat').

6. καὶ τὸ ἄρχον δὲ κ.τ.λ., i.e. the principle of rule and freedom as well as the capability of affection. Here Aristotle does not dissent from Plato, but agrees with him. He remembers Plato, Rep. 375 B, ἡ οὐκ ἐννεόρρας ὡς ἄμαχον τε καὶ ἀνίκητον θυμός, οὐ παρὼντος ψυχή πάσα πρὸς πάντα ἄφοβος τέ ἐστι καὶ αἵττητος; where there is evidently a tacit reminiscence of the saying of Heraclitus quoted in 7 (5). 11. 1315 a 30 sq. Compare also Eth. Eud. 3. 1. 1229 a 27, ὅμως δὲ μᾶλλον φυσικὴ ἡ τοῦ θυμοῦ (ἀνδρεία) αἵττητον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς, διὸ καὶ οἱ παῖδες ἀρετῆ ἐκχῦναν, and Eth. Nic. 4. 11. 1126 a 36, ἐνιότε σωτός τοὺς ἀλληλο-πιόντας ἐπανοίησαν καὶ πράοιν φαρέν, καὶ τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρόδεις ὃς ὅσομινθν ἀρχεῖν.

8. οὗ καλῶς δ’ ἔχει κ.τ.λ. With χαλεποὺς εἶναι supply δεῖν, as in 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 3. See note on 1335 b 5. This takes up 1327 b 40, πρὸς δὲ τοῖς ἀγνώτοις ἄγριοι, and corrects Plato, Rep. 375 D sqq. Magnanimous men are fierce only to those who act unjustly, and so far from being fiercer to such persons when unknown to them, they will be fiercer to them when they are familiar friends. Plato, however, had himself said in Laws 731 B, θυμοειδῆ μὲν δ’ χρῆ πάντα ἀνδρὰ εἶναι, πρῶον δὲ ἡ σε ὁ τε μᾶλλον.

10. πλήν. Bonitz (Ind. s. v.) compares De An. 2. 1. 412 b 20, ἢς ἀπολεπίσουσι οὐκ ἔστων ὀφθαλμός, πλήν ὀμοφύως.

13. παρ’ οῖς γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for in quarters in which they conceive there should be a feeling that the benefit conferred in the past is owed back [and ought to be requited], they think that in addition
to the injury done them they are defrauded also of the benefit.’ Aristotle mentions in Rhet. 2. 8. i386a ii, among things that arouse compassion, τὸ ἐθεν προσήκεν ἀγαθὸν τι πράξας, κακῶν τι συμβίαι.

15. ἐθεν εἰρηταὶ “χαλεποὶ πόλεμοι γὰρ ἄδελφῶν.” We learn from Plut. De Fraterno Amore, c. 5, χαλεποὶ πόλεμοι γὰρ ἄδελφῶν, ὅσ Ἐὐριπίδης εἰρηκεν, ὅτες, χαλεπῶστατο τοῖς γονεῖσιν αὐτοῖς εἰσιν, that this is a fragment of Euripides (Fragm. 965): cp. Democrit. Fragm. Mor. 228 (Mullach, Fragm. Philos. Gr. i. 355), ἡ τῶν εἰς γενεῶν ἐξήρη τῆς τῶν θενεῶν χαλεποτέρη μίλα.


18. For πόσην, see above on 1326 a 5.

19. οὗ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., ‘for we must not aim at the same exactness of detail by means of theoretical inquiries as is realized by means of what is presented to us through sense-perception.’ For ζητεῖν διὰ τῶν λόγων κ.τ.λ., cp. c. i7. 1336 a 5 sqq., and Plut. Pericl. c. 9, θεωρεῖσθω διὰ τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν ἡ αἰτία τῆς μεταβολῆς. For τῶν γιγανομένων διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, cp. De Caelo, 3. 4. 303 a 22, καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ἐνδοξῶν καὶ τῶν φαινομένων κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσιν ἀναφερόν, and for the contrast of οἷς λόγοι καὶ τὰ γιγανόμενα διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, see Bon. Ind. 20 b 30–39, and above on 1261 b 29. The double διὰ is awkward, but of this kind of awkwardness there are many instances in the Politics: see 2. 6. 1266 a 21 sq., 4 (7). 13. 1332 b 1 sqq., and 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 9 sqq. The same thing happens with other prepositions—with πρὸς in 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 18 sqq., and 6 (4). 3. 1289 b 38, with περί in 6 (4). 14. 1297 b 35 sq. and 7 (5). 12. 1315 b 34, and with ἐν in 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 29 sq. and 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 2.

21 sqq. Aristotle here passes on to the question who are to be C. 8. ‘parts of the State.’ It is from cc. 8–10 that we learn most of the little that he tells us as to the constitutional and social organization of his ‘best State.’ He begins by laying down a principle which holds of all things existing by nature, and therefore of the πόλις, and indeed of all κοινωνίαι which issue in ‘something one in kind.’ In all things that exist by nature the necessary conditions of the existence of the thing are to be distinguished from its parts. Not
all the necessary conditions are parts of the thing, but only those which have something in common. In a πᾶς the ‘something in common’ is ‘the best attainable life’ (1328 a 36), or in other words εὐδαιμονία, and as this is inseparable from virtue (c. 9. 1329 a 22), no class of persons is rightly a part of the State whose occupation precludes its attainment of virtue. Hence cultivators, artisans, day-labourers (c. 9. 1329 a 35 sq.), and traders (c. 9. 1328 b 39) are not to be parts of the State, or in other words are not to be citizens. The classes which will be parts of the State and which will constitute its citizen-body will be τὸ πολεμικὸν (c. 9. 1329 a 2), or rather τὸ ὀπληστικὸν (c. 9. 1329 a 31, 37), τὸ βουλευτικὸν ἐπὶ τῶν συμφερόντων, and τὸ κράτος ἐπὶ τῶν δικαίων. Aristotle takes no notice here of a class which he recognizes in 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 34 sqq., the official class (τὸ δημοψυχικὸν), but this also he would no doubt reckon as a part of the State. He is not, however, satisfied with excluding from citizenship the classes which are not δημοψυχογονή τῆς ἀρετῆς (c. 9. 1329 a 20); he requires that those who exercise deliberative and judicial functions in his ‘best State’ shall be over a certain age and yet not too old. In other words he gives supreme authority in his State to men of mature but not too advanced age, who will be presumably possessed of φρώνισις. Plato in his Republic had reserved the rule of the State for a special class of men highly gifted in intellect and character and prepared for rule by a long-continued philosophical training, but Aristotle does not think that the soldiers of the State would submit to be ruled by a class into which they would not ultimately rise; he also insists rather on the possession of φρώνισις by his rulers than on a philosophical training, and φρώνισις is according to him the fruit in fit minds of a ripe age. He follows in fact rather in the track of Plato’s Laws than in that of his Republic, for Plato had required in the Laws that the holders of the chief offices should be men of mature years. But Plato had not, like Aristotle, arranged that deliberative and judicial functions should be withdrawn from men over a certain age, though he contemplates in Rep. 498 C the retirement of infirm old men from political and military duties. This was, it would seem, a more or less novel suggestion. Its importance was no doubt brought home to Aristotle’s mind by his observation of the ill effects of advanced age on the holders of life-offices in the Lacedaemonian State (2. 9. 1270 b 38 sqq.), and probably also in many oligarchies. It will be
noticed that in Aristotle's 'best State' the right of deciding questions of peace, war, and alliance would rest, not with the soldiers who would have to fight for the State in case of war, but with the older citizens (contrast the view of the young Archidamus in Isocr. Archid. § 3 sqq.), and that judicial authority, including no doubt the momentous right of inflicting the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation, would also rest with the older citizens. Aristotle evidently thinks that the prospect of succeeding to these great powers after the attainment of a certain age would reconcile the younger citizens to their non-possession of them. He appears to allow the younger citizens to be owners of land (c. 9. 1329 a 17 sqq.), and perhaps to hold all but the chief military offices. But they are to have nothing to do with deliberative or judicial functions. In this Aristotle would seem to go too far. The attainment of a certain age has often been made a condition of the tenure of the highest political offices. This was the case at Rome (Willems, Droit Public Romain, p. 242). Even restrictions of this kind would now and then exclude a William the Silent or a William Pitt. But it is one thing to impose a limit of age on the tenure of the highest offices and another to exclude the younger men from the exercise of all deliberative and judicial functions. How is the future statesman to learn his business, if his earlier career is to be exclusively devoted to the profession of arms, and he is not allowed to hold even minor civil offices? Aristotle is evidently too uncompromising, but we must bear in mind two things, if we wish to do him justice—(1) that he desires supreme authority in the State to be in the hands of those who are morally as well as politically ripe for its exercise; he desires Reason to rule in the State as it rules in the well-constituted individual; (2) that one of his aims is the limitation of war and of indiscriminate conquest, and that his exclusion of the more martially-disposed part of the citizen-body from supreme power in his 'best State' is closely connected with this aim. Nothing had done more to break up and weaken Greece in the fourth century B.C. than the incessant wars which had been waged between the various States—between the Lacedaemonians and the Thebans, the Thebans and the Phocians, the Thessalians of Pherae and the Thessalians of Larissa—and Aristotle may well have thought that the best way to check these wars was to place supreme power in the hands of the older citizens.
21. ἐπεὶ δὲ ὀσπερ κ.τ.λ., 'but since, as in the other things which are constituted according to nature, not all those things are parts of the whole organization without which the whole would not exist, it is evident that neither must all those things be taken to be parts of the State which must necessarily be possessed by States, nor must we take as parts of any other union issuing in something one in kind all the things which are essential to such an union.' As this sentence stands, the words τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συνεστῶτων would seem to be in the gen. after τῆς ὀλης συστάσεως, but it is probable that Aristotle began the sentence with the intention of making these words in the gen. after μόρια and inserted τῆς ὀλης συστάσεως only by an afterthought. For the thought, cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 2, τοῦτο γὰρ ἀλήθεια, ὥσπερ πάντας θετέων πολιτάς δὲ ἀνεύ οὐκ ἂν εἶναι πόλις, and for the distinction between ὧν ἄνευ and μέρη, cp. (with Eaton) Eth. Eud. i. 2. 1214 b 26, δὲν ἄνευ γὰρ οὐχ οἷών τε εὐδαίμονειν, ἦνοι μέρη τῆς εὐδαιμονίας εἶναι νομίζοντι. Plato had already drawn a similar distinction: cp. Polit. 287 D, ὅσα γὰρ σμικρῶν ἡ μέγα τι δημιουργοῦντα κατὰ πόλιν ὄργανον, θετέων ἄπασας ταῦτα ἡ οὐσία συναιστείσιν· ἄνευ γὰρ τούτων οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ γένοιτο πόλις οὐδὲ πολιτική, τούτων δὲ ἀδ ἑαυτής ἐργαν τέχνης οἰδέν ποι δήσομεν, and (with Eaton) Phaedo 99 B, and see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 331. i (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 360, note 1). Τὰ κατὰ φύσιν συνεστῶτα are so termed in contradistinction to τὰ ἀπὸ τέχνης and to τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης and ἀπὸ τάυταμάτου (De Part. An. i. 1. 640 a 27–b 4). They are things which have in them a principle of motion and rest, whether that motion takes the form of locomotion, or increase and decay, or alteration: cp. Phys. 2. 1. 192 b 8, τῶν ὄστων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν φύσει, τὰ δὲ δὲ ἄλλας αἰτίαις, φύσει μὲν τὰ τὰ ἐν αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ἀπλὰ τῶν σωμάτων, οἷον γῆ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ἀέρ καὶ ὕδωρ· ταύτα γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα φύσι παρεῖ. πάντα δὲ τὰ ῥήσεις φαινεῖ διαφεροντα πρὸς τὰ μὴ φύσει συνεστῶτα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ φύσει ὀντα πάντα φαίνεται ἑξωτε ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἄρχην κινῆσεως καὶ στάσεως, τὰ μὲν κατὰ τόπον, τὰ δὲ κατ’ αὐξήσιν καὶ φθοίριν, τὰ δὲ κατ’ ἀλλοίωσιν (whereas the products of art have no such principle of motion and rest in them, except accidentally, so far as they are formed of earth or stone or other natural entities). Some of these natural entities are eternal, others are subject to generation and decay (De Part. An. i. 5. 644 b 22 sqq.); some of them have bodies and magnitudes (for instance, the human body), others possess body and magnitude (for instance, a human being), others are principles within beings possessing
body and magnitude (for instance, the soul): cp. De Caelo, i. i. 268 a 4 sqq., and see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 384. 3 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 417, note 2). The σώλις, we learn from the passage before us, belongs to the class of natural entities; it must belong to the subdivision of this class which consists of 'things possessing body and magnitude.' As to the words οὐδ' ἄλλης κοινωνίας οὐδεμιάς, εἰ ήδ' εὖ τῷ γένος, see vol. i. p. 43, note i.

27. οὖν εἶτε τροφὴ κ.τ.λ. Food is the 'common thing' in the case of a συνσώτινος, a certain amount of land in the case of the owners of an undivided estate (2. 5. 1263 b 23 sq.).

28. δὲν δ' ἡ κ.τ.λ. That there is nothing in common between the craftsman who uses an instrument and the instrument used, we learn in Eth. Nic. 8. 13. 1161 a 32, ἐν οἷς γὰρ μηδὲν κοινὸν ἐστὶ τῷ ἄρχωντι καὶ τῷ ἄρχομενῳ, οὐδὲ φίλια' οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιον ἄλλ' οἷον τεχνίτης πρὸς ὄργανον καὶ ψυχῆς πρὸς σώμα καὶ δεσπότης πρὸς δοῦλον' ἀφελεῖται μὲν γὰρ πάντα τατά ὑπὸ τῶν χρωμένων, φιλία δ' οὐκ ἐστὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα οὐδὲ δίκαιον ἄλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς ἵππον ἢ βοῦν, οὐδὲ πρὸς δοῦλον ἢ δούλος' οὐδὲν γὰρ κοινὸν ἐστιν' ὅ γὰρ δοῦλος ἐμψυχοῦ ὄργανον, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ἄψυχος δοῦλος: cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 9. 1241 b 17-24 and 7. 10. 1242 a 11 sqq. A slightly different lesson is taught in the passage before us. Here we learn that there is nothing in common between the instrument and the craftsman on the one hand and the product they bring into being on the other, except this, that the instrument and the craftsman act and the product is acted upon. That where one thing acts and another is acted upon there must be something common to the two things, we see from De An. 3. 4. 429 b 22, ἀπορήσεις δ' ἀν τις, ἐλ οὐ νῦν ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπαθὴς καὶ μηδεὶς μηδὲν ἔχει κοινόν, ὡσπερ φησίν 'Αναξαγόρασ, πῶς νοήσει, ἐλ τὸ νοεῖν πάσχειν τῷ ἐστιν' ὅ γὰρ τῷ κοινῷ ἀμφότερον ὑπάρχει, τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν δοκεῖ τὸ δὲ πάσχειν. But two things thus related to each other need not have much in common: see vol. i. p. 323, note i. The usual antithesis to ποιεῖν is πάσχειν, not λαμβάνειν, but we find λαμβάνειν τὴν μορφήν contrasted with ποιεῖν in De Gen. An. i. 21. 729 b 6 sqq.: cp. also Hist. An. 6. 23. 577 a 29 sqq., where λαμβάνειν = ἔχεσθαι. In the passage before us the instrument and the craftsman who uses it are said ποιήσαι and the work produced by them λαβέιν.

34. οὖθεν δ' ἐστιν ἡ κτήσις μέρος τῆς πόλεως, because property stands to the πόλις as a means stands to the end to which it is a means, and thus there is nothing in common between property and the πόλις except that the former acts on the πόλις and the πόλις
is acted upon. It follows that slaves, who are animate articles of property—and χερνυτες, including βάναυσοι τεχνητοι, are brought under the head of slaves in 3. 4. 1277 a 37 sqq.—are not parts of the State. 'It was a maxim of ancient jurisprudence,’ says Gibbon (Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, c. 2), ‘that a slave had not any country of his own; he acquired with his liberty an admission into the political society of which his patron was a member.’ Contrast with οὖθεν β’ ἐστιν ἡ κτήσις μέρος τῆς πόλεως, Οεον. i. 1. 1343 a 10, πόλις μὲν οὖν οἰκίων πλῆθος ἐστὶ καὶ χώρας καὶ χρημάτων ἀνταρκτε πρὸς τὸ εὖ γεν.

35. ἡ δὲ πόλις κ. τ. λ. Τῶν ὁμολογ ἐστιν emphatic. Κοινωνία τις, because there are other κοινωνίαι τῶν ὁμολογ besides the πόλις, e.g. trading or religious associations. For the thought, cp. 6 (4). Ι. 1295 b 25, οὐλεται δὲ γε ἡ πόλις εὖ ἵσων εἶναι καὶ ὁμολογ ὅτι μίληστα. When Aristotle says in 2. 2. 1261 a 22, οὐ μόνον β’ ἐκ πλειώνων ἀνθρώπων ἐστιν ἡ πόλις, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἶ διεὶ διαφερόντων ὁ γὰρ γίνεται πόλις εὖ ὁμολογων, he is thinking of the distinction between rulers and ruled, so far as he is not using the word πόλις in a wider sense (see vol. i. p. 40).


38. τελεῖος is here the fem., as in Eth. Nic. 7. 14. Ι. 153 b 16, Metaph. Δ. 6. Ι. 1016 b 17, and Phys. 8. 8. 264 b 28. In c. Ι. 13. 1332 a 9 we have χρήσιν ἄρετῆς τελεῖαν, and the form τελεῖα seems to be the commoner form of the fem. in Aristotle’s writings, to judge by the Index Aristotelicus.

συμβεβηκε δὲ κ. τ. λ. Slaves have no share in happiness (3. 9. 1280 a 33). Βάναυσοι, ἄγοραι, and νεαροί live lives unfavourable to virtue (c. 9. 1328 b 40 sqq.), and so do not share in happiness. There are persons excluded from happiness on account of some defect of nature or fortune (c. 13. 1331 b 40 sq.). For συμβαίνων ὀστε, cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 34 sq. and 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 12.

40. δῆλον ὡς κ. τ. λ. For the various accounts given in the Politics of the causes of constitutional diversity, see vol. i. p. 220 sqq. For εἶδο καὶ διαφοράς, cp. Phys. 3. 5. 205 b 31, τόπον δὲ εἶδο καὶ διαφοραν τῶν καὶ κατοι ἐμπροσθέν καὶ ὄπισθέν καὶ δεξιών καὶ ἀριστερών.

41. ἀλλον γὰρ τρόπον κ. τ. λ. "Ἀλλον τρόπον is a wider expression than ὁ άλλος, which is added in explanation and to give increased precision to its meaning. Cp. c. Ι. 15. 1334 b 5, πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἑσται, and 3. 18. 1288 a 39. For τούς τε βίους καὶ τὰς πολιτείας, cp. 6 (4). Ι. 1295 a 40, ἡ γὰρ πολιτεία βίος τις ἐστι πόλεως. For the
middle ποιοῦνται, ‘make for themselves’ (not ποιοῦσιν), cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 31, συμμισέδηκε δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ποιεῖσθαί τὰς παθήσεις τέλος, and Meteor. i. 5. 342 b 22, τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ὑφαιμάτων ὡς τὰς γιοντὲς τάς φαντασίας.

2. καὶ πόσα κ.τ.λ., i.e. not only what the parts of the State are, 1328 b. but also how many are the things without which the State cannot exist. For the omission of the article before πόλις, cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 2, τοῦτο γὰρ ἀλληλες, ὡς οὐ πάντας θετέον πολίτας ὡς ἄνευ οὐκ ἂν εἰς πόλις, and 2. 1261 a 24, οὐ γὰρ γίνεται πόλις ἐξ ὁμοίων: also 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 34 sq.

4. ἐν τούτοις ἂν εἰς (8) ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν. See critical note.

5. τῶν ἐργῶν, ‘the services which a State needs’ (cp. 1328 b 19, ἐργασίας).

ἔστιν δὴλον, i.e. πόσα ταύτι ἐστὶν ἂν ἄνευ πόλις οὐκ ἂν εἰς.


καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς, ‘within their own body also,’ as well as in the hands of any mercenaries they may employ or any allies they may possess. Cp. Plato, Laws 697 E, where the misery of a State dependent for its defence on mercenaries is depicted, and Philoch. Fragm. 132 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 406), μὴ ἐξενείην ἄλλοι ʻαυτῶν ᾱθηραιών. Cp. also 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 6 sqq., and Thuc. i. 121, δάνεισμα γὰρ ποιησάμενα ὑπολαβεῖν οἷον τ' ἐσμὲν μισθὸ μείζον τους ἔξους αὐτῶν οικοβάτας: ὧν ἄρη ἄρη ᾱθηραιῶν ἤ δύναμις μᾶλλον ἤ οἰκεία.


10. χρημάτων πιναὶ εὐπορίαι, ‘a certain abundance of money,’ in contradistinction to εὐπορία τροφῆς, ὀργάνων, etc.

11. καὶ πρὸς πολεμικὰς. Schneider, Bekker², and Susemihl add τὰς before πολεμικὰς, but cp. c. ii. 1330 a 41, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν πρὸς τε τὰς πολεμικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικὰς καλὸς ἔχειν. ‘In the non-repetition of the article, and also of prepositions, Aristotle appears, if I do not mistake, to go further than other prose-writers’ (Vahlen, Beiträge zu Aristoteles Poetik, 3. 330).
NOTES.

12. καὶ πρῶτον, 'and first in excellence,' cp. Isocr. Areop. § 29, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὰ περὶ τούς θεοὺς, ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ἄρχεσθαι δίκαιον. Τὰ δαμόνων are placed first in the list of subjects of official competence given in 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 29 sqq. Cp. also 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 40, τίς πρώτης καὶ βεσοτάτης (πολιτεια), and Oecon. i. 5. 1344 a 23, τῶν δὲ κτημάτων πρῶτον μὲν καὶ ἀναγκαιότατον τὸ βελτιστὸν καὶ ἡγεμονικότατον· τούτο δ’ ἂν ἀνθρώπος.


15. μὲν οὖν is answered by δὲ, 24. Susemihl places in a parenthesis everything between ἡ γάρ, 16, and συμφερόντων, 23, but the parenthesis should stop at ταύτην, 19, for ἀνάγκη τούτων, 19, introduces an inference from 15, τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔργα ταῦτ’ ἐστὶν διὸ δεῖ τὰ πᾶσα πόλις ὡς εἰπεῖν.


19. κατὰ τὰς ἐργασίας ταύτας συνεστάναι πόλιν, 'should be composed in accordance with these industries': cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32, βούλεται γὰρ ἐκατέρα (i.e. ἀριστοκρατία καὶ βασιλεία) καὶ ἀρετὴν συνεστάναι κεχορηγημένη.

20. Aristotle forgets that herdsmen, fishermen, and hunters are also providers of food.

22. κριτᾶς τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ συμφερόντων. Lamb., followed by Bekk.² and Sus., reads δικαιῶν in place of ἀναγκαίων (cp. 14 sq.), but compare the passages collected in vol. i. p. 323, note 2, and also Polyena. Strateg. 6. 1. 5, ὡς συμβοῦλῳ χρησόμενος τῶν ἀναγκαίων τῆς ἀρχῆς, and Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 40, τούτου οὖν προσέχετε τὸν νοῦν, καὶ ἐὰν ἕμιν δόξη δίκαια τε καὶ συμφέροντα τῷ κοινῷ, προσβῆσω δ’ ὦτι καὶ ἀναγκαία, συγχωρήσατε ἕμιν αὐτῶν τυχεῖν ἐκώντες. Judges are probably included under κριτᾶς τῶν ἀναγκαίων, the broad term τὰ ἀναγκαία comprising τὰ δίκαια τὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

C. 9.

25. πάντων τούτων, sc. τῶν ἔργων.

ἐνδέχεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for it is possible that the same men should be all of them both cultivators and artisans and the deliberators and judges.’ Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 2 sqq.
27. ἡ καθ' ἐκαστὸν ἔργον τῶν εἰρημένων ἄλλους ὑποθέτον, 'or whether for each of the above-mentioned services we are to assume the existence of a separate class.' For καθ' ἐκαστὸν ἔργον τῶν εἰρημένων, not καθ' ἐκαστὸν τῶν εἰρημένων ἔργων, see note on 1283 b 4, καθ' ἐκάστην πολιτείαν τῶν εἰρημένων.

29. οὖκ ἐν πάσῃ δὲ ταύτῃ πολιτείᾳ, 'but the same arrangement does not prevail in every constitution.'


31. ταῦτα γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for these differing arrangements as to participation [besides being different themselves] also make constitutions different.' This proves their possibility. Cp. 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 3 sqq.

34. αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 2. 1324 a 23 sqq.

36. εἰρηται προτέρουν, in c. 1. 1323 b 29 sqq.

38. τῇ κεκτημένῃ δικαίοσ ἄνδρας ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, 'that which possesses men absolutely just and not merely just relatively to the principle which may happen to be taken as the groundwork of the State': cp. 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 3 sqq.: 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 36 sqq.: 2. 9. 1269 a 32 sqq. See also Bon. Ind. 797 a 52 sqq.

39. οὗτε βάναυσον βίον οὗτί ἄγοραῖον δεῖ ξῆν τοὺς πολίτας. Plato had already forbidden the citizens of the State of the Laws, or even their slaves, to practise a handicraft (846 D), and had forbidden the practice of retail trade with a view to money-making to any one except strangers (847 D: 849 C sqq.: 920 A). Thus he goes farther in this matter than Aristotle.

40. ἀγεννησθά λαρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 26 sqq., and (with Eaton) 1. 11. 1258 b 38, ἀγεννυσταται δεῖ (τῶν ἐργασιῶν) ὑπὸν ἑλάχιστον προσδεία ἀρετῆς.

πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὑπεναντίος. Plato (Laws 920 B) had reckoned retail trade among the ἐπιτηδευματα ἃ προτροπὴν ἔχει τινὰ ἴσχυρὰν πρὸς τὸ προτρέπειν κακοὺς γίγνεσθαι. He has in his mind not only the adulteration practised by retailers (Laws 917 E, 920 C), but also their habit of exacting an excessive profit (Laws 918 D, 920 C).


τοὺς μέλλοντας ἐσεθαι, sc. πολιτας. Omissions of this kind are not rare in the Politics: see vol. ii. p. li, note 4, and note on 1266 b 1.
NOTES.

1329 a. 1. dei γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For the connexion of leisure with virtue and capacity for rule, cp. 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 28, σχολαστικότεροι γὰρ γεγ
νόμενοι διὰ τὰς εὐπορίας καὶ μεγαλοπυχάτεροι πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν: 2. 11. 1273 a 24, ἀδύνατον γὰρ τῶν ἀπορούντα καλῶς ἄρχειν καὶ σχολάζειν: 2. 9. 1269 a 34 sqq. Compare also Eurip. Suppl. 406 Botho (420 Dind.), γαστόνοι δ' ἀνήρ πένης,
εἰ καὶ γένοντο μὴ ἀμαθῆς, ἔργαν ὑπὸ οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο πρὸς τὰ κοιν' ἀποβλέπειν.

4. καὶ μέρη φαίνεται τῆς πόλεως μάλιστα οἶντα, 'and evidently are in an especial sense parts of the State, [so that there is no question to be raised as to their citizenship, such as has been raised as to the citizenship of the βάπτασονς and γεωργοῖν].'

5. ἐτέρα καὶ ταῦτα θετέων. Susemihl, following Coray and Bekk., inserts ἐτέρους after ἐτέρα, but cp. c. 10. 1329 a 41, ὅτι δεὶ διηρήσαντι καρπὸς κατὰ γένετ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὸ τε μάχημον ἐτέρους εἶναι καὶ τὸ γεωργοῦν.

6. ἄμφω, sc. τὰ ἔργα, i.e. τὸ πολέμειν καὶ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ κρίνειν: cp. 8, ἐκάτερον τῶν ἔργων.

7. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ τούτο. It has already (1328 b 37) been said to be φανερὸν that the citizens must not be βάπτασοι or ἀγοραῖοι or γεωργοῖ.

διότι τρόπον μὲν τίνα κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 14. 1332 b 41, ἔστι μὲν ἅρα ὡς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι φατέον, ἔστι δὲ ὡς ἐτέρους. For καὶ before ἐτέρους, see above on 1324 a 19.

8. ἐτέρας ἀκμῆς, 'a different prime.' Warlike activity suits the prime of the body, which, according to Rhet. 2. 14. 1390 b 9 sqq., falls between thirty and thirty-five years of age, whereas deliberative and judicial activity suits the prime of the soul and the intelligence, which Aristotle places at forty-nine (ibid.) or fifty (Pol. 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 32 sqq.). Plato places the prime both of body and of wisdom for men between thirty and fifty-five years of age; he does not seem to have discriminated the two primes, like Aristotle: cp. Rep. 460 E, ἀμφοτέρων γονών, ἔφη, ἀτῆ ἀκμὴ σώματος τε καὶ φρονήσεως.


ἳ δὲ τῶν ἀδινάτων κ.τ.λ. Eaton compares Xen. Cyrop. 7. 5. 79 and Thuc. 3. 27. Cp. also Plut. Aristid. c. 22.


13. λειτεταὶ τοῖνυν κ.τ.λ., 'the only course left, then, is to assign these constitutional rights' (i.e. those of fighting, judging, and
deliberating) ‘to the same men and to both classes’ (i.e. both to those who have strength and to those who have wisdom), ‘not however simultaneously; but in the natural order of things strength is found in younger men and wisdom in older men; therefore it is advantageous that distribution should be made to both classes in this way’ (i.e. so that fighting should fall to the younger men, and deliberating and judging to the older men), ‘and it is just that this should be so, for this division of functions has in it conformity to desert.’ ‘Αποδιδόναι takes up τοὺς αὐτούς ἀποδοτινον ἄμφω, 6. For τὴν πολιτείαν ταύτην, see note on 1264 a 38. There is, however, just a possibility that πολιτείαν has been repeated from the preceding line by an error on the part of the copyist of the archetype and has taken the place of λειτουργίαν or τάξιν or some such word: cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 20, where πολιτείας, repeated from πολιτικῶν in the preceding line, has taken the place of βοηθείας in Π Μ8 and Vat. Pal. Vict. interprets τὴν πολιτείαν ταύτην ‘hanc curam in republica’ and Bonitz (Ind. 612 b 47 sq.) ‘hanc partem reipublicae adminstrandae.’ Sus. would substitute ἀμφότερα for ἀμφότεροις and ταύτα for ταύτην (Mr. Welldon follows him in the former change but not in the latter), and would make τὴν πολιτείαν (in the sense of ‘the best constitution’) the subject of ἀποδιδόναι. But perhaps no change in ἀμφότεροις is necessary. The reading ἀμφότεροις is supported by ἀμφότερι, 16. For ὠσπέρ πέφυκεν, cp. 3. 6. 1279 a 11, ἕ πέφυκεν, and Meteor. 2. 4. 360 b 2, ὡς πέφυκεν. For the addition of καὶ δίκαιον εἴου (sc. οὗτως), compare the addition of καὶ δίκαιων καὶ συμφέρων in 3. 17. 1287 b 37 sqq. and that of καὶ δίκαιον αὐτὸ καλεῖν in 1. 9. 1256 b 40. Welldon, however, may possibly be right in reading δίκαιον ἐστιν in place of δίκαιον εἴου (see critical note). In assigning strength to younger men and wisdom to older, Aristotle perhaps has before him Hom. Il. 13. 727-734, 19. 216-219, and 3. 108 sqq.: cp. also Eurip. Fragm. 293 and 511, and Aeschin. c. Timarch. cc. 24, 139. Wisdom was often ascribed not to πρεσβύτεροι, but to old men (e. g. by Pindar, Fragm. 182, cp. Plut. An Seni sit gerenda Respublica, c. 10, and Plato, Laws 653 A: by Sophocles, Fragm. 240, contrast Eurip. Fragm. 25: and by Euripides, Fragm. 622), but Aristotle ascribes it to πρεσβύτεροι. What exact age Aristotle designates by this word, it is difficult to say. In c. 16. 1335 b 29 (see note) those over fifty or even fifty-five years of age are referred to: on the other hand, in 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 23 oi πρεσβύτεροι are contrasted not with oi νεότεροι, but with
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ol néo. As the prime of the intelligence is placed by him at forty-nine or fifty (see above on 8), perhaps this is the age intended. Alcibiades was probably about thirty-five when he became the advocate of the Syracusan expedition. The saying of Eupolis in his Demi, μὴ παιδὶ τὰ κοινὰ (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 2. 467: cp. Meineke, Hist. Crit. Com. Gr. p. 128), was famous. Aristophanes makes the Athenian Demos say of the young men (Eq. 1382 Didot: cp. Isocr. Areop. § 45),

µὰ Δι', ἀλλ' ἀναγκάσω κυνηγετέων ἐγὼ τούτων ἄπαντας, πανσαμένους ψηφισμάτων.

In the Polity or moderate Democracy which existed at Syracuse before the Athenian attack, the younger men were excluded from office by law (Thuc. 6. 38. 5). We read in [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. 31, νόμος δὲ ἦν Ἀλκιδέως μὴ ἄρξαι μηδὲ προσβεύσαι νεώτερον εὑτὸν πεντήκοντα. A somewhat similar principle underlay the ordo magistratum at Rome. Alcibiades, on the other hand, contends in Thuc. 6. 18. 6 that deliberation is most likely to be successful when it is carried on by old and young men together: compare the arguments put in the mouth of the young Archidamus by Isocrates (Archid. § 3 sqq.).

17. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here passes on from the γεωργοῖ, τεχνίται, τὸ μάχημον, and the κραται τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ συμφερόντων (c. 8. 1328 b 20 sqq.) to τὸ εὑρέτου (1328 b 22), and in 1329 a 27 sqq. to οἱ ἀρείς. Περὶ τούτων corresponds to τούτων, 25 (Bon. Ind. 579 b 43 sqq.). By τούτων Aristotle means soldiers, judges, and deliberators (cp. c. 10. 1329 b 36 sqq.). I add εὑρεί with Bekk., Sus., and others, though its omission may possibly be defensible, cp. c. 10. 1330 a 25, where however there is an εὑρεί close at hand, and Rhet. 3. 12. 1414 a 18, τὸ δὲ προσδιαρείσθαι τὴν λέξιν, ὅτι ἡδεῖα δεῖ καὶ μεγαλοπρεπή, περίεργον, and see Vahlen on Poet. c. 24. 1459 b 7. Εὐστορία must be possessed by the citizens, for otherwise they will not be at leisure to attend to politics.

21. τῆς ἀρετῆς δημιουργὸν. This phrase comes from Plato, Rep. 500 D, ἄρα κακῶν δημιουργῶν αὐτὸν οὐ̂ς γενήσεσθαι σωφροσύνης τε καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἐμπάσης τῆς δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς; It is, however, implied in the saying of Protagoras in Plato, Protag. 326 E, τούτον τοῦ πράγματος, τῆς ἀρετῆς, εἰ μὴλλει πόλις εὑρεί, οὔδενα δεὶ ἰδιωτεύειν. Contrast the description of the χρηματιστής in Plato, Gorg. 452 C as πλούτον δημιουργός.

τοῦτο δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but this' (i.e. the fact that βάλαναν and generally
those who are not producers of virtue ought not to be citizens

'is manifest from the principle which forms the basis of our State, for happiness must be forthcoming in it in close alliance with virtue, and we should pronounce a State happy, looking not to a part of it, but to all its citizens, [so that all the citizens must be virtuous, whence it follows that βάναυσαν and their likes must not be citizens].'

In requiring that all the citizens shall be happy, Aristotle here goes beyond 2. 5. 1264 b 17 sqq., and in requiring that they shall all be virtuous beyond 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 36 sqq. For τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰδαμονεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχει μετὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς, cp. c. 9. 1328 b 35, τὴν δ' εἰδαμονεῖν ὅτι χωρὶς ἀρετῆς ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχει εἴρηται πρῶτερον, and Plato, Laws 742 E, σχεδὸν μὲν γὰρ εἰδαμονεῖν ἀρα καὶ ἀγαθόν ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι.

25. φανερὸν δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and this also is evident that the landed properties should belong to these' (i.e. to the soldiers, judges, and deliberators), 'if, as is the case,' etc. The landed properties might have been given to the cultivators (to whom Plato had given them in the Republic, 2. 5. 1264 a 32 sqq.), if it were not necessary that they should be slaves or barbarian serfs.


30. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The reasoning is—the gods should be worshipped by citizens, but we have ranged all the active citizens either in the hoplite or in the deliberative class (Aristotle here appears to merge the judicial in the deliberative class: cp. 1328 b 26, τοῖς βουλευόμενοις καὶ δικαζοντας, and 1329 a 3 sq.), so that we must assign the priesthoods to those of the citizens who are past the age for work. Citizens who are past work are still πως πολίται (3. 1. 1275 a 14 sqq.). Aristotle thinks it fitting that the easy and recreative work of paying honour to the gods should fall, not, as was often the case in Greece, to those whose strength was unimpaired, but to those who had become infirm through age (cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 20 sqq., where easy harmonies are recommended to οἱ ἀπειρηκτες διὰ χρόνων). Plato, on the contrary, had advised (Rep. 498 C sqq.) that in old age, when strength declines and military and political work is over, men who are to be happy should reserve themselves exclusively for philosophy. See also on this subject
vol. i. p. 329 sq. At Sparta men of advanced years were allowed to discharge important public functions (2. 9. 1270 b 38 sqq.), and this Aristotle does not approve. He does not intend to withdraw from the βασιλεῖς, ἄρχοντες, οἱ πρωτόιεις the public sacrifices connected with the common hearth of the State which it was their function to offer (8 (6). 8. 1322 b 26 sqq.). These were not priestly sacrifices, and it is of priests alone that Aristotle is speaking in the passage before us. 'Ἀνάπαυσις is rather ‘relaxation’ than ‘repose’: cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 15 sqq. For the connexion of the worship of the gods, cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 24, τιμὰς ἀπονε-μοντες τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀναπαύσεις πορίζοντες μὲθ' ἥδονής, and Plato, Rep. 364 E (where Stallbaum compares Hdt. 8. 99, ἐν δυναστὶ τε καὶ εὐπαθίσας, and 9. 11, 'Ακεύθω τε ἄγετε καὶ παιζέτε), and Laws 803 D sq.

34. ὡν μὲν τοῖνυν ... 1329 b 35, ζητεῖν. I incline to regard this passage as an interpolation and as not being from the pen of Aristotle. As to 40, ἔοικε δὲ ... 1329 b 35, ζητεῖν, I have already spoken in vol. i. Appendix E, and if we reject this passage, as we should probably do, it is difficult to retain the recapitulation, 34, ὡν μὲν τοῖνυν ... 39, κατὰ μέρος. For this recapitulation cannot have been immediately followed by the second recapitulation 1329 b 36, ὃς μὲν οὖν ... 39, χώραν, and to expunge (with Sus.) this second recapitulation is not advisable, for then the mention of τῆς διανομῆς in 39 becomes extremely abrupt, inasmuch as the reference to the territory which prepares the way for it in the text as it stands will have disappeared. The passage 40, ἔοικε δὲ ... 1329 b 35, ζητεῖν appears still more clearly to have been interpolated. It may have been originally an annotation written by some member of the Peripatetic School on the margin of his copy of the Politics, and may have crept from the margin into the text. It is apparently intended to excuse and account for the absence of a special investigation of the question whether the fighting class should be distinct from the cultivating class. Thus we are told at its close (1329 b 33 sqq.) that it is useless to waste time in investigating what is well settled, and that one should investigate only what has been overlooked. It should be noticed that it says nothing of the existence in India both of castes and of a distinction between the fighting and cultivating classes, though Megasthenes, not very long after the time when the Politics was written, testified to this (ap. Strab. p. 703, φησὶ δὴ (ὁ Μεγασθένης) το τῶν Ἰνδῶν πλῆθος εἰς ἑπτὰ μέρη

διηρήσθαι κ.τ.λ.), but it would be rash to conclude that, if the passage is an interpolation, its author wrote before the publication of Megasthenes’ work. That it stood where it stands in the days of the authority followed by Stobaeus in his account (Ecl. 2. 6. 17) of the Political Theory of the Peripatetics is likely, for he says of the distribution of functions between the young, the elders, and the old, ταύτην δ’ ἄρχαιαν εἶναι πάνυ τὴν διάταξιν, Λεγεπτίων πρῶτων καταστησάμενοι, πολιτικῶν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἷς ἦττον, which evidently refers, however inaccurately, to the views expressed in this part of c. 10. The late Prof. Chandler and Bojesen, indeed, contented themselves with rejecting only a part of the passage 1329 a 40... b 35; the former rejected 1329 b 3, τά τε περὶ τὴν Κρήτην... 25, Σεσώστριος, and the latter 1329 b 5, ἄρχαια... 25, Σεσώστριος. The part they reject is certainly the most evidently spurious part, but much suspicion also attaches to the part which they retain, 1329 b 25–35 (see vol. i. Appendix E), and on the whole I inclined to reject the entire passage 1329 a 40–b 35, together with the recapitulation which precedes it, 1329 a 34–39.

35. γεωργοὶ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., ‘for cultivators and artizans and the whole class of labourers are a necessary appurtenance of the State’: compare for the construction c. 10. 1330 a 3, περὶ συσσίαι τε συνδοκεῖ πᾶσι χρήσιμον εἶναι (sc. τὰ συσσίαι) ταῖς εἴ κατασκευασμέναι πόλεως ὑπάρχειν, and 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 7, δ’ τούτων οὖσών ἢττον ἡστιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, and see Stallbaum on Plato, Laws 643 C, ὅσα ἀναγκαία προμεμβαθήκειν.

37. τὸ τε ὀπλιτικὸν καὶ βουλευτικὸν. For the absence of the article before βουλευτικὸν, cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 8, τί τὸ δίκαιον τὸ τε ὀλγαρχικὸν καὶ δημοκρατικὸν.

38. καὶ κεχώρισται δὴ κ.τ.λ. For καὶ... δὴ see above on 1253 a 18. Κατὰ μέρος, Vict. ‘per vices,’ i.e. in such a way that the one succeeds the other.

40. Ἑοῖκε δὲ κ.τ.λ. As has been pointed out in vol. i. C. 10. Appendix E, Greek writers are always glad to claim the authority of antiquity in support of their suggestions. Reference has already there been made to Demosth. in Lept. c. 89: compare also Lucian, De Saltat. c. 7, καὶ πρῶτον γε ἐκείνῳ πάντων ἡγησιέραι μοι δοκεῖ, ως οὐ νεώτερον τὸ τῆς ὀρχήσεως ἐπιτήδειμα τοῦτο ἔστιν, οὐδὲ χρίσει καὶ πρῶην ἀρξάμενον, οἷον κατὰ τοὺς προπάτορας ἡμῶν ἢ τοὺς ἑκείνους, ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. Isocrates says (De Antid. § 82) that the most ancient laws were
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thought the best. For τῶς περὶ πολιτείας φιλοσοφοῦσιν cp. 3. 1.
1274 b 32, τῷ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦντι. Διηρήσθαι χωρίς, 41,
appears to take up κεχώρισται, 38. For διηρήσθαι χωρίς κατὰ γένη cp.
1329 b 23, ὁ χωρίσμος ὁ κατὰ γένος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλῆθους. States
were also divided κατὰ συνστίτια and κατὰ φρατρίας καὶ φυλᾶς (2. 5.
1264 a 6 sqq.).

1329 b. 2. ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ τε γάρ κ.τ.λ. In Egypt there was a general
distribution of the population into γένη (Hdt. 2. 164, where,
however, the γεωργοὶ are not mentioned as one of the γένη: contrast
Diod. 1. 73 sq., where the classes enumerated are priests, kings,
wars, herders, means, cultivators, and artisans). Herodotus dwells
rather on the prohibition of βάναυσοι τέχναι to the warrior class in
Egypt than on the prohibition of agriculture (2. 165, καὶ τοῦτων
βάναυσοις οὐδεὶς δεδάπηκε οὐδὲν, ἀλλ’ ἀνέσταται ἐς τὸ μάχημαν), and so do
Isocrates (Busir. § 18) and Plutarch (Lycurg. c. 4 sub ñ., but
Plato in Tim. 24 B refers to the separation of the warrior class in
Egypt from the herdsman, hunters, and cultivators. The names of
Sesostris and Minos are mentioned in the passage before us to
show the antiquity of this institution in Egypt and Crete. The
separation of the warriors from those who practise other arts is
ascribed by Isocrates (Busir. § 15 sqq.) not to Sesostris, but to Busiris;
‘legislation respecting the warrior class,’ however, is ascribed by
Diodorus (1. 94. 4) to Sesoosis (Sesostris), whom he calls the third
lawgiver of Egypt, and Dicaearchus (Fragm. 7: Müller, Fr. Hist.
Gr. 2. 235) credits him with a law making all arts hereditary.
The passage before us evidently implies that the distinction
between warriors and cultivators survived in Egypt even in the
writer’s day, i.e. that the cultivators did not serve as soldiers, nor
the soldiers as cultivators.

5. ἀρχαῖα δὲ κ.τ.λ. With the object of proving that political insti-
tutions and laws are of early date (cp. 31 sqq.), the writer instances
another institution, that of the syssitia. Compare the similar transition
from the subject of the distinction of warriors and cultivators to
that of syssitia in 2. 10. 1271 b 41 sqq.

6. τὰ μὲν περὶ Κρήτην, sc. συνστίτια, in apposition to τῶν συνστιτίων
ἡ τάξις.

7. τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν πολλῷ παλαιότερα τούτων. This results
from the fact that in Italy syssitia were as old as the introduction of
the names ‘Italy’ and ‘Italians’ and the conversion of the Italians
from nomads into cultivators.
8. φασὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Antiocbus of Syracuse is probably referred to, for the facts here related are derived from him: cp. Antiocch. Fragm. 3 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 181), "'Αντίοχος Ιεροφάνεος τάδε συνέγραψε περὶ Ἰταλίας ... τὴν γῆν ταύτην, ἣν τῶν Ἰταλία καλεῖται, τὸ παλαιὸν ἕιχον Οἰνωπροῖ." "Επεί τα διεξελθὼν διὰ τρόπον ἐπολιτευόντο καὶ ὡς βασιλεύς ἐν αὐτῶν Ἰταλός ἀνά χρόνον ἐγένετο, αὕτη δὲ μετωνομάσθησαν Ἰταλοὶ, κ.τ.λ.: Fragm. 4. 'Ιταλία δὲ ἀνὰ χρόνων ὄνομάσθη ἐπὶ ἄνδρος δυνατοῦ, ὄνομα Ἰταλοῦ. Τούτον δὲ φησιν 'Αντίοχος οὐ παρακούσιοι ... ἀπασαν ὡς ἑαυτῷ ποιόσασθαι τὴν γῆν, δότῃ ἐν τῶν κόλπων τοῦ τε Ναπητίνου καὶ τοῦ Σκυλλητίνου ἕν δὴ πρότερν κληθησάν 'Ιταλίαν ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἰταλοῦ: and Fragm. 6. ἔτι δ' ἀνώτερον ('ἀπὸ υπερτυχοῦτ') Οἰνωπροὺ τε καὶ Ἰταλοῦς μόνους ἐφ' ἱκετεύσαι τοὺς ἐντὸς τοῦ ἱσθμοῦ πρὸς τῶν Σικελίκων κεκλιμένους πορεμόν. "Εστι δ' αὐτὸς ὁ ἱσθμὸς ἐκατον καὶ ἐξήκοντα στάδια, μεταξὺ δύον κόλπων, τοῦ τε Ἰπποναύτου, ἢ 'Αντίοχος Ναπητίνου εἰρήκε, καὶ τοῦ Σκυλλητικοῦ. Compare also Virgil, Aen. i. 532 sq. The origin of syssitia is here traced to the territory in which the Epizephyrian Locri was situated, and not to Crete, in much the same way in which the Locrian Onomacritus was made out by some authorities (2. 12. 1274 a 25 sqq.) to have been the spiritual progenitor of a number of great lawgivers.

11. ἀκτῆν, 'peninsula': cp. Dio Chrys. Or. 6. 198 R, περιέχεσθαι τε διάγων πάσαν αὐτὴν (i.e. τὴν 'Ἀττικήν) ὑπὸ τῆς θαλάττης' οὔθεν δὴ καὶ τούνομα λαβεῖν, οὐδ' ἀκτῆν των ὀδον. 'Ιταλίαν τούνομα λαβεῖν. The name taken is put in the acc.: cp. Aristoph. Fragm. 304 Didot, "Λμφοδών ἐχρήν αὐτῶ τεθείσαν τούνομα. 12. ἐντός κ.τ.λ. The peninsula is apparently reckoned from its point, so that the territory lying between the point and the two gulfs is said to be within them, and the territory lying beyond the two gulfs, looking from the point, is implied to be outside them.

τοῦ Λαμητικοῦ. Antiocbus called this gulf, the modern gulf of S. Eufemia, by the name Ναπητίνου or Ναπητίνος, a name the origin of which is uncertain; how it comes to be called Λαμητικός in the passage before us, which is based on Antiocbus, is not clear. The name Λαμητικός is derived from that of a city called Lametini, probably situated on the shore of the gulf of S. Eufemia and near the stream which still bears the name of Lamato (the ancient Lamētus). See Dict. of Greek and Roman Geography, art. Lametini and art. Napetinus Sinus.

13. ἀπέχει γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for these two gulfs are distant from each other [only] half a day's journey.' For the omission of 'only' see VOL. III.
note on 1282 a 36. The near approach of the two gulfs to each other is mentioned in justification of the description of Italy as lying ‘within’ them. They were 160 stadia, or about eighteen miles, apart (see above on 8), hence a day’s journey is calculated here at thirty-six miles.

14. τούτων δη κ.τ.λ. Italus is probably regarded as the first lawgiver of the Oenotrians, and if this is so, the introduction of legislation among them is connected with the change from a pastoral to an agricultural life: see Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, Eng. Trans., i. 21, and cp. Plut. De Iside et Osiride, c. 13, Basileiouna δ’ ὁσιρων Ἀλγυπτίους μὲν εὐθὺς ἀπόρου βίου καὶ θηριώδους ἀπαλλάξας, καρποὺς τε δείξαντα καὶ νόμους βέμουν αὐτοῖς, καὶ θεοὺς δείξαντα τιμὰν, and Ovid, Metam. 5. 341,

Prima Ceres unco glebas dimovit aratro,
Prima dedit fruges alimentaque mitia terris,
Prima dedit leges.

Janus takes the place of Italus in Plut. Quaest. Rom. c. 22, ἡ μάλλον ὅτι τοὺς περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν αὐτὸς ἀγρίως καὶ ἀνόμως χρωμένως ἤθεσιν εἰς ἔτερον βίον σχῆμα, πείσας καὶ γεωργείων καὶ πολιτεύσαθαι, μετέβαλε καὶ μετεκόψατος; Compare the language of Strabo as to Masinissa (p. 833), καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ὠφέτος ἐστιν ὁ τοῦ νομάδας πολιτικοὺς κατασκευάσας καὶ γεωργοῦσ, ἕτερον αὐτὸ τοῦ ληστεύειν διδάξας στρατεύειν. Syssitia (σύστο, ‘corn’) are probably conceived as connected with agriculture. For τούτων δη τῶν Ἰταλῶν Eucken (De Partic. Usu, p. 39) compares 1. 6. 1255 a 7, τούτω δὴ τὸ δίκαυον. Δὴ introduces in both passages a statement about the person or thing which has been described in what precedes. We expect δείχνει rather than δείκνυαι, but cp. 3. 13. 1283 b 38.

16. διό κ.τ.λ. On the resemblance of this passage to 2. 10. 1271 b 30 sqq., see vol. i. p. 575, note 2. The continued existence of the institution and of certain of the laws of Italus among some of his descendants is apparently mentioned in confirmation of the statement that he introduced the syssitia and was the author of other laws also.

18. φικου̂ς δὲ κ.τ.λ. It would seem that the whole region from the Lametic Gulf to Tyrrhenia (i.e. Latium Campania and Lucania) is here conceived as inhabited by Opici surnamed Ausones. That Aristotle included Latium in Opica we see from Fragm. 567. 1571 a 24 sq. Campania, according to Antiochus of Syracuse, was inhabited by ‘Opici, who were also called Ausones’ (Fragm. 8:
Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 183). But we do not find that Lucania is elsewhere said to be inhabited by Opici surnamed Ausones, or indeed by Opici of any kind. Herodotus regards Elea, which was in the region ultimately known as Lucania, as in Oenotria, not in Opica (i. 167).


τὸν ἵόνιον, sc. κόλπον, cp. 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 11, and see Liddell and Scott.

23. ὅ δὲ χρησιμος κ.τ.λ. The Egyptians, according to Plut. Lycurg. c. 4, claimed that Lycurgus visited Egypt and borrowed there the separation of the warriors from the other classes which he introduced at Sparta, and Isocrates in his Busiris (§ 17 sq.) traces this and other Lacedaemonian institutions to Egypt: cp. Pherecr. "Ἀγροι, Fragm. 5 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 257), where Lycurgus is connected with Egypt. Aristotle, however, in 2. 10. 1271 b 22 sqq., like the Lacedaemonians themselves (see above on 1271 b 22), traces the laws of Lycurgus to Crete.

24. πολὺ γὰρ ὑπερτείνει κ.τ.λ. According to Dicaearchus, Fragm. 7 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 235), Sesostris was king of Egypt immediately after Orus, the son of Osiris and Isis, and lived 2936 years before the first Olympiad. Herodotus, however, would seem to place Sesostris much later. Camerarius remarks (Interp. p. 298), 'quod quidem nunc ait autor, regnum Sesostris longe superare annis regnum Minois, cum narratione Herodoti non videtur congruere. Hic enim' (2. 112 sqq.) 'Proteum regem Aegypti facit tertium a Sesostris, cuius regnum inciderit in tempus belli Troiani. Et in exercitu Graecorum illius belli fuit secundum Homerus' (Odys. 19. 178 sqq.) 'Idomeneus et ipse tertius a Minoe, ut paeneaeque ita reperiantur Sesostris et Minos; hoc modo, Sesostris, Pherson, Proteus, et Minos, Deucalion, Idomeneus.'

25. σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The sense is—'So then, just as we have seen that syssitia were invented first in Italy and afterwards in Crete, and the division of the population into different classes first in Egypt and afterwards in Crete, we may take it that all other discoveries have been made over and over again an indefinite number of times—for discovery comes easily to men, need reveal-
ing discoveries of a necessary kind, and others following in due course—and this holds of political institutions as fully as of anything else; but that all political institutions are ancient, [which is what concerns us now,] is proved by the example of Egypt.' The view that everything has been invented over and over again is quite Aristotelian: cp. Metaph. A. 8. 1074 b 10, κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς πολλάκις εὐρημένης εἰς τὸ δυνάμεν ἐκάστῃ καὶ τέχνῃ καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ πάλιν φθειρομένων: De Caelo, i. 3. 270 b 19, οὗ γὰρ ἂπαξ οὐδὲ διὰ ἄλλα ἀπειράκεις δεῖ νομίζειν τὰς αὐτὰς ἀφικνεῖσθαι δόξας εἰς ἡμᾶς: Meteor. i. 3. 339 b 27 sqq. This view may have been suggested by the fact that the inventions which were ascribed to Palamedes, Orpheus, and others were ascribed in Egypt to far earlier inventors, so that it was natural to suppose that in the interval between the Egyptian inventors and Palamedes and the rest the arts invented by the former had been lost. It is likely enough that arts have been lost and rediscovered. A writer in the Times of Sept. 27, 1886, remarks of some 'glazed bricks' of the time of Rameses II from Tel-el-Jahûdi, now in the British Museum, 'Historians of Italian art speak of the "discovery" of Luca della Robbia; here is the faïence decoration in the highest state of excellence more than 2,700 years before he was born.' For ἐν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ, cp. 2. 5. 1264 a 1 sqq. Aristotle believed that the human race had existed from everlasting (see note on 1269 a 5). For the contrast of τὰ ἀναγκαῖα and τὰ εἰς εὐαχριστήμων καὶ περιουσίαν, Camerarius (Interp. p. 298) compares Top. 3. 2. 118 A 6, καὶ τὰ ἐκ περιουσίας τῶν ἀναγκαίων βελτίω, ενίοτε δὲ καὶ αἱρετώτερα βελτίων γὰρ τοῦ ζήν τὸ εὖ ζήν, τὸ δὲ εὖ ζήν ἐστὶν ἐκ περιουσίας, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαῖον . . . τὸ δὲ ἐκ περιουσίας ἐστὶν, ὅταν ὑπάρχοντων τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἄλλα τωδὲ προσκατα- σκευάζεται τις τῶν κολῶν: cp. also 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 2 sqq. For τὸν χρείαν διδάσκειν αὐτόν, cp. Eurip. Fragm. 709 (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 729),

οὐ τὰρ ὁθονετές ἐστών αἰμόλος μόνος
χρεία διδάσκει, κἂν βραδὺς τις ἤ, σοφὸν,

and Leutsch and Schneidewin, 2. 203,

πολλὼν ὁ λιμὸς γίνεται διδασκαλος.

That necessary things are discovered first had already been implied by Democritus (see vol. i. p. 356, note 1).

31. δι’ δὲ πάντα ἀρχαία κ.τ.λ. The argument is—'we might expect the Egyptians, who are thought to be the most ancient race in the world, to have come into existence before laws and
constitutions were invented, in which case we should find them lacking these still, but the fact is quite otherwise; hence laws and institutions must be of very ancient origin.' Thus the statement with which the passage commences as to the antiquity of the distinction between the fighting and cultivating classes is fully borne out. In the reference to the Egyptians it is evidently assumed with much naively that as a race is when it first comes into being, so it will remain. Bernays (Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit, p. 169) and Susemihl would insert ἄει after τετυχὴς-κατι, but in my opinion without necessity. We are familiar with the belief that the Egyptian race was the most ancient in the world from the well-known story in Hdt. 2. 2. There was a general agreement as to the fact, though some claimed priority for the Phrygians (ibid.) or the Scythians (Justin, 2. i. 5 sqq.) and Aristotle himself for the Magi (Diog. Laert. 1. 8), but there was much disagreement as to the cause. For one theory, see Hippys of Rhegium, Fragm. 1 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 13), Diod. 1. 10. i, and Justin, 2. i. 5 sqq. Aristotle's own theory may be gathered from Meteor. 1. 14. 352 b 20 sqq. The priests of Sais in the Timaeus of Plato (22 C sqq.) assign a different cause.

33. διὸ δὲι κ.τ.λ., 'hence we should make use of what has been adequately said [without spending time on its further investigation], and attempt to investigate [only] what has been left untouched': cp. c. i. 1323 a 21 sqq.: Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1181 b 12 sqq.: Isocr. Ad Nicocl. § 8, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τὸ γε ἐπιχείρημα καλὸς ἔχει, τὸ ἐγκεν τὰ παραλειμμένα και νομοθετεῖν ταῖς μοναρχίαις. I follow Sepulveda, Vict., and Lamb. in taking ἰκανὸς with τοῖς εἰρημένοις, and not (as do Sus. and Weldon) with χρησθαι: cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 3. 1096 a 3, ἰκανὸς γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις εἰρήται περὶ αὐτῶν, and Pol. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 10, διόπερ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ κομψός τούτῳ, οὐδὲ ἰκανὸς δὲ εἰρήται. Looking to these passages and to the very similar passage c. i. 1323 a 21 sqq., I incline on the whole to retain the reading of ΓΠ εἰρημένους, and not (with Lamb., Bekk., and Sus.) to substitute εἰρημένους for it, though c. 11. 1331 a 16 might be quoted in favour of this reading. It is true also that the antithesis to παραλειμμένα is often εἰρημένα (e.g. in Soph. El. 33. 184 b 6 sqq. and Demosth. De Symmor. c. 23: cp. Pol. 4 (7). 11. 1331 a 15 sqq.), but this is not always the case, as we see from Isocr. Hel. § 67, πολὺ δὲ πλείω τὰ παραλειμμένα τῶν εἰρημένων ἐστίν. For the suppression of 'only,' see above on 1329 b 13 and 1282 a 36.
36. τῶν ὑπλα κεκτημένων. For the absence of τά before ὑπλα, cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 29, peri τοῦ ὑπλα κεκτήσθαι, and see critical note on 1267 b 33. As to the distinction here implied between the hoplites and those who share in the constitution, see vol. i. p. 324 and note i on that page.

37. εἰρηται πρότερον, in c. 9. 1329 a 17 sqq.

38. αὐτῶν ἐτέρους, ‘distinct from them’: cp. c. 12. 1331 b 1 and Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1173 b 28, ἔτερα γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν (ἡδοναί) τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν.

40. τίνας καὶ ποίους. The answer to τίναs (given in 1330 a 25 sqq.) is ‘slaves or non-Greek serfs,’ and to ποίουs (ibid.) is ‘not of one race nor spirited in character.’

41. πρῶτον. Aristotle afterwards deals with the site of the city.

φαμεν, in 2. 5. 1263 a 37 sqq. That no citizen should want for food, is implied in 1263 a 21 sqq.: see above on 1263 a 24.

1330 a. 1. For the reference here to Plato as τινές, see above on 1327 b 38. Lycurgus (In Leocr. cc. 92 and 132) carries this use of τινές so far as to say that τινές wrote this or that passage of verse which he quotes (Richards).

ἀλλὰ τῇ χρήσει φιλικῶς γινομένην κουῆν, sc. εἶναι δεῖν. Φιλικός qualifies κουῆν, ‘common in friendly fashion,’ ‘common as the goods of friends are common’: cp. 2. 5. 1263 a 29, δι’ ἀρετὴν δ’ ἐσται πρὸς τὸ χρήσθαι κατὰ τὴν παρομοίαν κοινὰ τὰ φιλαί. Γινομένης = ποιομένην : cp. 2. 5. 1263 a 37, φανερῶν τοῖνυν ὅτι βέλτιον εἶναι μὲν ὅμοια τὰς κτήσεις, τῇ δὲ χρήσει ποιεῖν κοινά. For εἶναι γινομένην, cp. Hdt. 1. 140, ταῦτα δὲ ἡν γινομένα ἐν Μιλῆτῳ, and Plato, Polit. 301 D, and see above on 1259 b 11. Sus. and Welldon adopt Congreve’s conjecture of γινομένη for γινομένη (Sus. adding γίνοσθαι after γινομένη), but, as it seems to me, not rightly.

2. οὗτ’ ἀπορεῖν κ.τ.λ. As to the importance of this, see Isocr. Areop. §§ 53, 83, and Plato, Laws 735 E.

3. peri συσσετῶν τε κ.τ.λ., ‘and with regard to common meals, all agree that they are an useful thing to belong to well-constituted States.’ For the construction, compare c. 9. 1339 a 35 sqq. Aristotle passes on to the subject of common meals, because, like the friendly community of property which he has just recommended, they are a means of securing the citizens against a want of food. It was also necessary to settle the question of their existence before proceeding to the division of the territory, inasmuch as a portion of the territory is to be set apart for their support. Aristotle
nowhere fulfils, in what we possess of the Politics, the promise which he makes in 4, so that we can only guess why he approved of the institution. He probably valued it as a means of regulating habits of life and of enforcing the ‘temperate and liberal’ standard which he commends (c. 5. 1326 b 30 sq.), as a means of making an approach to community of property (2. 5. 1263 b 40 sq.), and also as a means of developing a high spirit and mutual confidence in his citizens and securing their acquaintance with each other (7 (5). 11. 1313 a 41 sqq.). See vol. i. p. 333 sq. For an account of the purpose for which, according to Plato, the institution was originally introduced, see Laws 780 B sq.

5. δει δὲ κ. τ. λ. All the citizens ought to share in the common meals, and not, as at Sparta, that portion only of them which could afford to pay a contribution. See 2. 9. 1271 a 26 sqq. and 2. 10. 1272 a 12 sqq. Aristotle appears here to contemplate the existence of ἄποροι in his ‘best State.’ Τὸ συντεταγμένον, ‘the assessed sum’ (Liddell and Scott).

7. καὶ διοικεῖν τὴν ἄλλην οἰκίαν, ‘to manage the rest of the housekeeping.’ For τὴν ἄλλην οἰκίαν, cp. c. 17. 1336 a 40 sq. and Plato, Rep. 458 D, καὶ ἐν γυμνασίοις καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ προφήτῃ.

8. τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς διαπανήματα, ‘expenses in relation to the gods,’ cp. 12, τὰς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς λειτουργίας, and 2. 8. 1267 b 34 sq.

9. ἀναγκαῖον τοῦν κ. τ. λ. As Aristotle’s principle seems to be that expenses which fall on all the citizens should be provided for by public land set apart for the purpose, we might have expected him to have gone farther in this direction, and (e. g.) to have set apart public land to defray the expenses of the public education which the citizens are to receive (5 (8). 1. 1337 a 21 sqq.). As to the public land in Greek States, see Büchsenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 63 sq. Aristotle does not, like Hippodamus (2. 8. 1267 b 33 sqq.), divide the territory of his State into three parts—sacred, public, and private—but only into two, public and private. He devotes a part of the public land to expenses connected with the gods, i. e. to the provision of sacrifices, repairs of temples, and perhaps also liturgies connected with festivals.

14. τῆς δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν κ. τ. λ. Aristotle follows in the track of Plato, Laws 745 C, κλήρους δὲ διελείπει τεταράκοντα καὶ πεντακισχίλιους, τούτων τε αὖ δίχα τεμείων ἐκαστον καὶ ἐνυκληρώσαι δύο τριμήματα, τοῦ τε ἐγγού καὶ τοῦ πόρῳ μετέχοντα ἐκάτερον το πρὸς τῇ πόλει μέρος τῷ πρὸς τοὺς ἑσχάτους εἰς κλήρους καὶ τὸ δεύτερον ἀπὸ πόλεως τῷ ἀπ’ ἑσχάτων δευτέρω
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καὶ τὰλλα οὕτω πάντα. (Compare the process by which lots of land are assigned to the peasants of a Russian commune, as described by M. Leroy-Beaulieu in Revue des Deux Mondes, Nov. 15, 1876, ‘Chaque paysan reçoit une parcelle d’autant de sortes de terrain qu’il y a de qualités de terre dans la commune.’ ‘Quand les terres seraient tous de même qualité . . . l’inégaie distance du village leur donne encore pour le paysan une inégaie valeur.’) Aristotle, however, does not approve (2. 6. 1265 b 24 sqq.) Plato’s further suggestion (Laws 745 E) of two houses: see above on 1265 b 25. But would not the cultivation of two lots of land at a distance from each other be almost as troublesome as living in two houses? The reason for the arrangement which Aristotle follows Plato in adopting is obvious enough. Land near the city was probably as a rule far more valuable in ancient Greece than land at a distance from it. It was land in this situation that rich men were most likely to buy up (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 8 sqq.). Cp. Xen. De Vect. 4. 50, καὶ οἱ γε χάρῳ οὖδὲν ἐν εἰς μείζους ἄξοι τοῖς κεκτημένοις ἑωταῖθα (at Laurium in Attica) ἕ τοις περὶ τὸ ἄστιν, and Hdt. 6. 20, τῆς δὲ Μιλησίης χώρης αὐτοῖ μὲν οἱ Πέρσαι εἰχον τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὸ πεδίον, τὰ δὲ ὑπεράκμα ἔδοσαν Καρσί Πηδασείσι ἐκτήσταται. So on the foundation of the colony of Thurii οἱ προϋπάρχοντες Συβαρίται . . . τὴν μὲν συνεγγυς τῇ πόλει χώραν κατεκληρούχοιν ἔαντοις, τὴν δὲ πορρω κειμίνην τοῖς ἐπήλυσι (Diod. 12. 11. 1). The owners of land near the city would not only be better able than others to take an active part in politics and be nearer to the conveniences and the handicraftsmen of the city, but would also command a better market for their produce, and would be less exposed to attack in case of invasion. Frontier-landowners, on the contrary, were the first to suffer in that event. Thus the Lacedaemonian owners of frontier-land suffered so much from the Messenians in Eira during the Second Messenian War that civil trouble resulted (Paus. 4. 18. 1: see note on 1306 b 37). Compare the case of the citizens of Corinth who owned the fertile and extensive frontier-plain between Corinth and Sicyon. This plain ‘ was rendered uncultivable during 393 and 392 B.C. ’ by the Corinthian War, and though its owners withdrew their servants and cattle to Peiraeum, their loss ‘ was still so great that two successive seasons of it were quite enough to inspire them with a strong aversion to the war ’ (Grote, Hist. of Greece, 9. 455). As to the Acharnians, see Thuc. 2. 21, and the notes of Mr. Congreve and Prof. Jowett on the passage before us. The frontier-landowners
of ancient Greece, unlike those of the English and Scotch Border and of the Welsh Marches of England in the middle ages, seem to have feared more from the loss of their own goods than they hoped from raids on those of the foe.

21. συμμετέχειν βουλής τῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολέμων. The story about the sufferings of the Lacedaemonian frontier-owners in the Second Messenian War comes from the Εἰσομία of Trytaeus (7 (5). 7. 1306 b 37 sqq.), and it is just possible that συμμετέχειν βουλής τῶν ὀμόρων πολέμων was a line in that poem. The Lacedaemonian State may well have been one of those in which the law referred to existed. For the absence of περὶ before τῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολέμων, cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 37, τὸ βουλευόμενον τῶν κοινῶν.

22. διὰ τὸ ἓδειον, 'on account of their private interest' : cp. 3. 13. 1284 b 4, αἱ μὲν γὰρ παρεκβεβηκαί πρὸς τὸ ἓδειον ἀποσκοποῦντα τούτο ὄρων. For the thought, cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 14 sqq. and 3. 16. 1287 b 2 sq.

25. τοὺς δὲ γεωργήσοντας κ.τ.λ. Plato also makes agriculture over to slaves in the State described in the Laws (866 D sq.). Περίουκοι differ from slaves in being only half-enslaved (see above on 1269 a 34). Thus the Mariandynian περίουκοι of the Pontic Heracleia could not be sold for export beyond the limits of the State (Strabo, p. 542), nor could the Helots (Strabo, p. 365).

ei δεὶ κατ' εὐχήν. For the omission of εἴναι, see above on 1329 a 17 and 1277 a 38. Its omission is facilitated by the nearness of δούλους εἴναι.

26. μήτε ὀμοφύλων πάντων μήτε θυμοεδῶν, 'and should consist neither of men all of one kin nor of men spirited in character.' The gen. appears to be partitive, as in 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 28. Polybius distinguishes ὀμόφύλων from ὀμοεθνείς in 11. 19, ἀυτοσίαστα διετήρησε τοσαῦτα πλήθη καὶ πρὸς αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα, καὶ περὶ οὐχ οίνον ὀμοεθνείς ἀλλ' οἶδ' ὀμοφύλων χρησάμενος στρατοπέδους εἰς γὰρ Λίβανος Ἰδηρας Νευστίνους Κέλτων Φοίνικας Ἡπαλίους Ἑλλήνας, so that, if we take Aristotle to mean the same thing by ὀμόφυλος as Polybius does in this passage, he would be opposed to the employment of slaves belonging to one and the same great stock (Libyan, Celtic, Italian, or the like), even though they belonged to different ἐθνη, but this is not the sense in which the word is used in 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 25 sqq., and Aristotle probably means ὀμοεθνῆς by ὀμόφυλος. In the corresponding passage in Oecon. 1. 5. 1344 b 18 in fact—καί μὴ κτασθαί
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ὁμοθέτες (δούλους) πολλοὺς, ὅσπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν—the word ὁμοθέτης is used, not ὁμόφυλος. Plato had already said in Laws 777 C, δύο δὴ λειπέσθην μᾶνῳ μηχανά, μήτε πατριώτας ἀλλήλων εἶναι τοὺς μελλοντας ἥτον δουλεύσειν, ἀσυμφόρους τε ('different in language') εἰς δύναμιν δ ὁ μάλιστα, and Aristotle follows in his track. His especial object is to avoid the errors committed by the Lacedaemonian State in its organization of slavery. The Helots were serfs (περίοικοι), not slaves, and Hellenic serfs into the bargain, both ὁμόφυλοι and θυμοειδεῖς (cp. 2. 5. 1264 a 34 sqq.). But other Greek States also probably had slaves whom he would regard as too nearly akin to each other and too spirited to be submissive. The fugitive slaves who under the name of Bruttians (βρέττια) did much to ruin some of the Greek colonies in South Italy (Diod. 16. 15) were apparently an instance in point. Attic slaves, on the contrary, came from a variety of sources, Lydia, Phrygia, Paphlagonia, Syria, and the Euxine (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 170). Dionysius the Elder wished his mercenaries to be collected ἐκ πολλῶν ἔθνων (Diod. 14. 44. 3). Aristotle would no doubt disapprove of a body of slaves wholly composed of negroes, and the experience of the island of St. Domingo in modern times bears out his view. 'It is always a wise arrangement to have different tribes in a caravan, for in the event of a strike, and there are always strikes, there is less chance of concerted action' (Prof. Drummond, Tropical Africa, p. 90). Some went so far as to advise the actual promotion of discord among slaves (Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 30, in Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 242 and 5. ccxxii, and Plut. Cato Maior, c. 21, quoted by Meineke), but Aristotle says nothing about this. We notice that he imposes no limit on the number of the slaves in his 'best State,' though we might have expected him to do so.

28. δευτέρον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Non-Greek serfs, unlike the Helots. Aristotle probably has in his mind the Mariandynian serfs of the Pontic Heracleia (see above on 1269 a 34). Serfs of this type would have the drawback of being almost inevitably ὁμόφυλοι.

30. τούτων δὲ κ.τ.λ. Here again Aristotle departs from the Lacedaemonian practice. The Helots employed on private estates did not belong to the owners of those estates (Strabo, p. 365, τρόπον γὰρ τινα δημοσίους δούλους ἐξον ὁ Δακεδαμίνοι τούτους, i.e. τοὺς Εὐλόχας): the owners could not free the Helots employed on their estates or sell them beyond the limits of the State (Strabo, ibid.)
31. τίνα δὲ κ.τ.λ. Plato had gone on to deal with this subject in the passage of the Laws (777 C sqq.) which Aristotle has before him here. The difficulty of the question is recognized in 2. 9. 1269 b 7 sqq. The promised solution is nowhere given in the Politics as we have it, but we have many suggestions on the subject in Oecon. i. 5.

32. καὶ διότι κ.τ.λ. Διότι is here 'why.' This promise also remains unfilled in the Politics as we have it, but cp. Oecon. i. 5. 1344 b 4, ὅσπερ δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅταν μὴ γίνονται τοῖς βελτίσσι βέλτιον μηδὲ ἄθλα ἢ ἀρετής καὶ κακίας, γίνονται χειροὺς, οὕτω καὶ περὶ ὁικήτας, and i.4, χρὴ δὲ καὶ τελος ὁρίσθαι πάσιν δίκαιον γὰρ καὶ συμφέρον τὴν ἐλευθερίαν κεῖσθαι ἄθλον βούλονται γὰρ πονεῖν, ὅταν ἢ ἄθλον καὶ ὁ χρόνος ὀρισμένος. Xenophon had already said in Oecon. 5. 16, καὶ ἀπίσθων δὲ ἀγαθῶν οὐδὲν ἤττον οἱ δοῦλοι τῶν ἐλευθερῶν δέονται ἄλλα καὶ μάλλον, ὅπως μένειν ἐθέλοσθ. Aristotle perhaps merely means by πάσι τοῖς δοῦλοι both public and private slaves. But it is possible that, as the slave often purchased his freedom from his master, emancipation was most within the reach of the slaves who stood highest in their master's service, or who had learnt some lucrative handicraft.

34. Τὴν δὲ πόλιν κ.τ.λ. Τὴν μὲν ὅσον χώραν, c. 10. 1330 a 23, has C. 11. already been answered by τοῦ δὲ γεωργήσοντα, 1330 a 25, but here it is further answered by τὴν δὲ πόλιν. Εἰρήνηται πρότερον, in c. 5. 1327 a 3—c. 6. 1327 a 40.

36. αὐτῆς δὲ πρὸς αὐτήν κ.τ.λ. Various attempts have been made to interpret this passage as it stands. Göttling, Stahr, Busse (De praesidiis Aristotelis Politica emendandi, p. 17 sqq.), and Broughton, in his edition of Pol. i, 3, and 4 (7), take εἶναι to be used in αὐτῆς πρὸς αὐτήν εἶναι τὴν θέσιν as it is used in such phrases as ἐκὼν εἶναι, κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι (Plato, Protag. 317 A), εἰς δύναμιν εἶναι (Polit. 300 C), and the like, and translate these words 'so far as concerns the position of the city in relation to itself,' but the objection to this view is that no instance is produced of the use of εἶναι in this sense in combination with a similar collection of words. Εἶναι, when thus used, commonly goes with one word, or two or three, of a simple and closely connected kind. Prof. Jowett, on the other hand (Politics 2. 273), thinks that 'the order of the words is as follows, δὲι εὐχεσθαι κατατυγχάνειν (τοῦ) τὴν θέσιν εἶναι,' but Sus. 4 (1. p. 519) objects that, if we take the passage thus, we require τοῦ τὴν θέσιν, οἶον δὲι, εἶναι, or something similar, not simply τοῦ τὴν θέσιν.
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ėvai. The difficulty of interpreting the passage as it stands being so great, it is not surprising that emendations of the text have been suggested. Coray and Bekk.\(^2\) bracket ėvai, while Bonitz (Ind. 375 b 8) places a query after κατανυχάνειν. For Susemihl’s view see his note in Sus.\(^4\) Richards suggests that κατ' ēvχήν should be read in place of κατανυχάνειν, translating ‘but we should pray that the position of the city in relation to itself may be the best possible,’ etc. If, however, κατ' ēvχήν was the original reading, we should expect it to be corrupted into κατανυχεῖν rather than κατανυχ-χάνειν, and perhaps also to stand nearer in the sentence to ėvai than it does. In defence of κατανυχάνειν it may be pointed out that κατανυχεῖν is used in the same sense (‘votis potiri’) in Demosth. De Cor. c. 178, ėvai δ' άρα μὴ συμβή κατανυχεῖν: cp. also Plut. Apophth. Lac. Ages. 59. 213 A and De Gen. Socr. c. 9. 580 B. I am myself inclined to suggest that some words may be wanting in the text. The rendering of Vet. Int. is ‘ipsius autem ad se ipsam si ad votum orporet adipisci positionem, quattuor utique respicientes.’ Sus. thinks that he here renders a gloss, Busse (De praesidiis, etc., p. 18) that he fills up a lacuna in his Greek text by borrowing words from c. 5. 1327 a 3 sq. It is, however, possible that the text of Γ differed here from that of the MSS. known to us, and that some words have really dropped out in our MSS. of which the rendering of Vet. Int. preserves a trace. The text, in fact, may have originally run, αὐτὴ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὴν (εἰ δὲ κατ' ēvχήν) ėvai τὴν θέσιν, εὐχεσθαί δεί κατανυχάνειν πρὸς τέτταρα δὴ βλέποντας. The four things seem to be health, adaptation to the needs of political life, adaptation to those of war, and beauty (κόσμος, 1330 b 31), though Aristotle in his haste omits to mention the last. Less attention seems generally to have been paid by the founders of cities in ancient Greece to the first two points than to the rest: cp. Strabo, p. 235, τὸν γάρ Ἑλλήνων περὶ τὰς κτίσεις εὐστοχίας μᾶλλον δοξάτων ὅτι κάλλους ἐστοχάζοντο καὶ ἐρωμότητος καὶ λιμένων καὶ χώρας εὐφυῶς κ.τ.λ. Myscellus, however, the founder of Crotona, had looked to health rather than to wealth (Strabo, p. 269), and in later days Hippocrates in his treatise De Aere, Aquis, Locis had paid great attention to the question what site and aspect are most favourable to the health of a city. Plato also had taken health into consideration (Laws 778 E). For πρὸς τέτταρα δὴ, cp. Pindar, Pyth. 9. 90,

Διώγα τε γάρ

φαμι Νίσου τ' ἐν λόφῳ τρίς δὴ πολὺν τάνδ' εὐκλείζαι.
Δὴ thus used strengthens (Holden, Index to the Oeconomicus of Xenophon s.v.).

38. πρῶτον μὲν, ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, πρὸς ὁγίειαν. Sepulveda translates, 'primum ad valetudinem, ut rem necessarium' (and so Lamb.); Vict. 'primum quidem, ut necesse est, ad corporis sanitatem.' But perhaps it is better (with Richards) to supply ὡς with ἀναγκαῖον and to take ὡς ἀναγκαῖον as=ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ὑπὸ βλέπειν πρὸς τοῦτο. A thing may deserve to be looked at first either on account of its excellence (cp. c. 8. 1328 b 11 sq. and 6 (4). 11. 1296 b 5 sq.) or on account of its indispensability (cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 29 sq.), and Aristotle is careful to explain that health is to be looked at first for the latter reason. Cp. 1. 10. 1258 a 29, καίτοι δει ὡγιαίνειν τόσο κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν, ὡσπερ ἔτη ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων, and Plato, Laws 743 E, εἰ δὲ τις τῶν προστατομένων αὐτόθι νόμων σωφροσύνης ἐμπροσθεν ὁγίειαν ἐν τῇ πόλει φανεται ποιῶν τιμίων, ἢ πλούτων ὁγιείας καὶ τοῦ σωφρονείν, οὐκ ὅρθος ἀναφανείται τιβέμενος. Some had regarded health as the most excellent thing in the world (Plato, Gorg. 451 E sq.: Anaxandrides, θεσαυρός, Fragm. 1, in Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 169, a line of which,

τὸ μὲν ὡγιαίνειν πρῶτον ὡς ἄρωτον ὑς,

may be in Aristotle's memory here: Rhet. 2. 21. 1394 b 13 sq.: Lucian, Pro Lapsu inter Salutandum, c. 5 sqqu.: Eth. Eud. 1. 1. 1214 a 1 sqqu.).

αἳ τε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Te should follow ἐω, not αἶ: for other cases in which it is found out of its proper place, see above on 1325 a 19 and 1259 a 13. Πόλεις is omitted as a word which will be readily supplied: for other cases of its omission, see above on 1266 b 1. Hippocrates, as Stahr and others have pointed out, had already pronounced in favour of an Eastern aspect for cities in De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 530 Kühn, ὅκοσι μὲν (τῶν πόλεων) πρὸς τὰς ἀνατολὰς τοῦ ἥλιου κέονται, ταῦτα εἰκόνι εἶναι ἵναι πιθεότερα τῶν πρὸς τὰς ἄρκτους ἐστραμμένων καὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ θερμά, ἢν καὶ στάδιον τὸ μεταξὺ ἃ. Compare Columella, De Re Rustica, 1. 5. 5, optime autem salubribus locis ad orientem vel meridiem... villa convertitur. The climate of Patras, the ancient Patrae, is thought unhealthy for strangers, because the mountains which rise above it close at hand screen it from the East winds (Curtius, Peloponnesos, 1. 440). Cities whose site slopes towards the East are exposed to the wind ἀπηλιώτης (Probl. 26. 12. 941 b 17, καθάπερ οὖν καὶ τὰ ἀπ’ ἀνατολῆς κινών ἀπηλιώτας ἀνέμους ἤγειρεν (ὁ ἥλιος), οὖτω καὶ τὰ ἄπο μεσημβρίας κινών
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νότου ἐγείρει), a wind which is in a mean between hot and cold winds (Probl. 26. 55. 946 b 24 sq.), and health results when things hot and cold are in due proportion to each other (Anal. Post. 1. 13. 78 b 18 sqq.). The East wind is described as ‘warm’ in Probl. 26. 31. 943 b 24, and as ‘comparatively warm’ in Meteor. 2. 6. 364 a 19 sqq. See also vol. i. p. 337, note 4.

40. δεύτερον δὲ κατὰ βορέαν, ‘and in the second place those which are sheltered from the North wind.’ Here Aristotle differs from Hippocrates, who appears to regard cities facing North and sheltered from the South as more favourably situated for health than cities facing South and sheltered from the North (De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. pp. 525–9 Kühn). For κατὰ βορέαν, cp. κατὰ-βαρρὸς, Οecon. 1. 6. 1345 a 33. We expect αἱ κατὰ βορέαν, but cp. 1330 b 10, δεύτερον δὲ ύδασιν ἰγινοῖς χρήσθαι, where ἐν τῷ ἔδασιν ἰγινοῖς χρήσθαι would have been more regular. See vol. i. p. 337, note 5. Some places suffered much from the North wind, e.g. Ismarus in Thrace: cp. Eustath. on Dionys. Perieg. 27, p. 90 Bernhardt (quoted by Ellis, Commentary on Catullus, p. 384), καθάπερ καὶ Ἰσμαρίκος ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς ὁ βορρᾶς, ἀπὸ Ἰσμάρον πόλεως Ὀρακίκης, ἐνθα μάλιστα βορρᾶς καταρρήγνυται. Plataea was exposed to the North wind, though, as it happened, the North wind was gentle there (Theophrast. Fragm. 5. c. 32 Wimmer). Plato had given the plain around the city in the island of Atlantis a Southern aspect sheltered from the North wind (Critias 118 A).

41. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν κ.τ.λ. Δεῖ should probably be supplied, as in c. 5. 1326 b 30 sqq. The sentence would have been more regularly constructed if καλὸς ἐχειν had not been added, for then πρὸς τέ τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικὰς would have depended on βλέπων, 38, but as a long parenthesis has intervened (αἱ τὲ, 38–μάλλον, 41), Aristotle adds καλὸς ἐχειν to make his meaning clear, and might have added δεῖ also. For πρὸς τέ τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικὰς, cp. 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 17, ἐκ τὸν ποιοῦ καὶ ποιοῦ, and 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 7, πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἀσκήσεις. Aristotle does not explain what sort of site would be well adapted for political activity, but he would perhaps regard as such a site which, while fairly level and favourable to easy communication, had within it a spot suitable for the common life of the elder citizens who are to rule the State, and somewhat withdrawn from the turmoil of buying and selling, such a spot as he sketches in c. 12. 1331 a 24 sqq.
2. πρὸς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν is answered by δὲ, 8. Similar 1330 b. advice is given as to the territory in c. 5. 1326 b 40, χρὴ μὲν (τὴν χώραν) τοῖς πολεμίοις εἶναι δυσέμβολον, αὐτοῖς δὲ εὖέδον. A city would be (1) 'hard of approach' (δυσπρόσοδος), if it lay, like Sparta, behind mountains penetrable at only a few easily-guarded points (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 24). Compare the description of Thalamae in Elis in Polyb. 4. 75. 2, πλείστη δ' ἀποσκευὴ καὶ πλείστος ὄξλος ἥδραίθη σωμάτων καὶ θρεμμάτων εἰς τὸ χωρίον ὁ καλῶν Θεᾶμας, διὰ τὸ τὴν τε χώραν τὴν περίξ αὐτοῦ στενὴν εἶναι καὶ δυσέμβολον τὸ τε χωρίον ἀπραγ-μάτευτον καὶ δυσπρόσοδον. So we read of Rome in Plut. Romul. c. 17, ἦν δὲ δυσπρόσοδος ἡ πόλις ἐχουσα πρόδηλημα τὸ νῦν Καπιτώλιον, ἐν δὲ φρουρά καθεστήκει. A lake or a river or cliffs would answer the same purpose as a mountain: see as to the site of Oeniadæ Thuc. 2. 102. 3, as to the acropolis of Sicyon (the site to which the city was removed by Demetrius Poliorcetes) Diod. 20. 102. 4, and as to the site of Psophis Polyb. 4. 70. 7 sqq. A city would be (2) 'hard to beleaguer' (δυσπερίληπτος), if the ground about it was made difficult by chasms or unfordable rivers or marshes. Pella was surrounded by marshes (Liv. 44. 46, sita est in tumulo vergente in occidentem hibernum: cingunt paludes inexsuperabilis altitudinis aestate et hiemae, quas restagnantes faciunt lacus). Looking to the advances that the art of siege-warfare had made (1331 a 1 sq.), a city's best chance of safety in Aristotle's days probably lay in the difficulty of approaching or beleaguering it.

4. οὐδάτων τε καὶ ναμάτων κ.τ.λ., 'and of waters and streams there should, if possible, be forthcoming a native supply.' Οἰκεῖον, in opposition to ὄμβριος, 6: rain-water is not 'native,' but comes from the clouds. Compare the contrast of ὄμβριον and γηγενές ὅπορ in Plut. De Facie in Orbe Lunæ, c. 25. 939 C, and also the contrast of οἰκεῖα and ἕξατερκαὶ πράξεις in c. 3. 1325 b 29 sq. Ναμάτων is added to explain and limit οὐδάτων, which, if it stood by itself, would include ὄμβρια οὐδατα. The term νάματα comprises both spring and river water: cp. Plut. Quaest. Nat. 2. 912 A, τὰ πηγάκα καὶ ποτάμια νάματα. Aristotle may possibly have in his memory here some lines of Pindar of which Quintilian has preserved a trace: see Pindar, Fragm. 258 Bergk (Quintil. 10. 1. 109), non enim 'pluvias,' ut ait Pindarus, 'aquas colligit,' sed vivo gurgite exundat (Cicero), where Bergk remarks, 'Pindarus συνάγειν οὐδατα ὄμβρια dixisse videtur,' but is not 'vivo gurgite exundat' also probably a translation from Pindar? Many Greek cities were famous for
their springs. Corinth was so, and especially for its spring Peirene (cp. Paus. 2. 3. 5, κρήνας δὲ πολλαὶ μὲν ἀνὰ τὴν πόλιν πεποίηται πᾶσαν, ἀτε ἀφθόνον ῥέωντος σφισιν ἕδατος, and see as to Peirene, Curtius, Peloponnesos, 2. 529, 592); Phereas was famous for its spring Hyperea (Pindar, Pyth. 4. 125: Strabo, p. 439); Cyrene was built round the inexhaustible ‘spring of Apollo,’ and Hermione also had an inexhaustible spring (Paus. 2. 35. 3). Compare with Aristotle’s recommendations as to water-supply those of Columella, De Re Rustica, i. 5. 1 sqq. We see from the passage before us that a city was all the stronger from a military point of view if its water-supply was good and safe from interference in the event of a siege. Athens was ill-supplied with water (see next note), and her weakness in this respect must have been keenly felt when the country-population was cooped up in the city during the Peloponnesian War.

5. ei δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘but if a supply of this nature is not forthcoming, a way has been discovered to obtain water by constructing,’ etc. For εὑρηται, cp. 1331 a 15 sqq., and for τοῦτο χρις c. 7. 1327 b 21. Τοῦτο γε εὑρηται means that we need not begin an investigation as to that, inasmuch as the problem has been already solved. ‘Ομβρίους is placed before ἔδασιν because it is meant to be emphatic. Hippocrates has a good opinion of rain-water (De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 537 Kühn, τὰ μὲν οὖν ὄμβρια (ἔδασι) κοινφότατα καὶ γλυκότατά ἐστιν καὶ λεπτότατα καὶ λαμπρότατα). So too Columella (De Re Rustica, i. 5. 2). Aristotle perhaps intends this hint for Athens. ‘There were three or four springs at Athens, but one only, that of Callirrhoe, was drinkable’ (Merivale, Hist. of the Romans under the Empire, c. 66, vol. viii. p. 217, note). See also below on 1330 b 25. Cisterns for storing rain-water existed in many Greek cities—at Alexandria (Stuart Poole, Cities of Egypt, p. 181), Cnidus (Dict. of Greek and Roman Geography, art. Cnidus), and Termessus (Davis, Anatolica, p. 231). They existed also in the insular part of Tyre (Maspero, Hist. Ancienne des Peuples de l’Orient, p. 192) and at Jerusalem (Tac. Hist. 5. 12). ‘The sky is the only source from which fresh water is obtained in the smaller towns of Dalmatia, and especially on the islands, where there are neither springs nor streams’ (T. G. Jackson, Dalmatia, i. 241). Aristotle does not refer to the possibility of bringing water into the city from a distance, but aqueducts existed in his day both at Samos (Hdt. 3. 60) and at Athens (Athenaeum,
No. 3355, p. 223). He would probably, however, feel that aqueducts lay at the mercy of an invading foe.

7. μηδέποτε ὑπολείπειν εἱργομένους τῆς χώρας. For the construction, cp. Rhet. 3. 17. 1418 a 34, καὶ δὲ ἐλεγεν Γοργίας, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπολείπει αὐτὸν ὁ λάγος, τοῦτα ἐστιν.

8. τοῦτο δ' ἐστιν ἐν τῷ κείσθαι τὸν τόπον κ.τ.λ. For εἶναι ἐν, see Bon. Ind. 245 b 25 sqq., where among other passages c. i. 1323 b 1, καὶ τὸ ἥν εἰδαμώνως, εἰτ' ἐν τῷ χαϊρεῖν ἐστιν εἰτ' ἐν ἁρετῇ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰτ' ἐν ἁμφῶν, is referred to. Τοῦτο ἐστιν. For the use of the neuter in reference to a fem. substantive, cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 1, and see Bon. Ind. 484 a 59 sqq., where Metaph. Ζ. 10. 1035 b 14, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ τῶν ζῴων ψυχή (τοῦτο γὰρ οὐσία τοῦ ἐμψύχου) κ.τ.λ. is quoted.

9. ἐν τε τοιοῦτῳ καὶ πρὸς τοιοῦτον, 'both in a healthy spot and facing a healthy quarter' (cp. Plato, Rep. 401 C).

10. δεύτερον δὲ ὕδασιν ὑγιεινὸς χρῆσθαι. We expect ἐν τῷ ὕδασιν ὑγιεινὸς χρῆσθαι, but Schneider rightly compares c. i. 1331 b 27, τοῦτον δ' ἐστιν ἐν μέν ἐν τῷ τῶν σκοπῶν κείσθαι καὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν πράξεων ὁρθῶς, ἐν δὲ τάς πρὸς τὸ τέλος φεροῦσας πράξεις εὑρίσκειν: cp. also 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 7–10, and 7 (5). Ι. 1314 a 33 sqq. As to the fact, cp. De Gen. An. 4. 2. 767 a 28, διαφέρει δὲ καὶ χώρα χώρας εἰς τάιτα (i.e. εἰς γένεσιν καὶ ἄγονιαν καὶ ἀρρενογονιάν καὶ θηλυγονιάν) καὶ ὕδωρ ὕδατος διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αἰτίας· ποιά γὰρ τὶς ἡ τροφὴ γίνεται μάλιστα καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἡ δάθεις διὰ τέ τὴν κράσιν τοῦ περιεστῶτος ἀέρος καὶ τῶν εἰσόντων, μάλιστα δὲ διὰ τὴν τοῦ ὕδατος τροφὴν· τοῦτο γὰρ πλείουτον εἰσφέρονται, καὶ ἐν πάσιν ἐστι τροφή τοῦτο, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ξηροῖς· διό καὶ τὰ ἀτέραμα θάνατο καὶ ψυχρά τὰ μὲν ἀτεκνίαν ποιεῖ τὰ δὲ θηλυτοκιάν (see also Hist. An. 6. 19. 573 b 32 sqq.).

καὶ τούτῳ κ.τ.λ. With ἔχειν supply δεὶ from 8.

11. οἷς γάρ κ.τ.λ. For οἷς πλείστοις χρώμεθα, see Vahlen on Poet. 16. 1454 b 20. For the thought cp. Hippocr. De Natura Hominis vol. i. p. 361 Kühn, αἱ δὲ νοῦσοι γίνονται αἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν διατημάτων, αἱ δὲ απὸ τοῦ πνεύματος, ὅταν ὁμογενές ὄμην. τὴν δὲ διάγωσιν χρῆ ἐκατέρω δὲ δοκεότας· δύσταν μὲν ὕπο νοσήματος ἐνός πολλοὶ ἀνθρώποι ἀλέκτονται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον, τὴν αὐτὴν χρῆ ἀνατίθηναι τούτῳ δὲ τὸ κοινότυπον ἐστι καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν πάντες χρώμεθα· ἔστι δὲ τούτῳ ὁ ἀναπνέωμεν. As to water, cp. Hippocr. De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 532 Kühn (a passage which Aristotle seems to have before him), πλείουτον γὰρ μέρος ἐξωμβάλλεται (ὑδωρ) ἐς τὴν υγιείν. VOL. III.
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As to air, cp. Philyll. Inc. Fab. Fragm. i (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 864),

έλκειν τὸ βέδυ σωτήριον προσεύχομαι,

ὅπερ μέγατόν ἐστιν ὑγειας μέρος,

τὸ τὸν ἄρ' ἔλκειν καθαρὸν οὐ τεβολωμένον.

Aristotle does not say anything about the importance to health of other kinds of food than water. The Egyptians believed that all maladies arose from food (Hdt. 2. 77; Diod. i. 82). See on this subject De Part. An. 3. 12. 673 b 25–28.

13. ἡ δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘and water and air possess this kind of nature,’ i.e. are of such a nature as to be largely and frequently used by us (so Vict. ‘talem naturam habere ut crebro cogamur ad illa confugere’). Cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 15. Ἡ τῶν ὑδάτων καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος δύναμις is little more than a paraphrase for τὰ ὑδάτα καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα: see Bon. Ind. 206 b 38, ‘sed etiam ea res cui aliqua facultas inept δύναμις nominatur, ut interdum δύναμις prope ad paraphrasin videri possit delitescere, cf. φύσις’ in such phrases as ἡ τοῦ γαλακτος φύσις, Pol. i. 8. 1256 b 14: Bonitz refers among many other passages to Meteor. i. 2. 339 a 22, ὅστε πᾶσαν αὐτοῦ (i.e. τοῦ κόσμου) τὴν δύναμιν κυβερνᾶσθαι ἐκείθεν. The same usage is traceable in Plato: see Ast, Lex. Platon. s.v. δύναμις οὐθείν.

14. διόπερ κ.τ.λ. 'Εὰν μη' πάνθ' ὅμως μη' ἀφθονία τοιοῦτων ἦν ναμάτων, 'if all the springs are not equally good, and there is not an unlimited supply of wholesome springs.' Πάντα, sc. τὰ νάματα. Τοιοῦτων, i.e. ὑγειών. For μη' followed by μη', see critical note on 1257 b 12. The arrangement recommended by Aristotle had probably already been adopted by some Greek cities when he wrote: thus we read of Pellene in Paus. 7. 27. 4, ἡκοδόμηται δὲ καὶ ἐλυπρὸν κρῆνης ἐν τῇ ἁγορᾷ, καὶ λοιπὰ ἐστίν αὐτοῦ τὸ ὕδωρ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐπεὶ τοὺ πνεῖν πηγαί σφισιν ὑπὸ τὸν πόλιν εἰσιν οὐ πολλαί. It has been adopted in more than one city of modern Europe; for instance, at Nice (Times, Nov. 1, 1883).

17. περὶ δὲ τόπων τῶν ἐρυμῶν. Aristotle has been speaking of the τόπος τῆς πόλεως from the point of view of salubrity (9), and now he turns to consider the question of ἐρυμῶν τόποις. Τῶν ἐρυμῶν follows, instead of preceding, τῶπων for the sake of emphasis. Cp. 3. 4. 1277 b 2, πρὶν δὴμον γενέσθαι τὸν ἔσχατον, and Diod. 13. 111. 3, τούτως δὲ γονεῖς καὶ τέκνα τὰ νόημα λαξάνες, where stress is laid on ‘infant children’ as being the most helpless.

19. οἷον άκρόπολις ὄλυγαρχικὸν καὶ μοναρχικὸν κ.τ.λ. Plato had
provided the city which he founds in the Laws with an acropolis (Laws 745 B, metá dé ταῦτα μέρη δωδέκα διελέσθαι, θέμενον ἑστίας πρῶτον καὶ Δίος καὶ Αθηναὶ ἱερόν, ἀκρόπολιν ὄνομάζουσα), but we seem to gather from 20, ἀριστοκρατίκον δὲ ὀδδέτερον, ἀλλὰ μέλλων ἴσχυροι τόσον πλείους, that Aristotle's ideal city is to have more strong places than one, and that its chief strong place (c. 12. 1331 a 24 sqq.) is not an acropolis. For μοναρχικῶν, cp. Pollux, 9. 40, τάχα δὲ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν καὶ βασιλέων ἀν τις εἶποι καὶ τυραννείον. The word, however, hints that an acropolis savours rather of Tyranny than of Kingship: cp. Diod. 16. 70, Τυμολόγων δὲ . . . τὰς μὲν κατὰ τὴν νῆσον ἀκροπόλεις καὶ τὰ τυραννεῖα κατέσχαψε, Plut. Timol. c. 24, and Juv. 10. 306 sq. That a level site was congenial to democracies may be inferred from the fact that the cities of Mantinea (Curtius, Peloponnesos, 1. 239: Bursian, Geogr. von Griechenland, 2. 209) and Megalopolis (Curtius, 1. 281 sqq.: Bursian, 2. 244), both of them designed to be demographically ruled, were built on comparatively level sites. Aristotle does not explain why there should be more strong places than one in the central city of an ἀριστοκρατία (see above on 1273 a 19)—perhaps he regards an ἀριστοκρατία as giving a share of power to a plurality of social elements (virtue, wealth, and the demos), each of which would have a strong place of its own—but it is a fact that at Sparta, Carthage, and the Epizephyrian Locri, the seats of three famous ἀριστοκρατία, there were more strong places than one within the city. As to Sparta, cp. Polyb. 5. 22. 1, τῆς γὰρ Σπάρτης τῷ μὲν καθόλου σχήματι περιφερεύσει ὑπαρχοῦσης καὶ κειμένης εἰς τόπους ἐπιπέδους, κατὰ μέρος δὲ περιεχούσης εἰς αὐτῇ διασφόρους ἀνωμάλους καὶ βουνώδεις τῶν κ.τ.λ., and Paus. 3. 17. 1, Λακεδαιμονίας δὲ ἀκρόπολις μὲν ἐς ύψος περιφανεῖς ἐξήχυναν οὐκ ἔστιν, καθα δὴ Θηβαῖους τε ἡ Καδμεία καὶ ἡ Λάρισα 'Αργείας' ἃντων δὲ εἰς τῇ πόλει λόφων καὶ ἄλλων, τὸ μάλιστα ἐς μετέωρον ἀνήκον ὄνομάζουσιν ἀκρόπολιν (see Dict. of Greek and Roman Geography, art. Sparta, vol. ii. p. 1026 b). The site of Carthage was 'a peninsula with water on three sides. On the three hills within this peninsula stood Carthage and its surroundings, its suburbs, and its necropolis' (E. A. Freeman, Contemporary Review, Sept. 1890, p. 368). See also Meltzer, Gesch. der Karthager, 2. 165 sqq. As to Locri, see Liv. 29. 6. 14 sqq. The seven hills of Rome, which was in its best days an ἀριστοκρατία, are famous. 23. τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις, i.e. other than those of war, e.g. ἀναγκαῖας (c. 12. 1331 b 13) and πολιτικὰς πράξεις.
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κατὰ τὸν νεώτερον καὶ τὸν Ἰπποδάμειον τρόπον. Καὶ is explanatory, as in 1. 9. 1257 b 9, τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ τὴν κατηλήκην. Holm (Griech. Gesch. 2. 324) denies that Hippodamus was the first to lay out cities with straight streets. The Campanian Neapolis, he says, was laid out altogether in this way, and Selinus was laid out with two main streets crossing each other at right angles. ‘New cities, therefore, were built in this fashion before the fifth century B.C.,’ and all that Hippodamus did was to introduce the method in places of the highest importance. But is this view reconcilable with 2. 8. 1267 b 22 sq.?

25. ὡς εἶχον κατὰ τὸν ἀρχαίον χρόνον. Like Athens, of which we read in Pseudo-Dicaearch. De Graeciae Urbibus (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 254), ἡ δὲ πόλις ἠξῆ ἑκάστα, οὐκ εὐθὺς, κακῶς ἐρρημοτομημένη διὰ τὴν ἀρχαϊότητα, and like Rome till its rebuilding by Nero (Tac. Ann. 15. 43, ceterum urbis quae domui supererant non, ut post Gallica incendia, nulla distinctione nec passim erecta, sed dimensis vicorum ordinibus et latis via rum spatiiis colibitaque aedificiorum altitudine ac patefactis areis). Compare also the contrast between the laying out of Rome and Capua in Cic. De Leg. Agrar. 2. 35. 96.

26. δισέξιως γὰρ κ.τ.λ., ‘for that arrangement of private dwellings is hard of exit for foreign troops and hard of exploration for assailants [whether foreign or not].’ The fate of the Thebans who were admitted into Plataea in B.C. 431 is probably present to Aristotle’s mind. They found much difficulty in escaping from the city when their attempt on it had failed (Thuc. 2. 4. 2, 5). Compare the difficult position in which Xenophon’s troops found themselves in assaulting the city of the Drilae not far from Trapezus on the Euxine (Xen. Anab. 5. 2. 7, ὁ δὲ ἑλθὼν λέγει ὅτι ἦστι χωρίον χρημάτων πολλῶν μεστὸν τούτων, τοῦτο οὔτε λαβεῖν δυνάμεθα, ισχυρὸν γὰρ ἐστιν, οὔτε ἀπελθεῖν βάδιον, μάχονται γὰρ ἐπεξεξελθοῦσες καὶ ἡ ᾅδος χαλεπὴ). An attacking force did not relish assaulting a city which it was at once desirable to explore, and consequently to reduce, and difficult to get out of in case of failure.

27. διὸ δεῖ τοῦτων ἀμφιτέρων μετέχειν, i.e. διὸ δεῖ τὴν τῶν ἰδίων οἰκίσεων διάθεσιν μετέχειν καὶ τὸν ἰδίον καὶ τοῦ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς ἀσφαλείας χρησίμου (cp. 31, οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἀσφαλείαν καὶ κόσμον ἐξει καλῶς). It is not quite clear whether Aristotle adds (in 29) καὶ τὴν μὲν ἄλλην μὴ ποιών πόλιν εὑρομεν, κατὰ μέρη δὲ καὶ τόπους in explanation of his suggestion that the houses should be arranged in clumps or
quincunes, or as an alternative plan. Perhaps the former is the case. His plan will then be to drive straight wide streets between the clumps or quincunes of houses, but to leave the interior of each quincunx a tangle of narrow lanes. Compare J. R. Green's description of Roman London (Making of England, p. 106); it was 'little more than a mass of brick houses and red-tiled roofs, pierced with a network of the narrow alleys which passed for streets in the Roman world, and cleft throughout its area by two wider roads from the bridge.' Silchester and St. Alban's, however, were laid out with great regularity (Fox and St. John Hope, On the Desirability of the complete Excavation of the Site of Silchester, p. 4).

28. κατασκευάζη, sc. τὴν τῶν ἱδίων ὀικήσεων διάθεσιν.
καθάπερ κ.τ.λ., sc. κατασκευάζοντα, 'as among farmers what some call clumps of vines are arranged.' For τῶν ὀμπέλων συντάδας, cp. Pollux, 7. 146, καὶ ξυστὰς μὲν καὶ συντάσεις * ἡ ἀμπελόφυτος γῆ, ἡ μὴ κατὰ στίχον πεφυτευμένη, στοιχάς δὲ ἡ κατὰ στίχον. Vines were planted in clumps or quincunes, partly because they looked better when thus arranged, and partly because they were more productive (Varro, De Re Rustica, i. 7. 2 sqq.: Columella, 3. 13. 4: Quintil. 8. 3. 9). The younger Cyrus seems to have planted trees in this way (Xen. Oecon. 4. 20 sqq.: cp. Cic. De Senect. 17. 59). Sus., following Scaliger, reads ἐν τοῖς γεωργίοις ('in the fields,' or 'farms') in place of ἐν τοῖς γεωργίοις, which is the reading of all the MSS., but the word γεωργίον is nowhere else used by Aristotle (is it used by any writer earlier than Philo, Mechan. Synt. p. 96, l. 49 Schoene?), and ἐν τοῖς γεωργίοις ('among farmers'), which is retained by Bekk., appears to be defensible: cp. Pherecr. Κοριανώ, Fragm. 2 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 281),

ἐν τοῖς Μαριανδυνοῖς ἑκείνοις βαρθάρους
χύτρας καλοῦσι τὰς μελανὰς ἵσχαδας,
and Xen. Cyrop. 1. 3. 2, ἅ δὴ νόμιμα ἵν ἐν Μήδοις. 'Ἐν ταῖς γεωργίαις, 'in the farms,' would probably be preferable to ἐν τοῖς γεωργίοις (cp. Plato, Laws 762 A). But Aristotle often refers to practices prevailing among farmers (e.g. in De Gen. et Corr. 2. 8. 335 a 13: Hist. An. 5. 32. 557 b 29 sqq.).

31. καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ κόσμον. See critical note.

32. περὶ δὲ τείχων κ.τ.λ. This takes up 1330 b 17, περὶ δὲ τόπων τῶν ἐρυμών. Aristotle has just pronounced in favour of an old-fashioned arrangement of private houses, and now he passes
on naturally enough to the question whether it is not the best
plan to be old-fashioned in the matter of walls, and to dispense
with them altogether. He has before him Plato, Laws 778 D, περὶ
dὲ τείχων, ὥσπερ Μέγιλλε, ἐγών' ἀν τῇ Ἱππάρτῃ ἐξελεημένον τὸ καθεδέουν ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῇ γῇ κατακαίεινα τὰ τείχη καὶ μὴ ἐπανιστάναι κ.τ.λ. The State of the
Laws was pre-eminently one which laid claim to virtue (696 A: 731 Λ sqq.). Agesilaus ([Plut.] Apophth. Lac. Ages. 30) had been
asked why Sparta had no walls, and had replied, ὅποι λίθοι δὲ καὶ
ξύλους τετειχίσθαι τὰς πόλεις, τοῖς δὲ τῶν ἐνοικοῦντων ἀρεταῖς, and a similar
dictum was ascribed to Lycurgus (Plut. Lycurg. c. 19). Isocrates
had spoken of the Lacedaemonians as ἀρετῆς ἀμφισβητοῦντες in Archid.
§ 91, and had used the expression τοὺς ἀρετῆς ἀντιποιμένους in
Panath. § 228 (cp. § 120). For λίαν ἀρχαῖοι ἱππαμβιάνουσιν, cp.
Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2, 57, ἀρχαῖα φρόνεις: ήτοι
εὐθη, where Aristoph. Nub. 821 (Didot) and Plato, Ethydem.
295 C are referred to.

34. καὶ ταύθ' ὀρῶντες κ.τ.λ. This refers to the humiliation (cp.
40, μὴ πᾶσχειν κακῶς μηδὲ ὑβριζοῦσαι) which Epaminondas' invasions
of Laconia inflicted on Sparta. For the sing. ἔγραψ, cp. Meteor. i.
13. 349 b 35, δῆλοι δ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἔγραψ, and Plato, Symp. 182 C, ἔγραψ δὲ
tούτο ἐμανθ. In 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 15 we have τοὺς ἔγραψ ἔξελέγχεται
and in 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 1 ἔξελέγχεται ὑπὸ τῶν ἔγραψ.

35. ἐστὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. So far as this Aristotle agrees with Plato's
censure of those who seek safety in walls (Laws 779 A, τείχες δὲ καὶ
πύλαις διανοοῦσα φραξχίσεται τε καὶ καθεδέουνται οὐσίαις ὅτως ἔξειν
μηχανίας κ.τ.λ.). Compare Thuc. i. 32, 5, where the Corcyreans say,
tὴν μὲν οὖν γενομένην ναυμαχίαν αὐτὸ κατὰ μόναν ἀπεωσάμεθα Κορυνθίους:
ἐπιδὴ δὲ μείζον παρασκευὴ ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἀρρητα, καὶ ἡμῖς ἀδύνατοι ὀρῶμεν ὄντες τῇ οἰκείᾳ μόνον δυνάμης
περιγενέσθαι κ.τ.λ.

37. ἐπεί δὲ κ.τ.λ. Take the case of Plataea or Philius besieged
by the Lacedaemonians and their allies, or of Haarlem besieged by
the forces of Spain (Motley, Rise of the Dutch Republic, Part 3,
c. 8). For καὶ συμβαίνει καὶ εἰ ἐστέχεται, see above on 1264 b 18.

38. καὶ τῆς ἀνδρωτείνης καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὀλίγοις ἀρετῆς. Cr. 6 (4).
11. 1295 a 26, μὴ ὁ δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς συγκρίνομεν τὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὄντος, Eth.
Nic. 7. 1. 1145 a 18, πρὸς δὲ τὴν θηριώτητα μάλιστ' ἁπὸ ἄρματοι λέγειν
tὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμῖν ἀρετῆς, ἤρωικὴν τινα καὶ θείαν, Magn. Mor. 2. 5. 1200 b
11 sqq., and Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 32, οἱ δ' αὖ Ἡλεῖοι . . . ἀπῆλθον εἰς τὸ
ἀστυν, τοιούτοι γενόμενοι οἷον τὴν ἀρετῆν θεός μὲν ἐν ἐμπνεύσας δύνατο καὶ
407.

\[\text{40.}\] **τὴν ἀσφαλεστάτην ἐρυμνότητα κ.τ.λ.** So far from strong walls being a sign of effeminacy, as many thought (Plato, Laws 778 E: [Plut.] Apophth. Lac. Agis 6, Ages. 55, and Panthiod. 1), they are really a sign of warlike forethought.

1. **ἄλλως τε καὶ νῦν εὐρημένων κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle refers among other things to the invention of the catapult made under Dionysius the Elder at Syracuse (Diod. 14. 42. 1, καὶ γὰρ τὸ καταπελτικὸν εὐρέθη κατὰ τούτον τὸν καρύν ἐν Συρακούσαις, ὡς ἄν τῶν κρατίστων τεχνῶν πανταχόθεν εἰς ἕνα τόπον συνεμένων . . . διὸπερ ἀνυπέρβλητον φιλοτιμῶν εἰσβέρεντες οἱ τεχνίται πολλὰ προπετευοῦντο βῆλη καὶ μιχανήματα ἕνα καὶ δυνάμεα παρίχεσθαι μεγάλας χρέας, and 14. 50. 4). The term μιχαναί, however, probably includes not only catapults, but also battering-rams with shelter-sheds for those who worked them, movable wooden towers with drawbridges which could be lowered so as to give the besiegers access to the top of the city-wall, scaling-ladders, etc. (Droysen, Gr. Kriegsalterth. p. 209. 1). Of these contrivances, catapults and (apparently) movable wooden towers were introduced into Greek warfare under Dionysius the Elder (Droysen, p. 211). He had to contend against the Carthaginians, who were the first to use battering-rams and towers for sieges in the West, and whose use of them against the Greeks gave them a great superiority in their Sicilian campaigns (Meltzer, Gesch. der Karthager, 2. 134). His catapults and wooden towers revolutionized the art of besieging cities. They cleared the walls of their defenders and thus facilitated the use of the battering-ram. Nor did the development of the art stop here. As time went on, the towers became higher and better armed, and the battering-rams longer and better sheltered. The new methods of siege-warfare were inherited by Philip of Macedon, whose engines of war were famous (Demosth. Phil. 3. c. 50). See on the whole subject Droysen, op. cit. p. 211 sqq. For εἰς ἀκρίβειαν, cp. Plato, Gorg. 487 C, εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν.

3. **ὁμοιον γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** Ταῖς πόλεσιν finds its correlative in τὴν χώραν and ταῖς οἰκίσεσι ταῖς ἱδίαις. If we are to deprive cities of their defence for fear of making the citizens unmanly, why should we stop there? Why should we not deprive the territory and private dwellings of their defences also?

4. **τὸ τὴν χώραν εὔφημολον ζητεῖν,** ‘to seek that the territory shall be easy of invasion,’ for εἶναι should be supplied with εὔφημολον.
Compare for the construction 1. 9. 1257 b 17 sqq. and Plato, Rep. 443 B and 375 E.

περαιρεῖν τοὺς ὄρεινοὺς τόπους, 'strip off (from the territory) its mountainous spots,' as one might strip off an outer coating. 

Περαιρεῖν answers to μὴ περιβάλλειν, 3.

7. For ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ . . . γε see note on 1339 a 29.

10. ταῖς δὲ μὴ κεκτημένας. See critical note.

11. οὐχ ὅτι τείχη μόνον περιβλητέον. Coray brackets μόνον, but, as Sus.² has already pointed out, quite wrongly: see Stallbaum on Plato, Symp. 179 B, καὶ μὴν ὑπερασπισθέντες γε μόνοι εὐθέλουσιν οἱ εὕροντες, οὐ μόνον ὅτι ἄνδρες, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες, where he refers to Xen. Mem. 2. 9. 8, ὁ δὲ Ἀρχέδωμος τῷ Κρίτωνι ἤδεος ἐχαρίζετο, καὶ οὐχ ὅτι μόνος ὁ Κρίτων ἐν ἢπυχα ἦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ φίλοι αὐτοῦ.

ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων ἐπιμελητέους κ.τ.λ., 'but attention must also be paid to them to secure that they shall be in a state befitting the city not only with a view to ornament, but also with a view to military procedures, both those already in use and those further ones which have recently been discovered.' The 'military procedures' here referred to are probably those of besiegers, not those of the besieged, but this is not quite certain. For τὰς πολεμικὰς χρήσεις, cp. c. 8. 1328 b 11, 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 34, and Plato, Phaedr. 239 D. How were walls to be made proof against recent improvements in siege-methods? By being made higher, for one thing, to resist scaling, and thicker, to resist battering-rams and heavy artillery (see Droysen, op. cit. p. 253). Aristotle’s remark is perhaps based on the experience of Athens. The dangerous position in which she found herself after the defeat of Chaeroneia prompted a hasty effort to repair the walls (Aeschin. c. Ctes. cc. 27, 31), which was continued in the years b.c. 334-326 (Corp. Inscr. Att. 2. 167, referred to by Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 239, note 1, and Droysen, op. cit. p. 237. 1).

12. ὅπως κ.τ.λ. For the order of the words see note on 1327 a 4.


16. τὰ μὲν εἶρηναί. Many of these devices are mentioned in the Commentarius Poliorceticus of Aeneas Tacticus (τακτικῶν ὑπόμηνα περὶ τοῦ πῶς χρῆ πολιορκουμένους ἀντέχειν), which was written (according to Christ, Gesch. der gr. Litteratur, p. 308) soon after b.c. 360. It is the only part which has come down to us of a larger work
referred to by Polybius (io. 44) under the title of Τὰ περὶ τῶν στρατηγικῶν ὑπομνήματα. See above on 1326 b 39.

ξητείν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν. Cp. Isocr. Epist. 7. § 3, κρῆ ξητείν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν, and De Pace, § 116, φιλοσοφήσει καὶ σκέψειθε.

17. ἀρχήν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Thuc. i. 93. 8, ἐβούλετο γὰρ (ὁ Θεομο- τοκλῆς) τῷ μεγέθει καὶ τῷ πάχει (τῶν τειχῶν) ἀφιστάναι τὰς τῶν πολεμίων ἐπιθυμίας. The Index Aristotelicus refers to no other passage in which ἀρχήν is similarly used. The use of εξ ἀρχῆς in Poet. 24. 1460 a 33 sq., however, approaches that of ἀρχήν here.

19. ἔπει δὲ κ.τ.λ. As the citizen-body must be divided into C.12. syssitia, and the walls must be dotted with guard-rooms and towers, it is a natural arrangement to locate some of the syssitia in the guard-rooms. Aristotele appears to intend the guard-rooms to be in the towers, but a common plan was to build city-walls solid only up to a certain height, and to place guard-rooms in them above that height (Droysen, op. cit. p. 251). As to κατὰ τόπους ἐπικαίρους (with which Liddell and Scott compare Demosth. De Cor. c. 27, προλαβόν τοὺς ἐπικαίρους τῶν τόπων), towers were often placed along the wall close to a gate which needed guarding, or at an angle where two curtains of wall met which could be commanded by weapons discharged from the tower, or at intervals along the curtain. In times of pressing danger, and especially during a siege, it must have been a common practice for the defenders of the walls to take their meals either on them or close to them (cp. Damon, ap. Athen. Deipn. 442 c, διὸ καὶ πολεμιμένων ποτὲ αὐτῶν (i.e. τῶν Βυζαντίων) καὶ οὐ προσκαρπεροῦντων τοῖς τείχεσι, Ἀεωνίδης ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐκέλευσε τὰ κατηλεία ἐπὶ τῶν τειχῶν σκηνοπηγεῖν, καὶ μῶλις ποτὲ ἑπαύσατο λιποτακτώντες, and Aelian, Var. Hist. 3. 14), but Aristotle's recommendation refers to times of peace as well as times of war, and it probably went far beyond the practice of most cities. We find, indeed, that the polemarchs of Cynaetha spent the day at the gates of their city (Polyb. 4. 18. 2, πολέμαρχοι τῶν κατεληλυθότων τινὲς ἐγεγόνεισαν ταύτην δὲ συμβάλλει τῇ ἀρχῇ κλείειν τὰς πύλας καὶ τῶν μεταξὺ χρόνων κυριεύει τῶν κλειδῶν, ποιεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ τὰ καθ' ἡμέραν τὴν διάστασιν ὑπὶ τῶν πυλῶν), but Aristotle does not appear to be speaking here of high magistrates like polemarchs; he seems rather to have in view some part of the military force of the State. For τὰ τείχη διελήφθαι φυλακτηρίους καὶ πύργους, cp. Diod. 2. 7. 3, τείχος διελημμένον πύργους πυκνοὺς καὶ μεγάλοις.

21. αὐτά, Lamb. 'ea eae res': cp. c. 4. 1325 b 33, ἔπει δὲ πεφρο-
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μίασται τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα περὶ αὐτῶν.  Bonitz (Ind. 125 a 34) compares Top. i. 5. 102 a 10, ὥστε δὲ πάντα τὰ νῦν ῥηθέντα τουσί, ἀπίπτει δὴ ἐξ αὐτῶν, and 102 b 20, but would read αὐτῷ in place of αὐτά.

23. καὶ τὰῦτα μὲν δὴ κ.τ.λ.  Ταῦτα, ‘these things,’ probably refers not to συσσίτια, but to the matters which form the subject of the preceding sentence. Just as some of the syssitias and the guardrooms are to be conjoined, so we must conjoin the temples of the gods and the syssitia of highest authority. As to μὲν δὴ, Eucken remarks (De Partic. Usu, p. 46), ‘diverso modo usurpatur, saepissime quidem ita ut inquisitione quadam finita omnia quae anteceudent comprehendat’: he compares Phys. i. 8. 191 b 27, εἰς μὲν δὴ τρόπος οὖν, ἄλλος δὲ κ.τ.λ., and adds ‘simili modo μὲν οὖν adhibetur.’ See also Bon. Ind. 173 a 38 sqq.

24. τὰς δὲ κ.τ.λ.  The suggestion just made as to some minor syssitia leads on to the question where the highest syssitia of the magistracies’ are to be placed (τὰ κυριότατα τῶν ἀρχείων συσσίτια, not τὰ τῶν κυριώτατων ἀρχείων συσσίτια, because Aristotle has the contrast of ἕνα τῶν συσσιτίων still in his mind), and to the general question how the various syssitia are to be distributed over the city, for it is not proposed that all citizens—priests, magistrates lower and higher, and soldiers—should meet for meals at one and the same spot. On the contrary, the soldiers will have their syssitia on the walls, the highest magistrates and the priests on the hill on which the temples stand, and the less dignified magistracies near the commercial agora. For τὰς τοῖς βείοις ἀποδεδωμένα οἰκήσεις (contrast αἱ ἰδιαί οἰκήσεις, c. i. 1330 b 21), cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 21, τὰ πιστώτων τῶν οἰκοδομομάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς τέτακται πρὸς τοὺς βείους. Τοῖς βείοις = τοῖς τῶν βεόν, ‘the things of the gods,’ and especially ‘religious observances’ (cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 8. 2, and Pol. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 31, τὰ δαμόνια): so Lamb. ‘rebus divinis,’ while Vict. translates ‘divinis naturis.’ Aristotle takes pains to sever the temples and the highest magistrates from all else, keeping them apart even from the free agora, much more from the commercial agora: contrast Plato, Laws 778 C, τὰ μὲν τοῖν εἰς πάντα πέρι τὴν τε ἀγορὰν χρῆ κατασκευάζειν... πρὸς δὲ αὐτοῖς οἰκήσεις τε ἀρχήτων καὶ δικαστηρίων, ἐν οἷς τὰς δίκες ὡς ιερωτάτους οὕσα λήψασθαι τε καὶ διώκονται, τὰ μὲν ως ὀσίων πέρι, τὰ δὲ καὶ τοιούτων βεόν ἰδρύματα, καὶ ἐν τούτοις (i. e. ‘deorum aedibus,’ Stallbaum) δικαστήρια, ἐν οἷς αἱ τῶν ὁμού πρέπουσαι δίκαι πάντως ἐν καὶ ὁσα βασάνων ἀξία ἀδικήματα. The agora at Leontini seems to have been arranged on a plan
somewhat resembling that of Plato. Cp. Polyb. 7. 6, ἢ γὰρ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν πόλις τὸ μὲν διὸ κλίματι τέτραπται πρὸς τὰς ἄρχουσ, ἓστι δὲ διὰ μέσης αὐτῆς αὐλῶν ἐπίπεδος, ἐν οἷς συμβαίνει τὰς τῶν ἄρχεων καὶ δικαστηρίων κατασκευὰς καὶ καθόλου τὴν ἄγορὰν ἴσαρχεων. Aristotle does not tell us where he would place the more important law-courts; he would probably place the less important ones at any rate near the commercial agora. His scheme differs from that of Plato in another point. Plato reserves his acropolis in the Laws (745 B) for Hestia, Zeus, and Athena, whereas Aristotle brings all the gods together on the central hill except those whose temples must necessarily be placed elsewhere. He follows Plato, however, in placing the more important magistracies of the State—its stratēgi, treasurers, and auditors (8 (6). 8. 1322 a 30 sqq. : 6 (4). 15. 1300 b 9 sqq.)—in the immediate neighbourhood of the temples. Their moral influence would thus be strengthened and their sense of responsibility increased. Whether his plan of placing the ‘Downing Street’ of his State on the top of a hill was a wise one, may well be doubted. At Athens the magistrates lived not on the acropolis, but at its foot. It is true that at Athens the Boulê sometimes met in the acropolis (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 20), and that at Megara the offices of the chief magistracy seem to have been in the acropolis (Plut. Ages. c. 27). The wisdom of separating the offices of the major from those of the minor magistracies seems also questionable. But Aristotle’s wish is to gather together in one easily defensible spot the animating forces of his State: cp. De Part. An. 3. 7. 670 a 23, καρδία μὲν οὖν καὶ ἡπαρ πᾶσιν ἄναγκαια τοῖς ἔργοις, ἢ μὲν διὰ τὴν τῆς θερμοτήτος ἄρχην (δεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τινα οἶνον ἐστίναι, ἐν ὃ κείσεται τῆς φύσεως τὸ ζωπροῦν, καὶ τοῦτο εὐθύλακτον, ὠσπερ ἀκρόπολις οὖσα τοῦ σῶματος), τὸ δ’ ἡπαρ τῆς πέψεως χάριν.

26. ὅσα μὴ τῶν ἱερῶν κ.τ.λ. Compare the way in which Plato severs the worship of the gods of the nether world from that of the heavenly gods (Laws 828 C, ἢτι δὲ καὶ τὸ τῶν χθόνιων καὶ δοσὺς αὐθεὸς οὐρανίους ἐπονομαστέων καὶ τὸ τῶν τοῦτοι ἐποίμων οὐ ξυμικτῶν, ἀλλὰ χωριστέων ἐν τῷ τοῦ Πλοῦτωνος μηδὲ τῷ δωδεκάτῳ κατὰ τῶν νόμων ἀποδιδόμας). Among the temples to which Aristotle refers are probably those of Aesculapius, which were often situated outside the city (Plut. Quaest. Rom. c. 94, “διὰ τὶ τοῦ Ἀσκληπιοῦ τὸ ἱερὸν ἔξις πάλιν ἔστι;” πότερον ὅτι τὰς ἐξω διατριβὰς ὑγιεινοτέρας ἐνάρξου εἰς τῶν ἐν τῷ ἁστεί; καὶ γὰρ Ἐλληνες ἐν τόποις καθαροῖς καὶ ὑφόλοις ἐπιεικῶς ἑδρυμένα τὰ Ἀσκληπεία ἔχωνσιν ἢ ὅτι τῶν θεῶν ἔς Ἐπιδαύρου μετάπεμπτον
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ηκεν νομίζουσιν, Ἐπιδαυρίοις δ’ οὗ κατὰ πόλιν ἄλλα πόρρω τὸ Ἀσκληπείων ἐστιν). As to other temples, cp. Plutarch peri ἴσωπιας ap. Stob. Floril. 58. 14, διὰ τούτο τοῦ καὶ τῶν θεῶν τὰ ἱερά, ὡσα ἐκ τοῦ πάλαι ἄρχαίον νεώμασται, τῶι ἐρμηνετάτων χαρίοις οἱ πρῶτοι (ἐνδιψοῦσι), μάλιστα δὲ Μονισῶν τε καὶ Πανὸς καὶ Νυμφὸν καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ ὀσοὶ μουσικὴς ἤγεμόνες θεοὶ. The temples of Eileithyia in the Peloponnesus were often outside the gate of the city (Curtius, Peloponnesos, 2. 536); there was, for instance, a temple of Eileithyia outside the gate in the walls of Corinth which led to Tenea (Paus. 2. 5. 4). The same was occasionally the case with the temples of the Chthonian Demeter; thus at Agrigentum ‘the place chosen for’ the Thesmophoria of Demeter ‘was far beyond the walls of the elder city; it is barely within the walls of the enlarged city’ (Freeman, Sicily, 2. 80), and at Syracuse the temple of Demeter and Persephonē ‘was placed by Gelon outside the bounds of his enlarged city’ (ibid. 2. 213: see Diod. 14. 63. 1). For ὁ νόμος, cp. c. 17. 1336 b 16, εἰ μὴ παρὰ τοις θεοῖς τοιούτους ὄς καὶ τῶι τεθαιμένων ἀπόδοκοις ὁ νόμος. For an instance of the founding of a temple in a given spot in obedience to the commands of Delphi, cp. Paus. i. 13. 8, καὶ σφίσσω ἵστη τοῦ θεοῦ χρήσαντος, ἔνθα ὁ Πύρρος ἐπελεύθησεν, ἐπεὶ δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ ὁ Πύρρος τέθησε. Obedience was proverbially due to a command from Delphi (Xen. Rep. Lac. 8. 5, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀνείλε (i.e. Apollo at Delphi) τῷ παντὶ ἁμείνων εἶναι (πείδευσθαι τοῖς Δυκοῦργον νόμοις), τότε ἀπέδωκεν (ὁ Δυκοῦργος), οὐ μόνον άνομον ἄλλα καὶ ἀνόσιον θεῖο το πυθοχρήσατος νόμοις μὴ πείδευσθαι: Sext. Empir. adv. Math. 8. 443, ὦτε γὰρ ταῖς Χρυσίσπου φωναὶ ἐς πυθοχρήσατος παραγγελμασιν ἀνάγκη πείδευσθαι κ.τ.λ.). Aristotle speaks only of the Delphic oracle, whereas Plato in Laws 738 B sqq. makes a similar reservation in favour of the commands of those of Dodona and Ammon also, and even of τῶι παλαιοὶ λόγοι.

28. εἰ δ’ ἂν κ.τ.λ., ‘and the place would be suitable which is such as to (ὁστις) possess adequate conspicuousness for the enthronement of virtue and a superiority of strength in relation to the adjacent parts of the city.’ For ἄ τοπος ὁστις (not δ’), cp. Xen. Oecon. c. 21. 10, τοῦ δὲ διεσπότου ἐπιφανείτος . . . ἐπὶ τὸ ἐργον, ὁστις δύναται καὶ μέγιστα βλάβαι τῶι κακῶι τῶι ἐργασιῶι καὶ μέγιστα τιμήσει τῶι πρόθυμον. For the use of the word ἐπιφάνεια in a not very dissimilar sense, see the passages collected in Stallbaum’s note on Plato, Alcib. 1. 124 C. Aristotle continues the sentence in καὶ πρὸς τὰ γειτνιώτατα μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἐρμηνεύοντας as if he had written
not ἐπιφανείων ἔχει θεανός, but ἐπιφανεστέρως ἔχει. For the use of ἔχει in this double sense (transitive and intransitive), cp. Plato, Rep. 370 E, and Stallbaum’s note. The ‘virtue’ referred to is apparently that of the gods and the supreme magistrates. That virtue should not be hidden, we see from Paroem. Gr. 2. 760, μὴ κρύπτε τὸ κάλλος ὥσπερ τὸ ποηφάγον: ἐπὶ τῶν διὰ δειλῶν κρυπτόντων καὶ ἢν ἐχοῦσιν ἀρετῆν ἡ δὲ ποηφάγους ζυόν ἐστιν ἐν Ἰνδοῖ (cp. Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 621): Pindar, Nem. 9. 6,

ἐστὶ δὲ τις λόγος ἀνθρώπων, τετελεσμένον ἐσόλον
μὴ χαμαί σιγά καλύψαι:

Hor. Carm. 4. 9. 29,

Paullum sepultae distat inertiae
Celata virtus:

and Plut. Pericl. c. 7, τῆς ἀληθινῆς δ’ ἀρετῆς κάλλιστα φαίνεται τὰ μάλιστα φαινόμενα, καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνθρώπων οὗτοι ὤντα δαμάσασθαι τοῖς ἐκτός ἦσ ὁ καθ’ ἡμέραν βίος τοῖς συνοίνων. Cp. also Simonides, Fragm. 58,

ἔστι τις λόγος
τῶν ἀρετῶν ναείν δυσαμβάτοις ἐπὶ πέτραις.

Temples especially were wont to be placed on conspicuous sites: see vol. i. p. 338, note 1, and compare also Xen. Mem. 3. 8. 10, νεάνις γε μὴν καὶ βωμοῖς χώραν ἐφε εἶναι πρεποδειστήν ἦτις ἐμφανεστάτη αὔστα ἀστιβεστήτη εἰπ’ ἥδε μὲν γὰρ ἰδώντα προεύεξασθαί, ἥδ’ δὲ ἀγῶν ἐχουσα προσεῖναι, Corp. Inscr. Gr. 2140. 35 (referred to by Bursian, Geogr. von Griechenland, 2. 83. 2), where the temple of Apollo in Aegina is described as situate in the ἐπιφανεστάτος τόπος τῆς πόλεως, and Polyaen. Strateg. 5. 1. See also Hom. Hymn. in Aphrod. 100 sq.

That the place assigned to the gods should be strong we see from Hdt. 5. 67; there are obvious reasons why the abode of the chief magistrates should be so.

30. πρέπει δὲ κ.τ.λ. Μέν is answered by δὲ in τὴν δὲ τῶν ὁνίων ἀγοράν, 1331 b 1. Κατασκευήν, ‘provision’ or ‘establishment,’ cp. 1331 b 10, κατασκευάσθαι. The agora here referred to is to be below the hill on which the gods and the magistrates dwell, but still on high ground (cp. 1331 b 12, τὴν ἄνω, sc. ἀγοράν). It would be in this agora that the citizens would come together to elect magistrates, for magistracies were to be elective in Aristotle’s ‘best State’ (c. 4. 1326 b 15), and here too the ecclesia would meet, if indeed, which is uncertain, Aristotle intends an ecclesia to exist. But the main function of this agora seems to be to serve as
a place for the enjoyment of leisure (1331 b 12), the highest and best thing in human life (c. 14. 1333 a 30—b 3). The buildings round it would not be the buildings which usually surrounded an agora. They would include no temples, for the temples were to be on the top of the hill above it, and no public offices either, if the public offices were also to be on the top of the hill, with the exception of those which adjoined the commercial agora. The only buildings which we are distinctly told would adjoin the 'free agora' are those of the gymnasium of the elders. These buildings are placed close to it, partly in order that the shady walks and the streams of the gymnasium may add a fresh charm to the agora, partly in order that the elder citizens may obtain recreation without straying from the region which is especially theirs, partly also perhaps in order that they may be encouraged to carry on in their years of maturity the physical training of their earlier years, and may not be tempted to drop it as they probably often did in ancient Greece. There were already cities in which the agora and the gymnasium were close together—e. g. Elis (Curtius, Peloponneseos, 2. 29) and Sparta (ibid. 2. 234)—but it should be noticed that Aristotle brings into the neighbourhood of his 'free agora' only the gymnasium of the elder men; if he had placed the gymnasium of the younger men near it, he would have seriously altered the character of the spot.

31. οἶνος κ.τ.λ., ' (such an agora) as they call by the name of agora in Thessaly, for example—I mean the agora which they term “free.” With ὄνομαξομένι we should supply ἀγορά: cp. Isocr. Panath. § 183, τοῖς ἀρετῆς ἀντιποιομένοις, μὴ τῆς ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν ὄνομαξομένης καὶ πολλῶν ἄλλων, where ὄνομαξομένης means 'called by that name.' The word ἀγορά was connected in the minds of Greeks with ἀγοράζω, and to use the word as the Thessalians did of a place in which nothing was bought or sold would seem strange to them. Lambinus, followed by Bekk. 2, Bonitz (Ind. 487 b 51), and Sus., would read νομίζομεν in place of ὄνομαξομένων, but it seems to me that this change involves the loss of the point of the passage. For καὶ in the sense of 'for example,' see above on 1255 a 36. Ἐλευθέραν is evidently interpreted by καθαρὰν τῶν ἄνων πάνων in the next line. The word ἐλεύθερος is occasionally used by Aristotle in opposition to ἀναγκαῖος (e. g. in I. ii. 1258 b 11), and we read of τὴν ἀναγκαίαν ἀγορὰ in 1331 b 11. Camerarius (Interp. p. 305) refers to Xen. Cyrop. i. 2. 3 (a passage which Aristotle evidently
remembers), οἱ δὲ Περσικοὶ νόμοι προλαβόντες ἐπιμέλεσθαι ὡς τῇ ἄρχῃν μὴ τοιοῦτο ἔσονται οἱ πολεῖται οὐδείς ποιητοῦ τινος ἢ αἰχθροῦ ἔργον ἐφεσθαι. ἐπιμέλεσθαι δὲ δόθε, ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ἐλευθέρα ἄγορα καλουμένη, ἕνα τὰ τε βασιλεία καὶ τάλα ἄρχεια πεποίηται. ἐντεῦθεν τὰ μὲν ὄνων καὶ οἱ ἄγοραῖοι καὶ αἱ τούτων φωναὶ καὶ ἀπειροκαλίαι ἀπελθάναι εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, ὡς μὴ μνημέω τοὺς τῶν τύρβη τῇ τῶν πεπαίδευμένων ἐκκοσμίᾳ: διήρηται δὲ αὐτῆ τῇ ἄγορᾷ ἡ περὶ τὰ ἄρχεια τέταρτα μέρη τούτων δ' ἐστιν ἐν μὲν παισίν, ἐν δὲ ἐφήβους, ἄλλο τελείοις ἀνδράσιν, ἄλλο τοῖς ὑπὲρ τὰ στρατεύσιμα. Τῇ γεγονόσι. At the opposite pole to an agora of this kind stands the γυναικεία ἄγορα of Menander (Pollux, 10. 18, καὶ μὴ εἰ γυναικέαν ἄγοραν τὸν τόπον οὗ τὰ σκεῦη τὰ τοιοῦτα πιπράσκουσιν ἐθέλους καλεῖν, εὑρὼς ἀν ἐν ταῖς Συναριστῶσιν Μενάνδρου τῷ ὁμοίῳ: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 204). According to Holm, Gr. Gesch. 2. 309 (see also Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 361), the agora at Athens was divided into two parts, a Southern part used for political purposes, and a Northern part used for trade and social intercourse. That Aristotle would not be satisfied with a mere division of one and the same agora into two parts, we see from 1331 b 1, τὴν δὲ τῶν ὄνων ἄγοραν ἐτέραν τε δεί ταύτης εἶναι καὶ χωρίς. As to Sparta and Rome in relation to this matter, see vol. i. p. 339, note 1. The two kinds of agora are traceable in some Southern cities still. At Zara there is a Piazza dei Signori, and also a Piazza dell’ Erbe (T. G. Jackson, Dalmatia, i. 239, 243). At San Marino the Borgo, which is ‘the business centre of the State,’ where the market is held, is some little way below the town of San Marino; ‘it lies on a small plateau beneath the steep long ridge with its three crags crowned with castles’ on which the town is built (E. Armstrong, ‘A Political Survival,’ in Macmillan’s Magazine, No. 375, Jan. 1891, p. 197).

33. καὶ μὴ τέ βάναυσον κ.τ.λ. Supply εἰς ἢν δεῖ. For παραβάλλειν, ‘enter,’ see Bon. Ind. s.v., where De Mir. Auscult. 81. 836 a 28, ὅτε . . . εἰς τούτους τοὺς τόπους παρέβαλε, is quoted among other passages.

35. εἰ ὅ δ’ ἂν κ.τ.λ. At Athens in Aristotle’s day the gymnasia were outside the walls, but Plato had already proposed a change in this respect (see vol. i. p. 338, note 2). One gymnasium at any rate at Thebes was outside the city (Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 25). At Sparta and Elis, on the other hand, the gymnasium was within the city (see above on 30), and this was the case also at Megalopolis (Paus. 8. 31. 8), and apparently at Pellene (Paus. 7. 27. 5: Curtius, Pelopon-
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The gymnasion built by the grave of Timoleon at Syracuse and called Timoleontium was in the agora (Plut. Timol. c. 39). The plan of separating the gymnasion of the elder from that of the younger men may be borrowed by Aristotle from Sparta; we read at any rate in Plut. Cimon, c. 16, of the ephebi and the young men (τῶν ἐφήβων καὶ τῶν νεανίσκων) exercising together in a stoa at Sparta as far back as the time of the great earthquake, when Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus, was King. In the imaginary Persia of Xenophon's Cyropædia the boys, the ephebi, the full-grown men, and those past the military age have each of them a separate part of the agora for their use (Xen. Cyrop. i. 2. 4, quoted above on 31).

38. καὶ τῶν τῶν κόσμων = καὶ ταύτην τὴν τάξιν, 'this arrangement' (or 'institution') 'also', i.e. the gymnasia as well as the syssitia: cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 20, ἄστι δὲ καὶ τάστα ὁμοιόμενα ταῖς ἡλικίαις, and for κόσμον, 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 5, ἦσας ἄν πώς κινήσωσι τῶν κόσμων, and 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 5, τῶν συστήσεων ἡ τάξις.

40. ἣ γὰρ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here implies that there are two kinds of αἴδως, one genuine and the other not (cp. Dio Chrys. Or. 21. 273 M, τῆς ἀληθινῆς αἴδους). Phaedra in the Hippolytus of Euripides (363 Bothe: 385 Dindorf) had already said,

αἴδως τε δισσαὶ δ' εἰσίν, ἥ μὲν οὗ κακή,

ἡ δ' ἄχθιος οὐκών,

but she is distinguishing between the αἴδως which holds back where there should be no holding back and the αἴδως which is not inopportune. Aristotle's distinction, on the contrary, is drawn between the αἴδως which befits freemen and the αἴδως which does not. The δέος οἰκετῶν πρὸς δεσπότας of which we read in Aristot. Fragm. 178. 1507 b 22, 37 was probably miscalled αἴδως by some. True αἴδως was rather to be sought in the respectful awe with which the Spartans regarded the members of the γεροντία (Aeschin. c. Timarch. c. 180, παρελθόν τις τῶν γερόντων, οὐς ἐκεῖνοι καὶ αἰσχύνονται καὶ δεδιώνται: cp. Plut. Apophth. Lac. Polydor. 4. 231 F, ἐρωτηθέν τοι δὲ διὰ τι Σπαρτιᾶται κατὰ πόλεμον κυβυπνεύοντοι ἀνδρείως, 'Ὅτι, ἀεί, αἰδεῖσθαι τῶν ἵδμονας ἐμαυθῶν, οὐ φοβεῖσθαι). The nature of the αἴδως which befits freemen may best be learnt from Plato, Laws 671 C sq. (where it is called θείος φόβος), 647 A, 698 B, and 699 C: we gather that it makes men obedient to law and order and content with their share of speech and silence, and also courageous and

οὐ γάρ ποτ' οὔτ' ἄν εν πόλει νόμοι καλῶς
φέρουσι' ἄν, ἐνθα μὴ καθεστηκη δέος,
οὔτ' ἄν στρατὸς γε σωφρόνως ἄρχοι' ἐτι
μηδὲν φόβου πρόβλημα μηδ' αἰδώς ἔχον,

and the language of Protagoras in Plato, Protag. 322 D. At Sparta the presence of elders was held to be enough, in the absence of magistrates, to produce aидός (cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. 2. 10, ὅσως δὲ μηδ' εἰ ὁ παιδονόμος ἀπέλθοι, ἔρημοι ποτὲ οἱ παῖδες εἰς ἄρχοντος, ἐποίησε τὸν ἀεὶ παρόντα τῶν πολιτῶν κύριον εἶναί καὶ ἐπιτάττειν τοὺς παιδίν, ὡς τι [ἄν] ἀγαθὸν δοκοὶ εἶναι, καὶ κολάζειν, εἴ τι ἀμαρτάνοιεν. τούτῳ δὲ ποιήσας διεῖπραξε καὶ ἀδημονετάρους εἶναι τοὺς παιδίν· οὔτε γάρ οὔτως αἰδώταν ὡς τοὺς ἄρχοντας, and 5. 5: also Plut. Lycurg. c. 17)—indeed, some held that the presence, or even the existence, of ἔρωτες produced αἰδός (Xen. Symp. 8. 33 sqq.: Plato, Symp. 178 D sqq.)—but Aristotle thinks that nothing produces it so well as the visible presence of magistrates: cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 1. 16 and Hell. 7. 3. 6, and on the whole subject Plut. Cleom. c. 9, a passage which shows that Aristotle’s views were much influenced by those which prevailed at Sparta. A current proverb, however, is also probably present to his memory, αἰδός ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. i. 381): cp. Rhet. 2. 6. 1384 a 34, καὶ τὰ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ τὰ ἐν φανερῷ μάλλον (αἰσχύνοντα): ὅθεν καὶ ἡ παροιμία, τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶναι αἰδώ. διὰ τούτου τοὺς αἰ. παρεσομενόν μάλλον αἰσχύνοντα καὶ τοὺς προσέχωντα αὕτοις, διὰ τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἀμφότερα. See Cope’s note on this passage.

1. τὴν δὲ τῶν ὁνίων ἄγοράν κ.τ.λ. This answers to 1331 a 30, 1331 b. πρέπει δ' ὑπὸ μὲν τούτων τῶν τόπων κ.τ.λ. ἡ ἐχουσάν τόπον εὐσυνάγαγον κ.τ.λ., ‘on a site easily made a meeting-place for all commodities, both those coming from the sea and those coming from the territory.’ Compare the use of εἰπαρακάμιστον in c. 5. 1327 a 7 sqq.

4. τιθήμοστ. See critical note.

eἰς ἰερεῖς, εἰς ἄρχοντας. See critical note. Here, as in 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 16 sqq. (cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 17 sqq.), priests are distinguished from magistrates.

5. καὶ τῶν ἱερέων συσσίτια, i.e. as well as the syssitia of the chief magistracies. For the absence of τά before τῶν ἱερέων, see note on 1285 b 12, τοῦ σκῆπτρου ἐπανίτασις. Vict. ‘cum enim frequentes ipsos

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oporteat esse in fanis illis, ut serviant officio suo, quod sine scelere deseri non potest, facilius id praestabunt, si explebunt desideria corporis propinquo in loco." Aristotle's aim probably is to secure more attention to their duties on the part of the priests than was often forthcoming from them. 'By the ἰερὸς νόμος of Oropus (Ἑφ. Ἀρχ. 1885, 94) the priest of Amphiaraus was only required μένειν εἰν τῷ ἱερῷ μὴ ἐλαττῶν ἡ δέκα ἡμέρας τοῦ μηνὸς ἐκάστου. He probably spent the remainder of his time in the city, where he had a civil occupation in addition to his sacred office. Compare von Wilamowitz, Hermes, 21. 93' (Toepffer, Attische Genealogie, p. 160. 2).

περὶ τὴν τῶν ἱερῶν οἰκοδομημάτων. Schn. is probably right in supplying τάξιν. Compare the suppression of διανομήν in Plato, Laws 745 D.

6. τῶν δ' ἄρχειν κ.τ.λ., 'but all the magistracies which have in their charge contracts and indictments in lawsuits and callings into courts and other administrative work of the kind just mentioned.' Aristotle does not rate these functions highly (cp. 6 (4). 15. 1300 b 10 sqq.), nor does Plato (Rep. 425 C sqq.). The magistracies which have the supervision of contracts are here marked off from the agoranomi, though in 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 12, πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἡ περὶ τὴν ἁγοράν, ἐφ' ἂ δεῖ τινὰ ἄρχην εἶναι τὴν ἐφορῶσαν περὶ τε τὰ συμβόλαια καὶ τὴν εὐκοσμίαν, the functions of the agoranomi are implied to include the supervision of contracts. Aristotle is perhaps here thinking of magistrates with whom contracts were registered: see as to these 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 34 sqq. and note.

9. τὴν καλούμενην ἀστυνομίαν. Probably the word ἀστυνομία was not familiar everywhere (cp. 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 23, καλοῦσι δ' ἀστυνομίαν οἱ πλεῖστοι τὴν τοιαύτην ἄρχην). The title, indeed, seems to be too grand for the functions of the office. See note on 1317 a 18. Yet Aristotle adds οἱ καλοῦμενοι to such simple and everyday words as γεωργοὶ and βάναυσοι in 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 40 sq., so that the addition of τὴν καλούμενην here may need no special explanation.

10. πρὸς ἁγορᾶ μὲν δεῖ κ.τ.λ., 'must be established near indeed to some agora and place of public concourse, but the place adapted for the business done by them is [not the place near the free agora, but] the place near the necessary agora, for,' etc. For σύνοδος, see note on 1319 a 31. For τουώτης, cp. 1331 a 28. For the contrast of ἀναγκαία ἁγορᾶ and ἑλευθέρα ἁγορά, cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 10.

12. ἐνσυγχαλάζειν μὲν γὰρ τὴν Ἀνῶ τίθεμεν. For ἐνσυγχαλάζειν, where the infinitive expresses the purpose, see Goodwin, Moods and
Tenses, § 770, who refers among other passages to Plato, Phaedr. 228 E. παρόντος δὲ καὶ Λυσίαν ἐμαυτῶν σας ἐμμελετάτων παρέχειν οὐ πάντων διδόκται, and Thuc. 2. 44. 2. For τὴν ἄνω, cp. Thuc. 1. 93. 9, τὸν τε Πειραιά ὤφθη λύσατε τῆς ἄνω πόλεως. For τίδεμεν, cp. c. 13. 1332 a 30 sq.

ταύτην δὲ πρὸς τὰς ἀναγκαίας πράξεις, ‘and this for necessary activities, [with the supervision of which these magistracies are concerned].’

13. νευμήσθαι δὲ χρῆ κ.τ.λ., ‘and matters in the territory should be distributed on the plan which has been described,’ i.e. so that sites shall be allotted for guard-houses and syssitia of magistrates in them and for temples. Aristotle here has before him Plato, Laws 848 C sqq., and especially δώδεκα κώμας εἶναι χρῆ, κιντὰ μέσον τὸ δωδεκαμηδίων ἐκαστὸν μίαν, εἴ τῇ κώμῃ δὲ ἐκάστη πρώτων μὲν λεπτα καὶ ἀγορᾶν ἐξισθήσασθαι τεῖν τε καὶ τῶν ἐπομένων θείως δαμιώνν . . . πρώτων δὲ οἰκοδομίας εἶναι περὶ τὰ λεπτα ταύτα, ὅπως ἃν ὅ τόπου ὑψήλαττος ἦ, τοῖς φρουροῖς ὑποδοχήν τι μίλιστα εὐερκή. He also follows the example of Plato (Laws 760 B sqq.) in creating the magistracy of the agronomi to keep watch and ward over the rural districts. We nowhere find a mention of ἀγρονόμοι except in the writings of Plato and Aristotle, nor of ἔληπτοι except in the Politics (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 333), though Suidas has an article under the head of ἔληπτοι. See as to these magistrates below on 1321 b 27.

Plato had already established syssitia for the agronomi (Laws 762 B, διατάσσον πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχηγοὺς οἱ πρὸς ἀγρονόμους τὰ δύο ἔτη τοιῶδε των πρῶτων πρώτων μὲν ἀρχῆς ἐκάστους τῶν τόπων εἶναι ἐνσεβεῖς, εἰ ois kain tēn diástin poușteous ὑπαξιῶν). As to the φυλακῆ τῆς χώρας, see Xen. Mem. 3. 6. 10 sqq. (where one of its objects is implied to be the protection of property against robbers), and Rhet. 1. 4. 1360 a 6 sqq. Φυλακτήρια were scattered over Attica (see Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 312, note 1, and Haussoullier, Vie Municipale en Attique, p. 193); we read in Xen. De Vect. 4. 43 of a τεῖχος at Anaphylustus and of another at Thoricus. A description of the castle at Oenoe will be found in Droysen, Gr. Kriegsalterthümer, p. 259. We may perhaps infer from Laws 848 C sqq. (quoted above) that Greek villages often had a fortress on high ground towering over them quite in the style which we associate with the middle ages. These φυλακτήρια furnished quarters for the young citizens of Athens during the year in which they served as περίπολοι (‘Αθ. Πολ. c. 42, § 4, with Sandys’
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note: cp. Eupolis, Inc. Fab. Fragm. 56, καὶ τοὺς περιπόλους ἀπείνει ἐις τὰ φρούρια). How important a part they sometimes played in the defence of the State appears from Diod. 14. 57. 6, where we read that after the city of Messana in Sicily had been captured by the Carthaginians, τὰ κατὰ τὴν χώραν φρούρια, in which most of the citizens had taken refuge, offered a successful resistance.

17. ἔτι δὲ ἵερὰ κ.τ.λ., 'and further temples must be marked out all over the territory, some for gods and others for heroes.' Cp. Plato, Laws 848 D, where it is arranged that in each village there shall be temples of the gods καὶ τῶν ἐπομένων θεῶν δαίμων: elsewhere also in the Laws he recommends worship to be paid not only to gods and heroes but also to δαίμονες (Laws 717 B, μετὰ θεῶν δὲ τούτῳ καὶ τοῖς δαίμονιν ὅ γε ἐμφρον ὀργαίζοι' ἄν, ἡρωι δὲ μετὰ τούτου): cp. 738 B and D). As to the position given by Plato to δαίμονες, see the passages from his writings referred to by Zeller, Plato, Eng. Trans., p. 501, note 38. Plutarch says (De Defect. Orac. c. 10: see also c. 17, and De Iside et Osiride, c. 25), Ἦσιόδος δὲ καθαρῶς καὶ διωρισμένοις πρώτοις ἔξειθηκε τῶν λογικῶν τέσσαρα γένη, θεοὺς, εἶτα δαίμονας πολλῶν κατάλοιπος, εἶτα ἠρωι, εἶτα ἄνθρωπος, τῶν ἠμιθέων εἰς ἠρωι ἀποκριθέντων. Aristotle is acquainted with the distinction between gods and δαίμονες (cp. Perί τῆς καθ ὤπου μαντικῆς, c. 2. 463 b 13 sqq.), and his silence in this passage about δαίμονες is significant. That heroes were believed sometimes to fight for the State which worshipped them, appears from Diod. 15. 53. 4. Attica was full of village-shrines (Liv. 31. 26: see Thirwall, Hist. of Greece, 8. 290). We see from the passage before us that the word ἱερῶν was used of the building dedicated to a hero, though the sacred enclosure round it was properly called not a τέμενος, but a σηκός (Pollux, 1. 6).

18. ἀλλὰ τὸ διατρίβειν νῦν ἀκριβολογομένους κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 34, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρήσιμον μὲν πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν, and 5 (8). 7. 1341 b 29 sqq. Καὶ λέγοντας is added in contradistinction to ποιοῦντας, cp. 20 sqq. Τῶν τοιούτων is repeated in 19 and 22, and in 20 we have τὰ τοιαῦτα. See note on 1284 b 28.

20. οὖ γὰρ χαλεπὸν κ.τ.λ. There is a designed antithesis between the similarly sounding words νοῦσαι and ποίησαι, εὐχῆ and τύχη. For the contrast of νοῦσαι and ποίησαι, cp. Metaph. Z. 7. 1032 b 15 sqq. Aristotle has before him Plato, Laws 745 B, τὸ δὴ μετὰ τούτῳ πρῶτον μὲν τὴν πόλιν ἱδρύοθαι δεῖ τῆς χώρας ὅ τι μάλιστα ἐν μέσῳ,
καὶ τούλα ὅσα πρόσφορα πόλει τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἔχωντα τόπον ἐκλεξάμενον, ἀναφέρει τε καὶ εἰπεῖ διὰδεν χαλεπῶν: cp. also Philib. 16 C, and Philen. Ἐφεβρίτας, Fragm. 2 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 10), χαλεπὸν τὸ ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ κελεύσαι μᾶδιον.


24. Περὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς κ.τ.λ. The contents of the C. 13. thirteenth and following chapters have been sketched in vol. i. p. 340 sqq. The answer given in them to the question here raised is—a State that is to be happy must consist of citizens who are endowed by nature, fortune, and education with the means of making an absolutely, and not merely conditionally, perfect use of virtue, or in other words of citizens who are not only good men (σπουδαῖοι), but are also supplied with an adequate amount of bodily and external goods, i.e. of citizens possessed of ἀρετὴ κεχορηγημένη (1332 a 28 sqq.: 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32 sqq.). Aristotle insists on this because he holds that Plato had starved the life of his guardians in the Republic and robbed it of happiness (2. 5. 1264 b 15 sqq.), and had sought to construct a happy State without making any class of his citizens happy (see vol. i. p. 427 sqq.); he probably thought that Plato would not have made this mistake if he had studied the nature of happiness more closely. Aristotle’s own ideal of a happy State, which is a sound and noble one, is conceived in direct and designed contrast to that of Plato’s Republic and also to the model of the Lacedaemonian State. His ideal State consists of a body of citizens fully supplied with absolute goods and living a life in which work is crowned with leisure, yet unspoilt by their good fortune and enabled by a wisely ordered education to use their leisure aright. For τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς, ‘the constitution itself, as distinguished from matters outside it,’ see above on 1326 b 35, and cp. Plut. De Cohib. Ira, c. 12, where ἀμαρτήματα, and Demosth. in
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Lept. c. 144, καὶ νυνὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ νόμου πᾶς ἐστίν ὁ λόγος, τοῦτο δ' (i.e. to the proposer of the law) οὔδεις ἐστι κίνδυνος. For ἐκ τίνων καὶ ἐκ ποιῶν, cp. c. 10. 1329 b 40, and see above on 1274 b 32. As to the repetition of ἐκ, see critical note.

26. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The apodosis is introduced by μὲν οὖν, 39, as in c. 2. 1324 a 19 sqq., where see note. Plato (Laws 962 A) and Isocrates (De Pace, § 28 and Epist. 6. 8) had already dwelt on the importance in any inquiry of ascertaining both the end and the means of attaining it. For τὸ εὖ, see Bon. Ind. 291 b 25 sqq. Bonitz (Ind. 685 a 40) contrasts τὸν σκοπὸν καὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν πράξεων with 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 14, ποιημένος γὰρ ὁ σκοπὸς πρὸς ἄν ποιοῦνται τὰ τέλος. See note on the latter passage.

28. ἐν δὲ τὰς κ.τ.λ., not ἐν τῷ τάς: see above on 1330 b 10.

30. ταῦτα, i. e. τὸ τέλος and τὰς πρὸς τὸ τέλος φερούσας πράξεις.

31. ἐκκειται καλῶς, 'is proposed well.' Compare (with Liddell and Scott) Megasthenes, ap. Strab. p. 707, τοῖς δ' ὀπλοτοιχίας καὶ καισαρίας μυσιδο καὶ τροφαί παρὰ βασιλέως ἐκκειται. In 28 we have κείσθαι ὀρθῶς, and in 36 τὸν ὑποκειμένων αὐτοῖς ὄραν.

ἐν τῷ πράττειν, as distinguished from τὸ νοεῖν, which is a prior stage: cp. Metaph. Z. 7. 1032 b 6 sqq.

33. ὅτε δὲ κ.τ.λ. The Platonic Socrates in the Republic is charged with this twofold error in 2. 2. 1261 a 11–16.

34. οἶνον περὶ ἱατρικὴν, sc. διαμαρτάνοντοι: cp. Plato, Laws 962 A, ἱατρὸς δῆ τὸ περὶ σῶμα ἀγνοοῦν, ὁ προσεῖπομεν ὑγίειαν νῦν, ἡ νίκην στρατηγὸς ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὀσυ ὑπὸ διήλθομεν, ἔστ' ὅπως ἄν νοῦν περὶ τι τούτων ἄν ἔχων φαίνοιτο;

36. ὄρον here = τέλος.

38. κρατείσθαι, 'obtineri' (Bon. Ind. s. v.): see Vahlen on Poet. 18. 1456 a 10, πολλοὶ δὲ πλέοντες εὖ λόγους κακῶς' δει δὲ ἀμφοτέροι καὶ κρατείσθαι, and cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 8. 1141 b 21, ὅστε δὲ ἀμφοτέροι ἔχοιν, ἡ ταύτην μάλλον. See vol. i. p. 341, note i.

τὰς εἰς τὸ τέλος πράξεις. We expect πρὸς in place of εἰς, but cp. c. 11. 1330 b 16, χωρίς τὰ τε εἰς τροφὴν ὑδάτα καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην χρείαν, and c. 15. 1334 a 14, τὰς εἰς τὴν σχολήν ἀρετάς. Cp. also 'Ath. Pol. c. 23, τὰ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον.

39. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦ τε εὖ ἵνα καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐφιέναι πάντες, φανερὸν. Here the apodosis begins. Aristotle perhaps remembers Plato, Meno 78 A, ἐστὶν οὖν ὅτις βουλεῖται άθλος καὶ κακοδαίμονα εἰναι; and the argument which follows. Cp. also Rhet. 1. 5. 1360 b 4, σχέδον δὲ καὶ ἴδια ἐκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ πάσι σκοπός τις ἐστὶν, οὗ στοχα-
ξώμηνα καὶ ἀροῦνται καὶ φεύγουσιν' καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰσεῖν ἢ τ' εὐθαμονία καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῆς.

40. ἀλλὰ τούτων κ.τ.λ. As to those who have not the power to attain happiness, cp. c. 8. 1328 a 38 sqq. In some of these there is a defect of φύσις (c. 13. 1332 a 40 sqq.: 7 (5). 12. 1310 a 8 sqq.); this is the case with natural slaves (3. 9. 1280 a 33 sqq.). In others there is a defect of τίχη (41 sqq.: cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 27, μὴτε πρὸς παπαίειν ἢ φύσεως δεῖται καὶ χορηγίας τυχῆς). Compare Plato, Laws 747 C (quoted in vol. i. p. 341, note 2) and 934 D.

41. δεῖται γάρ κ.τ.λ. This is added in explanation of διὰ τῶν τίχην, for a defect of χορηγία is due to a defect of fortune. Καὶ χορηγίας τιμῶς, as well as of φύσις.


2. οἱ δὲ εὐδόκειται κ.τ.λ. Εὐδόκειται, 'from the outset,' because, unlike the others, who start afloat but fail later on, they are wrong at starting. So we read in 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 31 sqq. that there are persons who seek happiness in the pleasures of recreation, mistaking them for the pleasures of the true end of life. Cp. Eurip. Hippol. 360 Bothe (382 Diendorf), where some are said to miss what is good,

ηδωνίν προθείτες ἀντὶ τοῦ καλοῦ
ἀλην τιν',

and Arrian, Epictet. 3. 23. 34.

7. φαμέν δὲ κ.τ.λ. As to the question whether we have here a reference to the Nicomachean Ethics, see vol. i. Appendix F. Aristotle has already given part of this definition in c. 8. 1328 a 37, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐστὶν εὐθαμονία τὸ ἁρμοσὺν, αὐτὴ δὲ ἀρετὴς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρήσις τις τέλειος. We find a similar definition of εὐθαμονία ascribed to the Peripatetics in Stob. Ecl. Eth. 2. 6. 12, εὐθαμονίαν δὲ εἶναι χρήσιν ἀρετῆς τέλειος ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ προηγουμένη . . . προηγουμένη δὲ τῆς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειας (sc. εἶναι δείκτος διὰ τὸ πάντως ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἀγαθοῖς ὑπάρχειν: compare another Peripatetic definition of εὐθαμονία there given, χρήσιν ἀρετῆς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἀνεμπόδιστον. Speusippus
had defined ἑὐδαίμονία as ἦς τελεία ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν οἱ ἦς ἀγαθῶν (Zeller, Plato, Eng. Trans., p. 579. 62), but Aristotle substitutes χρήσις for ἦς. For καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἥδυκοις, compare the frequent use of καὶ, when the ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι are adduced (e.g. in c. 1. 1323 a 22, καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοις, Eth. Nic. i. 13. 1102 a 26 and 6. 4. 1140 a 2 sq., and Metaph. M. 1. 1076 a 28), and also Eth. Nic. 6. 3. 1139 b 26, δόστερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν. Π’ add διωρίσμεθα after καὶ, but probably wrongly; this may be a gloss on φαιμών which has crept into the text.

9. καὶ ταύτην κ.τ.λ., i.e. 'and this perfect use of virtue not an use of virtue conditionally, but absolutely;' or, in other words, not a merely necessary use of virtue, but a noble use of virtue. A conditional use of virtue is an use of virtue which is called for under certain circumstances: for instance, if an offence has been committed, it is under the circumstances an use of virtue to punish the offender, but this is not an absolute use of virtue, because it is an use of virtue dictated by circumstances not desirable in themselves; it is the adoption and acceptance of an evil for the sake of the good which under the circumstances it will ultimately produce, whereas an absolute use of virtue is concerned with absolute goods, not with evils which are under given circumstances goods; it is concerned with the calling into existence of honours and wealth. In depicting the life of the citizens of his 'best State,' Aristotle often has in his mind the model furnished by the life of the gods (e.g. in c. 1. 1323 b 23 sqq. and c. 3. 1325 b 28 sqq.), and here too he probably remembers the θεοί δωτρίες ἑάυτων of Homer (Odys. 8. 325): cp. Isocr. Philip. § 117, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν θεῶν τοὺς μὲν τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰτίους ἢμῖν ὅτι ἐξ ὅλοπιοὺ προσαγωγομένους, τοὺς δ’ ἐπὶ ταῖς συμφοραῖς καὶ ταῖς τιμωρίαις ταταγμένους δυσχερεστέρας τὰς ἐποιήμας ἔχοντας, καὶ τῶν μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας καὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ νεός καὶ βωμοὺς ἱδρυμένους, τοὺς δ’ οὗτ’ ἐν ταῖς εὐχαὶς οὗτ’ ἐν ταῖς δυσίαις τιμωμένους, ἀλλ’ ἀποστομᾶσι αὐτῶν ἡμῖν ποιομένους: Menander, Κόλαξ Fragm. 3, with Meineke's note, Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 153: and the remarks of Plutarch on the epithet 'Olympian' conferred on Pericles in Pericl. c. 39, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τὴν μειρακιώδη καὶ σοβαρὰν ἐκείνην προσωνυμιάν ἐν τούτῳ ποιεῖν ἄνεπίφθονον καὶ πρέπονσαν, οὕτως εὐμενὲς ἠθος καὶ βιον ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ καθαρόν καὶ ἀμίαντον Ὄλυμπιον προσαγωγοῦσα, καθ’ όπερ τὸ τῶν θεῶν γένος ἀξιούμεν αἰτίου μὲν ἀγαθῶν ἀναίτιον δὲ κακῶν πεφυκός ἤρχει καὶ βασιλεύον τῶν ὄστων. For the association of τέλειος and ἄπλος, cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 15. 1138 a 32, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδίκειν μετὰ κακίας καὶ ψεκτόν,
11. οὖν τὰ περὶ τὰς δικαίας πράξεις κ.τ.λ., 'as for instance, if we take just actions' (i. e. uses of the virtue justice), 'just vengeances and punishments proceed indeed from virtue' (i. e. are uses of virtue), 'but they are necessary,' i. e. not desirable in themselves, 'and are noble only in a necessary way.' Aristotle here has before him, and slightly corrects, Plato, Laws 728 C, τοῦτο οὖν δὴ τὸ πάθος δικὴ μὲν οὐκ ἐστὶ—καλὸν γὰρ τὸ γε δίκαιον καὶ ἡ δίκη—τιμωρία δὲ, αὐθεντικὸς ἀκόλουθος πάθη, ὃς ὁ τε τυχὼν καὶ μὴ τυχὴνν ἀδίκιος, μὲν οὖν ἑαυτοῦ ὁμογενῆς, δὲ, ἣν έτερον πολλοὶ σῶζονται, ἀπολύμενον. In Laws 859 D—860 B the difficulty of classing just punishments either as καλὰ or as αἰσχρὰ is dwelt on, and Aristotle himself says in Rhet. 1. 9. 1366 b 30, καὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ δικαιῶν (sc. πεπραγμένα) ἔργα (sc. ἀνάγκη καλὰ εἶναι), πάθη δὲ οὖ: it would seem, however, from the passage before us, that just vengeances and punishments to καλῶς ἀνάγκαιος ἔχουσιν. For the difference between τιμωρία and κόλασις, cp. Rhet. 1. 10. 1369 b 12, διαφέρει δὲ τιμωρία καὶ κόλασις: η μὲν γὰρ κόλασις τοῦ πάθωσθος ἔνεκα ἔστιν, ἡ δὲ τιμωρία τοῦ ποιούσθος, ὡς ἀποκληρωθή, Eth. Nic. 4. 11. 1 126 a 26 sqq., and Gell. 6. 14, puniendi peccatis tres esse debere caussas existimatum est. Una est quae νουθεσία vel κόλασις vel παραίνεσις dicitur; cum poena adhibetur castigandi atque emendandi gratia, ut is qui fortuito deliquit attentior fiat correctionque. Altera est quam ii qui vocabula ista curiousius divisierunt τιμωρίαν appellant. Ea caussa animadverteri est, cum dignitas auctoritasque eius in quem est peccatum tuenda est, ne praetermissa animadversio contemptum eius pariat et honorem levet; idcircoque id ei vocabulum a conservatione honoris factum putant. For ἀπ' ἀρετῆς, cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 11, πράξεων τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς, and Plut. Pericl. c. 1, ἐν τοῖς ἀπ' ἀρετῆς ἔργοις.
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14. αἱρετώτερον μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Gorg. 507 D and 478 C: also Laws 628 C sqq. For μὲν solitarium, see above on 1262 a 6 and 1270 a 34. Here the suppressed clause is ‘though it is desirable that, if punishments are needed, they should be inflicted.’

15. αἱ δὲ ἑπὶ τὰς τιμὰς κ.τ.λ., ‘but actions with a view to [the production of] honours and wealth are the noblest actions in an absolute sense’: cp. 18, κατασκευαὶ γὰρ ἁγαθῶν εἰσὶ καὶ γεννήσεις. For the thought, cp. De Gen. An. 2. 1. 731 b 25, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τὸ θείον αἵτινες δὲ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν τοῦ βελτίων ἐν τοῖς ἐνδεχόμενοι, and Rhet. 1. 9. 1366 a 36, ἁρετὴ δὲ ἑστὶ μὲν δύναμις, ὡς δοκεῖ, ποριστικὴ ἁγαθῶν καὶ φιλακτική, καὶ δύναμις εὐργετικὴ πολλὰς καὶ μεγίλων, and 1. 6. 1362 b 2, καὶ τὰς ἁρετὰς δὲ ἀνάγκη ἁγαθῶν εἶναι κατὰ γὰρ ταῦτα εἰς τὸ διάκειναι οἱ ἔξωντες, καὶ ποιητικὰ τῶν ἁγαθῶν εἰσὶ καὶ πρακτικαί. Prodicus, indeed, according to Plato, Charm. 163 D, would give the name of πρᾶξεις only to τὰς τῶν ἁγαθῶν ποιήσεις.

16. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἑτέρων κ.τ.λ. Τὸ ἑτέρων = αἱ δικαιοὶ τιμιώτατοι καὶ κολάσεις. As Schneider points out in his Addenda (2. 506), Sepulveda (p. 229: see his note, p. 230 b, which Schneider quotes) translates, ‘illud enim est malum tollere,’ but, as αἱρεσὶς can hardly bear this meaning, Schn. would read ἀναίρεσις in place of it, and this reading is adopted by Bekk. and Sus. The change certainly makes the antithesis neater, for κακοῦ τῶν ἀναίρεσις answers well to κατασκευαὶ ἁγαθῶν καὶ γεννήσεις, and it receives support (which has not hitherto been observed, so far as I have seen) from Plato, Gorg. 478 C sqq. and esp. 478 D, ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ δίκην διδώσα μεγίστου κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγῇ ἢν, πονηρίας; ΠΩΛ. ἢν γὰρ. ΣΩ. σωφρονιζέτε γὰρ σου καὶ δικαστέρων ποιεῖ καὶ λατρική γεγένεται πονηρίας ἢ δίκη. Thus Plato at any rate regarded punishment as the ‘removal of an evil,’ the ‘evil’ being the wickedness of the offender, but the question is whether Aristotle took this view of punishment. This is very doubtful. He says indeed in Rhet. 1. 14. 1374 b 31, καὶ [ἀδίκημα μείζον ἐστιν] οὐ μὴ ἐστι οὐσίας χαλεπῶν γάρ καὶ ἀδύνατον. καὶ οὐ μὴ ἐστὶ δίκην λαβεῖν τῶν παθῶν ἀνισίων γὰρ ἡ γὰρ δίκη καὶ κολάσεις οὐσίς (cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1104 b 16 sqq. and Eth. Eud. 2. 1. 1220 a 35 sqq.). But it is one thing to say that punishment heals the injustice committed, and another to say that it heals and removes the wickedness of the wrong-doer. I incline on the whole to think that the reading of the MSS., κακοῦ τῶν αἵρεσις, is right, and to regard the ζημία as the κακὸν τι referred to: cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 7. 1132 a 15, τὸ δὲ κέρδος καὶ ἡ ζημία τὸ μὲν πλέον τὸ δὲ ἐλαττον ἐναντίως,

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tō μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πλέον τοῦ κακοῦ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀνθρώπων
megálês eiðhýnas didósaün τῷ γὰρ eiðhýnai bhláthi tis
dikaiá estin (where eiðhýnai means the penalty inflicted as a result of the eiðhýna properly
so called, see Bernays, Dialoge des Aristoteles, p. 16). The
meaning of the sentence will then be that just punishments are ‘a choice
of what is in a degree an evil’ (i. e. of bhláthi or ζημία). This interpre-
tation harmonizes well with what follows in 19 sqq. (see the
next note); it also has the merit of giving the proper force to
κακοῦ τινός, where τινός softens κακοῦ and marks the contrast with
τὸ ἀπλῶς κακῶν (cp. 1. 6. 1255 a 22, ἀντεχόμενοι τινες, ὡς κινοτά, δικαῖον
tiñs, ὑπὲρ νόμος δικαιῶν τι), and with the φαιλαί τύχαι mentioned in
20. Evil is not a fit object of choice; men should choose the
good (Plato, Protag. 358 C sq.: Gorg. 499 E: Isocr. De Pace § 106:
cp. also Plut. Galba, c. 14, κατ’ οὖδένα λογισμόν οὖθε ἀρέσειν ἀμεινόνων).

19. χρήσατο δ’ ἐν κ.π.λ. Aristotle continues, ‘Yes, and a good
man would make an in some sense noble use of virtue in relation
not only to evils which are in the particular case goods (such as
just punishments), but also to absolute evils like poverty, disease,
and other evil contingencies; still beatitude is not to be found in
them but in their opposites. For the use which the good man
makes of things which are not goods to him—and no things are
goods to him which are not absolute goods—is not an absolutely
noble use, and therefore happiness is not to be found in it, for we
have defined happiness to be an absolutely noble use of virtue.’
Aristotle perhaps has before him a saying which Plutarch places
in the mouth of Epaminondas in De Gen. Socr. c. 14, ἀλλ’ ἀπάγ-
gelle tois ékei γνωρίμοις, ὅτι κάλλιστα μὲν αὐτοὶ πλούτῳ χρόνιατ, καλῶς
dὲ πενία χρωμένους αὐτὸθε φίλους ἔχουσιν: cp. Isocr. Hel. § 8, τοσοῦτον
δ’ ἐπιδεδωκέναι πεποίηκαι τῷ ψευδολογεῖν, ὥστ’ ἦδη τινές, ὀράντες τοῦτος
ἐκ τῶν τοιοῦτων ὑφελομένους, τολμᾶσθε γράφειν, ὡς ἄστων ὧ τῶν πτωχευόν-
tων καὶ φυγόντων βίος ξηλωστότερος ἃ ὧ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, and Hor.
Carm. 4. 9. 46,

rectius occupat
Nomen beati, qui deorum
Muneribus sapienter uti
Duramque callet pauperiem pati.

Φαύλη τύχη is a milder term than δυστυχία: cp. Phys. 2. 5. 197 a 25,
tύχη δὲ ἀγαθή μὲν λέγεται ὅταν ἄγαθον τι ἀποθῆ, φαύλη δὲ, ὅταν φαύλον τι,
edutyxia δὲ καὶ δυστυχία, ὅταν μέγεθος ἔχοντα ταῦτα, and Metaph. K. 8.
What Aristotle includes under φαύλαι τέχναι may be gathered from Eth. Nic. 3. 9. 1115 a 10, φοβούμεθα μὲν ὄν πάσα tά κακά, οὖν ἄδοξιάν πενίαι νόσου ἄφιλλαν βάναυσον. A reminiscence of the passage before us may be traced in Stob. Ecl. Eth. 2. 6. 12, ἐπεί καὶ ἐν κακοῖς ἀρετῆς χρῆσαι ἂν καλῶς ὁ σπουδάσως, οὐ μὴ γέ μακάριος ἦσται. For the conjunction of penia and nósoς, cp. Bacchylides i. 32 sq. and Plato, Protag. 353 D.

21. καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The reference to ἥδικοι λόγοι may be a reference to Eth. Nic. 3. 6. 1113 a 25, τῷ μὲν οὖν σπουδαίῳ τὸ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν (sc. βουλητῶν φατένων βουλητῶν) εἶναι (see Sus. 4. i. p. 530), and Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 a 21, τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσις ἄγαθόν καὶ τῷ ἐπεικείᾳ: in some respects, however, we trace a nearer approach to the definition before us in Eth. Eud. 7. 15. 1248 b 26, ἄγαθον μὲν οὖν ἀστικὸν ἡ τῇ φύσις ἄγαθά ἀστικὴ, and in Magn. Mor. 2. 9. 1207 b 31, ἀστικὴν οὖν ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἄγαθος ὁ τὰ ἀπλῶς ἄγαθα ἀστικὴ καὶ τὰ ἀπλῶς καλὰ καλὰ ἀστικὴν (both passages referred to by Eaton), but there is nothing in either passage about διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν. For τὰ ἀπλῶς ἄγαθὰ cp. Top. 3. 1. 116 b 8 sqq. For the thought compare Plato, Laws 661 C sqq.

23. δὴ λοι ὧν ὀτι κ.τ.λ., ‘and it is evident that [just as absolute goods are absolutely good and noble, so] these uses also’ (i.e. the good man’s uses of absolute goods). ‘are necessarily absolutely good and noble.’

25. διὸ κ.τ.λ., ‘hence,’ i.e. because men see that the uses made by the σπουδαίος of absolute goods are absolutely good and noble and confer happiness on him, men think that external goods are the causes of happiness, forgetting that the σπουδαίος owes his happiness not to them but to his own virtue, and that even in his case they are only conditions, not causes, of happiness, while in the case of those who are not σπουδαίοι they may be the causes not of happiness, but of unhappiness, inasmuch as they may not be goods at all to them. For ἄνθρωποι, cp. Plato, Symp. 189 C, ἐμαί γὰρ δοκοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι παντελῶς τὴν τοῦ ἔρωτος δύναμιν οὐκ ἀνεβησαί, and 205 E, ὃς οἴδει γε ἀλλὰ ἐστίν οὐ ἐρώσιν ἄνθρωποι ἦ τοῦ ἄγαθον, where see Stallbaum’s critical note. We have οἱ ἄνθρωποι in 2. 7. 1267 a 2 sqq. and in Rhet. i. 1. 1355 a 15, just as we sometimes have ἄνθρωπος and sometimes ὁ ἄνθρωπος (see critical note on 1253 a 2). For the fact that men take external goods to be the causes of happiness, cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 9. 1099 b 6 sqq. and 7. 14. 1153 b 21 sqq., and Plut. De Virt. et Vit. c. 1.

27. αἰτιώτο. For the absence of τις, cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 5. 1113 a 2, ei δὲ υἱὸς δοῦλου ἔσται, εἰς ἀπεραύ ζείη, and other passages collected by Bonitz, Ind. 589 b 47 sqq.

28. ἀναγκαῖον τοῖν κ. τ. λ., 'it is necessary, therefore, as a result of what has been said,' etc.: see above on 1267 b 14. Τὰ μὲν, i. e. the external goods which are the gifts of Fortune. For ἵππαρ-χείν and παρασκεύασαν see note on 1331 b 21.

29. διὸ κ. τ. λ. These words are susceptible of two interpretations: either we may take καθεν' εἰκόν as adverbial to εἰκόμεθα and translate with Sepulv. 'precibus optamus' (so Vict. and Lamb.), or we may supply εἰναι and translate 'hence in respect of those things over which fortune is supreme we pray that the composition of the State may be all that can be wished.' Perhaps the second interpretation is the better. Compare with the passage before us Soph. Fragm. 731, τὰ μὲν διακάτα μανθάνω, τὰ δ' εὑρετά 
ζητῶ, τὰ δ' εὐκτά (αἰ. ἑπερά) παρὰ θεῶν ὑπησάμην.

31. τὸ δὲ κ. τ. λ. Cp. 2. 5. 1263 a 39, ὅπως δὲ γίνονται τοιούτοι, τοῦ νομοβιβτοῦ τοῦτ' ἔργον ἰδιῶν ἐστιν. 'Επιστήμης καὶ προαρέσεως, because science is not enough by itself: cp. 3. 13. 1284 a 1, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀρίστην (sc. πολιτείαν πολιτῆς ἐστίν) ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαρούμενος ἀρχεσθαι καὶ ἀρχεῖν πρὸς τὸν βίον τῶν καὶ ἀρετῆν. It should be noticed that if, as we are told in 39 sq., φύσις is one of the sources of virtue, it does not entirely depend on the lawgiver whether the citizens are virtuous or not. It is impossible, for instance, to turn barbarians into Greeks: still much may be done by attention to marriage and rearing to secure that the 'nature' of the citizens is what it should be.

32. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ. τ. λ. It is implied here that a man might be a citizen without sharing in the constitution: see vol. i. p. 229.

34. ἡμῖν δὲ κ. τ. λ., 'but in our State all the citizens share in the constitution, [so that all our citizens must be good].' See as to this vol. i. p. 324 and note 1, and Appendix B sub fin. Here Aristotle seems to use the word πολίται in a sense exclusive of the νέωτεροι, or in other words οἱ ὀπλα κεκτημένοι, for in c. 10. 1329 b 36 it is implied that οἱ ὀπλα κεκτημένοι do not share in the constitution.

35. τοῦτ' ἄρα σκεπτέον, πῶς ἄνηρ γίνεται σπουδαίος. In some lines of Eupolis (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 457) Nicias asks Aristides,

πῶς γὰρ ἐγένος δίκαιος;
and Aristides answers,

\[ \eta \, \mu\nu \, \phi\upsilon\iota\sigma \, \tau\, \mu\epsilon\gamma\mu\sigma\tau\omega\nu \, \eta\nu, \, \epsilon\pi\epsilon\iota\tau\a\, \delta\epsilon \, \kappa\alpha\gamma\omega \, \pi\rho\o\theta\iota\mu\omicron\upsilon\sigma\circ\upsilon\nu\lambda\alpha\mu\beta\alpha\nu\a\o\nu. \]

36. καὶ γάρ κ.τ.λ. It is more desirable that each individual citizen should be good than that all the citizens collectively should be good but not each individual citizen, because in the former case not only will each citizen be good but all will be good, and a good which includes another is more desirable than the good which it includes (Top. 3. 2. 117 a 16 sqq.). It appears from 2. 5. 1264 b 17, ἀδύνατον δὲ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὀλὴν (sc. τὴν πόλιν), μὴ τῶν πλείστων ἢ μὴ πάντων μερῶν ἢ τινῶν ἐχόντων τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, that a State may be happy if only some of its members are happy.

38. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. For ἀγαθοὶ καὶ σπουδαῖοι, cp. Rhet. 2. 9. 1387 b 7. Cp. also Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 12, ἄγαθον καὶ δικαίους. Eaton and Congreve compare Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1179 b 20, γίνεσθαι δ’ ἄγαθον οὐνται οἱ μὲν φύσει, οἱ δ’ ἐθείοι, οἱ δὲ διδαχῇ (= λόγῳ): cp. also Eth. Nic. 1. 10. 1099 b 9 sqq. The passage before us is perhaps present to the mind of the writer of [Plut.] De Liberos Educandis, c. 4. 2 Λ, ὥσ εἰς τὴν παντελὴ δικαιοπραγίαν τρία δεὶ συνδραμεῖν, φύσιν καὶ λόγον καὶ ἔθος· καλῶ δὲ λόγον μὲν τὴν μάθησιν, ἔθος δὲ τὴν ἀσκήσιν (already quoted by Eaton). Theognis (429-438) and Pindar (Olymp. 9. 100 sqq.: Nem. 3. 40 sqq.: see L. Schmidt, Ethik d. alten Griechen, 1. 158 sqq.) are already familiar with the contrast of nature and teaching as sources of virtue, and both insist on the importance of nature, but the maxim in the form in which it appears in the passage before us is perhaps found earliest in Protag. Fragm. 8 (Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. 2. 134), φύσεος καὶ ἀσκήσεος διδασκαλία δέεται, words which refer to the teaching not only of virtue, but of other things, and which are all the more remarkable as coming from Protagoras, because there were sophists who promised to teach virtue without dwelling on the necessity of natural aptitude and of practice (Plato, Meno 95 B). Compare (with Camerarius, Interp. p. 309) Hippocr. Lex, vol. i. p. 3 Kühn, if this work is by Hippocrates, χρή γὰρ ὅτις μελεί ἤτεριν ξύνειν ἄτρεκεως ἀρμόξεσθαι, τῶνδε μὲν ἐπήξιον γενέσθαι, φύσιος, διδασκαλία, τρόπον εὐφύειος, παιδομάθη, φιλοσοφία, χρόνου. The saying reappears in Xen. Mem. 3. 9. 2, Plato, Phaedr. 269 D, and Isocr. De Antid. § 187. See also Wytenbach’s note on the passage of [Plut.] De Liberos Educandis quoted above. *Εθος is mentioned before λόγος, because
education through habit precedes education through the reason

40. καὶ γὰρ φῶναι κτ.λ. Aristotle perhaps remembers a saying
1. 33, "Ερμανττος δ' ἐν τοῖς βλους εἰς τούτον (i.e. Thales) ἀναφέρει τὸ
λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τίνων περὶ Σωκράτους: 'έφασκε γὰρ, φησί, τρίων τούτων
ένικα χάριν ἐξει τῇ τύχῃ, πρῶτον μὲν ὃτι ἄνθρωπος ἑγεμόνη καὶ οὐ θηρίων,
εἶτα ὃτι ἄνηρ καὶ οὐ γυνῆ, τρίτων ὃτι "Ελλην καὶ οὐ βάρβαρος, and Plut.
Marius, c. 46. Πλάτων μὲν οὖν ἤδη πρὸς τῷ τελευταί γενόμενον ὤμει τῶν
αὐτοῦ δαίμονα καὶ τῆς τύχης, ὃτι πρῶτον μὲν ἄνθρωπος, εἶτα "Ελλην, οὐ
βάρβαρος οὖν ἔξει τῇ τύχῃ πρῶτον μὲν ἄνθρωπος, εἶτα "Ελλην, οὐ
βάρβαρος οὖν ἔξει τῇ τύχῃ πρῶτον μὲν ἄνθρωπος, εἶτα "Ελλην, οὐ
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βάρβαρος οὖν ἔξει τῇ τύχῃ πρῶτον μὲν ἄνθρωπος, εἶτα "Ελλην, οὐ
βάρβαρος οὖν ἔξει τῇ τύχῃ πρῶτον μὲν ἄνθρωπος, εἶτα "Ελλην, οὐ
βάρβαρος οὖν ἔξει τῇ τύχῃ πρῶτον μὲν ἄνθρωπος, εἶτα "Ελλην, οὐ
βάρβαρος οὖν ἔξει τῇ τύχῃ πρῶτον μὲν ἄνθρωπος, εἶτα "Ελλην, οὐ

41. οὖτω καὶ ποιῶν τινα τῷ σώμα καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ, 'so also of
a certain quality in body and soul.' For οὖτω see critical note.
Aristotle continues with οὖτω as if ἄστερε, and not πρῶτον, had
preceded, for I do not think that οὖτω here means 'then,' as it
seems to do in Rhet. 3. 19. 1419 b 15. That a man may be born
too faulty to be made good by education, we see from 7 (5). 12.
1316 a 8 sqq.

42. ἐνα τε κτ.λ., 'and in respect of some qualities it is no good
to be born this or that, for habits cause them to change; some
qualities, in fact, are made by nature to be susceptible of change
under the influence of habits in two directions, towards that which
is worse and that which is better.' I follow Stahr and Welldon in my
rendering of ἐνα τε οὐδὲν ὅφελος φῶναι: Sepulv. Vict. and Sus. less
well make ἐνα the subject of φῶναι. In ἐνα Aristotle refers to those
elements in man which may be made better or worse by good or bad
habitation, for instance the emotions: see note on 1253 a 34,
and cp. Plut. Themist. c. 2, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πρῶταις τῆς νεότητος ὅρμαι
ἀνώμαλος ἢν (ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς) καὶ ἀστάθμητος, ἄτε τῇ φύσει καθ' ἀυτὴν
χρώμονος ἄνευ λάθους καὶ παιδείας ἐπ' ἀμφότερα μεγάλα ποιημένα μετα-
βολὰς τῶν ἐπιτηθεμάτων καὶ πολλάκις ἐξοισαμένη πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον, ὡς
ὑπέρον αὐτὸς ἄμολογης, καὶ τοὺς τραχύτατος πώλους ἁρίστους ἵππους
γίνεσθαι φάσκων, ὅταν ἦς προσηκε τῷ χωσὶ παιδείας καὶ καταρτίσεως,
Nic. c. 9, οὖτως ἢ 'Αλκιβιάδου φῦσες ἐπ' ἀμφότερα πολλή ῥνίσα καὶ
λαμπρὰ μεγάλοι ἐνεδόκην ἄρχας νεωτερισμῶν, and Coriolan. c. 1.
For ἐπαμφοτερίζοτα ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον, cp. Magn. Mor. i.
35. 1197 a 30, ἢ ὑπὲρ ἀπάντων ἐπαμφοτερίζομεν
πρὸς τὸ καὶ εἶναι ταύτα οὖτω καὶ μὴ εἶναι. For διὰ τῆς φύσεως, cp. διὰ
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τριῶν (i. e. φύσις, ἔθος, λόγος), 39. Elsewhere we find ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως, as in Rhet. 2. 12. 1389 a 19 sq. and De Part. An. 2. 13. 657 a 31 sq. (Eucken, Praepositionen, p. 73).

1332 b. 3. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα κ. τ. λ. For τῇ φύσει ζῆ (‘live guided by nature’), cp. Metaph. A. 1. 980 b 25, τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα (ζῆα) ταῖς φαντασίαις ζῆ καὶ τοῖς μνήμαις, ἐμπειρίας δὲ μετέχει μικρὸν τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος καὶ τέχνη καὶ λογισμὸς, Eth. Eud. 2. 8. 1224 a 27, τῇ ὁρέξει ζῆ, and Rhet. 2. 12. 1389 a 35, τῷ γὰρ ζῆςι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ λογισμῷ (cp. 2. 13. 1390 a 16, καὶ μᾶλλον ζῶσι κατὰ λογισμὸν ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἕθος).

For the implied contrast between φύσις and λόγος, cp. 1. 2. 1252 a 28 sqq., where a contrast between φύσις and προαίρεσις is implied.

4. μικρὰ δ’ ἐνα καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν, ‘and some to a small extent guided by habits also.’ For μικρά, cp. Plato, Rep. 404 Α, ἐὰν συμκρά ἐκδοθῇ τῆς τεταγμενῆς διαίτης, and 527 Α, ὅσοι καὶ συμκρά γεωμετρίας ἐμπειροῦν. As to the habituation of animals, cp. [Plut.] De Virtute Morali, c. 4, κύνας καὶ ἱππαίος καὶ ὀρνιθίας ἀκόμοιρους ὀρνάτες, ἔθει καὶ τροφή καὶ διδασκαλία φωνᾶς τε συνετάς καὶ πρὸς λόγον ὑπηκοόν κυνήσεις καὶ σχέσεις ἀποδιδόντας, καὶ πράξεις τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἠμῖν ἔχονται.

5. μόνον, sc. τῶν ζῴων: cp. 1. 2. 1253 a 9, λόγον δὲ μόνον ἀνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζῴων.

ἄστε δει κ. τ. λ., ‘and so [in his case] these three things must harmonize with each other, [for it will not do to leave reason out,] since men are led by reason to do many things contrary to habituation and to nature, if they are persuaded that these things are better done otherwise [than as habit and nature dictate].’ We learn from c. 15. 1334 b 9 sqq. that the three things must not only harmonize, but harmonize in the best way, i.e. by all being adapted to the best end. Plato speaks of education in Laws 653 B as being the bringing of the child’s feelings of pain and pleasure into harmony with reason (cp. Rep. 401 C, καὶ εἴθευς ἐκ παῖδων λανθανὴ ἐις ὁμοιὸτητὰ τε καὶ φιλίαν καὶ συμφωνίαν τῷ καλῷ λόγῳ ἐγνωσα). I cannot follow Sus. and Welldon in placing ὄστε δει ταῦτα συμφωνεῖν ἄλληλοις after βέλτιον, 3, for, if we place these words there, what Aristotle says will be that nature and habit should harmonize, whereas the lesson which he wishes to enforce is surely this, that nature, habit, and reason should harmonize. As to πολλὰ γὰρ—βέλτιον, Laius in the Chrysippus of Euripides (Fragm. 837) had been made to plead,

λέξιθεν οὐδὲν τῶνδ’ μ’ ὅν σὺ νουθετεῖς,

γνώμην δ’ ἕχοντα μ’ ἡ φύσις βιάζεται,
but the Chorus in Aristoph. Vesp. 1457 sqq. (Didot) says,

tο γὰρ ἀποστήναι χαλεπῶν
φύσεως ἥν ἔχοι τις ἄει.
καίτιοι πόλλοι ταῦτ' ἐπαθον
ζυνώτες γράμμαις ἑτέρων
μετεβάλλουτο τοὺς τρόπους.

Cp. also Rhet. i. ii. 1370 a 25, μετά λόγου δὲ (ἐπιθυμοῦσιν), ὡσα ἐκ τοῦ πειθῆναι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν πολλά γὰρ καὶ θεάσασθαι καὶ κτῆσονται ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἀκούοντες καὶ πιειθοῦσαν και πιειθοῦσαν, and Plato, Rep. 452 D, ἀλλ' ἐπειδή, οὖναι, χρωμένοι ἦμενοι τὸ αὐτόνεασθαι τού συγκαλύπτειν πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα ἐφάνη, καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς δὴ γελοῖον ἐξερρύῃ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μηροθέντος ἀρίστου. A reference is given in the Index Aristotelicibus for the plural of ἔθσμος to Eth. Nic. 3. 15. 1119 a 26, καὶ οἱ ἐθσμοὶ ἀκίνδυνοι. The word ἔθσμος does not appear to occur in the writings of Thucydides, Xenophon, Plato, or Isocrates; it occurs, however, in [Demosth.] Or. 17. c. 27, and it is frequently used by Polybius not only in the singular, but also in the plural (e.g. in i. 17. 11 and 3. 76. 12).

9. For διωρισμέθα in a middle sense, cp. Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 192 (Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective, s. v. ὀρίζω). Διωρισμαί does not appear to be often thus used by Aristotle: Bonitz, however (Ind. 200 a 27), takes διωρίσθαι to be middle in De Cælo, 4. 2. 308 b i.

πρότερον, in c. 7. 1327 b 19 sqq. Εὑχερωτάτος τῷ νοµοθέτῃ in the passage before us takes the place of ἐναγώγω τοῖς νοµοθέτῃ πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν in 1327 b 38.

10. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἑθολομονοι μανθάνουσι, τὰ δ' ἀκούοντες. 'Ακούοντες answers to τὸν λόγον, 7. Here μανθάνειν includes both ἑθολομαί and ἀκούον. Contrast 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 16, μανθάνει καὶ συνειθείσαν. Sus. 2 refers to Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 a 14, διττῆς δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς ὀς, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς δὲ ἢθελῆς, ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὐθησίαν . . . ἡ δ' ἢθελὴ ἐξ ἐθων περιγίνειται. Cp. also Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν 1. 437 a 11, κατὰ συμβεβηκός δὲ πρὸς φρόνησιν ἢ ἀκόη πλείστων συμβαλλεται μέρος' ὁ γὰρ λόγος αὐτῶν ἐστι τῆς μαθήσεως ἀκούοντος ὡς, οὐ καθ' αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, Hist. An. 9. 1. 608 a 17 sqq., and Metaph. Θ. 5. 1047 b 31, ἀπισώ οἱ τῶν δυνάμεων οὐσιῶν τῶν μὲν συγγενῶν οἰον τῶν αἰσθητῶν, τῶν ἐθεί ὀνον τῆς τοῦ αἰλεοῦ, τῶν ἐθεί μαθήσει ὀνον τῆς τῶν τεχνῶν, τὰς μὲν ἀνάγκη πρεονεργήσασται ἐχειν ὅσα ἐθεί καὶ λόγω, τὰς δὲ μη τοιαύτας καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ σάσχειν

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oik. ánýgê. Add Philem. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 6 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 34: cp. 5. ccxxxii),

* ἰκουσα τούτο κατός, οὐδὲ φύται
autómaton anvrbôpoûsin, ò bëltìste, νοῦς,
ástpèr en ágrô ðìmous' èk ðè toû légein te kai
étêrōn akoùnein kai òweðrìsai * *
kàtâ mukròn áei, fai, fûntai fìrènes.

C.14. 13. toûto ðè sképeteôn. Cp. c. 15. 1334 b 5, πῶς ðè kai diâ tîwv
èstai, toûto ðè òweðrìsæn.

étêrous eînai, sc. ða ðìa ðíou.

15. ðèlòv γâr k.t.l. Cp. 3. 4. 1277 a 16, kai tîn paideiâν ð' eîðùs
étêran eînai légonuî nìvè ðřkçontos. For ðkòlouðëvina kâ tîn ðiaîrèsv
taînt, cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 b 23, kâtâ γâr tâs toûtvn diáforàs
ûkolouðovs ðî ðîzès.

16. ei mev tòiûv k.t.l. Here Aristotle has before him Plato,
Polit. 301 D, πῶν ðè ye ðopûte oik. ðêtî gýnômènos, òw ðè fàmèn, ðè ðaîs
pôleî tiûs bâtiûs oîos ðîn smûneîv êmûvetaî, tò tè sômà eîðûs kai tîn
ψûkhîn dîafèròvnu eîs, ðè ðè smûlêvâs õxugôrâmata grâfeîv k.t.l. Cp. also 1.
5. 1254 b 34 sqq. and Isocrr. Hel. § 56, tôis ðè kaloîs eîðûs ðôntèv
ënuî gýnômèba, kai mánon aîtovûs ðástpèr tòvûs ðeîovs ðîk. gýnôrëvûmèn
ðêpàpçvûntes, ðâl' ððiûnu dûlêvûmèn tôvûs toûvûtov ð tòvû ðâlûv ðûkçovèn.
The passage before us shows that not only gods (1. 5. 1254 b 34 sqq.)
but also heroes were credited with surpassing personal beauty, so
that we are not surprised to find that Philip of Crotona, who excelled
in this respect, was worshipped as a hero at Egesta after his death
(Hdt. 5. 47). For òtèpov tôvû ðâlûv (not tôvû étêrov), see Bon. Ind.
34 b 34 sqq., where Eth. Nic. 8. 7. 1158 a 28, ðâlûv γâr aîtovûs eîs
xhrìsìov kai òtèpov ðèîèî, Eth. Nic. 9. 4. 1166 b 7, and Meteor. 2. 6.
365 a 3 sq. are referred to.

20. ðôste k.t.l. Lamb. 'îta ut incontroversa et in promptu posita
esset eorum qui imperant praes ipsis qui sub imperio sunt excellentia':
Sus. 'dass diese Ueberlegenheit der Herrschenden für die Be-
herrschten (selber) unzweifelhaft und einleuchtend wäre.' Thus
Lamb. takes tôvûs ðûkçovèn as in the dat. after òpàrokhîn (so too
Mr. Welldon), Sus. as in the dat. after õnàmûfèvðùsîov kai phanèròv.
I have not noticed any passage in which the construction assumed
by Lamb. occurs, and I incline to follow Sus., at any rate till
a parallel passage is produced.

23. ðêtî ðè k.t.l., 'but since it is not easy to light on this highly
superior element, and we have not among ourselves anything to
answer to the vast superiority of the kings to their subjects, which Scylax says exists in India.' For λαβεῖν in this sense, cp. 3. 1286 b 7, Rhet. 1. 1. 1294 a 34, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἕνα λαβεῖν καὶ ὀλίγους μᾶν ἢ πολλοὺς οὐδεὶς φρονοῦνται καὶ δυναμένους νομοθετεῖν καὶ δικάζειν, and Eth. Nic. 10. 3. 1174 a 17. As to τοῦτο, Aristotle often uses the neuter in referring to persons, e.g. in 2. 5. 1263 a 1 and 3. 13. 1283 b 9. He would seem to have had before him the genuine narrative of Scylax of Caryanda in Caria, as to whom see Hdt. 4. 44. The Periplus which we possess bearing his name is not the genuine work by him, and does not contain the statement here repeated by Aristotle. The testimony of Scylax as to the superiority—both physical and mental, apparently—of the kings in India to their subjects may well have been perfectly true. Throughout Polynesia the chiefs and upper classes are taller than the lower orders, and with a finer physical they combine a greater mental development. They are in every respect superior to the people whom they rule. They are as genuine an aristocracy as ever existed in any country. They know every plant, animal, rock, river, and mountain, are familiar with their history, legends, and traditions, and strict in observing every point of their own complicated etiquette. They swim, row, sail, shoot, and fight better than the common people, and excel in house and canoe building' (Seemann, Viti, p. 79). For the form βασιλεῖας see note on 1284 b 33.

25. φανερὸν ὅτι κ.τ.λ., 'it is clear that it is for many reasons necessary that all should share alike in ruling and being ruled in turn [and that rulers and ruled should be the same persons], for when the sharers are alike, equality demands that each shall have the same share' (i.e. an identity of political privilege), 'and [the constitution must be just, for] it is difficult for a constitution to last which is framed in contravention of what is just.' For τὸ τέ γὰρ ἵσον ταῦτον τοῖς ὑμοίωσι, cp. 3. 16. 1291 a 12 sqq. and 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 7 sq., and also Thuc. 6. 38. 5, καὶ πῶς δικαίων τοὺς αὐτοὺς μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀξίοντος; 29. μετὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for together with the ruled [citizens] are forthcoming disreputable of revolution all those who are scattered over the territory,' i.e. the cultivators and other residents in the country (cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 30, οἳ δὲ γεωργοῦντες διὰ τὸ διωστάρθαι κατὰ τὴν χώραν, and 38, τοῦ κατὰ τὴν χώραν πλῆθους). Aristotle has arranged in c. 10. 1330 a 25 sqq. that the cultivators shall not be θυμοειδεῖς or
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ομόφυλοι, still he takes it for granted here that they will be desirous of revolution, though unable to make a revolution without the help of the ἄρχωνοι πολίται. Reiz followed by Sus. would read βουλο-
μένων, but βουλόμενω is probably right, for Aristotle is apt to suspect slave or serf cultivators of a tendency to νεωτερισμός (2. 4. 1262 a 40

8. 1. 37, ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἕτοι προσήκειν οὖθεν ἄρχης ὡστὶ μὴ βελτίων εἰς
τῶν ἄρχομένων, καὶ τοῖς προερημένοις πάσι δήλον καὶ ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

34. τῶς οὖν κ.τ.λ., 'how then this difference is to exist, and how
they are to share [in ruling and being ruled by turns], the lawgiver
must consider.' Μεθέξουσι takes up κοινωνία, 26.

35. πρότερον, in c. 9. 1329 a 2 sqq.

36. ἡ γὰρ φύσις δέδωκε τὴν διαίρεσιν κ.τ.λ., 'for nature has fur-
nished us with the distinction, having made that which is the same in
kind itself of two parts, the one younger and the other older.' For
dιαίρεσιν, see critical note. For a similar acceptance of the guidance
of nature, cp. c. 17. 1337 a 1 and 1. 8. 1256 b 7 sqq.: also De
Caelo, 1. 1. 268 a 13, διὸ παρὰ τὴν φύσεως εἰληφότες ὡσπερ νόμους
ἐκεῖνης, καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀγιστείας χρώμεθα τῶν θεῶν τῷ ἄρμῷ τούτῳ (the
number three), and Poet. 24. 1460 a 3, ἀλλ’, ὡσπερ ἔσομεν, αὕτη ἡ
φύσις διδάσκει τὸ ἄρμότον αὕτη διαμείβασι. By 'that which is the
same in kind,' is meant man.

τούτων ἔμελπηται τὸ προσβυτέρους μὲν ἄρχων δεῖ, νεωτέρους δὲ ἄρχεσθαι,
and Rep. 412 C, ὅτι μὲν προσβυτέρους τοὺς ἄρχοντας δεῖ εἶναι, νεωτέρους
dὲ τοὺς ἄρχομένους, δήλον; Cp. also 1. 12. 1259 b 10–17.

38. ἀγανακτεῖ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rhet. 2. 10. 1388 a 6, τοῖς γὰρ ἐγγὺς
καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ τόπῳ καὶ ἥλικια καὶ δόξῃ φθονοῦσιν. Aristotle perhaps
remembers the words of the aged Nestor to Agamemnon and
Achilles (Hom. II. 1. 259),

ἀλλὰ πίθευς’, ἀμφώ δὲ νεωτέρῳ ἑστὶν ἐμείο,
and what Agamemnon says of Achilles in II. 9. 160,
καὶ μοι ὑποστήτω, ὡσον βασιλεύτερός εἰμι
ἡδ’ ὡσον γενεῖ προγενέατερος εὔχομαι εἰναι.

Plutarch may have the passage before us in his memory in An Seni
sit gerenda Republica, c. 7, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλαις υπήρξις προσμά-
χονται καὶ διαμφισβητοῦσιν ἄρετὸς καὶ γένους καὶ φιλοτιμίας, ὡς ἀφαι-
ροῦτες αὐτῶν ὡσον ἄλλοις υφίσται, τὸ δ’ ἀπὸ τοῦ χρόνου πρωτείον, δ’
καλεῖται κυρίως προσβείων, ἀξιολογητῆτον ἑστὶ καὶ παραχωροῦμενον . . . ἐτι
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4 (7). 1332 b 32—42.

γιν contained in the sense that all cases, including that of the same age, are to be treated alike, and in this sense the distinction between the rulers of the different ages is, according to Voss, not quite clear what is meant by τοῦ στου τῶν ἔρανον (40). Sus., followed by Welldon, takes the words to mean ‘den Ehrenvorzug zu befehlen’ (‘the honourable privilege of ruling’). To me it seems that the ἔρανος referred to is rather the contribution of submission to the rule of others which the young citizen makes in his youth and receives from those younger than himself in years of maturity.

42. ὡστε καὶ τὴν παιδείαν κ.τ.λ. Rulers and ruled will be the same persons at different ages, so that they will be in a sense the same and in a sense different, and similarly the education given to rulers and ruled will be the same but will be different at different ages, the young learning to be ruled and later on learning through being ruled to rule, so that the education also of rulers and ruled will be in a sense the same and in a sense different. For the late appearance of εἶναι in this sentence, cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 29, ἐνα ὄν γὰρ ἀπρότετει μεγάλας ἐνθα ὅ εἶναι μικρᾶς τὰς αὐτὰς, and see note on 1285 b 36.
2. τε γὰρ here is not taken up by καὶ or any equivalent to καὶ, a thing which rarely happens (see Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 19 sq.), so rarely that Eucken pronounces the passage before us corrupt. Sus, however, rightly remarks that we have here one of the few cases in which τε γὰρ = "etenim." 'English readers may consult Shilleto’s critical note to Demosth. De Fals. Leg. c. 176' (Sus.). Eucken points out that in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 33, αἳ τε γὰρ ἄρχαι αἱ διὰ τῶν βελτίστων ἔσονται τοῦ δήμου βουλευτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐπικείσιν οὐ φθονοῦσος, the use of τε γὰρ is only apparently similar, inasmuch as the last eight words are virtually equivalent to καὶ ὁ δήμος βουλήσεται καὶ τοῖς ἐπικείσιν οὐ φθονήσει. So again in De Part. An. 3. 10. 673 a 3, γαραγαλιξομενοί τε γὰρ ταχὺ γελάσι διὰ τὸ τὴν κίνησιν ἄφικενοι δια τὸ τῶν τόπων τοῦτον, we find τε γὰρ virtually taken up in συμβαίνειν δὲ φασιν κ.τ.λ., 673 a 10.

3. έστι δὲ ἄρχη κ.τ.λ., 'but [we do not mean that he should have been ruled otherwise than a freeman should be ruled, for] rule is, as was shown in the first discussions' (i.e. in 3. 4. 1277 a 33 sqq. and 3. 6. 1278 b 30 sqq.), 'in one of its forms for the sake of the ruler and in another for the sake of the ruled, and we say that the former of these is rule such as is exercised by a master over slaves and the latter rule such as is exercised over freemen, [so that the latter is the kind of rule to which it is fitting that the young freeman should submit before ruling].'

5. φαμεν, in 3. 4. 1277 a 33 sqq. and 3. 6. 1278 b 30 sqq.

6. διαφερει δ’ ένα κ.τ.λ. This was probably written later than 3. 4. 1277 a 33 sqq., for we hear nothing there to the same effect. Aristotle had identified δεσποτικὴ ἄρχη in that passage with ἡ περὶ τῶν ἵππων, and had added, διέτερον δὲ καὶ ἄνδρασσόδδες, λέγα δὲ διέκρινον τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ὑπηρετέων τὰς διακομικὰς πράξεις. Now we are told that even service of this kind may become noble if it is rendered for a noble end. What Aristotle would consider a noble end may be gathered from 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 17 sqq. and 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 10 sqq. (cp. 3. 4. 1277 b 5 sq.). He probably has in his mind among other things the ἀνένθερατοντων αὐτοὺς ἑαυτῶν (αὐτῶν ἑαυτοῖς?) διακοµικῆς of the young Spartans employed in the Crypteia (Plato, Laws 633 B sq.). Plato had already recommended his agronomi and their youthful assistants to do the like (Laws 762 E sqq., cp. especially καὶ καλλοπιξεσθαι χρή τῷ καλῶς δουλεύσαι μάλλον ἢ τῷ καλῶς ἄρρησαι, πρῶτον μὲν τὸι νόμοις ἐπειτε τοῖς προσβουτρίοις τε καὶ ἑντίμως βεβαιώθησθαι τούς νέους, and 763 A, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα αὐτοὶ δὲ αὐτῶν διανοηθέτωσαν ὅσ
biowòmenv diákonouýntes te kai diákonouýmenvai éaútois). Perhaps the young Athenians who served as peri pólois had more done for them by slaves than Plato and Aristotle approved. Vict. refers to the story of Favonius and Pompey told in Plut. Pomp. c. 73, étei de kairos ὃν deítpou kai παρασκεú̂̄σεν ὁ ναῦκληρος ἐκ τῶν παρόντων, ἵδιν δὲ σωτήρος ὁ Πομπήιος ὀικετῶν ἀπορία τῶν Πομπήιων ἀρχόμενοι αὐτῶν ὑπολύειν προσέθραμε καὶ ὑπέλυσε καὶ συνήλευσε καὶ τὸ λυκτὸν ἐκ τούτων περίπτων καὶ θεραπεύων ὅσα δεσπότας δουλοί, μέχρι πνεύμων ποιῶν καὶ δείπνου παρασκευής διετέλεσεν, ὅστε τὴν ἐλευθερώτητα τῆς ὑπουργίας ἑκεῖνης θεασάμενον ἂν τινα καὶ τὸ ἀφέλες καὶ ἀπλαστὸν εἶπεν:

Φεῦ τούτι γενναίοσίν ὧν ἦσεν καλῶν (Eurip. Fragm. 953).

Vict. adds, referring to the siege of Florence in 1529, 'Recordor ego, cum premeretur obsidione nostra civitas, hostisque ad portas castra posuisse, universam nostram iuvuentutem in operibus faciendis muniendaque urbe occupatam suisse, neque tamen eo tempore quicquam quod nobilitati suae non conveniret gessisse, non enim ob mercedem inde capiendam, sed ob libertatem defendendam id facilebat.'

11. étei de k.t.l. If we take Aristotle to refer in πολίτου here, as also in 3. 18. 1288a 37 sqq., to the full citizen of the 'best State,' who is ex hypothesis capable of ruling, we shall not need to read πολιτικοῦ with Rassow and Susemihl. See vol. i. Appendix B. The argument is—since the virtue of a ruling citizen and the virtue of the best man are the same, and in our State the ruled citizens becomes sooner or later a ruler, so that he will need sooner or later to possess the virtue of a good man, the lawgiver must make this the aim of his labours, that the citizens may become good men, and [must seek to ascertain] by means of what pursuits [they may best be made so] and what is the end of the best life. For πραγματευτόν ὅπως . . . γίγνονται Bonitz (Ind. 630 a 14) compares Rhet. 1. 1. 1354 b 19, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἄλλο πραγματεύονται πλῆν ὅπως τὸν κρίτην ποιῶν τινα ποιήσωσιν. The end of the best life is leisure (c. 15. 1334 a 11 sqq.).

16. διήρηται de k.t.l. In c. 15. 1334 b 17 sqq., as in i. 13. 1260 a 5 sqq., the two parts of the soul are τὸ λόγον ἔχων and τὸ ἄλογον: here they are τὸ λόγον ἔχων καθ’ αὐτό, and τὸ λόγον οὐκ ἔχων καθ’ αὐτό, λόγῳ δ’ ἐπακούειν δυνάμενον. Thus here Aristotle adopts the division of the soul which is mentioned as feasible in Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1103 a 1, εἶ δὲ χρῆ καὶ τούτο φάναι λόγον ἔχειν, διττῶν ἐσται καὶ τὸ
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λόγον ἔχων, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, τὸ δὲ ὅσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικῶν τι. διαφέρεται δὲ καὶ ᾧ ἀρετή κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταῦτην· λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς μὲν διανοητικὰς τὰς δὲ ἡθικάς, σοφίαν μὲν καὶ σέμεναν καὶ φρόνημα διανοητικά, ἐλευθερίατη δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην ἡθικάς, a passage which throws much light on that before us, though καθ’ αὐτό, 17 ('per se,' in contradistinction to καθ’ ἔτερον: cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 12. 1245 b 18, quoted above on 1323 b 24, and Eth. Nic. 2. 3. 1105 a 22 sq., and see Bon. Ind. 290 b 34), means more than ἐν αὐτῷ, 1103 a 2. The part of the soul referred to as λόγον οἷκ ἐχον καθ’ αὑτό, λόγω β’ ὑπακούειν διανάμενον is τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν καὶ διὰς ὀρεκτικάν (Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 b 30), or, as it is occasionally called in the Politics (see above on 1254 b 8), τὸ παθητικόν. Τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς is omitted, as in Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 b 12, ἐπειδὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς ἄμοιρον πέψευκεν. Aristotle recalls this division of the soul because he wishes to throw light on the relative worth of the virtues connected with each part of the soul, and to show, in opposition to the eulogists of the Lacedaemonian constitution, that the virtues of the rational part have more of the character of ends than those of the other part. For the perfect δήμηται, cp. 3. 9. 1280 α 17 and 2. 9. 1269 b 16. For the participle διανάμενον, see note on 1254 b 23.

19. πως, 'in any way,' as in Xen. Oecon. 9. 1, ἢ γνώ ἐδόκει σοι, ἐφιν ἐγὼ, δ’ ἵσχόμαχε, πώς τι ὑπακούειν δὲν τῷ ἐπούδαζες διδάσκον; τούτων δὲ κ.τ.λ. 'Ως ἡμεῖς φαμέν = ὡς ἡμεῖς διαρρύημεν, for it is hardly likely that διαρρυθέον εἶναι should be supplied. Cp. 5 (8). 7. 1341 b 32 sq. For the μὲν soliciarum in τοῖς μὲν οὕτω διαρρύησιν, see above on 1332 a 14, 1262 a 6, and 1270 a 34.

21. αἰεὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. We learn in what sense the appetitive part of the soul exists for the sake of the rational part from Magn. Mor. 2. 10. 1208 a 12, ἐπειδὴ γὰρ τι τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ μὲν χεῖρον ἔχομεν τὸ δὲ βελτίων, αἰεὶ δὲ τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ βελτίους ἑνεκέν ἐστιν, ὡσπερ ἐπὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς ἑνεκέν, καὶ τὸ ἐρούμεν ἐχεῖν τὸ σῶμα καλός, ὅταν οὕτως ἐχθὶ ὑστε τῇ καλύπτει ἄλλα καὶ συμβαλλεῖσθαι καὶ συμπαραμένει πρὸς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιτελεῖν τὸ αὐτὸς ἐργα τὸ γὰρ χεῖρον τοῦ βελτίους ἑνεκέν πρὸς τὸ συνεργεῖν τὸ βελτίων. Cp. also M. Antonin. Comm. 5. 16, ἤ οὖκ ἢ ἐναργές, ὅτι τὰ χεῖρον τῶν κραιστῶν ἑνεκέν, τὰ δὲ κρείττω ἄλληλως; κρείττω δὲ τῶν μὲν ἀφύσω τὰ ἐφυσα, τῶν δὲ ἐμφύσω τὰ λογικά. On the far-reaching principle, αἰεὶ τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ βελτίους ἐστιν ἑνεκέν, see vol. i. p. 58 sq.

22. καὶ τούτῳ φανερὸν κ.τ.λ. When a principle holds good in reference both to art and to nature, Aristotle is often careful
to point out the fact: e.g. in Meteor. 4. 3. 381 a 10 sq., De Part. An. i. 1. 639 b 15 sq., and De Gen. An. 4. 6. 775 a 20 sqq.

24. διήρηται τε δικά. Sepulv., Lamb., Schn., Sus.⁴, Welldon, and others supply ὁ λόγος, but Vict. and Sus.⁴ supply τὸ λόγον ἔχων, and perhaps this is better.

καθ' ὄντερ εἰσάγαμεν τρόπον διαφέρειν. E.g. in De An. 3. 10. 433 a 14, νοῦς δὲ ὁ ἐνεκά του λογίζομενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικὸς διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει: cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 2. 1139 a 3 sqq.

26. ὄσαιτος, in the same way as ὁ λόγος, i.e. into τὸ λόγον ἔχων πρακτικῶν and τὸ λόγον ἔχων θεωρητικῶν.

τοῦτο τὸ μέρος, i.e. τὸ λόγον ἔχων μέρος καθ' αὐτό.

δηλοντί is adverbial, as in c. 2. 1325 a 1: see on this use Bon. Ind. 173 b 30 sqq.

27. καὶ τὰς πράξεις δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and indeed we shall say that the activities of the soul stand in a corresponding relation to each other.' Three classes of activities are apparently referred to—(1) πράξεις τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἔχουσας καθ' αὐτό, λόγον δὲ ἑπακούειν δυναμένον (e.g. ἑλευθερίας, σώφρονες πράξεις: cp. Eth. Nic. i. 13. 1103 a 6 and 3. 3. 1111 b 1 sq.): (2) πράξεις τοῦ λόγου ἔχουσας πρακτικῶν (φρόνιμοι πράξεις): (3) πράξεις τοῦ λόγου ἔχουσας θεωρητικῶν (σοφαί πράξεις).

28. τοῖς δυναμένοις τυγχάνειν ἡ πασῶν ἢ τοῖν δυσών, 'for those who can attain either to all the three activities of the soul or to the two lower ones of the three.' I take the meaning to be, that even if a man can attain only to the activities of the irrational part of the soul and to those of the lower, or practical, section of its rational part, the latter class of activities, being activities of the better part of the two, are more desirable for him than the former. If a man can attain to all three, then of course the activities of the theoretic section of the rational part are the most desirable for him.

29. αἰεὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for that is always most desirable for each man which is the highest to which it is possible for him to attain,' whether it is absolutely the highest or not. See vol. i. p. 6o.

30. τὸς ὁ βίος, 'life as a whole': see above on 1253 b 33. In 40 we have τοὺς βίους. By τὸς ὁ βίος Aristotle means τὸς ὁ πολιτικὸς βίος: cp. i. 5. 1254 b 30, ἡ χρήσιμα πρὸς πολιτικῶν βίων (αὔτος δὲ καὶ γίνεται δημημένος εἰς τῇ πολομάχῃ χρείαν καὶ τῇ εἰρημικῇ). In 1. 8. 1256 a 30 sqq. we have a classification of human life, so far as it is concerned with getting food. For the association of ἀσχολία and πόλεμος and of εἰρήνη and σχολή, cp. 41 sq., c. 15. 1334 a 38 sqq., and Eth. Nic. io. 7. 1177 b 4 sqq.
32. καὶ τῶν πρακτῶν κ.τ.λ. 'Bonitz brackets εἰς τὰ in 32 and 33 (Ind. 42 b 26 sqq. and 632 a 29 sq.), but see Vahlen in the Zeitschrift für d. östr. Gymn. 1872, p. 540' (Sus², p. 453). I have not seen Vahlen's article. The construction, if we supply διήρησα, as we must apparently do, is certainly remarkable. For τῶν πρακτῶν we have τῶν πραγμάτων in 40.

34. For αἴρεσιν, cp. Isocr. De Pace, § 106, εὑρήσετε γὰρ τοὺς πλείστους τῶν ἀνθρώπων περὶ τῶν αἴρεσιν τῶν πραγμάτων ἀμαρτάνοντας.

35. πόλεμον μὲν εἰρήμης χάριν. Aristotle continues his sentence as if ἀνάγκη ὤμοιος αἱρετὰ εἶναι had preceded in 33, and not περὶ ὃν ἀνέγκη τὴν αὐτήν αἴρεσιν εἶναι. He here has before him Plato, Laws 628 D sq. (referred to by Eaton) and 803 D. Cp. (with Eaton) Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 b 4, δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐθαμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι ἀσχολούμεθα γὰρ ἣν σχολάζωμεν, καὶ πολεμοῦμεν ἃν εἰρήμην ἀγωμεν.

ἄσχολίαν δὲ σχολῆς. See last note. There was much to suggest the view that σχολή is a nobler thing than ἄσχολία in the Greek conception of the gods as μεία ζώοντες, and in Aristotle's own conception of the life of the Deity (see above on 1325 b 28), to say nothing of the close connexion which the Greeks held to exist between σχολή and ἐλευθερία (Plato, Theaet. 175 D) and between σχολή and culture (Isocr. Busir. § 21 sq.: Metaph. A. i. 981 b 20 sqq.). As has often been pointed out by others, Aristotle does not mean idleness or recreation by σχολή. Σχολή is marked off by him both from ἄσχολία and from παυδία or ἀνάπαυσις: it is not, like παυδία and ἀνάπαυσις, recreation after toil (5 (8). 3. 1337 b 37 sqq.: 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 36 sqq.), nor is it, like ἄσχολία, the doing of work which is done not for its own sake, but as a means to something else; it is employment in work desirable for its own sake—the hearing of noble music and no doubt also of noble poetry, intercourse with friends chosen for their worth (Eth. Nic. 9. 11. 1171 b 12 sqq.), and above all the exercise, in company or otherwise, of the speculative faculty. Ἀσχολία and the παυδία or ἀνάπαυσις which makes ἄσχολία possible must necessarily find a place in human life, for men cannot exist without them, but the noblest element in human life is σχολή, and it is the end for which work and recreation exist. We hardly know whether Aristotle would class the sight of noble pictures or statues with the hearing of noble music and poetry as a right use of σχολή: he would probably not regard in this light the exercise of an art even for its own sake. Many will differ from him here, and some may ask whether work
done as a means to something else is not often as desirable for its own sake as anything which could be brought under the head of ςχολη. May we not say this of work done in a noble cause, like that of the victors of Marathon and Salamis, or that of Pitt and Stein, when they ‘weathered the storm’? It should be noticed that while Aristotle is following in the track of Plato when he exalts peace above war, he is not a borrower from Plato in his exaltation of σχολη at the expense of ωσχολια. His view of human life as comprising in its best form ωσχολια, παιδια, and σχολη is a remarkable one, and I am not aware that he owes it to any one.


3. και παιδιας ετι όρτας παιδευτεν και τας άλλας ήλικιας, οσαι δεονται παιδειας. According to the common view (a different view is ascribed to Pythagoras in Diog. Laer. 8. 10), boyhood ceased at puberty (cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 7. 6, εγω γαρ παις τε δεν τα εν παις νομιζομενα καλα δοκω κεκαρπωσαι, επι τε ωβησα, τα εν νεανισκοις, τελεως τε ανηρ γενομενος τα εν ανδρισι). Παιδ, however, is otherwise used in 3. 1. 1275 a 14. The words τας άλλας ήλικιων οσαι δεονται παιδειας seem to imply that education in the ‘best State’ will extend over more ήλικια than the two represented by boyhood and the years from puberty to twenty-one (see note on 1336 b 37).

5. οι δε νυν αριστα κ.τ.λ. The Lacedaemonians and Cretans are especially referred to (cp. 12 sqq. and c. 2. 1324 b 7 sqq.; see also note on 1337 a 31). Plato had said much the same in Laws 628 C sqq. Are we to infer from the use of και in 11, και των υστερον τως γραφιντων, that Aristotle regarded the Lacedaemonian and Cretan lawgivers as the authors of written constitutions and laws? Aristotle turns aside to censure the Lacedaemonian training in 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 9 sqq. also. The Fourth and Fifth Books of the Politics are written in a strongly anti-Laconian spirit. The Lacedaemonian lawgiver is more severely criticized in them than he is in the Second. It is true that the Spartans are said in the Second Book (c. 9. 1271 b 9) to prefer external goods to virtue—a strong thing to say of men who prided themselves on their virtue (4 (7). 11. 1330 b 32)—but this fault is not explicitly traced back to the lawgiver. In the Fourth Book, on the other hand (c. 2. 1324 b 27 sq.), the lawgiver is charged with pursuing an
unlawful end; it is also implied in 1325 a 7 sqq. (cp. c. 14. 1333 b 23) that he was not a good lawgiver (contrast 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 18–21). Aristotle’s criticisms of the Lacedaemonian lawgiver throughout the Fourth and Fifth Books are, in fact, more in the spirit of those of Isocrates (see e.g. Panath. § 210 sqq.) than of those of Plato.


7. οὕτε πρὸς τὸ βελτίων τέλος φαίνονται συντάξαντες κ.τ.λ., ‘evidently have neither framed their constitutional arrangements with a view to the better end,’ etc. Πρὸς τὸ βελτίων τέλος answers to πρὸς τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὰ τέλη, 1333 a 39, and πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς, 8, to πρὸς πάντα, 1333 a 36. The ‘better end’ is leisure and peace and things noble.


ἀλλὰ φορτικός ἀπέκλιναν κ.τ.λ. We have been told in 1333 a 36 that things noble are to be preferred to things necessary and useful. Compare the very similar sentence in De Part. An. i. 1. 642 a 28, ἐπὶ Σωκράτους δὲ τούτῳ μὲν ἡγύθη, τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν τὰ περὶ φύσεως ἐληξε, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρήσην ἀρετῆ καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀπέκλιναν οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες : also Pol. 2. 9. 1271 b 3, Probl. 27. 5. 948 a 31, διὰ τί μάλιστα τὴν ἀνδρείαν τιμᾶσιν αἱ πόλεις, οὐ βελτίστην οὔσαν τῶν ἀρετῶν; ἢ ὅτι διατελοῦσιν ἡ πολεμοῦσι τὴν πολεμοῦμενοι, αὕτη δὲ ἐν ἀμφότεροι χρησιμοτάτη ἑστίν· τιμῶσι δὲ οὕτω πολλαπλασιασμέναι, ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτώδες βέλτιστα, and Rhet. i. 9. 1366 b 3, ἀνάγκη δὲ μεγίστας εἶναι ἀρετὰς τὰς ἄλλοις χρησιμωτάτας, εἰπέρ ἑστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ δύναμις εὐεργετική. Φορτικός, for τὸ ζητεῖν πανταχοῦ τὸ χρῆσθαι ἡκαστὰ ἀρμότερο τοὺς μεγαλοψύχους καὶ τοὺς ἑλευθέρους (5 (8). 3. 1338 b 2). The Spartans valued themselves on their ἐλευθερία—compare the proverb ἐλευθεριώτερος Ἑπάρτης (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. i. 246: 2. 393)—and when Aristotle hints here that their lawgiver was φορτικός, and in 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 32 sqq. that his famous training made them βάναυσοι, he says as severe a thing as it was possible for him to say. In πλεονεκτικωτέρας Aristotle echoes Plato, Laches 182 Ε, όις (i.e. Δακεδαιμονίοις) ὕδεις ἄλλο μελεῖ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἢ τούτῳ ἔργει καὶ ἐπιτιθέεις, ὡ τι ἄν μαθόντες καὶ ἐπιτίθεσαντες πλεονεκτοῖ ὑπό τῶν ἄλλων περὶ τῶν πόλεων; cp. also Isocr. Panath. § 188 and Plut. Lycurg. c. 28, ἐν μὲν οὖν τούτως ὕδεις ἐστὶν ἀδικίας ὕχος νοῦ ὕδει πλεονεξία, ἢν ἑγκαλούσων ἐνοι τοῖς Λυκογέργοις νόμοις, ὡς ικανός ἔχοντες πρὸς ἀνδρείαν, ἐνδεικτικῶς δὲ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην.

14. ἄ, 'which praises.'

16. _φάσπερ γὰρ κ.τ.λ._, 'for just in the same spirit in which,' etc. Thibron’s grounds of praise are those of _οἱ πολλοὶ_, and are therefore sordid and easily overthrown by reasoning. _Οἱ πολλοὶ_ are athirst for _εὐτυχῆματα_: cp. 2. 7. 1267 b 3, ἀπειρος γὰρ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας φύσις, ἣς πρὸς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ζωσιν. Ζηλοῦσι, as in Isocr. De Pace, § 83, καὶ ταῦτα δρόντες αὐτοὶ τε τὴν πόλιν εὐθυμονίζουν καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν νοῶν οίκ ἐχόντων ἐμακάριζον αὐτὴν, τῶν μὲν συμβήσεσθαι διὰ ταῦτα μελ- λόντων οἰδεμιαν ποιούμενα πρόνοιαν, τὸν δὲ πλούτον βαυμάζοντες καὶ _ζηλοῦσι_.

18. τῶν εὐτυχημάτων. The term εὐτυχῆμα is applied to _τὰ ἐν ἑπεροχῇ_ ἀγαθά, such as high birth, wealth, and political power: cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1124 a 20 sqq.

άνάμενοις φαίνεται, 'evidently admires.' There is perhaps a reference to Thibron in Isocr. Panath. § 41, τὴν Ἐπαρματῶν (πόλις), ἥν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ μετρίας ἐπαινοῦσιν, ἐνοι δὲ τινὲς ὁσπερ τῶν ἡμιθέων ἐκεὶ πεπολιτευμένων μέμνηται περὶ αὐτῶν. As to the other writers on the Lacedaemonian Constitution, see above on 1269 a 29.

20. ὅτι κ.τ.λ., 'because it was owing to their having been trained to meet dangers that they ruled over many,' and thus they owed their empire to their lawgiver. Γυμνάζοντα is not used exclusively of gymnastic training (cp. for instance 2. 12. 1274 a 26), but the gymnastic training enforced by the Lacedaemonian lawgiver (5 (8). 4. 1338 b 27 sqq.) is probably here referred to, for it was supposed at Sparta to produce courage (1338 b 12 sqq.). The notion that _γυμνάσα_ lead to _ἄλλων ἀρχαί_ occurs also in Plato, Protag. 354 Α–Β (cp. 342 B–C).

23. ἅτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. The sense is—besides it is not merely that they have lost noble living, but that they have lost it, notwithstanding that (as they claim) they have faithfully observed the laws given them by their lawgiver and there has been nothing to hinder them from doing so; this is indeed strange. Aristotle hints that either the fault must rest with the lawgiver or the Spartans had not really observed his laws. Γελοῖοι has much the same meaning here as _ἄτοπον_ (cp. Phys. 7. 3. 246 a 25, ἅτι καὶ _ἄλλως_ _ἄτοπον_. τὸ γὰρ λέγειν τῶν ἄνθρωπον ἢλλοιωτότατο ἢ τὴν οἰκίαν λαβοῦσαν
NOTES.

τέλος γελοιον κ.τ.λ.). An oracle given to Lycurgus, according to Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 57 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 390: cp. Diod. 7. 14. 7), ὅς εὐθαϊμων ἐ τότις ἔσοτο εἰ τοῖς ἐκείνου νόμοι εἰμένοι, is probably present to Aristotle’s memory. In Isocr. Archid. § 61 the Lacedaemonian King Archidamus claims that the Spartans had abided by the laws which had been given them; there were, however, two views on this subject (see Isocr. De Pace, § 102 and above on 1270 a 19). There may be an allusion in μηδενός ἐμποδίζωντος πρὸς τὸ χρήσαντα τοῖς νόμοις to the fact that the observance of Solon’s laws at Athens had been interrupted by the Tyranny (‘Αθ. Πολ. c. 22). Μηδενός is neuter, as in 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 23, μηδενός ἐμποδίζωντος τῶν ἐκτάς. For ἐμποδίζων πρὸς τὸ χρήσαντα τοῖς νόμοις, cp. 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 6, ἐμποδίζων πρὸς τὰς ὑστερον πράξεις. For μένουσα ε ἐν τοῖς νόμοις αὐτοῦ, cp. 2. 8. 1269 a 7, ὥστε ἄποθον τὸ μένει ἐν τοῖς τῶν δάγμασιν.

26. οὐκ ὀρθῶς δὲ κ.τ.λ. Even if these eulogists of the Lacedaemonian lawgiver were right in praising him for making rule over other States his end, the kind of rule—despotic rule—which they praise him for honouring is not the kind of rule which a lawgiver should be seen to honour. Cp. c. 2. 1324 b 26 sqq., and for τιμώτα φαίνεσθαι, Plato, Laws 962 A, εἰ τις τὸν σκοπῶν, οἱ βλέπειν δὲ τὸν πολιτικόν, φαίνοντα ἄγνωσιν κ.τ.λ.

27. τοῦ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 3. 1325 a 24 sqq.

29. ἐτὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Further, they praise the lawgiver not only for what brings no permanent happiness, but also for what is positively harmful.

30. κρατεῖν ἡσκησεν ἐτὶ τὸ τῶν πέλασ ἄρχειν, ‘trained the citizens to conquer with a view to ruling over others.’ I have not met with an instance of ἀσκεῖν used with an acc. of the person and an infinitive, unless we except the passage of Phoius quoted below on 1337 a 1, but Plutarch has in De Defect. Orac. c. 21 γλώσσαις δὲ πολλαὶ ἡσκῆσθαι, and in Pyrrh. c. 24, ἀνδρας ἡσκημένους μάχεσθαι. Conquering is the first step to ruling over others: cp. c. 2. 1324 b 27 sqq., and 1324 b 7 sqq., and also Plut. Lycurg. et Num. inter se comp. c. 2, ἀλλο δὲ οὐδὲν εἰδότας οὐδὲ μελετώτας ἡ πειθεσθαι τοῖς ἄρχουσι καὶ κρατεῖν τῶν πολεμίων.

32. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι κ.τ.λ. A shrewd remark and one which, so far as I know, Aristotle was the first to make. There is much in the history of ancient Rome and modern France to illustrate and confirm it. Τῷ δυναμένῳ, like τὸν δυνάμενον ἄρχειν in c. 3. 1325 a 37.

34. ὅπερ ἐγκαλουσι κ.τ.λ., ‘yet this is just what the Laconians
charge Pausanias their king with doing, notwithstanding that he was already the holder of so great an office.' The Lacedaemonians praise their lawgiver for teaching the State to do to other States the very thing which they censure Pausanias for trying to do to his fellow-citizens. Aristotle has usually been taken to refer here and in 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 20, καὶ Παύσανιάν τὸν βασιλέα (sc. φασί τινες ἐπιχείρησας καταλύσαι) τήν ἐφορείαν, to the victor of Plataea, whom he, however, describes in 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 2 sqq. as ὁ στρατηγὸς κατὰ τὸν Μηδίκον πολέμον. This Pausanias was not really king, but only guardian of King Pleistarchus, who was a minor (cp. Hdt. 9. 10 and Thuc. 1. 132, referred to by Eaton), but he is 'often loosely called king in the later writers, e. g. in [Demosth.] c. Neaer. c. 97: Duris, Fragm. 31 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 477), ap. Athen. Deipn. 535 e: Justin 9. 1' (Busolt, Gr. Gesch. 2. 380. 4, ed. 1), and Aristotle may be guilty of a similar looseness here. In the second edition, however, of his Griechische Geschichte (1. 513 and note 3, and 3. 1. 98. 1) Busolt, following E. Meyer, takes the reference here and in 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 20 to be to the king Pausanias who was an opponent of Lysander. This Pausanias was really king, and might well be contrasted as such with ὁ στρατηγὸς κατὰ τὸν Μηδίκον πολέμον, but see on the other side of the question Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 22. 2. Was the opponent of Lysander quite the man to entertain the hardy design of abolishing the ephorate and making himself master of the State?

35. πολιτικός. Cp. c. 2. 1324 b 26 sq.

36. λόγων, i. e. praises of the lawgiver for his training his citizens to conquer with a view to empire.

37. ταῦτα γὰρ ἀριστα καὶ ἴδια καὶ κοινῆ. Cp. c. 15. 1334 a 11 sq. and c. 3. 1325 b 30 sqq. The 'best things' to which Aristotle refers appear to be temperance, justice, and wisdom in contradistinction to a capacity to conquer one's neighbours.

38. τὴν τε τῶν πολεμικῶν ἄσκησιν κ.τ.λ. See as to this account of the true aim of war, vol. i. p. 327 sq. Aristotle evidently has before him Isocr. Panath. § 219, οὖμαι γὰρ ἀπαντᾶς ἄν ὀμολογήσωι κακίστου ἄνδρας εἶναι καὶ μεγάττης ζημίας ἄξιος, δοσι τοῖς πράγμασι τοῖς εὐρήμενοι ἐπ' ὀφελεία, τούτους ἐπὶ Βλάβη χρώμενον τυγχάνουσι, μὴ πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους μὴ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἀμαρτάνοντας μὴ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν χώραν εἰσβάλλουσας, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς οἰκειοτάτους καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς συγγενείας μετέχοντας: ἀπερ ἐποίουν Σπαρτιάται.
NOTES.

40. Υνα is here followed by ὅπως. See Weber, Die Absichtssätze bei Aristoteles, p. 18 sqq., who gives a long list of passages in Aristotle’s writings in which the same thing occurs, among them Pol. 2. 7. 1267 a 2 sqq., 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 6–17, and 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 11 sqq. Kaissling (Tempora und Modi in des Aristoteles Politica und in der Atheniensium Politia, p. 32) compares ‘Αθ. Πολ. c. 16. 1. 7 sqq.

1334 a. 1. πάντων δεσποτείας, ‘despotic rule over all.’ Πάντων is an objective genitive: cp. Rhet. 2. 2. 1379 a 21, προοδοποίηται γὰρ ἐκαστὸς πρὸς τὴν ἐκάστου ὀργὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑπάρχουσι πάθος, where ἐκάστου = πρὸς ἐκαστὸν (Bon. Ind. 149 b 10).

2. τρίτων δὲ κ.τ.λ. Supply ὅπως ζήτωσι. See above on 1260 a 36.

5. τάξις. Supply ὅπως ζήτωσι.

6. αἱ γὰρ πλείσται κ.τ.λ. Crp. 2. 9. 1271 b 3 sqq. τῶν τοιούτων πόλεων, i.e. τῶν πολεμικῶν πόλεων, States that make war their end.

8. τὴν γὰρ βαφήν ἀφίασιν κ.τ.λ. Compare for the metaphor Plato, Rep. 430 A. Βαφὴ here means the temper which is produced by dipping, rather than the dipping itself. In Plut. De Vitioso Pudore, c. 4. 530 E, we have δοσίπερ βαφὴν τὴν φυλάττουσαν ἀποστίαν μαλαχθεὶσαν αἰσχὺν προέμενος. Aristotle evidently thought (cp. 25 sqq.), with Isocrates (De Pace, § 95 sqq.), that when the Peloponnesian War came to an end and the Lacedaemonians found themselves at the head of an empire, they lost much of the justice and temperance which war had enforced on them and became ὑβρισταί (28) and ἀνθραποδώδεις (39). Compare Isocr. De Pace, § 96, ἀντὶ γὰρ τῶν καθεστῶτων παρ’ αὐτοῖς (i.e. τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις) ἐπηρεαμένων τῶν μὲν ἰδιώτας ἐνέπλησεν (ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς βιλάττης) ἀδίκια, βραγμίας, ἀνομίας, φιλαργυρίας, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως ὑπερψίαις μὲν τῶν συμμάχων, ἐπιθυμίαις δὲ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ἀληγωρίας δὲ τῶν ὅρκων καὶ τῶν συνθηκῶν. Isocrates dwells on their insolent treatment of the Chians (§ 98) and of the islands generally (§ 99). He ascribes this change in them to their possession of maritime empire, which had already demoralized Athens, whereas Aristotle ascribes it to defective education and to the effect of leisure. The Lacedaemonian training was a training only for war; it did not impart justice and temperance, still less did it impart intellectual virtue. If this had been otherwise, the Lacedaemonians would have spent their leisure in pursuits which would have prevented the loss of ‘temper’ to which Aristotle refers. So Plato (Rep. 549 B) says of them that they lacked the


The end is σχολή, as is explained in 14 sqq.

12. ὁρον, 'distinctive aim' (= τέλος, 11): cp. c. 2. 1324 b 3 sqq.


ὑπάρχειν, sc. τῇ πόλει: cp. 34 sqq. and contrast c. 14. 1334 a 9 sq.

That the best man will possess the capacity of using leisure aright, we have seen in c. 14. 1333 a 41 sqq.

15. πολλάκις, e. g. in c. 14. 1333 a 35.

16. τὴν σχολὴν καὶ διαγωγὴν. Cp. 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 10, τὴν εἰς τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολήν, and 21, τὴν εἰς τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγὴν. Διαγωγὴ is the use of leisure in occupations desirable for their own sake—such occupations as have been described above on 1333 a 35. See as to its nature, Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 735. 5 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., 2. 266. 5), and Sus.2, Note 921 (Sus.4, i. p. 542). It is closely related to the end of human life (5 (8), 5. 1339 a 29-31), and therefore to happiness (1339 b 17-19), and hence, like happiness, it combines in itself both the pleasurable and the noble.

19. διὸ σώφρονα κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 1. 1323 a 40, κτοντα καὶ φιλάττοντοι οὐ τὰς ἄρετας τοῖς ἐκτός ἄλλ' ἐκείνα ταῦτας. Σώφροσύνη is a security for the possession of an abundance of necessaries, because it excludes the spendthrift habits of life which are a common concomitant of its opposite: cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 3. 1121 b 7, διὸ καὶ ἀκόλουθοι αὐτῶν (i. e. τῶν ἀσώτων) εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ εὐχερῶς γὰρ ἀναλίκνοντες καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀκολογίας διαπαραίρει εἰς, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ἥπι τὴς ἡδονᾶς ἀποκλίνοντα. It is implied that courage and other military virtues are productive of wealth in c. 14. 1333 b 10, 16 sqq.: cp. also Xen. Symp. 4. 13, τῶν μὲν ἵσχυρῶν πονοῦνται δεὶ κτάσασθα τάγαθα καὶ τῶν ἀνδρεῖον κυκυρεύουσα, τῶν δὲ γε σοφῶν λέγοντα. That they are preserving of wealth is obvious.

20. κατὰ γὰρ τὴν παροιμίαν, οὐ σχολὴ δουλοίς. See Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 765, where a remark of Erasmus is quoted, 'dictitur in eos quibus propter obnoxiam ministerii sordidioribus conditionem non vacat honestis disciplinis operam dare.'

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The proverb seems to be remembered by Euripides in a fragment of the Antiope (Fr. 215),

οὐ χρή ποιεῖ ἄνδρα δούλου ὄντ' ἐλευθέρας
γνώμας διώκειν οὐδ' ἐστὶ ἄργων βλέπειν,

and probably by Plutarch in Solon, c. 22, εἰλικρινοῦ πλήθους, δὲ βελτιών ἡν μὴ σχολάζειν, ἀλλὰ τριθύμευν ἄεί καὶ πονοῦν ταπεινοῦσθαι (see note on 1313 b 18). So we read in Plut. Cato Censor, c. 21, of Cato’s slaves, ἓδεὶ δὲ ἡ πράττειν τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων οὐκ οὖν τῶν δούλων ἢ καθευδεῖν. Compare also the saying ascribed to Socrates, ἢ Ἀργία ἀδελφή τῆς Ἐλευθερίας ἐστὶ (Aelian, Var. Hist. 10. 14).


23. φιλοσοφίας δὲ πρὸς τὴν σχολήν, ‘and of intellectual virtue for leisure.’ Bonitz (Ind. 821 a 6) rightly explains φιλοσοφία here as = ‘virtus intellectualis.’ See above on 1263 b 40. In 5 (8). 5. 1339 a 26 we find φρόνησις used in the sense of ‘intellectual virtue’ (see Sus. 2, Note 1023: Sus. 4, 1. p. 585). We do not learn in the Fifth Book how Aristotle proposes to develope intellectual virtue by his education; yet he keeps its development in view even in his arrangements respecting musical training; thus one reason why he rejects the study of pipe-playing is because it is οὐδ' ἐν πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν (5 (8). 6. 1341 b 6).

24. σωφροσύνης δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνης κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rhet. 1. 9. 1366 b 5, διὰ τούτῳ τούς δικαίους καὶ ἀνθρείους μάλιστα τυμώσειν ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐν πολέμῳ, ἢ δὲ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ χρήσιμος ἄλλος. Aristotle hopes to develope temperance by means of the musical element in his education (5 (8). 5. 1340 a 18 sqq.) and possibly justice also (cp. τῶν ἄλλων ἡδίκων, 1340 a 21). Something, however, would have been done for the promotion of temperance even in childhood by careful attention to children’s pastimes and to the tales told them, and by the prohibition of objectionable language in their presence, etc.

25. ὅ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμος κ.τ.λ., ‘for war obliges men to be just and temperate,’ so that in time of war men act justly and temperately, whether they have these virtues or not. Ἀναγκαζεί is emphatic. Compare for the expression Eurip. Fragm. 528, τὸ φῶς ὅ ἀνάγκη προστίθησι σωφροσύνην, and for the thought Xen. Cyrop. 8. 4. 14, δοκεῖ δὲ μοι, ὅ Κύρη, χαλεπώτερον εἶναι εὔρειν ἄνδρα τίγαλα καλῶς φέροντα ἢ τὰ κακά: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑβριν τοῖς πολλοῖς, τὰ δὲ σωφροσύνην τοῖς πάσιν ἐμποιεῖ.

26. ἢ δὲ τῆς εὐτυχίας ἀπόλαυσις κ.τ.λ. For the phrase, compare
Diod. 14. 80. 2, εἰς τροφὴν καὶ τὴν ἐν εἰρήνη τῶν ἁγαθῶν ἀπόλαυσιν, and for the thought, Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1124 a 29, ὑπερόπται δὲ καὶ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἁγαθὰ (i.e. τὰ εὐτυχῆματα) γέγοναν: Thuc. 8. 24. 4, Χίου γὰρ μόνον μετὰ λακεδαιμονίαν δὲν ἐγὼ ἴσθήμιν εὐθαμοῦσαντες ἄμα καὶ ἐσωφρότησαν: and the proverb Κολοφωνία ἱβρος, επὶ τῶν πλουσίων καὶ ὑβριστῶν, τοιοῦτοι γὰρ οἱ Κολοφώνοι (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 266). See also Justin 8. 1. 4. It would be easy to multiply instances of this familiar saying. For τὸ σχολάζειν μετ’ εἰρήνης, cp. Plato, Theaet. 172 D, τοὺς λόγους ἐν εἰρήνῃ επὶ σχολῆς τοιοῦται. For μᾶλλον, see note on 1270 b 33.


30. πάντων τῶν μακαριζομένων ἀπολαυόντας. Cp. c. 1. 1323 a 25 sqq. and Plato, Laws 631 B. The possession of all possible goods was held to make men insolent and overbearing (Rhet. 2. 16. 1390 b 32 sqq.).Ἐν πάσιν ἁγαθοῖς was a familiar Greek expression: cp. Bergk, Fragm. Adesp. Lyr. 18, ἀνθέωσαν ἁγαθοῖς πάσιν οἷς βαλλει πόλις, and see Leutsch and Schneidewin’s note on Gregor. Cypr. r. 36 (Paroem. Gr. 2. 58). It is parodied in Aristoph. Acharn. 1025 Didot, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι μὴ Δί’ ὀπερ μ’ ἐτρεφήτην ἐν πάσι βολίτοις, and Vesp. 709 Didot, δύο μνημάδες τῶν δημοτικῶν ἔξων ἐν πάσι λαγφοίς.

οἶνον εἰ τινές κ.τ.λ. Homer (Odys. 4. 561 sqq.), as Camerarius points out (Interp. p. 319), speaks of the Elysian plain; it is from Hesiod, Op. et Dies, 170 sqq., that we first hear of the Islands of the Blest. See Liddell and Scott s.v. μάκαρ. Hesiod describes how some favoured heroes of the fourth race did not die like their fellows, but were removed by Zeus far from the haunts of men to the Islands of the Blest in the deep-eddying Ocean. Even in the later Iron Age there were those whose lot was thought to be the same—e.g. Harmodius (Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Gr. Scol. 10) and those
who were initiated in the Eleusinian mysteries (Diog. Laert. 6. 39). Some found the ἔνυθισμα τῶν νῆσων in Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Cos, and Rhodes, the realm of Macareus (Diod. 5. 82), but they were more commonly believed to lie in the Atlantic Ocean at some distance from the West Coast of Libya (Plut. Sertor. c. 8: cp. Hor. Epod. 16. 41 sqq.).

32. φιλοσοφίας is introduced at some cost of trimness, but this is Aristotle's way: see note on 1323 b 35.

34. μὲν οὖν has no δὲ to answer to it, as the text stands. Perhaps it was taken up by another μὲν οὖν in the lacuna which, as we shall see, probably exists in 1334 b 4, both being then answered by πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἐστιν, 5.

35. τούτων τῶν ἄρετῶν, i.e. φιλοσοφία σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη.

36. αἰσχροῦ γὰρ δύντος κ.τ.λ., 'for [if they have them not, they will not be able to use good things in leisure-time, and] while it is disgraceful,' etc. Leisure is the crown of life, and ἤ εὖ τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγὴ is the διαγωγὴ τῶν ἐλευθέρων (5 (8). 3. 1338 a 21 sqq.), hence it is especially desirable to be able to make a right use of good things in leisure-time. Cp. also Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1105 a 9, περὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπότερον δὲ καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἄρετή καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὖ βελτιων ἐν τούτῳ.

38. Observe the chiasmus in ἀσκολάζονται καὶ πολεμοῦντας and εἰρήνην ἄγοντας καὶ σχολάζοντας.

40. διὸ δεῖ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 9. 1271 b 2, πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἄρετής ἢ πᾶσα σύνταξι τῶν νόμων ἐστί, τὴν πολεμικὴν αὐτὴ γὰρ χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν. τοιαροῖς ἐσώζοντο μὲν πολεμοῦντες, ἀπόλλυσιν δὲ ἀρέσκεται διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι σχολάζειν μὴδὲ ἴσχυον μηθεῖαν ἄσκησιν ἐτέραν κυριατέραν τῆς πολεμικῆς. Contrast the language of Xenophon in Rep. Lac. 10. 4, τόδε γε μὴν τοῦ Δυνατοῦ πῶς οὐ μεγάλος ἄξων ἀγαθήσεται; ὅσον δὲ ἐν τῇ Σπάρτῃ ἴσχύεται δημοσία πᾶσας ἀσκεῖν τὰς ἄρετὰς . . . ἐπέθηκε δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀνυπόστατον ἀνάγκην ἀσκεῖν ἀπασχολήσων πολιτικήν ἄρετήν.

41. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The meaning is—for they do not differ from other men in their views with regard to the question what are the greatest goods: the common herd think that external goods are the greatest of goods (Eth. Nic. 9. 8. 1168 b 17, τούτων γὰρ—i.e. χρημάτων καὶ τιμῶν καὶ ἱδανῶν τῶν σωματικῶν—οἱ πολλοὶ ἀρέσκονται, καὶ ἐσπουδάκασι περὶ αὐτὰ ὡς ἀρέστα δυντα, διὸ καὶ περιμάχητα ἐστιν), and so do the Lacedaemonians (Pol. 2. 9. 1271 b 6 sqq.); it is only in this that they differ from the mass of men, that they hold these goods to be won by means of one of the virtues (courage or military virtue). So far we see our way clearly, but there is little
doubt that the sentence which follows, commencing with ἐπεὶ δὲ, has reached us in an imperfect state, and that several words have dropped out after τῶν ἄρετῶν, 1334 b 4—how many, it is impossible to say. The lost words may well have ended with the word ἄρετῆς, and the omission of them may well have been due to the resemblance of ἄρετην to ἄρετῶν, 1334 b 4. Many attempts have been made to fill the lacuna (see Sus.) on the passage, but with indifferent success. If I were to hazard a suggestion, it would be to insert after ἄρετῶν the words νομίζουσιν, τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα χρησίμην εἶναι δοκούσαν ἄρετῆς ἀσκοίσι μόνον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ὁλην ἀσκητῶν τὴν ἄρετῆς. It seems likely at any rate that this filling-up more or less represents the sense of the words which have fallen out. Compare with the passage before us 2. 9. 1271 a 41—b 10. Camerarius (Interp. p. 320) was the first to suggest 'locum mendis non carere.' For οὗ ταύτη διαφέρουσιν τῶν ἄλλων, cp. Poet. 5. 1449 b 10 sqq. (already compared by Vahlen, Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. 3. 327), and Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 20, ἄλλ' εἰμὶ ἄπληστοι καίῳ ὅπερ οἷς ἄλλοι χρημάτων τῇ δὲ γε οἷς διαφέρειν μοι δοκοῖ τῶν πλείστων οὕτω κ.τ.λ. For ταύτη referring to what follows Bonitz (Ind. 546 b 11) compares Poet. 23. 1459 a 30 sqq. ἄλλα τῷ γενέσθαι ταῦτα (1334 b 2) = ἄλλα τῷ νομίζειν γενέσθαι ταῦτα, as Vic. points out. Possibly γίνεσθαι should be read (with Schn. Bekk. and Sus.) in place of γενέσθαι: cp. 2. 9. 1271 b 7, where we have γίνεσθαι. Ταῦτα, 1334 b 2, 3 = τὰ γαθὰ τὰ περιμάχητα. For the thought, cp. Xen. Cyrop. 3. 3. 8.

4. καὶ ὅτι δὲ αὐτῆς. Aristotle does not mean that virtue is not 1334 b. to be practised for the sake of the happiness resulting from it; what he objects to is the practice of virtue for the sake of τὰ περιμάχητα ἄγαθα.


6. τυγχάνομεν δὴ διηρημένοι πρότερον κ.τ.λ. Δὴ here, as often elsewhere (see note on 1252 a 24), introduces an investigation. Διηρημένοι is middle and used in the sense of διωρίζειν (cp. 3. 14. 1284 b 41, διελέσθαι). Πρότερον, in c. i3. 1332 a 38 sqq.

7. τῶν, 'of these things,' a partitive genitive: cp. c. i1. 1330 a 41, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν.
NOTES.

8. πρῶτερον, in c. 7.

9. τούτα γάρ κ.τ.λ. explains why this question must be considered: we must ask whether training through habit should precede training through reason, because these two kinds of training must be so harmonized with each other as to be adjusted to the best end, and we shall be better able to adjust them to the best end when this question has been answered. Aristotle has already said (c. 13. 1332 b 5) that nature, habit, and reason must harmonize with each other; he now adds that they must be so harmonized as to be adjusted to the best end. He follows in the track of Plato, Laws 653 B and 659 D. At Sparta this best kind of harmony had been missed, for in the Lacedaemonian training nature and habit had not been brought into harmony with reason, nor had reason been adjusted to the best end.

11. καί, 'both.'

12. καί διὰ τῶν ἑθῶν ὁμοίων ἡχθαι, sc. τοὺς παθενομένους. In Eth. Nic. 1. 2. 1095 b 4 we have τοῖς ἐθέσιν ἡχθαί καλῶς. For ὁμοίων (i.e. ὁμοίων τῷ λόγῳ), cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 26, πρὸς τῶν θεατῶν τῶν τοιούτων τοιουτῶν τινὶ χρήσθαι τῷ γένει τῆς μονικῆς, and Plato, Tim. 18 B, καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ περὶ γυναικῶν ἐπεμνήσθημεν, ὅσ τὰς φύσεις τοῖς ἀνδράσι παραπλησίας εἴη ξυναρμοστέον, and Rep. 472 C, ὅς ἐν ἑκέινοις ὅ τι ὁμοιότατος ἦ, τὴν ἑκέινοις μοῖραν ὁμοιοτάτην ἔξειν.

φανερὸν δὴ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle is about to decide that training through habit must precede training through reason, but that training through habit must be adjusted to and pursued for the sake of reason, which is the end, and he proves the second proposition first (in 12–17) and then the first (in 17–25). Translate—'this then at any rate is evident, first that as in all other things, [so in the case of the human being,] generation starts from a beginning, and that the end of some beginnings is related to another end, and that reason and thought are the end of man's natural development, so that [reason and thought are the end of generation, and] it is with a view to these ends that we should order generation and our training in custom.' I follow Sepulveda, Vict., Lamb., Stahr, and Welldon in my rendering of ὅσ ἡ γένεσις ἄν' ἀρχῆς ἐστί. Sus.2 (cp. Sus.4, i. p. 545) translates 'dass die Erzeugung und Geburt den Anfang macht (für den man zu sorgen hat)']—i.e. 'that generation and birth are the beginning (for which we have to care)']—comparing c. 16. 1334 b 29, but the next sentence, καὶ τὸ τέλος ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἄλλου τέλους,
suggests that ἀρχής ἐστί means 'start from a beginning.' It has not, I think, been noticed that Aristotle has before him Plato, Phaedr. 245 D, ἓ ἀρχής γὰρ ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ γεγονόμενον γίγνεσθαι, αὐτήν δὲ μὴ ἓ ἔνος εἰ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἀρχή γέγονα, οὐκ ἔν ἓ ἀρχής γίγνεσθαι, which supports the interpretation adopted by me. With Sepulveda (p. 237 b) I take the 'beginning' from which generation 'starts' to be the union of the parents: cp. Plato, Laws 720 E, ΑΘ... ἄρ' οὐ κατὰ φύσιν τὴν περὶ γενέσεως ἀρχὴν πρῶτην πόλεων περὶ κατακοσμῆσαι ταῖς τάξεσι; ΚΑ. τί μὴν; ΑΘ. ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶ τῶν γενέσεων πάσαις πόλεσιν ἄρ' οὖχ ἢ τῶν γάμων σύμμετρε καὶ κοινωνία; and c. 16. 1334 b 29-31, where it is implied that ἡ σύζυγος is the ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως. Compare with the passage before us those quoted in vol. i. p. 348, note 2, and Metaph. Θ. 8. 1050 a 7 sqq. Aristotle's aim is that in all arrangements connected with the generation of his future citizens and with the training of habit given them the ultimate development of reason and thought shall be kept in view, and we find that he bears this in mind later on (see above on 1334 a 23, and cp. c. 16. 1335 b 16 sqq., 29 sqq., and 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 24 sq., b 6 sqq.). We expect τὸ τέλος τὸ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν in place of τὸ τέλος ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν, but cp. c. 16. 1334 b 41, ἡ χάρις παρὰ τῶν τέκνων, and 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 35, τὰς κρίσεις ἐκ τῶν δικαιητηρίων. See also below on 1336 a 41 and cp. Plato, Laws 715 Α, τὰ τε πράγματα κατὰ τὴν πόλιν οὕτως ἐσφετέρισαν σφόδρα κ.τ.λ. For ἄλλο τέλος, cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 3. 1174 a 19, ἐν χρώμα γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησις καὶ τέλους τινός.

19. καὶ τὰς ἕξεις τὰς τούτων κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 4. 1277 a 6, where the soul is said to consist ἐκ λόγου καὶ ὀρέξεως, and De An. 3. 10. 433 a 9, φαίνεται δὲ γε δύο ταῦτα κανούντα, ἡ ὀρέξεις ἡ νοῦς, εἰς τις τὴν φαντασίαν τεθείη ὡς νόησιν των. That ὀρέξεις belongs to the irrational part of the soul and νοῦς to the rational, is implied in 1. 5. 1254 b 5-9, but we are not told elsewhere, so far as I am aware, that ὀρέξεις is the ἕξεις of the one part of the soul and νοῦς of the other. For the meaning of ἕξεις, cp. Metaph. Δ. 20. 1022 b 10, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἕξεις λέγεται διάθεσις καθ' ἑν ἡ κακὸς διάκειται τὸ διακείμενον, καὶ ἡ καθ' αὐτὸ ἡ πρὸς ἄλλο, εἰσὶν ἡ ὑγίεια ἕξεις τις' διάθεσις γὰρ ἐστὶ τοιαύτη, and see note on 1254 a 39, where an ἕξεις has been said to be a more permanent state than a διάθεσις. Thus ὀρέξεις is a διάθεσις τοῦ ἄλογου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς καθ' ἑν τὸ ἄλογον μέρος ἡ εἰ ἡ κακὸς διάκειται, καὶ νοῦς stands in a similar relation to τὸ λόγον ἔχον. "Ὀρέξεις is explained in 22 by θυμός, βουλήσεις, and ἐπιθυμία, for ὀρέξεις is made up of these three things (De

23. καὶ γενομένους εὔθυς, ‘even immediately after they are born’: cp. De Gen. An. 5. 1. 778 a 27, καὶ τὰ μὲν εὔθυς ἀκολουθεί γενομένους, τὰ δὲ προϊόνες τῆς ἡλικίας γίνεται δήλα καὶ γηρασκόντων: Pol. 1. 8. 1256 b 9, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν εὐθὺς, οὕτω καὶ τελεωθείσων: and Meteor. 3. 1. 371 a 6, εὐθὺς γενομένην.

24. ὁ δὲ λογίσμος καὶ ὁ νοῦς κ.τ.λ. The expression comes to Aristotle from Plato, Rep. 586 C, πλησιμωνίᾳ τιμῆς τε καὶ νίκης καὶ θυμοῦ διώκων ἄνευ λογίσμου τε καὶ νοῦ (cp. 431 C and 524 B, and Laws 897 C). These are the faculties that control ὅρεξις (Eth. Nic. 7. 8. 1150 b 22 sqq.) and bring it within bounds. They are absent in other animals than man (De An. 3. 10. 433 a 11 sq.), and the child has them in an imperfect form (Pol. 1. 13. 1260 a 13). At what age they develope we are not told. According to Probl. 30. 5. 955 b 22 sqq. νοῦς increases in men as they grow older, and reaches its highest development in old age (ἐπὶ γήρων). Some further light is thrown on the subject by Plato, Symp. 181 D, οὐ γὰρ ἐρώτησι παιδῶν, ἀλλ’ ἔπειταν ἢδη ἀρχίσατε νοῦν ἵσχεν τούτο δὲ πλησιάζει τῷ γενειάσκειν. Compare with what Aristotle says here
Polyb. 3. 20. 4, εἰ μὴ νῆ Δία πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἡ τίχη καὶ τούτῳ προσένειμε Ἄρωμαίους, τὸ φρονεῖν αὐτοὺς εὐθέως ἐκ γενετῆς.

προϊσίσχ. Bonitz (Ind. s. v.) compares De Part. An. 4. 10. 686 b 11, προϊσίσχι δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους αὐξηταὶ τὰ κάτωθεν.

25. διὸ πρῶτον μὲν κ.τ.λ. Πρῶτον μὲν is answered by ἔσειται. With ἔσειται τὴν τῆς ὅρεξεως we must apparently supply εἶναι or some such word. See note on 1279 b 7.

26. ἑνεκά μὲντοι τοῦ νοῦ τῆν τῆς ὅρεξεως. The ὅρεξεως should be so trained as to obey νοῦς (1. 5. 1254 b 5; see note on 1333 a 21, and cp. Plato, Laws 653 B, 659 D).

τὴν δὲ τοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς. Cp. Plato, Rep. 591 C, ἔσειται δ', εἴπων, τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἑξὶν καὶ τροφῆν ὡς ὅπως τῇ θηριώδει καὶ ἀλὸγῳ ἱδονῇ ἐπιτρέψας ἐστάθη τετραμμένος ζήσει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς ὑγίειαν βλέπων οὐδὲ τούτῳ προσβείνον, ὅπως ἄχυρος εἰ ὑγίας ἢ καλὸς ἐσται, εὰν μὴ καὶ σωφρονίσωμεν μέλλῃ ἀν' αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τὴν εἰ τῷ σώματι ἀρμονίαν τῆς εἰ τῇ ψυχῇ ἑνεκά ἐμφανίας ἀρμοτόμωνος [φανείσαι]. As to the omission of ἑνεκά with τῆς ψυχῆς Eucken remarks (Præpositionen, p. 20), 'if ἑνεκά belongs to two notions, it is usually expressed only with the first, and must be supplied with the second.'

26 sqq. Cp. Plato, Laws 721 A. But Aristotle is less guided C. 16. by Plato in this chapter than he is in the seventeenth. He raises questions here which Plato had not raised and solves those which Plato had already raised in a different way. Plato had not inquired ποῖον τινάς ἄντας χρή ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἄλληλους τὴν γαμκήν ὄμιλων, nor had he discussed the proper season of the year for marriage or the other questions raised in 1335 a 39 sqq. 'Απ' ἀρχῆς is evidently equivalent to ἀπὸ τῆς συζεύξεως.

30. τῶν τρεφομένων, 'of the children in process of rearing,' for not all that are born are to be reared. So Sepulv., whom Vict. follows.

πρῶτον μὲν κ.τ.λ., 'attention must first be given to the coupling of man and wife in marriage, [and the question must be considered] when'—i.e. at what age—'and in what condition [of body and mind] they should enter upon matrimonial intercourse with each other.' Critias, following no doubt Lacedaemonian traditions, had already said the same thing (see vol. i. p. 350, note 1). On the other hand, 'Chrysippus is reproached by Posidonius (Galen, Hipp. et Plat. 5. 1) for neglecting the first germs of education in his treatise on the subject, particularly those previous to birth' (Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, Eng. Trans., p. 303, note 2). In
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relation to animals other than man nature herself had fixed the age and season of the year at which intercourse was to take place (Hist. An. 5. 8. 542 a 19, ἄραν δὲ καὶ ἡλικία τῆς όξείας ἐκάστου εἰαίν ὀφριμένα τῶν ἔφοι), and Aristotle follows in her track. Indeed, Greek custom seems to have prescribed a certain season of the year for marriage (c. 16. 1335 a 36 sqq.), and particular Greek States seem often to have had an age of their own for its celebration (c. 16. 1335 a 15 sqq.). Another point is recognized in 1335 b 26 sqq. as needing consideration, πάσον χρόνον λειτουργεῖν ἅματε πρὸς τεκνοποιίας. It is not likely that regulations on this subject existed in any Greek State. Πρῶτον μὲν has nothing strictly answering to it, but it is in effect taken up by c. 17. 1336 a 3, γενομένων δὲ τῶν τέκνων κ.τ.λ. Ἐπιμελητέων περὶ τήν σύζευξιν, as in Plato, Laws 932 B, τῶν περὶ γάμων γυναικῶν ἐπιμελομένων. The question πότε κ.τ.λ. is considered in 1334 b 32–1335 a 35, and the question ποῖος τινὰς ὀντας κ.τ.λ. is considered, so far as relates to the body, in 1335 b 2–12.

32. δὲi δ' ἀποβλέποντα κ.τ.λ., 'and the lawgiver in instituting this union should look both to the persons united [as distinguished from the children to be born] and to the [whole] time for which they will live [not merely to the time at which the union takes place], in order that they may arrive simultaneously in respect of age at the same epoch' (i.e. the epoch at which each of the two loses the power to have children: cp. 1335 a 7, τέλος τῆς γεννήσεως, and for συγκαταβάινως 1335 a 10 sq., 31). If the lawgiver looked merely to the time at which the union takes place, and did not look forward to the time at which the power to have children is lost by husband and wife respectively, he might very well be led to arrange that husband and wife should both be of the same age and young, but to do this would be an error, and the right course for him is to keep in view the whole course of the lives of the wedded pair and to arrange that the husband shall be twenty years or so older than his wife. For τῶν τοῦ ζην χρόνων, cp. Plut. Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, c. 17. 1098 E, οὐκ ἦστιν αὐτῶν μέτρον ὁ τοῦ βίου χρόνος, ἀλλὰ τοῦ παντὸς αἰῶνος ἐπιδραττόμενον τὸ φιλότιμον καὶ φιλάνθρωπον ἐξαμελεῖται κ.τ.λ.: Euphron, Διδυμοι Fragm. 2 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 490), ὃ Ζεῦ, τί ποθ' ἡμῖν δοῦς χρόνον τοῦ ζην βραχὺν πλέκειν ἀλέπως τούτον ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἔργον,
Philemon, "Εφηβος Fragm. i (Meineke 4.10),

οὐκ εἰς ἡμέραν χειμῶνα μίαν γὰρ, εἰς τὸ ζῆν δὲ ὄλον:

and Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 444, Πιτύλος Πασειδίππου τῶν ἀδου δρεπτῶν λυκόλεντα αὖθικεν ελεύθερον παραμείνατα αὐτῷ τῶν ταῖς χρῶς χρόνων. Camerarius (Interp. p. 323) rightly translates τῶν τοῦ ζῆν χρόνων 'vitae ipsius spaciun.' Susemihl's rendering of the sentence, which Mr. Welldon follows, translating 'he should have in view not only the persons themselves who are to marry but their time of life,' needs the support of parallel instances of this use of τῶν τοῦ ζῆν χρόνων. Aristotle follows in the track of Euripides (Fragm. 24: cp. Fragm. 906, and contrast Fragm. 319, quoted below on 1335 a 1),

κακῶν γυναίκα πρὸς νέαν ζεῦξιν νέον,
μακρὰ γὰρ ἱσχὺς μᾶλλον ἀρσένων μένει,
θῆλεια δὲ ἡβῆ βάσσον ἐκλείπει δέμας.

For νομοθέτειν ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν, cp. 2. 8. 1267 b 39, ἐνομοθετεί δὲ καὶ δικαστήριον ἐν τῷ κύριον. That ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν refers to τὴν σύζυγον, we see from 1335 a 35 sqq. The union of man and wife is called a σύζυγος in 1. 3. 1253 b 9 sq. and a κοινωνία in 1. 2. 1252 b 9 sq.

37. καὶ στάσεις πρὸς ἅλληλους καὶ διαφοράς. Cp. Isocr. Nicocl. § 41, εἶπα λανθάνων ἐνδον ἐν τοῖς βασιλείσι στάσεις καὶ διαφοράς αὐτοῖς ἐγκαταλείπουσε, and Plut. Amat. c. 2, ἐκ τῆς γενομένης τοῖς γονεύσιν αὐτῶν διαφοράς καὶ στάσεως. A 'difference' is less serious and less long-continued than a 'state of discord,' though it may often end in the production of discord: cp. 7 (5). 4. 1303 b 37, καὶ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἐκ κηδείας γενομένης διαφοράς ἐρχὴ παιδῶν ἐγένετο τῶν στάσεων τῶν υἱότερων.

39. τῶν τέκνων includes female as well as male children.

40. τῶν πατέρων might well mean here, as often elsewhere, 'the parents,' but it would seem to mean 'the fathers,' if we compare 1335 a 32–35, for there the father alone must be referred to, inasmuch as he alone would be seventy years of age at the time when the children are approaching their acmê.

ἀνώνυμος γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for elderly fathers get no good from children's return of service, nor do the children from the assistance given by fathers.' If a man marries (say) at fifty-five, he will probably be in his grave before he gets much assistance from his
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children or is able to start them in life. See also vol. i. p. 184, note 2. For ἡ χάρις παρὰ τῶν τέκνων, not ἡ χάρις ἡ παρὰ τῶν τέκνων, see above on 1334 b 12.

1835 a. 1. οὔτε λίαν πάρεγγυς εἶναι. Euripides puts very different advice into the mouth of one of his characters (Fragm. 319),

καὶ νῦν παραίω πάσι τοῖς νεωτέροις
μὴ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας τοὺς γάμους ποιούμενοις
σχολὴ τεκνούσθαι παιδας' οὐ γὰρ ἱδονή,
γυναικὶ τ' ἐχθρῷν χρῆμα πρεσβύτης ἀνήρ'
ἀλλ' ὡς τάχιστα. καὶ γὰρ ἐκτροφαὶ καλαὶ
καὶ συνενέξον ἢδ' ταῖς νέφι πατρὶ.

On the un-Attic word πάρεγγυς see Rutherford, New Phrynichus, p. 120.

2. ἢ τε γὰρ αἰδῶς κ.τ.λ. Cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. 5. 5, καὶ γὰρ δὴ ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἀλλαὶς πόλεσιν ὡς τὸ πολὺ οἱ ἴλακες ἀλλήλοις σώνεις, μεθ' ὄντερ καὶ ἐλαχίστῃ αἰδῶς παραγίγνεται. Τοῖς τούτοις, sc. τέκνοις, 'children of the kind we have just described,' i.e. near in age to their parents. "Ωσπέρ ἢλικιώτας, 'as it does also to those of the same age': cp. 3. 16. 1287 b 16, ὀσπέρ ὁ δικασθῆς, and 2. 10. 1272 a 41, ὀσπέρ τοῖς ἐφόροις.


4. ἐτὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. We are apparently intended to supply δὲ νομοθετεῖν ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν before ὅπως κ.τ.λ. "Ὅθεν ἀρχίσασαι δέωρ μετέδημεν, cp. 1334 b 29 sqq. Τῶν γεννώμενον, 'of the offspring in process of generation,' whether born or unborn, for τὸ γεννώμενον in De Gen. An. i. 2. 716 a 22 refers to the latter and τοῖς γεννώμενοι in Pol. i. 8. 1256 b 13 to the former. After birth, however, τὰ γεγομένα is the usual designation, as in 1335 b 20, 22, and c. 17. 1336 a 16, and τὰ τέκνα is used of a still later stage (1334 b 39). 'Ὑπάρχῃ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ νομοθέτου βουλήν, 'be such as to answer to the wish of the lawgiver.' For πρὸς with the acc. in this sense, cp. Rhet. i. 15. 1375 b 16, εἰν δὲ ὁ γεγραμμένος (νόμος) ἢ πρὸς τὸ πράγμα, and other passages collected in Bon. Ind. 642 a 40-54: also Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 139, εἰκε γὰρ οὕτως ὀφείλεται δὲν τοῖς παλαί κειμένοις χρῆσθαι νόμοι καὶ τὰ πάτρια περιστέλλει καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὰς βουλήσεις μηδὲ πρὸς τὰς διαδύσεις τῶν ἀδικημάτων νομοθετεῖσθαι.
6. σχέδων δὴ κ.τ.λ., 'now all these things come about in connexion with one arrangement,' or 'one mode of dealing with the subject'—the arrangement being to place the commencement of wedlock at such ages in the case of husband and wife respectively as will enable it to close, so far as the production of children is concerned, at the age of seventy in the case of the husband and fifty in that of the wife, so that at no period of the cohabitation will the power of procreation be wanting to either party. It deserves notice that Aristotle himself was about forty years of age when he married the niece and adopted daughter of Hermias (see vol. i. p. 466). That this union was a happy one may be inferred from the direction in Aristotle's will that his wife's bones should be, in accordance with her request, disinterred and buried with his own (Diog. Laert. 5. 16). Πάντα ταῦτα, i.e. τὸ μὴ διαφωνεῖν τὰς δυνάμεις, τὸ μύτε λίαν ὑπολείπεσθαι ταῖς ἥλικίαις τὰ τέκνα τῶν πατέρων μύτε λίαν πάρεγγυς εἶναι, and τὸ τὰ σῶματα τῶν γενναμένων ὕπαρχειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ νομοθέτου βούλησιν. For συμβαίνειν κατὰ μᾶλλον ἐπιμελείαν, cp. Meteor. i. i. 338 b 20, διὰ συμβαίνειν κατὰ φύσιν, and Xen. Hell. 4. 4. 8, ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἄνδρε καὶ κατὰ τέχνην καὶ κατ' ἐπιμελείαν ἐγενέσθην φύλακε κατὰ τὰς πύλας ταύτας. The phrase perhaps contains an allusion to the proverb μία μάστιξ ἐλαύνει (or μία μάστιξ πάντας ἐλαύνει), Suidas: ἐπὶ τοῦ ῥαδίου (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. i. 280): cp. Herodes, Peri Πολιτείας, p. 175 (Bekker, Orat. Att., vol. v. p. 659), ἀπὸ μᾶς οὖν τέχνην ὁρμώμενον ἥμων τε κρατήσειν οἴεται καὶ τοῦτων δῶν δὲ ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἄρσει. Sus. transposes σχέδων, 6—τοῦτος, 11, to after 27, πληθών ἐτί (ἡ μικρόν), reading σχέδων δὲ in place of σχέδων δὴ, but the result of this transposition is to sever πάντα ταῦτα from the things to which these words refer.

8. ὃ τῶν ἐβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμὸς ἔσχατος, 'the extreme sum of seventy years' (cp. 35). For the fact, cp. Hist. An. 7. 6. 585 b 5 sqq. Camerarius remarks (Interp. p. 323), 'haec ita se habere putatur esse certum. Etsi paucha quaedam dissentanea memorantur, ut olim de Masinissa, quem Plutarchus in libello quo quaeritur an senibus capessenda sit república' (c. 15) 'ex Polybio' (37. 10. 5, 11 sqq.) 'narrat, mortuum annos habentem nonaginta, reliquisse superstitem puerum annorum quattuor. Et de Constantia, quae nupsit Friderico Secundo, traditum peperisse cam filium grandiorum annis quinquaginta.' See also Plin. Nat. Hist. 7. 61 sq. Bonitz (Ind. 289 b 16) couples with the passage before us Hist. An. 8. 15. 599 b 10, καὶ ἄρχονται βηρεύσεθαι (οἱ θύναι) ἀπὸ Πλειάδος ἀναστόλης μέχρι
For the ordinary of the words, which is quite regular, cp. 1. 2. 1252 b 27, ἡ ἐκ πλείωνον κωμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος: see Sandys’ note on ‘Αθ. Πολ. c. 51. l. 10, ὁ ἐν ἄγορᾷ σῖτος ἄργος.

9. For πεντήκοντα, cp. 29, ἐπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα.

10. δεῖ τὴν ἁρχήν κ.τ.λ., ‘the commencement of the union, so far as age is concerned, should reach down at its close to these epochs’ (i.e. the close of the union should arrive for the wife at the age of fifty and for the husband at the age of seventy, so that the husband should be twenty years older than the wife at the time of marriage). For κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν, ‘in respect of age’ as contrasted with time of year (τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀραν χρόνοις, 36), cp. De Gen. An. 5. 3. 784 a 17, τοῖς δ’ ἀνθρώποις κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν γίνεται χειμών καὶ θέρος καὶ ἔαρ καὶ μετόπαρον. For the use of καταβαίνων, cp. Plut. Demetr. c. 53, κατέβη δὲ ταῖς διαδοχαῖς τὸ γένος αὐτοῦ βασιλείου εἰς Περσέα τελευταίων, ἐφ’ οὗ ‘Ρωμαίοι Μακεδονίαν ὑπηγίγνουσι.

11. ἐστὶ δ’ ὁ τῶν νέων συνδυασμὸς κ.τ.λ. Partly in support of the conclusion at which he has just arrived, which implies that the bridegroom will be twenty years older than the bride at the time of marriage, and therefore will not be young, and partly in order to settle the age of the bride, which has not yet been settled, Aristotle recalls the fact that the union of young persons is a bad thing. The substantive συνδυασμός is not used elsewhere in the Politics in the sense of ‘coitus,’ though it is often thus used in the zoological writings of Aristotle (see Bon. Ind. s.v.), but we have συνδυασθέντων in this sense in 1335 b 24 (cp. also συνδυάζεσθαι in 1. 2. 1252 a 26, so far as it refers to the union of male and female). With the passage 1335 a 11–28 should be compared Plato, Rep. 459 B: Aristot. Hist. An. 5. 14. 544 b 14, τὸ γὰρ τῶν νέων (sc. σπέρμα) ἐν πάσι τοῖς ζωίσ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἄγονον, γονίμων δ’ ὅστιν ἄσθενετερα καὶ ἐλάττω τὰ ἐκγονα’ τούτῳ δὲ μάλιστα δῆλον ἐπὶ τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ἐφισάκων τετραπώδων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὀρνίθων, τῶν μὲν γὰρ τὰ ἐκγονα ἑλάττω, τῶν δὲ τὰ φά, and 7. 1. 582 a 16, μέχρι μὲν οὐν τῶν τρισ ἐπτὰ ἐτῶν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἄγονα τὰ σπέρματα ἐστὶ’ ἐπειτὰ γόνιμα μὲν μικρά δὲ καὶ ἀτελῆ γεννῶσι καὶ οἱ νέοι καὶ αἱ νέαι, ὕστερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων τῶν πλείστων, συλλαμβάνοντω μὲν οὐν αἱ νέαι ἵκτωρ’ ἐὰν δὲ συνήξοισι, ἐν τοῖς τόκοις παραπέφευσι μᾶλλον. καὶ τὰ σύμμετα δ’ αὐτῶν ἀσθένετερα γίνεται ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ γηράκοντα βάρτου, τῶν τ’ ἀφροδισιακῶν ἀρέσσων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν τῶν τοῖς τόκοις χρωμένων πλείσσων δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐδ’ ἡ αὔξησις ἐτὶ γίνεσθαι μετὰ τῶν τρεῖς τόκων, and De Gen. An. 4. 2. 766 b 29, τὰ τὸ γάρ νέα ὁμιλοῦσι μᾶλλον τῶν ἀκμαζόντων καὶ γηράκοντα μᾶλλον (τὰ πρεσβύτερα
μᾶλλον P, i.e. Vat. 1339) τοίς μὲν γάρ οὕτω τέλειον τὸ θερμὸν, τοῖς δ' ἀπολέστει. Aubert and Wimmer, in their edition of the De Generatione Animalium, remark on this passage, 'this appears from statistical investigations to be correct'; among other authorities they refer to 'the very precise and interesting investigations of Quetelet, Sur l'Homme'; see also below on 1335 a 15. According to Aristox. Fragment. 20 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 278), Pythagoras recommended (he probably referred to males only) complete abstinence till twenty, ἄνω δὲ καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἀφικηταί, σπανίος εἶναι χρηστέων τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις: τούτο γὰρ πρὸς τὸν τῶν γεννώντων καὶ γεννημένων εἰσέλαβον πολὺ συμβάλλεσθαι: see also below on 1335 b 37, ὑνείας χάρων. At Sparta, care was taken that both bridegroom and bride should be in their bodily prime (Xen. Rep. Lac. 1. 6: Plut. Lycurg. c. 15, cp. Num. et Lycurg. inter se comp. c. 4, where the custom at Rome is contrasted with the Lacedaemonian custom). It is evident from 28 sq. that Aristotle does not class a girl of eighteen among the νέα, at all events so far as fitness for marriage is concerned.

13. ἀτέλη, 'imperfect,' i.e. lacking some limb or organ, or with some limb or organ imperfectly developed, or lacking some sense, for instance the sense of sight or hearing (De An. 3. 1. 425 a 9 sqq.), or some power, for instance the power of movement (De An. 3. 9. 432 b 21-26) or speech, or the power to procreate (cp. Hist. An. 7. 1. 581 b 21 sqq., and De An. 2. 4. 415 a 26 sqq. and 3. 9. 432 b 21 sqq.), or possibly imperfect in mind (cp. 1335 b 29 sqq.), idiotic or the like. As infants born imperfect are not to be reared in Aristotle's 'best State' (1335 b 20), and the offspring of the over-young is often imperfect, much destruction of infant life would be saved by the prohibition of the marriage of those who are over-young.

μικρὰ τὴν μορφήν, 'small in figure': cp. Pindar, Isthm. 4. 53, μορφὰν βραχύς. In 17 we have μικροὶ τὰ σώματα. To be small in person was to lack beauty (Eth. Nic. 4. 7. 1123 b 6 sqq.). 'Ο μικρός was 'a term of reproach at Athens' (Liddell and Scott s.v.; Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 280, note: cp. also 7 (5).

10. 1311 b 3).

15. ἐν ὀσαίς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Vict. 'hoc autem vulgo de plebe Gallorum dicitur, apud quos mala haec consuetudo increbruit; unde notantur etiam voce ostendente erratum hoc ipsorum irridenteque brevitatem corporis eorumundet deformatatem.' Among the States
other than Troezen to which Aristotle here refers, Crete should probably be included. Cp. Ephor. Fragm. 64 (Strabo, p. 482: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 251), γαρειν μεν δια πάντες ἀναγκάζονται παρ’ αυτοῖς οἱ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἐκ τῆς τῶν παῖδων ἀγέλης ἐκκριθέντες. The age referred to would be the expiration of the eighteenth year according to Dareste, Inscriptions Juridiques Grecques, p. 408. The bride in Crete might be no more than twelve years of age (ibid. p. 407). The early age at which daughters were given in marriage at Troezen is probably an indication of material prosperity, for the father no doubt had to provide his daughter with a dowry. In Crete the bridegroom did not take his bride home till she was old enough to manage a household (Strabo, p. 482), and the actual provision of a dowry by the father may have been delayed till then. ‘In a meeting of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, M. Joseph Körösi, Director of the Buda-Pest Statistical Bureaux, read a paper on the “Influence of Parents’ Ages on the Vitality of Children.” . . . M. Körösi has collected about 30,000 data, and has come to the following conclusions:—Mothers under twenty years of age and fathers under twenty-four have children more weakly than parents of riper age. Their children are more subject to pulmonary diseases. The healthiest children are those whose fathers are from twenty-five to forty years of age, and whose mothers are from twenty to thirty years old’ (Times, Jan. 14, 1889).

16. ἐπιχωριάζεται. Ἐπιχωριάζει would be more usual, but Liddell and Scott refer to Nymphis, ap. Athen. Deipn. 619 f, κατὰ τὴν ἐπιχωριαζόμενην παρ’ αὐτοῖς συνήθειαν. See critical note.

18. διαφθείρονται, ‘die.’ Bonitz (Ind. s.v.) compares De Gen. An. 4. 4. 773 a 18 sqq.

διὸ καὶ τὸν χρησμὸν κ.τ.λ., ‘the well-known oracle also’ (in addition to other things). For τὸν χρησμὸν, cp. 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 30, δέν τὸ ἄγος συνέβη τοῖς Συβαρίταις. P1 and P2 have preserved this oracle for us in their margins—τὸ μῆ τέμνε νέαν ἄλοκα (see Sus.1). The literal meaning of these words was ‘let fallow land remain fallow, do not plough up uncultivated land,’ or in other words ‘let the land rest.’ The verb νέαν and the substantive νεατός (Xen. Oecon. 7. 20) were used of the ploughing-up of fallow land (see Liddell and Scott). Cp. also Anth. Pal. 6. 41, χαλκὸν ἀροτρητῆν, κλασιβώλακα, νεισσομήν.

As, however, the land which had been left for a time fallow was the land which would naturally be used for ploughing, the advice
of the oracle came in effect to this, that ploughing should cease for a time and that crops should not be raised. No wonder that men rejected this interpretation of the oracle and cast about for another—that given in the text. A third interpretation was, indeed, possible. The oracle might be understood as a warning against rash innovation: cp. Athen. Deipn. 461 ε, καὶ κατακλιθένταν, ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὁ Πλούταρχος ἔφη, κατὰ τὸν Φιλάσιον ποιήτην Πρατίναν, οὐ γὰρ αὐλακυσμένων ἄρων, ἀλλὰ σκύφων ματεών, κυλικηγορήσων ἔρχομαι κ.τ.λ. For διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν, see above on 1284 a 23.

20. διὰ τὸ γαμίσκεσθαι τὰς νεωτέρας. Sepulv. ‘propterea quod adolescentulae nuptui traderentur’ (γαμίσκεσθαι being taken as passive: so Lamb. and Sus.), or ‘because the custom was to take the younger women to wife’ (γαμίσκεσθαι being taken as middle: so Liddell and Scott). Perhaps the words which follow, τὰς ἐκδόσεις ποιεῖσθαι πρεσβυτέραις, where the act of the father, not the bridegroom, is referred to, make rather in favour of the former interpretation. Γαμίσκεσθαι is a rare word.

22. καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνην, as well as πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποιίαν (12).

τὰς ἐκδόσεις ποιεῖσθαι πρεσβυτέραις, ‘to give away their daughters in marriage, when they are older’ (literally ‘to make their givings-away in marriage for girls when older’).


24. καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀρρένων δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘and the bodies of the males also are thought to suffer injury in respect of growth, if they have intercourse with females while the seed is still increasing, for the seed also [as well as the body, the increase of which has just been referred to] is subject to a fixed limit of time, which it does not overpass in its increase, or overpasses only slightly, [so that it is not an indifferent matter whether intercourse occurs at an earlier or later age].’ The editors from Vict. downward, so far as I have observed, with the exceptions of Reiz and Götting, read σῶματος in place of σπέρματος, and there is much doubt as to the correct reading. The words σῶμα and σπέρμα are occasionally interchanged in the MSS.—e.g. in De Gen. An. 2. 3. 737 a 11 we should probably read σῶμα with Aubert and Wimmer in place of σπέρμα, and in Chaeremon, Fragm. 13, I would read Ὄρων σπέρματ’ in place of Ὄρων σῶματ’. It is therefore not without hesitation that I retain σπέρματος in the passage before us. I do so for the following reasons: (1) It is the reading of all the better MSS., for even in P*, which now has σῶματος, σπέρματος was the original reading;
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PL has ἀλλος σῶματος in its margin. Vet. Int. has 'corpor,' but whether he found σῶματος in the Greek text used by him is doubtful, for he may well have translated a marginal reading. Susemihl ascribes the reading σῶματος to Leonardus Aretinus, but Schneider says (Politica, vol. ii. p. 436), 'Aldinum et plurium Victorii codicum scripturam σπέρματος reddidit Aretinus,' and a manuscript of his Latin Translation belonging to Balliol College, Oxford (MS. Ball. 242)—I have not consulted any others—has 'ac masculorum corpora crescere impediantur si adhuc augente semine consuetudinem ineant.' (2) If we read σῶματος, it is not easy to see, as Schneider has already pointed out in his note on the passage, why Aristotle did not simply write καί τὰ τῶν ἀρρένων δὲ σῶματα βλάπτεσθαι δοκεῖ πρὸς τὴν αὐξήσιν, ἡν ἢτι αὐξανομένων (and not αὐξανομένων τοῦ σῶματος) ποὺνται τὴν συνουσίαν: Sepulveda, in fact (p. 240), found αὐξανομένων (not αὐξανομένον τοῦ σῶματος or σπέρματος) in some MSS. and prefers this reading. Besides, the added remark καί γὰρ—-yyyy seems rather otiose, if it refers to the body, for every one knows that the growth of the body ceases after a certain age. (3) The difficulty has been raised by Schneider that we nowhere read in Aristotle of a 'certus temporis terminus seminis augmento atque incremento definitus, ultra quem progresiatur nunquam, quoque intercepto corporis incrementum impediatur.' 'Corporis incrementum,' he adds, 'intra vigesimum fere annum actatis consistere solet, seminis vero incrementum et copia pro natura alimentorum aliasque per causas variatur usque ad annum sexagesimum.' The question is one for thorough students of Aristotle's physiology to decide, and I cannot pretend to be one of them, but it should be noticed that the expression φθινοντος τοῦ σπέρματος occurs in De Gen. An. 3. 1. 750 a 34, ὡς ἡναλισκομένου τοῦ περιτρόματος καὶ ἠμα τῆς ἥλικας ληγούσης φθινοντος τοῦ σπέρματος, in reference to the old age not indeed of a man, but of an animal, and if he believed in a decrease of the secretion after a certain age, he may well have believed in an increase of it up to a certain age. Some indications of his having done so are traceable, if we can trust the Seventh Book of the History of Animals, c. 5. 585 a 36, πλήν οὔτ' ἀρχομένων (sc. τοῦ σπέρματος καὶ τῶν καταμηνίων) γάνημα εὐθὺς οὔτ' ἢτι διότι γεγονόμενων καὶ ἀμένων, and Probl. 20. 7. 923 a 35, ή ἀπαντε μὲν μέχρι τοῦτου ἀκμάζει, ἔως ἀκτά τοῦ σπέρμα ἀκμάζῃ; ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ ἁθρώποι μέχρι τριάκοντα ἐτῶν ἐπιδιόδουσιν, ὅτε μὲν τῷ πλήθει ὅτε δὲ τῇ παχύτητι. Compare what we read in Hist. An. 7. 1. 581 b 2 sqq. of the
effect on bodily growth of a discharge of τὰ λευκά in early child-
hood, for the catamenia in the female answer to the seed in the male (De Gen. An. 1. 19. 727 a 2 sqq.)—τὰ δὲ λευκὰ καὶ παιδίοις
γίνεται νέοις οὐδὲ πάμπαιν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀν ὑγρὰ χρῶνται τροφῆς καὶ κωλύει τὴν αὐξήν καὶ τὰ σώματα ἰσχύαινε τῶν παιδίων. For ὡριμένοις χρόνοις,
cp. 3. 13. 1284 a 22 and 3. 14. 1285 a 34. As to (ἡ μικρὸν), see
critical note.

28. διό κ.τ.λ. Διό is explained by ἐν τοσούτῳ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 30. We
should have expected from Hist. An. 7. 1. 582 a 16—29 (quoted in
part above on 11) that Aristotle would have delayed the age of
marriage for women till twenty-one, but this would have involved
a shortening of the duration of wedlock, as it is to close before the
wife is fifty years of age. The male reaches the acme of his physical
development between thirty and thirty-five (see vol. i. p. 186, note 2,
and cp. 1335 a 32 sq.), so that Aristotle might well have placed
the age of marriage for the male a little earlier than he does, but he
probably wishes to make the duration of wedlock the same for
husband and wife (about thirty-two years). As to the ages recom-
manded by Plato, see vol. i. p. 183.

29. As to [ἡ μικρὸν], see critical note.

30. ἐν τοσούτῳ, sc. χρόνῳ, 'at an age no greater than this.'
ἀκμάζουσι τε τοῖς σώμασι σύζευξις ἔσται, 'coupling will take place
while their bodies are in their prime.' For the importance of this,

31. συγκαταβήσεται, sc. σύζευξις, cp. 10.

32. τοῖς μὲν, the children, answering to τοῖς δὲ, 34, the fathers.

33. ἀρχομένοις τῆς ἀκμῆς, cp. 1335 b 27, ἀρχεθαίρη τῆς σύζευξιος.

34. ἡ δὲ καταλελυμένης τῆς ἥλικιας, 'their period of vigour having
now been brought to a close' (cp. De Gen. An. 1. 19. 727 a 8, καὶ
παύεται τῆς ἥλικιας ληγοῦσης τοῖς μὲν τὸ δύνασθαι γεννᾶν, τοῖς δὲ τὰ κατα-
μήνια, and Demosth. in Apatur. c. 4, οὔτω δὲ ἐτῆ ἐστὶν ἐπτὰ ὠφ' οὗ τὸ
μὲν πλεῖν καταλελυκα), or possibly 'having now been wrecked.' For
πρὸς, 'towards,' see Bon. Ind. 641 b 9, where we find a reference
among other passages to De Gen. An. 5. 1. 778 a 25, τὰ μὲν γὰρ
(τῶν ζωῶν) οὐ πολιοῦσαι πρὸς τὸ γῆρας ἐπιδήλου.

p. 99. 11, δὲ δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἱπποτίζεσι τῶν τειχῶν λαβρᾶίος χρᾶσθαι καθάπερ
καὶ νῦν χρῶνται μεταλλεύοντες. Τοὺς περὶ τὴν ὁραν χρόνους, 'time in
connexion with season,' in contradistinction to οἱ περὶ τὴν ἥλικιαν
χρόνοι: cp. c. 5. 1327 a 8, τῆς περὶ ξύλα ἔλης, and for the distinction

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Hist. An. 5. 8. 542 a 19, ὄρα ἰ ἐκα ἴλικια τῆς ὀχείας ἑκάστου εἰς ἣν ὄρισμέναι τῶν ὕφων.

37. οἱ οἱ πολλοὶ κ.τ.λ. There is a tacit antithesis between οἱ πολλοὶ and οἱ ἱατροὶ and οἱ φύσικοι, 40. In reference to the question of season, which is a very simple one, we need not have recourse to the opinion of learned men; the verdict of the many will suffice: cp. Top. 2. 2. 110 a 19, οὐκ ὀνειδεῖν μὲν ἤρετον τὸ ποιητικοῦ ὄνειας, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν πότερον δὲ τὸ προκείμενον ποιητικοῦ ὄνειας ὃ οὔ, οὐκέτι ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ ἐλητέον ἄλλ’ ὡς ὁ ἱατρὸς. See vol. i. p. 187, note 1. The mention of οἱ πολλοὶ would seem to show that it was usual to marry in the winter throughout Greece and not merely in Attica. In ὀρίσαντες Aristotle probably refers to a custom or unwritten law. Pythagoras went further (Diog. Laert. 8. 9, καὶ περὶ ἀφροδισίων δὲ φησιν οὔτως “ἀφροδίσια χειμῶνος ποιεῖται, μή θέρεσι’ φθυνομένου δὲ καὶ ἤρος κοινότερα, βαρέα δὲ πάσαν ὄρην καὶ ἐς ὄνειαν οὐκ ἣγαθὰ εἶναι”: cp. Alcaeus, Fragm. 13, 39 with Bergk's notes, and Hist. An. 5. 8. 542 a 32). 'In 1876 Dr. Kulischer, in a paper in the Zeitschrift für Ethnologie, collected details of human pairing-seasons, as marked by festivals of plainly matrimonial intent, and brought forward still more distinct evidence from the statistics of births, which show maxima and minima pointing to two especial pairing-times, about New Year and in late spring. Dr. Westermarck [in his history of Human Marriage, Macmillan, 1891] 'brings new evidence to bear on the subject' (Prof. E. B. Tylor, Academy, Oct. 3, 1891).

38. τὴν συναυλίαν ταύτην, ‘this kind of dwelling together.’ Συναυλία in this sense is connected with αὐλή, not αὐλός, and is a very rare word, but Bekk. is no doubt wrong in following Lamb., who reads συνοισίαν. The word ὀμαυλία occurs in Aesch. Choeph. 599, ἕξουσιον ὅ ὀμαυλίας (‘wedded unions,’ Liddell and Scott), and Schn. points out that Plato (Laws 721 D) ‘caelibatum eodem modo μοναυλίαν vocavit.’ There were other kinds of συναυλία, e. g. those of ὀμίστως and ὀμοτραπέζως, not ὀμελέκτως.

39. δεῖ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἦν τῶν θεωρεῖν κ.τ.λ., ‘and the married couple also in turn’ (as well as the lawgiver, cp. 1334 b 33 and 1335 b 14) ‘should study the teaching of physicians and that of physical philosophers.’ For ἦν see note on 1258 b 18: ἦν here lends emphasis to a pronoun, as in that passage and often elsewhere (e.g. in 2. 8. 1268 b 21: 4 (7). 2. 1324 a 14: 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 10). For θεωρεῖν τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἱατρῶν λεγόμενα, cp. Metaph. M. 1. 1076 a 12,
but some were wholly against the time after a feast of any kind, even the ordinary δείπνων, and among them was Epicurus (Plut. Sympos. 3. 6: Usener, Epicurea, Fragm. 61, p. 117 sqq.). Cp. Plato, Laws 674 B, Plut. Lycurg. c. 15, and Diog. Laert. 7. 18. We learn the opinion of the Athenian physician Mnesitheus (b. c. 400–350?) from Athen. Deipn. 357 c, τὸ δὲ τῶν μαλακῶν γένος, οἷα πουλυπτόδων τε καὶ σημύων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων, τὴν μὲν σάρκα δυσπεπτον ἔχει: διὸ καὶ πρὸς ἄφροδισιασμοὺς ἀρμόττουσι. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ εἰσὶ πνευματώδεις, οὐ δὲ τῶν ἄφροδισιασμῶν καθὼς πνευματώδους προσδείται διαθέσεως (cp. De Part. An. 4. 10. 689 a 29 sqq.). As to the dawn of day, see Aristoph. Lysistr. 966 Didot.


2. τοῖον δὲ τιμῶν κ.τ.λ. Here the question announced for consideration in 1334 b 31 is taken up, so far at least as relates to the body. Plato had already said something on the subject in Laws 775 B sqq.: cp. 779 D sqq. The view which prevailed at Sparta may be gathered from Xen. Rep. Lac. 1. 4, ταῖς δὲ ἐξευθέντας μέγιστον νομίσας (ὁ Δυκαύργος) εἶναί την τεκνοποιίαν πρῶτον μὲν σωματικῶν ἐπαξεν οὖν ἦπτον τὸ ὑπέρ τοῦ ἀρρενοῦ φύλου· ἐπετα ὃ ὁμού καὶ ἵμαχος, ὄσπερ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, οὔτω καὶ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἀγάποις πρὸς ἄλληλαις ἐποίησε, νομίζων οὖν ὡς ἀρμόστερον ἰσχυρῶν καὶ τὰ ἔγγον ἐρω-μενόστερα γίγνεσθαι, and Plut. Lycurg. c. 14: compare the fragment of Critias quoted in vol. i. p. 350, note 1.
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3. ἐπιστήμαι μὲν κ.τ.λ. For the case of ἐπιστήμαι, see note on 1275 a 16. Subjects often receive only a hasty consideration in the Fourth Book, a fuller treatment of them later on being promised: see vol. i. p. 296. What Aristotle means by ἐπιστήμαι μᾶλλον (sc. τῶν λόγων, cp. Περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου 6. 470 b 5), we see from c. 17. 1336 b 25, ὅστερον δ' ἐπιστήμαιναι δεῖ διωρίσαι μᾶλλον, εἴτε μη δεῖ πρῶτον εἴτε δεῖ διαπορήσαντας, καὶ πῶς δεῖ. 'Εν τοῖς περὶ τῆς παιδευμίας, perhaps 'in the inquiries respecting the management of children,' rather than 'in the inquiries respecting the education of children,' which is the rendering of Sepulv., Vict., Lamb., and Liddell and Scott. Παιδευμία is used in a different sense in 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 39 and 1323 a 4. It seems strange that Aristotle should intend to treat the question ποιῶν τινῶν κ.τ.λ. in an inquiry respecting the management of children. He apparently designed to include a discussion of the subject in the Politics; no such discussion, however, finds a place in the work as we have it (for other cases of the same thing, see vol. ii. p. xxvii).

5. τύπῳ δὲ ίκανὸν εἴπειν καὶ νῦν, 'but one should now also say what is adequate in outline.' Sus. inserts δεῖ after ίκανῷ, but, as he himself suggests in Sus.¹, Addenda, p. lxiv, it seems likely that δεῖ is to be supplied here from λεκτέων, 4 : cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 3 sqq., where δεῖ must apparently be supplied with ἐπάρχειν and δεῖ with τάσσειν. Bonitz does not refer to the passage before us in Ind. 168 a 54 sqq., where he considers one or two other cases in which δεῖ may be thought to be omitted. Aristotle inherits the expression τύπῳ from Plato, in whose writings it occurs frequently. A τύπος is the outline or περιγραφή (cp. Laws 876 D, περιγραφὴν τε καὶ τοὺς τύπους τῶν τιμωρίων εἴπόντας) which an artist draws before filling in his picture: see note on 1263 a 31.

οὕτε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 1. 1138 b 26, καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἀλλαῖς ἐπιμελείαις, περὶ δόσας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ᾽ ἄλλης μὲν εἴπειν, ὅτι οὕτε πλεῖω οὕτε ἑλάττω δεῖ ποιεῖν οὐδὲ ῥαθυμεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέσα καὶ ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος. As to ἡ τῶν ἀδηποῦν ἔρις, cp. 5. (8). 4. 1338 b 10, ἀδηποτικὴν ἔρις, Xenophanes, Fragm. 2 Bergk, Eurip. Fragm. 284, and Plato, Rep. 403 E–407 E, where Stallbaum compares Plut. Philopoemen c. 3. What Plato objects to in athletes, however, is their sleepiness and inability to stand the rapid changes of diet which are inseparable from a soldier's life, whereas Aristotle rather objects to the tendencies impressed on their constitution by severe toil of one monotonous kind. For the order of the words in 5–8, see note on 1327 a 4.
6. πρὸς πολιτικὴν εὐεξίαν, εὐεξία, 'with a view to the kind of bodily fitness that is useful to a citizen': cp. Xen. Oecon. i. 1.13. Εὐεξία differs from strength, and it also differs from health; it is the business of a gymnastic trainer to produce εὐεξία, just as it is the business of a physician to produce health (Top. 5. 7. 137 a 3 sqq.). But the εὐεξία which Aristotle speaks of here is not gymnastic εὐεξία, but the εὐεξία which makes a man an efficient citizen, fit in body to bear the labours which fall to the lot of soldiers and citizens.


7. κακοποιητική, 'unfit for labour,' 'labouring ill,' like κακόπνους, 'breathing ill,' or κακοθάνατος, 'dying ill.'

8. πεποιημένη μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Οὖν here contains an inference from what precedes, as in 1. 1. 1252 a 7 (see note on that passage). Πόνος is the source of εὐεξία (Phys. 2. 3. 195 a 8 sqq.: Metaph. Δ. 2. 1013 b 9 sqq.: cp. Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 23 sqq.). Compare what Atalanta is made to say in Eurip. Fragm. 529,

εἰ δὲ εἰς γάμους ἐλθομεῖ, ὃ μὴ τύχων, ποτὲ,
τῶν ἐν δόμοισιν ἡμερευούσων ἅλει
βελτίων ἄν τέκνα μας δώμασιν τέκνα
ἐκ γὰρ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς ὧστε ἐκπονεῖ
σκληρᾶς διαίτας οἱ γόνιοι βελτίωνες.

But Atalanta's training had been that of a huntress, not that of an athlete. The toils which Aristotle would recommend to married women would, however, rather be the light and varied toils of the mistress of a household, as to which we learn much from the advice given by Ischomachus to his wife in Xen. Oecon. c. 10. 10 sq. For πόνος μὴ βιωσίως, cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 40, τὴν βίαιον τροφὴν καὶ τοὺς πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόνους.

9. πρὸς ἐνα μόνον, sc. πόνον (Ridgeway and Sus.).

11. ὁμοίως δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and these physical characteristics should be possessed alike by men and women,' so that women no less than men should ἑπιμελεῖθαι τῶν σωμάτων. (Ταύτα is in the plural because the characteristics are many.) Aristotle's language is very similar to that of Plato in Laws 804 D, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ δὴ καὶ περὶ θηλείων ὁ μὲν
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ἐμὸς νόμος ἂν ἐστιν πάντα, διασαρ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄρρενων, ἵσα καὶ τὰς ὑθλίας ἀρκεῖν δεῖν, but Plato goes much further both in Rep. 451 C–457 B and in Laws 804 C–806 C than Aristotle does here.

12. χρῆ δὲ κ.τ.λ. ‘Pregnant women also,’ as well as those marrying. 'Εγκύμων is the Attic word rather than ἔγαγως. Aristotle here follows in the track of Lycurgus and Plato: cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. 1. 3, αὐτίκα γὰρ περὶ τεκνοποίαις, ὡς ἐξ ἄρχῆς ἄρρομαι, οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι τὰς μελλούσας τίκτειν καὶ καλῶς δοκούσας κόρας παιδεύεσθαι καὶ σίτω ᾗ ἀνυστὸν μετριοστάτῳ τρέφουσι καὶ ὅψῃ ἣ δυνατὸν μικροτάτῳ οὐνεῖ γε μὴν ἡ πάμπας ἀπεχομένας ἡ ἡδαρία χρωμένας διάγουσιν, whereas Lycurgus ordered a different course, and Plato, Laws 788 D sqq. and 789 D, βούλεσθε ἀμα γέλωτε φράζωμεν, τιλέντες νόμους, τὴν μὲν κόουσαν περιπατεῖν, τὸ γενόμενον δὲ πλάτευτε τε ὑὸν κήρυμν, ἔως ὑγρὸν, καὶ μέχρι δυδίον ὠτὸν σπαργανᾶν. Not only the unborn child profit by the exercise taken by the mother, but the mother herself would secure an easier delivery (De Gen. An. 4. 6. 775 a 30 sqq.).

14. τούτο δὲ ῥαδίων τῷ νομοθέτῃ ποιήσα, i. e. to secure that pregnant women shall not take little food and exercise.

ὑποστάσαιτι κ.τ.λ. Τινά is of course to be taken with πορείων. Aristotle here perhaps takes a hint from Plato, who in Laws 833 B had made a temple the goal of a foot-race: cp. also Laws 789 E. For θεῶν τῶν εἰληξάτων τὴν περὶ τῆς γενέσεως τιμῆν, where ἡ γένεσις = ‘partus’ (Bon. Ind. 149 a 3 sqq.), cp. Plato, Phileb. 61 B, εἴτε Διώνυσος εἴτε “Ηφαίστος εἶθ' ὡστε θεῶν ταύτης τῆς τιμῆς εἰληξε τῆς συγκράσεως. Notwithstanding the gender of τῶν εἰληξάτων, the gods referred to are no doubt Eileithya (Hom. Il. 11. 270 sqq.: Paus. 8. 32. 4: Theocr. 17. 60 sqq.) and Artemis (Plato, Theaet. 149 B, αὐτίαν δὲ γε τούτου φαναί εἶναι τὴν "Ἀρτεμιά, ὅτι ἅλοχος οὔσα τὴν λοχείαν εἰληχε): perhaps also Demeter Calligeneia (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 2. § 56. 19) and at Athens the Τριστάτορες (Phanodem. Fragm. 4: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 367). The temples of Eileithya in the Peloponnesus were often just outside the city-gate (see note on 1331 a 26). Ἀποθεραπεῖαν, from ἀποθεραπεῖαι, ‘to honour zealously’ or ‘completely’: cp. ἀποβάπτειν (c. 17. 1336 a 16), ἀφιλάσκεσθαι (Plato, Laws 873 A), ἀποδύρεσθαι, and ἀποβρήσειν. A daily offering at a temple would be an indication of zealous worship: cp. Plut. Nic. c. 4, σφόδρα γὰρ ἢν (ὁ Νικίας) τῶν ἐκπέτειλημένων τὰ δαιμόνα καὶ θειαςμῷ προσκήμενος, ὡς φησι Θουκιδίδης, εἰ δὲ τοιῶν τῶν Παπσφόντος διαλόγων γέγραπται, ὅτι καθ’ ἡμέραν ἐθνο τοῖς θεοῖς.

16. τὴν μέντοι διάνοιαν κ.τ.λ. What is the construction of τὴν
diánoiaν? Is it in the acc. after διάγειν, the subject of διάγειν being τάς ἐγκύνους understood and διάγειν itself being here used in the sense of 'to keep,' as in Isocr. Nicocl. § 41, καίτω χρή τοὺς ὀρθῶς βασιλεύοντας μὴ μόνον τάς πόλεις ἐν ὅμοιοις πειράσθαι διάγειν, ὥς ἄν ἄρχοσίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς οἴκους τοὺς ἰδίους? Or is τάς ἐγκύνους the subject of διάγειν used intransitively, and the proper rendering of τὴν διάνοιαν 'in respect of the mind'? Or is τὴν διάνοιαν the subject of διάγειν used intransitively? Sepulveda, who translates, 'mentem autem contra quam corpus tranquillam securamque gerere convenit,' appears to adopt the first of these interpretations, Victorius, who translates, 'mente autem contra atque corpore sedatiusque degere convenit,' the second (so Stahr and Sus.), Mr. Welldon, who translates, 'their mind unlike their bodies should at such a time be comparatively indolent,' the third. I incline to the second interpretation: no instance of διάγειν being used in the sense of 'to keep' is given in the Index Aristotelicus, and in 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 32 sq. the word is used intransitively. The reason why Aristotle advises the avoidance of mental labour appears to be because it would 'be a hindrance to the body' (5 (8). 4. 1339 a 7 sqq.) and he wishes the bodily state of the mother to be as good as possible. Compare the advice given by Plato in Laws 792 E, where however he counselling the avoidance of an excess of pleasures and pains rather than of mental labour. We expect τοῦ σώματος in 17 rather than τῶν σωμάτων.

18. ἀπολαύοντα ... φαίνεται, 'evidently are influenced by.'

τῆς ἐχουσῆς, i.e. τῆς μητρὸς: see Bon. Ind. 305 b 38, where De Gen. An. 2. 4. 740 a 26, 37, and 3. 3. 754 b 1 are referred to.

19. ὀσπερ τὰ φυόμενα τῆς γῆς. Cpr. De Gen. An. 2. 4. 740 a 24, ἐπεὶ δὲ δυνάμει μὲν ἤδη ζῷον ἄτελες δὲ, ἀλλοθεν ἀναγκαῖον λαμβάνειν τὴν τροφὴν· διὸ χρῆται τῇ ἑστέρᾳ καὶ τῇ ἐχουσῇ, ὀσπερ γῇ φυτῶν, τοῦ λαμβάνειν τροφῆν, ἐσο ἀν τελεωθὴ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι ἤδη ζῷον δυνάμει παρευκονικόν. In this passage and also in that before us Aristotle seems to have in his memory Hippocr. De Natura Pueri, 1. 414 Kühn, φημὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐν τῇ γῇ φυόμενα πάντα ζῆν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς τῆς ικμάδος, καὶ ὅκως ἄν ἡ γῆ ἔχῃ ικμάδος ἐν ἑωτῇ, οὕτω καὶ τὰ φυόμενα ἔχειν. οὕτω καὶ παιδίον ζῇ ἀπὸ τῆς μητρὸς ἐν τῇσι μήτρησι καὶ ὅκως ἄν ἡ μήτηρ ὑγιείας ἔχῃ, οὕτω καὶ τὸ παιδίον ἔχει.

περὶ δὲ ἀποθέτεως κ.τ.λ., 'and with respect to the exposure or rearing of children, let there be a law that defective offspring shall not be reared, but that offspring shall not be exposed on the ground
of an excessive number of children [as distinguished from that of imperfection], in case the customs of the State, as regulated by the lawgiver' (literally, 'the ordering of the customs'), 'are opposed to an excessive number, for the amount of reproductive intercourse should be fixed, and if any parents have offspring in consequence of intercourse taking place beyond that limit, abortion should be produced before sensation and life develope in the embryo, for that which is holy in this matter will be marked off from that which is not by the absence or presence of sensation and life.' See on this passage vol. i. p. 187 and notes 2 and 3. In Greece the poor were often unwilling to rear children, especially daughters: cp. Plut. De Amore Prolis c. 5, οἱ μὲν γὰρ πένθητες οὐ τρέφουσι τέκνα, φοβούμενοι μὴ κ.τ.λ., and Poseidipp. 'Ερμαφρόδιτος Fragm. (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 516),

vōv τρέφει πᾶς κἀν πένθη τις ὄν τύχη,  
θυγατέρα δ' ἑκτίθησι κἀν ἅ πλούσιος.

The Greeks noticed with surprise that in Egypt all children born were reared (Aristot. Fragm. 258. 1525 a 37 sqq.: Strabo, p. 824). In Aristotle's 'best State' exposure would be resorted to only in the case of imperfectly developed offspring, or rather of offspring the imperfection of which was obvious at the moment of birth, for not all the kinds of imperfection noticed above on 1335 a 13 would be traceable at birth. The rule at Sparta was not to rear anything ἄγεννης καὶ ἀμορφον (Plut. Lycurg. c. 16). Seneca says of Rome (De Ira 1. 15), liberos quoque, si debiles monstrosique editi sunt, mergimus. I know not whether ἀπόδειξις in the sense of the 'exposing of children' occurs elsewhere. For ἦ τάξις τῶν ἔθων, cp. τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων, 2. 10. 1271 b 29, 32. Κωλύω, sc. πλήθους τέκνων (so Vict. 'in illis locis ubi lege interdictum est ne quis pater alat plures liberos quam lex patiatur'): cp. c. 17. 1336 a 35, οἱ κωλύωντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις. Ὄρισθαι γὰρ δεῖ κ.τ.λ., cp. 2. 6. 1265 b 6 sq. and 2. 7. 1266 b 8 sqq. In ἐὰν δὲ τισὶ γίγνῃται παρὰ ταύτα συνδυασθέντων, supply τέκνα with γίγνῃται from what precedes, and take παρὰ ταύτα (sc. τὰ ὀφραμένα) with συνδυασθέντων, 'in consequence of intercourse in excess of the legal limit' (so Vict. and Stahr), or possibly 'in contravention of the legal limit' (cp. Plato, Polit. 300 D, where παρὰ ταύτα = παρὰ τοῖς νόμοις). For the use of ταύτα here see note on 1252 a 33. For the case of συνδυασθέντων (one might expect συνδυασθέεια), Reiz (quoted by Schn.) compares Hom. II. 16. 531, ὅτι οἱ δὲ ἥκουσε μέγας θεὸς εὐξαμένου, and Odysse. 9. 256, ἡμῶν δ'
Mullach, Tato-áii/ Sus., orav

24. πρὶν αἴσθησιν ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ ζωήν. Cp. De Gen. An. 5. 1. 778 b 32, εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν αἴσθησιν τὸ ζῷον, καὶ τότε πρῶτον ἔστι ζῷον, ὅταν αἴσθησις γένεται πρῶτον κ.τ.λ., and Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 a 16, τὸ δὲ ζῷον ὀρίζουσι τοῖς ζῴοις δυνάμει αἰσθήσεως, ἀνθρώπως δ' αἴσθησεως ἡ νοήσεως. Contrast the view of Democritus, De An. 1. 2. 404 a 9, διὸ καὶ τοῦ ζῶν ὄρον εἶναι τὴν ἀναπνοὴν, which was also that of Diogenes of Apollonia (Fragm. 5: Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. 1. 254). Aristotle is here speaking not of life in general, but of animal life, for plants also live, and in their case ζωήν λέγομεν τὴν δὲ αὐτοῦ τροφήν τε καὶ αὐξήσει καὶ φθίσιν (De An. 2. 1. 412 a 14): cp. De An. 3. 12. 434 a 27.

25. ἐμποιεῖσθαι δεῖ τὴν ἄμβλοσιν. Bonitz (Ind. 243 b 17) takes ἐμποιεῖσθαι here as middle, but the verb seems to be rarely used in this sense in the middle voice, and perhaps Sus. is right in taking it as passive. In the 'oath of Hippocrates' which was sworn by aspirants to medical practice one of the promises made is that the taker of the oath will not produce abortion. The thing, however, was no doubt occasionally done not only by physicians but by midwives (Plato, Theaet. 149 D).

tὸ γὰρ ὅσιον κ.τ.λ. As to the use of οὐχ ὅσιος and ἀνώσιος of violations of duty to near relatives, see note on 1262 a 28. The abortion of an embryo in which sensation and life had already developed would involve a violation of this nature.

26. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but since the commencement of the fit age for marriage for man and wife has been defined' (in 1335 a 28 sqq.), 'and it has been settled at what age they should begin their union.' As to the μὲν solitariun in ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ, see notes on 1262 a 6 and 1270 a 34. The suppressed clause here is 'but the end of it has not.'

28. λειτουργεῖν πρὸς τεκνοποιῶν, 'to serve the State' in relation to the begetting of children, according to Liddell and Scott (so also Mr. Welldon): Sus., on the other hand, translates 'sich diesem Geschäfte zu widmen' ('to devote themselves to this task'), and Stahr 'dem Kinderzeugen obzuliegen,' following in the track of Lamb., 'liberis procreandis operam dare.' Perhaps, as Plato speaks in Rep. 460 E of ἔκτειν τῇ πόλει and γεννάω τῇ πόλει, the first of these two interpretations is to be preferred. For πρὸς, cp. 6 (4). 4.
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1291 a 35. τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς λειτουργοὺς. Ἄρμοττει is used in association with χρή here as with δέ in 6 (4). 15. 1290 b 14.

29. τὰ γὰρ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἐκγονα κ.τ.λ. Cp. Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 23 and Plato, Rep. 459 B. By οἱ πρεσβυτέροι Aristotle here means οἱ παρηκμακότες, i.e. those over fifty or perhaps fifty-five: cp. Rhet. 2. 13. 1389 b 13, οὐ δὲ πρεσβυτέροι καὶ παρηκμακότες. In Probl. 38. 9. 967 b 13 sqq. οἱ πρεσβυτέροι are apparently identified with οἱ γηράκοντες. See notes on 1329 a 13 and 1321 a 22. By οἱ γηράκοντες Aristotle may probably mean men over sixty, or sixty-five. Membership of the Lacedaemonian γεροντία was confined to men who had passed their sixtieth year. When Aristotle says that the children of aged fathers are ἀσθενεῖς, he perhaps means more than that they are weak in body. οἱ ἀσθενεῖς are specially subject to emotion (see note on 1342 a 11).

32. διὸ κατὰ τὴν τῆς διανοίας ἀκμὴν, sc. ὀρίσθη ὁ χρόνος τῆς τεκνοποίας: so Lamb. 'quare id tempus praefinatur, in quo mens maxime viget ac floret,' Coray, and others. Aristotle is speaking of the mental prime of the husband, not the wife. The bodily prime of a man falls between thirty and thirty-five (see above on 1335 a 28).

33. τῶν ποιητῶν τινές. Solon (Fragm. 27) is referred to. He however places the mental prime between forty-two and fifty-six. There is a further reference to these poets in c. 17. 1336 b 40 sqq.

35. ὡστε τέταρτον κ.τ.λ. Plato also in the Republic (460 E) closes the period of τεκνοποία for the man at fifty-five, adding that in his case the mental and bodily prime lies between twenty-five and fifty-five. Sir Nicholas Bacon (born in 1599) was fifty-two years of age when his famous son Francis was born to him in 1651. Lord Chatham was fifty-one when William Pitt was born to him. Sir John Herschel (born in 1792) was born when his father Sir William Herschel (born in 1738) was fifty-four years of age. How many other great men have had fathers over fifty at the time of their birth, I am unable to say. For τῆς εἰς τὸ φανερὸν γεννήσεως, cp. Plato, Rep. 461 C, μηδ' εἰς φῶς ἐκφέρειν κύμα μηδ' ἕν.

37. τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν κ.τ.λ. Compare Plato, Rep. 461 B sqq., where Plato does not impose this restriction on the intercourse of those over the legal age, if only they take care that no offspring shall see the light or, supposing it does, shall live.

ὄνειας χάριν. Cp. De Gen. An. 1. 18. 725 b 8 sqq., 726 a 22, and 5. 3. 783 b 29 sqq., and Probl. 4. 29. 880 a 22 sqq. See also

38. φαίνεσθαι δει ποιουμένους τήν ὁμιλίαν, 'ought manifestly to resort to the intercourse.'

περὶ δὲ τῆς πρὸς ἄλλην ἢ πρὸς ἄλλον, sc. ὁμιλίας, 'but with respect to the intercourse of a husband with another woman than his wife, or of a wife with another man than her husband.' Aristotle has before him here Plato, Laws 784 E, ὅταν δὲ δὴ παίδας γεννησονται κατὰ νόμους, ἂν ἀλλοτρία τις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κοινωνῇ γυναικὶ ἢ γυνὶ ἀνδρὶ, εἰώ μὲν παιδοσουμένους ἑτί, τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιζήμια αὐτῶς ἔστω, καθάπερ τοῖς ἑτὶ γεννωμένοις ἐδρασθ' μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὁ μὲν σοφρονός καὶ σοφρονύσα εἰς τὰ τοιαύτα ἑστω πάντα εἰδόκιμος, ὅ δὲ τοιναυτίαν ἑναντίον τιμᾶσθω, μᾶλλον δὲ ύπομαζέσθω, and 841 C sqq. Both Aristotle and Plato (in Laws 841 C sqq. at any rate, μὴ λανθάνων ἀνδράς τε καὶ γυναῖκας πᾶσας) seem to confine themselves to the prohibition of unconcealed adultery. Cp. Isocr. Nicocl. § 40. The writer of the First Book of the Oeconomics (c. 4. 1344 a 8–13) appears to go further. Contrast with all this the occasional permission to Spartan wives of intercourse with other men than their husbands (Plut. Lycurg. c. 15).

39. ἀπλῶς, 'broadly,' 'at any time,' in contradistinction to περὶ τῶν χρόνων τῶν τῆς τεκνοποιών : cp. Anal. Pr. 1. 15. 34 b 7, δει δὲ λαµ-βάνει τὸ παντὶ ὑπάρχον μὴ κατὰ χρόνον ὀρίσαντας, οἶον νῦν ἢ ἐν τῷ δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ, ἄλλ' ἀπλῶς.

40. ἀπότεμενον φαίνεσθαι, 'openly to touch,' cp. Plato, Laws 816 E, μηδὲ τίνα μανθάνοντα αὐτὰ γίνεσθαι φανερὸν τῶν ἐλευθέρων. Plato had already used the word ἀπεσθαί in Laws 841 D, μηδὲν ἀπεσθαί τῶν γενναίων ἄμα καὶ ἐλευθέρων, and this is no doubt one of the passages which Aristotle has before him here. Bonitz (Ind. s. v.) compares Probl. 4. 29. 880 a 28 sq.

μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς occurs in Plato, Laws 777 E, and μηδαμῶς μηδαμῇ in Laws 820 B, but I know not whether μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς occurs elsewhere in Aristotle's writings. The Index Aristotelicus omits the phrase, and indeed by some error the word μηδαμῶς. Πάντη
πάντως is a phrase frequently employed by Aristotle (see Bon. Ind. s. v. πάντως).

ὅταν ἂν καὶ προσαγορευθῇ πόσις. Καὶ here probably means ‘or,’ as in 2. 3. 1262 a 8 (see notes on 1262 a 6 and 1303 a 20). The word πόσις is used here and in i. 3. 1253 b 6 by Aristotle, but it is a poetical word, seldom used in prose. On προσαγορευθῇ, see Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective, s. v. ἀγορεύω.

C. 17. 3 sqq. Aristotle says little in this chapter which had not already been said by Plato, and throughout the whole of it he seems to write with the Seventh Book of the Laws before him, but he brings together, and thus makes more effective, what Plato had said in a scattered and often an incidental way. He sometimes differs from Plato; thus he is for rearing children under seven to a greater extent at home than Plato had proposed to do, he will not have their crying restrained, etc. In recommending, again, that children should be habituated from their earliest infancy to bear heat and cold, he goes beyond anything contemplated by Plato or practised at Sparta (Xen. Rep. Lac. 2. 4) or in Crete (Ephor. Fragm. 64: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 250), for neither the Spartans nor the Cretans seem to have begun this habituation in babyhood, and Plato speaks of ἐκ παιδών (Rep. 403 C), not, like Aristotle, of ἐκ μικρῶν παιδών, when he refers to the subject (Rep. 404 A); it is rather from some barbarian races, such as the Celts, that Aristotle learns this lesson, as indeed he himself tells us. He keeps the same end in view in his rules as to the rearing of children as he does in his rules as to marriage; he seeks in both to secure that the children shall be well-grown in body and sound in mind and likely to make good soldiers and citizens in after-years. Rearing comes first, covering the whole period up to seven years of age, and then comes education (c. 17. 1336 b 37 sqq.). Aristotle confines himself during the first two or three years of life to studying the physical development of the child in accordance with the principle laid down in c. 15. 1334 b 25 sqq., but after that age he pays attention to the development not only of the body, but of the ὅριος and character. Till seven the children must necessarily in his opinion be reared at home, and consequently must be more or less in the company of slaves, and he evidently fears that if they are much in the company of slaves at this impressionable time—the age at which permanent tastes are acquired, πάντα γὰρ στέργο-μεν τὰ πρῶτα μᾶλλον (1336 b 33)—they may acquire a taint of
illiberal feeling and indecency of which it will not be easy to rid them in later life. This leads him to pay special attention to the years from two or three to seven.

Aristotle reproduces the turn of the opening sentences of the Seventh Book of the Laws (788 A, γενομένων δὲ παιδών ἄρρενῶν καὶ θηλείων τροφὴν μὲν ποιοῦ καὶ παιδείαν τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα λέγειν ὁρθότατ' ἀν γίγνοιθ' ἡμῖν). Δεί must be supplied with ὀφειλεῖ: Aristotle forgets that he has not used the word since c. 16. 1335 b 38, and that the imperatives ἔστω (39) and ἐξευθεῖος (1336 a 1), which however contain in them much of the force of δεί, have intervened. Μεγάλην ἐκὼν διαφοράν, 'is a highly important determining influence one way or the other': we expect rather μέγα διαφέρειν (cp. i. 13. 1260 b 16 sqq.) or μεγάλην ποιεῖν διαφοράν (cp. De Part. An. 2. 4. 651 a 15) or μεγάλην ἔχειν διαφοράν (Pol. 5 (8). 6. 1340 b 22), but that which produces a difference is often termed a διαφορά, just as that which produces fear is sometimes termed φόβος. Compare the construction noticed in the note on 1264 a 39.

5. φαίνεται τε κ.τ.λ., 'and evidently, if we investigate the question by a reference to the lower animals and to the barbarian nations which make it their aim to introduce the habit of body suitable for war, food abounding in milk is most congenial to the bodies [of infants], and with little wine in it on account of the diseases which wine produces.' With τὴν πολεμικὴν ἔξω contrast 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 10, ἀβλητικὴν ἔξω. For ἔγεια see critical note. Φαίνεσθαι without an infinitive or a participle may mean either 'to appear' or 'evidently to be' (Bon. Ind. 808 b 52 sqq.); here it probably means the latter. The nom. to φαίνεται is ἦ τῷ γάλακτος πλῆθουσα (or πληθοῦσα) τροφή ἄνωτέρα δε διὰ τὰ νοσήματα. For διὰ, see note on 1328 a 19. The nations referred to are no doubt those mentioned in c. 2. 1324 b 9 sqq., and especially the Scythians: cp. Antiphanes, Μισοπονήρος (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 85),

εἰτ' οὐ σοφοὶ δήτ' εἰσὶν οἱ Σκύθαι σφόδρα,
οί γενομένοις εὐθέως τοῖς παιδίως
διδάσκον ἵππον καὶ βοῦν πίνειν γάλα;

We read of the milk-drinking Hippomolgi in Hom. II. 13. 5. The Greeks, however, mostly used goats' milk (Büchsenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 313); they used ewes' milk but little (ibid.), and they regarded the milk of cows (Plut. Pelop. c. 30) and asses (Plut. Demosth. c. 27) as food for invalids. It was on goats' milk that Jupiter was reared as an infant (Manil. Astron. i. 364 sqq.).
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Compare the rearing of the infant Camilla (Virg. Aen. 11. 570 sqq.). But Aristotle is recommending the use of milk not merely in the case of sucklings, who indeed must use it, but in the case of children generally, or at any rate of children under three or thereabouts. The great physical strength of the Suebi was due in part to their use of milk (Caesar, Bell. Gall. 4. 1. 8 sq.). In the early days of ancient Greece infants were sometimes given honey, not milk (Schol. Aristoph. Thesm. 506). Phoenix gave the infant Achilles wine (Hom. II. 9. 489), and it was probably commonly given to infants (Dio Chrys. Or. 4. 155 R, ἣ σὺ οὐις οὕτως ὑπὸ τοῦ Δίως τοῦ βασιλέα τρέφεσθαι, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ τίτθης γάλακτι καὶ ὄνως καὶ στὸν;) but Hippocrates (De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 542 Kühn) advises, καὶ θημιμί ἀρνιόντος οὖν τῶν παιδίων τὸν οὐνόν ός ὑπάρτεταιν διδόναι ἡ σαου γάρ τός φιλέοντες ξύνοικαι καὶ συναναιεί: one source of stone in the bladder was thus removed. According to Hist. An. 7. 12. 588 a 3 sqq., wine sometimes produced convulsions in infants (βλαβερὸν δὲ πρὸς τὸ πάδος καὶ ὁ οὐνός ὁ μέλας μάλλον τοῦ λευκοῦ καὶ ὁ μῆς ἱδρυμᾶς, καὶ τὰ πλείαστα τῶν φυσιῶν: cp. De Somno, 3. 457 a 14, διὸ τοὺς παιδίους οὐν συμφέρουσιν οί οὐνοὶ οὐδὲ τας τίτθας (διαφέρει γὰρ ἱσως οὐδὲν αὐτὰ πίνειν ἢ τάς τίτθας), ἀλλὰ δέι πίνειν ὑδραίν καὶ σκληροὺς πνευματῶδες γάρ ὃ οὐνός, καὶ τοῦτον μάλλον ὁ μέλας). Compare also Plato, Laws 666 A and 672 B (together with Aristot. Rhet. 2. 12. 1389 a 19), and Athen. Deipn. 429 b.

8. ἐτὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘and further it is of advantage to have all the movements made [of the bodies of infants] that it is possible to have made in the case of creatures so young.’ Τηλικοῦτων I take to be in the genitive after ὅσα κύμης. Ποιεῖσθαι is to be supplied with συμφέρει. Aristotle has before him Plato, Theaet. 153 A, and 153 B, τί δὲ, ἢ τῶν σωμάτων ἔξις οὐχ ὑπὸ ἡνχίας μὲν καὶ ἀργίας διώλυται, ὑπὸ γυμνασίων δὲ καὶ κυμησεων ὃς ἐτὶ τὸ πολὺ σώζεται; and also Laws 789 E, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰς πρόφοις ἀναγκάζομεν νῦν ἄρμοντες τα παιδία ἢ πρὸς ἄγρον ἢ πρὸς ιερὰ ἢ πρὸς αἰκίους ἢ τινὲς φέρειν, μέχριτε ἂν ἴκανος ἑστασθαὶ δυνάται γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τότε διελαβομένους, ἐτὶ νέου ὡντων μὴ τῇ βίᾳ ἔπειρον-δομένων στρέψηται τὰ κάλα, ἐπιποιεῖν φεροῦσας, ἢ δὲ τρέπετε ἀποτελεσθῆ τὸ γενόμενον; Συμφέρει, not merely πρὸς τὴν τῶν σωμάτων δύναμιν, as in 4, but probably also πρὸς τὴν αὖξην (cp. 34 sqq.); perhaps indeed in other ways too (cp. Plato, Laws 790 C sqq.).

10. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μῆς διαστρέφεσθαι κ.τ.λ. Cp. De Gen. An. 4. 6. 775 a 8, διὰ δὲ τὸ κυνείσθαι θαύμαται μάλλον ἐνθραυστὸν γάρ τὸ νέον διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν. Plato was so much alive to this danger that he
recommended the use of swathing-bands, it would seem, during the whole of the first two years of life (Laws 789 E), though at Sparta they were not used at all (Plut. Lycurg. c. 16) and the general Greek custom (according to Blümner, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., p. 80 sq.) probably was to drop them at the end of the fourth month. Plato had also advised with the same object in view that the unfortunate nurse should carry the child in her arms till he was three years old (see above on 8). Aristotle is silent as to all this; he apparently hopes to secure the same result by adopting from barbarian nations the use of certain ὀργανὰ μυχανὰ, which kept the body of the infant from being twisted. What these instruments were, it is difficult to say. Vict. compares the 'serperastra' of Varro, Ling. Lat. 9. 5, which were knee-splints or knee-bandages for straightening the crooked legs of children. As to the swaddling-clothes used, see Blümner, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., p. 79 sq.

12. τῶν τοιούτων, i.e. τηλικούτων. The Spartans and Cretans sought to make their youth indifferent to heat and cold, but they do not seem to have begun their discipline in this respect as early in life as Aristotle recommends (see above on 1336 a 3 sqq.). As to its importance, see 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 22 sqq. and Fragm. Trag. Gr. Adesp. 461 (Nauck).

15. διὸ παρὰ πολλοῖς κ.τ.λ. See Göttling's note, and that of Eaton, who adds references to Galen Περὶ Ὑγιείων, 1. 10 (vol. vi. p. 51 Kühn), Strabo, p. 165, where we read of the Iberian women, ἐν τῷ τοῖς ἐργῶς πολλάκις αὐτοῖ καὶ λούνοντι καὶ σπαργανοῦσιν ἀποκλίνασαι πρὸς τῷ βέβῳ, and Virg. Aen. 9. 603,

Durum ab stirpe genus, natos ad flumina primum
Deferimus, saevoque gelu duramus et undis.

See also the note of Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. p. 569, on the Greek proverb, ὃ 'Ῥήνος ἔλεγχε τῶν νόθων, who quote Julian, Epist. 16. p. 383 D (cp. Or. 2. p. 81 D sq.), whence it appears that the dipping of the new-born babe in the Rhine was used as a test of its legitimacy, spurious offspring being held to sink and legitimate offspring to swim. They also refer to Valerius Flaccus, Argonaut. 6. 335, where we read of the Scythians on the Phasis,

Nunquam has hiemes, haec saxa relinquam,
Martis agros, ubi iam saevo duravimus amne
Progeniem natosque rudes.

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They remark that neither Aristotle, who was, so far as they know, the first to refer to the custom, nor Galen says a word as to the use of the practice as a test of legitimacy. A few other references to a similar custom may be noted. Zeus was believed to have been dipped at his birth in the river Lusius, which flows through the Arcadian Gortyna and is the coldest of rivers (Paus. 8. 28). Thetis sought to make Achilles immortal by dipping him as an infant in the Styx, and the Styx was very cold (Hes. Theog. 785 sq.). ‘The modern Beloochees plunge the new-born infant into a tub of snow-water’ (Prof. Ridgeway, Trans. Camb. Philol. Soc. 2. 147). Compare also the proverb (Schol. Aristoph. Vesp. 1189),

\[ \text{ἐν Παρίῳ ψυχρὸν μὲν ὅσορ, καλαὶ δὲ γυναῖκες.} \]

The Lacedaemonian practice was to bathe the infant after birth not in water, but in wine; this was held to be strengthening to healthy children (Plut. Lycurg. c. 16). Were all these customs connected with the wide-spread custom of infant baptism, which Mr. Whitley Stokes (Academy, Feb. 15, 1896) traces ‘among the heathen Norsemen, the heathen Celts, two unconverted West African tribes, and lastly the Mexicans before the arrival of the Spaniards,’ referring also to ‘the cases mentioned by Prof. Tylor in his Primitive Culture, third edition, vol. ii. pp. 430–433’? Ἀποβάπτειν, ‘to dip completely’: see above on 1335 b 14, ἀποθεραπεῖαν.

17. τοῖς δὲ κ.τ.λ. Α ὁ σκέπασμα is a mere protection against cold, something much less elaborate than an ἵματιον. The Spartan youth were allowed an ἵματιον, though only one (Xen. Rep. Lac. 2. 4). Some modern physicians give very different advice. ‘In infancy parents above all should not make the mistake of letting their infants be too thinly clad... It was a monstrous mistake for parents to send out their children with bare necks and heads and bare legs. Children ought to be clothed from head to foot winter and summer’ (Dr. Corfield, Address to Sanitary Institute, Times, Sept. 30, 1889).

18. πάντα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Two interpretations of these words are possible. Lamb. translates, ‘omnibus enim rebus quibus assuefieri possunt, statim ab ineunte acetate eos assuefacere melius est, dummodo sensim ac paulatim’; thus he takes πάντα to refer not to the beings which are to be habituated, but to the things to which they are to be habituated; and so Sus. ‘zu Allem, wozu man Kinder überhaupt gewöhnen kann.’ But it is also possible, and perhaps
simpler, to translate πάντα δόσα δύνατών ἐβίζειν 'all things that are susceptible of habituation.' I am not sure whether I am right in inferring from the passages with which Bonitz (Ind. s.v. ἐβίζειν) groups that before us that he takes the words in this sense. He refers, however, in the preceding line to Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 a 19—23 and Eth. Eud. 2. 2. 1220 b 1, where we learn that not all things are susceptible of habituation. The bodily habit of children, Aristotle goes on in 20 to tell us, is susceptible of habituation to cold. Μέν here, as often elsewhere (Bon. Ind. s.v.), 'non ei additur vocabulo in quo vis oppositionis cernitur'; it should have followed ἐβίδος ἄρχομενῳ, not βέλτιον. 'Εκ προσαγωγῆς is 'frequent in Hippocrates' (Liddell and Scott) and a favourite expression with Aristotle, but it is apparently not used by Thucydides, or Xenophon, or Plato, or (in the sense at least in which it is used here) by the Attic Orators. Compare for the thought Hist. An. 6. 12. 567 a 5 sqq. and Xen. Cyrop. 6. 2. 29, and for the turn of the sentence De Part. An. 3. 14. 675 a 6, ὡστε διελείν μὲν δύναται, φαύλως δὲ διελείν.


21. τὴν πρώτην, sc. ἱλικίαν, which must be supplied from 23. See note on 1281 a 26. The phrase occurs in Pindar, Nem. 9. 42 (ἐν ἱλικίᾳ πρώτῃ), and in De Gen. An. i. 18. 725 b 19, ἔτι οίκε εὐπάρ-χει σπέρμα σοῦ 'ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ ἱλικίᾳ σοῦ' 'ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ σοῦ' 'ἐν ταῖς ἀρρωστίαις, but in a wider sense than in the passage before us, where it appears to refer to the first two or three years of life.

23. τὴν δὲ ἐξομένην κ.τ.λ. Aristotle intended to say that the next period of life till five should be dealt with in a different manner, the child being now encouraged to play games, but his sentence breaks down in course of utterance, for Πο. Πλ. Bekk. are probably wrong in omitting δὲ, 26, which is needed to contrast δεὶ τοσαύτης τυγχάνειν κινήσεως with what immediately precedes. The accusative τὴν ἐξομένην ταύτης ἱλικίαν is thus left without anything to govern it: compare the position of the nominative ὑπομονηστευόμενος τις in 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 14 sqq. For the thought, cp. Plato, Laws 793 E.
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τρίτει δὲ δὴ καὶ τετράτει καὶ πεντάτει καὶ ἕτει ἐξετεί ἡβει ψυχής παιδίων δέον αὖ εὑρ. For the child of six, however, Aristotle finds other occupation in 1336 b 35 sqq. Children under five are regarded by him as too young to be put to any study; it is not till seven that under his scheme of education children begin to learn what the gymnastic trainer and the παιδοτριβής can teach them (5 (8). 3. 1333 b 6 sqq.), nor till after puberty apparently that they learn their letters (5 (8). 4. 1339 a 4 sqq.); among ourselves, on the contrary, to say nothing of the Kindergarten, children are taught their letters before five. The effect of hard physical labour in injuring growth is referred to in 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 10 sq. Cp. also Plato, Rep. 377 A, οὐ μανθάνεις, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, διοι πρώτον τοῖς παιδίοις μίθους λέγομεν; τούτο δὲ που, ὅσ τὸ βίον εἰπίν, ψευδός, ἐν δὲ καὶ ἀληθή. πρότερον δὲ μίθους πρὸς τὰ παιδία ἡ γυμνασίας χρώμεθα. Aristotle does not quite agree with the last sentence; he thinks that from two or three to five children should have nothing to do with γυμνασία involving ἀναγκαίοι πόνοι, but he does not agree that they should have no γυμνασία at that age, but only stories. He provides a kind of gymnastic training for them in their pastimes and also in their διαστάσεις καὶ κλαυθμοῖς. He excludes γυμνασία involving ἀναγκαίοι πόνοι because they check physical growth (cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 40 sqq.), and any checking of physical growth is especially out of place in the first five years of life, inasmuch as physical growth is the main business of these years; in fact, according to Plato, Laws 788 D, the human being grows in height during them as much as he does in the twenty succeeding years (ἡ πρῶτη βλάστη παιδός ἐφων μεγάτη καὶ πλείστη φύτεα, διότι καὶ ζηρὶ πολλοὶ παρέχηκε μὴ γίνεσθαι τὰ γ' ἀνθρώπων μήκη διπλάσια ἀπό τέντε ετῶν ἐν τοῖς λαοῖς ἐκείσαν ἕτεσιν αὐξανόμεα; cp. Aristot. De Gen. An. 1. 18. 725 b 23, ἐν ἕτεσι γὰρ πέντε σχέδου ἐπὶ γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡμῶν λαμβάνεις δοκεῖ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ μεγέθους τοῦ ἐν τῷ ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ γεγονόμενον ἄπαντον). For ὅστε διαφεύγειν τὴν ἀργὴν τῶν σωμάτων, cp. Plato, Theaet. 153 B (quoted above on 1336 a 8).

27. ἡν, sc. κίνησιν.

28. δεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸς παίδιας κ.τ.λ., ‘and the pastimes also’ (no less than the ἄλλας πράξεις) ‘should be neither unbefitting for freemen nor laborious nor relaxed and effeminate.’ Aristotle probably has before him Plato, Rep. 558 B, εἰ μὴ τις ὑπερβηλημένην φύσιν ἔχων, οὖντον ἀν γένοιτο ἀνήρ ἄγαθός, εἰ μὴ παῖς ὄν εὐθύς παιδὸς ἐν καλοῖς καὶ ἐπιτηθεῖοι τὰ τουατα πάντα. The pastimes of little boys in ancient
Greece were no doubt often faulty in the ways referred to by Aristotle. He has hitherto been concerned almost, if not quite, exclusively with the training of the body, which precedes that of the ὀρέχοι (c. 15. 1334 b 25 sqq.), but now he begins to provide for the training of the ὀρέχοι, and here, as in 1336 b 2 sqq., he seeks to exclude ἀνελευθερία. Cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 14. 1128 a 19 sqq. Μὴ τε ἐπισόνους, because toilsome games will check the growth of the body (cp. 25). Μὴ τε ἀνεμένας, Vict. 'neque remissas nimirum atque enervatas': for the contrast of ἐπισόνους and ἀνεμένας, cp. 2. 6. 1265 a 33 sq.

30. καὶ περὶ λόγων δὲ καὶ μύθων κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has just said by implication that the nature of the games which children over three should play is a matter to be attended to by those in authority, and now he adds the remark, 'Yes, and with regard to tales true and fictitious also,' etc. He here has before him Plato, Rep. 376 E, λόγων δὲ διατόν εἴδος, τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς, ψεῦδος δ' ἔτερον; Ναὶ. Παιδευτέον δ' εἰν ἀμφοτέρας, πρότερον δ' εἰν τοῖς ψευδείσιν; Οὐ μαθάνω, ἐφι, πῶς λέγεις. Οὐ μαθάνεις, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι πρῶτοι τοῖς παιδίοις μύθους λέγομεν; τούτῳ δὲ που, ὥσ τὸ ὅλον εἰπέω, ψεῦδος, ἐν δὲ καὶ ἀληθῆ: cp. Phaedo 61 B, where Stallbaum remarks, 'tenendum est λόγων esse vocabulum generis atque significare quamcunque orationem et narrationem, sive veram sive fictam; sed interdum, ubi opponitur μύθος, de narratione vera usurpari solet.' Λόγος is thus used in opposition to μύθος in Laws 872 D, Gorg. 523 A, Protag. 320 C, Tim. 26 E. It is probable therefore that περὶ λόγων καὶ μύθων in the passage before us means 'with regard to tales true and fictitious' (Sus. 'Erzählungen und Märchen'), though it should be noted that Vahlen (Beiträge zu Aristoteles Poetik, 1. 34) does not take this view and regards λόγοι and μύθοι here as synonymous, no less than in Poet. 5. 1449 b 8, where he interprets 'λόγοι id est μύθους.' Aristotle is as careful as Plato (Rep. 377 B sq., 381 E) not to leave it to the uncontrolled discretion of mothers and nurses what tales are told to children, but his object seems to be to exclude tales which do not prepare the way for the pursuits of after-life—tales simply frivolous and amusing, for instance, or unsuitable to future soldiers and citizens—rather than tales giving a false impression of the gods, which were those specially objected to by Plato. Does Aristotle intend any kind of religious instruction to be conveyed through these λόγοι καὶ μύθοι? If not, he does not seem to provide for any religious element in the education of youth.
32. πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα, 'all the things we have mentioned,' παιδιαί, λόγοι, μιθού.

33. διὸ τὰς παιδιὰς κ.τ.λ. This is based on Plato, Laws 643 B, a passage which is probably present to Aristotle’s mind in Poet. 4. 144.8 b 5, τὸ τε γάρ μιμέσθαι σύμφωνον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παιδιῶν ἐστι, καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὅτι μιμητικῶτατον ἐστι καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας: cp. also Rep. 395 C. The Cretan lawgiver had already studied this (Ephor. Fragm. 64 : Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 250, ὄστερον δὲ καὶ συντάξαντα τὴν κληθέσαν ἵπ’ αἰτοῦ πυρρίχην, ὡστε μηδὲ τὴν παιδίων ἄμοιρον εἶναι τῶν πρὸς τῶν πόλεμον χρησίμων), and a saying was ascribed to Anacharsis, παιζέων δεῖ, ὅπως σπουδάσῃς (Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. 1. 233 : cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 6. 1176 b 33). Achilles as a child of six years had according to Pindar (Nem. 3. 43 sqq.) 'made mighty deeds his play.' The Tencteri learnt in the sports of childhood to become the formidable cavalry they proved themselves (Tac. Germ. c. 32). See also vol. i. p. 350, note 3, and cp. Plut. Sympos. 2. 5. 2 intit. Aristotle wishes the pastimes even of infancy to be a preparation for the life of the soldier and the citizen. Many of the games played by Greek children were 'games of imitation': on this class of games see Becq de Fouquières, Jeux des Anciens, p. 63 sqq., where the games of 'the King,' 'the Judge,' and 'the Architect' are described. Children's mimickers of riding, driving, building, and nursing are familiar enough to ourselves. The ways of Themistocles and of Cato of Utica as children in the matter of games may be studied in Plut. Themist. c. 2 and Cato c. 1. The late Rev. C. Kingsley is said to have preached to an audience of chairs at four years old. 'Even the games to which the little Chinese are addicted are always impregnated with the mercantile spirit; they amuse themselves with keeping shop and opening little pawnbroking establishments, and familiarize themselves with the jargon, the tricks, and the frauds of tradesmen' (Huc's Chinese Empire, Eng. Trans., 2. 149). These are exactly the sort of games which Aristotle would wish his infant citizen not to play.

34. τὰς δὲ διατάξεις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here passes naturally enough from παιδιαί, one means of producing movement, to διατάξεις καὶ κλαυθμοί, another and a more involuntary means of doing so. He had said in 25 that ἀναγκαῖοι πώοι must be avoided in the years from two or three to five because they interfere with the growth of the body, and now he tells us that the διατάξεις καὶ
κλαυθμοὶ which he declines to follow others in checking are not open to this objection, for they contribute to the growth of the body. Thus they are in place at this age, while the ἀναγκαῖοι πόνοι are not. Plato is referred to in the words οἱ κωλύστες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις: cp. Laws 791 E sqq., where he follows a Spartan tradition, for the nurses at Sparta sought to check fretfulness and crying in infants (Plut. Lycurg. c. 16). Plato is apparently speaking of new-born babes (791 D), and this might tempt us to transpose (with Sus. and Welldon) τὰς ἔδιατάσεις, 34–34θανομένους, 39, to after 20, τὴν τῶν ψυχῶν ἀσκήσει, so as to group 34–39 with the part of the chapter which deals with infants (though even there the paragraph would not be in place, for it ought to follow the discussion of κωλύσεις and to come after either συμφέρει, 10, or ἀστραβές, 12), but the transition from παιδια to διατάσεις is natural and easy, and, as I have pointed out, there is an evident reference in 34–39 to 25, ὅτε πρὸς ἀναγκαῖους πόνους, ὅπως μὴ τὴν αὕξησιν ἐμποδίζωσι. I am therefore against any transposition. For the thought, cp. Plut. Sympos. 6. 1. 1, αὐτὸν τε ἐκαστὸν αὐτοῦ γνωμάσια καὶ κραυγαί καὶ ὁσα τῷ κινεῖν αὔξει τὸ θερμόν, ἤδιον φαγεῖν ποιεῖ καὶ προβουμότερον. The word used by Plato in Laws 792 Α is κλαυθμοναῖ, not κλαυθμοί: κλαυθμός is a poetical word, 'rare in Attic prose' (Liddell and Scott).

37. γίνεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for they come to be in a way exercise for the body [and exercise makes the body grow]' : cp. Probl. 21. 14. 928 b 28, αἱ μὲν τῶν ἐξεις γνωμαζόμεναι αὔξονται καὶ ἐπιδιδόσαιν. Γίνεται is in the sing. by attraction to γνωμασία : cp. Thuc. 8. 9. 3, αὕτων θ' ἐγένετο τῆς ἀποστολῆς τῶν νεών οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τῶν Χλων οὐκ εἶδότες τὰ πρασσόμενα, οἱ δὲ διήλουν καὶ ἐνειδότες τὸ τε πλῆθος οὐ βουλόμενοι ποιοί πολέμου ἐκεῖν κ.τ.λ.

ἡ γὰρ τοῦ πνεύματος κάθεσις κ.τ.λ., 'for it is the holding of the breath [which accompanies exertion] that produces strength in those who labour [and therefore serves the same end as exercise], and this' (i.e. the holding of the breath) 'happens to children also when they exert themselves in crying [no less than to men taking exercise].'

With Bonitz (Ind. 190 α 31) I take θ to refer to ἡ τοῦ πνεύματος κάθεσις only, and not to the whole of the preceding sentence. For the use of διατείνεσθαι here of straining which involves the holding of the breath, Bonitz compares Probl. 19. 15. 918 b 14, ἡ ὥστι οἱ μὲν νόμοι ἀγωνιστῶν ἦσαν, δὲ ἡ ἰδίᾳ μειστικὴ δυναμεὼν καὶ δια-

teίνεσθαι ἡ φόδη ἐγίνετο μακρὰ καὶ πολυειδῆς; Cp. also Plut. Timol. c. 27, where διατείναμενος is used of one who shouts ὑπερφυεῖ φωνή
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καὶ μείζων τῆς συνήθους. As to the effect of holding the breath in increasing strength, cp. De Somno 2. 456 a 16, ἰοχύν δὲ ποιεῖ ἡ τοῦ πνεύματος κάθεσις (compared by Bonitz, Ind. 606 a 45), De Gen. An. 2. 4. 737 b 35 sqq., and 4. 6. 775 a 37 sqq. Τὴν ἰοχύν, not simply ἰοχύν, cp. Pol. 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 25, ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ῥόουν ἐκάστους τὸ κατὰ φύσιν οἰκείον, and De Part. An. 2. 7. 653 a 10, ποιεῖ δὲ καὶ τῶν ὑπνῶν τοῖς ἠλλοις τοῦτο τὸ μόρον τοῖς ἔχουσιν ἐγκέφαλον.

40. τὴν τούτων διαγωγὴν, 'the way in which these children pass their time.' Διαγωγὴ is here used in a wider sense than the special one in which (in 5 (8). 5. 1339 a 29) it is denied to children.

tὴν τ' ἄλλην, καὶ ὅπως ὅτι ἡκίστα μετὰ δούλων ἔσται. The sentence looks as if it was intended to run τὴν τ' ἄλλην καὶ τὴν μετὰ δούλων and was only finished as it stands by an afterthought. For the thought, compare the saying of Isocrates ([Plut.,] Decem Oratorum Vitae, 838 A), πρὸς δὲ τὸν εἰπόντα πατέρα, ὥς οἶδεν ἄλλ' ἡ ἀνδρόποδον συνέπεμψε τῷ παιδίῳ. Τοιγαροῦ (ἐφη) ἤπαινε. διό γὰρ ἁνθῇ ἐνὸς ἔξεις ἀνδρόποδα, and Antiophanes, Μισοπόνηρος (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 85). At Sparta παιδαγωγοί were dispensed with (see Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 16, and vol. i. p. 351, note 2). But Aristotle is speaking here of an earlier age than that at which boys were commonly provided with παιδαγωγοί—they would hardly have παιδαγωγοί till they went to school at seven—and he must be thinking rather of slave-nurses and of the slaves, male and female, about the house with whom the child was likely to come in contact. At Rome in its early days, according to Tac. Dial. de Orat. c. 28, 'suus cuique filius, ex casta parente natus, non in cella emptae nutricis sed gremio ac sinu matris educabatur.' The mother of Leopardi kept her children as much as possible out of the company of servants (see Macmillan's Magazine, vol. 56, p. 90). Aristotle is evidently afraid that children under seven may pick up ἀνελευθερία and ἀισχρολογία from the slaves about them, male and female. It must have taken imported slaves generally some little time to learn to speak Greek: even those employed as nurses and παιδαγωγοί, though they would commonly speak better Greek than most slaves, probably often spoke the language imperfectly (cp. Plato, Lysis 223 A): still they would speak it well enough to be occasionally guilty of ἀισχρολογία.

41. ταύτην γὰρ τὴν ἥλικιάν, καὶ μέχρι τῶν ἐπτὰ ἐτῶν, ἀναγκαῖον οἶκοι τὴν τροφὴν ἔχειν. Sus. understands τὴν before μέχρι referring to Bon. Ind. 109 b 44 sqq., where among other passages Eth. Nic.
10. 2. Πολος μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Ἡ μὲν οὖν is taken up by εἰς δὲ, 8, the sense being, 'we banish indecent language altogether from the State, but if we do not entirely succeed in accomplishing that, and any person should be found saying or doing anything that we prohibit, then' etc. For the intervening μόλιστα μὲν οὖν, 6, occurring by way of correction in the middle of a sentence, cp. Rhet. 2. 9. 1387 a 32, καὶ τὸν ἢπτῳ τὸ κρεῖττον άμφιαζητέων, μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. Bonitz remarks (Ind. 540 b 55) 'ὁλως μὲν οὖν—μάλιστα μὲν οὖν—ἐὰν δὲ non debebat tentare Susemihl.' 'Ολως goes with εξορίζεων, as it probably also does in Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 9, τοὺς δὲ ἀνώτατοι ἄλως εξορίζεων. For the distance at which it stands from εξορίζεων see note on 1255 a 21. For ὧσπερ ἄλλο τι ('more than anything else'), cp. 7 (5). 8. 1307 b 31. Aristotle passes on from ἀνέλειψερ φήσαμεν κ.τ.λ. he probably has before him a saying of Democritus recorded in [Plut.] De Liberis Educandis, c. 14, καὶ μὲντοι καὶ τῆς αἰσχρολογίας ἀπακέτων τοὺς νῦν, λόγος γὰρ ἤργον σκιή κατὰ Δημάκριτον. Compare what we read of the Persians in Hdt. 1. 138, ἄσσα δὲ σφὶ ποιέων οὐκ ἔξεστι, ταῦτα οὐδὲ λέγειν ἔξεστι, and of Archytas in Aelian, Var. Hist. 14. 19. The sons of the ὀμοίωμοι of Cyrus in the Cyropædia of Xenophon are described as brought up at his court αἰσχρὸν μὲν μηδὲν μῆτε ὀρῶτες μῆτε ἀκούοντες (Xen. Cyrop. 7. 5. 86). Some may ask why Aristotle
does not banish comedy, in which *ἀλοχολογία* was common, from the State. That he does not do so, we see from 1336 b 20. The reason is that those below a certain age will be forbidden to witness comedy, and that those above it will be protected from injury by the education they have received (1336 b 20 sqq.).

6. *μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῶν νέων κ.τ.λ.* Aristotle has before him Plato, Laws 729 B.

9. As to *ἀπηγορευμένων*, see Liddell and Scott, and Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective, s.v. ἀγορεύω.

τὸν μὲν ἐλευθέρον μήπω δὲ κατακλίσεως ἤζιωμένον ἐν τοῖς συσσίτιοις.

As to the age at which the young freeman was allowed to recline, instead of sitting, at meals, cp. 21 sqq. The age intended may be twenty-one (cp. 1336 b 37 sqq.). It was probably at this age that the young Spartan became a member of one of the *φίλητα* (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 66. 2). Sus.2 (Note 966: Sus., 1. p. 558), however, regards the change as occurring in the seventeenth year, when the youths, as he believes (cp. 5 (8). 4. 1339 a 4 sqq.), begin to have syssitia of their own, though he allows that, as they remain outside the general syssitia till twenty-one, κατάκλισις will not commence for them there till that age. *Κατάκλισις* is associated in 21 sq. with μέθη, and Plato in Laws 666 B will not allow any of his citizens to share in μέθη till forty, but it is not likely that Aristotle intended to be equally strict.

10. *ἀτιμίαις κολάξειν καὶ πληγαῖς.* Not with blows only, like a slave, but with indignities and blows combined—the former because the offender is a freeman (cp. Demosth. De Chersoneso, c. 51, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἐλευθέρῳ μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ μεγάλην ἄναγκη ἢ υπὲρ τῶν γνωρίμενων αἰσχύνη, καὶ μείζῳ ταύτης οὐκ ὅτι ἤμων ἀν ἐποιεῖ τις δούλῳ δὲ πληγαί καὶ δ τοῦ σώματος αἰκαμός, and c. Androt. c. 55), and the latter because he is under age (cp. Plato, Laws 700 C, πασὶ δὲ καὶ παπαγωγοῖς καὶ τῷ πλείστῳ ὀχλῳ, ῥάβδου κοσμήσει, ἡ νοσθένης ἐγγυντο). We read in Laws 721 B of offenders who are to be mulcted χρήματι τε καὶ ἀτιμία. Freemen of full age, on the other hand, were to be punished ἀτιμίας ἄνελευθέρους, i.e. with indignities usually inflicted not on freemen but on slaves. There were ἀτιμίαι not ἄνελευθέρους, such as the withdrawal of political rights. In Laws 946 C we read of βάσανοι ἐλευθέρων. Charondas had made use of humiliating punishments (Diod. 12. 16. 1). See on the subject Prof. Sidgwick, Elements of Politics, ed. 1, p. 116.

14. ἢ λόγους ἀσχήμονας, ‘or indecent speeches from the stage.’
Iambi and comedy are evidently referred to (cp. 20 sqq.). Prof. W. Christ (Gesch. der griech. Litteratur, p. 167. 4) takes λόγοι here to mean 'dialogue,' comparing the expression λόγοι Σωκρατικοί for Socratic Dialogues (see also Bon. Ind. 433 b 3 sqq.), but Aristotle must have objected to indecent monologue as much as to indecent dialogue. In speaking of the class of mimes called παίγνια, Plutarch (Sympos. 7. 8. 4) remarks, οἵ δὲ πολλοί (i.e. most of those who introduce παίγνια at banquets), καὶ γυναικῶν συγκατακείμενων καὶ παιδῶν ἄνήβων, ἐπιδείκνυται μυμήματα πραγμάτων καὶ λόγων ἡ πάσης μέθης ταραχωδετέρων τὰς ψυχὰς διατίθησιν.

ἐπιμελέσ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Οὖν here contains an inference, as in c. 16. 1335 b 8 and in 1. i. 1252 a 7.

τοὺς ἄρχουσι, not the paedonomi probably, but rather the astynomoi and agronomi (cp. 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 18 sqq.).

15. μὴ δὲν μὴτε ἀγαλμα κ.τ.λ., 'that there is no image or picture representing indecent scenes' (Welldon).

τοιούτων, i.e. ἀσχημόνων. Pictures and statues representing indecent acts or scenes must evidently have been visible in Greek cities, especially, it would seem, in connexion with the gods in whose worship τῶβασμός was used. It is not probably to the familiar Hermae that Aristotle objects, but rather to pictures and statues representing such subjects as the drunkenness of Dionysus: as to these cp. Athen. Deipn. 428 e, οὗ καλὸς δὲ οἱ πλάτωται καὶ γράφοντες τὸν Διώνυσον, ἔτι δὲ οἱ ἄγωντες ἐπὶ τῆς ἀμέμπης διὰ μίσης τῆς ἀγορᾶς οὐκομένων ἐπιδείκνυται γὰρ τοῖς θεαταῖς ὅτι καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ κρείττων ἐστὶν τὸ οὖνος καίτω γ' οὖν ἄν, οἷα, ἀνθρώπως σπουδάζω τοῦθ᾽ ἵπομείνειν. Others perhaps represented the amours of Zeus.

16. εἶ μὴ παρά τισι θεοῖς κ.τ.λ. As to this 'consecrated secrility,' see Grote, Hist. of Greece, 4. 108, note (Part 2, c. 29): C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 2. § 29. 3 (who refers to Paus. 7. 27. 10), 2. § 56. 14, and 2. § 57. 20: Toepffer, Attische Genealogie, p. 93 foot. Compare also Athen. Deipn. 622 a–d, and the unfavourable view expressed by Xenocrates, the contemporary head of the Academy, of the gods in whose worship τῶβασμός was resorted to (Plut. De Iside et Osiride, c. 26, ὃ δὲ Ξενοκράτης καὶ τῶν ἡμερῶν τὰς ὀποφράδας καὶ τῶν ἐορτῶν ὅσα πληγὴ τινὰς ἢ κοπτοῦσιν ή νροτεῖας ή δοσοφημίας ή αἰσχρολογίαν ἔχουσιν, οὔτε θεῶν τιμαῖς οὔτε δαμόνων οἶται προσήκειν χρηστῶν, ἂλλα εἶναι φύσεις ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι μεγάλα μὲν καὶ ἰχνὐράς, δυστρόπους δὲ καὶ σκυβρωπάς, αἱ χαίρουσι τοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ τυγχάνουσαν πρὸς οἴδεν ἄλλο χείρον τρέπονται: cp. Plut. De Defect.
NOTES.

Orac. c. 14. 417 C). Among the gods to whom Aristotle here refers are Dionysus, Demeter, and Corê (C. F. Hermann ibid.). But other gods also were thus worshipped, for instance Apollo Aeglêtês in Anaphê (Conon, ap. Phot. Biblioth. Cod. 186. p. 141 b 27 sqq. Bekk., év Ἀνάφη τῇ νήσῳ . . . ἱερῶν Ἀπόλλωνος ἀγαλῆτον ἔδρατα, ἐν δὲ σών τῶν τοβασμῶν οἱ ἐπιχώριοι θύουσι δι’ αἰτίαν τοιαύτην κ.τ.λ.). Here the τοβασμῶς was addressed by the worshippers to each other in commemoration of the jests exchanged between Medea and her attendant women on the one side and the Argonauts on the other, when the Argo was driven by a tempest to Anaphê. Ἐκ τῶν τοβασμῶν, 'scurrilous jeering also,' as well as indecent statues and pictures. Ὑ οὔμεν, probably an unwritten law, like that referred to in c. 12. 1331 a 26 sqq.

17. πρὸς δὲ τούτους κ.τ.λ., 'and in addition to this the law allows them to do honour to the gods on behalf both of themselves and of their wives and children.' Cp. Cato, De Re Rustica, c. 143, rem divinam (villica) ne faciat, neve mandet qui pro ea faciat, iniussu domini aut dominae. Scito dominum pro tota familia rem divinam facere. A saying of Pythagoras recorded in Diod. 10. 9. 7 is in a somewhat similar spirit, ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς (i.e. Πυθαγόρας) ἀπεβαίνετο τοῖς θεοῖς εὐχέσθαι δεῖν τὰ ἁγαθὰ τοὺς φρονίμους ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄφρονῶν τοὺς γὰρ ἀσωμῆτους ἄγνοεῖν τί ποτὲ ἔστω ἐν τῷ βίῳ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἁγαθῶν. In Laws 909 D Plato goes farther and confines sacrificing, as distinguished from prayer, to priests and priestesses, οἷς ἄγνεία τούτων ἐπιμελής. Τιμαλφεῖν (a poetical word, 'rare in Prose,' see Liddell and Scott) refers probably especially to sacrifices. For καὶ υπὲρ αὐτῶν καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν, see critical note on 1330 b 31.

20. τοὺς δὲ νεωτέρους κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle goes on to protect the young against λόγους ἀσχήμονας (cp. 14). As to iambi, see Stallbaum's note on Plato, Laws 935 E, ποιητῇ δὴ κωμῳδίας ἡ τῶν ἰμβών κ.τ.λ. Iambi are iambic verses, often abusive and indecent (cp. 35, ἡ μοχθηρίαν ἡ δυσμένεων), declaimed by actors at festivals of Dionysus in which the phallus was introduced (Poet. 4. 1449 a 9-13). It was from iambi of this kind that comedy took its rise (Poet. 4. 1448 b 24-1449 a 15, and esp. 24 sqq. and 1449 a 2 sqq.). Iambi, however, did not pass away on the rise of comedy; we hear, in fact, that they were particularly popular at Syracuse (Athen. Deipn. 181 c). Iambi and comedy had this in common that they dealt in ἴψοις (cp. Hor. Carm. 1. 16. 2, criminosis iambis), hence they are often named together, e.g. in Plato, Laws 935 E.
Whether Aristotle includes under iambi mimes written in iambic verse, like those of Herondas, it is difficult to say. As to comedy, compare Plato's views in Laws 816 D sqq. The satyr-play which was added at the close of a tragic trilogy often contained indecent passages, but it does not seem to have been open to as much objection as comedy (Blümner, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., p. 447), and it probably savoured less of ψόγος and δυσμένεια. It appears to be certain that boys were present at representations both of tragedy and of comedy at Athens (A. Müller, Die griech. Bühnenalt. p. 292). The bigger boys were very fond of comedy and older lads of tragedy (Plato, Laws 658 D). As to νομοθετήτων see critical note. If it is the correct reading, οὗτ' οἱμβῶν οὗτ' κωμῳδίας θεατάς νομοθετήτων must apparently mean 'we must not legislate that the young shall be [admissible as] spectators of either iambi or comedy.'

21. πρὶν ἢ τὴν ἥλικιαν λάβωσιν κ.τ.λ. See above on 9. For πρὶν ἢ with the aor. subj. without ἄν, cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 19 sqq. and other passages collected by Bonitz, Ind. 633 a 2 sqq. Kaisssling (Tempora und Modi in des Aristoteles Politica und in der Atheniensum Politia, p. 54) points out that πρὶν ἢ with the aorist subjunctive is not here preceded by οὗ πρότερον, as it is in 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 19 sqq. and 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 17 sqq.

22. τῶν τοιούτων, i. e. iambi and comedy.

24. The Index Aristotelicus (608 b 30) gives no other instance of πουεισθαν τὸν λόγον followed by a genitive (we expect περὶ τοιοτών, but compare for the absence of περὶ c. 10. 1330 a 22, 6 (4). 1292 a 33 sq., and 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 36, αἱ περὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον εἰς τῶν κοιμών), nor does it give any other instance of παραδρομή or ἐν παραδρομῇ (245 b 36). 'Εν παραδρομῇ seems to be a rare expression.

25. εἶτε μὴ δεῖ κ.τ.λ., sc. νομοθετεῖν τοὺς νεωτέρους εἶναι θεατάς ιάμβων καὶ κωμῳδίας. Διαπορήσαντας here=διελθόντας τὰς ἀπορίας, like διαποροῦντας in 3. 4. 1276 b 36 (Bon. Ind. 187 b 11). Πῶς δεῖ, sc. τοῦτο νομοθετεῖν, i. e. by what provisions of law the exclusion of the νεωτέρων will best be effected.

26. κατὰ δὲ τὸν παρόντα καιρὸν κ.τ.λ., 'but in relation to the present occasion we have touched on it only in the way in which it was necessary to touch on it.' For the suppression of 'only,' see note on 1282 a 36. Compare also Meteor. 3. 4. 374 b 17, νῦν δ' ἐὰν ἀνάγκη, τοσοῦτον περὶ αὐτῶν λέγομεν, and for κατὰ τὸν παρόντα
27. *τως γάρ κ.τ.λ.,* 'for perhaps Theodorus, the actor of tragedy, said not ill that which has just been said.' Ἐρμ introduces an explanation why it is not necessary* for Aristotle to say more; Theodorus, in fact, had by his remark done much to solve the problem and to indicate the true course. Camerarius, however, asks, not without reason (Interp. p. 332), 'Quod vero hoc dictum est? Factum enim magis expostitur histrionis. Nisi aliquid connecturam de eo capere dicto posse videatur. Aut libeat suspicari ista esse mutila.' Coray's note is, Ἐρμε γαρ το παραπλήσιον τούτο τῶν περὶ τῶν παιδων. Τι δὲ Ἐρμε; το οἰκειοσθαί τούς διατάσ ταῖς πρώταις άκοις, ος φαίνεται εκ τῶν εξης. Αὐτοὶ ἔργατο is to be retained, the passage should probably be explained as Coray explains it, but, as Sus.¹ says, Ἐρμε γαρ το παραπλήσιον τούτο τῶν παιδων. Τι δὲ Ἐρμε; το οἰκειοσθαί τούς διατάσ ταῖς πρώταις άκοις, ος φαίνεται εκ τῶν εξης. The only substitute for which has occurred to me is Ἐρμε ('gave not ill a practical solution of the question which has just been mentioned'). For ὅ τῆς τραγῳδίας ὑποκριτής, which is added to distinguish this Theodorus from others of the same name, cp. Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 417, ὑποκριτής τραγῳδίας, Athen. Deipn. 407 d, Τμοκλης ὁ τῆς κωμῳδίας ποιητής (ἡ δὲ καὶ τραγῳδίας), and Aelian, Var. Hist. 14. 40, Θεοδόρου τοῦ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποιητοῦ ὑποκριτικόν τῆς 'Απολλόν. As to Theodorus, see Meineke, Hist. Crit. Com. Gr. p. 523, and Sus., Note 968 (Sus., i. p. 558), and cp. Rhet. 3. 2. 1404 b 22 sqq., where the naturalness and charm of his voice are dwelt upon. He was one of the best tragic actors of the time immediately before that of Aristotle. How could Theodorus avoid being preceded by other actors on the stage, if he did not always take the part, perhaps an insignificant one, to which the first speech of the tragedy was assigned? Richards asks, 'Did he insist, when plays were competing, on being protagonist in the first, so that no other πρωταγωνιστ might win over the audience before him? Or does the statement about him refer to occasions when actors only (not plays or choruses) were competing, and when perhaps only scenes or single speeches were recited? See Haigh's Attic Theatre, p. 58.' Demosthenes acted in much the same way as Theodorus did, when he insisted on being heard by Philip of Macedon first of the Athenian envoys (Aeschin. De Fals. Leg. c. 108, φαίνετο γάρ νεώτατος εἶναι πάντων τῶν τάξιν τοῦ πρῶτος λέγειν οὐκ ἀν ἐφή παραλυπεῖν, οὖν ἐπιτρέψειν τινί (αὐττώμενος εἰς ἐμε) προκαταλαβόντα
29. οὐδένι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Εἰσίγνεω is commonly used of the poet or chorégus bringing the chorus on the stage (as in Aristoph. Acharn. 11, εἰσάγαγ, ὡσπερ τὰ θέατρα τῶν προκαταλημβανόντων.  

30. ὃς οἰκειομένων κ.τ.λ., ‘holding that the audience is made friendly to’ (or ‘won to the side of’) ‘what it hears first.’ Liddell and Scott compare Thuc. 1. 36, ὥστε μεγάλων καυρῶν οἰκειοῦται τε καὶ πολεμοῦται. Οἰκειομένων is interpreted by στέργομεν, 33.  

31. συμβαίνει δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘and this same thing happens both in relation to dealings with men, [which is what Theodorus had in view,] and in relation to dealings with things.’ For πρὸς, cp. 38, and 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 3. For τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων ὁμιλίας, cp. Eurip. Phoen. 1329 Bothe (1408 Dindorf), ὁμιλία χθονός.  

32. πάντα γὰρ στέργομεν τὰ πρῶτα μᾶλλον, ‘for whatever we first have to do with, we like better than anything else,’ so that if iambi and comedy are witnessed in youth, they will be among the things liked best. Aristotle has before him Plato, Rep. 378 D, ὥστε νέος οἶνος οἰός τε κρίνειν ὅ τι τε ὑπόνοια καὶ ὁ μῆς, ἀλλὰ ὁ ἄν τηλικοῦσαν ὄν λάβη ἐν ταῖς δόξαις, δυσέκνυτά τε καὶ ἀμετάστατα φιλεῖ γίνεσθαι. ὥστε δὴ ἰσός ἐναι περὶ παντὸς ποιητῶν ἡ πρῶτα ἀκούονεν ὅ τι κάλλιστα μεμιθολογημένα πρὸς ἄρετὴν ἄκονεν. Compare Hor. Epist. 1. 2. 69 and familiar sayings like ‘on revient toujours à ses premiers amours’ and ‘the child is father of the man.’ ‘The Jesuits used to say, “Give me a child till he is seven years old, and I will make him what no one will unmake”’ (Miss E. Welldon in the Cheltenham Ladies’ College Magazine, No. 18, p. 179). We may also explain in this way the tendency of men, as they grow old, to become ′laudatores temporis acti.’ On the other hand, there is truth in Hom. Odys. 1. 351, τὴν γὰρ ἄοιδὴν μᾶλλον ἐπικλέειον ἀνθρωποι, ἄτυχος ἀκούοντεσι νεωτάτη ἀμφιπέλησα.  

διὸ δὲι κ.τ.λ. Ποιεῖν ξένα, ‘to make strange and unknown,’ in opposition to οἰκειομένων, 30. Pythagoras (ap. Aristox. Fragm. 20 : Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 279) shows a similar desire to keep the young from all knowledge of evil. It was in a somewhat different sense that Antisthenes said (Diog. Laert. 6. 12), τὰ ποιημὰ πάντα νόμιζε ἔξωκά.
NOTES.

34. μάλιστα δ’ αυτῶν ὃσα ἔχει ἡ μοχθηρίαν ἡ δυσμένειαν. As αυτῶν—τῶν φαύλων, it is clear that in Aristotle’s view a thing might be φαύλον without possessing μοχθηρία. Cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 6. 1148 b 2, μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία περὶ ταύτ’ ἐστί διὰ τὸ εἰρημένον, ὅτι φύσει τῶν αἴρετῶν ἐκαστὸν ἐστὶ δὲ αὐτόν φαύλαι δὲ καὶ φευκται αὐτῶν εἰσὶν αἱ ἱπερβολαί. We see from Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1144 a 34, διαστρέφει γάρ ἡ μοχθηρία καὶ δυσφεῦδθεναι σοιὲν περὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρχὰς, what a strong term μοχθηρία is. Aristotle probably regards iambi and comedy as not free from elements of depravity and malignity. Δυσμένειαν, the reading of Π Bekk. (as to the rendering of Vet. Int. see critical note on 1336 b 35), seems to be perfectly right, though Sus. would read δυσφέυδθεναι in place of it. Aristotle probably has before him Plato, Laws 934 D—936 A, where iambi and comedy are connected with ἔθνηρα, βλασφημία, and κακιγορία, and Phileb. 48 A—50 A, where envy is implied to be an ingredient in comedy, for envy is nearly related to δυσμένεια, the words φθόνος and δυσμένεια being conjoined in Plato, Rep. 500 C, Phaedr. 253 B, and Protag. 316 D. Compare also Rep. 395 E, κακιγοροῦσται τε καὶ κωμῳδοῦσται ἄλληλους καὶ αἰσχρολογοῦσται, and Plut. Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, c. 22, ὅργῃ δὲ χάριτος καὶ χῶλος εὐμενείας καὶ τοῦ φιλανθρώπου καὶ φιλόφρονος τὸ δυσμένει καὶ ταρακτικὸν ἀποτάτα τῇ φύσει τέτακτα τά μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ δυνάμεως, τὰ δ’ ἀσθενεῖας ἐστὶ καὶ φαυλότητος. Plato does his best in the Laws (792 B, D, E) to secure that the child shall be εὐθυμος, ἔλεως, and εὐμενής, and it is in the same mood (Rep. 496 E) that he wishes men to close their life. This is the mood of the Olympian Gods (see above on 1332 a 9), and according to Plutarch (Pericl. c. 39) it was the εὐμενεῖς ἱδιος of Pericles that justified the application to him of the epithet ‘Olympian.’

35. διελθόντων δὲ κτλ. Θεωροῦσ means ‘spectators,’ not ‘auditores,’ as Sus. explains the word in this passage (Ind. s.v.). Aristotle gets the hint of what he here suggests from Plato, Rep. 466 E, ὅτι κανῇ στρατεύσωνται, καὶ πρὸς γε ἄξουσι τῶν παιδῶν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ὧσι ἄδροι, ἵνα ὅσπερ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων δημοσφρῶν θέωσιν ταῦτα, ἀ τελεωθέντας ἐνεῖσι δημοσφρῆνες . . . ἢ οὖκ ἠλθήσατα τὰ περὶ τὰς τέχνας, οἷς τὸ φυς τῶν κεραμέων παῖδας, ὡς πολὺν χρόνον διακοινοῦντες θεωροῦντ, πρὶν ἀπεσταλῆ τοῦ κεραμεύουν; Plato, however, is speaking here of older boys than those whom Aristotle has in view, and war would of course not be one of the μαθήσεις to which Aristotle refers. These μαθήσεις include probably gymnastic and music, especially the former. Plato in the Laws (794 C) had sent boys of six to
teachers of riding and of the use of the bow, the javelin, and the
sling; Aristotle sends boys at seven to the gymnastic trainer and
the παιδοτριβης (5 (8). 3. 1338 b 6 sqq.); of riding he says nothing.

37. δύο 8' εἴσιν ἡλικίαι κ.τ.λ. At this point we pass from τροφή,
or rearing, to παιδεία, or education strictly so called, which is
evidently conceived as beginning at seven years of age. We shall
find in the sequel that, in accordance with the announcement made
here, puberty forms a turning-point in the educational course, for
till puberty no studies find a place in it but gymnastic, and that of
the less laborious type (5 (8). 4. 1338 b 40), whereas after puberty
other studies are to be taken in hand for three years, and then the
severe kind of gymnastic is to be commenced (5 (8). 4. 1339 a
4 sqq.). That the age of twenty-one, like puberty, marks a crisis
in the physiological development of the human being, we see from
Hist. An. 7. 1. 582 a 16–33. The meaning of μετά in 38, 39, is
by no means clear, yet the commentators say nothing about it. Is
Aristotle’s meaning this, that a break is to occur in the education
at two epochs—at the close of the period from seven years of
age to puberty and at the close of the period from puberty to
twenty-one, or in other words at puberty and at twenty-one? If
this is so, it is manifest that Aristotle did not intend his education
to cease at twenty-one, a conclusion to which other considerations
also point (see vol. i. p. 370 and p. 358, note 2, and note on
1333 b 3). He apparently devotes the years intervening between
three years after puberty and twenty-one to the severer kind of
gymnastic training (5 (8). 4. 1339 a 4 sqq.). At Athens things
were arranged quite differently. Young Athenians were enrolled in
the ληξιαρχικών γραμματείων and became citizens on the com-
pletion of the eighteenth year (ΔΘ. Πολ. c. 42: the seventeenth
according to Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng.
Trans., pp. 197, 310, but see Mr. R. W. Macan in Class. Rev.
10. 199 sq.), though they spent the two following years in military
training, garrison-duty, and field-service as περίπολου, and therefore
did not discharge any strictly political functions till two years later.
Aristotle does not arrange for the performance of any military
service before the age of twenty-one. For πρὸς ἄσ, ‘in relation to
which,’ cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 11, διήρηται μὲν οὖν τὸ βουλευόμενον πρὸς
tὰς πολιτείας τούτων τῶν τρόπων. In 4 (7). 12. 1331 a 37, on the other
hand, we have πρέπει γὰρ διηρήθαι κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας καὶ τούτων τῶν κόσ-
μων, and in 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 20, ἄστι δὲ καὶ ταύτα ὀρισμένα τάς ἡλικίας.

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NOTES.

40. οἱ γὰρ ταῖς ἐβδομάδις κ.τ.λ. See above on 1335 b 33.


πᾶσα γὰρ τέχνη καὶ παιδεία κ.τ.λ. As art and education seek to complete nature, they should follow nature as far as she goes. Art seeks to complete nature because she takes the raw material furnished by nature—wool, or bricks, or human beings—and by completing what is deficient produces a garment, or a house, or a State: see Prof. Butcher, Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, ed. 2, p. 118 sq., and compare (with Eaton) Phys. 2. 8. 199 a 15, ὕλος τε ἡ τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἑπταελιά ἡ φύσει ἐδωοιεὶ ἀπεργάσασθαι, τὰ δὲ μμείναι, and (with Congreve) Eth. Nic. 1. 4. 1097 a 5 sq. The same thing is true of education, for education starts with that which is furnished by nature (c. 13. 1332 a 40 sqq.: 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 27 sq.), and completes it. Τέχνη καὶ παιδεία go together here, as τέχνη καὶ μάθησις in 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 9, where see note. For πᾶσα παιδεία, 'every kind of education,' compare the use of παιδεία in the plural in Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 b 7 sq., Oecon. 1. 5. 1344 a 26 sq., and Thuc. 2. 39. 2. The word προσλείπεω appears to be a rare one: Liddell and Scott compare C. I. G. 3935, τὰ προσλείψαντα τοῦ ἔργου.

3. πρῶτον μὲν οὐν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has now reached the subject—that of education—to reach which he has been hastening forward so fast, postponing the full consideration of not a few questions, and he here resumes the use of the aporetic method, which he had laid aside since the commencement of the Fourth Book (vol. i. p. 352). The first two of the questions here raised are easily answered, the first in 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 11—21, and the second in 1337 a 21—33, but the third question requires far fuller treatment; the consideration of it is not completed in what we possess of the Fifth Book.
4. κοινὴ ... ἡ κατ' ἑαυτὸν τρόπον, 'on a public footing or individually' (cp. 5 (8). i. 1337 a 24 sqq.). Aristotle has already said in Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 29, κράτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ γίγνεσθαι κοινὴ ἐπιμελείαν (sc. τροφῆς τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων) καὶ ὥρθην. Ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιμελείαν αὐτῶν, cp. 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 12 sq. and 7 (5). ii. 1314 b 21 sq.

6. καὶ νῦν, 'even now' (cp. c. 16. 1335 b 5). Even in Aristotle's day not many Greek States made the superintendence of education the concern of the State.

7. ποιάν τινα δεί ταύτην, sc. τὴν ἐπιμελείαν ποιεῖσθαι. This is explained by 5 (8). 2. 1337 a 34, τίς δ' ἡστιν ἡ παιδεία, καὶ πώς χρή παιδεύεσθαι, δεὶ μὴ λανθάνειν.

BOOK V (VIII).

11. Ἡστι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Two reasons are given for this conclusion—(1) attention to the education of youth is demanded in the interest of the constitution (12–18), and (2) it is demanded because some training is required before men can act virtuously (18–21).


14. δεὶ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκάστην παιδεύεσθαι. See critical note.

tὸ γὰρ ἡδος κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle probably has before him Plato, Rep. 544 D, οἰσθ' οὖν, ἢ δ' εὖ, ὅτι καὶ ἀνθρώπων εἰδὴ τοσαύτα ἀνάγκη τρόπων εἶναι διαμεροὶ καὶ πολιτείων; ἢ οἰεὶ ἐκ δριμῶς ποθεὶ ἢ ἐκ πέτρας τὰς πολιτείας γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἐκ τῶν ἡθῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἢ ἐκ διαμεροὶ μέφαντα τάλα ἐφελκύσῃ; Aristotle insists in 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 12 sqq. that the safety of constitutions is not secured by the mere making of laws, however excellent they may be; it is necessary to produce in the citizens the type of character which is favourable to the maintenance of the particular constitution. We read in Rhet. i. 8. 1366 a 12 of τὰ ἡθη τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐκάστης: cp. also Pol. 8 (6). i. 1317 a 39. As to the δημοκρατικῶν ἡδος see Demosth. Ol. 3. 25 sq., where it is implied that one feature of it is a willingness on the part of the leading men of the State to be content with a mode of life not more splendid than that of their neighbours and a desire that not private buildings, but public should be magnificent. Aristotle, however, would probably find the δημοκρατικῶν and ὀλιγορχικῶν ἡδον in the kind of character which makes
in favour of the existence and continuance of a democracy and an oligarchy: cp. 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 2 sqq. and see note on 1310 a 12.

17. δει δε κ.τ.λ., so that not only does the presence in the citizens of the type of character appropriate to a constitution generate that constitution, but a superior quality in the type generates a superior quality of constitution. For the form of the sentence cp. 1. 5. 1254 a 25 sq. and 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 28 sq. For βελτιστον see critical note on 1337 a 18.

18. ἐν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Euripides had placed a different sentiment in the mouth of one of the characters of his Αὐγή: cp. Diog. Laert. 2. 33, Εὐριπίδου ὁ ἐν τῇ Ἀϑηναίᾳ εἰς τὸν περὶ ἀρετῆς, κρατίστου εἰκῇ ταύτῇ ἐὰν ἀφεμένα, ἀναστὰς ἐξήλθη (Ἐσκράτης), φήμας γελοηῶν ἐναί διάφανον μὲν μὴ εὐρυσκόμενον ἄξιον εἴρητε, ἀρετὴν δ’ οὕτω ἐὰν ἀπολολέωμαι. See also Plut. Virtutem doceri posse, c. 3. Not only is it necessary in the interest of the constitution that training likely to produce the required ἱδρος should be given in youth, but training in youth is also necessary with a view to the practice of virtue. For previous training is desirable with a view to the practice of all δύναμεις καὶ τέχναι, and virtue is a δύναμις (Rhet. 1. 9. 1366 a 36 sqq.: contrast Eth. Nic. 2. 4. 1106 a 6 sqq.). Or the argument may be an a fortiori one. If previous training is necessary for the practice of an art, a fortiori it is necessary for action in accordance with virtue, for the successful practice of an art implies the fulfilment of fewer conditions than action in accordance with virtue (Eth. Nic. 2. 3. 1105 a 26 sqq.). For δύναμεις καὶ τέχναι see note on 1328 b 36 and Bon. Ind. 207 b 4 sqq., where Metaph. θ. 2. 1046 b 2, διὸ πᾶσας αἱ τέχναι καὶ αἱ ποιησικαί [καὶ] ἑπιστήμαι δυνάμεις εἰσιν’, ἄρχαί γὰρ μεταβαθτικαί εἰσιν ἐν ἄλλῳ ἀλλῳ, is quoted, and reference is made to Rhet. 1. 2. 1358 a 6 and other passages. For προπαθείσεσθαι καὶ προεξείσθαι, cp. Pol. 3. 18. 1288 b 1, καὶ παθεῖσα καὶ ἐθν., and 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 16, εἰδιστήμων καὶ πεπαθείσων. In 4 (7). 13. 1332 b 10 sq., on the other hand, παθεῖσα seems to include τὸ ἐθισθεῖσα. For πρὸς τὰς ἐκάστων ἐργασιάς, 'with a view to the operations of each of them,' cp. Plato, Symp. 205 B, ὅστε καὶ αἱ ἐπὶ πᾶσαι ταῖς τέχναις ἐργασιάς ποιήσεις εἰσι, and Gorg. 450 C.

21. τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς πράξεις. Cp. c. 2. 1337 b 9, τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς.

ἐπεί δὲ κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle passes to the second question, whether education should be in the hands of the State or in those
of the private individual (i.e. the father, cp. 25, τῶν αὐτοῦ τέκνων). Two reasons are given why it should be in the hands of the State: (1) as the whole State (i.e. all the citizens) has one and the same end before it, the education given will be the same for all, hence its management should be in the hands of the State, and not in the hands of parents, as at present, training their children privately and in whatever subjects they please; (2) the individual should regard himself as part of the State, and the management of the part should be adjusted to the management of the whole [so that it should be in the hands which manage the whole, i.e. the hands of the State]. The first of these two arguments is hardly conclusive. The education given to all might be identical without being placed in the hands of the State. Against the second it may be urged that the welfare of the whole might be kept in view in the training of the part, even if education were not placed in the hands of the State. Compare with Aristotle’s view that of Plutarch in Lycurg. et Num. inter se comp. c. 4. We learn from 2. 5. 1263 b 36 sq. that Aristotle looks to education to make the State one, and this is another reason why the State should take the charge of it into its own hands.


27. ἀμα δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘and at the same time [so far from its being right to think that the individual citizen can justly claim to educate his children as he pleases], it is not even right to think that he belongs to himself; the true creed is that all the citizens belong to the State.’ Aristotle inherits this view from others. Thus we read of the Spartans in Plut. Lycurg. c. 24, ἄλοις νομίζοντες οὖν αὐτῶν ἀλλὰ τῆς πατρίδος εἶναι διετέλουν, and in c. 25, τὸ δὲ ἄλοιν εἴθεζεν (ὁ Δυκούργος)
NOTES.

tous polites mi' boilesthai mi'de epistolathai kat' idian xin, alla ... olous einai tis patridos, and of the Athenians of the time of the Persian War in Demosth. De Cor. c. 205, ugeito gar aitwv ekastos oudi to patri kai t' mytrp mounon gegovista, alla kai t' patridi. Much the same thing, indeed, is said by the Corinthian envoys in Thuc. i. 70. 6 of the Athenians at the outset of the Peloponnesian War. But what Aristotle has especially before him is the language of Plato in Laws 923 A, eyan' ouv nomogetes ovn othen' umas umwv aitwn einai tides ouvte tivn oudian taute, eumpanatos de tiv gevnon umwv tov te emprosoven kai tov epieita esominev, kai eivi mallovs tivn polies einai to te genos paw kai tivn oudian. Cp. Cic. De Fin. 2. 14. 45, ut ad Archytam scripsit Plato, non sibi se soli natum meminerit, sed patriae, sed suis, ut perexigua pars ipsi relinquatur, and De Offic. i. 25. 85. To none of these authorities does it occur for a moment that the Greek citizen belonged to Hellas as well as to his own State. Isocrates may perhaps have remembered this (Jebb, Attic Orators 2. 44). Aristotle does not consider how far the citizen should carry his sense of belonging to his polis. Clearly he thinks that the citizen should subordinate his private preferences to those of his polis, but should he suppress conscientious convictions and sink his conscience in the will of the polis? Suppose the polis is under a tyranny or extreme oligarchy or extreme democracy? If the virtue of a citizen is relative to the preservation of the constitution (3. 4. 1276 b 27 sqq.), a good citizen must apparently do what tends to preserve the constitution, however bad the constitution may be, but what would Aristotle say that a good man ought to do in such a case? Subordinate his conscience to the maintenance of the constitution? If so, contrast the view of the Platonic Socrates in Plato, Gorg. 512 E sq.

29. m rooftop yap ekastos tis polews, and that which is a part of the State belongs to the State: cp. 1. 4. 1254 a 9, to te yap mupon ou mouv allon eist miropiv, alla kai elos allou.

η δ' επιμελεια κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1. 13. 1260 b 14, tivn de tiv mouv prós tivn tov elou deblipeto arepei. Aristotle has here before him Plato, Laws 903 B, peidoimenv ton nevian tois logous, os tov tov pantost epimeloumenos proi tivn sownhian kai arepev ton elou panti eisti sunegetageneva ... ow ev ka to sou', kai sxeile, mupon eis to pav euniteine blepov dei, kaipeter pantosumkron on, and Charmides 156 E, alla touto kai avton eiv tiv diaphen- genev tonous parα tonos "Ellhnon latrouv tα polelα vosηmatα, oti to elou avgouein, ou deoi tivn epimeliein politeia, ou mi kalos ekhoes adynaton
... compare the teaching of Hippocrates referred to in Phaedrus 270 C, and see Stewart on Eth. Nic. i. 13. 7.

31. καὶ τοῦτο, 'in this matter also,' i.e. for attending to the education of youth and making it a matter of State-concern: cp. c. 4. 1338 b 9 sqq. The Lacedaemonians were praised for many other things (6 (4). i. 1288 b 40 sqq.). It will be noticed that nothing is here said of the Cretans, and that the compliment paid to the Lacedaemonians is not extended to them: cp. Eth. Nic. io. 1180 a 24 sqq. and contrast Eth. Nic. i. 13. 1102 a 10 sqq., where the Cretan lawgiver, no less than the Lacedaemonian, is said to seek to make the citizens good and obedient to the laws.

34. πῶς χρὴ παιδεύεσθαι, 'how one should have them taught,' C. 2. cp. c. 3. 1338 a 38, and for πῶς c. 3. 1338 a 33, c. 4. 1338 b 38, ὅτι μὲν οὖν χρηστῶν τῇ γυμναστικῇ, καὶ πῶς χρηστῶν, ὑμολογούμενον ἐστιν, and c. 6. 1340 b 20, πότερον δὲ δεὶ μανθάνειν αὐτοὺς ἐξουσίας τε καὶ χειρουργοῦντας ἢ μή ... νῦν λεκτέον.

36. περὶ τῶν ἔργων, 'sc. τῆς παιδείας, i.e. de iis rebus quas doceri iuvenes oporteat, opp. πῶς χρὴ παιδεύεσθαι' (Bon. Ind. 286 a 33). For τῶν ἔργων in this sense cp. 1337 b 5 sqq. π’ Sus. read διὰ τῶν ἔργων, which Sus.² translates 'thatsächlich' (does this mean 'practically?'), but it is difficult to believe that διὰ is the true reading.

37. οὐτὲ πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὔτε πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν ἄριστον. For the distinction, cp. Eth. Nic. io. i. 1172 a 24, πρὸς ἀρετὴν τε καὶ τὸν εὐδαιμονίαν βίου, and Top. 3. i. 116 b 23, καὶ ὅλως τὸ πρῶτο τοῦ βιοῦ τέλος ἀρετῶτερων μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ πρῶτο ἄλλο τι, οἴον τὸ πρῶτο εὐδαιμονίαν συντείνων ἢ τὸ πρῶτο φράσματα. The study of music, we learn in the sequel, is of value both with a view to virtue and with a view to τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγὴν, or in other words τὸν βίον τὸν ἄριστον, but the two ends are not to be confounded. Education in the 'best State' will naturally be adjusted to both, and hence the mention of them here. Aristotle points out that there was no agreement as to the training conducive to either. The Spartans, for instance, would say that gymnastic training was the road both to virtue (c. 3. 1337 b 26 sq.) and to the life of empire, which they regarded as the best life (4 (7). 14. 1333 b 20 sqq.), but others would think differently.

38. οὔσθε φανερὸν κ.τ.λ. As to this see vol. i. p. 354, note 2. For the distinction of διάνοια and τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς θὸς, Bonitz (Ind. 185 b 61) compares 3. 11. 1281 b 7, οὔτω καὶ περὶ τὰ ἤθη καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν: cp. also 1337 b 11, ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ τῆς διάνοιας, and Plato, Laws
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798 A, καὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων διανοιας τε ἀμα καὶ τὰς τῶν ψυχῶν φύσεις. For τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡδος, cp. c. 5.1340 a 11, b 11, De Part. An. 4.11.692 a 22, τὸ ἡδος τοῦ ᾠν ὑ τῶν ψυχῆς, and Plato, Lysis 222 A, Ἡ κατὰ τὴν ψυχῆν ἡ κατὰ τὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡδος ἡ τρόποις ἡ ἔδος, and Laws 793 E, εἴς τοἰ ψυχῆς. Τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡδος is the disposition or character of the soul; the phrase is used not only by Plato, but also by Xenophon (Mem. 3. 10. 3), and there is nothing technical about it. Sus. (Ind. s.v. ψυχῆ) explains it as synonymous with τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν, but does it not rather mean the diathesis of τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν?

39. ἐκ τε τῆς ἐμποδῶν παιδείας κ.τ.λ., 'and if we take as the starting-point of our inquiry the education with which we are daily in contact, the inquiry proves perplexing.' For ἐκ, cp. De Part. An. 1. 5. 644 b 25, καὶ γὰρ ἐξ ὧν ἀν τις σκέψαται περὶ αὐτῶν ... παντελῶς ἐντὸν διδόγα, and for ἐμποδῶν, cp. De Gen. et Corr. 1. 6. 323 a 26, καὶ γὰρ κινεὶ κινοῦμαι πάντα σχεδὸν τὰ ἐμποδῶν (referred to by Bonitz, Ind. 243 a 61, who explains τὰ ἐμποδῶν as = τὰ παρ’ ἡμῖν). Light is thrown on Aristotle’s meaning by 1337 b 21 sqq. Actual education had four branches—reading and writing, gymnastic, music, and drawing—and of these reading, writing, and drawing were studied for their utility, and gymnastic as contributing to virtue (c. 3. 1337 b 25 sqq.), while the study of music included the practice of τὰ θαυμασία καὶ περιττὰ τῶν ἔργων (c. 6. 1341 a 11 sqq.), and was commonly pursued with a view to pleasure (1337 b 28). Some authorities favoured studies useful for life, others those contributing to virtue, and others those of an out-of-the-way kind. Aristotle’s own aim in planning the education of his ‘best State’ is to make his citizens men of complete virtue, fit in body, mind, and character to live in the practice of all the virtues and to rule and be ruled with a view to the most desirable life, the life in which work is crowned with leisure. Others had solved the question otherwise. Isocrates is on the whole in favour of useful studies, though he has something to say in defence of Eristic and Geometry and Astronomy, studies belonging to the out-of-the-way class (De Antid. § 261 sqq.: Hel. § 5). Of the Cynic Diogenes we read (Diog. Laert. 6. 73), μουσικής τε καὶ γεωμετρίκης καὶ ἀστρολογίας καὶ τῶν τουοτῶν ἅμελεων, ὥς ἄχρηστων καὶ ὧν ἄναγκαλων. For the views of Polybius see Polyb. 9. 20. 6 sqq. On the other hand, Lacedaemonian education was designed to develope virtue, though no doubt a one-sided kind of virtue (c. 4. 1338 b 11 sqq.: cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 16, γράμματα μέν οὖν ἕνεκα τῆς χρείας
emánthavon, ἢ δ' ἄλλῃ πᾶσα παιδεία πρῶς τὸ ἀρχεσθαί καλῶς ἐγώντεο καὶ καρτερείν ποιοῦντα καὶ νεκῶν μαχόμενον. As to the studies falling under the head of τὰ περιττά, see vol. i. p. 354, note 3. To the studies there enumerated should be added the wonderful feats of horsemanship which Cleophas, the son of Themistocles, learnt by his father's wish to perform (Plato, Meno 93 D). Aristotle, however, probably refers especially to the study of Geometry, Astronomy, and Eristic Argument, subjects which had found their way in Isocrates' day into the curriculum at Athens (Isocr. Panath. § 26: cp. Plato, Protag. 318 E, where Protagoras is made to sneer at λογισμοῖς ταί καὶ ἀστρονομιὰς καὶ γεωμετρίας καὶ μονακήν as studies which Hippias of Elis taught and he himself did not, the wisdom which he taught being εὐθυνία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως). Both τὰ περιττά and τὰ χρήσιμα are here distinguished from τὰ τεῖνστα πρὸς ἄρετήν, but many advocates of the study of τὰ περιττά at any rate would claim that it aided the development of virtue. Cp. Isocr. Busir. § 23, τῶν δὲ νεωτέρων ἀμελήσαντας τῶν ἑδονῶν ἔτη ἀστρολογία καὶ λογισμοὶ καὶ γεωμετρία διατρίβετον ἔπεισαν, ὅπερ τὰς δυνάμεις ὃι μὲν ὡς πρὸς ἄρετα χρήσιμον ἐπαινοῦσαν, ὃι δὲ ὡς πλείοντα πρὸς ἄρετήν συμβαλλομένοις ἀσφάλειν ἐπιχειροῦσιν. Pericles had studied τὰ περιττά under Anaxagoras and is thought by Plato and Plutarch to have owed much of his greatness of soul to these studies (Plato, Phaedr. 269 E sq.: Plut. Pericl. cc. 4–8). The virtuous Epaminondas had had a περιττή παιδεία (Plut. De Gen. Socr. c. 3). It is with a view to virtue that Plato recommends the study of Arithmetic, Geometry, and Astronomy (Rep. 525–530: Laws 818–822), and at a later age of Dialectic (Rep. 531 sqq.: Laws 965). For the contrast between τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς τῶν βιῶν and τὰ περιττά, cp. Rhet. 2. 13. 1389 b 25, οὐδενός γὰρ μεγάλου οὐδὲ περιττοῦ, ἀλλὰ τῶν πρὸς τῶν βιῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, and for the phrase τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς τῶν βιῶν, Diog. Laert. 2. 25, καὶ συνεχές ἐκεῖνα ἀμφιθέγγυτο (ὁ Σωκράτης) τὰ ἑμβεία,


τὰ δ' ἀργυρώματ' ἐστὶν ἥ τε πορφύρα
eis tois taurędous chrήsmi', oúk eis ton bion,

3. 98, χρημάτων καὶ τῶν eis ton bion χρησίμων, and Hyperid. Or. Fun. 3. 10. For δηλον οὐδὲν ('nothing is clear'), cp. Plato, Theaet. 201 A, μένονα δὲ δηλον οὐδέν ("manentibus vero—nec amplius quae-rentibus—nihil erit perspicuum,' Stallbaum).

NOTES.

1. 2. 405 b 8, πάντα γὰρ τὰ στοιχεῖα κριτὶν ἐληφε, πλὴν τῆς γῆς.
'Quid signifcet his locis formula eληφέναι κριτὶν apertum est, quomodo eam vim possit habere dubium videtur . . . Equidem nomine κριτῆς, quoniam coniunctum est cum λαμβάνει, significari putaverim suffragium iudicis: unumquodque ex tribus illis elementis unius tuit iudicis suffragium' (Bonitz on Metaph. A. 8. 988 b 22–989 a 19). See also Bon. Ind. s.v. κριτῆς.

1337 b. 2. καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν κ.τ.λ. Thus the Spartans identified virtue with military virtue, which is only a part of it (2. 9. 1271 b 2 sqq.), and naturally erred in their ἀνίκησις of virtue (4 (7). 15. 1334 a 40). Aristotle's remark is here suggested by that of Socrates in Plato, Laches 190 B, ἐπὶ οὖν τοῦτο γ' ὑπάρχει δει, τὸ εἶδενα ὃ τι ποτ' ἔστω ἀρετῆ; e i. g. ψρ που μη′ ἀρετὴν εἰδεῖμεν τὸ παράπαν ὃ τι ποτὲ τυγχάνει δυ, τίμα τρόπον τοῦτον σύμβουλον γενοίμεθα ὅταν, ὅπως ἄν αὐτῷ κάλλιστα κτήσατο;

4. δὲ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Laws 818 A, τῷ πλῆθει δὲ ὁσα αὐτῶν (i.e. Arithmetic, Geometry, and Astronomy) ἀναγκαῖα . . . μη εἰπότασθαι μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς αὐχρῶν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably refers to reading and writing and a certain amount of arithmetic and geometry as necessary. At Sparta these necessary subjects were evidently insufficiently studied (c. 4. 1338 b 33).

5. δὲ δὲ οὖ πάντα κ.τ.λ. Πάντα, sc. τὰ χρήσιμα, not τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. For instance, cookery should not be studied (c. 5. 1339 a 39 sqq.). The parenthetic clause, δεμημένων—ἀνελευθέρων, causes Aristotle to forget that he has begun his sentence with δὲ δὲ οὖ πάντα, and he proceeds in 6, φανερῶν δὲ κ.τ.λ., as if these words had not preceded. Bonitz (Ind. 538 b 38) compares De Interp. 14. 24 a 6 sqq., referring to Waitz' note on this passage. In De Interp. 14, however, we have merely a pleonasm of δὲ, whereas in the passage before us there is a surplusage of an entire clause introduced by δὲ. Still irregularities in connexion with δὲ are common in Aristotle's writings (see Bon. Ind. s.v.), and I think, on the whole, that Bekker, Bonitz, Sus., and the rest are right in leaving this awkward sentence as it stands. But a suggestion of Mr. Richards deserves mention, that καὶ should be added after φανερῶν.

6. τῶν τοιούτων, sc. ἔργων. Here ὁ τοιοῦτος does not, as it usually does (Bernays, Zwei Abhandlungen über die Aristotel. Theorie des Drama, p. 27), refer back to something preceding; on the contrary it refers forward to ὁσα τῶν χρησίμων κ.τ.λ. Compare its use in 12,
in c. 6. 1341 a 22 sq., in 3. 17. 1288 a 8, in 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 18, and in 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 19 sqq.

8. Βάναυσον δ' ἐργον κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 6. 1341 a 5 sqq. and see vol. i. p. 111 sqq. Here and in c. 7. 1342 a 22, εἰς δ' ὅσπερ αὐτῶν (i.e. βανάυσων καὶ θητῶν) αἱ ψυχαὶ παρεστραμμέναι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔξως, Aristotle probably has before him Plato, Rep. 495 D, οὗ δὴ ἐφεμενος πολλοὶ ἀτέλεις μὲν τὰς φύσεις, ὡσπὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τε καὶ δημουργιῶν ὅσπερ τὰ σώματα λειώθηται, αὐτῷ καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἔγγυκελαμάχουσι τε καὶ ἀποτελούμενοι διὰ τὰς βαναύσιας τυγχάνουσιν: cp. Laws 831 C, and Xen. Oecon. 4. 2 and 6. 5. As the term μισθαρμοῦτες ἐργασίαι (13) must include the work of the θῆς or day-labourer (cp. i. II. 1258 b 25 sqq., where he is classed among οἱ μισθαρμοῦτες), his work is here described as βαναύσος in addition to that of ὁ βάναυσος τεχνίτης, to which the epithet is more commonly applied. In general, however, the θῆς and the βάναυσος are distinguished (cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 12, βανάυσων καὶ θητῶν: I7, τῶν βάναυσουν καὶ τῶν θητῶν: 21, βιῶν βάναυσουν ἡ θητικῶν: 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 25: 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 27 sqq.: and 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 29, where we have τῶν βανάυσων καὶ μισθαρμοῦτων πλήθος). Indeed, notwithstanding what is said in the passage before us, the distinction reappears in this very Book, for in 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 20 we have βαναυσῶν καὶ θητῶν (cp. 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 13, διόσπερ οὗ τῶν ἐλευθέρων κρίνομεν εἶναι τὴν ἐργασίαν, ἄλλα θητικέρων καὶ βαναυσῶν δὴ συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι, where a difference is implied between θητικός and βάναυσος). Aristotle’s feeling probably was that though the work of οἱ μισθαρμοῦτες deserved to be called βαναυσός on account of its effect on the mind, the work of the βάναυσος τεχνίτης merited the epithet still better, because it injured the body (cp. i. II. 1258 b 37, βαναυσάται δ' (εἰς τῶν ἐργασίων) εὖ αἰς τὰ σώματα λαβῶνται μάλιστα). Καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μάθησιν ι.ε. καὶ βάναυσον τέχνην καὶ μάθησιν εἶναι ταύτην. Φοι τέχνην καὶ μάθησιν, cp. 18, πράττει τις ἡ μανθάνει, and 4 (7). 17. 1337 a 1, πάσα τέχνη καὶ παθεία. Μάθησις is the wider term, for though in one kind of μάθησις the aim is the acquisition of an art (Metaph. Θ. 3. 1046 b 36), in another it is the acquisition of an extent of knowledge falling short of that possessed by the master of an art (c. 5. 1339 a 36–38: Plato, Protag. 312 B). For τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἄρετῆς (where τὰς χρήσεις = τὰς ἐνεργείας, as in 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 38), cp. De An. 2. 4. 415a 18, πρότερον γὰρ εἶτι τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ ἐνεργείαι καὶ αἱ πράξεις κατὰ τῶν λόγων, and Magn. Mor. i. 35. 1197 a 8, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πράξεων οὐκ ἔστω ἄλλο οὖδέν τέλος παρ’ αὐτὴν τὴν πράξιν,
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οίνον παρὰ τὸ καθαρίζειν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο τέλος οὕτω, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τούτῳ τέλος, ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ πράξει. The χρήσεις καὶ πράξεις τῆς ἀρετῆς to which Aristotle refers are probably those of the soldier and citizen (cp. c. 6. 1341 a 7). For τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς cp. c. 1. 1337 a 21.


13. τὰς μισθαρμικάς ἐργασίας. 'Εργασία is a wider term than τέχνη: it is used, for instance, of such occupations as brothel-keeping in Eth. Nic. 4. 3. 1121 b 33. It is not certain what occupations in addition to that of the day-labourer Aristotle intends to include under αἱ μισθαρμικαὶ ἐργασίαι. Does he include the work of a teacher of rhetoric like Isocrates, when done for hire? In Pol. i. ii. 1258 b 25 sqq. μισθαρμία is made to comprise both the μισθαρμία of the βάναυσοι τέχνας and the μισθαρμία of the unskilled θῆς: here, however, the phrase αἱ μισθαρμικαὶ ἐργασίαι is used in a sense exclusive of the βάναυσοι τέχνας. The form μισθαρμικός occurs also in Eth. Eud. 1. 4. 1215 a 31 and Oecon. 1. 2. 1343 a 29, but Plato uses the form μισθαρμητικός in Rep. 346 B, D, and (if the MSS. are right) μισθαρμενικός in Soph. 222 D. See critical note on 1255 b 26.

14. ἀσχολον καὶ ταπεινήν. Leisure was held to give self-confidence (c. 6. 1341 a 28 sqq.), and its absence to make men poor-spirited, because it made them like slaves, who have no leisure (4 (7). 15. 1334 a 20). The epithets θητικός and ταπεινός are interchanged in Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1125 a 1 sq.

15. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐλευθερίων ἐπιστημῶν κ.τ.λ., 'and as to some liberal sciences also, while it is not illiberal to study them up to a certain point, to devote oneself to the study of them in an over-accurate way is bound up with the injurious results already mentioned,' i.e. unfit the body for the pursuits of a soldier and citizen and makes the mind abject. For ἔνοχος in this sense see Liddell and Scott. For the view that there is something illiberal in too close a study of a subject compare the passage from the Erastae ascribed to Plato quoted on 1338 b 32. The study of music has an ill effect when carried too far (c. 6. 1340 b 40 sqq. and 1341 b 10 sqq.: compare Plut. Pericl. c. 1, ὅ δὲ Φίλιππος πρὸς τῶν νιὸν ἐπιτερπῶς ἐν τινὶ πώτῳ ψῆλαντα καὶ τεχνικῶς ἐπινευ, Οὐκ αἰσθητή καλὸς οὔτω ψάλλον;), and also that of gymnastic (c. 4. 1338 b 32 sqq.). Socrates had said that the study of geometry, astronomy, arithmetic, and medicine should not be carried beyond a certain
point by the ordinary citizen (Xen. Mem. 4. 7), and Isocrates says the same thing of astronomy and geometry (De Antid. § 264: cp. [Demosth.] Erot. c. 44), and Plato of γράμματα (Laws 810 B). There were those who said this of philosophy (Plato, Gorg. 487 C), but Aristotle would hardly agree. The Cynics probably inherited the feeling of Socrates on this subject: see as to the Cynic Onesicritus vol. i. p. 112, note 1. Plato, on the other hand, had recommended in the case of a few the advanced study of arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy (Laws 818 A: cp. 967 D); it is not clear whether Aristotle would object to this. The term ἐλευθέρων ἐπιστήμων in its Latin rendering 'liberales artes' had a long subsequent history (see Mr. H. Parker in Eng. Hist. Rev. vol. v. p. 417 sqq.). The Index Aristotelicus gives no other instance of its occurrence in Aristotle's writings.

17. έχει δὲ κ.τ.λ. This repeats with added details 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 6 sqq. Aristotle is preparing the way for his recommendation that boys shall be taught to sing and play: many regarded playing as χειρουργία (c. 6. 1340 b 20) and as fraught with βανουσία (1340 b 40 sqq.: cp. Plato, Symp. 203 A). But the singing and playing which Aristotle enjoins will be αὐτῶν χάριν and δι' ἄρετήν (c. 6. 1341 b 8 sqq. and 1340 b 42).

19. τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν χάριν ἢ φιλῶν ἢ δι' ἄρετήν οὐκ ἀνελευθερον. As to αὐτῶν χάριν see note on 1277 b 5, and cp. Rhet. 3. 18. 1419 b 7 sqq., and Metaph. A. 2. 982 b 25, ὥστε ἄνθρωπος φαμεν ἐλευθερός ὁ αὐτῶν ἔνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλον ὄν, σώτω καὶ αὐτή μόνη ἐλευθέρα οὕσα τῶν ἐπιστήμων μόνῃ γὰρ αὐτῆ αὐτῆς ἕνεκι ἐστὶν. When Odysseus builds a ship (Hom. Odyssey. 5. 243 sqq.), it is for himself. As to φιλῶν, cp. Plato, Laws 919 D, Μαγνήτην ... μήτε κἀπέλει ἐκὸν μηδὲ ἄκων μηδεῖς γνεῖστο ὑμτε' ἐμπορος μήτε διακοινάω μηδ' Ἕρτινα κεκτημένοι θεώταις τοῖς μὴ ἔξου ἐπιτοφ, πλὴν πατρὶ καὶ μητρὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐπὶ τούτον εἰς τὸ ἄνω γένεσι καὶ πάσι τοῖς αὐτῶν προσβοτέρας, ὥσοι ἐλευθεροὶ ἐλευθέρως, and Symp. 184 B–C: cp. also Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1124 b 31, καὶ (μεγαλο-ψύχου) πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν ἄλλ' ἢ πρὸς φιλῶν δουλικὸν γάρ. See also the story told by Plutarch of Favonius and Pompey (quoted above on 1333 a 6). For δι' ἄρετήν, cp. c. 6. 1341 b 10 sqq. (which also illustrates δι' ἄλλους, 20), and Plato, Symp. 185 A sq.

20. As to αὐτὸ τοῦτο and as to the displacement of πολλάκις, which belongs to διάειται ἂν, see critical note, and cp. Plato, Rep. 358 D, περὶ γὰρ τίνος ἄν μᾶλλον πολλάκις τοῖς νοῦν ἐξων χαίροι λέγουν καὶ
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akoúon; where polliakés belongs to λέγων καὶ akoúon. For the conjunction of θητικῶν and δουλικῶν, cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1125 a 1 sq.

21. ai μὲν οὖν καταβεβλημέναι νῦν μαθήσεις κ.τ.λ., 'the studies now commonly known and in use' (literally 'made public property'), 'as has been said before' (in c. 2. 1337 a 39), 'point in two directions,' i.e. they may be used in support of the view that useful subjects should be studied, or in support of the view that subjects tending to promote virtue should be studied (see note on 1337 a 39). For ai καταβεβλημέναι νῦν μαθήσεις, cp. c. 3. 1338 a 36 and Plato, Soph. 232 D, τὰ γε μὴν περὶ πασῶν τε καὶ κατὰ μίαν ἐκάστην τέχνην, καὶ δὲι πρὸς ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν τῶν δημοσίων ἀντιπεψιν, δεδημοσιωμένα ποιο καταβεβλημένη γεγραμένα τῷ βουλαμένῳ μαθεῖν ('publice deposita sunt,' Stallbaum, who adds 'verbum καταβαλλειν propric dicitur de iiis quae deponuntur in tabulario publico, veluti leges, testimonia, alia monumenta litteris consignata'). For ἐπαμφοτερίζονσιν, see note on 1332 a 42.

C. 3. 23. ἄστι δὲ τέταρτα σχεδον κ.τ.λ. 'Usually three, γραφική being omitted,' as Eaton remarks, who refers to Plato, Protag. 325 D–326 C (where children are described as going successively to teachers of γράμματα, teachers of harp-playing, and παιδοτρίζαι), and Theag. 122 E. We see from Protag. 325 E sqq. that in learning γράμματα children learnt passages of epic poetry by heart, and that in learning harp-playing they learnt to sing to the harp passages of lyrical poetry, so that the study of poetry entered into the study both of γράμματα and of harp-playing. That the study of γράμματα included learning to write, we see from Laws 810 B. It is remarkable that arithmetic is not mentioned: Sus.4 takes the elements of arithmetic to be included under γράμματα, but does not give any passage in support of this view. According to Blümner (Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., p. 111), arithmetical instruction at Athens was given at home, not at school; this may possibly be the reason why nothing is said about it.

24. καὶ τέταρτον ἐνοι γραφικῆν. Plato had learnt drawing (Diog. Laert. 3. 5) long before Pamphilus of Amphipolis (the teacher of Apelles, who was a contemporary of Philip and Alexander) had made the study fashionable first at Sicyon and then throughout Greece (Plin. Nat. Hist. 35. 76 sqq.: see Overbeck, Ant. Schriften, p. 330, and Brunn, Gesch. der grie. Künstler 2. 134 sqq.). Γραφική probably includes painting as well as drawing. Aristotle says nothing of sculpture.
25. *τὴν μὲν γραμματικὴν κ.τ.λ.* Charondas had insisted on the many uses served by *γραμματική*; cp. Diod. 12. 13. 1, *τὴν γὰρ γραμματικὴν παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας μαθῆσεις προέκρυπν ὁ νομοθέτης*, καὶ μάλα προσηκόντως διὰ γὰρ ταύτης τὰ πλείστα καὶ χρησιμότατα τῶν πρὸς τὸν βίον ἐπιτελείσθαι, ψύφους, ἐπιστολὰς, διαθήκας, νόμους, τῶλλα τὰ τῶν βιῶν μᾶλλον ἐπανορθοῦντα, and Eurip. Fragm. 582, which is so similar in effect to the passage of Diodorus that one is inclined to ask whether Euripides had the words of Charondas before him. Cp. also 1338 a 15 sqq.

26. *τὴν δὲ γνωμαστικὴν κ.τ.λ.* So thought the Lacedaemonians (c. 4. 1338 b 11 sqq.), and also Aristippus (Diog. Laert. 2. 91).

27. *τὴν δὲ μοσικὴν ἣδη διαπορήσειεν ἂν τις, ἓν τις, ὁ δὲ γνώμῃς καὶ ἐν τῷ μέν ἄπορον τῶν ἐφαπτομέθα τινα τρόπον.* That Plato gives a wider meaning to *μοσική* than Aristotle does, we have seen in vol. i. p. 405. Both agree that *μοσική* is concerned with *μελοποιία* (c. 7. 1341 b 23 sqq.: Gorg. 449 D), but while to Plato (Rep. 308 D) a μέλος consists of λόγος ἁμοια and μυθός, Aristotle distinguishes *μελοποιία* and λέξις (Poet. 6. 1. 1449 b 33 sqq., 1450 a 13 sqq.).


29. *μετέχουσιν αὐτής, 'learn it,' cp. c. 2. 1337 b 6 sqq., and see note on 1339 a 14.

οἱ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, cp. 1338 a 14, οἱ πρότεροι, and Probl. 30. 11. 956 b 16, διὰ τί οἱ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τῆς μὲν κατὰ τὸ σώμα ἁγωνίας ἀδών τι προσταζαν, σοφίας δὲ οὐδεὶν ἱδοκαν; έταξαν ἐν παιδείᾳ, cp. 1338 a 14, εἰς παιδείαν έταξαν.

30. *τὴν φύσιν αὐτήν ζητεῖν κ.τ.λ.* For the phrase cp. Hist. An. 9. 12. 615 a 25, ἡ γὰρ φύσις αὐτή ζητεῖ τὸ πρόσφορον, and Eth. Nic. 8. 6. 1157 b 16. Aristotle has not said before that Nature aims at this, but he has implied it in 2. 9. 1271 a 41 sqq. and 4 (7). 14. 1334 a 2 sqq., passages in which he points out the disastrous consequences to the Lacedaemonian State of a forgetfulness of this.
31. For the place of ψύνασθαι cp. c. 5. 1339 b 1, and see note on 1281 a 26.

32. αὐτὴ γάρ ἄρχῃ πάντων, Lamb. 'hoc enim omnium rerum agendarum principium est.' With Sus. I take Aristotle to refer in αὐτῇ to σχολάζειν δύνασθαι καλῶς, not to Nature (as Vict., Schn., and others). For the attraction of the pronoun into the gender of the predicate, cp. (with Sus.'4) 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 41. For the phrase, cp. Plato, Phaedr. 237 B, peri παντός, δω παῖ, μία ἄρχη τοῖς μέλλουσι καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι, eisēna deis peri oũ an ἢ ἡ βουλή, ἢ παντός ἀμαρτάνειν ἄναγκη.

πάλιν, for the lesson has already been taught in 4 (7). 14. 1334 a 2 sqq.

33. εἰ γάρ ἀμφω μὲν δει κ.τ.λ. Γάρ introduces a justification of ἵνα καὶ πᾶλιν εἰσόμεν περὶ αὐτῆς. With δεὶ supply ἔχειν. For the thought cp. 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 16 sqq. The answer which is gradually given to the question in what activities leisure should be spent is, as we shall see, 'in activities desirable for their own sake.'

34. καὶ τέλος, 'and is its end': cp. 4. (7). 15. 1334 a 14 sqq. Mr. Welldon has anticipated me in retaining τέλος and placing a comma after it.


τέλος γάρ κ.τ.λ., 'for then, [as leisure is the end of life,] play would necessarily be to us the end of life.' Sus. would read in place of ἀναγκαίον either ἄν ἀναγκαίον (Schn. had proposed ἄν ὣν ἀναγκαίον, vol. ii. p. 452) or ἀναγκαίον ὣν (with Spengel), but perhaps ἄν ἔνθα may be supplied with ἀναγκαίον: cp. Xen. Oecon. 3. 13 and 4. 15. It seems to me more natural to supply ἄν εἴη than ἐςτίν. Many made play the end of life: cp. c. 5. 1339 b 31 sqq., and Ephor. Fragm. 82 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 259), ἐφορος ἐν πέμπτῳ φησὶν ὅτι Τιμαρρην καὶ τὸ πάζεων καὶ τὸ γελᾶν εἰς ἔξηλωκότες καὶ μεγίστην εὐδαμονίαν τοῦτο νομίζουν. A graffito on a pavement-slab of the forum of Thannyas or Timegad in Algeria runs 'venari lavari ludere ridere—oc est vivere' (Prof. Sayce, Algerian Notes, Academy, No. 780, April 16, 1887, p. 279).

39. τὸ δ' ἀσχολεῖν συμβαίνει μετὰ πόνου καὶ συντονίας. Cp. Rhet. 1. 11. 1370a 11, τὰς δ' ἐπιμελείας καὶ τὰς σπουδάς καὶ τὰς συντονίας λυπηράς.

41. καιροφυλακοῦντας τὴν χρήσιν. Pastime should be used ἐν ταῖς ἀσχολίαις, as a relief after toil (cp. 37).

ὡς προσόγνωστας φαρμακείας χάριν. A drug differs from an article of daily food, in that it is only for occasional use: cp. Oecon. 1. 5. 1344 b 10, ἐπεθεωροῦντας ὅτι ἡ τροφή οὐ φάρμακον διὰ τὸ συνεχές, and Top. 2. 11. 115 b 26, πάλιν ποτὲ μὲν συμφέρει φαρμάκευσθαι, οἷον ὅταν νοσή, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ. For the medical use of the word προσόγνειν cp. Plut. De Adulatore et Amico, c. 28, ὁ δὲ παρρησίαν καὶ δημού ἀνθρώπων δυστυχοῦντι προσόγνην, ὃσπερ ἰδιορικῶν ὑμματί παρασσομένῳ καὶ φλεγμαίνουσιν; θεραπεύει μὲν οὖν οὖν ἀφαίρετο τοῦ λυποῦσθαι, ὀργήν δὲ τῇ λύπῃ προστίθησαι καὶ παραξύνει τὸν ἀνιώμενον.

42. ἀνείς γάρ κ.τ.λ., 'for the movement of the soul to which we have referred' (that involved in play) 'is [remedial in character, for it is] a relaxation of strain and a remission because of the pleasure which accompanies it, [and only in place at times when there is strain].' For κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς, cp. Rhet. 1. 11. 1369 b 33, ὑποκείσθω δ' ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν ἑδονῆς κίνησιν τινα τῆς ψυχῆς κ.τ.λ. and Plato, Laws 896 E sq.

1. τὸ δὲ σχολᾶξειν κ.τ.λ., 'but taking leisure [unlike working] is 1338 a. thought to have in itself pleasure and happiness and blissful life, [so that it does not need to be helped out with play, and we should not spend leisure in play].'

3. τὸ ὅτε δ' οὖ κ.τ.λ., 'and this' (i.e. happiness) 'does not belong to those who work, but [only] to those who are at leisure, for he who works works for the sake of some end as having it not, but happiness is an end, inasmuch as all think that it is conjoined not with pain but with pleasure, [and therefore, as he has not the end, he has not happiness]).' That things conjoined with pleasure were commonly regarded as ends, we see from Rhet. 1. 7. 1364 b 23–25. Aristotle's object in adding this remark is to point out that not only does leisure bring happiness with it, but that work does not; he thus prepares the way for the distinction which he proceeds to draw in 11 sqq. between studies which are preparatory for work and studies which are preparatory for leisure, the former being, like work, a means to an end, and the latter, like leisure, desirable for their own sake and an end in themselves. Sus. reads τῷ ὅτε γάρ in place of τῷ ὅτε δ', but in this Mr. Welldon does not follow him, and rightly, for τῷ ὅτε δ' οὖ κ.τ.λ. does not contain the proof that leisure is thought to have in it pleasure and happiness, but an added
statement carrying matters further. For ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀσχολῶν ἐνεκά τινος ἀσχολεὶ τέλος ὡς οὖχ ὑπάρχοντος, cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 b 17, αὐταί δ’ (i. e. αἱ πολιτικαὶ καὶ πολεμικαὶ πράξεις) ἀσχολοὶ καὶ τέλοι τινὸς ἐφίενται καὶ οὗ δὲ αὐτᾶς αἱρετά εἶσων.

7. ταὐτην μὲν τὴν ἡδονήν κ. τ. λ., ’but [here their agreement ceases, for] all do not find the pleasure which accompanies happiness in the same pleasure.’ Cp. Plato, Laws 658 E (quoted below on 1339 b 33), and Gorg. 448 C, ἐκάστων δὲ τούτων μεταλαμβάνουσιν ἄλλοι ἄλλον ἄλλος, τῶν δὲ ἀρίστων οἱ ἄριστοι.

8. For καθ’ ἐαυτοῦς ἔκαστος καὶ τὴν ἓξιν τὴν αὐτῶν, where we expect ἑαυτὸν and αὐτοῦ, cp. Plato, Gorg. 503 E, ὁσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες δημοφυγοὶ βλέποντες πρὸς τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἐκαστός οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐκλεγόμενος προσφέρει ἀ προσφέρει πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὐτοῦ κ. τ. λ.

9. ὢστε φανερῶν κ. τ. λ., ’and so, [as leisure is the end], it is evident,’ etc. Καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολῆν, ’with a view to leisure spent in noble enjoyment also,’ as well as with a view to work. For τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολῆν, cp. c. 7. 1342 a 31, τῆς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατριβής. It is obviously strange that we should have τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολῆν here and τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγῆν in 21, and it is possible that τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολῆν is a simple blunder, and that we should read τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγῆν (with Cor.) in place of it. But Sus., following Prof. Postgate (Notes, p. 15), leaves the text as it stands, and I incline on the whole to do so too, though Bonitz adds a query to the words (Ind. 741 a 40) and Jackson would omit σχολῆν as an interpolation and understand ἡδονήν (Sus. † ad loc.). For looking to 1337 b 31, σχολάζειν δύνασθαι καλῶς, and 1338 a 1, τὸ σχολάζειν (cp. 4 (7). 14. 1334 a 9), we expect that the conclusion drawn in 1338 a 9 sqq. will be that it is well to study with a view to taking leisure, or taking leisure nobly, and τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολῆν, ’leisure spent nobly in diagogê,’ comes nearer to this than τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγῆν. Not leisure spent anyhow, but leisure spent in diagogê is the end with a view to which Aristotle claims that study should be especially pursued. The words τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἀσχολίαν (12) also, as Postgate points out, require πρὸς τὴν σχολήν, and not πρὸς τὴν διαγωγήν, as their antithesis. For μαθήμαν ἢτα καὶ παιδεύεσθαι, cp. Theophil. Κηθαρφόδος Φραγμ. (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 628), μέγας

δησαυρός ἐστι καὶ βέβαιος μονικὴ
ἀπαντὸ τοῖς μαθοῦσι παιδευθεῖσι τε.

Μαθήμαται is to learn, παιδεύεσθαι to be trained by another.
For the repetition of the pronoun in ταύτα...ταύτας see note on 1317 b 5.

12. τάς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἀσχολίαν κ.τ.λ., 'and that studies preparatory for work are pursued as necessary and as being for the sake of other things.'

13. διὸ, 'hence,' i.e. because it is right that studies which contribute to the enjoyment of leisure should find a place in education.

15. ὁσπερ τὰ γράμματα κ.τ.λ. See note on 1337 b 25.

16. καὶ πρὸς μάθησιν, 'and for the acquisition of knowledge': cp. 39 sq. and Isocr. Panath. § 209, ὥστε γράμματα μαθαίνουσιν, ἀ τηλικάτην ἔχει δύναμιν ὧστε τούς ἐπισταμένους καὶ χρωμένους αὐτοίς μὴ μόνον ἐμπείρους γίγνεσθαι τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς ἡλικίας τῆς αὐτῶν πρακτικῶν ἄλλα καὶ τῶν πώποτε γεομέτρων.

17. δοκεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Learning to draw was evidently held by many to make men skilful in the purchase of works of art, furniture, and equipments of all kinds (1338 a 40 sqq.).

19. πρὸς ὁγίειαν καὶ ἀλήθη, 'for health and prowess in battle.' Not every one would agree with Aristotle that learning music does not produce military prowess in the learner: cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 21, μουσικώτατος γὰρ ᾧμα καὶ πολεμικώτατος ἀποφαίνουσιν αὐτοῖς κ.τ.λ.: Athen. Deipn. 626 f, τὸ δ' ἀρχαῖον ἢ μουσικὴ ἐπὶ ἀνδρείαν προ- τροπή ἢν κ.τ.λ.: Plut. De Musica c. 26. And if the study of music does not produce health, listening to music was thought by Theophrastus to cure some diseases (Athen. Deipn. 624 a); indeed, a plague was thought to have been stayed at one time at Sparta by the Cretan musician Thaletas (Plut. De Mus. c. 42).

21. λείπεται τοῖνυν κ.τ.λ., 'it remains therefore that music is useful for rational enjoyment in leisure.' Aristotle has shown that the study of music is not useful for purposes connected with work, like learning to read and write and to draw, nor productive of bodily advantages useful for work, like gymnastic; hence he concludes that it is useful for leisure. He omits to inquire at present whether it is not productive of moral and intellectual virtues useful for work; we shall find later on that it is (c. 5. 1340 a 18 sqq.). This somewhat invalidates the conclusion which he arrives at here.

22. εἰς ὁπερ κ.τ.λ., 'into which they do in fact evidently introduce it.' Καὶ φαίνονται, i.e. not only may be inferred to introduce it, but manifestly do so: cp. καὶ συμβαίνειν in 2. 3. 1262 a 18 sq.

L 1 2
NOTES.

For ὅπερ, not ὅπερ, see Bon. Ind. 484 b 5, where Hist. An. 2. 17. 508 b 13, ἀναδιπλώσων ἔχει, ὃ ἀναλύεται εἰς ἐν, is referred to, and Vahlen on Poet. 3. 1448 a 24 (‘Aristotelem nemo nescit usum neutrius valde adamasse’) and 4. 1449 a 7. Aristotle takes no notice of the use of music in the worship of the gods.

ἡν γὰρ κτ.λ., ‘for they give it a place in that which they think is the form of rational enjoyment appropriate to the free’ (i.e. feasting), and therefore appropriate to those who are at leisure, for leisure belongs to freemen: cp. 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 20, οὗ σχολῆ δοῦλος. Aristotle would hardly agree with their view that banqueting is ἡ ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγή (see note on 1333 a 35). In c. 5. 1339 a 16 sqq. he treats conviviality (μέθη) as a means of relaxation, not as διαγωγή.

24. διόπερ ὁμηρος κτ.λ. Aristotle has before him Hom. Odys. 17. 382,

τὸς γὰρ δὴ ξείνων καλεῖ ἀλλοθεν αὐτὸς ἑπελθὼν
ἀλλὸν γ', εἰ μὴ τῶν οἳ δημοσεργοί ἔστει,
μάντιν ἢ ἔτηρα κακῶν ἢ τέκτων δούρων,
ἠ καὶ θέσπιν αἰοίδων, ὃ κεν τέρπησιν ἄείδων;

but the line first quoted by him, ἀλλ' οἶνον κτ.λ., finds no place in our text, any more than it does, as Sus.4 points out, in Plato, Rep. 389 D. 'Αείδων also takes the place of ἀπαντας in our texts (Sus.2, Note 997). Probably we should read μόνον in place of μὲν in ἀλλ' οἶνον κτ.λ. I take Aristotle's text to have been—

τὸς γὰρ δὴ ξείνων καλεῖ ἀλλοθεν αὐτὸς ἑπελθὼν,
ἀλλ' οἶνον μόνον ἔστι καλεῖ ἐπὶ δαίτα θαλείη,
μάντιν ἢ ἔτηρα κακῶν ἢ τέκτων δούρων,
οἷ καλέουσιν ἀείδων, ὃ κεν τέρπησιν ἀπαντας;

It is just possible that οἷ in 26 is a false reading for καὶ, but there is no absolute necessity for any change. Spengel, followed by Sus., reads ὅσο καλοῦσιν or ὃι καλοῦται in place of ὃι καλέουσιν, and regards these words as not forming part of the quotation, but the form of the word καλέουσιν seems to show that it is quoted from Homer. As to the differences between our text of Homer and Aristotle's quotations, see note on 1285 a 12. For the use of music at banquets, cp. Hom. Odys. 1. 152. Aristoxenus gave a fanciful reason for it, quite different to that given here (Plut. De Musica, c. 43: Aristox. Fragm. 91 in Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 291: cp. Plato, Tim. 47 D).
27. καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δὲ κ.τ.λ. Hom. Odys. 9. 5 sqq. For (ὁ) ἕνθεσθε see critical note.
32. πότερον δὲ κ.τ.λ. This promise is not fulfilled in the Politics as we have it: see vol. ii. p. xxviii sq.
33. καὶ πῶς, ‘and how they are to be studied’: cp. c. 2. 1337 a 34 sq.
34. For the needless addition of περὶ αὐτῶν, cp. περὶ αὐτῆς, c. 5. 1339 a 15.
νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν εἶναι πρὸ ὀδοὺ γέγονεν. Two different views have been taken of the construction of this sentence. Some have regarded τοσοῦτον εἶναι πρὸ ὀδοῦ as an accusative and infinitive dependent on γέγονεν, as in Luke 16. 22, ἐγένετο δὲ ἀποθανεῖν τῶν πτωχῶν, and Acts 21. 1 and 22. 17 (referred to by Hermann ad Viger. p. 231 note, cp. p. 749); the translation will then be, ‘but now it has happened that thus much profit has accrued to us.’ Others have taken τοσοῦτον εἶναι together in the sense of ‘to this extent at least,’ εἶναι being used as in such phrases as κατὰ τὸῦτο εἶναι (Plato, Protag. 317 A, where Stallbaum renders ‘quantum quidem ad hoc attinet’: see his note and Ast, Lex. Platon. i. 625). Göttling, who refers to Lobeck, Phryn. p. 275, Stahr in his edition of the Politics, and Sus. appear to understand the passage thus. The translation will then be, ‘but now to this extent at least we have profited.’ I should prefer the second of these two interpretations if εἶναι followed τοσοῦτον immediately without the interposition of ἡμῖν. In support of the first interpretation it may be noted that in Plato, Rep. 397 B we have γέγενται λέγειν (Richards), and in Xen. Oecon. 17. 3, γέγενται ὁμοοείν (sc. πάντας τοὺς ἀνθρώπους): see also Xen. Cyrop. 5. 2. 12. There is a further difference as to the meaning of πρὸ ὀδοῦ, Sus. translating the sentence ‘für jetzt steht uns vorläufig nur so viel fest,’ and Welldon, ‘at present however we have advanced so far as to see that,’ etc., where ‘vorläufig’ and ‘advanced’ seem to represent πρὸ ὀδοῦ. My own rendering has been suggested by the meaning assigned to the word by Liddell and Scott.
35. δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων κ.τ.λ., ‘that from the ancients also’ (cp. 1337 b 29, οἱ ἐκ ἀρχῆς) ‘we have a testimony derived from the established studies [that there are subjects which should be taught the young not as necessary but as liberal and noble].’ The ancients are regarded by Aristotle as the authors of the established curriculum.
37. τοῦτο, 'this fact,' i.e. that we have the testimony of the ancients to this effect.

εἰτὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν χρησίμων ὤτι κ.τ.λ. Supply again τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν εἰναι πρὸ ὀδού γέγονεν. Οἶνον τὴν τῶν γραμμάτων μάθησιν is added in illustration of τῶν χρησίμων τινά. Παθένεσθαι is middle, as in c. 2. 1337 a 35. Τὸ χρήσιμον πρὸ τοῦ βίου is contrasted with τὸ πρὸς μάθησιν συντείνων: compare the contrast in Plato, Rep. 527 A between studies pursued πραξεος ἑνεκα and γνώσεως ἑνεκα. As to ἡ τῶν γραμμάτων μάθησις cp. Menand. Monost. 657, διπλῶν ὄρασιν οἱ μαθῶτες γράμματα.


1338 b. 1. We expect ἄλλα or ἄλλα μάλλον in place of ἡ μάλλον, but ἡ μάλλον is substituted as less dogmatic, and partly also perhaps because ἄλλα has been used in the preceding line. "Η 'modeste affirmantis est' (Bon. Ind. 312 b 57 sqq.: cp. Trendelenburg on De An. 1. 1. 403 b 8). In 3. 1. 1275 a 25 and 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 28 ἡ takes the place of δι'.

ποιεῖ θεωρητικόν, cp. c. 7. 1342 b 26, βακχιστῶν γὰρ ἡ γε μέθη ποιεῖ μάλλον. We expect θεωρητικῶν rather than θεωρητικόν, but compare the change from the singular to the plural in c. 6. 1341 b 10–15 (ὁ πρᾶττων, βαναύσους). Θεωρητικόν, 'a scientific observer' (Weldon).

τοῦ περὶ τὰ σῶματα κάλλους. Cp. Plato, Symp. 210 B, τὸ ἐπὶ πάσι τοῖς σώμασι κάλλος, and Critias 112 E, οὐτοι μὲν οὐν δὴ... ἐπὶ πάσαν ἔριστον καὶ 'Ἀσίαν κατὰ τὰ σωμάτων κάλλη καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ψυχῶν παντοίων ἀρετὴν ἐξομολογήσει τὸ ἡγαν καὶ ὄνομαστότατοι πάντων τῶν τότε. Aristotle probably would not go so far as Diotima in Plato, Symp. 210 sq., as to the results of studying τὸ ἐπὶ πάσι τοῖς σώμασι κάλλος, but he apparently holds that the study of drawing helps to make men capable of diagógê. We note that he says nothing of landscape beauty, or of the use of drawing in cultivating a perception of it. In τὰ σώματα he no doubt refers mainly to the bodies of animals,
and especially of human beings (cp. τῶν σωμάτων in c. 4. 1338 b 11). As to Aristotle’s value for beauty, cp. Lucian, De Saltat. c. 70, κάλλους δὲ προνοιών καὶ τῆς εἰ τοίς ὀρχήσασιν εἰμιρφίας, τί ἅλλο ἃ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ἐπιληθέει, τὸ κάλλος ἐπαινοῦστος καὶ μέρος τρίτων ἰγνώμενον τάγαθον καὶ τούτῳ εἶναι; (I do not notice that this dictum is included in Rose’s collection of the Fragments of Aristotle, ed. 2, 1886.) For the phrase τοῦ περὶ τὰ σώματα κάλλους, cp. 4 (7). 5. 1326 b 34, τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εἰπορίας, and 1327 a 8, τῆς περὶ ξύλα ὄλης, and see note in Sus.4

3. τοῖς μεγαλοφύσιοι καὶ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις. Cp. Plut. De Amicorum Multitudine, c. 6 sub fin., τοῖς ἐλευθέροις καὶ γενναίοις, and Isocr. Asep. § 43, τοῖς ἐλευθέροις τεθραμμένοι καὶ μεγαλοφονεῖν εἰδισμένοις. These passages show that there is no occasion to change ἐλευθέροις into ἐλευθέροιοι, as Sus. is half inclined to do. As to the μεγαλοφύσιος, cp. (with Eaton and Congreve) Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1125 a 11 sq.


6. δὴ λοι ἐκ τούτων κ.τ.λ. In beginning the study of γυμναστική and παιδοτριβική at seven, Aristotle follows with some variation in the track of Plato, Laws 794 C, πρὸς δὲ τὰ μαθήματα τρέσεσθαι χρεών ἐκατέρως (after the completion of the sixth year), τούς μὲν ἄρρητας ἐφ’ ἵππων διδασκάλους καὶ τὸξων καὶ ἀκοντίων καὶ σφενδονήσεως κ.τ.λ. In the Republic, on the other hand, μονική seems to precede γυμναστική (403 C, μετὰ δὴ μονικῆν γυμναστικῆ θρεπτείοι οἱ νεανίαι: see Stallbaum on Protag. 326 B). At Athens boys began their studies by learning to read and write (aet. 7—11); at about eleven they were sent to a harp-player to learn the harp; how early their gymnastic studies began is uncertain (Blümner, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans. pp. 111—115). Aristotle postpones learning to read and write and learning to sing and play till puberty (c. 4. 1339 a 4 sq.) and puts the boys in charge of gymnastic trainers and παιδοτριβαί from seven till puberty. Till puberty they are to receive no literary training. His scheme of training resembles the Lacedaemonian more than the Athenian, but it avoids imposing on boys the severe physical toil imposed on them at Sparta, and it gives up three years after puberty to the exclusive study of subjects other than gymnastic. We may be quite sure that no young Spartan was permitted to drop gymnastic for three years.

7. τούτων γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 16 sqq., where it is implied that γυμναστική imparts a certain bodily ἔξος and that παιδοτριβική imparts ἐπιστήμην τῶν περὶ τὴν ἀγωνίαν. Cp. also Eth. Nic. 5.
15. 1138 a 31, εὐεκτικὸν δὲ ἐν γυμναστικῇ, and Isocr. De Antid. § 183, οἱ μὲν παιδοτρίβαι τὰ σχήματα τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀγωνίαν εὑρήμενα τοὺς φοιτῶντας διδάσκοντον: also 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 42, χειρο[χειρ] δε (ὁ δήμος) καὶ παιδοτρίβας αὐτοῖς δύο καὶ διδασκάλους [οί] τινες ὀπλομυχεῖν καὶ τοξεύειν καὶ ἀκοντίζειν κ[αί] καταπέλτην ἀφινέα διδάσκοντος, and Plato, Gorg. 456 E, τοὺς παιδοτρίβας καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὀπλοῖς διδάσκοντας μάχεσθαι. But of course the παιδοτρίβης would teach boys of seven only easy accomplishments, such as shooting with the bow and throwing the dart. In Plato, Gorg. 451 E sq. and 452 B, however (cp. 504 A), the business of the παιδοτρίβης is said to be to produce physical beauty and strength.

C. 4. 9. Νῦν μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν has apparently nothing to answer to it in the sequel; the answering clause would have run, if it had not been suppressed, ‘but we must take quite a different course.’ Little is said by Aristotle in conflation of the first of the two errors here referred to, probably because it was generally felt to be an error, but the second is dealt with at some length, because the Lacedaemonian training still stood high in common opinion. Phocion, for instance, sent his son to Sparta to undergo the training (Plut. Phoc. c. 20). The late Mr. Mark Pattison notes in his copy of Stahr’s edition of the Politics on 1338 b 9–19, ‘Respicit hic locus ad Plat. Rep. libr. iii. et speciatim ad pag. 410 D.’

10. αἱ μὲν ἀθλητικὴν ἔξων ἐμποιοῦσι. The Thebans are referred to (vol. i. p. 357, note 2: cp. also Plut. Sympos. 2. 5. 2, ὡθυμοῖς τε χρήσθαι καὶ περιτροπαῖς ἀλλήλων, ὃ δὴ μάλιστα φασίν ἐν Δεικτοῖς τοὺς Σπαρταῖτας ὑπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων παλαιστρικῶν ἄντων καταβιβαθμαί), and also probably the Argives: cp. Aristophon, Ιατρός (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 357).

deὶ των ἂρασθαί μέσον
tῶν παροικοῦντων, παλαιστὴν νόμισον Ἀργείων μ. ὀρᾶν,

and see Meineke’s note. The Cynic Diogenes agreed with Aristotle in objecting to this kind of training (Diog. Laert. 6. 30, ἔστω ἐν τῇ παλαιστρᾷ οὐκ ἐπέτρεπε τῷ παιδοτρίβῃ ἀθλητικόν ἔγεν (τοὺς παιδας τοῦ Ξενίδου), ἀλλ’ αὐτοῦ ἐρυθήματος χάριν καὶ εἰδέειας). Cp. also Julian, Or. 1. 10 D sq. It is to the habit of body characteristic of athletes that Aristotle objects, not to the practice of athletic exercises; the Spartan training included the latter, for instance boxing (cp. Plato, Protag. 342 B sq.), but it did not produce ἡ ἀθλητική ἔξως. In 4 (7). 17. 1336 a 6 we have τὴν πολεμικὴν ἔξων. 'Ἀθλητικήν, being placed before ἔξω, is emphatic.
λωβώμεναι τὰ τε εἴδικα καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν τῶν σωμάτων. Cp. De Gen. An. 4. 3. 768 b 29, οἶον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀθλητῶν συμβαίνει διὰ τὴν πολυφαγίαν. διὰ πλῆθος γὰρ τροφῆς οὐ δυναμένης τῆς φύσεως κρατεῖν, ὡστ' ἀνάλογον αὔξειν καὶ διαμείνῃς ὁμοίως τὴν μορφήν, ἄλλοια γίνεται τὰ μέρη, καὶ σχεδὸν εὖ οὕτως ὡστε μηδὲν εὐκείναι τῷ πρότερον, and Plutarch’s language about Aratus, ἐπιφυσάται δ' ἀμέλει καὶ ταῖς εἰκόναις ἀθλητικὴ τις ἑιδα, καὶ τὸ συννέτο τοῦ προσώπου καὶ βασιλικὸν οὐ παντάπασιν ἀρένται τὴν ἀθημα- γίαν καὶ τὸ σκαφέιόν (Arat. c. 3). The excessive labour exacted from athletes would also tell on their physical growth, no less than the excessive amount of food they took: cp. Isocr. Ad Demon. § 12, τὰ μὲν γὰρ σώματα τοῖς συμμέτροις πόνοις, ἢ δὲ ψυχῆ τοῖς σπουδαίοις λόγοις αὔξεσθαι πέρφυκε.

12. θηριώδεις δ' ἀπεργάζονται τοῖς πόνοις, ὡς τούτο πρὸς ἀνδρείαν μάλιστα συμφέρον. Τούτῳ ὡστ' ἐκ τοῦ τροφικοῦ καὶ τοῦ φυσικοῦ ἐναρκτεί συνομιλοῦσιν πόνους. So Pericles says of the Spartans (Thuc. 2. 39. 2), καὶ ἐν ταῖς παιδείαις οἱ μὲν ἐπιστόμω άσκήσει εὐθὺς νέοι ὡστε τὸ ἀνδρείον μεταχείρονται, and Ephorus of the Cretans (Fragm. 64 Müller, ap. Strab. p. 480), πρὸς δὲ τὸ μῆ 2. ἀνδρείαν ἐναρκτεί συναρκτεί συνεπειφές, καὶ τοὺς πόνους καὶ τοὺς πόνους ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὸ σκαφέιον. The Spartans were renowned for their austerity, and their physical culture was highly esteemed.

Hippocrates shared the view that hard physical labour produces courage (De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 565 Kühn), καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μὲν καὶ μὲν ἡσυχίας καὶ μαθήματι ἡ δείκνυται ἀνδρεία, καὶ δὲ τὴς ταλαιπωρίας καὶ τῶν πόνων ταῖς ἁμιττέναι καὶ πρὸς τὸ ταλαιπωροῦν τὸν ἀνδροῦν εὖ περικοῦν. Hippocrates regarded the Spartans as the reverse of the ἑρμωδείς, for he says of Dercyllidas (Fragm. 130 Müller), ἂν γὰρ οὖνν εἰ τῷ τρόπῳ λακωνικὸν οὖν ἐπὶ οὐδὲν ἔχων, ἀλλὰ πολὺ τὸ πανοῦργον καὶ τὸ ἱθωδές. Διὸ καὶ Σκίθον αὕτων οἱ Λακεδαιμόνοι προσηγόρεουν.


15. πρὸς μίαν, sc. ταύτην (Ridgeway). ‘The extraordinary position of μάλιστα is probably due to the position of μίαν’ (Richards). The sentence, if completed, would run, oüte πρὸς μίαν ταύτην oüte πρὸς μάλιστα ταύτην. See Kühner, Ausfuhrl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 452. 1 a.
NOTES.

16. τοῦτο, i. e. τὸ πρὸς ταύτην.
17. οὗτε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. It has not been noticed, so far as I am aware, that Aristotle tacitly corrects a saying ascribed to Anacharsis in Diod. 9. 26. 3, ὃ δὲ Κροίος . . . ἥρωτησεν 'Ανάχαρσιν . . . τῶν νομίζει τῶν ἄνδρειοτατῶν ὃ δὲ τὰ ἄγριοτάτα τῶν ζῴων ἔφησε, μόνα γὰρ προθύμως ἀπόδοθηκεν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀλευθερίας. Does Aeschylus refer to this view of Anacharsis in Suppl. 760,

Plato had already said in Rep. 430 B, δοκεῖς γὰρ μοι τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τοιῶν ἀνέν παιδείας γεγονότας, τὴν τὲ θηριόδω καὶ ἄνδραπο-δώση, οὔτε πάντες νόμοι τὴ ἱεραία, ἄλλο τε τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ καλεῖν. Brave and formidable men, however, were commonly likened to wild animals (Deinon ap. Athen. Deipn. 633 d sq.: Plut. Aristid. c. 15).

19. τοῖς ἡμερωτέροις καὶ λεοντώδεσιν ἢθεσιν. Heracles is called by Homer θυμόλεων in Il. 5. 639 and Odys. 11. 267 (cp. Hymn. Homer. 15, ἔτει Ἡρακλῆς λεοντόθυμων, and see Liddell and Scott, s.v. θυμόλεων). Among the lower animals the dog is probably referred to: cp. Plato, Soph. 231 A, καὶ γὰρ κυνὶ λύκος, ἀγριότατον ἡμερωτάτα. For the gentleness ascribed to the lion cp. Hist. An. 9. 44. 629 b 8, καὶ γὰρ ὁ λέων ἐν τῇ βρώσει μὲν χαλεπότατος ἐστὶ, μὴ πεινῶν δὲ καὶ βεβρωκόν πραδήγατος: Anal. Pr. 2. 27. 70 b 26, ὁ λέων ἄνδρειον καὶ μεταδοκικόν: and Hist. An. 1. 1. 438 b 16, τὰ δὲ ἀλευθέρα καὶ ἄνδρεια καὶ εὐγενῆ, ἀνίου λέων. Plato also has a favourable opinion of the lion (Rep. 589 B). Yet Homer says of Achilles (Il. 24. 41), λέων δ′ ὄφει αὐτὴν;

The authorities followed by Pliny ascribed clemency to the lion (Nat. Hist. 8. 48, leoni tantum ex seris clementia in supplices: prostratis parcit et, ubi saevit, in viros potius quam in feminas fremit, in infants non nisi magna fame).

πολλὰ δ′ ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ. The sense is—and, so far from courage being the offspring of savageness, there are many very savage races which are wholly devoid of courage. The Achaiæi and Heniochi dwelt on the East coast of the Euxine. The Heniochi were believed to be an offshoot of the Lacedaemonians (Strabo, p. 496, Λακώνων δὲ (οἰκίται) τὴν Ἡμινόχα, ὅπ' ἥρων Κέκας καὶ Ἀμβώτρατος ἀι τῶν Διοσκυρῶν ἡμίχοι, καὶ τοὺς Ἡμίχοις ἀπὸ τοιῶν εἰκὸς ἀνθιμάσθαι); there is therefore some appropriateness in the reference to them here in an argument directed against Lacedaemonian customs. The wild races on the Euxine are described as θηριώδεις in Eth.
Nic. 7. 6. 1148 b 21 sqq. also. Cannibalism is a sign of ἀγριότης (Ephor. Fragn. 76, τοὺς μὲν γὰρ εἶναι χαλεποὺς, ὡστε καὶ ἀνθρώποφαγεῖν: Aristot. Hist. An. 2. 1. 501 b 1, ἄγριοι καὶ ἀνθρωπόφαγοι).

22. τῶν ἡπειρωτικῶν ἔθνων, 'continental nations,' as distinguished from nations inhabiting islands (Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 12, μη ἐς ἑαυτὰ ἀποβλέπουσα, ἀλλ' ἡπειρωτικὰ ἔθνη καρπουμένων). Asiatic nations are probably especially referred to: cp. Isocr. Paneg. § 187, εἰ τῶν μὲν πόλεμον τῶν νῦν ὄντα περὶ ἡμᾶς πρὸς τοὺς ἡπειρώτας πολεμαίμεθα, τὴν δ' εἰδαμονίαν τὴν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα διακομίσαμεν, and Philip. § 119, where we read of Jason of Pherae, ἐποιεῖτο γὰρ τοὺς λόγους ὡς εἰς τὴν ἡπειρόν διαβροχόμενοι καὶ βασιλεῖς πολεμίσαντος. Continental races were perhaps regarded as wilder than island races; they were less in the way of intercourse with others.

23. ληστρικά. Aristotle will not allow that these nations are πολεμικά: he slips in the word ληστρικά instead: cp. Demosth. Phil. 1. 23, ἀλλὰ λῃστεύειν ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῦτο τῷ τρόπῳ τοῦ πολέμου χρήσθαι τὴν πρώτην, and Strabo, p. 833, where we read of Masinissa, ἀντί τοῦ λῃστεύειν διδάξας (τοὺς νομάδας) στρατεύειν. In Strabo, p. 508, certain ἔθνη are described as ληστρικά καὶ μάχιμα.

ἔστιν—μετελήφασιν. For the use in the same passage of a singular and a plural verb after a neut. plur. nominative see Bon. Ind. 490 a 56 sqq.

24. εἶτι δ' αὐτοῖς τοὺς Λάκκωνας κ.τ.λ. The sense is—besides, we need not go so far afield as to the races of the Euxine to prove that the Lacedaemonian system of gymnastic training is not the true means of producing courage, for the experience of the Lacedaemonian State has proved this.

25. εῶς μὲν αὐτοῖς κ.τ.λ. Αὕτοι, 'alone': see notes on 1252 a 14 and 1278 b 24, and cp. De Gen. An. 2. 8. 748 b 5. That the Spartans were thought to be φιλόσωμοι, we see from Isocr. Archid. § 56, where Archidamus says, ὁ δὲ πάντων σχετλιωτάτου, ἐφιλοσωμώτατο δοκούτες εἶναι τῶν Ἑλλήνων ραθυμότερον τῶν ἄλλων βουλευτομέθα περίτοιτών.

26. νῦν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle no doubt has before him in his reference to athletic contests the story told of Epaminondas by Plutarch, Pelop. c. 7, Ἐπαμεινόνδας δὲ τοὺς νίους πᾶλιν φρονίματος ἢν ἐμπεπληκτὸς ἔκελεν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ πολλαίες, εἶτα ὁρᾶν ἐπὶ τῷ κρατεῖ καὶ περιίμακε γαυρομένους ἐπέπληστεν, ὡς αἰχμήασαν μᾶλλον αὐτοῖς προσήκον, εἰ δουλεύουσι δε' ἀναβριᾶν ὑπὸ τοσοῦτον τοῖς ἑώμαις διαφέρομεν. As to the superiority of the Thebans in battle, cp. Diod. 15. 87. 1. For the absence of ἐν
before τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἁγόσι καὶ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, cp. 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 33, ἑττηθέντες τῇ περὶ Ἑρετρίαν ναυμαχία, and c. 34. l. 4.

27. οὗ γάρ κ.τ.λ. Lord Macaulay says the same thing in his note, History of England, c. 23 (Cabinet Edition, vol. viii. p. 13), though he does not refer to the Politics. That at Athens there was no public training for war, we see from Xen. Mem. 3. 12. 5. Τῷ μόνῳ μῇ πρὸς ἀσκοῦσας ἁρκεῖν = τῷ μόνῳ πρὸς μὴ ἄσκοντας ἁρκεῖν, according to Bonitz (Ind. 539 a 42), who remarks, 'interdum negatio universo enunciato vel enunciati membro praeponitur, cum pertineat ad unum quoddam eius vocabulum,' and gives many other instances.

28. For τὸν τρόπον τούτον see note on 1281 a 21.

30. οὐδὲ γάρ λύκος κ.τ.λ. See vol. i. p. 357, note 3, and cp. Eth. Eud. 3. 1. 1229 a 25, ἔδω καὶ οἱ ἄγριοι θήρες ἄνδρεῖοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οὐκ ὄντες· όταν γὰρ ἐκτόσι, τοιοῦτοι εἰσίν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀνώμαλοι, ὅσπερ οἱ θρασεῖς. It would seem from Plato, Laches 196 E sq. that everybody regarded wild animals as courageous (cp. Laws 963 E). Gryllus is made to argue to this effect in Plut. Gryllus, c. 4. 988 C sq.

οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων. For the gen. see note on 1259 b 24.

31. ἄλλα μᾶλλον ἄνήρ ἄγαθος. Cp. Plato, Laws 641 B, γενόμενοι δὲ τοιοῦτοι (i.e. ἄνδρες ἄγαθοι) τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράσσοιν καλῶς, ἔτι δὲ κἂν μικρὸν τοὺς πολεμιῶς μαχόμενοι.

32. οἱ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but those who throw boys too much into these hard physical exercises and leave them untrained in necessary things make them in truth [not good men, but] sordid, for they make them useful to political science only for one task, and for this, as our inquiry tells us' (cp. 27, λειπομένους ἑτέρων), 'less well than others do.' Cp. [Plato.] Erastae 136 A, καλῶς γε μοι, ἐφ' ὧν Σάκρατες, φαίνει ὑπολαμβάνειν τὰ περὶ τοῦ φιλοσόφου, ἀπεικόσασα αὐτὸν τῷ πεντάθλῳ· ἐστὶ γὰρ ἀτεχνῶς τοιοῦτος οἶος μὴ δουλεύειν μηδὲν πράγματι μηδ' εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μηδὲν διαπερνομέναι, ὅστε διὰ τὴν τῶν ἐνός τούτων ἐπιμέλειαν τῶν άλλων ἀπάντων ἀπολείφθαι, ὅσπερ οἱ δημιουργοί, ἄλλα πάντων μετρίως ἐφ' ἓρθαί. Cp. also Plato, Laws 644 A, τὴν δὲ εἰς χρήματα τείνονσαν (παλινδειάν) ἤ τινα πρὸς ἱσχύν ἢ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλην τινὰ σοφίαν ἄνεν νῦν καὶ δίκης βάλανον τ' ἐνιαὶ καὶ ἀνελευθερον καὶ οὐκ ἀξίων τὸ παράπαν παλινδειά ταλιστάθαι. In τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπαιτούμενος ποίησάντες Aristotle appears to imply that the Lacedaemonian State did not oblige the young Spartan to learn to read and write (see Blümmer, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., p. 100 sq.). Has
he in his mind the language used by Archidamus (Thuc. i. 84) not without reference to his own countrymen, πολι τι διαφέρειν οὐ δει νομίζειν ἀνθρώπουν ἀνθρώπον, κράτιστον δὲ εἶναι ὁστὶς ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαστικοῖς παιδεύεται? For εἰς ταῦτα ἀνέντες cp. Hdt. 2. 165, ἀνένται εἰς τὸ μάχιμον, and 167, τοὺς ὑπὸ τὸν πόλεμον ἀνεμένους.

35. ὥς φησίν ὁ λόγος, cp. Plato, Phaedr. 274 A, ὥς ὁ λόγος φησίν, and Soph. 259 C, ὥς οἱ νῦν λόγοι φασί. ‘Formula ὁ λόγος σημαίνει apud Platonem creberrimi usus est’ (see Stallbaum on Plato, Polit. 275 E). In Phys. 7. 4. 249 a 21 we have σημαίνει ὁ λόγος οὗτος: cp. also Pol. 3. 8. 1279 b 34, ἐνεκε τοῖνυ ὁ λόγος ποιεῖν δῆλον κ.τ.λ.

36. δει δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘and we ought to judge [whether they train them worse than others do]’ etc. This remark may probably have reference to a reply of the Lacedaemonians to the Thebans, when the latter bade them fight or acknowledge their inferiority to the Thebans; the Lacedaemonians answered, περὶ μὲν τοῦ πόλεμοι βελτίους τὰ πράξεις κρίνεις τὰς ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἐλλήνων ἐκατέρως πεπαγμένας κ.τ.λ. (Aristid. Or. in Platon. 4. ap. Phot. Biblioth. Cod. 248. 425 a 21 sqq. Bekker).

37. ἀναγωνιστάς τῆς παιδείας, ‘rivals in gymnastic education’ (Sepulv. ‘concertatores et aemulos disciplinae’).

40. μεχρὶ μὲν γὰρ ἦβης κοιφότερα γυμνᾶσια προσοιτεύον κ.τ.λ. Aristotle would no doubt exclude at this age the pancration and the pentathlon, which were among the βαρύτερα ἄθλα (Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 179: Paus. 6. 24. 1), and would probably desire that contests even in running and leaping should be made as little exacting as possible. In the Panathenaea at one time boys contended in the pentathlon, but later on this was dropped (Blümner, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., p. 373). See vol. i. p. 358, note 1, and cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 24 sq. In Plut. De Gen. Socr. c. 26 sub fin. it is implied that ἀναγκαία ἄθλα are not suitable for a boy of fifteen.

τὴν βίαν τροφῆν, ‘the constrained diet of athletes’: see Liddell and Scott s.v. ἀναγκοτροφεῖον, and cp. Hippocr. De Diaet. i. vol. i. p. 664 Kühn, γυμνασίων τῶν ἀπὸ βίντζ γυμνομέων.

41. τοὺς πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόνους. Cp. Rhet. i. 11. 1370 a 16, οὐδὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἀνάγκην τούτων.

1. δύναται, sc. ἐν ἐκείνος τροφῆ καὶ οἱ πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόνου. If with 1339 a. P5.3 Bekk. we read δύναται, we must supply τὰ ἀναγκαῖα γυμνασία (cp. 4).
Aristotle would seem to have had a list of Olympic victors before him, and possibly not merely the list inscribed on stone at Olympia, but a list in the form of a book. ‘With the year B.C. 776 began the list of Olympic victors used by the Alexandrian writers on chronology. A list of this kind was first published by the sophist Hippias of Elis, a contemporary of Socrates (Plut. Num., c. i: cp. Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 61 and Zeller, Gr. Ph. 1. 958. i). The list was later dealt with by Aristotle and others’ (Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, i. 585). See on this subject Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 109. i (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., 1. 104. i): V. Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, p. 545 sqq.: Heitz, Die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles, p. 254. Milo of Crotona was one of the exceptions; he won in the wrestling-match for boys at Olympia, and also won in the wrestling-match for men at six Olympic festivals between B.C. 532 and 512 (Holm, Gr. Gesch. 1. 439). In Herondas 1. 50 sqq. Gryllus, the hero of the piece, is said to have achieved almost as much.


4. διαχαίρεσθαι τὴν ἠθικήν κ.τ.λ. See vol. i. p. 358, note 2. The ‘other studies’ are reading and writing, music and drawing. Plato, on the other hand (Laws 809 E sqq.), allot three years (aet. 10-13) to reading and writing, and three more (aet. 13-16) to lessons on the harp. Aristotle evidently thinks it better to postpone these studies till after the attainment of puberty. His view is that mental work is not favourable to the body (1339 a 7 sqq.), and he desires that the important physical change involved in the attainment of puberty should have been safely and well achieved before any mental training begins. By ἠθική Aristotle evidently means (cp. 4 (7). 17. 1337 a 1, τῆς διαχρέος τῆς φύσεως) not the attainment of the age at which youths arrived at ἠθική in the eye of the law, but the advent of physical puberty, which seems to be placed in the fourteenth year in Hippocr. Coacae Praenotiones, vol. i. p. 321 Kühn. Aristotle appears to devote to the more exacting kind of gymnastic training all the years intervening between three years after puberty and twenty-one. He makes no provision for the military duties which occupied the young Athenian during his nineteenth and twentieth years (see note on
1336 b 37). We do not learn when the youth of Aristotle's 'best State' were to begin their military training, but they would not do so apparently till after twenty-one. Plato in the Laws (833 D, 834 A) abolishes the heavier kind of gymnastic contests at festivals, such as wrestling and the pancration, but this is perhaps in part because he is legislating for Cretans.

7. ἂμα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. See vol. i. p. 359, note i. This rule does not seem to be observed among ourselves. Much hard work is done on the river and in the football-field by youths who are preparing for difficult examinations. In a lecture before the Sanitary Congress at Brighton in 1890 the late Sir B. Richardson pointed out that in those occupations in which 'mental and bodily work was combined, the strain was most intense, and that those sorts of work should never be carried into weariness' (Times, Sept. 1. 1890).

12. καὶ πρότερον, in c. 3. 1337 b 27 sqq. C. 5.

13. For ἐνδόσιμον see Bon. Ind. s. v., where the passage before us is grouped with Rhet. 3. 14. 1415 a 5 sqq., in which passage ἐνδόσιμον = προσόμον.

14. οὕτε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Μετέχειν αὐτῆς, 16, is a vague expression, but probably means 'study it' (cp. παυδεύειν, 27, and see note on 1337 b 29). This question must be settled in order that we may ascertain how music is to be studied, for if it is to be studied for the sake of recreation, the tunes and rhythms to be practised by the pupil will be quite other than those which will be practised by him if it is to be studied for the sake of virtue or intellectual enjoyment. A classification of studies into αἱ ἡθοποιοὶ, αἱ πρὸς ἡλιόν των καὶ χάρων δεηθέριον σπουδαζόμεναι, and αἱ εἰς σύνεσιν ἡ πράξεως λεγόμεναι is implied in Plut. Themist. c. 2—a classification which recalls to some extent that in the passage before us. Compare also the witticism of Dorion, a musician and bon vivant of Aristotle's day, about a kind of lobster, τόυς δὲ καράζουσι ἐφη τρία ἔχειν, διατριβὴν καὶ ἐναχίαν καὶ θεωρίαν (Athen. Deipn. 337 e).

17. καθάπερ ὄνπον καὶ μέθης. As to sleep, cp. Rhet. i. i. 1170 a 11, τὰς δ' ἐπιμελείας καὶ τὰς σπουδὰς καὶ τὰς συννοιασ λυπηρὰς . . . τὰ δ' ἔναντι ἡδεία διό αἱ ῥᾳθμίαι καὶ αἱ ἀπονίαι καὶ αἱ ἀμέλειαι καὶ αἱ παθίαι καὶ αἱ ἀναπαύσεις καὶ ὃ ὄνπον τῶν ἡδῶν, and De Somno et Vigilia 2. 455 b 20 sqq.

ταῦτα γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for these things are not in themselves connected with virtue, but are pleasurable and at the same time 'bid care to
cease," as Euripides says, [and therefore they are used with a view to relaxation]." For τῶν σπουδαίων, cp. Theogn. 115,

πολλοί τοι πόσιοι καὶ βρώσιον εἶσιν ἑταῖρον,

ἐν δὲ σπουδάσῳ πρήγματι παντοτέροι,

and Plato, Symp. 181 A, ὅτι δὲ νῦν ἥμεις ποιοῦμεν, ἥ πίνεις ἥ ἄδειν ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, οὐκ ἔστι τούτων αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτῷ καλῶν οἴδεν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ πράξει, ὦς ἐν πραξθῇ, τουτοῦν ἀπέβη, and see vol. i. p. 359, note 2. For οὔτε followed by ἀλλά, cp. 7 (g). 8. 1308 b 11 sqq., Magn. Mor. 2. 6. 1203 b 10, Ἀδ. Πολ. c. 16. 1. 8, and with Kaibel (Stil und Text der Politeia 'Aθηναίων, p. 158), Rhet. 1. 1. 1355 b 7 sqq. and 2. 21. 1394 a 22, where Roemer reads οὐ μέντοι οὔτε περὶ κ.τ.λ. In Metaph. Ἐ. 3. 1046 b 33-36 οὔτε is taken up by ὅμοιος δὲ (see Bonitz' note on the passage in his edition of the Metaphysics). Aristotle has Eurip. Bacch. 332 Bothe (377 Dindorf) before him, where we read of Bromius,

ὅς τάδ' ἔχει

θαυσεῖν τε χοροῖς, μετά τ' αὐλοῦ γελάσαι

ἀποπάσασθαι τε μερήμασι, ὅποτάν ποτέρα θέλη
gάνων ἐν δαιτ' θεών, καισοφόρας δ' ἐν δαιλίασις

ἀνδράσι κρατήρ ὑπνον ἀμφιβάλλη.

Here, as he says in 19-21, ὑπνος μέθη μονοική and ὄρχησις are all grouped together. The same is the case in Hom. ΙΙ. 13. 636 (cp. Lucian, De Saltat. c. 23),

πάντων μὲν κόροις ἐστὶ, καὶ ὑπνον καὶ φιλότητος

μολῆς τε γλυκέρης καὶ ἀμύμων ὄρχησμοῦ,

and Odyssey. 8. 248,

αἱεὶ δ' ἡμῶν δαίς τε φίλη καθαρίς τε χοροῖ τε

εἰματά τ' ἐξημουθά λοετρά τε θερμὰ καὶ εὐναί.

Cp. also Athen. Deipn. 40a.

19. διὸ καὶ τάττουσιν κ.τ.λ. Supply μετὰ πάντων τούτων from what follows. Cp. 1339 b 14, εἰδόγως δ' εἰς πάντα τάττεται καὶ φαίνεται μετέχειν (sc. πάντων), c. 7. 1342 a 14, where πάντως must be supplied with κοινοῦσθαι, 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 37, καὶ περὶ δὲν ὦ νόμος ἀπαγορεύει μὴ κυώσων ἀλλ' ἀκολουθῆσαι (sc. τῷ νόμῳ), and 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 31, where εἰς τὴν σύνοδον ταύτην is suppressed after ἀπαντώσων.

21. τιθέασι δὲ καὶ τὴν ὄρχησιν ἐν τούτοις. This view implied that dancing is a cure for care. The sight of dancing must apparently be meant. Lucian says (De Saltat. c. 79), οὕτω δὲ δῆλεγε ὄρχησις, ὡςτε ... λύπῃ ἐχόμενος (τις) ἐξήρχεται τοῦ θεάτρου φαινόμενος ὡςπερ τι φάρμακον λθήδεαν καὶ κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν νηπενδεῖ τε καὶ ἄχολον
πίν. He goes further in c. 81, and claims that it has a good ethical effect on the spectator.

η μάλλον οίητεν πρὸς ἀρετήν τι τείνειν τὴν μουσικήν κ.τ.λ. This is answered in 1340 b 10 sqq. 'Aretήν, 'moral virtue,' is represented by παιδείαν in c. 5. 1339 b 13 (cp. c. 7. 1341 b 38), for education is commonly connected by Aristotle with the production of moral virtue: cp. c. 7. 1342 a 2, πρὸς μὲν τὴν παιδείαν ταῖς ἠθικωτάταις (ἀρμονίαις χρηστέοις).

26. φρόνησις, 'intellectual culture': see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 772. 3 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., 2. 309. 3), and Sus.3, Note 1023 (Sus.4, 1. p. 585), who rightly defend the words καὶ πρὸς φρόνησιν against those who would expunge them or change φρόνησιν into εὐφροσύνην. That the study of music may contribute to intellectual virtue is implied in c. 6. 1341 b 6 sqq., and that intellectual virtue is the ultimate end of education we see from 4 (7). 15. 1334 b 14 sqq. For the use of φρόνησις in this sense, see Bon. Ind. 831 b 4 sqq.

τρίτων τῶν εἰρημένων, 'third among the aims which have been enumerated': see Vahlen on Poet. 3. 1448 a 19.


29. ἄλλα μὴν οὖν διαγωγήν γε παισίν κ.τ.λ. For ἄλλα μὴν οὖν οὐδὲ ... γε, cp. 3. 13. 1284 b 30, ἄλλα μὴν οὐδὲ ἄρχειν γε τοῦ τοιοῦτον, and 4 (7). 11. 1331 a 7. Eucken (De Partic. Usu, p. 15) has anticipated me in comparing these passages.


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31. ἀλλ' ἵσως κ.τ.λ. The sense is—but perhaps the toils of boyhood in learning to play may, notwithstanding what has been said, be for the sake of pastime, not indeed for the sake of pastime in youth, but for the sake of pastime in manhood. The Lacedaemonian Leotychidas, the first in the royal line to bear this name at Sparta, in answer to the question, 'Τί δὲι μάλιστα μανθάνειν τοὺς ἐλευθέρους παιδάς;' said, 'Ταῦτα, ὥς ἂν αὕτως ὁφελήσειν ἄνδρας γενομένους (Plut. Apophth. Lac. Leotych. 3), and Aristippus replied to a similar question, ὅς ἄνδρες γενόμενοι χρῄστονται (Diog. Laert. 2. 80).

33. ἀλλ' εἰ τούτ' ἐστὶ τοιούτου κ.τ.λ., i.e. εἰ ἦ τῶν παιδῶν σπουδῆ ἐστὶ παιδίας χάριν ἄνδρῶς γενομένους καὶ τελεωθείς. The supposition is somewhat of a paradox: cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 6. 1176 b 32, σπουδάζων δὲ καὶ ποιεῖν παιδίας χάριν ἠλίθιον φαίνεται καὶ λίαν παιδικὸν παιξίν δ' ὅπως σπουδάζῃ, καὶ' Ἀνάχαρσιν, ὄρθως ἐχεῖν δοκεῖ. The Persian kings had μουνοὐργοι attached to their court (Xen.Cyrop.4.6.11). Compare Plut. Pericl. c. 1, ὅ δὲ Φιλίππου πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ἐπιτερπῶς ἐν τοῖς πότῳ φήλαται καὶ τεχνικῶς ἐπεν, "Οὐκ ἀσχύναι καλῶς οὕτῳ πώλλαν;" ἀρκεὶ γάρ, ἂν βασιλεῖς ἀκροβάταις παλαίτων σχολάζῃ, καὶ πολὺ νεμεῖ ταῖς Μοῦσαις, ἐτέρων ἀγωνιζομένων τὰ τοιαῦτα θεατῆς γεγομένους. Αὐτὸ ποιούτων, i.e. χειρουργούσων, which is implied in μανθάνειν αὐτοῦς (cp. c. 7. 1342 a 3). So we have in Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 30, δρᾶν αὐτὸ ἤσσασθαι, and in Plato, Rep. 498 A, ἄλλων τούτῳ πραττότων.


39. τὰ τοιαῦτα, 'things such as have been mentioned,' but what things are meant? 'Things which will be a source of pleasure in after-years' (so Vict.), or 'things which afford pleasure' (Sus.), or 'musical performances' (Welldon)? The question is not free from doubt, but I incline to the third interpretation, as ταῦτα in 42 seems to mean 'musical performances,' and not τὰ δυνάμενα τὰ ἡθη βελτίων ποιεῖν. καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν ὅψων πραγματείας κ.τ.λ. Richards is probably right in adding τά before περί (see critical note), though we expect τὰ ὅψα with παρασκευάζων rather than the cumbrous periphrasis τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν ὅψων πραγματείαν. If the reading of the MSS. is retained, ὅψα or some such word must be supplied with παρασκευάζων. Bonitz
5 (8). 5. 1339 a 31—1339 b 7.

(Ind. s.v.) explains πραγματεία as 'rei allicuius tractatio viae ac ratione instituta. ' Παρασκευάζειν is especially used of cooks: cp. Plato, Gorg. 518 B, αὐτὸν θαυμάσιον γεγόνασι σωμάτων θαπευταί, ὁ μὲν ἄρτον θαυμαστώς παρασκευάζων, ὁ δὲ ὤφον, ὁ δὲ οἶνον. Cookery no less than music is a source of refreshment and pleasure to grown-up men. But it was regarded by the Greeks as work for slaves (1. 7. 1255 b 23—27: Plut. Lycurg. et Num. comp. c. 2, ἀλλ' ἦν ἡ περὶ τὰ χρήματα κατασκευὴ δεδομένη δοῦλως καὶ Εἰλωσιν, ὅσπερ ἡ περὶ τὸ δεῖπνον καὶ ὤφον διακοινία: Pomp. c. 73, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐκ τούτου περιότερον καὶ θεραπεύων ὅσα δεσπότας δοῦλοι μέχρι νύσεως ποθῶν καὶ δείπνου παρασκευῶ). Has Sextus Empiricus this passage of the Politics before him in Adv. Math. 6. 33, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μὴ ποτε, ὅν τρόπον χωρίς ὀψαρτυκῆς καὶ ὀνομαντικῆς ἡδομένα ὤφον ἢ οἴνον γενεάμενοι, ὅρε καὶ χωρίς μουσικῆς ἡσθείμην ἐν τετρανόμενοι ἀκούσαντες?

41. ἔχει, sc. ἡ μουσική.

42. ταύτα, i.e. musical performances.

1. ὀρθῶς τε χαίρειν καὶ δύνασθαι κρίνειν, i.e. μανθάνειν δύνασθαι 1339 b. ὀρθῶς τε χαίρειν καὶ ὀρθῶς κρίνειν, or in other words to learn to become better in character: cp. i. 340 a 15, τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ μισεῖν. For the place of δύνασθαι cp. c. 3. 1337 b 31, and see note on 1281 a 26.

2. ἔκεινοι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Athenaeus may have this passage before him in Deipn. 628 b, Λακεδαίμονοι δ', εἰ μὲν ἐμάθανον τὴν μουσικῆν, οὐδὲν λέγοντι· ὅτι δὲ κρίνειν δύναναι καλῶς τὴν τίχνην ὁμολογεῖται παρ' αὐτῶν, καὶ φασὶ τρίς ἑδ' σεισκόμει διαφθειρομένην αὐτήν. The Spartans learnt to sing (Plut. Lycurg. c. 21), and we read in c. 6. 1341 a 33 of one Spartan at any rate who had learned to play on the αἰλός—indeed, the Peripatetic Chamaeleon, a pupil of Aristotle, asserted that at one time they commonly learnt to play on the αἰλός (Athen. Deipn. 184 d)—but it would seem that in Aristotle's day they did not commonly learn to play on any instrument.

7. οὗ γὰρ ὁ Ζεύς κ.τ.λ. It is Apollo, not Zeus, whom the poets represent as singing and playing on the harp (Europ. Ion 827 Bothe, 905 Dindorf, ὁ δὲ κιβάρα κλάζεις παιάνας μελών). In the older poetic descriptions, however, according to Preller, Griech. Mythologie i. 215, Apollo does not sing but only plays, while the Muses sing to his playing (e.g. in Hesiod, Scut. Herc. 201 sqq.). For τοῖς ποιηταῖς, see Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 423: 3, where Plato, Rep. 389 E, 'Ομηρος, and Laws 706 D, αὐτῷ, are compared. Vahlen (Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. 4. 417) compares Poet. 18.
NOTES.

1456 a 25, τῶν χορῶν δεὶ . . . συναγωνίζονται μὴ ὄσπερ Εὐρυπίδης ἄλλ' ὄσπερ Σοφοκλεῖ. Aristotle elsewhere uses the form ἄδειν: he may possibly use ἄειδεν here because he is quoting from a poet.

9. τοὺς τοιούτους, i.e. τοὺς ἀειδούσας καὶ κιβαρίζοντας. In Hom. Odysse. 17. 382 sqq. the ἀοίδος is counted among δημουργοί. Compare Croesus’ advice to Cyrus as to the Lydians (Hdt. i. 155), πρόσεπτ' αὐτὸί καὶ καὶ φύλλου καὶ κατηπελέειν παιδείν τοὺς παιδίας' καὶ ταχέως σφέας, ὥστε ὕπερ ὄφεια γεγονότας, ὅστε οὐδὲν δεινῷ τοι ἦστα τῷ ἀποστέωσι.


18. παιδείαν. See above on 1339 a 21. Παιδείαν corresponds to τα ἤθη βελτιῶν ποιεῖν, 1339 a 41.


15. μετέξειν, sc. πάντων. See above on 1339 a 19.

ὁ τε γὰρ παιδία κ.τ.λ., 'for pastime [must be pleasurable, since it] is for the sake of relaxation and relaxation must be pleasurable, for it is a cure for the pain which is produced by toil, [and things are cured by their contraries].' For the famous principle that things are cured by their contraries, cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1104 b 17, ἅτρειαι γὰρ των ἐλευθὲρων πεφύκασι γίνονται (see Stewart), and 4. i. 1126 a 21 sq. Aristotle inherits this principle from Hippocrates: cp. Hippocr. Aphorism. vol. iii. p. 714 Kühn, ἀπὸ πλῆρωμην ὀκόσα ἀν νοσήματα γένθαι, κἀκεῖα ἢθη, καὶ ὀκόσα ἀπὸ κενώσεως, πλῆρωμῆς, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἢ ἐπεναντίως, and De Natura Hominis, vol. i. p. 361 Kühn. Compare with τὴν δ' ἀνάπαυσιν κ.τ.λ. Pindar, Nem. 4. 1, ἀριστος εὐφροσύνα πάνων κεκριμένων ἵππρος.

In the passage before us and in c. 3. 1337 b 36 sqq. we get a glimpse of Aristotle’s Theory of Relaxation, if he can be said to have one. The essential thing about relaxation is that it must be pleasurable. Toil causes pain and pain is cured by its opposite; hence if the pain of toil is cured by relaxation, relaxation must be pleasurable. Play is a means of relaxation, but there are other means also—sleep and conviviality (1339 a 16 sqq.). Sleep and conviviality heal care as well as the pain of toil (ibid.); whether
play does so we are not told. Play, unlike sleep, involves movement (4 7). 17. 1336 a 26 sqq.; it may even be toilsome, though it is a cure for toil (1336 a 28 sqq.). Unlike sleep, again, it may be of a right or a wrong kind ethically; it may, for instance, be illiberal (1336 a 29: cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 14. 1128 a 17 sqq.); hence it may affect the character for good or ill. In infancy no toil is undergone, so that the play of infancy does not come as a relaxation after toil. Aristotle distinguishes diagogê from relaxation, for though diagogê is pleasurable, it has in it an element of τὸ καλὸν which relaxation has not (1339 b 17 sqq.). We may probably infer that diagogê will not serve as relaxation. Does it need to be followed by relaxation as ἀσχολία does? Aristotle does not consider this question, but the answer to it is probably in the negative. It is true that the activities called into play in diagogê are activities of so high a kind (see note on 1333 a 35) that they may well cause fatigue needing to be removed by relaxation, but we must remember on the other hand that Aristotle regards them as pleasurable (c. 5. 1339 b 17 sqq.) and desirable for their own sake. Ἀσχολία is accompanied by pain (c. 3. 1337 b 39), and hence the need that it should be followed by relaxation.

19. τὸ γὰρ εὖδαιμονεὶν κ.τ.λ., 'for happiness, [which is an accompaniment of diagogê,] consists of both these things.' See vol. i. p. 296, note 1, and cp. Stob. Ecl. 2. 6. 12, ἡδουν τῷ καὶ κάλλιστον εἶναι τὴν εὖδαιμονίαν. That happiness is an accompaniment of diagogê, we see from c. 3. 1338 a 1 sqq.

20. καὶ ψυλὴν οὖσαν. Plato (Laws 669 D sqq.) objects to ψυλὴ μουσική. Fuit autem ψυλκιδαμοτικῆς auctor Aristonicus, aequalis fere Archilochi' (cp. Athen. Deipn. 637 l), 'atque ψυλὴν ἀδηλησιν sub initium Pythiadum exercuit Sacadas' (Stallbaum on Laws 669 D).

21. Μουσαίος. See note in Sus. 4.

22. καὶ εἰς τὰς συνουσιάς καὶ διαγωγάς. See critical note on 1330 b 31.

24. ὅστε καὶ ἐντεῦθεν κ.τ.λ. 'Εντεῦθεν, i.e. from the fact of its pleasantness. Παιδεύοντα is probably middle: cp. 1340 b 13.

25. ἀδαν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for things harmlessly pleasant, [of which music is one,] are suitable not only for the end' (i.e. happiness), 'but also for relaxation.' That the pleasure derived from music is harmless had already been said by Plato (Laws 670 D, ὅτα . . . ἀδαντεν αὐτοὶ τε ἡδονάς τὸ παραχρήμα ἀσινεῖς ἡδωρται κ.τ.λ.). Plato had also connected harmless pleasure with pastime in Laws 667 E,
NOTES.

KL. ἀμαλή λέγεις ἠδονήν μόνον. ΔΘ. ναί, καὶ παιδῶν γε εἶναι τὴν αἰτὴν ταύτην λέγω τότε, ὅταν μῆτε τι βλάπτῃ μῆτε ὡφελῆ σπουδὴς ἡ λόγου ἀξίων. For ἀρμόττεων πρὸς, cp. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 10, ποία μὲν ὄνω δημοκρατία πρὸς πολιν ἀρμόττει πόλιν, and Isocr. Ad Nicocl. § 34.

27. For ἐν τῷ τέλει γίνεσθαι cp. Plato, Laws 635 C, γεγράμενα εν τοῖς ἠδοναῖς (‘dum versantur in voluptatibus,’ Stallbaum), and 841 C, γεγράμενος ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ, and Philib. 35 E.

29. οὐχ ὅσον ἔτι πλέον, apparently ‘not merely with a view to a further end’ (Vic. ‘non ut plus inde capiant’). I have not happened to meet with a parallel to this use of ἔτι πλέον. For οὐχ ὅσον in the sense of ‘not only,’ cp. Thuc. 4. 62. 2 (Liddell and Scott).

30. διαναπαύειν, ‘to let them rest awhile’ (Liddell and Scott).

31. συμβεβήκε δὲ κ.τ.λ. The meaning is—but men are not content with using pastime as a means of obtaining the relaxation and pleasure of which they often stand in need; they fall into the error of confounding it with the end of life, and seek happiness in the pleasures arising from it. Pastime is χρῆσιμον (1339 b 30), or in other words a means to the end (Eth. Nic. 8. 2. 1155 b 19 sq.: cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 3. 1096 a 7, χρῆσιμον καὶ ἄλλου χάριν), but instead of regarding it thus, they take it to be the end of life.

33. ἄλλα όδ τὴν τυχόσαν, ‘but not any chance kind of pleasure.’ Prof. Butcher (Aristotle’s Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, ed. 2, p. 211), compares Poet. 14. 1453 b 10, οὗ γὰρ πᾶσαν δεί ζητεῖν ἠδονήν ἀπὸ τραγῳδίας, ἄλλα τὴν οἰκείαν, and 26. 1462 b 13, δεί γὰρ οὗ τὴν τυχόσαν ἠδονήν ποιεῖν αὕτα (i.e. tragedy and epic poetry) ἄλλα τὴν εἰρήμενην. Aristotle perhaps has before him Plato, Laws 658 E, συνχώρω δὴ τὸ γε τοὐστὸν καὶ ἐγὼ τοῖς πολλοῖς, δειν τὴν μούσαν ἠδονήν κρίνεσθαι, μὴ μένοι τῶν γε ἐπετυχάντων, ἄλλα σχέδου ἐκείνην εἶναι Μοῦσαν καλλίστην, ἢτις τοῖς βελτίστοις καὶ ἴκανοι πεπαιδευμένους τέρψει. ζητοῦντες δὲ ταύτην κ.τ.λ., ‘and seeking this’ (i.e. the pleasure of the end) ‘they take the other’ (i.e. the pleasure of pastime) ‘as being this.’ Cp. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 2, οἳ δὲ εὐθὺς οὐκ ὄρθως ζητοῦσί τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἐξουσίας ὑπαρχοῦσης, and see note on that passage.

36. αἱ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἠδονῶν, ‘the pleasures we have mentioned,’ i.e. the pleasures of pastime. Cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 6. 1176 b 9, καὶ τῶν παιδῶν δὲ αἱ ἱδεῖα (sc. καθ’ αὐτὰς εἰσὶν αἱρεταί) οὗ γὰρ δὲ ἐτέρα αὐτὰς αἱροῦνται, καὶ 34, ἀναπαύετε γὰρ ἐοικέν ἡ παιδία, ἀδυνατοῦντες δὲ συνεχῶς ποιεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δῆσοντες. See note in Sus.4.

38. For the needless addition of αἰτίαν in the relative sentence,
5 (8). 5. 1339 b 27—1340 a 5. 535


40. peri δὲ τοῦ κοινωνεῖν κ.τ.λ. Compare the similarly anaclitic sentence, 3. 16. 1287 a 8, peri δὲ τῆς παμμαθείας καλομένης, αὐτὴ δ' ἐστὶ καθ ὑπὸ ἀρχεῖ πάντα κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βούλησιν ὁ βασιλεὺς—δοκεῖ δὲ τισιν οὐδὲ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι τὸ κύριον ἑνα πάντων εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν. Sus.4 would supply (after ζητεῖν) εἰκότως ἂν τις ἐπολύβους ζητεῖσθαι (or γίνεσθαι). Perhaps, however, it is simpler to supply ζητήτων, which comes to the surface, as it were, in the next sentence. Κοινωνεῖν τῆς μουσικῆς, 'have recourse to music': cp. c. 6. 1341 a 1, ποιῶν μελῶν καὶ ποιῶν ῥυθμῶν κοινωνεῖτον. Οὐ διὰ ταύτην μόνην, sc. τὴν αὐτήν.

42. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα κ.τ.λ. Cp. Probl. 10. 42. 895 a 33, ἡ τούτῳ μὲν συμβαθήκειν, αὐτῶν δὲ καὶ ταῖς γυναιξιν ὅτι ἡ βερματίς κάτω ὀρμά. A contrast is here drawn between the accidents of a thing and its nature or essence (φύσις=οὐσία, see Bon. Ind. 545 b 23 sqq., where Metaph. Δ. 4. ιοι b 35, ἐτε δ' ἄλλον τρόπον λέγεται ἡ φύσις ἡ τῶν φύσει ὀρθῶν ὀσθία, is referred to among other passages). For the contrast of ὀσθία and συμβαθήκος, see Metaph. Γ. 4. 1007 a 31 sqq.

2. καὶ δὲι κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 6. 1341 a 15 sqq. and Probl. 28. 7. 1340 a. 956a 5, ἢ διὰ τὸ ταύτα ἀπὸ τούτων γνωμενῶς ἑδονᾶς κοινᾶς εἶναι ἢμι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῷοις; ἄτε οὖν οὖσαι κοινὰ ἀπειράτα ταῖς καὶ μάλιστα ἡ μόνα ἐπονείδιστοι. The many know not what true pleasure is (Eth. Nic. io. io. ιοι b 15). For τῆς κοινῆς ἑδονῆς ἢς ἔχουσι πάντες αἰσθήσειν, cp. Metaph. B. 2. 996 b 28, τὰς κοινὰς δόξας εἴς ὑπ' ἄπαντες δεικνύσειν. Aristotle implies that this κοινὴ ἑδονή does not affect the character or the soul; he probably regards it as pleasure of a merely physical kind. For the view that pleasure which comes by nature is common to all, cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 13. 1118 b 8, τῶν δ' ἐπιθυμοῦν αἰ μὲν κοινὰ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, αἱ δ' ἵδιοι καὶ ἐπιθέτοι ὅλον ἢ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς φυσικῆ πίας γὰρ ἐπιθύμει ὁ ἑδεθεὶς ἐξηρᾶς ἢ νύρας τροφῆς, ὅτι δ' ἄμφοι, Phys. 8. 7. 261 b 25 sqq., and Plato, Laws 963 E. Cp. also Diphilus, Πολυπράγμων Fragm. I (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 407), тόδε δ', ὧς ζωίκε, τὸ γένος ὡσπερ θηρίων ἐπιθυμῶν εἰσὶ τῇ φύσει καὶ πανταχοῦ.

5. ἄλλ' ὅραν κ.τ.λ. Sepulv. 'sed etiam videre numquid ad mores quoque animamque pertineat.' For συντεινεῖν πρῶς, cp. Peri νεότητος
NOTES.

καὶ γέρως, 3. 469 a 20, διὰ τι δ’ αἱ μὲν τῶν αἰσθήσεων φανέρως συντεῖνουσι πρὸς τὴν καρδιὰν, αἱ δ’ εἰσὶν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ . . . τὸ αὐτὸν τούτον ἐν ἐπέροις εἶρηται χωρίς. For πρὸς τὸ ἱθὸς καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν, cp. 11, τοῦ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἱθοῦς, and see note on 1337 a 38: cp. also Plato, Symp. 195 E, ἐν γὰρ ἱθοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων τὴν ὁμοίωσιν θρυντὶ (‘Ερως). For συντείνει cp. De Part. An. 3. 4. 667 a 11, αἱ δὲ διαφορὰς τῆς καρδιᾶς κατὰ μέγεθος τε καὶ μικρότητα καὶ μαλακότητα τείνουσιν περὶ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἡθοὺς. For the repetition of the preposition see critical note on 1331 b 24. Plato had already said in Rep. 401 D, ἃ ῥ’ οὖν, ἣν δ’ ἐγὼ, δ’ Ἡλαύκων, τούτων ἑνεκε κυριωτάτη ἐν μούσικῇ τροφή, ὅτι μάλιστα καταδύεται εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ὅ τε ρυθμός καὶ ἄρμονία καὶ ἐρωμενεύστατα ἀπτεται αὐτῆς φέροντα τὴν εὐσχημοσύνην, καὶ ποιεῖ εὐσχῆμον, ἦν τό ὁρθός τραφῆς, ἐὰν δέ μὴ, τοιούτοις; (cp. Laws 673 A), and in Tim. 47 D, ἡ δὲ ἄρμονία, ἔξωγενεὶς ἔχουσα φοράς ταῖς ἐν θῆς τῆς ψυχῆς περιοδοῖς, τῷ μετὰ νῦν προσχωμένῳ Μοῦσαις οὐκ εἴπ’ ἥδην ἀλόγου, καθάπερ νῦν, εἶναι δοκεῖ χρήσιμον, ὀλλ’ ἐπὶ τὴν γεγονόσαν ἐν θῆς αὐτᾶμοντος ψυχῆς περιοδοί εἰς κατακόψησιν καὶ συμφωνιῶν ἑαυτῇ ἐμμαχαὶ ὕπο Μουσῶν δεδοτα. Both these passages are probably present to Aristotle’s mind here.

9. διὰ τῶν Ἄλσουμπον μελῶν. Eaton refers to Plato, Symp. 215 C, τὰ οὖν ἔκεινον (i.e. Ἄλσουμπον), ἐὰν τε ἀγαθὸς αἰλητής αἰλή ἐὰν τε φαῦλη αἰλητρίς, μόνα κατέχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ δηλοὶ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν τε καὶ τελετῶν δεομένους διὰ τὸ θεῖα εἶναι. Bernays (Grundzüge der verl. Abhandlung des Aristoteles über Wirkung der Tragödie, Note 5) uses the passage before us to show that, when in c. 7. 1342 a 8 sqq. Aristotle describes the effect of τὰ ιδρο μελῆ, it is to these melodies of Olympus that he mainly refers. See as to them Sus. i. 621 sq.

11. ὁ δ’ ἐνθουσιασμὸς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has to prove that music affects τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἱθός, therefore he has to prove that the ἐνθουσιασμὸς which it admittedly produces is an affection of τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἱθός. Some may have regarded it as a σωματικὸν πάθος, like the πάθη referred to in Eth. Nic. 10. 1173 b 8 sqq., and others as a special condition of the νοῦς (cp. Plato, Ion 534 B, κοῦφον γὰρ χρήμα ποιητῆς ἐστι καὶ πτηνόν καὶ ιερόν, καὶ οὐ πρότερον οἶς τοὺς ποιεῖν, πρὸν ἀν ἐνθεός το γένηται καὶ ἔκφρουν καὶ ὁ νοῦς μικρείτε ἐν αὐτῷ ἑν, and Aristid. Quint. De Musica, p. 66, περὶ δὲ τὸ λογικὸν τῶν ἐνθουσιασμῶν ἑώρων), but Aristotle regards it as connected with an impulse to action (Magn. Mor. 2. 8. 1207 b 4, καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐνθουσιαζόμενοι ἀνει λόγον ὑμῖν ἔχουσι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τι: cp. Magn. Mor. 1. 20. 1190 b 35 sqq.),
and this is perhaps the reason why he here traces it to τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡδος. For other πάθη τού τῆς ψυχῆς ἡδονᾶς, Bonitz (Ind. 557 b 9) compares Rhet. 2. 9. 1386 b 12, where τὸ ἔλεείν and τὸ νεμεσαῖν are said to be καὶ ἄμφω τὰ πάθη ἡδονᾶς χρηστοῖ. Some of the external symptoms of εὐθυνησιασμὸς may be gathered from Dio Chrys. Or. 1. 62 R, ταύτα δὲ ἔλεγεν, οὐχ ὄσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν λεγομένων εὐθείων ἄνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν, αὐθεμαίνουσα καὶ περιδιανοῦσα τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ πειραμεῖν δεινῶν ἐμβλέπειν, ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἐγκρατῶς καὶ σωφρόνως.

12. ἐτὶ δὲ ἀκροώμενοι κ.τ.λ. Even mere imitative sounds without the aid of melody or rhythm call forth in every one the feelings which they imitate (see vol. i. p. 362, note 3). Thus a single note from the pitch-pipe of a slave was enough to restore calmness and gentleness to the tones of C. Gracchus' oratory when they became harsh and angry (Plut. De Cohib. Ira, c. 6). Aristotle has just been dwelling on the effect of the melodies of Olympus, and he now adds this remark in order to guard against the supposition that the effect produced by music on τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡδος is due not to its power of imitating ethical states, but to its accompaniments of melody and rhythm. Plato had spoken in Rep. 401 D (see note on 5) as if this was so. Aristotle appears to imply here that the musical imitation of ethical states is possible without the use of rhythm and melody; hence, when in c. 7. 1341 b 23 he speaks as if music was confined to μελοσονία and ῥυθμός, we must suppose that he refers to music in a somewhat narrower sense.

14. ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβεβηκέν τ.τ.λ., 'but since it happens that music belongs to the class of pleasant things, [so that it calls forth feelings of pleasure, and pleasure may be called forth by the right or the wrong objects,] and virtue is concerned with taking pleasure aright and loving and hating aright, it is evident that we ought to learn and to be habituated to nothing so much as to judging aright and taking pleasure in good characters and noble actions, [because it is thus that men learn virtue].' Aristotle proceeds in what follows to show that music is capable of teaching men to take pleasure in noble characters and actions, or in other words to be virtuous (cp. 1340 b 10 sqq.). Μανθάνειν is distinguished from συνκινεσθαι in 16, whereas in 4 (7). 13. 1332 b 10, τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐδιζόμενοι μανθάνουσιν, τὰ δὲ ἀκούοντες, the word μανθάνειν includes both ἐμπληκόμενοι and ἀκούοιν.

18. ἐστὶ δὲ ὅμοιωματα κ.τ.λ., 'and in rhythms and melodies there are images, most nearly approaching the reality, of anger and
NOTES.

gentleness,' etc. It is thus that Sepulveda ('proxime ad veras naturas accedunt'), Vict. ('maxime secundum veras naturas'), Stahr, and Sus. interpret μάλιστα παρὰ τῶν ἀληθινῶν φύσεις: cp. Top. 8. 14. 164 b 19, ἐκ τῶν παρὰ πόδας, 'things close to the feet.' Compare Alcidamas, De Sophistis, p. 88, μεμήματα τῶν ἀληθινῶν σωμάτων, and for φύσεις (with Bon. Ind. 838 b 55), Phys. 4. 6. 213 b 24, διὰ διορίσει τῶν φύσεις (i.e. τὰ ὄντα, τὰ σώματα). Aristotle, who here has before him Plato, Rep. 399 A sqq. (where however only ἄνθρωποι and σοφροσύνη are referred to, not πραοτήτις), and Laws 654 E, 655 B, and 798 D, appears to imply that the images of emotions and ethical states conveyed in melody and rhythm approach nearer to the original than those conveyed for instance in poetry, except so far as poetry is associated with melody and rhythm. The question might be asked why the young should not be taught to take pleasure in good characters and good acts by a training concerning itself directly with that subject-matter and not merely with images of it, but Aristotle would probably reply that there would not be the same pleasurableness in a training of that kind as there is in a musical training, and that it would not fulfil the end of accustoming the young to take pleasure in the right things.

20. καὶ πάντων τῶν ἑναντίων τούτοις. Aristotle implies that musical imitations not only of cowardice but also of ἀκολασία, the opposite of σοφροσύνη, are possible. Music can certainly at any rate imitate ὀκρία.

21. τῶν ἄλλων ἡθικῶν, sc. παθῶν καὶ ἐξεων τοῦ ἡθικοῦ (Sus.3 Ind. s. v. ἡθικός).

22. μεταβάλλομεν γὰρ τὴν ψυχῆν, i.e. we experience emotional change: cp. (with Vahlen, Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. 3. 336) Rhet. 2. 1. 1378 a 20, ἔτσι δὲ τὰ πάθη δὲ ὁσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις, οἷς ἔπεται λύπη καὶ ἵδου, οὐδὲ ἀργὴ ἔλεος φῶς καὶ ὁσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἑναντία.

23. τοιούτων, sc. τοιούτων καὶ μελῶν.

25. οἴον εἰ τις κ.τ.λ. For the thought cp. De Part. An. 1. 5. 645 a 10 sqq.

μὴ δὲ ἄλλην αἰτίαν ἄλλα διὰ τὴν μορφὴν αὐτῆς is added, because if a man took pleasure in an image (for example) on account of the beauty or costliness of its material, he might not take equal pleasure in the thing of which it is an image. Cp. Poet. 4. 1448 b 15, δὲ γὰρ τούτο χαίρουσι τὰς εἰκόνας ὄρωντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει δεινοῦτας μανθάνειν
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kai συλλογίζομαι τι έκαστον, οίνον ότι δέστε έκείνος, ἑπεὶ εάν μή τέχνη προσωρικός, οὐ διὰ μίμημα ποιήσει τήν ἤθοσάν άλλα διὰ τήν ἀπεργασίαν ἢ τῆν χρώμαν ἢ διά τοιαύτην τινά ἄλλην αύτίαν.

27. αὐτήν έκείνην. Bekk. adopts the emendation of Lambinus and Scaliger, αυτοῦ έκείνον, perhaps rightly. If we retain αυτήν έκείνην, we must supply τούτον as the antecedent to οὗ.

28. συμβέβηκε δὲ κ.τ.λ. Eaton and Prof. Butcher (Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, ed. 2, p. 132 sq.) compare Probl. 19. 27. 919 b 26, διὰ τὸ τὔκουστὸν μόνον ἤθος ἔχει τῶν αἰσθητῶν; καὶ γάρ εάν ἢ ἀνεν λόγον μέλος, ὅμως ἔχει ἤθος. Άλλ' οὐ τὸ χρώμα οὔδε ἡ ὀψιν οὔδε ὁ χυμὸς ἔχει. ἢ ὅτι κίνησιν ἔχει μόνον ... αἱ δὲ κινήσεις αὐταὶ πρακτικά εἶσαι, αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἤθους σημασία ἐστίν, and Probl. 19. 29. 920 a 3 sqq. Prof. Butcher points out that these passages exaggerate the true Aristotelian view, as they deny all ethical suggestiveness to sight as well as to taste and smell. 'Εν μὲν τοῖς δύλοις τῶν αἰσθητῶν ('other sensible things than things audible') is taken up not by ἄλλα, 30, but by ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς, 38.

31. σχήματα γάρ ἐστι τοιαύτα κ.τ.λ., 'for there are forms that have this power' (i.e. the power of imitating emotions and ethical states), 'but only to a small extent, and all, [even children and worthless men,] share in the perception just referred to.' The painter Parrhasius denied in a conversation with Socrates (Xen. Mem. 3. 10. 3) that painting can imitate the character of the soul (τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἤθος), but was led on by Socrates to a different conclusion (Xen. Mem. 3. 10. 5, ἄλλα μὲν καὶ τὸ μεγαλοπρεπὲς τε καὶ ἐλευθέρων καὶ τὸ ταπεινόν τε καὶ ἄνελευθέρων καὶ τὸ σωφρονικόν τε καὶ φρόνιμον καὶ τὸ ὑβριστικόν τε καὶ ἀπειροκέλαν καὶ διὰ τοῦ προσώπου καὶ διὰ τῶν σχημάτων καὶ ἐστῶτων καὶ κινουμένων ἀνθρώπων διαφαίνει. 'Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἐφή. Οὐκόν καὶ ταύτα μιμητά; Καὶ μάλα, ἐφη). Plato went further (Rep. 400 E sq.) and found not only painting, but also weaving, embroidery, building, and the forms of vessels and of animals and plants, full of ethical suggestiveness, but Aristotle rates the ethical suggestiveness of forms and colours lower and finds such suggestiveness, it would seem, only in the human body under the influence of emotion (compare the passage of Xenophon quoted above), or in representations of it. See vol. i. p. 363, note 5. As to καί πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνούσιν, see note on 1340 a 2, and vol. i. p. 363, note 3. Spengel and Sus. transpose ἄλλ' εἰπὶ μικρῶν to after κοινωνούσιν, 32, while E. Müller inserts οὐ before πάντες, 31. If any change in the text is necessary, of which I do not feel certain, I prefer the former change
to the latter, but it would also be possible to add a second ἐπὶ μικρὸν after πάντες, 31. Forms and colours are mentioned as examples of τὰ ὀρατά: cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 13. 1118 a 3, τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὀψεως, ἐνόν χρώματι καὶ σχῆματι καὶ γραφῆ.

32. ἐπὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. For the distinction between copies and symbolic representations of an original, see Prof. Butcher, Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, ed. 2, p. 124, who refers to Teichmüller, Aristotelische Forschungen, 2. 145–154, where the subject is fully discussed. 'A sign or symbol has no essential resemblance, no natural connexion, with the thing signified.' Aristotle does not say that painting and sculpture can give only symbolic representations of all that they imitate, but that it is only in this way that they can reproduce character. In τὰ γεγράμενα σχῆματα καὶ χρώματα Aristotle seems to refer to forms and colours in pictures and statues (for we read of painters in Poet. 1. 1447 a 18 as μιμοῦμενοι καὶ χρώμασι καὶ σχῆμασι, cp. Plato, Rep. 373 B), not to attitudes and colours in living men. The words τὰ γεγράμενα σχῆματα καὶ χρώματα are added by an afterthought in explanation of ταῦτα very much as ἡ περὶ τὴν τροφήν is added in 1. 9. 1258 a 16 sqq.: cp. also [Demosth.] c. Aristog. 2. 19, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα γε νὴ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν ὄνειδός ἐστιν, ἀνδρεῖς δικασταί, τὰ γεγράμενα τῇ πόλει ἐπὶ τοῦ βῆματος. As to the repetition of τῶν ἡδῶν in 33 and 34 see critical notes on 1276 a 21 and 1319 a 33, and explanatory note on 1284 b 28.

34. καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν. I now take this to mean, 'and these indications of character occur [only] in the case of the body under the influence of emotions, [so that it is not forms in general, but only a particular kind of forms, that are even indications of character].' I explained this obscure clause otherwise, though with much hesitation, in vol. i. p. 363. For the suppression of 'only,' see note on 1282 a 36. For ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος cp. Plut. Sympos. 9. 15. 2. 747 C, δότων Ἀπόλλωνος ἡ Πανός ἡ τινος Βάκχης σχῆμα διαβέβει ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος γραφικός τοῖς εἴδεσιν ἐπιμένωσι. For the fact, cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 5. 1147 a 14, ἀλλὰ μὴν ὡς διατίθενται οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες: θυμοὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐπιθυμία ἀφροδισίων καὶ ἐνώ τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιθήλως καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεθιστάσων. To many modern minds, however, there seems to be ethical suggestiveness in architecture.

35. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὡς διαφέρει κ.τ.λ., 'not but that, so far as it makes a difference in relation to the contemplation of these things also [whether we contemplate one thing or another],' etc. By 'these things' Aristotle means forms and colours.
36. δεί μη τὰ Παύσωνος κ.τ.λ.  Cr. Poet. 2. 1448 a i, ἐπεὶ δὲ μμοιὸνται οἱ μμοιὸμενοι πράττονται, ἀνάγκῃ δὲ τοῦτον ἡ σπουδαῖος ἡ φαινομεν εἶναι . . . ἦτοι βελτίωνος ἡ καθ ἡμᾶς ἡ χεῖρονας ἡ καὶ τοιοῦτος, ἀστερ οἰ γραφεῖς, Πολύνυμοισ μὲν γὰρ κρείττουσ; Παύσων δὲ χεῖρους, Διονύσιος δὲ ὁμοίους εἶκασ. In this, we learn from what follows, Polygnatus found a parallel in Homer and Pausan in poets far inferior to Homer. In the passage before us it is implied that Pausan was not ἤθικος, and according to Sus., 1. p. 624, Aristotle means by "an artist "full of character" (ἡθικὸς)" one who 'represents noble characters'. The word ἤθικος appears to bear this meaning here and in c. 7. 1342 a 3, 28, but in c. 6. 1341 a 21, ἐτὶ δὲ οὐκ ἐστιν ὁ αἰλὸς ἤθικων ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀργαστικῶν, it evidently means simply 'expressive of ethical character' as distinguished from 'emotional.' In Poet. 6. 1450 a 26 we read of Polygnatus, οὖν καὶ τῶν γραφέων Ζεύγεις πρὸς Πολύνυμων πέπονθεν ο μὲν γὰρ Πολύνυμωσ ἄγαθος ἰδιογράφος, ἢ δὲ Ζεύγειδος γραφὴ οὐδὲν ἔχει ἤθος. Lysippus may be among the sculptors referred to as ἤθικοι: cp. Plut. De Alex. seu Virtute seu Fortuna 2. 2, διὰ καὶ μᾶνων 'Ἀλέξαιδρος ἐκέλευε Λύσιππον εἰκόνας αὐτοῦ δημιουργεῖν' μᾶνως γὰρ αὐτὸς, ὥε εὖκε, κατεμήνυν τῷ χαλκῷ τὸ ἤθος αὐτοῦ καὶ συνεζητερ τῇ μορφῇ τὴν ἀρετήν. As to the skill of Polygnatus in portraying character, see Brunn, Gesch. der gr. Künstler 2. 40. There were paintings by Polygnatus at Athens in the Stoa Poecile, in the Anacieum, in a chamber of the Propylaea, and elsewhere, so that his work must have been familiar to Aristotle's hearers. As to Pausan, see Brunn 2. 49 sqq. and Overbeck, Schriftquellen, p. 212, both of whom take Aristophanes to refer to him in Acharn. 854, Thesmoph. 948 sq., and Plut. 602. If they are right in this, Pausan would seem to have been a contemporary of Aristophanes.

38. ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς, 'in melodies taken by themselves' apart from anything else, apart from the person of the singer and from the words sung. Forms and colours, on the other hand, are suggestive of character only in the case of the body under the influence of emotion.

40. εὐθὺς γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for, to begin with, the nature of harmonies, [which are elements in melody] is different.' Aristotle goes on to show in 1340 b 7 sqq. that the same thing holds of rhythms, and probably he regarded a melody as made up of harmony and rhythm, just as Plato, who, unlike Aristotle (c. 5. 1339 b 20), did not approve of ψυλη μουσική (Laws 669 D sq.), regarded it as made up of words, harmony, and rhythm (Rep. 398 D). If harmonies
affect the ἢδος of the hearer differently, it follows that they differ in ἢδος and are μυμᾶτα τῶν ἢδων. The word ἄρμονία had more meanings than one (Monro, The Modes of Ancient Greek Music, p. 56), but it is evidently used here of the Dorian, Phrygian, and other ‘modes,’ whatever we take their nature to have been. On this disputed question see (in addition to Sus.⁴, i. p. 624 sqq.) the work of Mr. Monro just referred to, Mr. H. Stuart Jones’ review of it in Class. Rev. 8. 448 sqq., and Mr. Monro’s reply (ibid. 9.79 sqq.).

41. ἄλλως διατίθενται καὶ μῆ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔχειν τρόπον. For the pleonasm cp. Poet. i. 1447 a 17, τῷ ἐτέρῳ καὶ μῆ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπον, and see Vahlen on this passage. For the fact cp. Sext. Empir. Adv. Math. 6. 48 (p. 757. 29 sqq. Bekker), ὅπερ δὲν ἀλ’ ὅν τρόπον ἄπαν διάστημα κατὰ μονοικὴν ἐν φθόγγοις ἔχει τὴν ὑπόστασιν, οὕτω καὶ πάν ἢδος. τὸ δ’ ἐστὶ τῇ γένους μελῳδίας. καθά γὰρ τῶν ἀνθρώπινων ἢδῶν τιν δὲν ἐστὶ σκυθρωπᾶ καὶ στιβαρώτερα, ὅπω ὅ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἱστοροῦσιν, τὰ δὲ εὐένθοτα πρὸς ἑρωτας καὶ οἰνοφληγίας καὶ ὀδυρμοῖς καὶ οἴμωγις, οὕτω τίς μὲν μελῳδία σεμνὰ τυχὶ καὶ ἀστεία ἐμποιεῖ τῇ ψυχῇ κυμάτα, τίς δὲ ταπεινώτερα καὶ ἀγενή.

42. ἄλλα πρὸς μὲν ἐνίας κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has before him Plato, Rep. 398 D, ἄλλα μέντοι θρήνων τε καὶ ὀδυρμῶν ἔσαμεν ἐν λόγοις οὕτων προσδείχθησαι. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Τίνες οὖν θρηματικὰ ἄρμονίαι; λέγε μοι οὖ γὰρ μονοικός. Μεζολυδιστί, ἐφί, καὶ συντονολυδιστί καὶ τοιαῦτα τινές. Οἶκοιν αὕται, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ἄφαιρεται’ ἀφήροτοι γὰρ καὶ γυναῖκιν, ὡς δὲν ἐπιεικέσι ἐναι, μὴ ὅτι ἄνθρασι (possibly a hit at Sappho, who is credited with the invention of the mixo-Lydian mode by Aristoxenus ap. Plut. De Mus. c.16), and Laws 800 D, πάσαν βλασφημίαν τῶν ίερῶν καταχέουσι, ῥήμασι τε καὶ μυθοῖς καὶ γοαδεστύτασι ἄρμονίαις συντείνοστε τὰς ἐκρομομένας ψυχῶς, καὶ δ’ ἂν δακρύσασθαι μᾶλιστα τὴν δύσας παραχάσα τοῦσα πόλιν, οὕτω τὰ νυκτήρια φέρει. He also has before him Pratinas ap. Athen. Deipn. 624 f (Pratinas, Fragm. 5),

μήτε σύντονον διώκει μήτε τὰν ἀνεμέναν λαστὶ μοῦσαν, ἄλλα τὰν ἐμπνεῦς . . νέων ἁρπάζαν αἰώλιζε τῷ μέλει,

where, as Sus.⁴ points out, the Aeolian mode is described as intermediate between ‘high-pitched Ionian’ and ‘low Ionian.’ Pratinas, however, declares in favour, not of the Dorian mode, as Aristotle, but of the Aeolian, later called the hypo-Dorian according to Athen. Deipn. 625 a.

δυντικωτέρως καὶ συνεστικότως μᾶλλον. Grief was believed to compress and joy to expand the mind: cp. Eurip. Alcest. 771
Bothe (797 Dindorf), τού νῦν σκυθρωποῦ καὶ ξυνεστῶτος φρενῶν, and Hippol. 937 Bothe (983 Dindorf), μένος μὲν ξύστασις τε σῶν φρενῶν, and Cic. Tusc. Disp. 4. 31. 66, eodem enim vitio est effusio animi in laetitia quo in dolore contractio. So the Stoics defined λύπη as συστολὴ ἀλογος and explained ἡδονὴ as ἐπαρσις (Diog. Laert. 7. 111, 114: see Pearson, Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes, p. 180). In Laws 8oo D (quoted above) Plato had spoken of the ψυχὴ generally, but Aristotle here speaks more particularly of the διάνοια as affected by the various musical modes (cp. 134o b 2); he regards it as susceptible of compression and relaxation, two extreme states, and also of a mean state of calm. He was led by a false etymology of the Greek word ἐπιστήμη to connect wisdom and knowledge with a calm state of mind (Phys. 7. 3. 247 b 10, τῷ γὰρ ἡμερήσαι καὶ στήναι τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπιστήσαται καὶ φρονέων λέγομεν, and 18 sqq.), and this is perhaps one reason why he selects the composed and collected Dorian mode for use in education. He feels that anything which calms is useful both morally and intellectually. In Aesch. Suppl. 69, τὸς καὶ ἐγὼ φιλόδυρος ἦσον ἤσσαι νόσοις διάπω τῶν ἀπαλῶν νειλοθείη παρειάν, the high-pitched variety of the Ionian mode is probably referred to. This variety, which some identify with the mixo-Lyodian (see Sus. 4, 1. 625 sqq.), appears to have been expressive of lamentation.

2. πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαλακωτέρως τὴν διάνοιαν, οἷον πρὸς τὰς ἀνειμένας. 134o b. Aristotle probably refers to the softer varieties of the Ionian and Lydian modes: cp. Plato, Rep. 398 Ε, where these varieties (if we follow Mr. H. Stuart Jones’ interpretation of the passage in Class. Rev. 8. 449, note) are said to be μαλακά καὶ συμπτομακαί.

3. μέσως καὶ καθεστηκότως, ‘in a midway state of collectedness and composure’: cp. c. 7. 1342 a 1o, καθισταμένοις, and Plut. De Gen. Socr. c. 32, καθεστηκότα, and for the conjunction of μέσως and καθεστηκότως, Eth. Eud. 7. 5. 1239 b 35, εἰς τὸ μέσον καθίσταται, and 124o a 2 sq. Καθίστασθαι is conjoined with σωφρονίζονθαι in Hist. An. 7. 1. 582 a 25. As to the Dorian mode, cp. c. 7. 1342 b 12 sqq. Plutarch describes the songs sung by the Spartans as πολύ τὸ κόσμον ἔχοντα καὶ καταστατικόν (Lycurg. c. 4), and Heracleides Ponticus (ap. Athen. Deipn. 624 d) says of the Dorian mode, ἣ μὲν οὖν δάρμος ἀρμονία τὸ ἀνθρώπος ἐρμαίνει καὶ τὸ μεγαλοπρεπὲς καὶ οὐ διακεχυμένον οὐδὲ δαιμών, ἀλλὰ σκυθρωπὸν καὶ σφοδρόν, οὕτω δὲ παυκίλον οὕτε πολύτροπον: cp. Plut. De Mus. c. 16, ἣ μὲν (δωριστὶ) τὸ μεγαλοπρεπὲς καὶ ἄξιοματικὸν ἀποδίδωσιν.
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4. ἐνθουσιαστικὸς δ’ ἐφφυγιστῆ, sc. δοκεῖ ποιεῖν. Cr. 1340 a 10 and c. 7. 1342 b 1 sqq.

5. ταῦτα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle evidently takes his account of the mental effect of each of the harmonies from οἱ περὶ τὴν παιδείαν ταῦταν πεφιλοσοφηκότες, ‘those who had studied musical education.’ Some musicians (Damon, for instance, as Sus‘, r. p. 596, points out, referring to Plato, Rep. 400 B and 424 C) had probably done this, and also some philosophers (cp. c. 7. 1341 b 27 sqq. and 1342 a 30 sqq.). Among the philosophers would be Plato (Rep. 398 Ε—399 Α and elsewhere) and some of his disciples (Plut. De Mus. c. 3 init.), e.g. Heracleides Ponticus, and perhaps, as Eaton says, some Pythagoreans (cp. Plut. De Virt. Mor. c. 3. 441 Ε). It has been suggested by Mr. H. Stuart Jones (Class. Rev. 8. 450) that Aristotle’s view of the mental effect of the various modes rests on a verbal basis, the word ἀνειμένοι meaning both ‘loosely strung’ (or ‘low-pitched’) and ‘soft, relaxed,’ and the word σύννονοι both ‘highly strung’ (or ‘high-pitched’) and the reverse of ‘soft’ and ‘relaxed’; it appears, however, from the passage before us that his view comes to him from other authorities, so that the verbal confusion supposed to exist would be theirs rather than his. But indeed the emphatic statement in 6, λαμβάνοι τὰ μαρτυρία τῶν λόγων ἡξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἑργῶν, suggests that these authorities arrived at their conclusion inductively by watching the effect of the different modes on individual hearers.


8. οἳ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rhet. 3. 8. 1408 b 32, τῶν δὲ ρυθμῶν ὁ μὲν ἠρῆσος σεμνὸς καὶ λεκτικὴς ἀρμονίας δεόμενος, ὁ δὲ ἵμβος αὐτῇ ἐστιν ἡ λέξις τῶν πολλῶν... δὲ τροχαῖοι κορδακικότεροι· δηλοὶ δὲ τὰ τετράμετρα, ἐστὶ γὰρ τροχεῖα δομῶς τὰ τετράμετρα· λείπεται δὲ πιαίν. Poet. 24. 1459 b 34, τὰ γὰρ ἠρωίκον στασιμότατον καὶ ὀρχικόστατον τῶν μέτρων ἐστὶ... τὸ δὲ ἱμβικὸν καὶ τετράμετρον κυνηκικὰ, τὸ μὲν ὀρχιστικόν, τὸ δὲ πρακτικόν. As the trochee is κορδακικότερος, it is probably regarded by Aristotle as φορτικότερα ἐξών τὰς κινήσεις: cp. Athen. Deipn. 631 d, ὦ μὲν κόρδας παρ’ Ἐλλησι φορτικὸς ᾧ ὦ ἐμμελεία σπουδαία, and 629 b sq. Compare the striking picture in Plut. Sympos. 7. 5. 1 of the effect produced by a skilful αὐλοφός on the guests at a banquet—οὐδὲ γὰρ κατακειμένοις ἐτι βοῶν ἐξήκρικε καὶ κροτείν, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶντες ἀνεπήδων οἱ πολλοί, καὶ
we know the kinsmen acquaintance of κρούσμαν, προπούσας de tois κρούσμασιν ἑκεῖνοι καὶ τοῖς μέλεσιν. We read in Plato, Rep. 400 B, of κρούσματα καὶ ἀξίωσις ἢ μανιάς καὶ ἀλλὰς κακίας προπούσαι βάσεις, and in Laws 669 C of μυθούς δοῦλων καὶ κρούσματων: cp. also 815 E.

10. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων κ.τ.λ. Aristotle says nothing about the question raised in c. 5. 1339 a 25, whether music contributes to διαγωγή and φρόνησις.

12. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. The reason for which Pythagoras employed music in education, according to Plut. De Virt. Mor. c. 3. 441 E, was akin to this, but not quite the same. Plutarch there says that he ἐπηγάγετο τὴν μουσικὴν τὴν ψυχὴν κηλίσας ἐνεκα καὶ παραμεθρία, ὅσο οὐ πῶς ἔχονσι διδασκαλία καὶ μαθήμασιν ὑπήκοον, οὔτε λόγῳ μεταβλητῶν ἐκ κακίας, ἀλλὰ τινος ἑτέρος πειθοῦς συνεργοῦ καὶ πλάσαις καὶ τιθασείσεως δεόμενον, εἰ μὴ πανταπαίσι μέλλοις φιλοσοφία δυσμεταχείριστον εἶναι καὶ ἀπέδειξιν.

15. οἱ μὲν γὰρ νεῶν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 15. 1119 b 5 sqq., Plato, Laws 659 E, διὰ δὲ τὸ σπουδὴν μὴ δύνασθαι φέρειν τὰς τῶν νεῶν ψυχὰς παιδιάς τε καὶ φίλας καλείσθαι (sc. δοκούσι) καὶ πράττεινθαι, and Isocr. Areop. § 43, ἐφόρων γὰρ ... τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν (i.e. τῶν νεωτέρων) μᾶλως παιδευθήσαι δεόμεναι ἐπιθυμίας καλῶν ἐπιθυμεμένων καὶ πόνου ἡδονᾶς ἔχοντων εἰ μόνοις γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἐμμεῖναι τῶν ελευθερῶν τεθραμμένων καὶ μεγαλοφρονεῖν εἰδισμένους. Isocrates here (like Plato in Rep. 536 E, ψυχὴ δὲ βιαοῦν οὖν ἐμμοῦν μάθημα) adopts the Pythagorean view (Aristox. Fragm. 22 : Muller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 279) that study, if it is to come to anything, must be willingly pursued. Aristotle seems to think so too.

16. ἡ δὲ μουσικὴ φύσει τῶν ἡδυμένων ἀστίν. 'Ἡ μουσικὴ (sc. τέχνη ou ἐπιστήμη) is ἡδυομένη because rhythm and harmony and melody go with it (Poet. 6. 1449 b 28 sqq.). In Poet. 6. 1450 b 15 we read τῶν δὲ λαοντὶς πέντε ἡ μελοποία μέγιστον τῶν ἡδυμένων, and Prof. Bywater (Journal of Philology, xiv. 1885, p. 42) would read ἡδυμένως here. 'Ανήδυμενον, however, finds a better antithesis in ἡδυμένων than in ἡδυμένων.

17. καὶ τις ἐς ἐκεῖνο συγγενέα κ.τ.λ. Supply πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν (see Vol. ii., p. li., note 4). The sense is—and not only is music τῶν ἡδυμένων, but it is also akin to the soul (which is not the case with all ἡδυμένα), and therefore still more congenial to it than those ἡδυμένα which are not akin to it. I cannot follow Sus. in transposing 17-19 to after ἐλευθερωτέρας, 10. Cp. Plato, Tim. 47 D, ἡ δὲ ἀρμονία, ἐξυγγενέις ἔχουσα φορὰς ταῖς εἰ ἡμῖν τὴν ψυχῆς περιόδους, κ.τ.λ., VOL. III.
and Probl. 19. 38. 920 b 33, μυθώ& δε χαιρομεν δια το γνωριμον και
tetaygmenoν &ri&&.δον ἢest& και κινει &ri&.δον ἡμι- τεταγμενων oikeiotera γαρ &ri& τη τεταγ-
mενη κίνησις φυσε την ανάκτου, ὡστε και κατα φύσαν μαλλον. That which
is akin to the soul is likely to be suitable to it (cp. c. 7. 1342 a 25 :
Eth. Nic. io. 7. 1178 a 5, το γαρ οικευον &kappa& τη φυσει κράτιστον και
ηδισων ειτων &kappa& Plato, Lysis 214 B, 221 E sqq.).
18. διδ πολιοι κ.τ.λ. The Pythagoreans held that the soul is
a harmony, and two of Aristotle's disciples, Aristoxenus and Dicae-
archus, followed them in this opinion (see Sus.4, i. 597, who refers
to Zeller, Gr. Ph. i. 444 and 2. 2. 888, 890 (Aristotle and the earlier
The view that the soul has harmony is that of Plato (Phaedo 93:
see Sus. 4, ibid.). For the two views cp. De Caelo i. i. 268 a 4, των
γαρ φυσει συνεστωτων τα μεν εστι σωματα και μεγεθυ, τα δ' &ri&
εστι σωμα και
μεγεθος, τα δ' &ri& σωμα
&kappa; των εχουσων εισιν, and Plut. Camill. c. 20, κίνησις δε
tis &kappa; σωμα της κινησει παντος &kappa; γενεσις.
C. 6. 20. χαιρουργωντας takes the place of κυβαριζωντας (c. 5. 1339 b 8),
partly because Aristotle does not wish to pre Judge the question of
the αιλος, partly because the use of the word χαιρουργειν serves to
place in a strong light the doubtful ness of the point, the Greeks
being prejudiced against χαιρουργια. We shall find in the sequel
that Aristotle seeks to confine χαιρουργια within as narrow limits as
possible (cp. 1340 b 35 sqq. and 1341 b 1). He nowhere considers
the possible alternative of teaching the young to sing but not to
play. The two things usually went together in ancient Greece, so
far at any rate as solo-singers were concerned; the singer was
expected to be able to accompany himself on the lyre.
21. πρότερον, in c. 5. 1339 a 33 sqq.
22. ουκ αδηλον κ.τ.λ. This takes up 1o sqq., Εκ μεν ουν τοιτων
κ.τ.λ. For ποιον τινας cp. c. 5. 1339 a 22, ος δυναμεν ... και την
μοναςκειν το ἧδος ποιων τι ποιειν, εβιζουσαν δυνασθαι χαιρεων ὄρθως. To
become ποιοι τινας is to acquire a certain έξις (Categ. 8. 8 b 25,
pοιτητα δε λεγω καθ' ἕν ποιοι τινας ειναι λεγονται; έστι δε η ποιτης των
πλεοναξων λεγομενων. εν μεν ουν ειδος ποιτητος έξις και διαθεσι λεγεσθω-
σαν), and it is by acquiring the appropriate δυναμας or έξις that we
become able to judge of things (De An. 3. 3. 428 a 3). But the
έξις is acquired by practice (Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 a 31, τα δ' αρετας
λαμβανομεν ενεργησταις προτερον, υπστερ και επι των άλλων τεχνων κ.τ.λ.).
Aristotle's language here seems hardly consistent with his language in Pol. 3. ii.
1281 b 7 sqq. He does not speak there as if it was
necessary to have learnt to sing and play in order to judge of music aright. We are told, again, in 3. ii. 1282 a 17 sqq. that there are arts in which the user is a better judge than the master of the art. Are we to infer that music is not one of these? Besides, Aristotle’s teaching in the passage before us appears to imply that we ought to practise in youth all kinds of music—not merely the ethical kind, which he alone recommends for use in the education of the young (c. 7. 1342 a 2), but also practical and enthusiastic airs, for otherwise how can we judge of these aright?—and indeed all arts of the products of which we desire to become good judges (e.g. poetry, painting, sculpture, and architecture, to say nothing of the useful arts). This he does not seem to have observed. His experience as to music evidently was that those who did not practise the art up to a certain point were apt to rest content with music possessing merely a physical charm—the music which pleased slaves and children—and did not acquire a liking for noble music. By ‘good judges’ Aristotle clearly means not good judges of music from a technical point of view, but men capable of taking pleasure in ethically good music (cp. c. 5. 1340 a 17 and 1339 a 24). The difference between γίγνεσθαι, 22, and γενέσθαι, 25, may be illustrated by Plato, Theaet. 155 C, ἀνευ γὰρ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι γενέσθαι ἀδύνατον (sc. ἐμὲ οἰάστῳ): see also Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, § 97.

25. ἀμα δὲ καὶ δει τοὺς παίδας ἔχειν τινὰ διατριβήν. The value of education in keeping boys out of mischief is recognized by Isocrates in Panath. § 27 and Areop. § 45: cp. Plato, Protag. 326 A. ‘Children are sent to school as much to keep them out of harm’s way as to prepare them for after-life,’ observes a writer in the Academy for Nov. 9, 1895, who probably remembers and extends to all children a remark as to little children which has been pointed out to me in Spectator, No. 330 (March 19, 1712), ‘as little children are sent to school before they are capable of improvement, only to be out of harm’s way.’

26. τὴν Ἀρχύτου πλαταγήν. As to the rattle of Archytas, cp. Plut. Sympos. 7. 10. 1, εἴ δὲ μή, δοτέων ὁσπερ παισίν ἄτρεμειν μή δυναμένοις, οὔ δόμων καὶ ξέρως, ἀλλὰ πλαταγὴν καὶ σφαῖραν (cp. Anthol. Pal. 6. 309), ὁσπερ δ’ θεᾶς τῶν πάρθηκα τοὺς μεθύοντας ἐνεχείρησε κούφωταν βέλος καὶ μαλακότατον ἀμπυρίτηρον, δόπως, ἐπεὶ τάχιστα παίονων, ἥκιστα βλάπτοσι: Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. ii. 213 (where however the invention is ascribed to an Archytas who was a τέκτων): N n 2
NOTES.

Lucr. 5. 229. Archytas was fond of playing with children (Aelian, Var. Hist. 12. 15: Athen. Deipn. 519 b). Πλαταγι, however, appear to have existed before the time of Archytas, for they were known to Hellanicus and to Pherecydes of Athens (see Göttling’s note on the passage before us, and Hellan. Fragm. 61, Pherecyd. Fragm. 32 in Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 53, 78). As to the form 'Αρχύτον see critical note.


30. ἡ δὲ παιδεία πλαταγή τοῖς μείζονι τῶν νέων. Are these words present to the mind of the writer of Virg. Catal. 7,

Et vos, Stiloque Tarquitique Varroque,
Scholasticorum natio madens pingui,
Ite hinc, inane cymbalon iuventutis?

33. τὸ δὲ πρέπον καὶ τὸ μὴ πρέπον ταῖς ἡλικίαις κ.τ.λ. Here the difficulty raised in c. 5. 1339 b 8, ἀλλὰ καὶ βασιλεύουσα καλοῦμεν τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ τὸ πράττειν οὐκ ἄνδρος μὴ μεθύνοντος ἡ παιζοντος, is taken up and answered.

34. λύσαι, sc. τὴν ἐπιτίμησιν : cp. 40 sqq.

35. πρῶτων μὲν γάρ κ.τ.λ., 'for first, since it is [only] for the sake of judging of music that they are to practise playing [and not for the sake of perfect mastery of execution], on account of this they should indeed practise playing in youth, but as they become older, they should be released from playing, and yet be able to distinguish noble airs and to take pleasure in music aright, thanks to the training which they have received in youth.' Though it is provided here that, as men cease to be youthful, they shall be excused playing on an instrument, singing is apparently contemplated even in the case of aged men in c. 7. 1342 b 20 sqq., if this passage is genuine. Aristotle would seem to be less favourable to playing in the case of adult citizens than many were: not a few Pythagoreans played on the harp (Cic. Tusc. Disp. 5. 39. 113 : Aelian, Var. Hist. 14. 23), and on the αὐλός (Athen. Deipn. 184 e), and so did Epaminondas (Athen. ibid. : Cic. Tusc. Disp. 1. 2. 4). Socrates learnt the harp in old age (Diog. Laert. 2. 32 : Val. Max. 8. 7. Ext. 8).
5 (8). 6. 1340 b 29—1341 a 7.  549

42. μέχρι τέ πόσου κ.τ.λ.  Cp. c. 2. 1337 b 15 sqq., and see note. This question receives an answer in 1341 a 5-17. Τούς πρὸς ἀρετὴν παιδευομένους πολιτικὴν, 'those who are being educated with a view to excellence as citizens,' and not with a view to excellence as musical executants. Πολιτικὴν is emphasized by its position in the sentence. So in De Part. An. i. 1. 642 a 29 sqq. a contrast is implied between ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀρετὴ (including perhaps ἡδικὴ ἀρετὴ and φρόνησις) and ἡ τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀρετὴ. Cp. also Isocr. Panath. § 183, τοὺς ἀρετὴς ἀντιποιμένους, μὴ τῆς ἑπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν ὑμηρομοομένης καὶ πολλῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ τῆς τοιούτου κάγαθος τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐν ταῖς ὕσυναῖς μετ' εὐσεβείας καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἐγγεγυγομένης, and see note on 1280 b 5.

1. καὶ ποίων μελῶν καὶ ποίων ῥυθμῶν κοινωνητέον. The question 1341 a. as to the melodies is answered in 1341 a 9 sqq. and in c. 7. 1341 b 19 sqq., but the question as to the rhythms is not answered in what we possess of the Politics (see vol. i. p. 367, and vol. ii. p. xxviii sqq.). We may probably infer, however, from c. 5. 1340 b 7 sqq. that the rhythms used in education will be οἱ ἐχοντες ἡδος στασιμώτερον.

2. ἐτι δὲ ἐν ποιῶν ὑργάνοις κ.τ.λ. Answered in 1341 a 17-b 8. Ἐν is used here of the 'medium' of instruction, as it is often used in the Poetics (e.g. in Poet. i. 1447 b 29) of the medium of imitation (see Eucken, Praepositionen, p. 24: Bon. Ind. 245 b 42 sqq.): cp. Plato, Laches, 182 A, οἱ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς περὶ τῶν πόλεμον ὑργάνοις γυμναζόμενοι.

4. τρόπους τυνάς τῆς μουσικῆς, 'some kinds of music' (for the use of τρόποι in the sense of ἐδει see Bon. Ind. 772 b 30 sqq.). οἱ τεχνικοὶ τρόποι τῆς μουσικῆς, οἱ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγώνας (1341 b 10), are referred to: cp. 1341 b 14 sqq.

6. μήτε ἐμποδίζειν πρὸς τὰς ὑστέρους πράξεις. It is implied that the study of music might stand in the way of a citizen's work in after-life without harming the body. It might do so if it lowered the character or enfeebled the intelligence (c. 2. 1337 b 8-11), and this result might well follow if music were studied as festival-performers study it.

7. μήτε τὸ σῶμα ποιεῖν βάναυσον καὶ ἅρπασον πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἀσκήσεις, πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσεις ἡλιθία, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαθήσεις ὑστέρους. By τὰς πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἀσκήσεις Aristotle probably means 'military and civic training,' 'training designed to develop military and civic virtue': cp. 2. 9. 1271b 5, μὴδὲ ἰατρικὴν μηδεμίαν ἀσκησιν ἐτέρων κυριωτέραν τῆς πολεμικῆς, 5 (8). 6. 1340b 42, τοῖς
πρὸς ἀρετήν παιδευμένοις πολιτικῆν, and 5 (8). 1337 b 8–11. The words πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσεις ἤδη, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαθήσεις ὑστερον appear to be added in explanation and limitation of ἄχρηστον πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἀσκήσεις, but their meaning is by no means clear. Coray’s note on them is “οὐκ ἐρρωταί τὸ χωρίον.” Some explain τὰς χρήσεις (in the sense of doing the thing studied) as one form of the military and civic training referred to and τὰς μαθήσεις as another, and regard χρήσεις as preceding μαθήσεις, because in any training designed to produce good soldiers and citizens practice comes first and instruction in the theory afterwards (cp. c. 3. 1338 b 4, Metaph. θ. 5. 1047 b 31 sqq., and Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 a 31 sqq. and 10. 10. 1179 b 23 sqq.). But what χρήσεις πολεμικαὶ καὶ πολιτικαὶ can the boys to whom Aristotle refers be said to perform? Bojesen, on the other hand, followed by Sus., interchanges χρήσεις and μαθήσεις, reading πρὸς μὲν τὰς μαθήσεις ἤδη, πρὸς δὲ τὰς χρήσεις ὑστερον. Sus. appears from the translation which he gives of the passage to supply τῶν πολεμικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν ἀσκήσεων with μαθήσεις and χρήσεις, but the expressions τὰς χρήσεις τῶν πολεμικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν ἀσκήσεων and τὰς μαθήσεις τῶν πολεμικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν ἀσκήσεων seem rather strange. And, whether we supply these words or not, the question remains, to what μαθήσεις πολεμικαὶ καὶ πολιτικαὶ pursued in boyhood and youth does Aristotle refer? He must apparently refer to the ordinary education in gymnastic, music, etc., for we know of no other which he provides for the young. I am inclined, however, to suggest a different interpretation of the passage before us. Should we not supply τοῦ σῶματος with τὰς χρήσεις (as Schneider appears to do, for he says, ‘χρήσεις sunt cum quis corpore vario modo uitur’), and explain the passage thus, ‘the study of music in youth must not render the body unfit for military and civic training either by rendering it unfit for such training in a purely physical way’ (literally, ‘unfit for the uses of the body’) ‘or by rendering it an unfit assistant for the mind in studies later on’? That the body may be a help or a hindrance to the use of the mind in study we see from Plato, Rep. 498 B and 536 B, and Protag. 326 B sqq.; cp. also Magn. Mor. 2. 10. 1208 a 12 sqq., quoted on 1333 a 21. For τὸς τοῦ σῶματος χρήσεις cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 38.

10. τὴν μαθήσιν, ‘the study of music’: cp. 6, τὴν μαθήσιν αὐτῆς. τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγώνας τοὺς τεχνικοὺς συντείνοντα. Supply τῶν ἐργῶν from 12: cp. 1341 b 9, τῆς ἐργασίας. Does Aristotle refer to the same kind of performances which Plato rejects in Laws 812 D sqq?
11. τὰ θαυμάσια καὶ περιττὰ τῶν ἔργων κ.τ.λ. Compare a fragment of Anaxilas (Athen. Deipn. 623 e, f: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 352),

η μουσικὴ δὲ Ὀσπερ Δείψῃ πρὸς τῶν θεῶν
dei ti kaiwv kata' enwvtov theiwn
tiktēi,

where Anaxilas has perhaps before him Plato, Laws 660 B, καὶ δὲ ἢ ἄστα ἐδὲ γεγυμένα περὶ τέτο τῶν ὄρχησις καὶ περὶ τὴν ἄλλην μουσικὴν ἐξώματον κ.τ.λ. These seats of execution in singing and playing are distinguished here from ordinary 'agonistic' performances; the nature of 'agonistic' music may be divined from Probl. 19. 15. 918 b 20 sqq. and Pol. 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 22 sqq. Does Aristotle refer to the musical innovations of Timotheus among others, as to which see Pherecr. xelwov Fragnm. 1 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 326 sqq.)? Cp. also Plato, Laws 812 D-E.

12. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ τουατα κ.τ.λ., 'but practise even such music as we have mentioned' (i.e. music that is neither agonistic nor of extraordinary difficulty) 'only to the point at which' etc. For this limitation cp. Plato, Laws 812 B-E.

15. καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔννα ζῷων. See vol. i. p. 365, note 1, and cp. Plato, Polit. 268 B, where Plato refers to the effect of music on herds and flocks, and Rep. 620 A, where he speaks of 'swans and other musical animals.' Cp. also Pindar, Fragm. 220, and Athen. Deipn. 328 f. For the conjunction of ἔννα and παιδία, cp. Rhet. i. 1371 a 14, ὅν τις πολὺ καταφρονεῖ, Ὀσπερ παιδίων ἂ θηρίων, Eth. Eud. 2. 8. 1224 a 29 and 7. 2. 1236 a 2, and Plato, Theaet. 171 E, πᾶν γόνιμον καὶ παιδίου καὶ θηρίου δὲ, and Clitophon 409 D, τῶς δὲ τῶν παιδίων φιλίας καὶ τῶς τῶν θηρίων κ.τ.λ.

17. δήλων δὲ ἐκ τούτων καὶ πολὺς ὄργανοι χρηστῶν. They must not be instruments which serve for festival-competitions or in wonderful feats of execution (10 sqq.).

18. οὔτε γάρ αὐλοῦς κ.τ.λ. Τεχνικὰ ὄργανα are instruments designed for use at festival-competitions (1341 b 10). It is implied here that learning to play on them would tend to make boys ill recipients of musical and other training. Why is this? Probably because learning to play on them trained the hand rather than the mind (1341 b 1, 6 sqq.). The cithara must have come by Aristotle's time to differ a good deal from the lyre; still Plato retains (Rep. 399 D) both lyre and cithara. Αὐτῶν, 20, i.e. τῶν ὄργανων.

21. ἐτὶ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν κ.τ.λ. This is a second argument against the use of the αὐλὸς in education. It is not an instrument expressive of
ethical character (see above on 1340 a 36), but rather one for employment in orgiastic rites (compare the use of the word βακχεία in c. 7. 1342 b 4 in connexion with ὄργανοι καὶ παθητικά), one which produces that modification of emotion which orgiastic rites produce. For παθητικόν is a wider term than ὄργανοι: not all things that are παθητικά are ὄργανοι. The use of the αὐλὸς in the worship of Dionysus (Virg. Aen. ii. 737, ubi curva choris indixit tibia Bacchi) and of Cybele (Hor. Carm. 4. 1. 22, Berecyniae tibiae) is well known. Cp. also Strabo, pp. 466, 468, and Plato, Crit. 54 D. 'One who listens to the remarkable music of the flute and cymbals at the dances of dervishes in Konia or Kara Hisstar of Phrygia can understand the intoxicating influence which it had over the devotees and populace of antiquity' (Prof. W. M. Ramsay in Journal of Hellenic Studies, 8. 510). Some light is thrown on the effect of the αὐλὸς in orgiastic worship by Plut. Sympos. 3. 8. 2, ὁστερ ἦ θρησκία καὶ ὁ ἑπτήδειος αὐλὸς ἐν ἀρχῇ πάθος κυνεὶ καὶ διάκριναι, προάγων δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς οἶκτον, υἱότω κατὰ μικρὸν ἐξαίρει καὶ ἀναλάμβανε τὸ λυπητικόν. As to κάθαρσις cp. c. 7. 1342 a 8 sqq. and see note on this passage. Compare also Plut. Pelopid. c. 19 (quoted above on 1274 a 32), where however the αὐλὸς is regarded, not as a means of stirring, and so carrying off, emotion, but as a means of softening the untempered strength of the spirited element in the Theban character.

22. ὁστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους κ.τ.λ. Φοι τοὺς τοιούτους καρποῖς ἐν οἷς κ.τ.λ. see note on 1337 b 6. Bonitz (Ind. 329 a 43) appears to give ἡ θεωρία here the sense of 'spectaculum,' to judge by the passages with which he groups the passage before us, as do also Sepulveda and some others, but it probably means much the same thing as ἡ ἀκρόσις (Sus.8 Ind. s.v.); we must, however, remember that αὐλῆσις was accompanied with certain bodily movements on the part of the performer (1341 b 18), so that there was something to be seen as well as heard. For the contrast between κάθαρσις and μάθησις here compare the contrast between παθεῖν and μαθεῖν in Aristotle. Fragm. 15 in Rose's second edition of the Fragments (Fragm. 45. 1483 a 19 in the first), καθάπερ Ἀριστοτέλης ἀξιοὶ τοὺς τελουμένους οὐ μαθεῖν τι δεῖν ἀλλὰ παθεῖν καὶ διατεθῆναι, δηλοῦσθαι γενομένους ἐπιτηδείους (Synes. Dion, c. 10). That μάθησις may be derived by persons of mature age from listening to music (and it is persons of mature age, not boys, that Aristotle has in view here) appears from c. 5. 1339 a 34 sqq.
24. προσθύμεν δὲ κ.τ.λ. In interfering with the use of language the use of the αἰλός interferes with a means of education, for the air and the words sung exercise an educating influence on the singer. Cp. also De Part. An. 2. 16. 659 b 30, οἱ δὲ ἀνθρώποι μαλακὰ καὶ σαρκώδη καὶ δυνάμενα χωρίζεσθαι (sc. τὰ χείλη ἔχουσι), φιλακής τε ἕνεκα τῶν ὄντων ὄσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι διὰ τὸ εὖ πρὸς γὰρ τὸ χρῆσαι τὸ λόγῳ καὶ ταῦτα.

26. διὸ καλῶς κ.τ.λ. 'Αποδοκιμάζειν τὴν χρήσιν τοῦ αἰλοῦ ἐκ τῶν νέων καὶ τῶν ἔλευθερων is a rugged expression, and I have not happened to meet with any parallel to it. There is less ruggedness in the language of Plutarch in Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 30, ὄσπερ οὖν ὁ Πλάτων ἀφείλε τῶν παιδευμένων νέων τὴν ἀρμονίαν τὴν Λύδιον καὶ τὴν Φρυγιαν κ.τ.λ.

27. καίπερ χρησάμενοι τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῷ. We read of poets at a very early date who were also performers on the αἰλός—Mimmermus of Colophon and Smyrna at the end of the seventh century b.c. (Strabo, p. 643) and Sacadas of Argos at the beginning of the sixth (Plut. De Musica, c. 9). Compare Athen. Deipn. 184 c, ἔμελε δὲ τοῖς πάλαι πάσιν Ἑλλησίοις μαντικοῖς διότερο καὶ ἀλήτης περιπούδαστος ἦν. Χαμαλέων γυνῶν ὁ Ὑρακλεώτης ἐν τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ Προτρηπτικῷ Δακεδαμονίους φησὶ καὶ Θηβαίοις πάντας αὐλεῖν μανθάνεις, Ὑρακλεώτας τε τοὺς ἐν τῷ Πόντῳ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἐτί, Ἀθηναίων τε τούς ἐπιφανεστάτους, Καλλίαν τε τοῦ Ἰππονίκου καὶ Κριτιάν τῶν Καλλαίσχου. Athenaeus shows by quotations from the Δαυτάλεις of Aristophanes (Fragm. 17 : Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 1037) and from the Ephialtes of Phrynichus (Fragm. 3 : Meineke 2. 581), that the αἰλός was commonly taught to boys in the days when these plays were performed. A reaction set in at Athens against the study of the αἰλός, aided perhaps by the increased hostility to Thebes which must have resulted from the Athenian defeat at Delium (b.c. 424), and certainly by the influence of Alcibiades (vol. i. p. 365, note 3), but Archytas at Tarentum, among other Pythagoreans, and Epaminondas at Thebes are said to have played on the αἰλός (Athen. Deipn. 184 e: see above on 1340 b 35), and we have already seen that at the Pontic Heracleia, a city in the population of which a Boeotian element was included (Paus. 5. 26. 7), the custom of learning to play on it still prevailed in the time of Chamaeleon (a little later than Aristotle), so that when Aristotle speaks of the study of the αἰλός as 'rejected,' we may take him to refer to the general rule.
28. σχολαστικώτερον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle appears to be speaking of the Hellenes of Greece Proper, for they alone took part in the repulse of the Persian invasion in B.C. 480 and 479, and it is of this that the expression τὰ Μηδικαί is commonly used (Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 614. i). When Aristotle looks back to an increase of wealth and leisure and a consequent widening of study at a date even prior to the invasion of Xerxes, he may be referring to the time of Anacharsis and to the story about him which Herodotus (4. 77) rejects, ὡς . . . δοῦσο ἀπονοσίας φαίη πρὸς τὸν ἀποσέψαντα Ἑλληνας πάντας ἄσχιλους εἶναι ἐς πάσαν σοφίην πλῆν Ἀκαδαιμονίων, τούτοις δὲ εἶναι μούνοις σωφρύνως δούναι τε καὶ δέξιοντα λόγον. After the repulse of Xerxes the Greeks of Greece Proper threw themselves with vigour into the study of painting sculpture and architecture; the dramatic art made a great advance, and many States began for the first time to strike coins. Cp. Diod. 12. 1. 4. A similar spirit shows itself, though less happily, in the determination of Themistocles and Thucydides, son of Melesias, that their sons should be made marvellous horsemen and wrestlers (Plato, Meno 93-94). Compare with Aristotle’s picture of Greece after the Persian Wars what we read of the intellectual and artistic progress of the United Provinces after the War of Independence. M. Lefèvre-Pontalis remarks in his Life of John de Witt (Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 12) that ‘prosperity and freedom combined had been for the United Provinces the signal for a sudden blossoming of arts, sciences, and letters,’ and illustrates his remark by enumerating the painters, jurists, philosophers, scholars, soldiers, and men of science who flourished in the United Provinces at this epoch. That leisure was thought to be favourable to high aims we see from c. 2. 1337 b 14 sq. and 7 (5). 11. 1313 b 1 sqq.


33. καὶ γὰρ ἐν Ἀκαδαιμονίᾳ κ.τ.λ. The ordinary practice was that an aulêtēs was allotted to the chorēgus to accompany the chorus, the aulêtēs being commonly a man of inferior social
position (cp. Athen. Deipn. 624 b, διό καὶ τοὺς παρὰ τοὺς "Ελληνων αὐλητὰς φριγίους καὶ δουλοπρεπέος τὰς προστορίας ἔχειν" οίδι ἐστιν ὁ παρὰ Ἀλκάμαυ Σάμβας καὶ Ἀδων καὶ Τῆλος, παρὰ δὲ ἐπιώνακτι Κίων καὶ Κώδαλος καὶ βάβος), while the choréguς was a man of wealth and rank, but in this instance the choréguς himself acted as auletēς. We learn from this passage that choréguς existed in the Lacedaemonian State; their existence at Athens is a familiar fact, and they can be shown to have existed in other States also (see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 372. 1). As Sus. 4 (1. 603) points out, the chorus at Lacedaemon here mentioned was probably not a dramatic but a lyrical chorus.

34. ἐπεχωρίασεν, sc. ἡ αὐλητική.

οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἐλεύθερων, 'most of the gentlefolks.' Οἱ ἐλεύθεροι are contrasted with θῆται in 1341 b 13 sq., and with βίανυσοὶ and θῆται in c. 7. 1342 a 18 sqq., where ἐλεύθερος is conjoined with πεπαθευμένος.

35. δῆλον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Choréguς sometimes dedicated to Dionysus a tablet recording the victory of the poet whose play they had brought out: so we read of Themistocles in Plut. Themist. c. 5, εὐκήσει δὲ καὶ χωρήγων τραγῳδοῖς . . . καὶ πίνακα τῆς νίκης ἀνέθηκε, τοιαύτην ἐπιγραφὴν ἔχοντα, "Θεμιστοκλῆς Φρεάρριος ἔχορήγη, Φρύνεχος ἐθῆκακεν, 'Αδείμαντος ἕρχεν" (cp. Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 108). See A. Müller, Die griech. Bühnenalterth., p. 418, who follows Bergk in comparing Theophrast. Char. 22, δὲ ἀνελεύθερος τοιούτος τις, οἱς νικήσας τραγῳδοῖς ταυτίας ἔμμεν ἀναθείναι τῷ Διονύσῳ, ἐπιγράψας μὲν (μόνον;) αὐτοῦ τὸ ὅνομα κ.τ.λ. The tablet mentioned by Aristotle here cannot of course have shown that most Athenians of respectability were able to play on the αὐλός: it can only have recorded the name of one such Athenian as having acted as auletēς on this particular occasion. As to Ecphantides, one of the earliest comic poets at Athens, see Sus. 4, and Meineke, Hist. Crit. Com. Gr. p. 35 sqq.

37. ὑστερον δὲ ἀπεδοκιμάσθη κ.τ.λ. Supply δὲ αὐλός. 'But afterwards it was rejected [as an instrument for the young and for gentlefolks] simply by force of experience.'

39. ὃμοιός δὲ, sc. ἀπεδοκιμάσθη. It is evident that at one time not only the αὐλός, but also the five instruments mentioned here, together with others which, like them, required manual dexterity and skill, were used by the young and by gentlefolks, but that they were afterwards discarded, so far as these classes were concerned, because they were thought not to contribute to virtue. They were probably regarded as training the hand rather than the mind or
character, and of three of them—sambucae and triangular and septangular harps—we read that their strength lay in pleasing the ear of the listener, not in anything ennobling. Music, however, that is merely for pleasure is said to be no better than a 'plaything' by Plato (Polit. 288 C: cp. Gorg. 501 E and Laws 700 D sqq.); the best type of music leads on to the love of τὸ καλὸν (Rep. 403 C). As to the instruments here named see Sus.¹, i. p. 632 sqq., and Blümner, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., pp. 312–314. The sambuca was high-pitched and piercing in tone (Aristid. Quint. De Mus. p. 101, τὴν δὲ σαμβυκήν πρὸς θηλύτητα (ἀναλογοῦσαν), ἀγεννη τε οὖσαν καὶ μετὰ πολλῆς δέξητος διὰ τὴν μικρότητα τῶν χορδῶν εἰς ἔκλυσιν περιάγωσαι: cp. Athen. Deipn. 633 f), whereas the lyre was deeper in tone (Aristid. Quint. ibid.). Trigona and pectides (which were a kind of harp) had already been rejected by Plato in Rep. 399 C as being 'many-stringed and many-toned,' but the number of strings in the pectis seems to have varied (Sus.¹, i. p. 632 sqq.), and Aristotle does not name this ground for rejecting them. Opinion at Mytilene was probably favourable to the sambuca, for we read in Euphorion ap. Athen. Deipn. 182 f of a statue of one of the Muses there, who was represented holding a sambuca.

1341 b.

2. εὐλόγως δ' ἔχει κ.τ.λ. For this myth see Ovid, Fasti 6. 695 sqq.: Hygin. Fab. 165 (quoted in Bull. de Corr. Hellénique 12. 107): Paus. 1. 24. 1: Aristid. Quint. De Mus. p. 109. As Schneider points out, Aristotle evidently has before him the lines of Melanippides (Fragm. 2 Bergk) and the reply of Telestes (Fragm. 1 Bergk): see for both Athen. Deipn. 616 sq. Some, however, ascribed the invention of the αἰλός to Apollo (Plut. De Mus. c. 14). Τῶν αἰλῶν and τῶν αἰλόων, because two pipes and not one were commonly used for playing in Greece.

4. οὗ κακῶς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. According to Melanippides (Fragm. 2) Athena had said, when casting away the αἰλοῖ, ἔρρετ' αἰσχεα, σῶματι λίμα, οὖ με τὰδε ἐγὼ κακότατι δίδωμι.

6. οὗ μὴν ἄλλα κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably remembers an old saying (Athen. Deipn. 337 e), ἀνδρὶ μὲν αὐλητηρὶ θεοὶ νόσον οὐκ ἐνέφυσαν, ἄλλοιμ' ἄμα τῷ φυσὶν χῳ νόσον ἐκπέταται.

Cp. Aristid. Quint. De Mus. p. 109, ἀπορρίψαι τὴν θεοῦ φασι τοὺς αἰλοὺς ὅσο οὗ πρόσφορον ἥδονην ἐπιφέροντας τοῖς σοφίασ ἐφιμενοῖσ: also
Plato, Laws 644 A, τήν δὲ εἰς χρήματα τείνουσαν ἢ τινὰ πρὸς ισχύν ἢ καὶ πρὸς ἅλλην τινὰ σοφίαν ἰδέαν νοῦ καὶ δίκης βιανασοῦ τ' εἶναι καὶ ἀνελεύθερον καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον τὸ παράπατον παυδεῖαν καλεῖσθαι, and Eth. Nic. 7. 12. 1152 b 16, ἐτί εἰμπόδων τῷ φρονείν αἱ ἡμῶν, καὶ ἄσφα μᾶλλον χαίρει, μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ. For ὑπὸ τὴν διάνοιαν οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἡ παιδεία τῆς αὐλήσεως, 'training in flute-playing contributes in no way to the intelligence,' cp. Chrysipp. ap. Plut. De Stoicorum Repugnantiis, c. 14, πρῶτον γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ ψυλλός οὐδὲν ἐστι πρὸς τὸ ζην ἡμᾶς, οὔτω δ' οὐδ' ἡ κακία οὐδὲν ἐστι πρὸς τὸ δεῖν ἡμᾶς ὁπίσων, and Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, c. 6, τὸ δὲ μηδὲν ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲν ἐστι πρὸς τὸ βαρβεῖν.

7. τῇ δὲ 'Αθηνᾶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην περιτίθεμεν καὶ τὴν τέχνην. 'Science' and 'skill in art' are mentioned together, just as we have in Plato, Ion 536 C, οὗ γὰρ τέχνη οὐδ' ἐπιστήμην περί ὁμήρου λέγεις ἀ λέγεις, ἀλλὰ θεία μοίρα καὶ κατοκωξῆ, and in Theaet. 207 C, ἀντὶ δοξαστικοῦ τεκμικὸν τε καὶ ἐπιστήμονα περὶ ἀμάξις οὐνάς γεγονέναι. In the passage before us καὶ τὴν τέχνην is probably added in explanation and limitation of τὴν ἐπιστήμην, for it is the less wide term of the two: cp. De Soph. Elench. 6. 168 b 6, οἷς τεχνίται καὶ δῶς οἶ ἐπιστήμονες. As to Athena cp. Hom. Odys. 13. 297,

ἐπεὶ οὖ μὲν ἐστι βροτῶν ὅχ' ἀμαστός ἀπάντων
βουλή καὶ μύθουσιν, ἐγώ δ' ἐν πᾶσι βεβίον
μὴτε τὰ κλέομα καὶ κέρδεσαν,


8. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The apodosis to this protasis virtually comes in c. 7. 1341 b 19, σκεπτέον δ' ἐτί κ.τ.λ., though by the time Aristotle reaches these words he has forgotten the existence of his protasis, owing to the interposition of the long parenthesis (10–18) in which he states his reasons for excluding a professional study of music. Compare I. 12. 1259 a 37 sqq., where the same thing occurs.

10. τεχνικὴν δὲ τίθημεν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀγώνας. This is added because the word τεχνικός was commonly used in a different sense. Plato had already said of ἡ κιβαριστική ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἀγώνις that its only aim is pleasure (Gorg. 501 E), and Aristotle here has before him the whole passage, Gorg. 501 B–502 A.
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ἔν ταῦτη γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Ἐν ταύτῃ = ἔν τῇ πρὸς τοῦ ἀγώνας παυεῖα. Γὰρ introduces the reason why Aristotle rejects study with a view to festival-competitions, not the reason why he calls this study τεχνήν: hence the parenthesis which Sus. begins before τεχνήν should rather begin before ἔν ταῦτῃ. The object with which an ἔλευθερος should study is his own improvement in virtue (c. 2. 1337 b 17 sqq.). The ἔλευθερος is defined in Metaph. A. 2. 982 b 25 sqq. as ὁ αὐτοῦ ἐνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου ὄν: it is characteristic of him not to live for the convenience of another (Rhet. 1. 9. 1367 a 31 sq.). To do things with a view to the virtue of others would be more befitting to him than to contribute merely to their pleasure (cp. Plato, Gorg. 500 A sqq.). Thus αὐτοῦ and ἀφετῆς are both of them emphatic, and also τῶν ἀκούοντων and τῆς ἠδονής.

14. For καί ... δὴ see note on 1253 a 18. We expect βάναυσον rather than βαναύσους, but see note on 1338 b 1.

ποιηρὸς γὰρ ὁ σκοπὸς πρὸς δὲ ποιοῦται τὸ τέλος, 'for the object is evil with a view to which they select their end' (cp. c. 5. 1339 b 31, συμβεβήκε δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ποιεῖσθαι τὰς παυεῖας τέλος, and Rhet. 2. 16. 1391 b 16, ὥστετος δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιθεικτικοῖς' ὡσπερ γὰρ πρὸς κρητήν τὸν θεοῦν ὁ λόγος συνεστηκεν). Competitors at a festival play, or singing and play, in the way which is most likely to please the less refined among their audience.

17. αὐτοῦς τε ποιοῦσ τινας ποιεῖ καὶ τὰ σώματα διὰ τὸς κινήσεις. Ποιοῦσ τινας, i.e. βαναύσους. As to the κινήσεις of performers on the αὐλός, cp. Poet. 26. 1461 b 29, ὡς γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθανομένων, ἐν μὴ αὐτὸς προσοθῇ, πολλὴν κίνησι τινοῖς, ὥστεν οἱ φαιλός αὐλητῇ κυλόμενοι, ἀν διόκουν δέ μιμέσθαι, καὶ ἔκκοστε τὸν κυρφαίον, ὅτι ἡ ἀλοών τοις ἀβατηρίους: Athen. Deipn. 21 f, Φίλλις ὁ Ἁλέας μονόκλος τοῦ ἄρχαῖος φησι καθαρφ- δοὺς κινήσεις ἄπο μὲν τοῦ προσώπου μικρᾶς φέρεις, ἀπὸ ποθὸν δὲ πλείους, ἐμβατηρίους καὶ χορευτικὰς, and 22 c, Θεόφραστος δὲ πρῶτον φησιν Ἀνδρονίκος τὸν Ἰατραίον αὐλητὴν κινήσεις καὶ μυθοὺς ποιήσαι τῷ σῶματι αὐλοῦντα· ὅθεν συκειλίζει τὸ ὀρχείσθαι παρὰ τῶν παλαιῶν· καὶ θὰ τὸν Ἡβαίαν καὶ τοῦ Θησαίου (cp. Scholiast. Aeschin. quoted by Meineke, Hist. Crit. Com. Gr. p. 336): and Paus. 9. 12. 6, λέγεται δὲ ὡς καὶ τοῦ προσώπου τῷ σχήματι καὶ τῷ τοῦ παντὸς κινήσει σῶματος περισσῶς δὴ τε ἐτερεῖ (Πρόνομος) τὰ θέατρα. Pronomus was a famous player on the αὐλός. In a bas-relief found at Mantineia (see Bull. de Corr. Hell. 12. 105 sqq., esp. p. 110 sq.) the contorted attitude of Marsyas, as he plays on the αὐλός in competition with the cithara of Apollo, is in strong contrast with the calm bearing of the god.
19. **Σκεπτέον δ' ἐτι κ.τ.λ.**  Aristotle has finished what he had to **C.7.** say about ἄργανα and ἐργασία, and now only one of the subjects mentioned in c. 6. **1340 b 41 sqq.** remains to be dealt with, and this is ποιῶν μελῶν καὶ ποιῶν ῥυθμῶν κοινωνίαν (i.e. τοῖς πρὸς ἀρτίν παιδευομένοις πολιτικὴν). But in taking up this subject for consideration Aristotle gives a wider extension to it than he had led us to expect that he would, and announces that he will inquire generally περὶ τὰς ἀρμονίας καὶ τῶν ῥυθμῶν, as well as with regard to their use in education. And in fact we find in the sequel that he inquires in this chapter not only what harmonies are to be used in education, but also what are to be used for the other purposes served by music. This is quite in accordance with c. 5. **1339 a 11 sqq.,** where the question proposed for discussion is the broad question, for how many purposes music is useful. We see, therefore, that the Fifth Book of the Politics is not exclusively concerned with questions relating to the education of youth, but occupies itself also with the question for what purposes music is to be used in adult life. As to the state of the text in 19–26 see critical note.

21. τοῖς πρὸς παιδείαν διαπονοῦσι, 'those who are practising music with a view to education': cp. τὰ τωιάτα διαπονεῖν, c. 5. **1339 a 39.** Cp. also Plut. Pericl. c. 4, 'Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ παρὰ Πυθαγόρην μουσικὴν διαπονηθήκαε τὸν ἄνδρα φησίν, and Plato, Laws 818 A.

23. τὴν μὲν μουσικὴν ὀρθῶν διὰ μελοποιίας καὶ ῥυθμῶν οὖσαν. Sepulv. 'musicam in cantus modulatione et rythmis consistere,' and so most interpreters, but Vict. explains, 'musicam exerceri colique et per cantus et per numeros,' and perhaps he is right. Cp. 4(7).

2. **1324 a 15, ὁ δὲ τοῦ συμμολυτέσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως (βίο) 24. τούτων δ' ἐκάτερον κ.τ.λ.** What the difference is between the educational effect of rhythm and melody, Aristotle does not tell us, for the promise here given of a discussion of the subject is not fulfilled in what we possess of the Politics. We see from Plato, Laws 655 A, that ῥυθμός makes men εὐρυθμοῖ and ἀρμονία makes them εὐάρμοστοι, but Aristotle probably has in view some more tangible difference than this. The εὐρυθμοῖ μουσικῆ would be the better preparation for war (cp. Polyb. 4. 20. 6). But the key to the question which of the two kinds is the better for education will be found in the question which benefits the character most.

27. **νομίσαντες οὖν κ.τ.λ.** Cp. 1342 a 31 sq. Specialists in music (μουσικοὶ, cp. 1342 b 23, τῶν περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν τινες) are distinguished here from philosophers who have received a musical training
NOTES.

(cp. I 341 b 33, τινές τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, and c. 5. I 340 b 5 sq., and see below on I 342 a 31, and cp. for ἐκ Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 232). Works seem to have been in existence written by men belonging to each of these classes, which went into full detail both on the subject of harmonies and rhythms and on that of musical education. As to the persons referred to see note on I 340 b 5.

31. As to the meaning of νομικῶς see Sus.4, who renders the word 'formally,' and compares Metaph. M. 1. 1076 a 27, ἄπλως καὶ ἄσον νόμον χάριν. But does not the word mean 'after the fashion of a law,' i.e. in a broad and general way, as a law does? Cp. 3. 15. 1286 a 9 sqq., and Plato, Laws 876 D, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὅπερ πολλάκις εἶσομεν τε καὶ εἴθρασαμεν ἐν τῇ τῶν ἐμπροσθεν νομοβείτήσει νόμων, τὸ περιγραφῆν τε καὶ τούς τόπους τῶν τιμωρίων εἴπατος δοῦναι τὰ παραδείγματα τούτων δικασταῖς τοῦ μὴ ποτὲ βαίνειν ἔξω τῆς δίκης κ.τ.λ.

32. ἐπέλει δὲ κ.τ.λ. The classification of melodies here given rests on the familiar distinction of ἡθὴ πράξεως and πάθη (cp. Poet. 1. 1447 a 28), for ἐνθυνωσιμός is a πάθος (Pol. 5(8). 5. I 340 a 11). Of the four kinds of tragedy mentioned in Poet. 18. I 455 b 32 sqq. one is ἡ ἡθικὴ and another ἡ παθικὴ. Compare also Strabo, p. 15, τοῦναττόν δ' οἱ παλαιοὶ φιλοσοφίαν τινὰ λέγουσι πρώτην τὴν ποιητικὴν, εἰσάγουσαν εἰς τὸν βίον ἡμᾶς ἐκ νόμων καὶ διδάσκοντον ἡθὴ καὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεως μεθ' ἡθονής. 'Ἡθικὰ μέλη are those which imitate and mould to virtue (see above on 1340 a 36); as to πρακτικὰ μέλη, 'melodies which imitate and stir to action,' cp. Probl. 19. 48. 922 b 12, ἡθός δὲ ἐξεῖ ἡ μὲν ὑποφρυγματί πρακτικῶν, διὸ καὶ ἐν τῷ Γηρμανίᾳ ἡ ἔξοδος καὶ ἡ ἐξόπλισις ἐν ταύτῃ πεποίηται, and Poet. 24. I 459 b 37, τὸ δὲ ἱαμβικὸν καὶ τετράμετρον κινητικά, τὸ μὲν ὀρχηστικὸν, τὸ δὲ πρακτικόν. So in Aelian, Var. Hist. 2. 44 a trumpeter is described as playing τὸ παρομοιτικὸν μέλος, διάτορον τε καὶ γεγωνὸς ὅτι μᾶλλον καὶ ὅδου εἰς τὴν μάχην ἐγερθήμων. Πρακτικὰ μέλη seem to have been the favourites at Sparta: cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 21, and Inst. Lac. § 14, ἐσπούδαζον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ μέλη καὶ τὰς φώνας οὐδὲν ἤττον' κινητῶν δ' εἶχε ταύτα ἐγερτικῶν θυμοῦ καὶ φρονίματος καὶ παραστατικῶν ὀρμὸς ἐνθυνωσιός καὶ πρακτικής. Plutarch, however, gives a somewhat different account of Spartan songs in Lycurg. c. 4, λόγοι γάρ ἦσαν αἱ φώναι πρὸς εἰπεῖδειαν καὶ ὁμόνωοι ἀνακλητικοὶ διὰ μελῶν ἀμα καὶ ῥυθμῶν πολῷ τὸ κόσμου ἐξώντων καὶ καταστατικῶν, διὸ ἀκροαλαθεῖν κατεπράαντο τελετῶν ἡθή καὶ συνεργείωσιν τὸ ζήλῳ τῶν καλῶν. As to πρακτικὰ μέλη, which were of course not exclusively warlike, see vol. i. p. 367, note 1. Dr. Johnson describes in his Journey to the Western Islands (Works, 8. 279) how the strokes of
the reapers' sickles 'were timed by the modulation of the harvest-song, in which all their voices were united,' and adds that 'they accompany in the Highlands every action which can be done in equal time with an appropriated strain, which has, they say, not much meaning, but its effects are regularity and cheerfulness. The ancient proceleusmatic song, by which the rowers of galleys were animated, may be supposed to have been of this kind.'

33. ὡς is followed in 35 by καὶ. For instances of a similar structure see note on 1313 b 13.

35. καὶ τῶν ἄρμονιῶν κ.τ.λ., 'and they lay down that musical modes are appropriate in nature to each of these, one mode answering to one kind of melody and another to another.' The Dorian mode was the appropriate harmony for ἵβεκα μέλη, the Phrygian for ἑθονωσιαστικά, and perhaps the hypo-Phrygian (see above on 32) for πρακτικά. Μέρος seems here to be used in the sense of εἶδος (cp. διάφρεσιν, 32): for this use of the word see Bon. Ind. 455 b 46 sqq.

36. φαμέν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 5. 1339 b 14. Plato, on the other hand, had spoken in Laws 659 D–660 A as if the ethical use of music was its only use. For καὶ πλείων see note on 1287 a 34.

38. καθάρσεως—τί δὲ λέγομεν τὴν καθάρσιν κ.τ.λ. See below on 1342 a 8. The promise here given of a full explanation of the word καθάρσις is not fulfilled in the Poetics as it has come down to us: see note in Sus.4. For other matters known to have found a place in Aristotle's treatise which are wanting in our Poetics, see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 107. 1 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 102. 2). 'We possess Aristotle's treatise,' he remarks, 'only in a text mutilated and in many ways corrupted.' For ἀπλῶς, 'in a general way,' cp. Magn. Mor. i. 4. 1185 a 38, ἀλλ' ἵκος οίχ ἰκανόν οὖσας ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ἄλλα σαφέστερον διωρίσατε δεῖ.

40. τρίτον δὲ πρὸς διαγωγήν κ.τ.λ. Bernays translates in his Grundzüge der verlorenen Abhandlung des Aristoteles über Wirkung der Tragödie, p. 7 (ed. 1880), 'drittens zur Ergötzung, um sich zu erholen und abzuspannen,' but if, as he seems to think, the words πρὸς ἀνεσίω τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσιν are added in explanation of πρὸς διαγωγήν, the word διαγωγή must here be used in a different sense from that in which it is used elsewhere in the Fifth Book, e.g. in c. 5. 1339 b 14, where it is distinguished from παπώι. This is not perhaps impossible, but it is more likely that VOL. III. O O
διαγωγή is used here in the same sense as in 1339 b 14, and that it is linked with ἄνεσις and τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσις because it has already been so linked in c. 5. 1339 b 15 sqq. Zeller, indeed, thinks (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 771. i: Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. ii. p. 308. r) that Aristotle intends ἄνεσις and τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσις to come in as a fourth end and not as a part of the third, though the word τέταρτον is not used. Sus. would read ταύτης δ' ἢ πρὸς διαγωγήν ἢ πρὸς ἄνεσιν τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσιν partly for other reasons and partly because he regards it as inconceivable 'that the cathartic enjoyment could possibly be anything else but either that of pure amusement and sensuous delight or the genuine higher aesthetic enjoyment which is a part of the highest intellectual culture and rational satisfaction' (see Sus., i. p. 638 sqq.), but if any change in the text is necessary, I should be content with the insertion of ἢ before πρὸς ἄνεσιν.

1342 a. 1. φανερῶν δτὶ χρηστέων μὲν πάσαις ταῖς ἀρμονίαις, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον πάσαις χρηστέων. Aristotle probably refers only to the modes which are not παρεκβάσεις, yet he finds a use in 22 sqq. even for those which are. For the repetition of πάσαις see note on 1283 a 30.

2. πρὸς μὲν τὴν παιδείαν ταῖς ἡθικωτάταις. As to the meaning of ἡθικωτάταις here and ἡθικῶς in 28 see note on 1340 a 36. Aristotle may use the plural because he is prepared to approve, in addition to the Dorian mode, of the ὑποδωριστὶ, of which we read in Probl. 19. 48. 922 b 14 that it is μεγαλοπρεπὴς καὶ στάσιμον, but perhaps it is more likely that he does not wish to exclude any modes which may be recommended as ἡθικῶταται by οἱ κοινωνικῶν τῆς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατριβής καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν παιδείας (cp. 30 sqq.). He rejects without consideration the possible claims of πρακτικὰ and ἐνθουσιαστικὰ μέλη to a place, however subordinate, in the education of the young, but he might well have considered whether they do not deserve to be occasionally used. Are not boys, or some of them at any rate, παθητικοὶ, and might not κάθαρσις by music be sometimes useful to such boys even educationally? Might not airs which stir to action also be a useful element in the education of some boys? It is not clear that Aristotle objects to the presence of boys at the performance of πρακτικὰ καὶ ἐνθουσιαστικὰ μέλη, any more than he objects to their presence at the performance of tragedies (cp. 4 (7). 17. 1336 b 20 sqq.), but he certainly allows no place in education to music of these two kinds.
4. καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἐνθουσιαστικαῖς. Sus.⁴ is probably right in translating these words ‘also the practical and the enthusiastic’: cp. 1. 2. 1253 a 14, ὅ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστὶ τῷ συμφέρον καὶ τῷ βλαβερόν, διότι καὶ (’also’) τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον.

δ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. See note in Sus.⁴. Aristotle seems to anticipate that his recommendation of the use of the ‘enthusiastic’ modes, when we listen to music played by others, will excite surprise, and hence in 4—16 he justifies it at some length, though he adds no similar justification of his recommendation of the use of the ‘practical’ modes under similar circumstances, probably because he does not anticipate that any objection will be made to this.

7. καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς κινήσεως κατακώχμοι τινές εἶσιν. Ταὐτής τῆς κινήσεως = τοῦτον τοῦ πάθους: cp. 5, πάθος, and Plut. De Sanitate Tuende c. 13, ἤδη δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς κινήματα τὸ σῶμα μηνύει πρὸς νόσον ἐπισφαλῶς ἔχειν, ἄλογοι γὰρ ἰσχύσεως ἀθροίμα καὶ φόβων. For κατακώχμοι see critical note on 1269 b 30. Κατέχεσθαι is the appropriate technical term, cp. Plato, Symp. 215 C, and Aristid. Quint. De Musica, p. 65, τοὺς δὲ ὑπὸ θείας ὀρμῆς καὶ ἐπιποιείας καταχωμένους ὑπὸ ἐνθουσιασμὸν. As to the nature of ἐνθουσιασμὸς see note on 1340 a 11. Of this susceptibility to ἐνθουσιασμός we have a striking example in Olympias, the mother of Alexander (Plut. Alex. c. 2, ἣ δὲ Ὀλυμπιᾶς μᾶλλον ἑτέρων ζηλωσασα τὰς κατοχὰς καὶ τοῖς ἐνθουσιασμοῖς κ.τ.λ.). Had Aristotle observed in her case the calming effect of sacred melodies?

8. ἐκ τῶν δ’ ἱερῶν μελῶν κ.τ.λ., ‘and as an effect of the sacred melodies we see these men, when they have used the melodies which fill the soul with mystic excitement, brought back to a normal state as if having received medical treatment and purgation.’ Sus.⁴ points out that χρήσθαν, like κίνησις, καθίστασθαι, and κονφίζεσθαι, is a medical term. It seems likely that the patient both listened to and sang the maddening melodies (see note in Sus.⁴). Τοῖς ἑξοργιάζουσι τῆς ψυχῆς μέλεσι has been interpreted in many ways. Vict. explains these words ‘cantibus expiando animo frangendisque vehementioribus illis motibus aptis,’ Lamb. ‘cantibus animum furore levantibus ac purgantibus,’ and Liddell and Scott ‘melodies which purge by mystic rites,’ but Sepulveda is probably right in translating ‘cantiβus animum concitavitibus’ (cp. 1342 b 3, ἅμφω γὰρ ὀργιαστικὰ καὶ παθητικὰ). Bernays (followed by Sus.) renders the words in a not very dissimilar way, ‘Lieder die eben das Gemüth berauschen’ (‘songs which intoxicate the soul’). "Οταν—μέλεσι is bracketed by
Sus. as a gloss on ἐκ τῶν ὥλποι μελῶν (see Sus., 1. p. 640), but perhaps not all the ἑραὶ μηλη were 'intoxicating to the soul': cp. Plato, Ion 536 C, ὅσπερ οἱ κορυβαντίωντες ἐκείνου μόνον αἰσθάνονται τοῦ μέλους δέξιως, ὃ ἐν ἐγώ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐξ ὰυ ὁ θεοῦ ἀν κατέχονται, καὶ εἰς ἐκεῖνο τὸ μέλος καὶ σχημάτων καὶ ῥημάτων εὑροῦσί, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐ φροντίζουσιν. There may have been ἑραὶ μηλη introductory to the melody which produced the decisive effect. Τὴν ψυχὴν is emphatic: if the music does not go to the soul, it does nothing. For καθισταμένως see above on 1340 b 3. In ἰατρείαι καὶ καθάρσεως the καὶ is explanatory, as in 1. 9. 1257 b 9, τὴν χημικαταστικὴν καὶ τὴν κατηλκυῖαν (see note on 1257 b 7). The action of the sacred melodies on the souls of persons naturally disposed to εὐθυνοσαμῶς is compared to the action of some cathartic medicine like hellebore, which removes the worst elements and leaves the best (Plato, Rep. 567 C, καλὸν γε, ἐφί, καθαρμόν. Ναὶ, ἢν δὲ ἐγώ, τὸν ἐναντίον ἢ οἱ ἰατροὶ τὰ σῶματα· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὸ χεῖριστον ἀφαιροῦντες λείποντι τὸ βέλτιστον, δὲ τοῦτοντι). The following passages may be selected from many others as throwing light on Aristotle's meaning—Plut. Sympos. 6. 7. 2, καὶ γὰρ ἀνθρωπος, ὃς ἐφεξετίζων καὶ μαυσόμενος (πλεον ἀναχεί) ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν ἀλλεξιδρ χρήσαμεν ἡ διαίτης καταστή, τὸ μὲν σφοδρὸν ἐκείνο καὶ σύντονον οἴχεται καὶ γέγονεν ἔζηκηλον, ἢ δ᾽ ἀληθινῆ δύναμις καὶ σωφροσύνη παραμένεται τὸ σῶματι οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡ κάθαρσις τοῦ οἴνου, τὸ πληκτικὸν ἀφαιροῦσα καὶ μανικοῦ, εἰς πραείαν ἐξεὶ καὶ ἐγκαίνουσαν καθίστου: Strabo, p. 418, καὶ ὅς φασιν ἐκεῖ (at the Malian Anticyra) τῶν ἀλλέξιδρον φύεσθαι τῶν ἀστείον, εἰσαύδα δὲ (at the Phocian Anticyra) σκεκάξεσθαι βίλτικαν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀποδημεῖν δεύρο (to the latter) πολλοὺς καθάρσεως καὶ θεραπείας χάρων: and Plut. Coriol. c. 12, ἐδοξοῦσι οὖν τοὺς νοῦς ἔχονσιν εἰς ἄλλον γεγονόντα καὶ κατὰ καιρὸν ἡ χρεία τῶν Οὐκελτράνων διὰ τὴν ἄποριαν κορυφαίου δεομένου, καὶ τὴν στάσιν ἀμα σκεδασμένην ἕπιπλωσαν, εἰ τὸ δορυφοῦ κομίστα καὶ συνεπηρμένον τῷ δημαγωγῷ ὅσπερ περίττωμα τῆς πόλεως νοσεροῦ καὶ παραχώδης ἀποκαθαρθείν. That certain sacred rites produced a similar effect on the soul to that produced by cathartic medicines on the body, we see from Plato, Rep. 560 D, τούτων δὲ γέ στην κενωσαίτες καὶ καθήμαστες τὴν τοῦ κατεχομένου τε ὡς αὐτῶν καὶ τελουμένου ψυχῆς μεγάλοις τέλεσι, and Aristid. Quint. De Music, p. 158, διὰ καὶ τὰς βασικίας τελετὰς καὶ ὅσα ταῦτα παράληπησι λόγου τινός ἤχεσθαι φασιν, ὅπως ἢ τῶν ἄραδεστερῶν πτοιχίας διὰ βίοις ἢ τέχνην ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταύταις μελῳδίων τε καὶ ὁρκήσεως ἀμα παδικαίς ἐκκαθαρίσαται, where the purging influence of the rites is traced in part to the music by which they were accompanied. On the whole subject of the
kádáropis effected by music and also by tragedy, see Sus. 4, i. p. 641 sqq.,
and Prof. Butcher, Aristotle’s Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, c. 6.
We are not distinctly told in the passage before us that a kádáropis
παθημάτων occurs under the influence of the sacred melodies, as we
are in the famous passage of the Poetics about tragedy (Poet. 6.
1449 b 27 sq.), but we can hardly be wrong in taking the musical
kádáropis to be a kádáropis of παθημάτα like the other. It should be
noticed that music appears to purge all emotions, not merely, like
tragedy, those of pity and fear, and also that the kind of music
which produces a cathartic effect is by no means the wailing kind
characteristic of such modes as the mixo-Lydian; music of this
sort is charged with human feeling and essentially human, whereas
cathartic music is full of a divine afflatus (Probl. 19. 48. 922 b 19,
dió καὶ ἄρμαξε ῥόχῳ ἔχοντο ἀλλὰ ἄρμανται, ἡμῖν δὲ αὐτῶν ἡ ὑποθεξιατίκη
ἐνθουσιατικὴ γάρ καὶ βακχική). In Milton’s Paradise Lost, 1. 549 sqq.,
the ‘Dorian mood’ is said to inspire ‘deliberate valour’ ‘firm and
unmoved With dread of death to flight or soul retreat’ (cp. 1342 b
12 sqq.), and is also credited with a cathartic influence which
Aristotle does not ascribe to it—

‘Nor wanting power to mitigate and swage
With solemn touches troubled thoughts, and chase
Anguish and doubt and fear and sorrow and pain
From mortal or immortal minds.’

Here the passage before us may be present to Milton’s mind.
Julian perhaps refers to it in Epist. 56. 442 B, ὅτι γὰρ πρὸ ἡμῶν αὐτοῦ
τὰς ψυχὰς ὑπὸ τῆς βείας μονοσικῆς κακαρθέντος ὑψησόνται, πιστευόν τοῖς
προσφαυνομένως ὄρθος ὑπὲρ τούτων.

II. ταῦτα δῆ τούτο κ.τ.λ. Aristotle seems still to be speaking of
the effect of the sacred melodies. They cannot fail, he thinks, to
 purge others besides those who are specially given to ἐνθουσιασμός—
those who are specially subject to the emotions of fear and pity
(two allied emotions, as we learn from Rhet. 2. 8), and indeed
those who are subject to emotion of any kind, and also those
who are not specially emotional, so far as they are accessible
to emotion. Philoxenus had represented the Cyclops as ‘curing
his love with music’ (Philox. Fragm. 7: Plut. Amat. c. 18), and
anger also was thought to be soothed by music (Athen. Deipn.
623 f sq.). As to the specially emotional persons referred to,
cp. Eth. Eud. 3. 1. 1228 b 35, οἱ μὲν ὁδὸν νοσώσεις καὶ ὀσθενεῖς καὶ δειλοὶ
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καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν κοινῶν παθημάτων πάσχοντι τι, πλῆν βαστῶν τε καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ, and Probl. 19. 48. 922 b 21, ἰσιωτα δὲ αὐτῶν ἡ ὑποθερματὴ ἐνθουσιαστικὴ γὰρ καὶ βακχικὴ. κατὰ μὲν οὖν ταύτην πάσχομεν τι παθητικοὶ δὲ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς μᾶλλον τῶν δυνατῶν εἰσὶ.

13. καθ᾽ ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει τῶν τοιούτων ἐκάστως, ‘so far as a share in the things mentioned’ (i.e. emotions) ‘falls to each’: cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 22, καθ᾽ ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἐκάστῳ τοῦ ζην καλῶς, and Plato, Rep. 421 C, ἐστέον ὅπως ἐκάστου τοῖς ἵθεσιν ἢ φύσις ἀποδίδωσι τοῦ μεταλαμβάνειν εὐδαιμονίας.

14. τινὰ κάθαρσιν. Bern. ‘irgend eine Katharsis,’ and Prof. Butcher (Aristotle’s Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, ed. 2, p. 246, note 1) observes, ‘τινὰ κάθαρσιν implies that the katharsis in all cases is not precisely of the same kind,’ and (p. 247) ‘it is pretty plainly implied that the katharsis of pity and fear in tragedy is analogous to, but not identical with, the katharsis of “enthusiasm.”’ This may be so, but I am not sure that Aristotle means anything more than that all experience some purgation, though the amount of it varies with the amount of emotion by which they are severally possessed: cp. Plut. De Tranq. An. c. 9, δεὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ κοινὰ (‘things which are shared by men in general’) μὴ παρορῶν, ἄλλ᾽ ἐν τινι λόγῳ τίθεσθαι. τις, indeed, is sometimes added to a substantive merely to soften it, as in Xen. Oecon. 8. 3, καὶ γὰρ χρόνος εἷς ἀνθρώπων συγκείμενος ἐστιν’ ἄλλ᾽ ὅταν μὲν ποιῶν ὅ τι ἄν τύχῃ ἐκάστος, ταραχῆ τις φαίνεται καὶ θέαιθαι ἀτερπέ, but I do not think that this is the case here.


15. ὁμοίως δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘and similarly the cathartic melodies also,’ (as well as the sacred melodies) ‘are a source to men of harmless pleasure.’ So Vict. ‘ut cantilenas illas sacras, quas docuit adhiberi solitae sua aetate ad expiandos lymphaticos, praeter furorem quem levant affirmavit gignere voluptatem, ita nunc testatur cantus purgandis animis factos, qui tamen non opitulantur ope divina valde commotis animal, sed concentu vocum sonorumque, apto illis motibus, prosunt, continere in se suavitatis plurimum.’ The fact that they are a source of harmless pleasure shows that they are well suited both for diagoge and for relaxation (cp. c. 5. 1339 b 25 sqq.). The cathartic melodies here referred to seem to be the
same as those which are called enthusiastic in 1341 b 34. I understood this passage otherwise when I wrote (in vol. i. p. 366), ‘the melodies also which purge emotion are similarly productive of innocent pleasure.’ I should have written, ‘just as the sacred melodies produce this effect, so the melodies which purge emotion are similarly productive of innocent pleasure.’ [Since the foregoing note was written, Sus.4 (i. p. 611) has rightly disagreed with the view which I took of the sentence in vol. i. p. 366. I then thought that it referred to cathartic melodies as distinguished from cathartic harmonies, whereas I think now that it refers to cathartic melodies as distinguished from the sacred melodies, whose effects I take to be described in ēk τῶν δ’ ἱερῶν μελῶν, 8—ἡδονή, 15. I am still of opinion that καθαρτικά should be retained in 15, and not, as Sus. suggests, discarded in favour of πρακτικά.]

16. διὸ κ.τ.λ. Μέν is taken up, not by δ’ in 19, but by δὲ in 28. With Spengel and Sus. I insert (χρήσθαι) before θετέων: cp. χρηστεών, 1342 a 1, 2, χρήσθαι, 27, and χρηστεών, 29. For θετέων χρῆσθαι, cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. 15. 1, ἐθηκε γὰρ δύοι μὲν βασιλέα πρὸ τῆς πόλεως τὰ δημόσια ἄπαντα. Διὸ—ἀγωνιστάς is virtually repeated in 26–28.


21. ἀγώνας καὶ θεωρίας, ‘contests and spectacles.’ Cp. 8 (6). 8. 1323 a 1, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις περὶ ἀγώνας ἐπιμέλεια γυμνικὸς καὶ Διουσιακὸς, κἂν εἶ τινα ἑτέρας συμβαίνει τοιάτου γίνεσθαι θεωρίας, whence it appears that a ‘contest’ was a kind of ‘spectacle.’ A dramatic or musical performance would also be a ‘spectacle.’ θεωρία is explained by Stallbaum to be used in the wider sense of ‘festival’ (ἱερόν) in Plato, Laws 650 A, τῆς τοῦ Διουσίου θεωρίας. Cp. also Isocr. Aeginet. § 10, οὐτε θυσίας οὐτε θεωρίας οὐ’ ἀλλην ἱεροτήν οὐδεμίαν. We infer from the use of καὶ in καὶ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις that Aristotle is prepared to provide ἀγώνες and θεωρίαι at which music of a higher type is performed for the citizens of his ‘best State.’ It is remarkable that he should expect day-labourers to care for music of any kind.

22. εἰσὶ δ’ ὠσπερ αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ κ.τ.λ. As to the souls of βίωνων and θητῶν cp. Plato, Rep. 495 D, quoted above on 1337 b 8. The position of εἰσὶ is strange; it seems hardly to belong to
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δόστερ αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ κ.τ.λ., and yet it can hardly belong to οὕτω καὶ κ.τ.λ., for that clause is already provided with an εἰσί. Did Aristotle originally intend the sentence to run εἰσί δὲ τῶν ἁρμονίων παρεκβάσεις and insert δόστερ κ.τ.λ. by an afterthought? Perhaps the repetition of εἰσί in 24 is to be compared with the repetition of δῆλον in 3. 13. 1283 b 17 and of ἔργον in 8(6). 5. 1319 b 35.

23. οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἁρμονίων παρεκβάσεις εἰσί. Here the relation between the soul and an ἁρμονία dwelt on in c. 5. 1340 b 17 sqq. is again present to Aristotle's mind. The μεγαλυδιστή and συντονολυδιστή (Plato, Rep. 398 E) are probably among the modes referred to, and perhaps also the low-pitched Lydian and low-pitched Ionian (see note in Sus.); at any rate both high-pitched and low-pitched modes are treated as παρεκβάσεις τῶν ἁρμονίων in 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 24 sqq. The abandonment of the mixo-Lydian mode to βάναυσοι and θητεῖς is uncomplimentary to Sappho, its reputed inventress (see above on 1340 a 42).

24. καὶ τῶν μελῶν τὰ σύντονα καὶ παρακεχρωμένα, 'and of melodies those which are highly-strung and unnaturally coloured.' Σύντονα is perhaps used here in opposition both to ἁφαίμινα or μαλακά, as in 1342 b 21 and 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 27, and to βαρέα, as in De Gen. An. 5. 7. 786 b 35, καὶ εἰ τοῖς μελέσαι τὸ βαρὺ τῶν συντόνων βέλτιον. The Cretans are said by Ephorus to have used in their songs the rhythms which are most σύντονοι (Fragm. 64: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 250). For the meaning of χρώμα in music see Liddell and Scott, s.v., and Sus.; i. p. 636 sqq. Aristotle probably objected to the musical innovations of Timotheus, of whom we read in Pher.XE,ρος, Fragm. i (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 333), οὕτως ἀπαντᾷ οὖς λέγω παρελήφθη ζώον ἐκτραπέλους μυρμηκάς, ἔχαρμονίους ὑπερβολαίους τ' ἀνοσίους,

and also to the music of Agathon: cp. Plut. Sympos. 3. 1. 1, θαυμάζω δὲ καὶ Ἑράτωνα τούτον, εἳ τάς ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι παραχρώμεσι βδέλυντόμενοι καὶ κατηγοροῦν τοῦ καλοῦ Ἀγάθωνος, ὃν πρώτον εἰς τραγῳδίαν φασίν ἐμβαλεῖν καὶ ὑπομίζει τὸ χρωματικόν, ὅτε τοὺς Μυνοὺς ἐθίδασκεν, αὐτὸς ἥμιν, ὃς ὁρᾶτε, πουκιλὼν χρωμάτων καὶ ἀνθρώπων τὸ συμπόσιον ἐμπέπληκε καὶ τὴν διὰ τῶν ὀστῶν ἀποκλείει τρυφήν καὶ ἐνυπάθειαν κ.τ.λ. Compare also Philoch. Fragm. 66 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 385), where we read of Lysander of Sicyon, καὶ περιέλων τὴν συντονίαν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἐν τοῖς ψυλλοῖς κιθαριστῶν, χρωματά τε εὖχραο πρῶτος ἐκιθάρωσε κ.τ.λ., and Pratinas, Fragm. 5, quoted above on 1340 a 42.

28. διότερ εἶρηται, in 1342 a 2.

30. καθάπερ εἴπομεν πρότερον, in c. 5. 1340 b 3 sqq.

31. οἱ κοινωνοὶ κ.τ.λ., 'those who have shared in philosophical study and in musical education,' as distinguished from mere musicians on the one hand and philosophers who have not studied music on the other (see above on 1341 b 27). For the phrase cp. Plato, Gorg. 487 C, κοινωνοῖς γεγονότας σοφίας: Laws 968 A, παιδείας ὑπάρχουσας διελεύθημεν κοινωνοῦ γενόμενον: Hipp. Minor 363 A, οἱ μάλιστ' ἄν ἀντιτιμοσεϊμέθα μετείναι ἡμῖν τῆς εἰς φιλοσοφία διατρίβησί: Theaet. 172 C, οἱ ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβωσίν.

32. ὁ δ' ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ Σωκράτης κ.τ.λ. Here begins a similar review of the opinions put in Socrates' mouth by Plato in the Republic to that which we find at the end of the Book on Revolutions (7 (5). 12. 1316 a 1 sqq.). As to these passages see vol. i. p. 519, note 1. The passage in the Republic referred to is Rep. 399 A sqq., where Plato seems to imply that the Dorian and Phrygian modes inspire courage in war and temperance in peace. Aristotle holds, on the contrary, that the Phrygian mode does neither the one thing nor the other. Φρύγων should probably be 'Ionian' in Plut. Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 30, διότερ οὖν ὁ Πλάτων ἀφεῖλε τῶν παιδευμένων νέων τὴν ἀρμονίαν τὴν Λύδιαν καὶ τὴν Φρύγαν, τὴν μὲν το θρησκείαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἡμῶν ἐγερομενάν τῆς ψυχῆς, τὴν δὲ τὸ πρὸς Ἰωνίων ὀλασθηνὸν καὶ ἀκόλουθον αἴθουσαν: cp. Aristid. Quint. De Musica, p. 22. For ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ cp. 2. 6. 1264 b 28, 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 11, and 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 1, in all which passages the phrase is used in close proximity to a mention of ὁ Σωκράτης, and 2. 5. 1264 b 24, ἡ πολιτεία περὶ ἡς ὁ Σωκράτης εἴρησε. In 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 1, on the other hand, we have διότερ Πλάτων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις (perhaps referring to the Eighth and Ninth Books of the Republic), and in 2. 1. 1261 a 6, ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνοι.

34. ἀποδοκιμάσας, in Rep. 399 D.

2. αὐλός. For the absence of the article see note on 1255 b 36. 1342 b.

3. For the difference between ὁργαστικά and παθητικά see above on 1341 a 21.

δηλοὶ δ' ὡς ποίησις: πᾶσα γὰρ βακχεία κ.τ.λ., 'and poetry makes this clear' (i.e. that the αὐλός and the Phrygian mode are similar in effect), 'for every sort of Bacchic frenzy and all Bacchic agitation of mind [when represented in poetry] find their fit expression in
the pipes more than in any other instrument.' In translating κίνησις 'agitation of mind' and not 'bodily movement' I have followed Sus., who may probably be right (cp. 3, παθητικά, and c. 3. 1337 b 42), but I have done so with some hesitation, for βακχεία is used of physical movement in Plato, Laws 672 B, τάς τε βακχείας καὶ πάσαν τήν μανικήν χορείαν, 790 E, καθάπερ αἱ τῶν ἐκφράσεων βακχείων ὑάλεις τάυτη τῇ τής κινήσεως ἀμα χορεία καὶ μούτη χρώμεναι, and 815 B–C. For ἐστιν ἐν (= 'sitae sunt in'), see above on 1330 b 8, and cp. c. 6. 1341 a 3, and Plato, Protag. 354 E, 356 D (where see Stallbaum). It should be noted that in a letter (genuine or not) from Olympias to Alexander quoted in Athen. Deipn. 659 f she distinguishes between τὰ ὀργανιστικά ἱερά and τὰ βακχικά, though in the passage before us βακχεία is evidently connected with τὰ ὀργανιστικά.

7. οἶον ὁ διθύραμβος κ.τ.λ., 'as for instance the dithyramb, [which is an expression of Bacchic frenzy,] is generally agreed to be a Phrygian melody' (and to require the Phrygian mode).

8. σύνεσιν, not far in meaning from τέχνην: cp. 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 11, τῆς αὐτῆς φρονήσεως ταύτης.

9. διότι Φιλόζενος κ.τ.λ. Vict. 'est autem molestum hac in parte quod legitur in media sententia accusandi casu μυθος.' Schn. 'Rezius latere nomen dithyrambi Philoxenei suspicatus est; et recte quidem. Equidem non dubito Μυσούς id fuisse, quo nomine fabulas tragicas ab Aeschyllo et Agathone publico in certamine Athenis commissas fuisse novimus.' Sophocles also wrote a tragedy thus entitled (see Nauck, Trag. Gr. Fragm., p. 175). Schneider's conjecture has been adopted by Coray, Stahr, Bekk, and Sus., and is probably right, if indeed τοῦς Μυσούς is not an explanatory gloss which has crept from the margin into the text. Bergk accepts the change (Poet. Lyr. Gr., Philoxenus Fragm. 20), and adds, 'huc refero Plut. De Mus. c. 33, ὅστε οὐδὲ ἤτειν παρὰ ταύτης τὸ διαγρώναι δύνασθαι, πάτερον οἰκεῖος ἐξήθην ὁ ποιητής ὁς οἶον [ὁμων MSS. in place of ὁς οἶον] εἰπεῖν ἐν μούσοις (corrige Μυσοῖς) τὸν ὑποδόρον τὸν ἐπὶ τὴν ύρχην, ἢ τὸν μέσολοντα τε καὶ δόρον ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκβασιν, ἢ τὸν ὑποθρύμον τε καὶ φρύγων ἐπὶ τὴν μέσην (τὸ μέσον ?).’ If τοῦς Μυσούς is correct, the dithyramb probably turned, like the tragedies of the same name by Aeschylus and Sophocles, on the story of Telephus. The mention of the title of the dithyramb is made somewhat abruptly, and also without necessity; still the title of a poem by Tyrtaeus is given, though less abruptly, in 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 39. As to the subjects in connexion with which the Dorian mode was employed, it should
be noticed that, as Plutarch points out (De Musica c. 17), it was sometimes used for τραγικόν ὀίκτην and even for ἐρωτικά, subjects as alien to it, one would have thought, as a dithyramb. We see from Plato, Laws 669 C, that composers were not always successful in mating melody and words.

12. περὶ δὲ τῆς δωριστῆς κ.τ.λ. See above on 1340 b 3.
13. ἢ τι ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ. Is this a reference to Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 a 26 sqq., b 26 sq.? Cp. also Magn. Mor. i. 24. 1192 a 6, ὁ ἄρα εὐθύρως, ἐπειδὴ ἐστὶν ἐπαινετός, μέσος τις ἂν εἰη τούτων.
14. ἢ δὲ δωριστῇ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 5. 1340 b 3 sqq.
16. εἰσὶ δὲ δῶ ω σκοποὶ—34. τὸ πρέπον. Susemihl brackets this passage as an interpolation, and I incline now to think that he is right: I thought otherwise when I wrote vol. i. p. 366, note 1. It would seem that the writer of it seeks to qualify the decision just arrived at in favour of the use of the midway mode in education by pointing out that for certain ages the relaxed modes are the only possible and becoming ones, and also that there is something to be said for the use in education of such modes as the Lydian. It is hardly likely that Aristotle would do this, unless we suppose a change of mind on his part, for he would scarcely be willing to unsay what he has said against the relaxed modes in c. 5. 1340 b 2, or to allow the boys for whose training he recommends the Dorian mode to be also trained in modes which he regards as soft and effeminate. Besides, as Sus.4 remarks (i. p. 616, note), after what has been said in c. 6. 1340 b 35 sqq. we do not expect to hear of old men singing, except perhaps on the occasion of some special festivity (c. 5. 1339 b 9 sq.). The language of the passage recalls that of Plato in Laws 785 B, τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ πρέπον ἑκάσταις προστάταιν μέχρι τῶν πεντήκοντα ἑτῶν, and 670 D, ἦνα καθορίστην τὰς τε ἄρμονίας καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς ἐκλέγεσθαι τοῖς προσήκοντα ὁδοῖς τ' ἀδειίν, ἃ τοῖς τηλεκύμονες τε καὶ
NOTES.

τοιούτως ἰδέων πρέπουν. We also hear a good deal about τὸ δυνατόν and τὸ πρέπον, or rather τὸ ἁρμότον, in the opening chapter of the Book which stands next to the Fifth, if we adopt the order of the Books which has been adopted in the present edition and place the old Fourth Book immediately after the old Eighth. It should further be noticed that Plutarch seems to have had 17–29 before him in An seni sit gerenda Respublica, c. 18, ὡσπερ γάρ, εἰ καθήκον ἦν ἂδουτας διατελεῖν, ἐδει, πολλῶν τῶν καὶ τρόπων ὑποκειμένων φωνῆς, οὐς ἄρμονίας οἱ μουσικοὶ καλοῦσιν, μὴ τὸν ἄξιον ἤμα καὶ σύντονον διόκειν γέροστας γενομένους, ἀλλ' ἐν ὧ τὸ βάδιον ἐπεστὶ μετὰ τοῦ πρέπουτος ἥδουν. It is, however, possible that Plutarch had before him the criticism of the Republic by τῶν περὶ τὴν μουσικήν τινις which is reproduced here, and not its reproduction in the passage before us. In addition to the objections to the passage 17–34 to which reference has already been made, it may be noted that, as Sus. has pointed out, looking to the reference to τὸ δυνατόν in 18 sqq., we expect to be told that the young should learn those melodies which are suitable to them and not beyond their powers, and not to be told, as we in fact are, that they should learn those melodies which will be the only ones suitable and practicable for them when they are past a certain age. Perhaps, however, the writer does mean that the relaxed modes are suitable both to the young and to the old; this seems to be indicated by his use of καὶ in ὅστε καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐσομείωσιν ἥλικιαν, 'for the coming age also as well as for that of youth.' If this is his meaning, however, and there is nothing defective in the text, he must be allowed to have expressed it in a very imperfect way.

20. καὶ ταύτα, i.e. τὰ δυνατὰ καὶ τὰ πρέποντα, as well as τὰ μέσα: cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 α 37, τὸν μέσον ἀναγκαίον βιόν εἶναι βελτιστόν, τῆς ἐκάστους ἐυδεχομένης τιμῆς μεσότητος. Τὸ μέσον would not be exactly the same for boys and for men of full age and for old men.

οἶνον τοῖς ἀπειρηκόσι διὰ χρόνον κ.τ.λ. Cp. De Gen. An. 5. 7. 787 b 10, ἔστι μὲν οὖν πάση ἡ ἱσχύς ἐν τοῖς νεύροις, διὰ καὶ τὰ ἀκμᾶζοντα ἱσχύει μᾶλλον ἀναβρα ζὰρ τὰ νέα μᾶλλον καὶ ἰνευρα. ἐτὶ δὲ τοῖς μὲν νέοις οὔπω ἐπιτετάστα, τοῖς δὲ γηράκοισιν ἦδη ἀνίσται ἡ συντονία διὸ ἀμφο ἀθένη καὶ ἀδύνατο πρὸς τὴν κίνησιν, and Plut. An seni sit gerenda Respublica, c. 18, quoted above on 17–34. Οἱ ἀπειρηκότες διὰ χρόνον (cp. 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 33) are distinguished from those who are in the same state from other causes: see Bonitz (Ind. 71 b 45), who groups with the passage before us Hist. An. 6. 18. 572 a 18, ἀπείπωσι διὰ τῶν πόνων.

25. ὃς μεθυστικὰς κ.τ.λ., 'taking them as connected with intoxication, not conformably to the influence of intoxication (for intoxication makes men rather frenzied revellers), but as enfeebled and exhausted.'

26. ὡστε καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐσομένην ἠλικίαν κ.τ.λ. This sentence seems to be modelled on 1342 a 28 sq. and to be intended to contradict it. Καὶ, 27, implies that the study of relaxed modes by the young (for with δεῖ we must supply τοὺς νέους or τοὺς νεωτέρους) will be useful to them at their actual time of life as well as with a view to the coming time of life (see above on 17–34). We expect not τὴν τῶν πρεσβύτερων, but τὴν τῶν ἀπειρηκότων διὰ χρόνον, and we must not identify ὁι πρεσβύτεροι with ὁι ἀπειρηκότες διὰ χρόνον (cp. 4 (7)). 16. 1335 b 29 sqq.), but for some reason the wider term is preferred.

27. έτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Here we pass from τὸ δυνατὸν to τὸ πρῶτον (cp. 17 sq.). The apodosis of this sentence is missing in a lacuna after ἀρμονίων, 33. It seems better to adopt this view (with Sus.) than (with Schn. Cor. and Götting) to place a colon instead of a full stop after τοιοῦτων, 29, and to connect ἐτι δ' εἰ τις, 29–ἀρμονίων, 33, with what precedes. As to the lacuna after ἀρμονίων see critical note.

30. For τοιαῦτα followed by ἦ, see above on 1266 b 36.

31. κόσμον, probably 'orderliness': cp. 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 7, πρὸς εὐτάξιαν καὶ κόσμον, and Plut. Lycurg. c. 4, quoted above on 1341 b 32.

33. τούτως ὄρους τρεῖς. For the absence of the article see above on 1253 b 11.
I am indebted to the kindness of Mr. F. G. Kenyon for the following collation of Brit. Mus. MS. Harl. 6874.

The MS. contains the First Book of the Politics with the exception of the latter part of its last chapter, from 1260 a 26, τὸ ὧρθο-πραγεῖν, to the end. It also contains 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 24–1301 a 12, beginning with the words κλήρῳ καὶ ἂ ἐξ ἀπάντων and ending with the word δημοτικά, and 7 (5). 1. 1302 a 3–1302 b 31, beginning with the words φαϊλον, φανερῶ δ' and ending with the word Μεγαρίων. ‘It is of octavo size, measuring 8\(^{3/4}\) in. x 5\(^{7/8}\) in. It is on vellum, written in a very neat hand, apparently of the first half of the fifteenth century. There is nothing to show how it came into its present fragmentary condition, as it was rebound when acquired by Lord Oxford’ (Letter from Mr. Kenyon).

The MS. does not, as far as I see, contain anything new except in one passage, 1253 b 8, where a ‘lacuna quasi trium litterarum inter ποιον et δεῖ’ is noted. None of the seventeen MSS. examined by or for Susemihl in 1252–1254 a 17 (see his edition of the Politics of 1872, p. xxviii) have any lacuna there. It is possible that τι has dropped out. But the MS. belongs to the better type of the second family and is nearly allied to P\(^{2,3}\) (especially to P\(^{2}\)), two MSS. which, with Ms P\(^{1}\), the Vatican Palimpsest Fragments, and the Latin Translation of the Vetus Interpres, stand at the head of the authorities for the text of the Politics. Of course it has many errors of its own, and when it agrees with P\(^{2,3}\), some of the inferior MSS. often do so too, but sometimes it agrees with P\(^{2,3}\) where none of the inferior MSS. do so (this is the case in 1252 a 15, 1253 a 16, 1254 b 2, 1257 a 13, 16, 1300 b 24, 26). I have
noted only two or three passages in which it sides with inferior MSS. against P².³—in 1252 a 26 it has συνδιακείσθαι with Ms Sb Ub L⁸ pr. P⁹, and in 1257 b 21 it has ἦ with P⁴,⁶ Q L⁸ Ald., not ἦ as Ms P¹,²,⁸ Tb.

It often stands alone or almost alone in agreement with P³:

1255 a 31 P³ has εἰπάμεν, and Harl. εἰπάμεν corrected into εἰπαμεν prima manu,

b 2 ἐκ is omitted by pr. P³ pr. Harl.,

1256 a 17 πότερος Harl. pr. P⁹,

b 35 οὐδὲ μᾶς Ms P³ Harl.,

1258 b 33 ἔστι Ms P³ Harl.: ἔστι P²,

1259 b 8 αἴλαυσι Harl.: αἴλαυσι (‘ut videtur,’ Sus.¹) pr. P³,

To χοι P³ Harl.

But P³ has many false readings which Harl. has not, and in two passages Harl. shows a striking resemblance to P²: thus in 1255 a 37 we find ἐκ γώνων in P² Q Ms² Harl., and in 1302 b 19 Ald. pr. P² have ἐν ἔσονται (αἰνέονται γρ. marg. P³), while Harl. has ἐν ἔσονται (marg. μὴ αἰνέονται prima manu). It is obvious, therefore, that Harl. is not copied from P³.

The glosses found in Harl. in 1302 a 28 and b 4 are found also in red ink in the margin of P² and in a later hand than the MS. in the margin of P³ (see Susemihl's edition of 1872 in these passages). Harl. does not seem to have the glosses which are found in P² but not in P³.


APPENDIX A. 577

A.  

b 2-4.  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  

2.  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  

577  

b 2-4.  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  

2.  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  

APPENDIX A. 577
APPENDIX A.


BOOK IV. c. 15.


APPENDIX B.

HYPERBATON is much used in the Politics—more, I think, than in the Nicomachean Ethics—for the purpose of emphasizing a particular word or words.

Kühner's account of Hyperbaton (Ausfuhrl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 607. 1) is as follows—'In Hyperbaton two words forming together a unity are severed by the interposition of one or more less important words. By means of this severance prominence is given, as a rule, to one only of the severed words, that which stands first, but often also to both of them, especially when both are placed in emphatic positions in the sentence, for instance at the beginning or end of it.' In one particular this account is open to amendment. The severed words are not always only two in number; they are more than two, for instance, in Pol. 4 (7). i. 1323 b 38, ότε πάντας τοὺς οἰκεῖους ἐπεξείλθει ἐνδέχεται λόγους.

In the following passages the emphasis appears to fall on the first only of the severed words:

4 (7). i. 1323 b 39, ἐτέρας γάρ ἐστιν ἐργον σχολῆς ταύτα,
4 (7). 2. 1324 a 21, ἤμεις δὲ ταύτην προηρήμεθα νῦν τὴν σκέψιν,
5 (8). 6. 1341 a 22, ότε πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτῷ καιροῦς χρήσεων ἐν οἷς κ.τ.λ.
5 (8). 7. 1342 a 4, ὃ γάρ περὶ ἐνίας συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχῆς ἱσχυρῶς,

APPENDIX B.

On the use of Hyperbaton in the Politics.
In the following passages, on the other hand, the emphasis appears to fall on both, or all, the severed words:

4 (7). I. 1323 a 16, ἀδήλου γὰρ ὄντος τούτου καὶ τὴν ἀρίστην ἀναγκαῖον ἀδήλου εἶναι πολιτείαν,

5 (8). 6. 1341 b 10, ἐν ταύτη γὰρ ὁ πράττων οὗ τῆς αὐτοῦ μεταχειρίζεται χάρων ἀρετῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν ἀκούοντων ἡδονῆς,

8 (6). 4. 1318 b 7, καθίστη ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτων ἐλέηθη λόγοις, 37, καὶ ἀρξοντεὶ δικαίως διὰ τὸ τῶν εὐθυνῶν εἶναι κυρίους ἐτέρους,

8 (6). 4. 1319 b 23, φυλαῖ τε γὰρ ἐστεραὶ ποιητέα πλείους καὶ φρατρία,

8 (6). 5. 1320 a 14, δεὶ δὲ καὶ τῇ πολιτείᾳ πάντας μάλιστα μὲν εὐθύνους εἶναι τοὺς πολίτας,

The following words are among those most often emphasized in this way—οὔδεις and μηδείς, πᾶς, πολὺς, οὔτος, ἐκαστὸς, έἰς, αὐτὸς and ὁ αὐτὸς, ἄλλος and ὁ ἄλλος, τουτέστω καὶ ὁ τουτέστω, τίς and τες, πόσος, and πῶς.

Occasionally two sets of words are thus emphasized in the same sentence—e.g. in 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 3, ἢ γὰρ ἀριστοκρατία διέστηκεν ἀπὸ ταύτης πολὺ τῆς πολιτείᾳ, where both διέστηκεν πολὺ and ταύτης τῆς πολιτείᾳ are emphasized by severance, and in 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 10, ἀπὰν γὰρ οἰκεῖον τοῦτο τῷ τουτῷ δῆμῳ μᾶλλον, where both ἀπὰν τοῦτο and οἰκεῖον μᾶλλον are similarly emphasized.

Groups of words linked by καὶ or ἦ are often emphasized in this way: e.g. in

3. 5. 1278 a 6, ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις παρένεμεν ἦν δοῦλον τὸ βάλανσον ἦν ἐμικρόν,

17, ὡστὶ ἐν μὲν την πολιτεία τὸν βάλανσον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ τὸν θήτα πολίτας,

19, ἐν ὑ καὶ ἀρετὴν ᾧ τιμαὶ δίδονται καὶ καὶ ἀξίαν,

3. 10. 1281 a 24, ἀλλὰ ἄρα τοὺς ἐλάττους δίκαιον ἀρχεῖν καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους;

8 (6). 3. 1318 a 15, ἔπειτα ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσίων ὅσους λαβόντα καὶ ἐκ τῶν χιλίων.

It should be added that, though in nearly all the cases of the severance of connected words which have been examined by me in the Politics the aim evidently is to throw emphasis on particular words, I have noticed two or three passages in which this cannot
be said to be clearly the case. They are passages in which the relative is severed from its substantive. We have in

4 (7). I. 1323 b 15, ἦπερ εἶπησε διάκτασιν ὅν φαμὲν αὐτὰς εἶναι δια-
θέσεις ταύτας,

6 (4). 4. 1290 b 28, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, οἷς κυβεῖται μορίους ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν,
6 (4). I4. 1298 a 31, ἄντεπ ἡ τελευταία δημοκρατία νῦν διουκεῖται τρόπον
(contrast 5 (8). I. 1337 a 24, ὃν τρόπον νῦν ἐκαστὸν ἐπιμελεῖται τὰν αὐτὸν τέκνων κ.τ.λ.).

Is any emphasis intended to be thrown on the severed words in these three passages?

APPENDIX C.

On the variations in the order of words in Π¹ and Π².

A considerable proportion of the variations in the order of words which we observe in Π¹ and Π² may be arranged in classes.

1. There are those in which Π² sever the adjective or pronoun from the substantive with which it agrees, while Π¹ place them together:—

I253 a 7, διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἥφιον Π² (ἥφιον ὁ ἀνθρώπος
Π¹),

b 7, περὶ τριῶν ἄν τούτων σκεπτέον εἴη Π² (περὶ τριῶν τούτων
σκεπτέον ἄν εἴη Π¹),

I256 b 26, τούτων ὡστα τῶν πόλεμων Π² (ὡστα τούτων Π¹),

I270 b 28, κρίσεων εἰσὶ μεγάλων Π² (κρίσεων μεγάλων εἰσὶ Π¹),

I273 b 36, νομοθέτην γενέσθαι σπουδαίον Π² (γενέσθαι νομοθέτην σπου-
δαίον Π¹),

I274 a 17, κύριος ὥν ὁ δήμος Π² (ὡν ὁ δήμος Κύριος Μα Ρ¹ and
perhaps Π'),

I276 b 14, εἰς ἑτέραν μεταβάλῃ πολιτείαν Π² (πολιτείαν μεταβάλῃ Π¹),

I323 b 15, ὅν φαμὲν αὐτὰς εἶναι διαθέσεις ταύτας Π² (εἶναι αὐτὰς
tαύτας διαθέσεις Π¹),

I330 b 29, τὴν μὲν δὴν μή ποιεῖν πόλιν εὐτόμον Π² (πόλιν μὴ ποιεῖν
Γ Μα, πόλιν ομ. Ρ¹),

I335 a 38, τὴν συναυλίαν ποιεῖσθαι ταύτην Π² (ποιεῖσθαι τὴν συνα-
υλίαν Π¹),
2. There are those in which \( \Pi^2 \) sever words from the words they govern, while \( \Pi^1 \) group the words together. A substantive, for instance, is often severed from the genitive it governs by \( \Pi^2 \), where it is not so severed by \( \Pi^1 \). Thus \( \Pi^2 \) have in

1328 b 17, εάν δὲ τι τυγχάνη τούτων ἐκλείπον (τί τούτων τυγχάνη \( \Pi^1 \)), 1331 b 4, τὸ πλῆθος διαμείκται τῆς πόλεως (τῆς πόλεως διαμείκται \( \Pi^1 \)), 1337 a 2, τὸ προσλείπτων βοϋλέται τῆς φύσεως ἀναπληροῦν (τῆς φύσεως βούλεται \( \Pi^1 \)), 1340 b 29, τοῖς νηπίοις ἀρμόττουσα τῶν παιδίων (ἀρμόττουσα τοῖς νηπίοις \( \Pi^1 \)), 1309 b 38, οὐδετέραν μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται αὐτῶν (οὐδετέραν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐνδέχεται \( \Pi^1 \)), 1321 b 30, αὐταί μὲν οὖν ἐπιμέλειαι εἰσὶ τούτων τρεῖς (τούτων εἰσὶ τρεῖς \( \Pi^1 \)).

A similar tendency appears in the following passages, though in a less marked degree:—

1341 a 23, κάθαρσιν μᾶλλον δύναται ἡ μᾶθησιν \( \Pi^2 \) (δύναται μᾶλλον \( \Pi^1 \) and possibly \( \Gamma \)), 24, συμβέβηκεν ἐναντίον αὐτῶν πρὸς παιδείαν \( \Pi^2 \) (αὐτῶν ἐναντίον \( \Pi^1 \)), 1295 b 31, καθάπερ τῆς τῶν πλουσίων οἱ πέντες ἐπιθυμοῦσιν \( \Pi^2 \) (καθάπερ οἱ πέντες τῆς τῶν πλουσίων ἐπιθυμοῦσιν \( \Pi^1 \)), 1302 b 17, γίνεσθαι γὰρ εἰσεθεν ἐκ τῶν τουκότων \( \Pi^2 \) (γίνεσθαι γὰρ ἐκ τῶν τουκότων εἰσεθε \( \Pi^1 \) and possibly \( \Gamma \)), 1322 a 7, κοινωνεῖν ἀδύνατον ἄλληλοις \( \Pi^2 \) (κοινωνεὶν ἄλληλοις ἀδύνατον \( \Pi^1 \)).

3. In all the above passages the order of words adopted in \( \Pi^2 \) is more broken and more emphatic than that adopted in \( \Pi^1 \), and

1 In 1302 b 5 all MSS. have τίνα ἐξει διάρκεια καλεῖν θαλεῖν and ἐξονεί δύναμιν.
2 In 1338 a 25, on the other hand, \( \Pi^1 \) have ἐπὶ δαίμαν καλεῖν θαλεῖν and \( \Pi^2 \) καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαίμαν θαλεῖν, where \( \Pi^1 \) are evidently wrong.
the following passages also show a leaning on the part of Π² to a more emphatic order (in the first five the adjective is placed before the substantive by Π¹):—

1276 b 40, οὐκ ἄν εἴη μιᾷ ἀρέτῃ πολέτου καὶ ἀνθρῶς ἀγαθοῦ Π² (ἀρέτη μιᾷ Π¹),
1280 a 15, φαίλου κριταί Π² (κριταί φαίλοι Π¹),
1290 b 8, πλεῖστα μόρα Π² (μόρα πλεῖστα Π¹),
1294 a 22, ἀρχαῖος πλοῦτος καὶ ἀρετή Π² (ἀρετή καὶ πλοῦτος ἀρχαῖος Π¹),
1320 a 22, δεῖ ποιεῖν ἀλήγας ἐκκλησίας Π² (ἐκκλησίας ἀλήγας Π¹),
1277 a 14, φαμέν δὴ τῶν ἀρχοντά τῶν σπουδαίων ἀγαθῶν εἶναι καὶ φρόνυμον Π³ (εἶναι ἀγαθῶν καὶ φρόνυμον Π¹),
1301 b 26, ἐν τῇ πολτεία ταύτῃ Π² (ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πολτείᾳ Π¹),
1330 b 27, τούτων ἀμφιτέρων Π² (ἀμφιτέρων τούτων Π¹),
1334 b 29, ὅπως βεβήστα τὰ σώματα γείνηται Π² (ὅπως τὰ σώματα βεβήστα γίνηται Π¹),
1337 b 12, τὸ σῶμα παρασκευάζουσι χείρων διακείθηκαί Π² (παρασκευάζουσι τὸ σῶμα χείρων διακείθηκαί Π¹).

Yet sometimes Π¹ place words in the more emphatic order. Thus they have in

1259 b 30, δεὶ τὴν γυναῖκα σώφρονα εἶναι καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαίαν (εἶναι σώφρονα Π²),
1265 b 15, ἀνίσιος τοὺς κλήρους εἶχον Μο Π¹, ἀνίσιος εἶχον τοὺς κλήρους Π (τοὺς κλήρους ἀνίσους εἶχον Π²),
1280 b 30, οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ πόλις καμανία τόπου (ἡ πόλις οὐκ ἔστι Π²): ὑπ. 1341 a 21 (οὐκ ἔστω ὁ αὐλὸς ΠΠ) and 1286 a 15,
1281 a 27, φαίλα πάντα (πάντα φαίλα Π²),
1282 a 40, τούτων πάντων (πάντων τούτων Π²),
1331 a 16, τὰ δὲ ζητεῖν δεὶ καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν (τὰ δὲ δεὶ ζητεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν Π²),
1339 a 39, εἰ δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα δεὶ διαπονεῖν αὑτοὺς (δεὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα Π²),
1300 b 27, ὅσα τοῖς φεύγουσιν ἐπὶ καθόδι ἐπιφέρεται φῶνον (τοῖς φεύγουσι φῶνον Π²),
1307 b 11, ὁμιῇ ἐξείτει συνεχῶς τοὺς αὐτοὺς στρατηγεῖς (τοὺς αὐτοὺς συνεχῶς Π²),
1322 a 31, ἐν μείζω δὲ σχῆματι (ἐν σχήματι δὲ μείζων Π²).

4. In some passages the genitive is differently placed in Π¹ and Π²:—

1326 a 20, πόλεως εἰσὶ μέρος Π², μέρος εἰσὶ πόλεως Μο Π¹ and perhaps Π,
APPENDIX D.

Reminiscences in the Politics of passages in the writings of Plato and other Greek authors and of dicta of notable men.

We are concerned in this Appendix not with explicit references, but with reminiscences, or apparent reminiscences, of a tacit kind. I have endeavoured to gather together in it those noticed in the commentary, or most of them, and a few which I have observed since I wrote it, beginning with reminiscences of Plato's writings or dicta. Many reminiscences have no doubt escaped me, but those which are here pointed out may serve in some degree to throw light on the direction and extent of Aristotle's reading in connexion with the Politics.

i. PLATO.

2. 315 1269 a 34 sqq. Laws 776 C sqq.
    317     b 14 sqq. — 781 A sqq., 806 C
    322 1270 a 4 sqq. — 780–1, esp. 780 B and 781 A
    337     b 34 sqq. Rep. 548 B
    358 1272 b 9 sqq. Laws 712 E

3. 163 1277 a 26 sq. Laws 643 E
    169     b 11 sqq. — 762 E?
    172     24 sq. Meno 71 E
    189     25 sqq. Rep. 433 C
    196 1279 a 3 sqq. — 341 C-D
    207 1280 b 20 sqq. — 550 C
    212 1281 a 34 sqq. Laws 713 E sqq.
    222 1282 a 15 sq. — 701 A
    223     20 sqq. Rep. 601 D, Cratyl. 390
    225 sq. b 14 sqq. Laws 945 B sqq.
    227     23 sqq. — 756 E–758 A, esp. 757 C,
    236 1283 a 40 sqq. Rep. 540 D
    238     b 23 sqq. — 488 D
    240 1284 a 3 sqq. — 489 E sqq.
    285 1286 b 3 sqq. Rep. 540 D
    296 sq. 1287 a 38 sqq. — 445 D
    303 1288 a 4 sq. Polit. 298 A sqq., 300 A
    306     41 sqq. Plato ap. Diog. Laert. 3. 18?
    311 1323 a 36 sqq. Polit. 292 B, E, 259 B
    312     40 sqq. Apol. Socr. 29 D, E
    318     b 29 sqq. — 30 A sq.
    326     b 9 sqq. Gorg. 500 C
    331     41 sqq. Laws 637 D
    338 1325 b 21–23 — 704 C
    341     40 sqq. Polit. 259 C, E
    346 1326 b 2 sq. Laws 709 C sqq.
    347     7 sqq. Rep. 369 D
    348     14 sqq. Same passage
    350     26 sqq. Laws 738 D sqq., 751 D, 766 E
    351     30 sqq. — 704 C, Critias 110 E
    358 1327 a 19 sqq. — 737 D, Critias 112 C
    — 705 A
| 361 | 1327 a 37 sqq. | Laws 952 D sqq. |
| 368 | 1328 a 6 sq. | Rep. 375 B |
| | 8 sqq. | — 375 D sqq. |
| 375 | b 6 sqq. | — 369 C sqq., Critias 110 C |
| 391 | 1330 a 14 sqq. | Laws 745 C |
| 394 | 26 | — 777 C sqq. |
| 395 | 31 sqq. | — 778 D |
| 406 | b 32 sqq. | — 778 D |
| 419 | 1331 b 13 sqq. | — 848 C sqq., 760 B sqq., 762 B sqq. |
| 420 | 20 sqq. | — 745 B |
| 422 | 26 sqq. | — 962 A sq. |
| | 39 sq. | Meno 78 A |
| 425 | 1332 a 11 sqq. | Laws 728 C, 859 D–860 B |
| 431 | 40 sqq. | Plato ap. Plut. Marius, c. 46 |
| 434 | b 16 sqq. | Polit. 301 D sq. |
| 436 | 37 sq. | Laws 690 A, Rep. 412 C |
| 442 | 1333 a 35 | — 628 D sq., 803 D |
| 454 | 1334 b 9 sq. | — 653 B, 659 D |
| 455 | 12 sqq. | Phaedr. 245 D |
| 457 | 27 sq. | — 591 C sq. |
| | 29 sqq. | Laws 721 A |
| 477 | 1335 b 38 sqq. | — 784 E, 841 C sqq. |
| 480 | 1336 a 8 sqq. | Theaet. 153 A, B, Laws 789 E |
| 486 | 33 sq. | Laws 643 B sq. |
| 487 | 34 sqq. | — 791 E sqq. |
| 488 | 41 sqq. | — 794 |
| 490 | b 6 sqq. | — 729 B |
| 495 | 33 | Rep. 378 D sq. |
| 496 | 35 sqq. | — 466 E sq. |
| 499 | 1337 a 14 sqq. | — 544 D sq. |
| 501 | 23 sqq. | Laws 804 C–D, 810 A |
| 502 | 27 sqq. | — 923 A sq. |
| | 29 sqq. | — 903 B, Charm. 156 E |
| 506 | b 2 sq. | Laches 190 B sq. |
| 507 | 8 sqq. | Rep. 495 D sq. |
| 1342 a 22 sq. | }
| 512 | 1337 b 35 sq. | Laws 803 D sq. |
| 519 | 1338 b 6 sqq. | — 794 C |
| 3. | 520 | 1338 b 9 sqq. | Rep. 410 D |
|    | 529 | 1339 a 26 sqq. | Laws 819 B, 820 D? |
|    | 534 | b 33 | — 658 E sq. |
|    | 536 | 1340 a 5 sqq. | Rep. 401 D, Tim. 47 D |
|    | 538 | 18 sqq. | — 399 A sqq. |
|    | 542 | 42 sqq. | — 398 D sqq. |
|    | 550 | 1341 a 10 sq. | Laws 812 D sq.? |
|    | 557 | b 10 sqq. | Gorg. 501 B–502 A |
|    | 571 | 1342 b 17 sqq. | Laws 785 B, 670 D |
|    | 158 | 1290 a 30 sqq. | Polit. 291 D |
|    | 181 | 1292 a 31 | Rep. 557 C sqq., Laws 712 E |
|    | 204 | 1294 b 18 sq. | Laws 712 D sqq. |
|    | 211 | 1295 b 4 sqq. | — 679 B sq., 728 D–729 A |
|    | 212 | 13 sqq. | — 728 D–729 A, 791 D |
|    | 217 | 1296 a 8 sq. | Laws 744 D |
|    | 286 | 1301 b 4 sq. | Laws 690 D |
|    | 290 | 26 sq. | — 757 A |
|    |    | 29 | — 757 A sqq. |
|    | 291 | 1302 a 2 sqq. | — 757 E |
|    | 309 | 1303 a 25 sq. | — 708 D |
|    | 322 | b 28 sq. | — 792 C |
|    | 358 | 1306 a 19–31 | — 551 D sq. |
|    | 371 | 1307 a 17 sq. | Gorg. 483 C |
|    | 379 | b 30 sqq. | Rep. 424 B–E |
|    | 406 | 1309 b 18 sqq. | Laws 701 E, Rep. 562 |
|    |    | 20 sqq. | Rep. 562 B |
|    | 409 | 1310 a 12 sqq. | — 552 E, Laws 793, 870 A |
|    |    | 34 sqq. | Laws 715 D |
|    | 438 | 1312 a 26 sqq. | Symp. 208 C sq. |
|    | 446 | 1313 a 19 sqq. | Laws 690 D–E, 691 D sqq. |
|    | 447 | 25 sqq. | — 691 D sqq. |
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4. 456 1313 b 18 sqq.  Rep. 567 A
     459       28 sq.       — 566 E
     477 1315 b 8 sqq.       — 580 A
     494 1317 a 41 sqq.       — 562 B sq.
     507 1318 b 1 sqq.  Laws 663 E
     518 1319 a 22 sqq.       — 695 A
     539 1320 b 33 sqq.  Rep. 556 E
     549 1321 b 14 sqq.       — 371 B
     557 1322 a 5 sqq.  Crito 50 B

ii. Isocrates.

2. 122 sq. 1253 a 9 sqq.  Nicocl. § 5 sqq., De Antid. §§ 253–257
      155 1255 a 14  Philip. § 15
     177 sq. 1256 b 23 sqq.  Panath. § 163
      228 1260 b 33 sqq.  De Antid. § 83
      375 1274 a 14 sq.       — $316 sqq.$

3. 190 1279 a 10 sqq.  Areop. § 24 sq.
     447 1333 b 38 sqq.  Panath. § 219 sq.
     448 1334 a 8 sqq.  De Pace § 96

4. 204 1294 b 18 sqq.  Areop. § 61, Nicocl. § 24
     340 1305 a 7 sqq.       — $54 sq.$, Philip. § 140
     409 1310 a 12 sqq.  Areop. § 40 sqq.
     420       b 40 sqq.  Ad Nicocl. § 16
     454 1313 b 6 sqq.  Paneg. § 151
     460       29 sqq.  Hel. § 33, De Pace § 112
     468 1314 b 21 sq.  Ad Nicocl. §§ 11, 24
     477 1315 b 8 sqq.  Hel. § 34
     512 1319 a 2 sqq.  Ad Nicocl. § 16
     535 1320 a 39 sq.  Areop. § 32

iii. Xenophon.

2. 162, 164 1255 b 20 sqq., 33 Oecon. 13. 5, 21. 10

3. 172 1277 b 24 sq.       — 7. 25
     210 1281 a 11 sqq.  Mem. 1. 2. 42 sqq.
     300 1287 b 26 sqq.  Cyrop. 8. 2. 10–12
     344 1326 a 32 sqq.       — 8. 7. 22
     365 1327 b 25 sqq.       — 1. 1. 4
     414 1331 a 31 sqq.       — 1. 2. 3 sq.
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4. 198 1294 a 3 sq. Oecon. 9. 14
258 1299 a 25 sq. Mem. 3. 9. 11
260 38 sqq. Cyrop. 2. 1. 21
446 1313 a 21 sqq. Rep. Lac. 15. 8
460 b 29 sqq. Cyrop. 8. 7. 13, Hiero 3. 7 sqq., 1. 38
472 1315 a 6 sqq. Hiero 9. 3
475 37 sq. — 6. 5
542 1321 a 19 sq. Cyrop. 2. 1. 8?

iv. Homer.

The reminiscences of Homer noticed by me are more doubtful, but possible reminiscences of the Iliad are pointed out in 2. 257, 3. 214, 273, 295, 301, 343, 379, 436 (compare also 2. 5. 1263 a 11 sqq. with Il. 1. 165–168), and of the Odyssey in 2. 239, 3. 177.

v. Reminiscences of the writings of the following authors also seem to occur in the Politics:

Aeschines 4. 198, 255? (see also 4. 214)
Aeschylus 4. 460
Aristophanes 4. 179, 510? (see also 3. 214 sq.)
Democritus 3. 489
Ephorus 2. 347–350, 4. 219
Eubulus, the comic poet, 4. 462
Euripides 2. 358?, 3. 459, 4. 211, 391, 460?, 461
Herodotus 3. 326, 4. 461 (see also 3. 150 sqq., 4. 208)
Hippias of Elis 4. 297 sq.
Hippocrates 3. 401, 473, 483, 532 (compare also 1. 8. 1256 a 32 sqq. with Hippocr. De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 556 Kühn, foot)
Melanippides 3. 556
Pratinas 3. 542
Solon 3. 169, 228, 350, 4. 139?, 290, 391, 408
Telestes 3. 556:

and reminiscences of sayings ascribed to

Alcibiades 2. 337
Anacharsis 3. 522
Epaminondas 3. 523
the Lacedaemonians 3. 525
Pelopidas 3. 423
the Pythagoreans 2. 142 sq.

Reminiscences may also occur, though this is more doubtful, of the writings of

Anaxandrides 3. 201, 397
Antiphanes 2. 252
Archilochus 4. 465 (quoted 3. 368)
Eupolis 3. 429 sq.
Heraclitus 2. 153 (quoted 4. 474)
Lysias 3. 150, 4. 334
Phrynichus, the comic poet, 2. 120
Pindar 2. 131, 153, 157, 3. 399, 4. 182
Theognis 4. 226, 297, 321, 391
Thucydides 2. 308, 3. 525, 4. 294, 402, 416,

and of sayings ascribed to Aristides 4. 403, Aristippus, 2. 287, Socrates, 3. 217, 431, and Themistocles, 4. 403.
ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS
TO VOLs. I, II, AND III.

VOL. I.

P. 15, line 14, for παμπολλοι read πάμπολλοι.

P. 20, eleven lines from foot of page, for compounds formed read things constituted.

P. 34, line 14. A. Schmekel (Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa, p. 375) takes the reference in the words 'docti homines' (Cic. De Rep. i. 24. 38) to be to Aristotle, while C. Hinze (Quos scriptores Graecos Cicero in libris de re publica componendis adhibuerit, p. 50 sq.) takes it to be to Panaetius.

P. 148, line 9, for Hecuba read Helen.

P. 236, lines 15-27. See as to the two arguments here summarized the explanatory notes on 3. 4. 1276 b 37 and 1277 a 5 (vol. iii. pp. 157-159).

P. 237, five lines from foot of page, for from read after, and dele first.

P. 242, line 1 sq. As to this recapitulation, however, see note on 3. 5. 1278 a 34 (vol. iii. p. 182).

P. 243, line 8 sq. I have given a slightly different translation of this sentence in the explanatory note on 3. 6. 1278 b 8 (vol. iii. p. 184 sq.).

P. 264, six lines from foot of page, 'his disciple Dicaearchus'. See however below on vol. ii. pp. xiii and xiv.

P. 270, note 1. In the quotation from 3. 16. 1287 b 6 for ωτε read ωτ' et (see critical note on 1287 b 6).

P. 272, line 1, for compensation read return (see vol. iii. p. 282 sq.).

P. 278, lines 17-20, add a reference to Diod. 16. 92. 5 and 95. 1, and Stob. Floril. 98. 70.

P. 286, note. The term 'mortal god' is borrowed by Hobbes from Aristotle: see Cic. De Fin. 2. 13. 40, sic hominem ad duas res, ut ait Aristoteles, ad intellegendum et ad agendum esse natum quasi mortalem deum (Aristot. Fragm. 48. 1483 b 15: Rose 2, Fragm. 61).

P. 290, line 14, for leadership read rule.

P. 297, note 2. Mr. Shute's essay 'On the history of the process by which the Aristotelian writings arrived at their present form' (Clarendon Press, 1888) has been published since my first and second volumes appeared. See p. 164 sqq. of the essay.

P. 299, note 1, first column, last line but two, for So read 81.

P. 325, in the quotation from Ion of Chios (Fragm. 63 Nauck), after ἐστὶν add ἄρ.

P. 348, note 1, lines 1-2, read We find this many-sidedness and versatility more often realized, etc.


P. 366, line 1 sqq. See as to the passage here summarized the critical note on 1341 b 19-26 (vol. iii. p. 126 sqq.).

P. 366, last line, for The melodies also read Just as the sacred melodies produce this effect, so the melodies. (See the explanatory note on 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 15 in vol. iii. p. 566 sq.)

P. 366, note 1, and p. 369, note. See the explanatory note on 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 17-24 (vol. iii. p. 571 sq.)

P. 375, line 24, for thus composed read composed of owners of complete lots.

P. 443, seven lines from foot of page, ‘he abandons’. This is true, subject to what is said in p. 435, line 14 sqq.


P. 456, note. Add Plato, Polit. 299 B sqq. to the passages referred to.

P. 470, lines 20-22. See the explanatory note on 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 38 sqq.

P. 502, four lines from foot of page, ‘the rich encroach’, etc. See explanatory note on 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 11 for a closer rendering of this passage.

P. 508, note 2. Perhaps it is better to read ἡ πολιτεία in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 8 than ἡ πολιτεία. See the critical note on 1298 b 8 and the explanatory note on 1298 b 5.

P. 509, lines 14, 15. This will not be so if I am right in bracketing Ἢ ἐκ τῶν with Spengel in 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 35.

P. 513, fourteen lines from foot of page, ‘from each tribe or section of the State’. Probably rather ‘from the γράμματα and δῆμοι’: see the explanatory note on 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 21.

P. 519, note, second column, line 4. add For other statements in this chapter inconsistent with statements made elsewhere in the Politics, see vol. iv. pp. 441, 485 sq.

P. 541, last line but one, ‘worth or’ should perhaps be omitted: see the explanatory note on 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 34.

P. 566, seven lines from foot of page, for nor again where a wealthy majority rules over a minority of poor read nor again an oligarchy where the rich rule, because they are in a majority, over a minority of poor. (See critical note on 1290 b 15 and explanatory note on 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 14.)

P. 573, line 18. ‘This agrees sufficiently well with the account of aristocracy in the passage before us’. I have changed my opinion as to this, and now distinguish the aristocracy of the Third Book from that of the Fourth (old Seventh): see above, p. xxxvi, and vol. iv. p. ix.

P. 575, end of Appendix E, after Aristotle’s? add It should not, however, escape notice that if this part of c. 10 (1329 a 40-b 35) is an interpolation, it is an interpolation of old date, for the author of the epitome of the Political Theory of the Peripatetics which is preserved in the Eclogae of Stobaeus.
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(2. 6. 17) seems to have had it before him when he says of the distribution of functions in the Fourth (old Seventh) Book of the Politics between the young, the elders, and the old, ταύτην δ' αρχαίαν εἶναι πᾶν τὴν διάταξιν, Αἰγυπτιῶν πρώτων καταστησαμένων, πολιτικῶν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄχ ηττων, which evidently refers, however inaccurately, to the views expressed in this part of c. 10.

P. 577, line 2 sq. Should τούτο οὖν ἑστίν ἢ διὰ πολλοῦ χρόνον be read?

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Pp. xii—xvi. So far as the question has been investigated at present, it seems likely that neither Polybius nor Cicero had a first-hand acquaintance with the Politics, and that any resemblances traceable in their teaching to that of the Politics are due to their use of a work by an authority—probably Panactius—who had a first-hand acquaintance with the Politics. See A. Schmkel, Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa, pp. 47—85 and 374—379. C. Hinze, Quos scriptores Graecos Cicero in libris de re publica componendis adhibuerit, pp. 11—21 and 29—55, and Sus., vol. i, p. 660 sq.

P. xiii, last line but two, and p. xiv, note 3. See however as to Dicaearchus C. Hinze, op. cit. p. 23 sqq., where a different view is taken as to the probable subject of the Τριπολιτοίκος of Dicaearchus.

P. xiv, note 1. See Mr. Shute’s essay, p. 40 sq.

P. xvii, line 19, after the Politics add See also the explanatory note on 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 19 as to Stob. Ecl. Eth. 2. 6. 12.

P. xviii sq. For a fuller list of apparent reminiscences of passages in the Politics see the heading Politics of Aristotle in the General Index (vol. iv. p. 642).

P. xix, line 10, after this passage add See, however, the explanatory note on 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 38.

P. xix, line 20, after 1333 a 30 add (see also explanatory note on 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 38).

P. xx, four lines from foot of page. For the term πρώτοι λόγοι cp. De Part. An. 4. 5. 682 a 2 sq. and Isocr. De Antid. § 71.

P. xxviii, line 8, after προ βλ δέ διατσ. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 10 sq.:–

P. xxix, line 2, after 8 (6). 1. add 1316 b 36 sqq. and after 1316 b 39 sqq. add 1317 a 13 sqq.

P. xxxix, twelve lines from foot of page, for ‘disiecta membra’ read pieces.

P. xi, line 5, after the Seventh add In one MS. of Pliny’s Natural History (the Pollingensis) ‘the first eighteen Books are wrongly numbered’ (Class. Rev. 7. 454).

P. xlvii, six lines from end of note 2, dele in 4 (7). 17—inducere.

P. li, note 4, line 3, dele 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 15 and, and after 1260 a 24 (line 4) add 3. 5. 1278 a 40 and 3. 13. 1283 a 40.

P. lvii, line 21, after 1268 a 18 read Ms P add 715 before κυβέρνασι: Π Ρ are probably right in reading simply κυβέρνασι, which was the reading of Γ also (see vol. iii. p. xxv, and critical note on 1340 b 24).

P. lviii, dele lines i—5 (see critical note on 1339 a 29).

P. 15, last line, for γόρ read γάρ.

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Q q
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P. 26, nine lines from foot of page. Should ροδι be added before ἀμφοτέρους? See vol. iii. p. 315.

P. 28, line 9, for ἤθεα read θεων (see Class. Rev. 7. 307).

P. 54, fourteen lines from foot of page, for γενέσθαι νομοθέτην read νομοθέτην γενέσθαι.

P. 61, line 17, after Latin Translation add unless indeed, which is more probable, he copied the annotations from the MS, before him.

P. 76, eighteen lines from foot of page, read ὧρθονωργένων.

P. 76, last line but one, after τοῦς ἀπόρους) add In Demosth. Phil. 3. 54 Σ has λοιδορίας φόνου (L. φόνου) σκυμματος where other MSS. have λοιδορίας ἡ φόνου ἡ σκυμματος.

P. 78, eleven lines from foot of page, after 23. add 22. in om. Π. 1.

P. 80, line 19, for αποθέν read αποθεν.

P. 80, three lines from foot of page, before Almost add See vol. iii. p. xvii.

P. 81, twenty-one lines from foot of page, dele rightly—note). See above on p. 28.

P. 82, line 19, end of note on 1264 a 8, add Sus.a reads φατρίας, not φατρίας.

P. 84, twenty lines from foot of page, after rightly add but see explanatory note on 1283 b 4.

P. 85, last line but two, after 35. add ἐκλείπων Π 2: ἐκλείπων Μ Π 1: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. derelinquere which reading he found in his text. See critical note on 1270 a 21.

P. 86, five lines from foot of page, after § 77 add (ed. 2, § 694 sqq.).

P. 86, last line but one, before 12. add 6. ἧ after ἐπορκείν om. ΓΜ, ἡ ταύτα om. Λ 8 pr. Π 1 (corrected in Π 1 in paler ink than the MS.). ἐρίθει δὲ νόμον Π 2 Bekk.: ἔτι δὲ νόμον ἐρίθει Π 1 Sus.

P. 87, four lines from foot of page, after render it add 23. γίνεσθαι Π 2 Bekk. Sus.: γενέσθαι Μ Π 1 and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. feri). But

P. 87, four lines from foot of page, for (perhaps ... 1340 b 24) read (= κυνήσας: see above, p. xxv, and critical note on 1340 b 24).

P. 87, last line, read in.

P. 88, line 10, after Vet. Int. add 6. περαιβοίς Π 2 Bekk.: περαιβοίς Π 1 Sus.: see Class. Rev. 7. 307 sq.

P. 92, line 22, after here add It is, however, so used in Eurip. Fragm. 795 Nauck (ed. 2).

P. 101, line 5. Τῆς τοιαύτης may possibly refer forward and mean τῆς πολιτικής: see the explanatory note on 1337 b 6.


P. 106, last line, after here add As to διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν cp. c. 5. 1254 b 12 and Plut. Pelop. c. 24, ὃ γὰρ πρῶτος, ὅς έουσκ, καὶ κυριώτατος νόμος τῷ σώξεσθαι δεομένῳ τὸν σώξειν δυνάμενον ἄρχοντα κατὰ φύσιν ἀποδίδωσι.

P. 114, thirteen lines from foot of page, before Plato add Πάθος τε καὶ πάθος παῖδας may possibly be added because ὀμογάλκας standing by itself might be taken to refer only to children, and not to grandchildren also.
P. 114, ten lines from foot of page. It is probably from Panaetius that Cicero derives the views expressed in De Offic. i. 17. 54: see C. Hinz, Quos scriptores Graecos Cicero in libris de re publica componendis adhibuerit, p. 50.

P. 115, thirteen lines from foot of page. The passage referred to as 7. 13. 11 is probably 6 (4). 13. 11. 1297 b 24 sqq.

P. 118, line 14, end of note, add Cp. also Xenophanes, Fragm. 5, 6 (Mullach, Fragm. Philos. Gr. i. 101 sq.).

P. 118, seventeen lines from foot of page, add In illustration of ackbar fivovov kcpov cp. Strabo, p. 336 sub fin.—337.

P. 123, five lines from foot of page, add 12. 4µηρξ γάρ τούτον κ.τ.λ. For the phrase cp. Πρεπει μακροβιότητος 6. 467 a 20 and [Plato,] Epinomis 978 C.

P. 128, twenty-one lines from foot of page, after 20. add For η θηρίον η θεός cp. Plut. Publicola, c. 6, ουδέτερον δι' μικρών ουδ' ανθρώπων, ἀλλ' η θείον η θηρίδος. See also Plut. Aristid. c. 6 sub fin. and De Profect. in Virt. c. 1 sub fin.

P. 131, ten lines from foot of page, for The ellipse—πάνα μεταλληκτικά read Cp. 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 20, ἔτερον (sc. δικαστήριον) δοσ εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν φίλει, where πρὶν ταῦτα must apparently be supplied before δοσ.

P. 133, seventeen lines from foot of page, after χρήσων add and 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 16.

P. 138, twelve lines from foot of page. Prof. Bywater points out (Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, Band ii. p. 504), no doubt rightly, that the article is used before Ἡφαιστόν because the Hephæstus of Homer's Iliad (18. 376) is referred to. It should be noticed, however, that in the Politics the article is almost always prefixed to the names of gods and goddesses. The phrase νη Δία is the only exception I remember.

P. 147, line 17, after cp. add Plato, Polit. 289 B, τα δὲ πρεπε χρῆσαι κτήσιν των ἡμέρων, πᾶλι δύολον κ.τ.λ.

P. 159, twelve lines from foot of page, add 37 sq. See explanatory note on 1275 b 21, and cp. Diod. 17. 77. 3 and Hippocr. De Morb. Vulgar. 6 (vol. iii. p. 605 Kühn), δύο δὲ μεγάλων μεγάλα καὶ τὰ ἐγώνα γίνεται.

P. 164, line 15, end of note, add Cp. Soph. Philoct. 138 sqq. and Manil. Astron. 5. 739 sqq. (where atque omnia iust a priorum should perhaps be read).

P. 169, three lines from foot of page, before Their add and Hippocr. De Aere, Aquis, Locis, c. 18 Kuehlewein (vol. i. p. 556 Kühn), μένουσι δ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τοσοῦτον χρόνον, ὅσον ἀν ἁπαξχρήσις τοῖς κτήσισι τὸ χέρτον ὑπόν τοι μηκετί, εἰς ἑτέρῳ χόρμην ἔρχονται.

P. 171, line 5, before Giph. add Vet. Int. 'quicunque quidem sponte natam habent elaborationem'.

P. 171, line 9, after betreiben ' add J. C. Wilson, 'the industries of which spring up of themselves', a rendering which resembles that of Vet. Int.

P. 171, line 11, for vita read ἐργασία.

P. 171, line 22, end of note, after c. 12 add I am not disposed to be dogmatic in support of Victorius' interpretation of the rare word αὐτόφυτος in the passage before us, but I still incline to think that it is right. See for J. C. Wilson's view Class. Rev. 10 (1806), p. 187 and Archiv für Gesch. der Phil. 11. 260 sqq. The meaning of αὐτόφυτος may be studied in Pindar, Pyth. 3. 47, where Q Q 2
it seems to mean 'self-engendered' ('self-caused', as Liddell and Scott, not 'sponte natus', as Boeckh): cp. Polyb. 11. 25. 2 Hultsch, τά εἰς αὐτῶν τῶν σωμάτων γενόμενα φύσμα καὶ νόσους. Its meaning is still clearer in Dio Cass. 44. 37. 2. Here αὐτόφυτος is contrasted with ἀνδροματόκαινος and explained by ἐκ παρασκευῆς συγγενοῦς, and it seems to mean 'self-bred', 'self-engendered', i.e. engendered by the stock of which the person comes ('bon chien chasse de race'). 'Ἐτέρῳν φτέρων is 'a grafted tree', i.e. a tree not self-engendered (Theophrast. ap. Julian, Epist. 24, referred to by Liddell and Scott). Cp. also the use of αὐτοφυής in Plato, Laws 794 A, where it is explained by ἄς ἐπειδὰν ξυνέλθασιν αὐτοὶ σχέδιον ἀνεμίσκουσιν. If αὐτόφυος in the passage before us meant 'springing up of itself', we should expect that exchange (ἄλλαζη), if not carried too far, would be described by Aristotle as αὐτόφυος, for he says in 1. 9. 1257 a 18 sq., that exchange not carried beyond a certain point is necessary. Yet he nowhere describes the necessary kind of exchange as αὐτόφυος.

P. 172, after line 13, add οἱ μὲν νομαδικὰν ἀμα καὶ ληστρικόν. That these lives were often conjoined we see from Strabo, p. 511.

P. 172, nine lines from foot of page, after 1216 a 7 add Cp. also [Plato,] Axiochus 366 D, ὃν κατὰ μὲν τὴν πράξιν γένεσιν τὸ νήπιον κλαίει; Cp. next line, add 10. καὶ γάρ κατὰ τὴν εἰς ἄρχης γένεσιν κ.τ.λ. Cp. [Plato,] Menex. 237 E, and [Demosth.] Or. Fun. c. 5. πάντα γὰρ τὰ τικτοῦτα ἄμα καὶ τροφὴν τοὺς γυνομένους ἀν' αὐτῆς τῆς φύσεως φύει.

P. 179, sixteen lines from foot of page, after αὐνωτήτης dele and in ... 1253 b 3).


P. 187, end of note on τοῦ πλοῦτου καὶ χρημάτων, add For the account of χρηματιστική here given cp. Plato, Gorg. 452 C, where the χρηματιστική claims to be πλοῦτον δημιουργός.

P. 188, line 12, before Eryxias add the saying of Solon to Croesus reported in Diod. 9. 27. 2, of Plato, Rep. 521 A and Laws 742 E, and of.

P. 193, line 8, add 12. ἄλλα τῆς μὲν νίκην τῆς δ' ὑγίειαν. Aristotle here probably has before him Plato, Laws 962 A.

P. 203, lines 3–5. I prefer to the interpretation of this passage given here that given by Sus., and independently with greater fullness and clearness by J. C. Wilson in Class. Rev. 10 (1896), p. 184 sqq. and Archiv für Gesch. der Phil. 11. 246 sqq. and 12. 50 sqq. The latter explains δοσα ἅνδο γῆς by δοσα μέρη χρηματιστικῆς χρηματίζεται ἂνδο γῆς, comparing Decon. 1. 1343 a 26, κατὰ φῶς δὲ γεωργικῆς προτέρα καὶ δεύτερα δοσα ἄνδο τῆς γῆς, οἰνον μεταλλευτικὴ καὶ εἰ τις ἄλλη τοιαύτη. and translates the whole passage 'all the forms of acquisition (or all the industries) which make their profit from minerals and from things growing from the earth which, though not edible (or fruits), are still useful.' One difficulty in connexion with this rendering should be noticed. In the short phrase δοσα ἅνδο γῆς καὶ τῶν ἅνδο γῆς γινομένων the words ἅνδο γῆς occur twice, and one would expect them to be used in the same sense in both places, but in the first place we have to translate them 'from minerals' (i.e. from rock, metal, soil, sand, etc.) and in the second 'from the earth' (i.e. from soil, but not from rock, metal, or sand). We need not make too much of this difficulty,
but it seems to me to exist. It appears also to be implied, which we hardly 
expect, that agriculture οὐ χρηματίζεται ἀπὸ γῆς, though it obviously derives 
food from that source (Oecon. 1. 1343 a 30 sqq.: cp. Plut. Numa, c. 16, where 
γεωργία is described as ὄ ἀπὸ τῆς βίος), but this is implied in Oecon. 1. 1343 a 
26 sqq. also, so that this passage is open to the same objection.

P. 203, line 5, after 1256 b 26 add and cp. 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 20, ἐτερον 
(sc. δικαστήριον) ἄσα εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν φέρει, where we have to supply ἀπὸ 
tαῦτα or something equivalent before ἄσα.

P. 203, last line but one. I have here taken ἀνωνυμαί in τά σώματα ἀνωνυμα-
tαι as passive and τά σώματα as the nom. to it, but it is more likely that 
ἀνωνυμαί is middle, and that the words should be construed, 'men injure 
their bodies'.

P. 206, lines 10—12, dele ἀλλὰ μὴν—1339 a 29.

P. 209, twenty-two lines from foot of page, after τὸν οἰκονόμον add Cp. (with 

P. 209, twenty-one lines from foot of page, after 1253 b 4 sq. add for though, 
as Sus. has pointed out, it has not been said there or in any preceding 
passage that the rule of the husband over the wife is a political rule and the rule 
of the father over the child a kingly rule, it has nevertheless been implied in c. 3. 
1253 b 4 sqq. that these two kinds of rule are two and not one. Aristotle 
perhaps adds ἀλλὰ . . . βασιλικός somewhat unguardedly in his eagerness to 
explain at once how the one kind of rule differs from the other. A similar 
inaexactness of reference occurs in 1. 5. 1254 b 3, ὡσπέρ λέγομεν (see also 
explanatory notes on 1312 b 34 and 1321 b 5), and it is not, I think, 
necessary to suppose (with Sus.) a lacuna before the words καὶ γάρ κ.τ.λ. 
These words, as Vict. has seen, are closely connected with what precedes. 
See J. C. Wilson's remarks in Archiv für Gesch. der Phil. 12. 52 sqq.

P. 210, lines 16—20. Perhaps it is better (with Sepulveda) to supply τὸ 
ἀρρεν καὶ τῷ θῆλυ with συνείσημεν than to take συνείσημεν as impersonal, as 
I have here done.

P. 213, line 17, after quoted add Cp. also 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 3, ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ 
ἐλαττων ἔργον τὸ ἐπανορθώσαι πολιτείαν ἡ κατασκευαίς εἰς ἄρχεις, and Eith. Nic. 
9. 9. 1169 b 10, ἐὰν τὸ φίλου μᾶλλον ἔστι τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἡ πάσχειν, and see 

Bekker, τὸν λόγον τῆς ἀπάντων ανασάεσι, οἷον εὐθεία τοῦ τὸ σώματος καὶ 
τῆς ψυχῆς, and.

P. 219, fourteen lines from foot of page, after ἀρχιτέκτονας add and Plut. De 
Gen. Socr. c. 12, οὐ γὰρ τοῦ ὄργανοῦ τὸ ἔργον, ἀλλ' οὐ καὶ τὸ ὄργανον οὐ 
χρηταί πρὸς τὸ ἔργον.

P. 223, line 13, after with him add Cp. Athen. Deipn. 262 b, ταῦτα γὰρ 
(sc. τὰ λεγέσια) ὑπερφόρασιν (οἱ δύολοι) οὐ μόνον διὰ φόβου, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
κατὰ διδα-

P. 223, fourteen lines from foot of page, after πειθοῦσα add and Xen. De Re 
Equestri 8. 13. I incline now to follow Stahr, not Bonitz, in his interpretation 
of λόγος in this passage.

P. 238, lines 3—5. Prof. Robinson Ellis adds other Greek examples to those 
given by me—Xen. Oecon. 6. 14, τοὺς ἔχοντας τῷ σεμνῷ ὅμοια τοῦτο τῷ καλῷ.
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τε κάρθος, and 6. 15, προσέκειτο τὸ καλὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ—and supplies me with closer Latin parallels—Ovid, Met. 15. 96,

At vetus illa aetas cui fecimus Aurea nomen,
and Plin. Epist. 3. 2, cum dico princeps (‘where J. E. B. Mayor has a learned note’). See Prof. Ellis’ commentary on Catull. lxxvi. 3 (ed. 2).

P. 239, ten lines from foot of page, for is probably read may be.

P. 239, seven lines from foot of page, after p. 79) add But Hecataeus and others had written γῆς περίδου (Bywater).

P. 242, eighteen lines from foot of page, after eis dele 3. 4 ... ταύτα, and.

P. 243, eight lines from foot of page, add 28. eis τοῖς φύλακας and 27. eis ἐκεῖνος. ‘We often find eis used of movement to persons, for instance in De Caelo 1. 3. 270 b 20 and Pol. 2. 4. 1262 b 26, 27’ (Eucken, Praepositionen, p. 33).

P. 248, lines 16-20, for but ἤθεσι ... χρωμάτων read probably rightly: see my remarks on the passage in Class. Rev. 7. 307.

P. 254, line 16. I do not feel sure that Sus. intended to render καὶ by ‘gerade’, and I doubt whether it can bear this meaning here. Perhaps καὶ means simply ‘also’, and the sense is ‘since we see that those also quarrel who own property in common, as well as owners of several property, and indeed that the former quarrel more than the latter’, etc.

P. 254, line 25, after p. 54. 2 add Sec as to these cases of undivided property

Dio Chrys. Or. 38, 2. 151 R. Cp. Lucan, De Bell. Civ. 1. 84,

Τα ψυχα μαλαριν

Facta tribus dominis communis, Roma.

P. 255, line 18, after 36. add πλῆθος οὐ, not οὕτως, though τὴν πόλιν is to be supplied: cp. Plato, Cratyl. 418 E and Stallbaum’s note, and see Kühner, Ausfuhrl. gr. Gramm., ed. Gerth, § 369. 3.

P. 256, nine lines from foot of page, add τοῖς δ’ οὗ χρωμάτων γυνώσκοντες.


P. 267, twenty lines from foot of page, end of note on 1265 a 12, add This was proverbial: cp. Demosth. Prooem. 42, p. 1450, ἰδοὺ μὲν οὖν, ὡσπερ οὖθεν ἰδιὰ βάδιν ἑτερ ἀπάντη ὀρθῶς πράττειν, οὕτως οὖθεν κοινῇ.

P. 267, line 26. I have here taken τὸ νῦν εἰρήμενον πλῆθος as an ‘anticipatory accusative’, but it may be, as Prof. R. Ellis points out, the direct subject of λαπάλαιν.

P. 269, twenty-three lines from foot of page, after using property add Cp. also Cic. De Offic. 1. 27. 96, ut in eo moderatio et temperantia apparent cum specie quadam liberali.

P. 269, fourteen lines from foot of page, after μετρυτῆς add See Class. Rev. 7. 309.

P. 270, line 20, after § 41. 4 add (ed. 2. § 216).

P. 271, line 4, after 1335 b 22 sq. add Tέκνα must be supplied with πλεῖον from τεκνοποιάν (see Bon. Ind. 239 a 39 sqq.).

P. 275, last line but four, and p. 277, line 9, ‘checked by an approach to the principle of the lot’. See below on p. 335, last line.
P. 283, twenty lines from foot of page, after given add (see explanatory note on 7 (5). 5. 1304 b 31).

P. 293, line 5, after name add See Sandys' note on 'Ath. Pol. c. 28, l. 20, τήν δισβέλαιαν.

P. 293, line 13, after κ.τ.λ. add and Demosth. Prooem. 5, p. 1422, ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ τοῦ δοκιμασίαν ὑδρῶς ἀπαντᾷ ἐστὶ μηδὲν οἰκεῖαι πρὸ τερὸν γεγράφει οἱ πρῶτοι, and Prooem. 18, p. 1430.

P. 298, line 10, after 1326 a 32) add Hippodamus' wish to be learned about Nature as a whole reminds us of the similar teaching of Hippocrates referred to in Plato, Phaedrus 270 C. See also Stewart on Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 7. 1102 a 19.

P. 304, line 7, after κοινωνίαν add See, however, vol. iii. p. xvii.

P. 307, last line, after εἰν add Or perhaps admirers of Lacedaemonian customs: cp. [Plato,] Hippias Maior 284 B, οὐ γὰρ πάτριον, ἡ Σωκράτης, Λάκεδαιμονίου κανεὶ τούτοις νόμους. See R. Hirzel, 'Αγραφος νόμου, p. 72. 2.

P. 308, line 20, after e.g. dele in 3. 9 ... ἄρξεται γάρ, and.

P. 309, line 26. Μαρτύρων τῶν αὐτῶν συγγεζυκτάτων is probably intended to be emphasized by hyperbaton, the words οἱ διάκονοι τῶν φόνων being interposed after μαρτύρων: see vol. iii. Appendix B.

P. 314, line 5 sqq. It is likely that the Polities were written, not before, as I have implied here, but after, the Politics.

P. 316, nineteen lines from foot of page, after τὴν γῆν add 40. For the change of construction in τὰς γεννιώσας πόλεις ... μηδεμίαν cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 15 sqq., where see note.

P. 318, line 8. Prof. R. Ellis much prefers Victorius' way of taking the passage, 'We ought to think that a city approximates to a division into equal halves as divided into men and women'.

P. 319, line 2, after Σαυρομάται add Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 122 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 460), ταῦτα δὲ γυναιξὶ (Σαυρομάται) πάντα πέιθονται ὡς δισσοιναν, Strabo, p. 165, as to the Cantabri, and Plut. Cato Censor, c. 8, as to the Romans.

P. 323, line 5 sq. See above on p. 314, line 5 sqq.

P. 334, line 10, for According to Plutarch read We read of Agesilaus in Plut. Ages. c. 4, ἡδίκαι δέ τόνχο καθήμενον ἐν τῷ βασιλικῷ δόμῳ καὶ χρηματίζον, ἐπιστύει τοῖς ἐφόροις ὑπεξανίστατο.

P. 334, line 25, after 1266 b 23 add Contrast the view of Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 29, ἡ γὰρ τῶν ἐφόρων κατάστασις όως ἀνείας ἤπ, ἀλλ' ἐπίτασις τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ δικόνα πρὸς τοῦ δήμου γεγονόν ὑποθέσε τῆς αὐτοκρατίας.

P. 335, last line. It has been pointed out by Mr. J. Solomon (Class. Rev. 3. 295: see Susenmihl, Jahresbericht für Altertumswissenschaft, 1891, Bericht über Aristoteles, etc., für 1887-1890, p. 124) that this expression of Plato refers not to the ephorate, as Stallbaum and others have thought, but to the kingship.

P. 338, line 3, before For add Minnernus had said of old age (Fragm. 5 Bergk),

βλάπτει δ' ὀρθαλμοῖς καὶ νόσον ἀμφιθυλίν.

Cp. Herondas 1. 67 sq. and Hdt. 3. 134.

P. 339, note on 1271 a 14. I am inclined still to read τούτῳ, but to interpret it in a slightly different way from that in which I have interpreted it in
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P. 350, fourteen lines from foot of page, add 38. τᾶς δ' ὁμοιον. 'Ceos is called by Bacchylides (2. 8) τῷ πλαστῷ νάσον, a title hitherto unknown, but evidently implying a claim to have been colonized by the son of Minos' (Kenyon, Poems of Bacchylides, p. xxvii).


P. 358, line 4, for of read ascribed to.

P. 359, line 19, after στάσιν) add Cp. also Plut. Cato Minor, c. 45, where Cato says of Pompey, αὐτὸς δὲ τῇ πόλει παρακάθηται στάσεις ἀρχοντεῖσιν ἐν ταῖς παραγγελίαις καὶ θοριβοὺς μιχανάμενοι, εἰ δὲν ὡς ἀκριβεῖ δὲ ἀναρχίας μονορθίαν ἰαυτῷ μηστρεύομεν, and Justin 16. 4. 6.

P. 361, four lines from foot of page, dele c. 12. 1274 a 2.

P. 362, five lines from foot of page, dele the parenthesis, ‘cp. ... changes’, and see critical note on 1390 b 27.

P. 366, nineteen lines from foot of page, for all magistracies read all magistrates empowered to try cases.

P. 371, note on 1273 b 19. I incline now to adopt the reading τῷ πλουτίζεων.

P. 373, fifteen lines from foot of page, for as he found them read in existence.

P. 374, nineteen lines from foot of page, note on 1274 a 2. Ἰὼν δήμων καταστάσιν probably means not 'set up the demos', as I have interpreted it in this note, but 'set up the democracy' (cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 22, οὗ τῶν δήμων καθιστάντες).

P. 375, line 10. As to the meaning of the expression τὰ Μηδικά, see vol. iii. P. 554.

P. 376, line 18, for The fact ... 1537 a 20 sqq.) read See 'Ath. Πολ. c. 7, l. 9 sqq.

P. 379, line 4, after latter add and which represented the Chalcidian Charonidas as a disciple of Zaleucus, the lawgiver of the Italian Locri, a not too friendly rival of the Chalcidian colonies of Italy and Sicily.

P. 384, line 3, after 155 E add 'In inscriptions of the Attic period there is no trace of an exception to this rule' (Prof. Bywater, Archiv für Gesch. der Phil. 2. 504). See on this subject Sus. 4, vol. i. p. 682.

P. 384, thirteen lines from foot of page, add 23. ἐγένετο δὲ κ.τ.λ. We notice that one and the same lawgiver gave laws to all the Thraceward Chalidians—an early indication of the tendency to unity which they afterwards displayed in grouping themselves round Olynthus—and that this lawgiver was a citizen of Rhesium, itself a colony of Chalcis.

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P. xix, end of note, add and in 1312 a 11, 18 all the MSS. have τοῖς μονάρχαις. In 1295 a 13 also Μ' Π' have μονάρχου with Π'.

P. 11, line 1, colon in place of full stop.
P. 111, line 17, colon in place of full stop.
P. 21, line 9, for τοῦτ read τούτων.
P. 37, line 13, dele comma.
P. 89, line 1, for ac si read ac si utique.
P. 91, line 4, after ὑπερήχοντας add See on the subject of this note vol. iii. Appendix C.
P. 93, last line, for have read sometimes show. See vol. iii. Appendix C.
P. 100, last line, for ἔχθονες read ἔχθος.
P. 101, fourteen lines from foot of page, after Musuras add See critical note on 1311 a 36-39.
P. 104, line 17, after δοῦ? add Yet compare 6 (4). 7. 1293 a 37, where we have λέγωσι δὲ τέτταρας, not τὰς τέτταρας.
P. 105, eleven lines from foot of page, after in place of it add (with Madvig, Adversaria Critica, i. 468 sq.).
P. 117, line 5, after ἐπιχωριάται add In 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 34, however, Vet. Int. renders ἐπιχωρίασεν by devenit, if the text is correct.
P. 126, line 20, for ἄλλανοκράτας read ἄλλανοκράτεις (see vol. iv. p. 431).
P. 126, line 21, after -as add and -ες.
P. 144, seven lines from foot of page, read κτίσαντες.
P. 156, three lines from foot of page. This is one of several passages in which it is doubtful which word in the sentence is the subject and which the predicate. Among these passages are the following—3. 6. 1278 b 11, 3. 7. 1279 a 26 sq., 3. 13. 1283 b 42 sq. I have followed most of the translators and commentators in the view I have taken on this question in my notes on these passages, but there is much to be said for the opposite view, and I do not feel sure that I am right. In 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 18, ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ εὐπορίαν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς πολίταις, πολίται δὲ οὖν, the word πολίται seems to be the predicate (see also 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 5 sq.); yet in 3. 1. 1275 a 22 sq., where τὸν ἀσίδης πολίτην is taken up in πολίτης δὲ κ.τ.λ., πολίτης is clearly the subject of the sentence (see also 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 7 sq.).
P. 186, line 4, Sus. supplies πολιτείας, not πόλεις, with ταῖς δημοκρατικαῖς, perhaps rightly (cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 33 sq.).
P. 189, fifteen lines from foot of page, dele comma.
P. 191, line 4, after Hdt. i. 97, 2 add and Plato, Rep. 347 A-D.
P. 191, three lines from foot of page, after conduct add (This remark is borrowed from Hobbes, Leviathan, c. 19, 'Now in monarchy the private interest is the same with the public. The riches, power, and honour of a monarch arise only from the riches, strength, and reputation of his subjects', etc.).
P. 196, seven lines from foot of page, after preferred add The next ἀνορία is whether the version of justice put forward by the partisans of oligarchy and democracy is satisfactory. This ἀνορία is discussed in c. 9.
P. 199, line 12, after προστίθεμαι add For ἀφαιροῦτι cp. Περὶ ἀναπνοῆς 2. 471 a 6, πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἱματιο τοῦ πράγματος ἀφαιροῦτι.
P. 204, line 18, for Cf. read Cp.
P. 206, seventeen lines from foot of page, dele Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 36.
P. 210, line 6, after force add comma.
ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.


P. 220, line 10, after the true one add A distinction is, in fact, drawn in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 8 sqq. between ἀρετοῖ and κληρωτοί ἐκ προκρίτων.

P. 238, line 15, after πέπεσθα add Cp. Aristoph. Eq. 384 sq.

P. 258, eight lines from foot of page, add In Nymphis, Fragm. 15 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 15) we read Παυσανίας ... τὰ τῆς Σπάρτης ἐξελθὼν νόμιμα.

P. 261, eleven lines from foot of page, after Kingship? add It would seem from Diod. 15. 60. 5 that the office of the ταγός might be so classed.

P. 264, eight lines from foot of page, see above on p. 260.

P. 267, seventeen lines from foot of page, for Ἐμμενησ read Ἐμμήνη.

P. 272, line 19, after 31 sqq. add In this passage Aristotle is speaking of Kingship in both πόλεις and ἔθνη (cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 35), whereas in the passage before us he seems to refer only to Kingships in πόλεις (cp. 1285 b 13, τὰ κατὰ πόλιν, and 16, ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεως, and also c. 15. 1286 b 7-10).

P. 272, six lines from foot of page, for τῶν read τῶν.

P. 288 (and p. 418), page-heading, after NOTES add full stop.

P. 301, eleven lines from foot of page, after rule) add and Polyb. 6. 2. 14 Hultsch.

P. 308, line 2, for ὑπαρχόντων read ὑπαρχόντων.

P. 312, line 1, for peri read peri.

P. 317, twelve lines from foot of page, after Protag. 323 D sq. add and Seneca, Epist. 123, nemo est casu bonus.

P. 318, line 11, before latter add the.

P. 342, line 6. Perhaps it is more likely that Megalopolis was founded in B.C. 370 than in B.C. 369. See Grote, Hist. of Greece, 10. 319, note 5 (Part 2, c. 78), and Frazer, Pausanias 4. 307.

P. 345, line 8, end of note, add Cp. also Plin. Epist. 1. 20. 5.

P. 362, eighteen lines from foot of page, for θυμουδεῖξι read θυμουδεῖξι.

P. 363, twenty-two lines from foot of page, after τούτων add and Περὶ αἰσθη-

... σεως 2. 439 a 5, ἐστω τούτων τῶν τρόπων διαφορές, μένα.

P. 370, five lines from foot of page, after military duties add and provides in the Laws (see vol. i. p. 446) that the Nomophylakes are not to remain in office after they have attained seventy years of age.

P. 385, line 5, for διεξελθὼν read διεξελθῶν.

P. 386, seven lines from foot of page, after other laws also add For τῶν ἀπ’ ἐκείνου τινές cp. Plint. Solon, c. 12, τοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ Μεγακλῆουs.

P. 387, three lines from foot of page, all other. It is possible that τὰ ἄλλα means here 'other things than τὰ περὶ τὰς πόλεις (30) ', and not, as I have taken these words to mean, 'other things than sussitia and the division into classes'.

P. 414, line 17, after Greece add But Aristotle's main object is to place the gymnasion of the elders in the immediate neighbourhood, and under the eye, of the chief magistrates. It must, therefore, be situated, like the agora, under the hill on which the chief magistrates dwell.
P. 418, eighteen lines from foot of page, after contracts add at any rate those which were made in the agora.

P. 428, line 3, after ἀναστον add For the thought cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 11. 1100 b 35 sqq.

P. 428, line 18, after 116 b 8 sqq. add and Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 3 sq.

P. 433, thirteen lines from foot of page, for ἀκοινοντες read ἀκοινοντες.

P. 434, line 4, for Βελτιστὸν read Βελτιστα.

P. 475, line 11, after 1. 254) add In Περὶ νεώτητος καὶ γήρως 1. 467 b 11, ἀμα δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀναστον ἀναγκαῖον ἵσως τὰς αἰτίας εἰπεῖν: ἐνίοις γὰρ τῶν χρῶν (cp. Περὶ ἀναστον 1. 470 b 9 sqq.) διὰ τούτο συμβαίνει τὸ ἐνν καὶ τὸ μῆ ᾧν, and 21. 480 b 12, 19 sq., Aristotle seems to make some concessions to this view.

P. 483, ten lines from foot of page, after life add Cp. also Περὶ ἕννυν 3. 457 a 3 sqq.

P. 487, nineteen lines from foot of page. My rendering of γίνεται γὰρ εὐλ. 1. λ. is that of the translators generally, but it would be possible to translate the words, 'for in a way exercise results to the bodies [of the children]'. Cp. 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 3, γίνεται κατάλυσις, and 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 30, γίνεται σωτηρία ταῖς τυραννίς.

P. 491, nine lines from foot of page, before Compare add and Frazer, Pausanias 2. 492.

P. 497, twenty lines from foot of page. We need not perhaps interpret δηρήσασα so strictly as to infer from it, as I have done here, that Aristotle intended the education of his future citizens to be carried on beyond twenty-one, though it is on other grounds not improbable that he did so.

P. 500, line 12, for εἰκη read εἰκη.

P. 500, line 20, after 1366 a 36 sqq. add and see explanatory note on 1258 a 10.

P. 505, line 1, for εἰμάνθανον read εἰμάνθανον.

P. 507, line 2, after 1319 b 19 sqq. add Cp. also Thuc. 8. 89. 3 (τῷ τοιοῦτῳ .. ἐν ὕπερ).

P. 507, twelve lines from foot of page, after μάθησιν add comma.

P. 509, fourteen lines from foot of page, after himself add (cp. Athen. Deipn. 18 a sq.).

P. 509, last line but one, for ἄν read ἄν.

P. 524, line 2, after c. 34. 1. 4 add and c. 48. 1. 16, ταῖς ἄ[γορ]αις.

P. 524, line 7, for μὴ read μῆ.

P. 525, nine lines from foot of page, after fifteen add As to light and heavy gymnastic exercises see Frazer, Pausanias 4. 163.

P. 535, line 4, after 503 a 23 sqq. add Περὶ ἕννυν 1. 454 a 26, ὅταν ὃπερβάλλῃ τὸν χρόνον ὃ διδάσκει χρόνον τι πολιτίν.

P. 545, seventeen lines from foot of page, for Müller read Müller.

P. 548, three lines from foot of page, dele the first comma.

P. 557, line 11, for τοῦ read τοῦ.

P. 559, four lines from foot of page, add As to rhythm and melody see Abert, Die Lehre vom Ethos in der griechischen Musik, pp. 53-56.

P. 575, nineteen lines from foot of page, read 58.
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