

Sect. 42

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2007
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WAR DIARY

German Naval Staff Operations Division

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PART A VOLUME 50

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OCTOBER, 1943

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W A R D I A R Y

German Naval Staff
Operations Division

Part A Vol. 50

OCTOBER 1943

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WAR DIARY OF THE GERMAN NAVAL STAFF

(Operations Division)

PART A

October 1943

| | |
|---|-----------------------|
| Chief, Naval Staff: | Grand Admiral Doenitz |
| Chief of Staff, Naval Staff | Vice Admiral Meisel |
| Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff | Rear Admiral Wagner |

Volume: 50

Begun: 1 Oct. 1943

Closed: 31 Oct. 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE: 1/15/50

TO: SAC, NEW YORK

RE: [Illegible]

[Illegible]

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

Washington, D. C.


Foreword

1. The Office of Naval Intelligence has undertaken to translate important parts of the War Diary of the German Naval Staff. The present volume, entitled War Diary of the German Naval Staffm Operations Division, Part A, Volume 50 is the twenty-sixth one of the series to appear. Other volumes will follow shortly.

2. The War Diaries, Part A, are important because they contain a day by day summary of the information available to the German Naval Staff and the decisions reached on the basis thereof. Together with the Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German Navy, 1939-1945, which have been published by this office, the War Diaries should provide valuable material for the study of naval problems arising from total war. The War Diary, Part A, is also a useful index to the German Naval Archives of World War II; references may be found in the microfilm library of Naval Records and History.

3. Due to the cost of publication, only a limited number of copies could be made; it is therefore desirable that the copies which may have been distributed are available to other offices which may be interested.

Washington, D. C.
1949



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Items of Political Importance

According to British and American press reports, the U. S. Senate has postponed the debate on the Fulbright resolution suggestion U. S. participation in maintaining peace after the war. It is apparent that a crisis will arise regarding the conference. The U. S. Government has expressed the wish to meet in London instead of going to Moscow as arranged, apparently to make it possible for 72 year-old Secretary of State Hull to attend. Evidently the Russians have not yet agreed. As regards the agenda of the conference, British and American opinions are divergent. "The Times" writes apprehensively that an alliance between the Americans and British alone is one ideology and that the world security can only be built up on a foundation of British, American and Russian unity. It is evident that U. S. policy does not follow the Russian trend to the extent still regarded necessary in London at present. The differences which are usual and natural in such a war coalition are anyway quite evident at the moment and require most careful observation. These differences will, however, still not be great enough to warrant any hope of a spontaneous relaxation of enemy pressure on us - either politically or strategically. It remains to be seen to what extent any clear picture of the actual diplomatic and political game can be gained from press reports and other sources of information, diplomatic included, even with a greater insight into these than Naval Staff has. The degree to which the Foreign office and Armed Forces High Command are successful in this is not known, since the supreme commands are given no information or orientation. It is therefore only possible with difficulty to obtain satisfactory recognition of the special experiences gained from the individual sectors, for example the naval officer's specific outlook, which is detached from matters Continental. By reason of its nature this cannot be restricted to purely military matters. What lends special interest for the near future to the factors above indicated within enemy coalition, is the reciprocal effect of politics and warfare. The question of the so-called Second Front in Europe has a political aspect which is just as important as its military one. The same applies to the enemy's strategic plan in the Mediterranean, particularly with regard to the Balkans and the Near East. In view of this reciprocal effect in the political and military game it is understandable if Naval Staff is anxious to concern itself with the problems of warfare as a whole and that the limited opportunity in this respect is felt to a certain extent as shortcoming.

According to Reuter, the Badoglio Government has been reformed. General Ambrosio has been appointed Chief of General Staff, Roatta Chief of the Army Staff, Admiral De Courten, Secretary of Navy, General Sandelli Secretary for Air. According to "Exchange", Italy will soon be regarded as a "co-belligerent state".

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Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval StaffI. Army Situation:

In the southern part of the eastern front a full defensive success was scored in the Melitopol sector against a heavy enemy attack. The battles for the Dnieper bridgeheads continue with fluctuating success. Positions on the contemplated "East Wall" line have now been taken up from the south as far as Gomel. In the Smolensk sector heavy enemy pressure inflicted considerable losses on our forces. The Russians are throwing in their men regardless of the cost. In Italy and the Balkans the situation is more or less unchanged.

II. Chief, Naval Staff announces that the Fuehrer wishes monitors to be improvised for the defense of the Iron Gate.

Chief, Operations Division reports that the defense assignment is already being carried out by parts of the Danube Flotilla. Group South will be requested to investigate the possible strengthening of defense by bringing up naval landing craft. Chief, Naval Staff orders that Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters be advised accordingly for today's situation report.

III. Chief, Naval Staff enquires regarding the state of anti-aircraft defenses at Gdynia and the possibilities of immediate measures to increase them. The present reinforcement by 12.8 cm guns will still take many weeks owing to the construction of emplacements. Quartermaster General does not consider the transfer of 8.8 cm. mobile anti-aircraft batteries from Brest worthwhile, as their caliber is not effective. This matter will be investigated further.

IV. Chief, Organizations and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division reports that Commanding Admiral, Group South has again drawn attention to the considerable difficulties in administration resulting from the withdrawal of Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic from the sphere of Admiral, Adriatic. Armed Forces High Command has now withdrawn its objections to the difference in the area boundaries, as far as naval control makes it necessary. With the exception of dockyards, Naval Staff considers that every advantage lies in the assignment of the North Adriatic to the area of Admiral, Adriatic.

Chief, Naval Staff signifies his approval but stresses the fact that Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic must still "see two sides" and is on no account to neglect the interests of German Naval Command, Italy.

V. The Naval Attache's Section reports that the crew of submarine U "617" will be transferred to Cartagena. On arrival Lieutenant (s.g.) Brandi will "escape".

Chief, Naval Staff orders that blowing-up of the submarine must be ensured under all circumstances (on account of the pistols in the bow tubes). This would best be carried out under the unobstructive supervision of one of her officers.

The Naval Attache's Section further reports that Italian ships will sail from Las Palmas, i.e. are being handed over to the enemy.

VI. Report by Chief, Naval Intelligence Division

Discussions took place between Eisenhower and Badoglio aboard the NELSON in La Valetta, probably on the use of Italian forces.

A report of the German Ambassador in Dublin describes Britain's inner power of resistance as far lower than is apparent from the majority of other reports. One must take the writer's Irish environment into account.

According to a Portuguese report, the British and Americans intend to take up the fight against Russia after the defeat of Germany; whether before or after the Japanese conflict is settled is not stated.

A report of the Greek Ambassador in Ankara confirms the current rumor that the Russian Ambassador has requested from the Turkish Government active participation in the war on the side of the Allies. Turkey has refused. It is assumed that Russia's step was instigated by exhaustion and fear of the Turkish armed force being intact at the end of the war.

VII. Chief, Operations Division reports on the agreement between Germany and England regarding the exchange of seriously wounded prisoners, which is to start on 8 Oct. according to the British proposal and on 12 Oct. according to the German proposal, in Gothenburg, Oran/Marseilles and Smyrna. For details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

Special Items

I. In order to co-ordinate defense of the Scheldt, Group West and Naval Command, North have agreed that as from 20 Oct. the whole artillery group "Zeebrugge" be transferred to Admiral, Netherlands without any change in the previous area boundaries.

II. According to the previous arrangement, overlapping in the Memel sea area between Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic

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and Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic is unavoidable. Naval Command, Baltic proposes therefore that the boundary be moved to the line Polangen-Utlaengan. The entire Memel sea area will thus come completely in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic so that uniform command is guaranteed.

III. Commander in Chief, Navy has put into force for the Navy the directive for the Shipbuilding Commission, issued with his approval by the Minister of Armament and Ammunition. The following order is given: "Up to now cooperation between warship construction and weapons development has been lacking. In future all efforts must be concentrated to the full on completion of 1943 Fleet Construction Program."

To attain this objective "Coordination of Ship, Weapons and Equipment" I order the following:

"All naval research departments will without delay submit to the Shipbuilding Commission a written survey of the developments at present in preparation or already in progress. If the Shipbuilding Commission then wishes to have certain projects canceled, in order to concentrate forces, and if an agreement cannot be reached I am to be called on to make a decision. In future the Shipbuilding Commission is first to be advised of developments contemplated and its approval obtained before any orders are given for these!"

For copy of directive as per 1/Skl 29919/43 geh. see War Diary Part B, Vol. V.

Situation 1 Oct.

I. War in Foreign Waters

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area.

Enemy Situation:

Only four enemy planes were reported over the Bay of Biscay; this is the lowest number ever reported unless (and this is unlikely) interception of radio traffic is no longer an indication of the actual number of enemy planes on operation. One British vessel was located in BF 2780 at 2319 and another in BF 5120 at 2330. On 30 Sept. fishing vessels equipped with radar were detected in BF 8356 and 9271.

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If positive results are obtained by our air reconnaissance operating on the afternoon of 1 Oct. it is planned to send out our destroyer sub-division on 2 Oct. to seize the suspicious vessels.

Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Four submarines were escorted out and two in off Lorient, Brest and La Pallice. One mine was swept off the Gironde and another off La Pallice.

In order to seize the fishing vessels, destroyers should, if necessary, put out on the night of 1 Oct. so as to be in position 70 miles southwest of the mouth of the Gironde at dawn. Commander, 8th Destroyer Flotilla with destroyers Z "24" and Z "32" will be transferred to Royan roads in readiness.

Submarine Division requests a decision on the proposal of Commander, Submarines, West for bringing out the FLIEDER. Escort, as in the case of our submarines, is proposed. If it is desirable for reasons of prestige, escort by torpedo boats may be considered. In agreement with the Commander of the FLIEDER, Submarine Division recommends a normal escort, as torpedo boats offer no protection but only endanger the submarine. Naval Staff decides in accordance with the proposal.

Channel Coast:

At 1730 an enemy vessel, apparently attempting mine-sweeping in our barrage, was fired on five miles north of Calais. At 2320 the target was located by radar six miles northwest of Boulogne. From 2345 onwards enemy vessels were detected off Boulogne by radar and searchlights and attacked by our batteries. One landing boat caught fire and capsized; the remaining boats turned away. The capsized boat (200 GRT) was towed in to Boulogne and beached. The enemy's intentions are not yet known but minesweeping is possible.

During the night of 1 Oct. the transfer of the LIVADIA with torpedo boat T "19" from Le Havre to Dieppe will continue. In addition the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla will be transferred from Cherbourg to Brest. The projected minelaying operation by the 2nd, 4th, 6th, and 8th PT Boat Flotillas on the convoy route between Harwich and Great Yarmouth was broken off as visibility deteriorated.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters

1. North Sea:

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During the night of 1 Oct. the 7th Minesweeper Flotilla and the 9th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla are to carry out minelaying operation "Fafnia" west of Terschelling. Otherwise nothing special to report.

2. Norway/ Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Over the North Sea 18 planes were detected on operation. Photographic reconnaissance of 28 Sept. revealed:

At Murmansk: 1 destroyer in dry dock, 1 torpedo boat on slipway, 13 vessels, apparently minesweepers, some being fitted out and on slipway, 1 repair ship, 1 special service vessel, 1 torpedo boat of the "S" class, 2 vessels, apparently PT boats, 1 submarine (Presumably of the "E" class) in floating dock, 1 submarine on slipway and 17 freighters with a tonnage of 62,000 G.R.T. The total number of ships in harbor is almost unchanged since August.

Polyarnoye: 4 submarines, 1 vessel, presumably a submarine supply ship, 1 tanker (about 3,000 G.R.T.), one vessel, apparently a motor minesweeper. The number of submarines detected in this port has decreased.

Our aerial reconnaissance sighted on 1 Oct. at 0925 in AM 2151 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers, 3 escort vessels and 2 large merchantmen on course 300 degrees; also south of the Faroes 1 merchantmen and 1 destroyer on course 270 degrees.

Reconnaissance with single planes was detected in the Banak and Petsamo-Vardoe area on 29 and 30 Sept. At 0651 the mine-layer PARIS was unsuccessfully attacked with an aerial torpedo by a Boston in the harbor of Honningsvaag.

Own Situation:

At 1855 on 30 Sept. the Norwegian steamer ST. SVITHUN (1,376 G.R.T.) was attacked off Stadtlandet by five enemy planes with bombs and machine-guns and set on fire. She was beached off Buholmen. Rescue work is hampered by a southwesterly storm.

In the area of Naval Command, Norway 22 ships were escorted north and 22 south. In the Arctic Coast area 14 ships were left lying in harbor owing to lack of escorts. The Task Force reports that one of the enemy midget submarines was salvaged and beached. Investigation will commence on 2 Oct.

Submarine Group "Wilking", operating along the West Siberian route reports sinking altogether 15,000 G.R.T. of merchant shipping. The Group is now homeward bound. One boat is to bring along the rest of the crew of the Russian steamer from Hope Island.

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IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

In Kronstadt Bay and among the islands in the Gulf of Finland the situation is unchanged.

Admiral, Baltic States reports the appearance of partisans in the Libau and Windau area. North of Libau a truck carrying twelve Latvian auxiliary police was ambushed and eight men were killed; the bandits escaped.

2. Own Situation:

The five Danish gunboats engaged in patrolling the Sound were laid up, since the crews had to be returned to the large minesweeper MRS "11".

The steamer RADBOD (4,354 G.R.T.) ran aground south of Kjelsnor. Salvaging is under way.

Effective 1 Oct. the previous offices of Coastal Defense Commanders, Western Baltic, Pomeranian Coast and Eastern Baltic are abolished and Coastal Defense Commanders, Central and Western Baltic now established.

The LUETZOW and PRINZ EUGEN put in to Gdynia.

On the afternoon of 30 Sept. two mine detonations were observed east of Tyters. West of Lyserort the steamer NOGAT was attacked by a twin-engined torpedo bomber.

Two patrol boats are standing by off the Latvian coast as anti-aircraft defense for steamers expected at dawn.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an Intelligence report from Portugal, a convoy will sail from Portland (Maine) during the first days of October with approximately 15,000 U. S. and Canadian troops as well as war materiel on board and will probably join up with a convoy to Boston. Destination - England.

2. Own Situation:

Evaluations of radio intelligence show that the two convoys expected in the North Atlantic actually are in a position further to

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"Rossbach" has, therefore, been ordered to take up new disposition AD 8511 to AK 3834 on 2 Oct. at 0800. It is evident that the enemy is reacting to the serious defeat of the last convoy battle by resorting to very rapid and decided deviations. It is very doubtful whether, in view of the small number of submarines and the large area to be covered, the convoy will be intercepted. Without our own air reconnaissance this is more or less a matter of chance.

Naval Staff informs the Naval Attache in Tokyo that our submarines have arrived in the operational areas off Mombasa, in the Gulf of Aden, off the southern point of India and off Bombay. Another submarine is expected in three days off the Gulf of Oman. The submarines will remain about four weeks in their operational areas.

Submarine successes are reported from Northern Waters and the Mediterranean.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 25 planes out on operation over England, 27 over the Atlantic and 10 over the Mediterranean.

The attack by 18 planes on the convoy intercepted west of Cape Finisterre was unsuccessful. It is intended to repeat this operation with stronger forces.

During the day the enemy attacked airfields and traffic installations in Belgium and France.

At noon 25 Fortresses from the south flew into the upper Lake Constance area. Fifteen bombs were dropped on Feldkirch; 115 of our fighters shot down five Fortresses.

A large formation, also coming from the south, flew in to Austria and dropped 60 bombs on Wiener-Neustadt. According to reports so far, 54 of our fighters shot down 10 out of 50 - 60 Liberators, 7 of our planes being lost. The damage caused at the Messerschmidt plant was less serious than in the first attack.

During the night of 1 Oct. 300 bombers made a heavy raid on the Rhine-Westphalian industrial area, concentrating on Hagen, where considerable damage is reported. Anti-aircraft batteries shot down one bomber; although 19 of our fighters went up they scored no successes.

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2. Mediterranean Theater:

The 2nd Air Force reports only slight transport activity from Corsica because troops are engaged in loading ships. As soon as this is completed, however, increased air transports are to be expected. Our planes were out on reconnaissance flights.

Air Force Command, Southeast made another attack on shipping in Leros. One destroyer and one freighter were damaged.

Further attacks were made on Kos to prepare for our landing operation.

Air reconnaissance of Beirut was not possible. The enemy air activity over the combat area was normal. The airfield at Frosinone and the city of Bologna were raided, but damage only slight.

Six enemy reconnaissance planes were detected over the Aegean Sea.

3. Eastern Front:

Nothing is reported from the Army front. The 5th Air Force reports 24 planes out on reconnaissance flights.

VII. Warefare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

Two transports escorted by five destroyers left Gibraltar presumably for the Atlantic. At noon eight loaded U. S. tankers, carrying planes as deck cargo. passed Tangier on easterly course. Two of these entered Gibraltar, followed by a cruiser of the DIDO class also from the Atlantic. At 1400 the following were lying in Gibraltar: 3 ILLUSTRIOUS class, 5 destroyers, 7 corvettes, 3 transports, 56 freighters, 8 tankers, etc.

No reconnaissance reports have been received from the western and eastern Mediterranean.

Reconnaissance of the Italian area brought little result owing to the small number of planes on operation. Ten ships were sighted north west of Palermo and 10 also 60 miles north-northeast of Bizerta. The course and speed of these two units were not ascertained. In the afternoon 1 light cruiser and 1 destroyer were off the west coast of Sardinia on westerly course. In the Gulf of Salerno 70 ships were counted. Thirty miles south of Salerno there were 7 ships proceeding south and 90 miles south of Salerno 12 ships proceeding south and 90 miles south of Salerno 12 ships proceeding West. New.

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enemy landings were observed at Castellamare near Naples. Naples was occupied by the enemy after our forces had finally withdrawn. The increased number of hospital ships between Italy, Sicily and Tunisia indicates considerable enemy losses.

Submarine activity has increased between Bastia and the mainland. Our convoys were attacked on 29 and 30 Sept. and on 1 Oct. On 30 Sept. the leading ship of the lobster boat flotilla was sunk.

On the afternoon of 30 Sept. a small convoy was sighted 30 miles south of Crotona on course northeast. The number of merchantmen in Bari has increased slightly.

Naval Staff, Operations Division has drawn up a preliminary survey of the whereabouts of the Italian Fleet. For copy as per 1/Skl 1 m 29806/43 geh. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

This statement shows that out of the original 8 battleships 5 are in enemy hands and 2 in ours. The eighth battleship was sunk. The 2 heavy cruisers are in our hands.

Out of the 15 light cruisers, 7 are in enemy hands, 5 in ours and 1 is interned in Spain. The whereabouts of the remaining 2 cruisers is not known.

Out of 28 destroyers 11 are in enemy hands, 5 in our hands and 3 are interned in Spain. One was sunk; the whereabouts of 8 destroyers is not known.

Of 66 submarines 13 are in enemy hands, 7 in our hands and 3 were destroyed; 43 submarines have not been located.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

The PT boat operation during the nights of 29 and 30 Sept. had to be broken off on account of the weather. Minelaying operation "Pommern" was also postponed until 1 Oct. because of the weather. Ferry traffic from Corsica to Leghorn was carried out as planned despite air and submarine attacks. This will probably be completed already on 3 Oct. Two of the seven enemy fighters which attacked three naval landing craft off Bastia on 29 Sept. were shot down. On the same day four of our transport planes were shot down by enemy fighters which flew out from Sardinia.

Naval Staff asks German Naval Command, Italy whether ground mines were laid in the harbor of Naples. If not, the 2nd Air Force should be urged to lay aerial mines.

Submarine U "410", firing five single torpedoes on a westbound convoy

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sank a steamer of 8,000 GRT in CJ 7718. Since four additional detonations were heard, it is probable that further steamers were sunk and damaged.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

One small steamer, 7 auxiliary sailing vessels and 7 auxiliary fishing vessels were captured at Zara. One company of the 1st Motorized Naval Communications Division left Belgrade for the Dalmation coast under its own power.

b. Aegean Sea:

On 30 Sept. and 1 Oct. Milos and Candia were attacked by single enemy planes.

The disarmament of Italian troops on Andros has been carried out. The next action is being prepared against Paros and Antiparos. Minesweeping on the "Trikkeri" barrage is being continued. North of Skiathos passage another enemy barrage was detected, from which 18 mines Mark XIV were swept. Three boats of Minesweeping Group Attica are engaged in clearing a barrage gap in the entrance to the harbor of Argostoli.

For instructions from Group South to Admiral, Aegean regarding the crew of the Italian Hospital ship GRADISCA see teletype 2040.

c. Black Sea:

At 2035 an enemy submarine was located 70 miles west of Sevastopol.

Operations by our PT boats and patrol units off the south and north coasts of the Taman Peninsula and east of Genichesk were without result. Three boats of the 1st PT boat Flotilla were sent out during the night of 1 Oct. against enemy naval forces and supplies in the Anapa - Cape Utrish area.

Otherwise nothing to report.

VIII. Situation East Asia

Nothing to Report.

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Items of Political Importance

Nothing to report.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff

I. Army Situation:

On 1 Oct. no large-scale actions took place on the eastern front. The inactivity in the southern sector is obviously caused by the heavy losses suffered by the enemy, especially in the Zaporozhe area. The battles for the Dnieper bridge-heads continue with varying success. Enemy attacks in the sector of Army Group Center no longer showed the same impetus as hitherto. The areas of Gomel and Smolensk are the main points of attack.

In Italy it appears that the forces we had available were insufficient to hold the Foggia area. There is increasing partisan activity, sometimes under British leadership, in Northern Italy.

British and French troops appeared for the first time on Corsica. There are still approximately 6,000 of our own troops and 1,500 motor vehicles as well as numerous anti-aircraft guns on the island. All tanks and assault guns have been taken off.

The Apennine line in the Florence area is being strengthened.

II. a. Quartermaster General reports that an order has been received from the Reichsmarschall for concentration in the production of anti-aircraft guns on heavy ones, chiefly 12.8 cm. caliber. Super-heavy anti-aircraft guns (15 and 24 cm. which are being developed) have been dropped. Anti-aircraft rockets are the only ones in the calibers above 12.8 cm. which are still to be manufactured and their output is expected to benefit from the above restrictions. This will, however, not effect the Navy.

b. Group West reports that out of 100 Italian officer and 1,000 enlisted men, 10 officers and 70 men have declared their adherence to the cause; 70 officers and 450 men have volunteered for labor service. Twenty officers and 450 men refused any further cooperation.

III. Chief, Naval Ordnance Division reports on a meeting with the General War Office and Commander, Replacement Army regarding preparation of the Fuehrer's directive through which the Ministry of Armament and Ammunition is to be granted the right to inspect and dispose of all stocks of the Armed Forces. On 4 Oct. a final discussion on this matter will take place under the auspices of Chief, Armed Forces High Command. The

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point of view of the Navy, as approved by Commander in Chief, Navy, is that the Ministry must naturally be furnished a survey on all stocks but that these can only be surrendered with the consent of the branches of the Armed Forces concerned. It is pointed out in this connection that the Navy nowhere has excessive stocks of materials which are in short supply.

With regard to the armament conference at Gdynia and the Gauleiter convention at Posen, Commander in Chief, Navy orders that new weapons and new submarine tactics are not to be discussed.

IV. Chief, Naval Intelligence Division: The first reports from abroad on the convoy battle in the North Atlantic are now to hand. According to Reuter, more than 6 freighters and 3 - 4 escort vessels were lost, including the Canadian destroyer ST. CROIX, from which the crew of 147 was lost except for one survivor. The submarines are said to have attacked two convoys and it is assumed that new and deadly torpedoes were used.

Reports from the United States mention torpedoes with acoustic control.

Chief, Naval Intelligence Division also submitted a final report on enemy merchant shipping losses for the month of September. (For copy as per 1/Skl 30012/43 geh. see War Diary Part D, Vol "Enemy Shipping Losses 1943"). The number of ships sunk was 59, totalling 202,584, GRT, out of which our submarines accounted for 16 vessels totalling 76,392 GRT.

V. In a Highly Restricted Circle:

Following a report by Quartermaster General on strengthening the anti-aircraft defense of Gdynia, Chief, Naval Staff decides that completion of the final emplacements for 12.8 cm. twin anti-aircraft guns is to be awaited.

Quartermaster Division, Fleet Branch, Air Defense Section reports on the anti-aircraft defense of Pillau, Memel and Libau and states that personnel is lacking for the material which is available for strengthening defense. Chief, Naval Staff orders that Chief, General Naval Administration Bureau should assess personnel requirements by the middle of October. With regard to smoke-screen defense, Air Defense Section proposes that no change be made in present arrangements. Chief, Operations Division urges that the re-formation of smoke-screen battalions with Italians be investigated and Naval Command, Baltic be ordered to investigate the possibilities of dispersing berths in Gdynia.

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VI. Chief, Naval Staff again discusses the failure of technical developments, which last summer led to the break-down in submarine warfare. It is the second time that technical deficiency has robbed the submarines of great successes. Even now heavy pressure has been necessary to urge technicians to speed up research work. The "Zaunkoenig" torpedo was not to be ready for operational use before 1944.

Special Items

I. Operations Division had expected the eleven boats of the zero series of the multi-purpose boat to be put into construction independent of completion of the first boat. It agrees, however, because of the difficulties reported by the Shipbuilding Commission, that construction of the eleven boats shall not commence until after the first boat has been tested, if this emergency measure is offset by arranging quotas of minesweepers and moror minesweepers so that output is possible at least of the number requested.

II. The Swedish Naval Attache in Berlin has reported that, according to Swedish experiences, the duration of minefields in waters where there are currents is relatively short, since the mines go adrift after 8-9 months; he has asked for a report on German experiences in this matter.

This is obviously a ruse in order to obtain data on the durability of German mines, e.g. those used in the "West Wall". Probably Sweden was astonished at the protracted efficacy of our Skagen barrage (loss of the ULVEN).

The Naval Attache's Section is given the following guide for an evasive reply:

"The Swedish Navy's unfortunate experiences on the limited duration of minefields can only be confirmed to a certain extent. Numerous drifting mines with broken mooring rope are continually discovered. These mines are of German as well as of British origin; they are mostly obsolete. A proof of the good durability of the German mooring ropes is the large barrage east of Skagen which is still effective though laid over three years ago. This is shown by the loss of the Swedish submarine ULVEN."

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Situation 2 Oct.

I. War in Foreign Waters

All units operating in foreign waters are advised regarding the enemy situation by Radiogram 0902.

Otherwise nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the Bay of Biscay 20 planes were detected on operation. The following were located: one British vessel at 1905 in BF 4548 and one at 2043 in BF 4518; 1 U. S. vessel at 2100 in CG 4720.

Our aerial reconnaissance reported:

at 1320 1 light cruiser on course 270 degrees in BE 6772;
at 1340 32 merchantmen, 8 guardboats and 1 cruiser on course 360 degrees in BE 5986;
at 1840 a convoy consisting of 17-19 merchantmen with 5 guardboats 2-3 destroyers and 1 vessel, presumably a cruiser, on course 360 degrees in BE 9719.

As regards the vessels successfully attacked during the night of 1 Oct. off Boulogne, of which one landing boat was brought in, Group West no longer adheres to its previous assumption of a minesweeping operation. It seems most likely that the enemy's aim was to land sabotage detachments between the harbor and battery at Mont de Couple or between this battery and Cape D'Alprech or, if more vessels were taking part, to seize radar sets located there. The enemy plan was successfully frustrated by prompt detection and accurate hits on the leading boat.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ELM/A mine was swept off Brest and one off Ile de Re. Altogether 7 submarines were escorted in to Brest, St. Nazaire, La Pallice and the Gironde.

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Torpedo boats T "22". "23". "24" and "25" were transferred from Concarneau to Brest. The operation by a destroyer subdivision against steam trawlers was postponed for 24 hours.

Channel Coast:

Three ELM/A mines were swept off Nieupoort. The LIVADIA was escorted from Le Havre to Dieppe by 13 escort vessels. Further passage to Boulogne is postponed for 24 hours.

Four boats of the 6th Minesweeper Flotilla and torpedo boat T "19", while being transferred, became involved in an engagement with seven vessels of the 2nd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla towards 0300 off Cayeux between Boulogne and Dieppe. Both Flotillas fired at each other with all calibers for approximately ten minutes. The command boats of the Flotillas were quite unable to stop the engagement although they were aware of the true situation. The incident, which entailed casualties amounting to 4 dead and 14 seriously wounded as well as some damage to the boats, was caused by the blowing-up of star shells which were intended for the detection of an unknown target located by radar, but which misfired.

Considering the facts available, this must be regarded as one of those unfortunate incidents which in wartime can never be entirely avoided.

For detailed report by Group West see teletype 1437.

A minelaying operation on the convoy route Harwich - Great Yarmouth by the 2nd, 4th, 6th and 8th PT Boat Flotilla and a torpedo operation by the 5th PT Boat Flotilla against a convoy off the southeast coast are scheduled for the night of 2 Oct.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters

1. North Sea:

North of Terschelling and Ameland altogether 8 ELM mines were swept. Emden was heavily raided from 1450 - 1710 by a U. S. bomber formation with fighter escort. For details see "Aerial Warfare".

Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North reports that a deep-water route for special purposes has been prepared by a double sweep and requests permission to search and sweep the remainder of barrage "3". For sailing directions see teletype 1845.

Naval Staff has approved as requested.

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2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Eighteen planes were detected on operation over the North Sea. Slight gunfire was observed in the Petsamo area and slight aerial reconnaissance in the Vardow area.

Our air reconnaissance of Longyearbyen on 1 Oct. established that the coal dumps there were still smouldering

Own Situation:

In the area of Naval Command, Norway 14 vessels and 1 submarine were escorted north and 11 vessels south. In the Arctic coast area 15 ships were delayed owing to lack of escorts.

Chief, Naval Staff has decided that twelve submarines are to remain in the northern area. Order to this effect from Naval Staff has been sent to Group North/Fleet, Admiral, Northern Waters, Commander, Submarines, Norway and Submarine Division.

Submarine Division has arranged withdrawal of the submarines so as to leave Commander, Submarines, Norway six boats which are at present at sea, also five which will be ready for operations in October and a twelfth, the date of operational readiness of which is not yet certain. Nine submarines will be withdrawn for operations in the Atlantic.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

Only slight gunfire is reported from Kronstadt Bay. The steamer NORDSTRUM was unsuccessfully attacked by a torpedo bomber which was again observed southwest of Windau and off Sworbe.

2. Own Situation:

A mine was swept off schulzgrund by mine-exploding vessel "13", which was slightly damaged.

Naval Command, Baltic transmitted a report from Admiral, Denmark according to which the police raid on Jews carried out in Denmark during the night of 1 Oct. was a failure, since most of the Jews, warned by rumors, had hidden. A mass flight of Jews to Sweden has also started. Admiral,

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Denmark further reports that according to telephonic advice from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, demobilization of the Danish Armed Forces will probably commence next week. Admiral, Denmark interprets this to mean that obviously there will be no recruiting of SS volunteers.

Convoy and transport traffic in the entire Baltic Sea area was carried out according to plan. Nothing special is reported from the area of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic and Admiral, Baltic States.

Armed Forces High Command, Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas advises that, in view of the enemy aerial torpedo attacks on hospital ships and leave ships as well as on merchantmen proceeding to and from the Baltic States, this traffic must cease as long as escort and air cover are not provided. (See teletype 2224).

Naval Command, Baltic advises Operations Division for information of instructions issued to offices concerned dealing with the situation and plans for escort of vessels to and from the Baltic States. For copy as per 1/Skl 27644/43 Gkdos. See War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

It is of primary importance to equip all ships proceeding to and from the Baltic States with 2 cm. anti-aircraft guns, to establish an anti-aircraft relay escort from Kolka to Backofen by four heavy gun carriers of the 24th Landing Flotilla, to have the 3rd Patrol Boat Flotilla, which will be withdrawn from the Gulf of Finland, carry out anti-aircraft escort of specially valuable ships and tankers and, finally, to establish air patrol by the 102nd Bomber Wing. Moreover, merchantmen have been advised to keep a sharp lookout and to avoid the run from Domesnes to Libau at dawn. Attempts should be made, until all merchantmen are equipped with anti-aircraft guns, to have unarmed ships proceed together with one that is armed. As regards armament of merchantmen in the Baltic, Operations Division has issued relevant instructions to Quartermaster Division and requested re-armament of all merchantmen passing north of the line Memel - southern point of Oeland. If possible Finnish merchantmen too should be armed. The first request in this connection was already made on 25 Sept. to Quartermaster Division.

V. Submarine Warfare

On the basis of evaluations of radio intelligence, the patrol line of Group "Roszbach" was once again moved 50 miles further north into the line AD 8133 - AK 3929.

Otherwise nothing special to report from the Atlantic.

VI. Aerial Warfare.1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force reports the number of planes out on operation as 60 over England, 15 over the Atlantic and 3 over the Mediterranean. A minelaying operation was carried out over the Humber area by 56 planes, of which 4 did not return.

Emden was raided between 1640 and 1740 by 200 - 250 enemy planes mostly 4-engined ones, which came in over the Heligoland Bight. Our fighters, numbering 244, went up in defense and brought down 3 enemy planes but themselves lost 10. Considerable damage was caused at Emden. Amongst other things, a slipway and a submarine were badly damaged at the Nordseewerke. The Schulte & Bruns Dockyard was hit by 30 high explosive bombs, causing a 95% deficit in production; a floating dock with crane sank. At Cassens dockyard all machines in the workshop and forge were destroyed. A floating dock with a patrol boat sank and a patrol boat was heavily damaged. Production deficit is 75%. At the State Dockyard the production deficit is 60%. One steamer, two tugs and two barges sank and further vessels were damaged. Traffic on the Ems-Jade Canal will be interrupted for 8 to 10 days owing to hits on the locks. Furthermore, naval barracks and labor camps were badly damaged.

The enemy obviously still regards Emden as a center of submarine production, possibly remembering the first World War. Actually submarine construction at Emden is extremely small.

During the night of 2 Oct. about 70-80 planes carried out minelaying (probably heavy) in the Heligoland Bight and the western part of the Baltic Sea.

Approximately 300 planes flew into southern Germany via Belgium and carried out a heavy raid on Munich where extensive damage was caused to residential districts as well as to industrial installations.

Twenty further planes carried out nuisance raids over Duisburg, Dortmund and Remscheid, causing only slight damage.

With reference to the attack of 1 Oct. on Wiener-Neustadt, it is now reported that this was carried out by 81 enemy planes of which 6 were brought down by anti-aircraft guns and 19 by our fighters, of which 47 were sent out. Of the 25 Fortresses which raided Feldkirch, presumably as an alternative target to Augsburg, 2 were shot down by fighters over northern Italy and 6 over home territory. In addition it is reported that 8 Fortresses made forced landings in Switzerland.

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According to Swiss press reports, Swiss anti-aircraft guns opened fire on several of the U.S. planes flying over and actually shot down at least one.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The 2nd Air Force reports reconnaissance activity over the area of Corsica - Salerno - Palermo. Following the loss of four Arado 196's on transport operations from Corsica, these planes will be withdrawn. Air Force Command, Southeast reports a successful attack on Leros and the airfield of Kos. Over Crete our fighters brought down two enemy planes.

In Italy the enemy carried out continuous fighter-bomber and machine-gun attacks over the Army Front. Two planes were over Rome.

Over the Aegean Sea 14 reconnaissance planes were observed. An unsuccessful attack by 6 - 8 enemy planes was carried out on Rhodes.

3. Eastern Front:

On 1 Oct. the 4th Air Force carried out photographic reconnaissance of Black Sea ports. For evaluations see Enemy Situation, Black Sea.

Ten planes of the 5th Air Force carried out reconnaissance. West of Ireland 4 merchantmen with 3 destroyers and 2 escort vessels were sighted on course 210 degrees.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

At 0815 (obviously 1815, Tr.N.) a cruiser of the DIDO class which put in to Gibraltar in the morning put out for the Atlantic. A convoy of 22 loaded freighters left Gibraltar in the evening for the Mediterranean. According to a report from Cape Spartel, a convoy of 54 freighters, 10 tankers and 10 destroyers passed the line Cape Spartel - Cape Trafalgar between 1700 and 1800 on easterly course and passed through the Straits of Gibraltar at 2000.

No reports on air reconnaissance have been received from the western and eastern Mediterranean.

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In the Tyrrhenian Sea rough interpretation of photographic reconnaissance over the Salerno beachhead shows an increase in the numbers of cruisers and large landing boats. No convoys were sighted between Salerno and Sicily.

At 0930 there was a cruiser with two destroyers on south-easterly course 60 miles east of Cagliari. No further landings at Castellamare were observed.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

During the night of 1 Oct. the minelayer POMMERN broke off her operation after laying three barrage sections, but will resume it during the night of 2 Oct. Ferry traffic from Corsica by large vessels and barges continues according to plan.

Submarine chaser "2210" was unsuccessfully attacked by an enemy submarine off Porto Ferrajo.

On 30 Sept. the auxiliary minelayer LAURANA was commissioned in Venice and on 2 Oct. the minelayer CROTONE was commissioned in Spezia.

At 0102 30 miles northeast of Cape Tenes submarine U "223" heard two hits on a steamer of 10,000 GRT and observed a hit each on a destroyer and a steamer 8,000 GRT. Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean assures that all three vessels were sunk. According to a report from submarine U "81", there was an enemy destroyer group in the Strait of Otranto during the night. Submarine U "380" is heading for Salerno Bay.

German Naval Command, Italy has requested immediate shipment of 450 EMC mines to Toulon for minelaying operations north of Corsica and off the Ligurian coast by the minelayers POMMERN and AQUI. Naval Staff has arranged for shipment of the 431 EMC mines available. The mines, however, only be released after presentation of an exact minelaying plan, since the shortage of mines makes it imperative to restrict barrages to areas which can be defended by us.

German Naval Command, Italy had requested on 4 Sept. closing of the approaches to the central Adriatic in a line from Cape Gargano to the island of Korcula with 520 EMF or 1260 EMC mines, and asked for allocation of two to four minelayers from the area of Group South. Developments in the situation in Italy at that time made it appear most urgent to defend the Aegean Sea and the Dalmatian coast; furthermore, neither sufficient mines nor minelayers were available. Accordingly Naval Staff on 10 Sept. rejected the minelaying project and promised available mines and minelayers to Group South for defense of the Aegean Sea and east coast of the Adriatic. On 26 Sept. German

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Command, Italy repeated the request and proposed that the Adriatic minefield be laid immediately by Group South. In addition it requested 72 UMB and 200 EMC mines for operations by PT boats and naval landing craft off the southern ports of the east coast of Italy and reported the imminent commissioning of small Italian minelayers equipped with Italian mines and of one naval landing craft for German mines.

Operations Division has approved the latter request. Naval Ordnance Division, Underwater Obstacles Branch has been ordered to supply the mines to the Mining and Barrage Command, Venice. As regards the Adriatic barrage, Naval Staff deems it expedient, because of the situation in the southern part of the Adriatic which is by no means under control and in view of the short supply of mines, to continue to concentrate mine defense on the coastal areas. Group South is of the same opinion and also reports that the Adriatic barrage cannot at present be laid by minelayers of Admiral, Aegean as this might jeopardize the entire minelaying plan in the Aegean area. On 29 Sept. Operations Division advised Group South and German Naval Command, Italy as well as Admiral, Adriatic for information, of its views and entrusted Group South with responsibility for the defense of the Adriatic Sea area including the southern approaches, with orders to investigate the possibilities of a barrage approximately off Ancona. Furthermore, Group South is to submit as soon as possible plans and requirements for mine defense of the east coast of the Adriatic.

German Naval Command, Italy is also to report the mines and minelayers available in Trieste to Group South and Admiral, Adriatic, while Group South is to investigate the possibility of diverting minelayers from the Aegean for the tasks in the Adriatic Sea area and on the east coast of this area.

On 1 Oct. German Naval Command, Italy submitted the view that an EMF barrage in the Adriatic off Gargano, combined with anti-submarine barrages laid in the direction of the enemy, even without possibility of patrol, can decidedly hinder or check an enemy operation in the Adriatic, particularly a thrust into the partisan area with landing craft. German Naval Command, Italy, therefore, asks for increased shipments (of mines, Tr.N) to Venice. The Italian east coast ports will be mined with Italian mines. Operations Division has ordered Group South to investigate the suggestion made by German Naval Command, Italy, considering facilities available, and has advised German Naval Command, Italy that further shipments of mines are at present impossible, except 100 cutting floats, and that it should resort to Italian mines.

3. Area Naval Group South:a. Adriatic Sea:

Of the steamers proceeding south from the northern Adriatic, the motorship POZARICA en route from Trieste to Cattaro put into Zara, as the route South of Sibenik is not navigable owing to shelling from land. The steamer DEA MARCELLA was probably sunk there on the same route. The steamer MERANO has turned back.

b. Aegean Sea:

On the afternoon of 1 Oct. a strong enemy formation which flew into the area of Suda Bay was scattered by our fighters, which brought down three enemy planes.

On 1 Oct. the landing operation on Kos, code word "Eisbaer", commenced. Army troops boarded steamers and naval vessels which sail from Piraeus, Suda and Candia in three groups and meet west of Naxos.

Operational control rests with Admiral, Aegean and tactical control at sea with Commander, 21st Submarine Chaser Flotilla. The landing on Kos is set for 3 Oct. at 0400. So far the operation is proceeding according to plan.

c. Black Sea:Enemy Situation:

According to photographic reconnaissance of 1 Oct. the following were lying:

In Poti:

1 battleship, 1 heavy cruiser, 2 destroyers, 1 of them in dock, 6 submarines, 3 of them in dock, 7 motor minesweepers, the submarine accommodation ship NEWA, 15 freighters, etc.

In the Schopi estuary:

The hulls of 1 cruiser and 1 destroyer were made out and 2 submarines, 3 PT boats, 1 tanker, 8 freighters and other vessels were detected.

In Oshemshiri:

There were 3 submarines, 6 motor minesweepers, 4 of them on slipway and also 2 submarine escort boats.

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Own Situation:

The enemy carried out air attacks on Feodosiya, where two motor minesweepers were heavily damaged and casualties sustained, on Sennaya and on a convoy from Kerch to Feodosiya. Our fighters reported that one enemy plane was shot down.

During the night of 1 Oct. our motor minesweepers were in position off the southern outlet to the Strait of Kerch without sighting the enemy. When putting in to Feodosiya they were bombed by enemy planes without success.

Repeated enemy air attacks were also made by day on the naval landing craft and naval artillery lighters in patrol lines north and south of the Taman Coast.

Two naval landing craft returning from the south Taman coast struck mines and became total losses.

Submarine U "9" put out from Constanta into the operational area.

Otherwise nothing to report.

VIII. Situation East Asia.

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance

According to British press reports, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden and Portugal have decided for the time being not to recognize the new Fascist-Republican Government of Italy. However, the Badoglio Government also is not yet recognized by these countries. According to Swedish reports from London, Russo-Polish tension has increased to such an extent that an inter-Allied crisis is feared. Churchill's diplomacy will be put to its hardest test yet in order to prevent a conflict.

According to a Reuter report from Washington, emanating from apparently the best informed source, the opening of the second European front will be advanced by more than a month compared to the Quebec plan, because of the speedy development in the situation in Russia and in Italy. General Marshall is said to be making preparations to leave Europe. The British, U. S. and Russian Supreme Commands regard Europe now as the only theater of war. All preparations are said to be under way. Practical execution will be the main topic at the Allied Staff discussions soon to commence.

According to the "International News Service", the U. S. State Department has drawn up a plan for post-war cooperation with Russia, in preparation for the Three Power Conference in London or Moscow, which plan is said to provide a system for maintenance of lasting peace. The United States have, according to Reuter, dropped the plan to hold the conference in London instead of in Moscow, in view of Russian objections.

British newspapers are again discussing the possibility of a Portuguese declaration of war on Japan.

The strikes for wage increases continue in the British Armament industry.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval StaffI. Army Situation:

The situation on the whole is satisfactory on the eastern front. There were no large-scale actions on 2 Oct.

Italy:

The withdrawal from Corsica should be completed by 3 Oct. The Fuehrer has ordered that the line Gaeta - Ortona is definitely to be held. Two divisions will be moved up from Northern Italy. If this is successful, the surrender of Rome will thus be avoided.

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Mopping-up operations in the Goerz area are completed and will be followed by similar operations in the Pola, Trieste and Fiume areas.

II. According to advice from Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters, the Fuehrer has expressed concern regarding a possible enemy landing in the Crimea and considers the concentration of all naval forces for defense to be imperative.

Chief, Operations Division reports in this connection that the following are available for defense of the Crimea:

6 submarines, 3 of them in operational readiness: 10 PT boats, 4 of them in operational readiness; 17 motor mine-sweepers, 12 of them in operational readiness; 7 naval artillery lighters, 6 of them in operational readiness (4 in sea of Azov, the remained in the southern Crimea); 5 Italian CB boats (midget submarines, Tr.N.) all of them in operational readiness; 98 naval landing craft, 70 of them in operational readiness (35 of these are required for increasing escort duties in the western part of the Black Sea),

Rumanian naval forces cannot be used for defense of the Crimea. No additional German forces from home waters can be allocated in view of the exceedingly tense situation in all areas. No reserves are available.

Chief, Naval Staff orders that Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters be informed at once and his attention drawn to the Fleet Construction Program for 1943, which should ensure the most urgent naval requirements.

For teletype 1/Skl 27720/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV a.

III. On the evening of 2 Oct. Operations Division received telephonic advice from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff through competent authorities that, as regards demobilization of members of the Danish Armed Forces, plans have been revised. It is intended to carry out demobilization - also of regular soldiers within the next few days.

Instructions to this effect from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff were received on the evening of 3 Oct. For copy as per 1/Skl 27736/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. III. According to these instructions, recruitment for the Schalburg Corps and River Railway Police is to commence after non-commissioned officers and enlisted men are demobilized.

It remains to be seen whether recruiting will still be very promising after what has happened meanwhile. Further, Chief

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Operations Division reports on difficulties which have arisen as regards the exchange of seriously wounded between Germany and Britain because the Foreign Minister refuses to report to the Fuehrer the result of negotiations so far, so that adherence to the date fixed (12 Oct.) is questionable. It will be impossible to adhere to the date if the Fuehrer's final instructions are not issued today. For details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

Chief, Naval Staff orders that Chief of Staff, Army Group B be advised of the negative decision regarding the appointment of the negative decision regarding the appointment of Vice Admiral Ruge, with special reference to the fact that the latter is not an expert on coastal defense.

Special Items

I. The Shipbuilding Commission - Sub-Commission Landing Craft - reported on 28 Sept. that the immediate setting-up of a construction site for naval landing craft and naval artillery lighters in Salonika, as requested by Naval Staff, cannot be carried out.

Naval Staff must nevertheless insist most emphatically on its demand; naval landing craft cannot be dispensed with in the Aegean Sea for the extensive tasks of minelaying, escort submarine chase, etc. and also as freight-carriers.

Siebel ferries can only be used to a certain extent in these operations. Quartermaster Division therefore requests the Shipbuilding Commission to take the necessary steps without further delay so as to make up for lost time.

II. Operations Division, Special Weapons Division (Vice Admiral Weichold) has ascertained from Prince Borghese the present situation regarding material and personnel of the Italian special weapons available, with a view to quick establishment of fighting power and operational readiness.

Naval Staff contemplates setting up the 10th Italian PT Boat Flotilla as a volunteer corps with Italian personnel under the command of Prince Borghese, since there are no forces available for the establishment of a German unit and new training would take too long. The Borghese unit would be put under Admiral Legnani. German Naval Command, Italy would submit operations requirements to Legnani, would supervise, through the liaison officer to the 10th Italian PT Boat Flotilla, its training, activity and

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conduct and would expedite, through the Commanding General, Armed Forces, establishment of war readiness as well as current material requirements by means of Italian dockyard and industrial facilities.

Naval Staff advises German Naval Command, Italy of these plans and of the fact that Prince Borghese will leave for Rome on 3 Oct., in order to contact Admiral Legnani. The position of the former German Liaison Officer of Armed Forces High Command, Intelligence Division to the 10th Italian PT Boat Flotilla remains unchanged for the time being.

III. With regard to the considerations put forward by Operations Division on the enemy mine offensive against our submarine bases in the Biscay area (see War Diary 5 Aug.), the views of Group West and Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West, as requested, have in the meantime been received. Both Commands fully agree with the basic statements of Operations Division and their reports, especially the one of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West, contain various requests and recommendations which have been followed up in detail or are still under consideration by Naval Staff.

The following are dealt with: All anti-mine measures and defense against mines, including navigational aids of a technical as well as of a tactical nature. For further details see order 1/Skl IE 26140/43 Gkdos. and 1/Skl IE 27542/43 Gkdos. in files IE 15, Vol. 3.

IV. In brief Report No. 4/43 regarding the situation on the eastern front, Naval Intelligence Division reports on the following, among other things:

Re-occupation of Novorossiisk by the Russians on 10 Sept.; armored boat flotilla in the Sea of Azov; ships sunk in the Arctic by submarines and awards conferred. For copy as for 1/Skl 30186/43 geh. see War Diary, Part D, "Data on the Enemy Situation 1943".

Situation 3 Oct.

I. War in Foreign Waters

Nothing to report.

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II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the Bay of Biscay 42 planes were detected in operation. Between 1918 and 2140 one British vessel each was located in BE 9890, AL 6810, BE 9440 and AM 4470.

Our air reconnaissance reported at 0951 4 freighters, 1 tanker and 6 destroyers on course 250 degrees in BE 3162.

From 2115, vessels were located in the Channel west of Boulogne, northwest of Calais and in Les Sept Iles area.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Seven submarines were escorted out of Brest, St. Nazaire and La Pallice. The tanker NORDVAARD left Brest at 1650 with escort Lezardrieux. Air Commander, Atlantic Coast plans to guide the destroyer sub-division to steam trawlers with radar on 4 Oct. So far this operation had to be postponed owing to fog.

Channel Coast:

Torpedo boat T "19" put in to Flushing in the morning, Torpedo boats T "22", "23", "25" and "27" left Brest at 1900 for transfer to St. Malo. The convoy of the steamer LIVADIA from Dieppe to Boulogne was carried out with 14 escort vessels and is scheduled to continue to Ostend at 2400. At 2331 British long-range batteries fired on one of our westbound convoys between Blanc-Nez and Gris Nez without effect; our batteries returned fire.

Two ELM/J mines were swept west of Zeebrugge and 14 ELM/A mines between Nieuport and Ostend.

The PT boat minelaying operation during the night of 2 Oct. was canceled on account of bad visibility. The Torpedo operation by the 5th PT boat Flotilla was not carried out owing to negative air reconnaissance.

Group West transmits a report of Commander, 2nd Coast patrol Force on the brief reports of the 6th minesweeper Flotilla and the 2nd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla on the exchange of gunfire during the night of 1 Oct.

For copy see teletype 1610.

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III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters

1. North Sea:

Patrol operations were to some extent hampered by unfavorable weather. Three ground mines were swept west of Scheveningen. In the Dutch coastal area a few bombs were dropped by enemy planes. No casualties or damage sustained. Patrol boat "2009" was set on fire off Vere by eight enemy planes and capsized, casualties being sustained. Minesweeper M "438" was damaged in an air attack of Wemeldingen.

For report of Naval Command, North on the heavy enemy attack on 2 Oct. on Emden see teletype 0801. The damage caused was already reported on 2 Oct. Under "Aerial Warfare".

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Over the North Sea 23 planes were detected on operation. On 1 Oct. and 2 Oct. single reconnaissance planes were reported in the areas of Banak and Nordkyn.

Own Situation:

On 2 Oct. the steamer ROTENFELS (8,000 GRT) carrying a cargo of ore went aground while lying anchored off Roervik. The ship was damaged and towed off.

Seventeen vessels were escorted north and 18 south. The Task Force reports that during the night prior to the midget-submarine attack and on the morning itself the barrage gap to the TIRPITZ net enclosure was open owing to continuous boat traffic with teletype station "Dosskopf". During darkness the gap was patrolled by a sailing smack manned by TIRPITZ personnel. Furthermore, the hydrophone station aboard the TIRPITZ was manned until broad daylight at 0700.

This report gives decisive information on the submarine's penetration into the net enclosure.

Meteorological operation "Kreuzritter" began from Hammerfest on the evening of 2 Oct. and operation "Schatzgraeber" was commenced on 3 Oct. 0310.

Group North/Fleet has transmitted to the 5th Air Force

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agreement of Chief, Naval Meteorological Service to the installation of a meteorological station on Hope Island for the Air Forces; a naval station will not be set up. Admiral, Northern Waters has orders to communicate direct with the 5th Air Force regarding preparations for this project as well as transport and installation of the station.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Minor gunfire and slight patrol boat traffic were observed in Kronstadt Bay. Eighty planes flew in over Denmark, the Baltic Sea entrances, Fehmarn Belt, Luebeck Bay and the central part of the Baltic, apparently on mining operations. A returning Liberator was shot down by naval anti-aircraft guns in the outer Kiel estuary.

2. Own Situation:

Three ELM/A mines were swept in the Fehmarn area and five in the central part of the Baltic.

Group North/Fleet submits a brief report of the LUETZOW on her transfer from 23 Sept. to 30 Sept. For copy see teletype 1232. In the whole Baltic Sea area convoy and transport traffic was carried out as planned and without incident.

The Finns swept four Russian ground mines in the Porkalla - Helsinki channel on 2 Oct.

The heavy gun carriers of the 24th Landing Flotilla on barrage patrol in the "Seeigel" area were relieved by the 25th Minesweeper Flotilla and will transfer to the Irbon Straits as anti-aircraft defense for merchant shipping.

V. Submarine Warfare

From the patrol line of Group "Rossbach" two submarines report an attack by enemy planes which, however, caused no damage. Three submarines of the patrol line were probably sighted by planes, according to radio intelligence. These planes are possibly the advance reconnaissance of the awaited convoy. It is possible that the convoy has already passed

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the patrol line, and, if so, it will no longer be possible to intercept it.

No further important reports have been received from the Atlantic.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 15 heavy fighters out on free lance operations over the Atlantic. Two enemy planes are reported shot down. Nine bombers attacked airfields in the Bedford area and 16 heavy fighters attacked airfields in the Cambridge area.

During the day the enemy attacked airfields and patrol vessels in Holland. Four airfields and several boats were damaged. Two enemy planes were brought down. In Belgium the airfield at Beauvais Tille was badly damaged. In Western France, Le Havre and Fecamp were raided as well as the electric power plants at Mur de Bretagne, Le Treport and Orleans. Three enemy planes were shot down.

Over Germany there was lively reconnaissance activity by single planes in the northwest and in the Baltic Sea area.

During the night Cassel was heavily raided by about 300 enemy planes. Our fighters, numbering 261, went up in defense and shot down 15 planes, themselves losing 8. The damage to industrial and traffic installations in Cassel is serious. For particulars see "Daily Situation".

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The 2nd Air Force reports an attack by five fighter-bombers on LST's off Termoli. One LST was damaged. Air reconnaissance was also carried out. The enemy carried out reconnaissance in the Bologna - Padua area and raided Civitavecchia. In addition, continuous attacks are reported from the front.

3. Eastern Front:

Fifty two enemy planes were shot down over the Army front on 2 Oct. We lost one plane. Nothing special is reported by the 4th and 5th Air Forces.

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VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

On the evening of 2 Oct. 3 tankers, 1 freighter, 2 escort vessels and 16 vessels, presumably minesweepers, put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic. On 3 Oct. 7 destroyers, and, at 1415, the VALIANT put in from the Mediterranean. One DIDO class put out on the evening destination unknown.

The large eastbound convoy which entered the Mediterranean on the evening of 2 Oct. was not detected again.

Our own air reconnaissance in the Corsica - Sardinia area was incomplete because of unfavorable weather. Only a few reports were received also from the Tyrrhenian Sea. At 0850 4 torpedo boats and 3 landing boats on course west northwest were sighted 10 miles east of Cagliari.

The hunt carried out for the submarine which attacked submarine chaser "2210" seems to have been successful; according to a report from German Naval Command, Italy.

Submarine chaser "2208" reports having out-maneuvered a spread of three torpedoes southeast of Rapallo. Submarine chase was taken up by her and later on continued by a motor minesweeper.

Motor minesweeper R "212" was unsuccessfully attacked by an enemy submarine off Bastia.

According to photographic reconnaissance the following were lying in Taranto at 1025:

3 light cruisers, including an Italian one, 3 destroyers, 2 torpedo boats, 6 vessels, apparently torpedo boats, 6 submarines, 3 of them in dock, 53 small vessels (naval), 10 LST's. 1 large passenger steamer, 3 tankers, 19 freighters. Only a few light naval forces were detected in Brindisi but the number of freighters had increased. In the harbor of Termoli 4 ships were observed, apparently for the first time enemy vessels.

2. Own Situation:

On 2 Oct. 2300 PT boats unexpectedly sighted a receding convoy 40 miles northeast of Ustica. Fuller reports have not yet been received. This confirms that convoys are out at sea at night.

Commander, Supply and Transport, Corsica reports at 2300

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the completion of evacuation. From 1715 Bastia was under enemy fire. PT boats were disposed east of Corsica as flanking defense for ferry traffic.

The minelayer POMMERN has completed her operation according to plan. The escort boats LIDO and SCARPANTO were commissioned in Venice. In the area of Naval Shore Command, West Adriatic an escort group of five vessels and a Harbor Defense Group, Venice are being formed. Preparations are being made for the formation of a submarine chaser group. The manning of three coastal batteries in the Venice area has started.

Submarine U "616" left Toulon for Salerno Bay. Submarine U "410" has now reported on arrival, in connection with her successes of 1 Oct., that the sinking of the steamer of 8,000 GRT was observed and sinking of the other four steamers totaling 31,000 GRT is to be assumed on the basis of dept setting (torpedo pistol Pi 2 - 7 meters)

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

Radio communication has been established between the naval liaison officer to Army Group F and Durazzo, Cattaro, Ragusa and Zera, according to a report from Group South. According to a decision by Air Force Command, Southeast, convoy escort in the Adriatic will at present be provided by Air Commander, Albania, since Air Commander, Croatia has not sufficient forces available.

The loss of the steamer DEA MARCELLA south of Sibenik was due to stranding and fire caused by coastal battery gunfire. Her German crew was rescued.

Group South has again stressed its request for allocation of vessels for the Adriatic, reporting the following as minimum requirements:

- a. for offensive operations:
2 PT boat flotillas, 1 midget submarine flotilla
- b. for minesweeping and escort operations:
3 motor minesweeper flotillas and as many torpedo boats as possible.
- c. for local patrol and minesweeping:
3 coast patrol flotillas
- d. for submarine chase:
3 submarine chaser groups

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- e. for mining operations:
1 minelayer unit and 1 net barrage unit
- f. for anti-aircraft defense of ports
Siebel anti-aircraft ferries
- g. for supply traffic:
naval landing craft, as many as possible, also barges,
lighters and tugs
- h. for local defense:
naval artillery lighters.

Group South also reports that an increase in the number of vessels in the Aegean is imperative and that submarine chasers, motor minesweepers, PT boats and submarines are primarily needed. For copy of report see teletype 1345.

b. Aegean Sea:

On 2 Oct. the airfield of Gadura on Rhodes was attacked by six to eight enemy planes without any particular damage. Over the central and southern parts of the Aegean several enemy reconnaissance planes were detected throughout the day of 2 Oct.

Naval Staff has advised Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy and the Naval Liaison Officers to High Command Army, Army General Staff and Commander In Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff regarding naval participation in the landing operation on Kos, based on the report by Group South. (See War Diary 2 Oct.) For copy of teletype as per 1/Skl I op 27674/43 Gkdos see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

Group South reports that the landing on Kos began at 0400 as planned. Commander, 21st Submarine Chaser Flotilla reported at 0922 that the landing was almost completed and that it had been successful. Casualties are slight in spite of strong resistance. Our radio intelligence intercepted at 0653 an enemy order for air attacks on our invasion forces. Our landing vessels, with the exception of two naval landing craft, are on return passage.

After completion of the mopping-up of Andros the bulk of the Army Group was transported back to Syra.

Sweeping of mines from the barrage north of Skiathos and in the harbor of Argastoli was continued.

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c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

At 1600 Feodosiya was attacked by eleven planes. Twenty-five high-explosive bombs fell in the harbor basin and on the mole, causing only slight damage.

Own Situation:

Nothing to report from any of the patrol lines during the night of 2 Oct. The patrol line north of the Taman coast was repeatedly attacked from the air; two enemy planes were shot down.

The last transports out of Sennaya arrived at Kerch. Installations in Taman and Sennaya were blown up. Ferry traffic over the Strait of Kerch, between Kossa Shushka and Yenikale as well as convoys between Kerch and Sevastopol were carried out as planned and without incident.

VIII. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance

"DNB" transmits a Spanish press report from London, according to which Allied discussions are taking place at Brindisi regarding Italy's admission to the Allied Nations.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff

I. Army Situation:

Evacuation of the Taman peninsula is being continued as planned. On the eastern front the areas of Melitopol/Zaporozhe and of Smolensk are the two enemy points of concentration. The Dnieper line is firmly in our hands. On the Volchov front the enemy has again taken up the offensive. Army General Staff calculates that approximately 50 divisions are being assembled for the Russian winter offensive (80 according to Japanese Statements).

Italy:

The ferry operation between Corsica and the mainland is completed. The enemy is pursuing hotly in the Foggia area; in the Naples area he is only following up our movements with hesitation.

Balkans:

Partisan activity has increased in the Agram area. The partisan leader Tito is trying to recapture the coastal area of Split. The operation against Kos is proceeding according to plan.

II. The steamer LIVADIA was sunk in the Channel by enemy long-range batteries during the night of 3 Oct. Thus the first attempt to withdraw large vessels from the west area to the east has failed, but the operation will be continued when conditions are more favorable.

III. For report by Operations Division, Fleet Operations Section on revised instruction of Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff regarding Denmark, see statements in War Diary under 2 Oct. and 3 Oct.

IV. Chief, Naval Communications Division, Rear Admiral Stummel, will be unable to attend to his duties for several weeks because of injuries sustained while picking fruit.

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V. Chief, Naval Intelligence Division reports that out of 175 senior officers at the Italian officers' prison camp in Posen only four have declared allegiance to Mussolini.

It seems that the Spanish Government is making preparations for the withdrawal of the "Blue" Division from the fighting line on the eastern front.

Reuter reports press statements by the U. S. Secretary of the Navy, Knox, at Algiers, after visiting Eisenhower, Alexander and Cunningham. According to these statements the Allied attack on Europe has not yet begun and the most difficult part of the war is yet to come. The battle has so far only been for outposts. At present the submarine menace is not so serious, though there was a time when everything hung in balance. Knox warned against underestimating with German submarine. The Germans would reappear on the scene with newly equipped submarines. Their submarines had again appeared in the Atlantic in full strength. Submarine warfare is a serious threat as long as the war lasts.

Special Items

I. According to telephonic advice from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy, the Fuehrer will address a letter to the Duce regarding the constitution of the future Italian Armed Forces. Branches of the Armed Forces are to submit suggestions for this at once. According to a report of Cdr. Meier, the Army will suggest the formation of four Italian Divisions, to be trained in France and the Air Force the formation of several groups.

Chief, Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division is of opinion that it will be impossible to lay down such specific requirements as to number and type regarding the Italian Navy. After having obtained the approval of Commander in Chief, Navy by telephone, Chief, Organization and Mobilization Branch submitted the following suggestions to the Fuehrer Headquarters by telephone on the afternoon of 3 Oct. As regards Commander in Chief's approval is to be noted that he personally included "submarine warfare" in Section 3 as he had in view possibly using the "Gross" Unit again for submarine operations when conditions in Italy became more settled.

1. Formation of commands and offices for coastal tasks of the German Navy in the Italian area, such as commands for coastal defense as well as offices for harbor traffic. The type, number, strength and operational areas of these

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commands and offices, which are to be under German operational control, are to be determined in direct discussions between the two High Commands.

2. Formation of further, and/or retention of already existing smoke-laying units, construction parties and similar units to be used also outside the Italian area for tasks of the German Navy. Here too the number and strength should be decided in separate discussions.

3. In special exceptions to be determined by Naval Staff, formation of Italian units for patrol of coastal waters, command operations and submarine warfare under German operational control.

II. Instructions of Chief, Naval Staff, regarding advice to Admiral Inspector of the Navy on the war situation are contained in order 1/Skl 30094/43 geh. For copy see War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

III. Submarine Division advises Operations Division for information of instructions to Commanders, Submarines, West and Mediterranean regarding the transfer of five submarines to the Mediterranean during the next new moon period. For teletype in question as per 1/Skl 3000/43 Gkdes. Chfs, see War Diary, Part C, Vol IV.

IV. According to advice from Quartermaster Division, Fleet Branch, the PRINZ EUGEN will have to undergo a six to eight weeks' engine overhaul and subsequently two months' training before she will be ready for operations. Complete operational readiness is, therefore, not to be expected before the beginning of February 1944 at the earliest.

Situation 4 Oct.

I. War in Foreign Waters

All vessels in foreign waters were advised of enemy shipping movements by Radiogram 2103.

Otherwise nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area1. Enemy Situation:

Forty-four planes were observed on operation over the Biscay area. One British vessel was located at 0306 in BE 2990, one at 0340 in BE 6110 and one at 1155 in AM 4140.

Radar locations in the areas of Boulogne and Calais continued until 0224. Further locations were made from 0102 to 0158 in the area of Les Sept Iles.

2. Own Situation:Atlantic Coast:

One ELM/J mine was swept by a plane off Lorient. The LONDOR put in to La Pallice at 1600. The FALKE and torpedo boat T "14" were transferred from Bordeaux to Royan Roads.

Off Brest, Lorient, St. Nazaire and La Pallice four submarines were escorted out and four in.

Channel Coast:

Torpedo boats T "22", "23", "25" and "27" had an engagement with enemy destroyers at 0202 four miles west of Les Sept Iles. Commander, 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla first reported two and later four modern destroyers, one possibly being a small cruiser. Both sides brought their guns and torpedoes into full action; a torpedo hit on a destroyer and a large number of gun hits were observed. Actual sinking of enemy vessels was not ascertained. Torpedo boat T "27" received a hit from from 15 cm. shell in her boiler room and sustained casualties - two seriously wounded and two slightly wounded. For brief action report of Commander, 4th torpedo boat Flotilla see teletype 1415. Repairs to torpedo boat T "27" will require one to two days. The Flotilla put in to St. Malo in the morning. When entering port torpedo boat T "22" had a minor collision with patrol boat "707" and sustained slight damage; repairs will require two to three weeks.

The convoy of the tanker NORVAARD left Lezardrieux at 1800 for Cherbourg. Three boats of the 4th torpedo Boat Flotilla provided close escort from St. Malo and then put in to harbor again. Seven boats of the 5th PT Boat Flotilla in two groups were in defensive patrol line from 2200 northwest of Peterport. Mine-exploding vessel "180" sustained slight damage from splinters when one of our westbound convoys was shelled by long-range batteries during the

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night of 3 Oct. All vessels put in to Boulogne.

The convoy of steamer LIVADIA started on passage from Boulogne to Ostend at midnight and was shelled from 0115 to 0157 by long-range batteries from Dover. At 0150 the steamer sprang a leak forward following a close hit, but was unable to continue. Following a second hit close to her side damage was caused to the engine. An attempt to tow the ship in to Calais was unsuccessful and she sank at 0226. Her entire crew was rescued. The escort vessels sustained no damage or casualties. For brief action report see teletype 0630.

The naval supply depot near Rouen was damaged during an enemy air attack by 12 planes with fighter escort on 3 Oct. at 1945. Traffic was also interrupted through one ferry being put out of action.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters

1. North Sea:

Torpedo boat T "19" was transferred from Flushing to Rotterdam. Patrol positions were not taken up owing to the weather. An enemy air attack on convoy traffic between Zijpe and Wemeldingen on the afternoon of 3 Oct. caused damage to one heavy gun carrier and two naval landing craft. On the morning of 4 Oct. the ferry at Zijpe was again attacked. One enemy plane was shot down and one set on fire by boats of the Meas Flotilla. A tug of a convoy off Wemeldingen was beached. A further plane was shot down. From 0942 an enemy formation flew into the Heligoland Bight in three waves but was forced by a large number of our fighters to turn away to the west. Three planes are reported shot down by fighters.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Over the North Sea 8 planes were observed in the morning and 27 in the afternoon on operations in the direction of the Norwegian coast, the northern area and Iceland. In the morning 14 planes were detected on air-sea rescue operations northeast of Cromer and in the southern part of the North Sea. In the area of Vardoe slight air reconnaissance was reported on 3 Oct.

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On 4 Oct., between 0755 and 0835 about 44 British and U. S. carrierborne planes of the Martlet, Skua, Martin and Thunderbolt types carried out surprise attacks in the Bodoe area on two of our convoys, one northbound and the other southbound, as well as on ships in Bodoe harbor. At 1645 Admiral, North Norwegian Coast reported an air formation in AF 6429 on course south.

At 1300 a Ju 88 sighted in AF 2671 17 warships, including a carrier, on course 90 degrees. This report did not reach the naval operations office until a second plane had landed, as the shadowing plane did not return and the radio message sent was only picked up at sea.

Consequently the first reports as to the extent and the nature of the operation were at first only transmitted through Air Force stations. Naval Staff was also unable to gain a clear picture of events from individual radio messages intercepted from escort vessels regarding air attacks and hits on ships in the convoy which messages came in late in the morning, quite apart from the fact that the above mentioned reports were not submitted until the afternoon, entailing a regrettable delay.

Own Situation:

The enemy raid, which was apparently carried out by strong British and American fleet units and which came as a complete surprise owing to absence of our own reconnaissance, has caused us appreciable losses. Altogether 6 steamers totaling approximately 22,300 GRT were lost and 4 further steamers totaling 18,000 GRT more or less badly damaged. The latter include the tanker SCHLESWIG (10,762 GRT) with a cargo of fuel oil and the troop transport SKRAMSTAD (4,300 GRT) with several hundred troops aboard. Difficult communications hampered exact determination of the losses sustained, which are now known to be as follows:

The Norwegian steamer TOPEKA (4,991 GRT) burned out; 6 of the ship's anti-aircraft crew dead, 4 seriously wounded.

The Norwegian steamer VAGAN (687 GRT) sank following a bomb hit.

Naval landing craft MFP "231" was beached after a bomb hit forward; 2 of her crew were wounded.

The tanker SCHLESWIG (10,762 GRT) received 3 bomb hits. The vessel is out of control and has anchored.

The steamer KERKPLEIN: 2 bomb hits, steering out of order,

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stern on fire; 13 dead and 17 seriously wounded. The steamer was towed to Bodoe roads.

The steamer La Plata (8,056 GRT) was beached after a bomb hit.

The troop transport SKRAMSTAD (4,300 GRT) was hit by a bomb; probably cannot be kept afloat. About 40 men seriously wounded.

The steamer IBIS (1,367 GRT) sustained slight damage from machine-gunfire.

The steamer MALAGA (2,711 GRT) sustained minor damage from an unexploded bomb.

During the attack on Bodoe harbor and roads the steamer RABAT (2,719 GRT) sank following a bomb hit. The steamer KAGUIR (1,536 GRT) was beached in the inner harbor following a bomb hit.

Only 2 of the attacking planes were shot down, according to reports received so far.

Two U. S. Pilots were taken prisoner.

Our own countermeasures: At 1940 Admiral, North Norwegian Coast ordered coast alarm third degree and at 1139 second degree.

From 1045 - 1119 Air Commander, Lofoten sent out two Ju 88's and one He 115 on reconnaissance for the assumed carrier.

Admiral, Northern Waters has ordered the Task Force to maintain three hours' readiness from 1900. For 5 Oct. one submarine is disposed in AF 3730 and two submarines in AF 3750.

Admiral, Northern Waters reported at 1942 that the enemy's final plans could not be recognized and that further air attacks were to be expected. At 1900 Group/North Fleet gave its views on the situation as follows: The carrier sent out against our shipping, which was escorted by forces presumably superior to our Task Force, will turn away again after the attack. An air formation in AF 6429 is combing the coast for further convoys. Reappearance on 5th Oct. is unlikely. Group North/Fleet is obviously correct in its opinion that the enemy has no aims other than air attack on our own shipping. The 5th Air Force plans further reconnaissance at dawn on 5 Oct.

Naval Staff is of opinion that following our operation on Spitsbergen some kind of enemy activity in Northern Waters was to be expected.

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Our convoy traffic has become obvious target of attack since the cessation of Swedish transit traffic. By its operation "Zitronella" (attack on British base at Spitsbergen, Tr. N) the Task Force has drawn great attention to itself. This enemy operation, as well as the midget submarine attack in Alta must, therefore, be regarded as the beginning of systematic provocation of our heavy vessels, aiming at elimination of our battleships in order to obviate the undesirable tying down of heavy enemy vessels in favor of concentration against the Japanese Fleet.

Further, it is reported:

At 0507 submarine chaser "1214" sank, probably through striking a mine, in the outlet of the Bussesund while escorting a westbound convoy.

Fifteen ships were escorted north and 24 south.

In connection with the proposal of Group North/Fleet (see War Diar 30 Sept) to assign additional armed fishing vessels to Naval Command, Norway in order to strengthen defense in Alta Fjord, Operations Division decides as follows:

"1. Out of the first 300 armed fishing vessels, 66 were assigned to Naval Command, Norway (more than to any other theater of war). Naval Command, Norway will also in future receive preference in assignments.

2. If armed fishing vessels are considered suitable for strengthening defense of the Alta Fjord anchorages, Naval Command, Norway must provide some for this purpose from its own numbers."

With regard to the plan to transfer the HUASCARAN to Alta for repairs to TIRPITZ, Commander, Submarines, Norway requests that he and Commanding Admiral, Submarines be consulted in this matter and points out that this repair ship is indispensable for submarine repairs at Trondheim and Bergen. For copy of report see teletype 1435.

The following details are reported regarding the successes of submarine Group "Wilking" in the North Siberian area from 30 Sept. to 2 Oct. against a southwest convoy.

Submarine U "601" sank 1 steamer (5,100 GRT), U "703" 1 steamer (4,200 GRT), U "960" 2 steamers (8,900 GRT) and 1 escort vessel. An ice-breaker and 2 escort vessels have escaped.

U "387" and U "255" have put out from Narvik into the operational areas off the Lofoten Islands (AF 3750 and AF 3730).

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Weather ship KOBURG has reported that staying in her present position for the winter is considered possible. Group North/Fleet reports in this connection that rapid deterioration in ice conditions renders release of the ship by icebreakers impossible and that there is no possibility of seaplanes or land based planes making a landing, according to air reconnaissance. Ice conditions also prevent the use of submarines. It is therefore intended to leave the ship in the ice and to have the transmission of weather reports commence from the end of October, since the enemy Air Force will no longer be able to reach the ship owing to darkness. As soon as the days begin to lengthen the weather reports by radio will be discontinued and the ship's crew will be fetched later on. Naval Staff agrees with this solution.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

At 0150 a large fire was observed on Seiskar and at 1045 dense smoke.

2. Own Situation:

Nothing to report from the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic.

Convoy and transport operations in the Baltic Sea were carried out as planned and without incident.

Two boats of the 3rd Patrol Boat Flotilla are in position in the Irben Strait for relay escort. Heavy gun carriers are still under way.

Battery "Prinz Heinrich" shelled the Sudomech Dockyard from 0930 - 0955 and Kanoerski Dockyard and Petropalovsk from 1028 - 1200. Hits causing heavy fires were observed. Counter-fire was feeble and targets were heavily smoke screened.

The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping does not regard the air patrol off the Baltic coast provided by the Air Force as sufficient and has requested Commander in Chief, Air Force to transfer two fighter flights to Libau. The Commissioner requests Naval Staff to investigate whether, and to what extent, escort forces can be used to protect shipping in this area, and, further, to see to it that vessels on the run to the Baltic States are equipped with anti aircraft guns as quickly as possible.

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Operations Division replies as follows:

"Escorts for merchant shipping in the northern part of the Baltic for defense against air attack cannot be provided at present owing to shortage of suitable naval vessels. Moreover, such escort operations, which would also have to extend to the Aeland Sea area considering the present air situation, would necessarily involve considerable delays for shipping. Local anti-aircraft relay escorts are, however, already provided. A basic order for equipment with anti-aircraft guns of all merchantmen passing north of the line Memel - southern point of Oeland has already been issued and will be carried out according to the arms available.

The Air Force has promised fighter defense at local points of concentration, as far as forces are available."

V. Submarine Warfare

I. Enemy Situation:

The following is an extract from brief Report No. 18/43 of Naval Intelligence Division.

According to an official statement in Washington, three German submarines were sunk and a fourth damaged recently in the Atlantic by a Grumman-Avenger bomber which took off from an escort aircraft carrier. Sixty-five survivors were picked up by a destroyer.

Chief, Anti-Submarine Division on the Staff of the U. S. Fleet Admiral stated on 28 Sept. that more than 4,000 Allied vessels had been convoyed across the Atlantic from May to the end of August this year, without a single ship having been lost by submarine attack.

Naval Intelligence Division remarks in this connection:

According to data available, the figure mentioned of over 4,000 ships convoyed across the Atlantic without loss from May to the end of August may be correct.

Naval Intelligence Division, Enemy Situation Branch estimates trans-atlantic traffic as follows:

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| | | |
|--------|-------|-------------|
| May | about | 1,200 ships |
| June | " | 1,190 ships |
| July | " | 1,082 ships |
| August | " | 1,107 ships |
| Total | about | 4,579 ships |

Chief, Anti-Submarine Division on the Staff of the U. S. Fleet Admiral also announced the formation of the 10th Fleet, incorporating all naval vessels for operations against Axis submarines.

Further statements regarding anti-submarine measures of the U. S. Navy deal with new types of escort vessels, destroyer construction and improvements in location gear.

2. Own Situation:

Reports of two submarines of Group "Rossbach" show that the expected convoy evidently passed our patrol line on 3 Oct. at 2100. At this time destroyers, apparently of the remote escort, were sighted and from dawn on 4 Oct. enemy planes also.

Unfortunately the sighting of these destroyers was not reported promptly enough for an order to be given to pursue and search. The operation was therefore unsuccessful, although radio intelligence provided some data.

Submarine Division in this connection points out the difficulties of intercepting the enemy without air reconnaissance and complete radio intelligence. Reconnaissance reports from planes, for which the operational area was within range from Norway, could have influenced the present operation decidedly.

Group "Rossbach" will proceed from 5 Oct. at 0800 on course 195 degrees in order to intercept an eastbound convoy in AK 80 and AK 90 on 7 Oct. Data on this is, however, based solely on an estimate of convoy schedules. U "455" reported by short signal from the supply rendezvous as attack by carrier borne planes necessitating transfer to BD 81.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force reports 25 planes out on operation

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over England and 13 over Biscay area. One Liberator was shot down.

In the morning the enemy raided Frankfurt on Main with 300 Fortresses in six waves. On the run-in a heavy escort of fighters accompanied them as far as Holland and met them again on the return flight. Our fighters numbering 302, went up in defense. For flight of a further formation of about 100 Liberators into the Heligoland Bight see "Situation North Sea". Altogether 18 enemy planes were shot down.

During the night of 4 Oct. Frankfurt on Main was again heavily raided by about 400 bombers, of which 10 were shot down by our fighters. For particulars of the appreciable damage caused in the Frankfurt area see "Daily Situation".

Further attacks were carried out during the night on Mannheim, Ludwigshafen and Worms, also causing serious damage to industrial installations.

In Belgium and France airfields were attacked by smaller formations. Fifteen planes were on a minelaying operation over the mouth of the Gironde.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Formations of the 3rd Air Force carried out reconnaissance flights as far as the Western Mediterranean. At 1800 a large convoy of 80 vessels was detected off Cape Tenes and this is to be attacked by 80 bombers on 5 Oct.

Air Force Command, Southeast had 21 Ju 88's and 36 Stukas out on operation against Leros with good results.

The enemy attacked the station and town of Bolzano with 44 Fortresses and the station and town of Pisa with 28 Fortresses. Here two of our ammunition trains were destroyed and a goods train damaged.

In an enemy air attack on the airfields of Athens - Tatoi and Argos altogether 16 of our planes were destroyed on the field. Over the Aegean nine reconnaissance planes were detected during the day and eight during the night.

3. Eastern Front:

Nothing special is reported from the Army front. The 5th Air Force reports 17 planes on reconnaissance flights. For details of evaluations see "Situation Norway, Northern Waters".

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VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

Two transports, carrying troops which had apparently had been relieved, 12 freighters, 2 destroyers and 2 gunboats left Gibraltar; 6 freighters and 2 corvettes put out direct from the Mediterranean into the Atlantic. The cruiser UGANDA, 15 freighters and 4 corvettes arrived at Gibraltar from the Mediterranean. At 1400 the VALIANT, 3 ILLUSTRIOUS class, 15 destroyers, 2 transports, 30 freighters, 13 tankers etc. were lying in port.

The large convoy which put into the Mediterranean on 2 Oct. was detected on 3 Oct. at 1830 north of Alboran consisting of 69 ships and on 4 Oct. at 0845 north of Oran consisting of 40 ships and 8 escort vessels..

Our air reconnaissance also sighted: at 0824 1 transport on course west 60 miles north of Trapani; at 1930 3 small warships 30 miles southeast of Cagliari; at 2140 6 merchantmen south of Punta Stilo on course northeast.

PT boats and landing boats were sighted off Olbia for the first time. Continuous freight traffic was observed off the beachhead at Termoli

No evaluations of air reconnaissance have been received from the eastern Mediterranean.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Our PT boat operation during the night of 3 Oct. led to an unsuccessful attack on a convoy escorted by destroyers 70 miles north northeast of Palermo.

PT boats S "30" and S "33" were placed at the disposal of Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic by German Naval Command, Italy. The minelayer POMMERN left Toulon at 2000 on a new minelaying operation off the west coast of Italy.

It is probable that the enemy submarine attacked southeast of Rapallo was destroyed.

Chief, Supply and Transport, Leghorn reported at 0704 that the withdrawal from Corsica was carried out according to plans.

The Fuehrer has addressed the following message to Commanding General, Armed Forces, South with copy to Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff and High Command Navy, Naval Staff:

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"The withdrawal of troops, including their heavy arms and equipment, from Sardinia and Corsica to the mainland was an exceptional feat. It was hardly to be hoped that this evacuation from one island to the other and thence by sea to the mainland would be completed so successfully.

The German forces, pushing through the treacherous Badoglio troops, shelled from the sea and attacked from the air by by strong enemy formations, made their way to Bastia, recaptured it and there held out against the attack of regular de Gaulle troops until evacuation to the mainland was completed in spite of numerous enemy submarines.

I express my fullest appreciation to the Commander on Corsica, General Von Senger und Etterlin, to the troops under his command as well as to the Naval and Air Force escort and transport units and to their Commanders."

Commanding General, Armed Forces, South advises Naval Staff for information of his request to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff for allocation of two further 21 cm. guns for defense of the Piombino Strait (See teletype 1925).

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

The steamers BOCCACCIA and LEOPARDI and the tanker JOHN KNUDSEN arrived at Cattaro from Trieste on 3 Oct.

Naval Shore Commander reports that the coastal battery at Cattaro is, as an emergency measure, manned by Army troops.

Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic reports plans to send 1,500 coastal gunners during the night of 4 Oct. aboard five steamers to Dubrovnik and Durazzo and requests air escort and reconnaissance from Air Commander, Dalmatia since naval escort cannot be provided.

Army Group F advises in this connection that air escort can only be provided from Korcula southward.

It is of importance for Adriatic shipping to note that on 1700 an enemy submarine was sighted for the first time again; she was on course 60 degrees, 40 miles north-northeast of Ancona. Radiogram 1835 on this was transmitted from the submarine base at Pola to Commander Submarines, Italy and German Naval Command, Italy.

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In accordance with instructions from Operations Division dated 29 Sept. (see War Diary 2 Oct.) regarding mine defense of the Adriatic Group South reports that, in its view a barrage off Ancona is impracticable because data on navigation is lacking; it also reports plans to effect transfers for mine defense of the east coast of the Adriatic, beginning from Valona to the north, i.e. Valona, Durazzo, Drin Gulf.

This report by Group South obviously crossed with the last instructions from Operations Division of 7 Oct. (see War Diary 2 Oct.) regarding a barrage in a line from Gargano to Korcula. A reply to this enquiry is, therefore, to be awaited.

b. Aegean Sea:

Enemy air attacks in the Candia area on the evening of 3 Oct. and during that night caused only slight damage. For particulars of the attacks on the airfields of Tatoi and Argos see "Aerial Warfare".

The operation on Kos proceeded according to plan against slight enemy resistance. On the evening of 3 Oct. our forces were outside the city of Kos and the island airfields from which no enemy planes came out on operation. Operations from Cyprus and North Africa were ineffectual, whereas our Air Force in considerable strength very effectively covered the advance of our troops. On 3 Oct. at 1400 1 cruiser and 2 destroyers were reported approaching northwest of Cyprus. Twelve Ju 88's were sent out against this unit. Other planes carried out fighter escort of our escort of our convoys, reconnaissance, air-sea rescue operations and dropping of a paratroop company. On 4 Oct. at 0700 the Commander of the landing troops reported that the airfield and harbor were in our hands and that 800 men, including 200 British, had been taken prisoner.

A brief report by Commander, 21st Submarine Chaser Flotilla (Lt. Cdr. Brand) had been received on the part played by Naval Forces in this operation. For copy see teletype 1725.

According to this report, several landing groups were assembled in the Naxos area on 2 Oct. On 3 Oct. between 0400 and 0430 the first wave was landed by surprise at three points of the island of Kos with naval landing craft. Two landings were made on the south coast by 0700. These were attacked by enemy planes, of which two were shot down. The four steamers of the northern group were unloaded to some extent under mortar fire and shelling. This group also was attacked by planes, of which three were shot down. The

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passage of the small vessels and naval landing craft was also subjected to continuous mortar fire and, at times, to shelling. Our losses were insignificant. Unloading was assisted by two armed fishing vessels, several motor boats and cutters. Four submarine chasers and two unloaded steamers received orders to depart at 1500. This convoy was shelled while passing the island of Calino. On receipt of the report that enemy naval forces had been sighted northwest of Cyprus, which by dead reckoning could reach the western point of Kos at 2100, Commander, 21st Submarine Chaser Flotilla decided to discontinue operations immediately and to start back in several groups, avoiding direct courses and leaving behind the last four naval landing craft which were still loaded. All vessels participating have meanwhile reached harbor. The steamer CITTA DI SAVONA and submarine chaser "2102" were bombed and machine-gunned by seven low-flying enemy planes; only minor casualties were caused and one enemy plane was shot down.

The prudent decisions taken by Commander, 21st Submarine Chaser Flotilla fully met the situation and were instrumental in reducing to the minimum the danger to our vessels from enemy naval forces, which was considerable when the situation as a whole is taken into account.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance three destroyers were lying in Tuapse.

Own Situation:

Nothing is reported from the patrol lines during the night of 3 Oct. The naval landing craft on the north coast of the Taman Peninsula were repeatedly attacked by enemy planes during the day; two planes were shot down. Naval landing craft F "125", while returning from the inner part of Taman Bay, struck a mine at 0555 seven miles east-southeast of Kerch and was later shelled from the coast. The boat received three direct hits. Five men including the Commander of the group are missing.

Feodosiya was attacked 17 times during the night of 3 Oct. and again four times during the day. One lighter and one tug were damaged. The anti-aircraft defense of Feodosiya has been strengthened by two heavy batteries and one light battery.

Barrage "X" was laid in the Strait of Kerch as planned.

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Three boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla served as escorts for convoys from Feodosiya to Sevastopol during the night of 4 Oct.

In carrying out evacuation of the Gotenkopf bridgehead the following were transferred from 28 Sept. to 3 Oct. inclusive:

21,314 tons of war supplies
45,620 men
1,857 wounded
5,287 motor vehicles
6,003 horse-drawn vehicles
4,092 guns
23 tanks
15,845 horses and
800 civilians

of which 16,824 tons of war supplies
1,923 men
812 wounded
89 motor vehicles and
11 guns

fell to the share of the Navy.

VIII. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

Items of Political Importance

The United States have appointed a new Ambassador for Moscow. At the same time the new Russian Ambassador in Washington has presented his credentials. These facts are worthwhile mentioning since a certain political significance had withdrawn from previous conditions.

Moscow has now definitely been fixed as the location for the Allied Foreign Ministers' Conference. The forthcoming Conference will be the most critical diplomatic undertaking of the war, according to a statement by Hoare Belisha. Only if it leads to a closer relationship between the Three Big Powers can speedy victory and a world order ensuring lasting peace be hoped for.

Admiral Cunningham has been appointed successor to the First Sea Lord, Dudley Pound, who is retiring for reasons of health.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval StaffI. Army Situation:

No large scale actions took place on the eastern front.

According to a new directive from the Fuehrer on future operations in Italy, Commanding General, Armed Forces, South is to continue delaying defense only as far as the line Gaeta-Ortona. This line is to be held and two divisions from northern Italy brought up for this purpose. If the enemy does not press on more strongly to the north but plans to invade the Balkans from southern Italy, Commanding General, Armed Forces, South is to work out plans for an attack on Apulia.

Elba is to be kept occupied by one fortress regiment. The duties of Army Group B are: to pacify its territory and suppress the uprising in Slovenia and Istria with strong forces; to protect rear communications and the coastal flank of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, concentrating on the Ligurian Sea; to organize defense in northern Italy; to build up a defense position on the Apennines and the adjoining coasts, concentrating on the Ligurian coast. Since major enemy operations against the coastal sectors of Army Group B are not expected within the near future, coastal defenses should be reduced, with concentration on the most important sectors and ports, in favor of operations by strong forces in Istria and Slovenia.

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II. Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy reported to Chief, Naval Staff on 4 Oct. that the transfer from Corsica to the mainland of all German troops, including vehicles and most important supplies, have been completed and added in his report that this was achieved thanks to the untiring effort and devotion of all naval offices and units concerned. Chief, Naval Staff replied as follows:

"The task of withdrawing German troops from Sardinia and Corsica has been carried out remarkably well and I commend German Naval Command, Italy and all naval units and offices concerned."

III. Chief, Operations Division reports on the inefficiency in transmitting reports during the air attack on our convoy traffic in Norway on 4 Oct. Naval Staff should in any event have received a report from Naval Command, Norway at latest during the morning. Chief, Naval Staff orders that the following personal teletype be dispatched to Naval Command, Norway with copy to Group North Fleet: "The successful air attack by British and American carrier borne planes on our convoy traffic in skerries off Bodø on the morning of 4 Oct. was not reported to Naval Staff by Naval Command, Norway until the evening. I must insist that Naval Staff be advised at all times without delay of all special events".

IV. Chief, Naval Ordnance Division reports on the meeting on 4 Oct. with Chief, Armed Forces High Command.

Within the armament organization of the Ministry of Armament and Ammunition all interests of the Armed Forces are taken care of in Office "Kehrl". Armed Forces High Command will be represented by a General in this Office. No extension of this representation to branches of the Armed Forces is intended. As regards the right to seize Armed Forces reserve stocks, Chief, Armed Forces High Command will in specific cases consult branches of the Armed Forces. The final decision, however, will rest solely with Armed Forces High Command.

V. Chief, Operations Division reports that transports of prisoners of war through the Dardanelles are at present out of question and that the Foreign Office is of the same opinion.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

VI. The Fuehrer's directive regarding future operations in Italy outlines the Navy's tasks as follows:

"The Navy will assist the Army in every way possible, especially in: coastal defense against enemy landings at the

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rear of our front; maintenance of coastal traffic, which may be of vital importance in case the enemy succeeds in effectively disrupting railroad traffic along the east and west coasts of Italy; offensive naval operations against enemy shipping." The main task of the Air Force will still be attacks on enemy shipping; in addition, support of the Army and defense for large-scale troop movements and vital lines of communication.

German Naval Command, Italy and Group South, for information, have been sent an extract of the above by Operations Division, For teletype 1/Skl I op 3001/43 Gkdos. Chefs. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

VII. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff states:

It is necessary to adjust our plans to the fact that, in spite of all previous assurances, the raw materials required for the 1943 Fleet Construction Program will in fact not be available. Naval Staff must point out that the 1943 Program already represents minimum requirements so that any cuts will unquestionably mean that tasks of naval warfare can no longer be fulfilled. There are now already gaps caused by mountain losses and increasing damage through natural wear and tear, which can hardly be filled even if the 1943 Program is carried out in full. Moreover, the Program is drawn up, as regards the various types of vessels, on the basis that one type is absolutely dependent on the other. This means that, if cuts should actually become unavoidable, these can only be made in the entire Program according to the various according to the various types required and not solely in this or that category. In any case, operational considerations only, and not practical wishes for reasons of construction, may be the basis for effecting cuts. In view of recent experiences, a curtailment of the definite minesweepers and motor minesweeper Construction Program will certainly not be justified. Events have already proved that the 1943 Program also is very moderate and represents a minimum which was perhaps adjusted all too much to meet emergency conditions and leaves no margin for cuts. Investigations should be made as to whether the Italian dockyards really did not give us raw materials which render a certain alleviation of the raw material situation possible.

Chief, Naval Staff agrees and points out that, if necessary, a reduction in submarine construction in favor of minesweepers and motor minesweepers might have to be accepted.

Special Items

I. The transfer of Naval Shore Command, North Adriatic to Group South, as approved by Commander in Chief, Navy on 1 Oct. was ordered by Quartermaster Division, Organization And Mobilization Branch as follows:

1. Effective immediately Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic will be under Admiral, Adriatic. The boundary between Admiral, Adriatic and German Naval Command, Italy will be the Isonzo River. Further details will be worked out between Admiral, Adriatic and German Naval Command, Italy.

2. The Dockyard Control Staff of German Naval Command, Italy will provide Working Group "Trieste" as long as control of dockyards from the Italian area is necessary. Ensure cooperation with Admiral, Adriatic and Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic.

3. Cooperation between Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic and local operational headquarters of Army Group B regarding Fuehrer Directive No. 40.

4. If alteration of the boundary between Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic and Naval Shore Commander, Dalmatia is intended, submit proposal.

II. Operations Division has settled the request of Group South for allocation of forces in the Adriatic area (see War Diary 3 Oct.) as follows:

A. Since Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic is now under Admiral, Adriatic, Naval Staff plans the following distribution of forces in the Adriatic:

German Naval Command, Italy (Naval Shore Commander, West Adriatic will receive: 10 Siebel ferries, one third of the naval landing craft becoming available in the Adriatic up to a maximum of 10, as well as the necessary Harbor Defense Flotillas.

Group South will receive all other warships and auxiliary warships of every description, naval landing craft and Siebel ferries becoming available in the Adriatic.

B. The following remarks are made on the particular requests submitted by Group South:

1 and 2 are acknowledged.

3. Anti-aircraft defense rests with the Air Force.
4. Submarines will not be assigned. Operations by submarines also midget submarines, in the Adriatic will be ordered when the occasion arises.
5. Will be decided on separately.
6. Request is acknowledged in principle and will be complied with as far as possible (with the exception of a midget submarine flotilla, see under 4.).

The composition of naval forces of Admiral, Adriatic will probably differ substantially from that requested by Group South. Naval Artillery lighters will not be available at present for the Adriatic. Instructions with regard to organization of naval forces in the Adriatic will be issued separately.

7. All forces becoming available in the Adriatic will be assigned to Group South. It is left to the discretion of Group South to transfer part of these forces to the Aegean Sea, according to the situation.

III. Naval Intelligence Division issued Enemy Situation report No. 19.43 on 2 Oct. For copy as per 1/Skl 27972/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, File "Enemy Situation Reports of Naval Intelligence Division".

With reference to the general situation this report states:

"Inadequate air reconnaissance in the Mediterranean makes an insight into the present disposition of enemy landing craft and merchant shipping difficult. It is assumed that approximately 30% of special landing craft available and approximately 20% of merchant shipping in the Mediterranean is still engaged in traffic between North Africa/Sicily and the Italian operational areas.

It is expected that the focal point of future operations in the Central Mediterranean outside the Italian mainland will be the east Adriatic area (Albania/Dalmatia), while in the Eastern Mediterranean a further operation against the Aegean islands is likely."

With regard to enemy merchant tonnage, Naval Staff has reached the following conclusion:

"The total tonnage of vessels over 1,000 GRT each available to the enemy at the beginning of October 1943 is estimated to be approximately 35,000,000 G.R.T. without taking the lately acquired Italian tonnage into account.

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The surplus in new constructions reached a maximum level of approximately 1,000,000 GRT during the month of September.

Freighters which can be used for supplying home countries and troops overseas, for operational purposes and other tasks must be estimated as exceeding 20,000,000 GRT.

At present a rise in enemy tankers is to be expected, since in the USA alone approximately 20 tankers are to be commissioned every month. The tanker construction program of the United States may be connected with enemy operational considerations.

It is intended to build 200 tankers during 1943 in the United States, while for 1944 only 89 tankers are planned. This leads to the assumption that the tanker fleet available is considered sufficient as from 1944 for the demands to be made on it.

Accurate figures of serviceable Italian merchant shipping which fell into enemy's hands cannot yet be ascertained. About 500,000 GRT of Italian and former French merchant shipping are in enemy territory; a substantial part, however, may have been sunk or damaged.

In addition there are approximately 100,000 GRT of Italian merchant shipping at present in Spanish ports."

Situation 5 Oct.

I. War in Foreign Waters

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Twenty-seven planes were detected on operation over the Bay of Biscay. One British vessel was located at 1538 in BE 5350 and one around midnight on 5 Oct. in BE 6220.

An Intelligence report states that there is a marked decline in the assembly of invasion troops for northern France in England.

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and traffic restrictions as well as closed areas have been abolished. Shipping concentrations in southern ports no longer indicate an imminent operation against northern France. Troop movements from these ports during September were destined solely for the Mediterranean and India. For particulars see teletype 1830.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ELM/J mine was swept by a plane off St. Jean de Luz.

Three submarines were escorted out of Brest and La Pallice. The FLIEDER (Japanese submarine, Tr. N.) left Brest at 1600. The FALKE and torpedo boat T "14" anchored in Royan roads on the evening of 4 Oct. T "23" and T "27" left St. Malo for Brest at 1845.

With reference to the inquiry by the 3rd Air Force as to the use of BV 222's in the Atlantic, Naval Staff is of the following opinion:

"In order to augment reconnaissance, it seems advisable to leave the BV 222's there even after allocation of JU 290's.

The view that the BV 222 is inadequately armed has up to now not been borne out by any air combat. It is not considered important to retain the BV 138's in the Atlantic area.

Since, at the order of Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, the further production of large flying boats has been discontinued, a maximum of seven flying boats only be reckoned with, of which never more than three to four boats can be in operation simultaneously. Expansion of the ground organization at Biscarosse need, therefore, provide only three to four berths with provisional camouflage, of which two are already completed according to information available."

Naval Staff, therefore, requests Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff to keep the operational BV 222's still in use, even after introduction of the 5th long-range Reconnaissance Group.

Channel Coast:

Five ELM/J mines were swept northnorthwest of Dunkirk. The convoy of the NORDVAARD put in to Cherbourg at 0330 and at 2000 continued its passage to Le Havre; however, on account of ships located and presumed to be in a lurking position, it was first instructed to proceed close to shore and, later, to turn back to Cherbourg.

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Torpedo boats T "23" and T "27" left St. Malo for Brest at 1845.

The first batch of 1,000 surface mines (types OMA I, II and IV) developed in accordance with the earlier request of Group West has been delivered to this Group in exchange for the remaining UMA/K mines. Instructions have been given to make a study, in close cooperation with the Minelaying Experimental Command and by participating in the trials being conducted in the Channel, of the efficiency of the OMA mines and to try out the first OMA/I mines delivered in operation. The extent of further production of OMA I, II and IV mines will depend on the practical results.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters:

1. North Sea:

Nothing to report.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Twenty-one planes were detected on operation over the North Sea. Single reconnaissance flights were observed in the Petsamo - Vardoe - Alta areas. On 4 Oct. five planes were reported south of Stadtlandet and one plane each off Ytteroe and Bergen.

Our air reconnaissance sighted at 0945 in AE 9630 1 aircraft carrier, 1 battleship, 2 cruisers and 4 destroyers on course 200 degrees and at 0925 in AF 7410 1 aircraft carrier, 1 cruiser and 5 destroyers on course 140 degrees. Admiral, Northern Waters and Group North/Fleet assume that the warship unit detected on 4 Oct consisting of 17 ships is on return passage in two groups.

Own Situation:

In view of the enemy situation the three hours' readiness of the Task Force is canceled. The submarines will be withdrawn to West Fjord. Skjomen Fjord remains the submarine base for the present. Admiral, Northern Waters expects a repetition of similar surprise attacks at any time until the days become very short, since there is no reconnaissance of coastal waters. He considers that submarine bases and vessels carrying supplies, ore and men on leave are still in danger considering the small number of our escort forces and inadequate anti-aircraft defense. Eight steamers damaged and one naval landing craft sunk justify a further request for permanent transfer.

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of fighter planes to the northern area, where they are just as badly needed as in southern Norway (See teletype 1524).

Naval Command, Norway reports casualties sustained yesterday evening as follows:

200 believed to be dead and 15 seriously wounded on the troop transport SKRAMSTAD, which had 834 soldiers aboard. On the steamer KERKPLEIN, which had 1,551 prisoners on board, 14 are reported dead, 9 missing and 29 seriously wounded. For further particulars see teletype 1320.

From investigation of the salvaged British midget submarine the Task Force deduces that these submarines avoid any known nets and also anti-submarine bottom nets, so that our net defense is still of utmost importance. (See teletype 0940).

In the area of Naval Command, Norway 11 ships were escorted north and 28 south. In the Arctic coast area 9 ships were held up owing to shortage of escorts.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

In Kronstadt Bay there was heavy gunfire from the Oranienbaum pocket on our positions from 1000. At 0200 about 25 Russians landed near Strelna Mole and west thereof; they blew up two Army assault boats and fired on a pillbox. As soon as our Army defense went into action they withdrew to Leningrad Mole, leaving a rubber dinghy behind.

In the afternoon the presumed positions of Army Battery 688 and Army Coastal Battery 509 were bombed without result by two enemy planes after Army Battery 688 had shelled Lavansaari. There was only minor air activity over Tyters. Minelaying is suspected in the Irben Strait.

2. Own Situation:

Four ground mines were swept in the Baltic Sea entrances and one off Gdynia. The Danish steamer HANNE struck a mine and was damaged near Drogden lighthouse. Convoy and transport operations in the whole Baltic Sea area were carried out according to plan.

Operations Division points out to Naval Command, Baltic, as regards control of merchant shipping, that some ships come from the North Sea and, from Hiltenua, pass through into the northern part of the Baltic Sea without calling at an intermediate port. It is therefore the distribution of military instructions. This should rather be done direct by Naval Command, Baltic in order to avoid misunderstandings.

Special Items

Naval Command, Baltic submitted on 29 Sept. plans for Naval Warfare and coastal defense in the Gulf of Finland and Eastern part of the Baltic Sea during the coming year after commencement of Operation "Blau" (withdrawal to "East Wall" position).

Naval Command, Baltic specifies the Navy's tasks in this operation as follows:

- "a. To continue blockade of the Russian Fleet in the Gulf of Finland so as to exclude a threat to the Baltic Sea. This is to be done in spite of the deterioration in our positions in the Gulf of Finland and the activity to be expected from the Russian Fleet.
- b. To protect the coasts of the Gulf of Finland and of the Baltic States in such a way that a threat to the left wing of the eastern front from the sea is impossible.
- c. To ensure sea communications from the Baltic States to Germany and vice versa, as well as to and from Finland, in spite of increased threat."

Commanding Admiral, Naval Command, Baltic is of the opinion that this can be done if a certain concentration - in men and material - is effected and if the Navy is given adequate support by the Air Force. The requirements set forth in the following plans have been weighed up in view of the threat to the Baltic Sea and also have in mind retaining Finland's faith and trust in our strength and thus keeping her still as our Ally.

The plans provide for:

1. Strengthening of the "Nashorn" barrages.
2. A new defended barrage system to be known as "Krebs"

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for the defense of Tallinn and Helsinki and for control of the sea area between "Seeigel" and "Nashorn" barrages.

3. Coastal defense barrages and flanking barrages and expansion of "Seeigel" barrages.

For defense by naval forces, Naval Command, Baltic is of opinion that the Dutch gunboats, artillery motor minesweepers and coastal minelayers would be suitable as torpedo carriers. In view of the requirements of other theaters of war certain requests are not being made at present.

A total of 16,400 mines and 13,000 anti sweeping devices will be required.

The 1st Motor Minesweeper Flotilla, the 24th Landing Flotilla, the 31st Minesweeper Flotilla and at least two minelayers will be required to carry mines. It is considered necessary to assign twelve further armed fishing vessels to the 31st Minesweeper Flotilla for anti-submarine patrol.

Two additional minesweeper flotillas would have to be assigned to Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic for defense of the routes in the eastern part of the Baltic Sea which are outside the area of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic. Furthermore, as a precaution, a request is made for two submarine chaser flotillas for the Baltic Sea area. The old vessels of the Coastal Defense Flotilla, Baltic States would have to be replaced by armed fishing vessels.

The tasks of coastal defense will be:

- a. defense of the Estonian coast so as to prevent landings aimed at occupation of the oil shale area;
- b. on connection with this, patrol of the defensive barrages laid for the same purpose;
- c. defense of the "Nashorn" and "Krebs" barrages.

The disposition of batteries has been planned in accordance with these tasks. In addition it is intended to expand the radar network. Preparations for withdrawal of batteries from the Leningrad sector are being made at the instigation of the 18th Army Command. The batteries concerned are: Battery "Prinz Heinrich"; two 13 cm and two 10.5 cm batteries; Battery "Bluecher" and one 8.8 cm anti-aircraft battery.

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Preparations are being made for demolition of the ports of Peipia and Rutschi. The defense of Tyters is being Strengthened. With regard to minelaying operations, Operations Division issued the following order to Naval Command, Baltic on 2 Oct.

1. "Nashorn":

- a. The proposed reinforcement is approved in principle. Economical use of mines will, however, suffice since only a slight deterioration is to be assumed in deep barrages lying outside the enemy's sphere of minesweeping activities.
- b. The use of EMF mines is advisable on account of their all-round effect against submerged submarines. UMA mines should also be provided in deep rows.

2. "Krebs":

- a. This barrage system is only to be provided in case Tyters and/or Hogland are evacuated, so that "Seeigel" position cannot be held.
- b. The barrage should (according to the "Juminda" system) be laid over as wide an area as possible and lie shallow (against surface faces only). An average distance between mines of 15-20 m. is sufficient. The number of anti sweeping devices (average distance apart 5 m.) applied for is far too large, since these are less effective against narrow shipping targets than against minesweeping gear of 100 150 m. cutting width and frequently remain effective still for the next minesweeping run.
- c. Report whether sufficient Finnish mines are available for the barrage section north of Kalbada.
- d. The shallow mines of the old Juminda barrage have, after three winters, certainly been rendered ineffective by ice, but the deep mines are probably still effective. They would, however, become useless if a searching sweep of the whole area were carried out. It therefore appears possible to lay mines next spring by motor minesweepers and naval landing craft, without a previous searching sweep by minelayers with advance motor minesweeper gear.

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3. "Seeigel":

- a. Attempts are to be made to retain and reingorce the northern part of this barrage system up to Neugrund and to extend it from Neugrund in approximately a southerly direction as far as the coast.
 - b. Here too the mines should be laid over as wide an area as possible and lie shallow. The average distance apart of mines in the new sector should be about 15 meters.
 - c. Plans to extend this barrage in the direction of Hungerburg are inadvisable. This extension could not be defended, since it would be within range of Russian batteries assumed to be on Kurgala Peninsula.
 - d. If it is impossible to hold the islands, extensive minelaying should only be carried out in the area between the islands and in the eastern part of Narva Bay; for this purpose extension of "Krebs".
4. Make preparations for coastal defense barrages, if necessary also system "Krebs", as alarm barrages, in accordance with developments in the situation.
5. If operation "Blau" does not arise, repeat in general the minelaying operations carried out this spring.

6. Mines:

Present stocks and probably supplies permit allocation of at most 50% of the numbers requested; EMF and UMA mines will also have to be used.

7. Mine carriers:

At least two minelayers as well as motor minesweepers, naval landing craft and coastal minelayers in the numbers available this year can be relied on.

8. In view of the above points, revise plans and submit again in compliance with the necessary material restrictions."

Further plans as regards coastal batteries will be drawn up by Quartermaster Division and when completed will be decided on finally by Naval Staff.

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Naval Ordnance Division, Underwater Obstacles Branch
received the following order on 5 Oct.:

"In order to create mine reserves for the large numbers needed in spring 1944 in the Gulf of Finland, from November on the following numbers monthly are to be set aside, with designation "Otto 29":

400 EMC
400 UMB
200 EMF and
200 UMA

Lengths of mooring rope 100 m.

Irrespective of this provision, the special production program of the Minister of Armament and Ammunition should be speeded up in every way possible and current Production brought to its highest level. The total requirements applied for by Naval Command, Baltic for the Gulf of Finland next spring are 16,400 mines and 13,000 anti-sweeping devices. It is therefore imperative to increase monthly output of anti-sweeping devices to at least 500 in spite of ample supplies.

V. Submarine Warfare

Four submarines of Group "Rossbach" are returning owing to damage and casualties. A supply group of four submarines was attacked by several enemy carrier-borne planes on 4 Oct. in BD 9750. One submarine was damaged and also had to start on return passage.

No successes have been reported from the Atlantic or the Indian Ocean.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

During the day minor enemy forces attacked traffic installations and planes on the ground in Belgium and France. Three planes are reported shot down and two crashed. No enemy planes flew in during the night of 5 Oct. During the night of 4 Oct. 16 planes were shot down and on 5 Oct. 18 were definitely shot down and 15 probably shot down.

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2. Mediterranean Theater:

The 3rd Air Force sent out 57 planes against a convoy off Cape Tenes. Of these, 46 reached the target and sank or damaged 15 ships totaling 150,000 GRT. Four of our planes were lost through strong fighter escort and very severe light anti-aircraft gunfire.

The 2nd Air Force sank two landing boats and damaged a third one during an attack by 24 fighter-bombers on the port of Termoli. Air Force Command, Southeast had 67 planes out on operation against Leros, concentrating their attack on Porto Lago, and reports accurate hits on land and on small vessels.

3. Eastern Front:

The 5th Air Force reports 23 planes out on reconnaissance.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

Three U. S. tankers, 1 U. S. Coastguard cruiser and two U. S. gunboats left Gibraltar in the afternoon for the Atlantic and 13 auxiliary minesweepers left for the Mediterranean. The VALIANT, FORMIDABLE, INDOMITABLE and one ILLUSTRIOUS class left port in the evening, probably westbound.

A damaged Norwegian tanker sank during an attempt to tow her into port.

At 1800 on 4 Oct. the large eastbound convoy was detected again 20 miles west of Tenes, consisting of 80 ships and 7 escort vessels; on 5 Oct. it was successfully attacked by forces of the 3rd Air Force.

At 0350 there were 5 ships on northerly course 55 miles south of Salerno, at 1355 7 ships on southwesterly course 12 miles south of Salerno, at 0335 5 ships on northerly course east-northeast of Crotona and at 0650 4 ships on northeasterly course 15 miles east-northeast of Punta Stilo. There were no ships in Termoli harbor. The coast 13 miles northwest of Termoli was subjected to heavy gunfire, probably from destroyers.

No reconnaissance reports have been received from the eastern Mediterranean.

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The Naval Attache in Madrid transmits a report from the Italian Embassy, according to which Italian warships and merchantmen will leave the Balearic Islands, presumably for the British area (Gibraltar). (See teletype 1750).

According to a later report, the Spanish Foreign Minister assured the German Ambassador today that Italian warships in the Balearic Islands are definitely interned. For details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

At 0845 the minelayer POMMERN sank, presumably as a result of striking a mine, 1½ miles south of San Remo while on her way to a new minelaying operation. Naval landing craft rescued the Commander and 189 of the crew. These survivors are to man the minelayer AGNI and a mine ferry.

A naval landing craft was sent out on a minelaying operation in the Nettunia area.

Submarine U "380" probably sank a tanker of 8,000 GRT 60 miles south of Salerno, U "593" after return from the operational area in Salerno Bay reported:

"No location from the air, no night activity, strong naval patrol. Heavy traffic on courses north and south over CJ 6797 and 6798. Good result with "Aphrodite" (submarine decoy, Tr.N)."

Commanding General, Armed Forces, South reports on the completion of the withdrawal from Corsica as follows:

"It was possible to conclude withdrawal of troops, all assault guns and special motor vehicles to the mainland as planned, in spite of a marked increase in the enemy's pressure during the last stages of withdrawal from the island.

During embarkation of the last bridgehead garrison in Bastia the new harbor was continuously under heavy gunfire from 1715 until nightfall, so that some of the vessels had to be loaded under considerable difficulties outside the harbor on the open coast. Embarkation of the troops was completed towards 2300. Demolition companies destroyed the harbor and sank the steamer SASSARI as a block ship. Only after the last rear guards and demolition parties had embarked did the Commander of the German Armed Forces on Corsica, General Von Senger und Etterlin, leave the island with his staff. Two

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motor minesweepers stood by off Bastia until around 0300 to pick up any stragglers. There was no enemy interference on the return passage and all the vessels taking part have put in."

German Naval Command, Italy reports that 2,282 men, 222 prisoners, 328 motor vehicles, 51 guns and 77 tons of material were transferred on 3 Oct. the last day.

Transports and escort units will at once be transferred to coastal traffic, especially for intensified evacuation of return cargo from the front-line area on west and east coasts. From the Gaeta - Ostia area alone 25,000 tons are to be transported.

The interruption of traffic across the Brenner by enemy air attacks proves the vulnerability of land traffic routes and the importance of coastal traffic from southern France to the west coast of Italy.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic reports plans to send the 623rd Naval Artillery Battalion aboard the steamers ARGENTINA and ITALIA from Trieste outside the islands to Durazzo on the evening of 5 Oct. and to send two detachments of the 612th Naval Artillery Battalion aboard the steamer FISSER from Pola to Zata and from there aboard the steamer CAGLIARI to Durazzo on the morning of 6 Oct. Air escort especially of the ARGENTINA and ITALIA, is necessary. (See teletype 1758).

Group South, as instructed, commented on 4 Oct. on the suggestion of German Naval Command, Italy with regard to a barrage defense of the entrance to the Adriatic Sea in a line Lagosta - Pelagosa - Tremiti and urged that enemy-occupied ports on the east coast of Italy be mined by planes.

Operations Division then issued the following instructions to Group South, with copy to German Naval Command, Italy:

1. a. Mine barrages for defense of the entrance to the Adriatic Sea in a line Lagosta - Pelagosa - Tremiti are too late. Since enemy forces have already been established in Termoli and withdrawal of our land front as far as Ortona has been ordered, the laying of mines in the western part, as planned, is questionable; barrages in the eastern part only would be a half measure, especially as enemy supplies will stay close to the Italian coast occupied by him.

b. It is left to your discretion to lay mines west of Pelagosa and in our coastal waters between Lagosta and Lissa merely in order to harass enemy thrusts to the north; due regard must, however, be given to passage facilities for the submarines of Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean.

2. Offensive operations against enemy supplies off the ports on the east coast of Italy are desirable. Close contact should be maintained with Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean owing to operations by our submarines in this area (submarine mining operation off Brindisi).

3. The suggestion made regarding mining of enemy-occupied ports by planes will be passed on to Air Force Operations Staff.

4. On the Adriatic coast the mine defense of Cattaro appears to be urgent.

5. The following mines will be allocated under designation "Ad 2":

- a. for minelaying as per 1 b:
300 EMF's and 200 m. mooring rope,
100 EMR's and 200 m. mooring rope.
- b. for offensive operations as per 2:
36 EMF's and 200 m. mooring rope,
144 EMF's and 100 m. mooring rope,
100 LMB's.

In addition, 100 UMB's and 150 m. mooring rope, since the laying of EMF mines by PT boats is dependent on calm weather.

Details and place of delivery are to be arranged direct with the Mining and Barrage Inspectorate.

Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean has been advised at the same time as follows:

Group South has received instructions, when laying mines in the Adriatic

- a. between Lagosta and Lissa
- b. between Pelagosa and Tremiti
- c. off enemy-occupied ports on the east coast of Italy,

to take into consideration passage and operational facilities for our submarines and, therefore, to keep in close touch with Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean.

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b. Aegean Sea:

On 4 Oct. at 0805 our air reconnaissance sighted a surfaced enemy submarine on southeasterly course 24 miles east of Naxos.

All naval forces and steamers which participated in the operation against Kos, except for two naval landing craft, have returned to Piraeus. Our losses amount to 15 dead and 70 wounded. The number of prisoners taken on Kos has increased to 600 British and 2,500 Italians. Among other things 1 ferry barge, 1 fishing smack, 1 luxury yacht and 11 planes, as well as 40 guns, are also reported to have been captured.

The operation to disarm Naxos, Paros and Antiperos by Army groups, which are to be transported from Syra on boats of Coast Patrol Flotilla "Attica" and one naval landing craft, was scheduled for 5 Oct. No reports have yet been received.

According to radio intelligence, enemy air activity over the Aegean was less than usual on 5 Oct.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

During the evening two submarine locations were reported southwest and northwest of Sevastopol. The destroyers reported in Tuapse have apparently put out. Our air reconnaissance sighted shortly after midnight on 5 Oct. two destroyers proceeding at high speed on westerly course 58 miles southeast of Feodosiya. One destroyer shelled Yalta without particular effect. Coastal batteries returned fire without the result being observed.

Own Situation:

Naval artillery lighters and naval landing craft had an encounter from 0200 to 0230 at the northern outlet of the Strait of Kerch with several enemy gunboats which were proceeding towards the Taman coast. The enemy attack was repulsed. There were no casualties or damage. During the day the patrol line off the north Taman coast was bombed and machine-gunned by 50 enemy planes without substantial damage. No enemy planes were brought down. On 4 Oct. three enemy planes were shot down at this point, and not too as previously reported.

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During the enemy air attack on Genichesk on 3 Oct. a tank containing 13 cbm. of gasoline was destroyed. The battery position on Biryushi partly collapsed. Enemy planes attacked Feodosiya three times during the day of 5 Oct. Two lighters were damaged.

Crimean convoys were carried out according to plan.

Three boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla, as expected, sighted an enemy destroyer while escorting the Kerch-Feodosiya convoy during the night of 5 Oct. The destroyer, however, outmaneuvered attack.

Two Italian midget submarines are proceeding from Sevastopol to Constanta via Odessa for repairs. PT boats S "51" and "52" left Constanta for Ivanbaba and S "49" left Ivanbaba for Constanta.

VIII. Situation East Asia:

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance

According to "DNE" the U. S. press reports, in view of Franco's latest speech, that Spain has changed her foreign policy from a non-belligerent status to one of watchful neutrality.

According to Reuter, disappointment is becoming increasingly evident in Moscow over the failure to open a second front, now, during the height of the Russian offensive, since progress is necessarily becoming slower. The Allied advance in Italy is regarded by Russia as too slow and unimportant. Very little is expected of the Balkan operation. It is held that the Balkan problem would be automatically solved by a German defeat on the western front.

Finland's attitude seems to have become more settled lately. The new Parliamentary elections for summer 1944 and this year's municipal elections have wisely been postponed. A capitulation is unanimously rejected.

The "Daily Mail" writes as follows in connection with the appointment of Cunningham:

"Now that the Atlantic is under British control and the Mediterranean as good as cleared, the Pacific looms on the horizon. In the days to come the biggest naval war in world history will be fought in the East. Preparation for this war will be Cunningham's task".

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff

I. Army Situation:

On 5 Oct. no major operations took place on the eastern front. The enemy's anticipated large-scale offensive in the Melitopol - Zaporozhe area has not yet commenced. Minor penetrations into the "East Wall" position prove the weakness of this line, where our own divisions, most of them exhausted, have to defend sectors of 20 - 25 km. each.

Fighting in the Leningrad area shows an increase.

Our forces were sent in against the enemy landing near Termoli behind our Italian front but they were not able to break through.

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II. The departure of the three aircraft carriers from the Mediterranean may indicate that no operation against the Balkans in the near future is contemplated. Aircraft carriers are no longer needed in the Italian area since the occupation of the Tyrrhenian islands.

Chief, Naval Staff expresses his great appreciation of the able command of naval forces during the operation on Kos by Commander, 21st Submarine Chaser Flotilla.

No other special conferences or decisions.

Commander in Chief, Navy attended the Gauleiter Convention at Posen, in the course of which he spoke on questions of naval warfare. The Fuehrer also attended this Convention.

Special Items

I. On 6 and 7 Oct. there will be discussions at Naval Staff headquarters between the Chiefs of Staff of the Groups, Naval Commands and the other high Command headquarters.

For itinerary and list of reports and conferences as per l Skl I op 29415/43 geh. see War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

This meeting has been called with the intention of acquainting all those concerned, in personal discussions, with the general situation and requirements in the various theaters of war.

Chief of Staff, Naval Staff will take the opportunity to impress on all the Chiefs of Staff the necessity of quicker and more effective advice to Naval Staff regarding special events.

II. The Shipbuilding Commission has requested Naval Staff to decide as to whether a number, which is lower by at least 50%, of large mine-exploding vessels (3,000 tons, 14-16 knots) should be constructed or whether the number, as provided in the 1943 Construction Program, should be constructed of wartime mine-exploding vessels of the present type.

Operations Division gives the following views on this to Quartermaster Division:

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If it is possible to build the wartime mine-exploding vessel with the additional fittings and reinforcements, without thereby lowering the speed to less than 12 knots, Operations Division agrees to construction of the wartime mine-exploding vessel of the present design and abandonment for the time being of the 3,000 ton type. It is, however, requested that the plan of the latter type nevertheless be taken in hand and completed, so that construction can be started without delay if the situation should demand it.

Situation 6 Oct.

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

The naval Attache in Tokyo reports that the OSORNO has orders to leave Jokjokarta on 26 Oct. In his report he also gives details as regards route, equipment and intended camouflage.

According to a further report of the Naval Attache, the Japanese Navy will probably agree to the request to hand over all three AQUILA submarines.

All vessels in foreign waters were advised of the enemy situation; see Radiogram 1651.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Only five planes were detected on operation over the Biscay area. One British vessel was located in BF 1810 at 2013 Channel: Up to 0245 enemy targets, probably larger than PT boats, were located in Seine Bay, also at 0143 9 miles west of Boulogne and 0242 North of Point D'Ailly.

2. Own Situation

Atlantic Coast:

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One ELM/J mine was swept on 4 Oct. off St. Jean de Luz and one on 5 Oct. off Lorient and La Pallice.

Three submarines were escorted out of the submarine bases and one was escorted in.

Destroyer Z "37" was transferred in the morning from Bordeaux and the KONDOR in the evening from La Pallice to Royan Roads.

Torpedo boat T "27" ran on to the net barrage while entering Brest, but sustained no damage.

Tactical exercises in the Bay of Biscay by the 8th Destroyer Flotilla and the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla are planned for 7 and 8 Oct.

Channel Coast:

A ground mine was swept north of Gravelines on 3 Oct.

Patrol positions in the Channel were not taken up on account of weather conditions.

The convoy of the NORDVAARD put in to Le Havre again at 0600.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters

1. North Sea:

Patrol positions were not taken up and minesweeping operations had to be canceled owing to weather conditions.

The Hook - Elbe and FUESILIER convoys were postponed for 24 hours.

Patrol duty in the inner part of the Heligoland Bight was carried out according to plan.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Twenty-one planes were detected on operation over the North Sea, A reconnaissance plane was reported in the Alta area.

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Own Situation:

At 0400 the steamer ANTJE FRITZEN was damaged at the waterline by an adhesive (sabotage) mine in Aelesund harbor, but remained afloat.

Seventeen ships were escorted north and 17 south.

In the Arctic coast area 13 ships were delayed owing to lack of escorts.

Naval Command, Norway reports that it, as well as Admiral, North Norwegian Coast, and the Naval Shore Commanders were quite inadequately informed on events regarding the convoys and the actual situation during the enemy air attack in the Bodoe area, owing to inefficiency in the transmission of messages by our escorts - the cause of which has not yet been ascertained. It took some time to obtain accurate information on the situation. The message of 1300 reporting the sighting of the enemy carrier unit was not received by the 5th Air Force until 1739. Messages received up to then by the 5th Air Force were such that even its Commanding General was not sure until 1730 that the planes concerned were carrier-borne. (See teletype 1930.)

Naval Command, Norway further submits a survey dated 4 Oct. of casualties and damage so far ascertained. (For copy see teletype 2315.)

Submarine U "733" will relieve U "277" off Ice Fjord. U "36" will take up position AB 3568.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Gunfire in Kronstadt Bay was very lively. In our lines 450 impacts were counted, including 85 heavy ones near Battery "Prinz Heinrich", but no damage caused. Battery "Prinz Heinrich" shelled the large floating dock and Kanonerski Dockyard from 100 to 1200. One hit was observed in the dock and three in the dockyard area, causing a fire.

The enemy planes which dropped numerous bombs were reported in the coastal area. At 1105 there were 26 motor minesweepers northeast of Labansaari on westerly course. This unit put in to Lavansaari at 1315.

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A submarine was located between the net barrage and the line Hogland-Tyters.

The Finns have captured a Russian with radio set and provisions, who had been landed on Hamen-Holmarne from a submarine. On the southern part of Hogland a radio set and a store of provisions were found. A further search has so far been fruitless.

2. Own Situation:

Two ELM/J mines were swept east of Halsbarre.

Mine exploding vessel "18" is transferring from Gdynia to Copenhagen for operations in the Danish area.

Convoy and transport traffic in the entire Baltic Sea area was carried out according to plan and without incident.

No other reports of special note have been received from the areas of Commander, Minesweeper, Baltic and Admiral, Baltic States.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

U "539" shot down one enemy plane on 4 Oct. in AD 8190 (south of Newfoundland) and warded off a further one. The submarine sustained minor damage.

Group "Rossbach", consisting of 16 submarines, is to be in reconnaissance patrol line from AK 3970 to AK 9290 at midnight on 7 Oct. and will proceed at 5 knots on course 220 degrees.

On 8 Oct. an eastbound HX-convoy is expected. There is, however, no information on its position.

Four submarines are proceeding to BD 37 for refuelling.

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VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force reports 44 planes out on operation over England, 16 over the Atlantic and 3 over the Mediterranean.

Nine planes carried out nuisance raids on London, dropping 14.2 tons of high explosives.

Five FW 200's have been sent out on armed reconnaissance west of Portugal.

During the day and the night enemy air activity over the west area and Germany was only slight.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Planes of the 2nd Air Force were on reconnaissance operations over the Italian area.

Air Force Command, Southeast reports that 20 Ju 88's, 4 He 111's and 25 Stukas carried out operations against land targets on Leros with good effect.

All available planes of Air Force Command, Southeast were sent out against the enemy force of two cruisers and two destroyers which attacked our convoy west of Leros.

3. Eastern Front:

The 4th Air Force had 67 Stukas out on operations against three destroyers south of Yalta. For particulars of this successful operation see "Black Sea". Reconnaissance of Poti was also carried out.

On 5 Oct. 49 enemy planes were shot down over the Army front. Our losses amounted to two planes.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

Four freighters and 2 destroyers put in to Gibraltar

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from the Atlantic and 2 battleships of the KING GEORGE V class with 5 destroyers and 1 cruiser of the CARDIFF class put in from the Mediterranean.

Tres Forcas reported at 0830 13 escort vessels on course east, presumably the auxiliary minesweepers which left Gibraltar on the evening of 5 Oct.

Two floating docks in tow and 4 escort vessels proceeding towards the Mediterranean were also reported.

The large eastbound convoy, which was off Cape Tenes on 4 Oct., was not detected again owing to lack of reconnaissance.

German Naval Command, Italy is of opinion that the convoy probably entered Algiers or Bone. Photographic reconnaissance of Bizerta and Bone was broken off owing to unfavorable weather.

The number of ships in Sardinian and Corsican ports was found to be unchanged. In the Salerno-Sicilian area single ships were sighted.

Merchantmen, tankers and landing boats were lying in Naples on the afternoon of 5 Oct. according to photographic reconnaissance.

Considerable shipping movements, consisting of small convoys or single vessels, were observed near Crotone, off Brindisi and Manfredonia by our reconnaissance planes.

No reports have been received from the eastern Mediterranean.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Submarine U "380" fired a T5 torpedo on a destroyer off Salerno Bay without, however, observing the result.

In CO 5721 (60 miles west of Derna) U "596" fired a spread of four torpedoes on four steamers; three hits were heard. The submarine was heavily dept charged and is not returning to Pola.

Minelaying operations during the night of 5 Oct. were carried out by PT boats, minelayer F "8" and one naval landing craft according to plan. Two motor minesweepers searched the area off San Remo without result.

Out PT boats were sent out on operation in the Salerno-Ustica area during the night of 6 Oct.

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The torpedo boat ARTURE was commissioned in Genoa on 5 Oct.

The torpedo boat MISSOURI, manned by an Italian crew, is at present supporting Army operations in the Fiume area.

German Naval Command, Italy reports in teletype 1920 complete figures on ferry operations from Sardinia to Corsica and from Corsica to the mainland. Our vessels lost in these operations were: 1 infantry landing boat, 7 naval landing craft, 2 submarine chasers, 1 tug, 3 Siebel ferries, 1 barge and 3 steamers each of 16,943 G.R.T. In 40 enemy air attacks 15 planes were shot down and in 8 submarine attacks 1 submarine was destroyed. Our total casualties amount to 31 dead and 101 wounded.

Commanding General, Armed Forces, South in his report to Armed Forces High Command, makes mention of the operational achievements of German Naval Command and Chief, Supply and Transport, Italy. He expresses highest praise for the crews of the naval landing craft, Siebel ferries, combined operations boats and the transport planes on their excellent achievement during the last few weeks, their daring having been decisive for the success of the whole operation.

3. Area Naval Group South

a. Adriatic Sea:

It is intended to use the Cruiser CATTARO as a floating anti-aircraft battery for Trieste.

After the occupation of Split by German troops it was found that the mole was only slightly damaged and for the most part can be used, whereas the dockyard and the large dock are out of action. It will be possible to repair the small floating dock. Three ships were sunk in the harbor, but they can be made serviceable again in six to eight weeks.

In the Adriatic the steamer SIBENICO avoided a submarine torpedo on 4 Oct. 38 miles southeast of Pola.

The steamer SIGLIANO reports on the same day a mine detonation ten miles south of Pola. A subsequent report states that the tanker KNUDSEN was damaged by a torpedo or mine hit two miles off Dubrovnik on 29 Sept. She was, however, able to reach Cattaro.

The steamer E. H. FISSER left Trieste for Sibenik on 5 Oct. according to plan.

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In connection with the intended mine offensive and operations by naval forces along the southeast coast of Italy, Group South assumes that Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean will coordinate plans with Group South or keep the Group promptly and continually informed in order to avoid complications.

Group South further proposes that the Naval Liaison Staff, Croatia be put under Admiral, Adriatic, as it is in this area of command and many points for discussion arise in connection with the training of and operations by Croatians. Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch will go into this matter further.

b. Aegean Sea:

At 0050 20 low-flying enemy planes machine-gunned the airfield at Araxos. One plane was destroyed by fire.

Two naval landing craft arrived at Piraeus from Kos with 500 Italian prisoners. The operation against Paros and Antiparos has been postponed since all naval landing craft are reserved for a special operation. Details of this are not yet known to Naval Staff.

The steamer OLYMPOS and six naval landing craft are transferring one battalion from Piraeus to Kos.

c. Black Sea:

During the night of 5 Oct. two enemy destroyers attacked the Crimean coast off Feodosiya-Ivanbaba, while the destroyer CHARKOW with two further destroyers attacked Yalta and Alusta. The destroyer group off Feodosiya was attacked and driven off by the 1st PT boat Flotilla, acting as flank escort for the Kerch-Feodosiya convoy, in cooperation with our night reconnaissance planes. In this way the enemy operation planned against the coast and our convoy was frustrated in cooperation with the Air Force. At 0400 enemy planes attacked Ivanbaba, using numerous flares to illuminate the target for shelling from the sea.

At 0350 the CHARKOW group shelled the roads, harbor and town of Yalta at long range. No military damage is reported. Our coastal battery immediately returned fire.

The enemy withdrew to the east under heavy smoke and shelled Alusta. At 0503 submarine U "9" unsuccessfully attacked the enemy destroyer formations which had joined up at a position about 30 miles southwest.

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Towards 0700 the returning enemy unit was attacked by one of our Stuka formations. One enemy vessel, possibly a minelayer, was sunk and a destroyer was put out of control and had to be taken in tow by the CHARKOW. In a second air attack at 0950 another destroyer received two direct hits. At 1253 the sinking of one, and at 1326 of two destroyers was observed. The remaining 3 destroyers withdrew at high speed.

At 1625 U "9" observed the explosion of a destroyer when closing in for an attack.

The destruction of three destroyers can, therefore, be considered certain.

Four boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla left Ivanbaba at 1800 for a further operation against enemy destroyers and at 1950 had an engagement with three Russian gunboats. In addition to U "9", U "20" also was ordered to operate against enemy naval forces and to bring in prisoners if possible.

During the night of 5 Oct. Naval landing craft in patrol line off the north Taman coast had an engagement with enemy naval forces. Hits on one enemy vessel were observed. During the day the naval landing craft were repeatedly bombed and machine-gunned. One naval landing craft was slightly damaged. Kossa Tussla was occupied by the enemy during the night of 5 Oct.

At 0750 before entering Feodosiya one of our convoys was unsuccessfully attacked by twelve enemy planes which dived on it.

Nothing else to report.

VIII. Situation East Asia

The Naval Attache in Tokyo reports:

1. The Japanese Naval Representative in Batavia, Captain Maeda, was in Tokyo for two weeks, in order to draw attention of headquarters to the inadequate defense of Sumatra and Java. Should the enemy attack Burma, it will, in the opinion of naval offices in the southern area, only be a deceptive operation. The enemy's main thrust must naturally be expected on southern Java or Sumatra, aiming at Palembang and later at Balikpapan. Should these

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oil supply centers be wrested from Japan, her situation would become very serious. The present defense of the islands is far too weak and above all could not withstand any surprise attack from the Indian Ocean, which must soon be expected.

2. Admiral Nomura has, since his return, given more than 30 lectures on Germany, several of them before highest Government and Armed Forces offices. He is said to have expressed himself on Germany in a very definite manner, without glamorizing, and in view of this General Banzai was very soon no longer taken seriously. Admiral Nomura has played an important part in recent Government measures for total mobilization.

Items of Political Importance

Reuter transmits from Washington the report of the Senate's Sub-Committee for Mobilization, according to which the Allies now have sufficient shipping available to carry out a decisive blow against Europe this year. It is planned to transport a U. S. Army of 5 million men overseas, of which 2½ million will be shipped by this Christmas. It was possible to advance the original dates planned by six months as, through the lull in submarine warfare, the increase in tonnage has exceeded its quota by 3 million tons.

The British Home Secretary stated in one of his speeches that Great Britain's objective in this war was the annihilation of Japan just as much as that of Germany.

The military state of emergency in Denmark was canceled on 6 Oct.

According to an intelligence report of 16 Sept. the expected declaration by Salazar and the Portuguese National Assembly has been postponed until completion of large-scale maneuvers now commencing. Portugal is to be declared a non-belligerent with close leanings to Great Britain.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff

I. Army Situation:

No large-scale actions took place on the eastern front. In Italy our attack on Termoli was broken off. The enemy landed new forces and assisted the fighting on land with gunfire from cruisers and destroyers. Strong enemy forces broke through 10 km. southwest of Termoli. Enemy supplies are continuously moving in via Brindisi, Taranto and Termoli. The marked increase in freighters at Salerno indicates preparations for a new landing operation. Enemy advance battalions have reached the Volturno southeast of Capua.

II. Operations Division, Fleet Operations Section submits a report from Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, Naval Liaison that the convoy of the steamer OLYMPOS consisting of six naval landing craft led by submarine chaser "2111" was attacked by an enemy submarine at 0400 and later by surface forces in the Amorgos-Levithe area, while en route from Piraeus to Kos in connection with the operation against Leros. All our vessels, with exception of one naval landing

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craft, were sunk, according to air reconnaissance. Naval Staff merely knows that this convoy was intended for the transfer of one battalion of German troops from Piraeus to Kos. It is to be assumed that the destroyers detected by our air reconnaissance southeast of Rhodes on the afternoon of 6 Oct. carried out this attack. So far Naval Staff has not been advised of any operations planned following that against Kos. It is only known that the operation against Paros and Antiparos was postponed in favor of a special operation and it seems that this was the operation against Leros. Chief of Staff, Group South, who was present at the Chiefs of Staff Conference was questioned, and states that he too was not informed. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff has therefore ordered the following teletype to be sent to Group South:-

"Commander in Chief, Navy and Naval Staff were not advised regarding plans for and commencement of the operation against Leros, otherwise approval to carry it out would not have been given.

After the successful attack on Kos, Naval Staff expected enemy measures to prevent a similar German success against Leros. The Fuehrer has ordered an investigation as to why the Operations Divisions concerned were not advised beforehand of this plan, of the preparations and of the actual commencement of the operation against Leros. Commander in Chief, Navy and Naval Staff have, even up to the time of dispatch of this teletype, only had information from messages transmitted from the Air Force Operations Staff; nothing has so far come in from Group South.

I have to request a brief report by KR (most immediate) teletype without delay, enabling me to inform the Fuehrer at this evening's conference on the situation. A detailed report on the preparations for and course of the operation is subsequently to be submitted to me.

A basic order to this effect is being sent separately to all Groups and Naval Commands."

III. Prompted by the action off Bodoë, Operations Division has written to Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff as follows:

On 4 Oct. 1943 an enemy naval force, which presumably included two aircraft carriers, succeeded in approaching the north coast of Norway unobserved. Carrier-borne planes carried out the surprise and successful attack on our convoy south of Bodoë and on ships in Bodoë harbor on the morning of 4 Oct. The losses sustained are very heavy.

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Naval Staff is of opinion that a repetition of such attacks is certainly to be reckoned with and that our traffic in the Norwegian skerries may be seriously affected by this.

Since, following the notice given to terminate transit of Armed Forces transports through Sweden, supplies by sea for our forces in northern Finland and Norway now assume still greater importance than hitherto, every precaution should be taken to prevent the enemy again achieving such successes in similar attacks to those on 4 Oct.

Naval Staff will do everything possible to increase convoy escort and to reinforce anti-aircraft guns on board and ships being convoyed. These measures alone will, however, not suffice to protect our convoys adequately.

In this respect it is of primary importance to have an adequate air reconnaissance off the entire Norwegian coast, which establishes the approach of enemy aircraft carriers early enough to enable our forces to operate against the enemy unit. In addition, it will be necessary to transfer sufficient fighter planes also to northern Norway so as at least to provide the convoys with fighter cover in case the approach of an aircraft carrier is not prevented.

It is therefore requested that investigation be made as to how the forces necessary to fulfill these duties and the necessary fuel can be allotted to the 5th Air Force.

Quartermaster Division will make further arrangements regarding reinforcement of anti-aircraft guns aboard ships.

Chief, Naval Staff agrees.

For copy of order 1/Skl I op 28009/43 GKdos. see War Diary, Part C. Vol. IIIa.

Special Items

I. Quartermaster Division has issued the following order:

1. In the area of Admiral, Adriatic a new escort flotilla will be formed consisting of the escort vessels GRADO, NAZARIO SAURO and JADDERA at Trieste, the SAN GIORGIO, SALVORE and F "149" at Venice and the torpedo boats MISSOURI at Trieste, AUDACE at Venice and INSIDIOSO at Pola. Crews for the torpedo boats are to be drawn from

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reserves for the CALATAFIMI and from reserves on PT boat depot ships.

2. The following new constructions, which will be completed by the end of 1943, are to be given priority:

At Ansaldo Dockyard:

In Genoa-Sestri:

3 torpedo boats, 1 corvette, 2 vedette boats.

In Geno-Voltri

1 war transport

In Genoa-Sampier d'Arena:

3 naval landing craft.

At Cantieri Baglietto, Varazze:

2 minesweepers, 1 sea-rescue boat and 1 motorboat.

At Cantieri del Tirreno, Riva Trigoso:

10 naval landing craft and 1 war transport.

At Odero Terni Orlando in Muggiano:

3 transport submarines (top priority)
(two of these not until 1944).

At Odero Terni Orlando in Leghorn:

1 destroyer and 2 corvettes.

3. At Cantieri Navale Riuniti del Adriatico in Monfalcone:
2 coastal submarines and 3 transport submarines
(not until 1944).

At San Marco and Rocco (Trieste):

2 corvettes, 1 PT boat (vedette boat),
2 torpedo boats and 5 tugs.

At Cantieri Navale del Quarnaro:

In Fiume:
2 torpedo boats.

In Breda:
1 corvette.

4. A decision as to the new constructions which will be completed in 1944 will be made later.

II. Re: River Mine-exploding Vessels

In view of the favorable experiences of Naval Ordnance

Division, Underwater Obstacles Branch, and owing to the urgent need to supply as many small mine-exploding vessels as possible to the front in the shortest possible time, Operations Division request Quartermaster Division immediately to convert a series of naval landing craft into river mine-exploding vessels or to fit up new naval landing craft for this purpose.

The following are to be provided:

| | | |
|--------------------|-----------|-------------------------------------|
| for the West Area | 6 | river mine-exploding vessels |
| for the Baltic Sea | 6 | " " " |
| for the North Sea | 6 | " " " |
| for the Danube | 3 | " " " |
| as reserve | 3 | " " " |
| | <u>24</u> | <u>river mine-exploding vessels</u> |

This new use of necessity requires the construction of 24 more naval landing craft. The introduction of the river mine-exploding vessel will entail an appreciable relief for the seagoing ones, since it can free them of duties in the shallow coastal areas and river mouths. This will soon enable a general improvement in the present very strained situation as regards these vessels.

III. German Naval Command, Italy proposes the introduction of a special award for crews of small ships, in view of the outstanding achievements by crews of naval landing craft, Siebel ferries, barges, etc.

IV. Personnel requirements, which are becoming more urgent every day in connection with the increase in small naval vessels and escorts, are also being felt in Royal Navy. Naval Intelligence Division reports that the Admiralty is taking measures to appoint officers of the Royal Marines as Commanders of landing craft and to man certain types of boat with Royal Marines exclusively. For details see copy as per 1/Skl 30641/43 geh. in War Diary, Vol "Evaluation of Intelligence on Foreign Navies."

V. For summary of intelligence on the enemy obtained by radio decoding and radio intelligence from 27 Sept. to 3 Oct. see Radio Monitoring Report No. 40/43.

Situation 7 Oct.

I. War In Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attache in Tokyo reports an order for the RIO GRANDE to leave Jekhokarta on 29 Oct., with statements as regards route, equipment, camouflage, etc.

Naval Staff advises the Naval Attache in Tokyo that the FLIEDER left Brest on 5 Oct. at 1600.

II. Situation West Area:1. Enemy Situation:

Forty-five enemy planes were observed on operation over the Bay of Biscay; there was much radio traffic of an urgent nature between them.

One British vessel was located in BE 9890 at 2029 and one in BF 1860 at 2034.

Nine British freighters arrived at Lisbon from the southwest, according to an intelligence report. An escort, consisting of one destroyer and 4 corvettes, is waiting off the Tagus for 8 outgoing steamers.

2. Own Situation:Atlantic Coast:

Three submarines were escorted out and one in. The steamer MUENSTERLAND is being transferred from Royan to Brest. The exercises of the 8th Destroyer Flotilla have been postponed.

Channel Coast:

Patrol positions were not taken up during the day because of stormy weather.

The steamer NORDVAARD moved from Cherbourg to Le Havre during the night of 6 Oct.

The 2nd, 4th, 6th and 8th PT Boat Flotillas were out laying mines on the Harwich - Great Yarmouth convoy route during the night of 7 Oct. Targets located by radar in the Channel, off Boulogne, Dieppe and in the western part of Seine Bay were in no case confirmed by searchlights and star shells.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern WatersNorth Sea:

Three ground mines were swept north of Terschelling. Three PT boats were transferred from Wilhelmshaven to the Hook. Hook - Elbe convoy "1179" started out at 1900; torpedo boat T "19" joined this convoy. It is intended to transfer the steamer FUESILIER from Helder to Ijmuiden during the night of 7 Oct.

Emden was attacked by twelve enemy planes at 2000. No damage is reported from the harbor and dockyards. Towards midnight planes were detected on minelaying operations in the Borkum - Elbe mouth area. In the morning two unescorted Dutch freight barges were sunk by eight Typhoons in the East Scheldt.

In connection with air attack on Emden on 2 Oct., it is now reported that despite good smoke screens and an overcast sky numerous bombs hit the town and its northern suburbs.

Norway, Northern Waters:1. Enemy Situation:

Twenty-seven planes were detected on operation over the North Sea. Minor reconnaissance activity was reported over the Vardoe/Nordkyn area and near Stavanger on 6 Oct. A merchantmen lying at Toross landing pier, at the outlet of Kola Bay, was attacked and damaged by our planes on 6 Oct. The ship has apparently run aground.

2. Own Situation:

Fifteen ships were escorted north and 14 south. Nine ships were left lying in harbor in the Arctic coast area owing to shortage of escorts.

Naval Command, Norway submits a report of Admiral, North Norwegian Coast, from Bodoe stating that exact figures of the casualties sustained on 4 Oct. cannot yet be given, since the local hospitals were temporarily cleared during the full alarm and the seriously wounded were evacuated, some to Germany and some to Fauske.

Group North/Fleet reports that the submarine operation against the radio and signal station and the coal mines at Svea (Spitsbergen) will be canceled because of the slight chances of success and view of the number of submarines and their state of readiness.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea1. Enemy Situation:

Over the mouth of the Luga and Lippovo slight air activity was reported during the day. On 5,6 and 7 Oct. our vessels were unsuccessfully attacked by a torpedo bomber off Duenamuende, off Domesnes, west of Backofen and off Porkalla.

2. Own Situation:

Two mine detonations were reported off the Shulzgrund. In the exercise area of the Torpedo Experimental Station off Gdynia altogether five ground mines were swept.

Three heavy gun carriers on the 24th Landing Flotilla anchored north of Moon on the evening of 6 Oct. because of weather conditions.

The activity of vessels of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic was also hampered very much by weather conditions.

Naval Command, Baltic reports:

- "1. For operation in the Skagerrak, Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic has at his disposal:
The 16th Patrol Boat Flotilla with 6 boats,
The 17th Patrol Boat Flotilla with 9 boats
and 4 detached minesweepers of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North - in all 19 vessels.
2. On continuous operations: for Oslo convoys 8 boats, for convoys to Kristiansand South 2 boats for boiler cleaning and relief purposes 5 boats in all 15 boats.
3. This leaves only 4 boats available for the patrol line Arendal-Hirtshals for interception of blockade runners. As these boats have to relieve each other, the patrol line can only be taken up by 2 or at the most 3 patrol boats.
4. The number of boats in the patrol line is too small and they are too slow. A breakthrough by blockade runners can, therefore not be prevented effectively.
5. It is deemed necessary to allocate to Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic another 6 fast boats from another area, since only then will there be a chance of intercepting

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of intercepting the blockade runners. No such boats can be released from the area of Naval Command, Baltic.

6. From 15 Oct. the 5th Air Force intends to carry out regular evening reconnaissance in the inner part of the Skagerrak and morning reconnaissance in the outer part of the Skagerrak to detect blockade runners. This promise was only given with reservation. Reconnaissance will only be carried out when formations are available and if they are not needed for more urgent operations.
7. Nothing was said about plans to provide bombers and torpedo bombers to operate against the blockade runners".

With regard to the anti-aircraft defense of Peenemuende, Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy reports:

"An assignment of heavy batteries does not promise any appreciable improvement in anti-aircraft defense, since the location of the objective on a peninsula offers few good facilities for emplacements and during day attacks does not permit fire to be opened before bombs are released.

An investigation is requested as to whether High Command, Navy can provide an anti-aircraft cruiser for improvement of defense."

Quartermaster Division will make this investigation.

Naval Command, Baltic informs Naval Staff of instructions to Baltic Sea Offices that the 102nd Bomber Wing cannot provide continuous fighter and convoy escort for merchant shipping and that, therefore, reports of departure, as ordered up to now, are superfluous. The 102nd Bomber Wing is still willing, by means of single planes, occasionally to harass activity by Russian torpedo bombers.

V. Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report, 10 tankers, including 3 of the latest type, left Baltimore on 2 Oct. at 0200. During September 62 freighters carrying war material left Baltimore for Ireland, Gibraltar and Siberian ports. On 29 Sept. a convoy of 11 freighters left Philadelphia, destination unknown.

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2. Own Situation:

From the Gulf of Oman U "188" reports the sinking of a U. S. Steamer type "C 3" (8,000 GRT) in MZ 8916 on 21 Sept. and of the tanker BRITANNIA (9,970 GRT) in MF 2640 on 5 Oct. From MF 8630 to 8860 and subsequently 30 miles away from the 200 m line the submarine observed convoy traffic with light escort on course 35 degrees and 215 degrees; also in the inner part of the Gulf occasional single vessels. During the day planes made straight for the submarine, apparently by location. No night air activity was observed. Probably due to diminished acid content in electric torpedoes, the submarine had 10 misses (end of run detonators) which cannot be accounted for otherwise, and thus lost the chance of any great success.

Investigations are being made as to whether tropical influences on the electric torpedoes could be the cause.

The loss of transport submarine UT "460" and of U "422" is to be assumed. Anti-aircraft submarine U "271" has been sent to BD 30 as defense for UT "488".

In the North Atlantic single submarines in the later afternoon contacted in AK 61 and 62 what was obviously the destroyer escort of an eastbound SC convoy. Group "Rossbach" was sent in. During the night of 6 Oct. altogether 8 submarines reported destroyers, some of which were proceeding in sub-divisions. One destroyer was sunk. Our BV 222's are carrying out reconnaissance of the convoy area.

VI. Aerial Warfare

British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force reports 36 of our planes out on operation against London and 39 against Norwich. Four bombers and two fighters are overdue. Ten JU 88's were on free-lance operations over the Atlantic without success.

The enemy flew reconnaissance with altogether seven planes during the day over Germany and carried out machine-gun attacks in Holland, Belgium and France on railway installations and on airfield, as well as on vessels off the coast. On the east coast of Walcheren the motor ship KAMPERLAND and a fishing smack were sunk.

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During the night of 7 Oct. the Baltic Sea entrances and the Heligoland Bight were mined by strong enemy formations. A large-scale attack was carried out on Stuttgart. Further bombs were dropped on Munich, Boeblingen, Friedrichshafen and Strassburg. Substantial damage was done in Stuttgart. For particulars see "Daily Situation". Our fighter defense in northern Germany, consisting of 56 planes, shot down 4 enemy planes; in southern Germany our fighters could not go up owing to fog.

Mediterranean Theater:

The 2nd Air Force carried out reconnaissance flights.

Strong formations of Air Force Command, Southeast carried out continuous attacks on an enemy warship unit off Scarpanto, which was defended by 18-20 fighters and accurate anti-aircraft fire. Hits were scored on two cruisers.

Our planes rescued 219 of the survivors of the OLYMPOS convoy. Reconnaissance reported at 1550 near Castelli Rosso two destroyers on course 280 degrees. The enemy's air activity over the Italian front was only slight. In the Aegean the airfields of Castelli on Crete and Maritza on Rhodes were attacked. In addition two Ju 88's were damaged during an attack on the airfield of Candia.

Eastern Front:

The 5th Air Force reports 32 planes out on operation without special event.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

Cape Spartel reported at 1000 sighting a convoy of about 43 ships with 6 escort vessels making for the Mediterranean. Seven of these ships put in to Gibraltar in the afternoon. Four destroyers put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean, and the FORMIDABLE, and the INDOMITABLE and 4 destroyers left Gibraltar for the Mediterranean and one CARDIFF class left for the Atlantic.

No reconnaissance reports have been received from the western and eastern Mediterranean.

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At Naples many lighters were observed, so that it can be assumed that the blasting of the berths was effective. Strong enemy fighter defense makes reconnaissance over Naples and Salerno impossible.

According to Italian reports, a British cruiser sank on 9 Sept. as a result of a mine detonation, when entering Taranto. This was probably due to the mines laid by our PT boats and naval landing craft. Off Rapallo one of our motor minesweepers was unsuccessfully attacked by an enemy submarine.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

The PT boat operation during the night of 6 Oct. was discontinued owing to unfavorable weather conditions.

As regards the loss of the POMMERN, it is reported that this minelayer was chased by two submarines into the Bay of San Remo. Whether she was sunk by a submarine or a mine is still being investigated. Our own minesweeping operations off San Remo were hampered by weather conditions.

On 8 Oct. four naval landing craft are to leave Marseilles for Genoa; they will be joined from Toulon by three further naval landing craft.

Submarine U "81" reports from CN 3256 six misses on a freighter of 1,800 GRT; U "380" reports from CJ 6794 a miss with a T 5 torpedo on landing boats and from CJ 9128 a miss by a spread of four torpedoes on two overlapping freighters, firing data being certain. The Commander presumes pistol failures.

Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic reports that dockyards have received orders from the Italian Secretary of the Navy which do not conform with the instructions issued by Naval Staff.

Quartermaster Division has ordered that dockyard interests of the Navy in the north Adriatic area be looked after by the Dockyard Control Staff of German Naval Command, Italy as long as matters relating to dockyards in this area are controlled by Organization Speer from the Italian area. Naval interests at the yards are to be looked after by Working Group Trieste from the Dockyard Control Staff of German Naval Command, Italy, with cooperation between German Naval Command, Italy and Admiral, Adriatic.

Regarding the Army Situation, Commanding General, Armed Forces, South reports regrouping for continuation of the Attack near Termoli; however, he considers it doubtful whether a decisive success can still be gained.

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3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

The steamer ERIDANIA en route from Pola to Fiume was sunk by an enemy submarine at 0740 off Cape Promontore. The steamer SANSEGO en route from Zara to Pola was unsuccessfully attacked by an enemy submarine at 1445 at the same point as the ERIDANIA. The steamer UGLIANO was fired on by enemy submarine between Zara and Pola. She returned the fire and observed several machine-gun hits on the bridge of the submarine.

In the Valona area Italian coastal batteries were taken over, namely six 15 cm guns at Saseno, three 15 cm guns at Cape Linguette, one 15 cm and 7.5 cm battery at Cape Treporti. In Venice PT boats S "30" and S "33" are lying in restricted operational readiness and S "34" and S "61" out of operational readiness.

Report on departure of the steamer ROSSELLI from Durazzo to Patras has not yet been received.

b. Aegean Sea:

Our air reconnaissance sighted: at 1240 on 6 Oct. four miles south of Leros one destroyer or torpedo boat on south-easterly course; at 1500 east of Leros a small naval vessel on easterly course; at 1540, as already reported by the Air Force, six miles south of Castell Rosso 2 destroyers on westerly course. These reports were contained in the morning situation report of Group South, which did not reach Berlin until 1538. At 0400 on 7 Oct. an enemy force of 2 cruisers, and 4 destroyers with a few escort vessels was reported off Leros; this attacked our convoy OLYMPOS. The same force consisting of 2 cruisers, 2 destroyers and 2 corvettes was sighted at 1000 between Rhodes and Scarpanto on southeasterly course and was successfully attacked by our Air Force.

As already reported only one naval landing craft remains out of the convoy of the steamer OLYMPOS. So far 490 men have been rescued in operations started at once by naval and air forces. These operations are continuing.

Naval Staff advises Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters, with copy to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy as follows:

"Submarine chaser "2111", the steamer OLYMPOS and 7 naval landing craft left Piraeus for Kos with one battalion of German troops aboard at 0715 on 6 Oct. At 1150 on 6 Oct. the

convoy was first detected by the enemy Air Force southwest of Kos. At 1640 the convoy was west of Serifos according to plan. At 0400 on 7 Oct. the convoy leader reported sighting a submarine and subsequently sent a distress report on a submarine attack east of Amorgos, to the northwest of Stampalia. At 0426 submarine chaser "2111" reported heavy gunfire from the direction of Levitha and requested Air Force assistance. At 0458 the steamer OLYMPOS and one naval landing craft were lost. At 0515 distress report was sent by torpedo boats. At 0510 our air reconnaissance detected 2 cruisers and 2 destroyers on course 250 degrees immediately south of Levitha. At 0525 our air reconnaissance reported enemy naval forces and submarines attacking our convoy. Our air reconnaissance also sighted at 0550 2 cruisers approaching west of Patmos and at 0605 east of Stampalia 2 destroyers on course east. Between 0500 and 0530 the convoy was scattered by enemy surface forces about halfway between Levitha and Stampalia. At 0624 3 of our motor minesweepers were about 13 miles west of the scene of the engagement; they requested air cover and at 0720 reported having rescued survivors. According to air reconnaissance, the entire convoy was sunk, except for one naval landing craft which proceeded to Stampalia. Other convoys en route to Kos were diverted. Two naval landing craft are on their way to Kos for rescue operations.

An enemy force consisting of 6 vessels which were withdrawing to the southeast was attacked at 1000 by our Air Force between Scarpanto and Rhodes.

Naval Staff was not advised by Group South or Admiral, Aegean either about further operational plans following the operation against Kos or about the departure of the convoys on 6 Oct. Subject to further investigations, Naval Staff is of opinion that convoys should have been recalled following the report of two destroyers on westerly course by our air reconnaissance at 1540 on 6 Oct. 80 miles southeast of Rhodes. Necessary steps for further investigations have been taken."

Group South has replied to the teletype from Chief of Staff, Naval Staff as follows:

"1. Group South assumes that Naval Staff was informed through the Fuehrer directive and the situation reports of the Group regarding the plan to push the British out of Dodecanese, especially as the first part of the operations had already been carried out with the occupation of Kos. The date for the attack on Leros had to be adjusted according to the outcome of the operation against Kos (in view of cooperation of the Air Forces) and according to the enemy situation.

2. Reaction by the British to the operation against Kos was expected by all Commands in the Aegean, namely reinforcement of defense on the islands and prevention of further offensive operations by us. Our limited resources for operations at sea and on land would not have permitted any later operations, since we would not have had sufficient forces after the enemy had strengthened his positions. British intervention at sea could not be expected at any time and for long periods, so that plans for this operation could not be made dependent on a waiting policy. Only the following countermeasures on our part were possible:

- a. immediate continuation of the operation and
- b. very strong cooperation by the Air Force through suitably heavy and extensive reconnaissance and systematic attacks on the enemy.

3. The transfer of one battalion to Kos as relief and as the island garrison, reported in the evening situation report of 6 Oct., meant practically the start of operation "Leros". Group South has, however, not yet received any detailed orders and instructions for this because of delay of the air courier. The causes are under investigation.

4. Advice to Naval Staff about Leros operation was held back until the date and codeword were stated by Army Group E and until receipt of data at least for the naval operation.

5. Sinking of the convoy of the steamer OLYMPOS was reported by Group South in the morning situation report of 7 Oct. and in most immediate teletype 5920 Gkdos, of 7 Oct. No reply to further inquiries of Group South to Admiral, Aegean regarding the operational control of this convoy has been received here yet."

Group South has also submitted the context of the following order issued by Army Group E regarding the occupation of Leros:

"1. In the unanimous opinion of Army Group E, Naval Group South and Air Force Command, Southeast, the immediate occupation of the island of Leros is decisive for maintaining the Aegean stronghold.

2. I therefore order that:

- a. The island of Leros is to be attacked and occupied at latest on 9 Oct., if possible on 8 Oct., by forces under the command of Lt. General Mueller in accordance with basic operational plan discussed and agreed on 5 Oct. It is necessary to act with extreme daring and

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to accept all risk before the British transfer further reinforcements to the island.

- b. It is the task of Admiral, Aegean to carry out the naval part of this operation at once, setting aside all objections and avoiding all runs not essential for the success of the operation. Plans for carrying it out are to be reported to me at once. The date for attack - 9 Oct. - is definite unless developments in the situation make a change necessary, in which case I will personally make the decision.

3. The 10th Air Corps will continue support of the operation with combined forces.

4. Lt. General Mueller has been advised by radiogram accordingly."

Naval Staff then asked Group South and Admiral, Aegean to whom this order of Army Group E was addressed, when it was received by Admiral, Aegean and when by Group South. Information has also been requested as to who gave the order for departure of the convoys on 6 Oct. and when the reconnaissance report of 1540 on 6 Oct. was received by Admiral, Aegean and how this report was evaluated.

Mopping-up operations on Kos are continuing. The number of prisoners taken has increased to 886 British and 3,000 Italians. A reinforced platoon of Assault Division Rhodes landed on Symi, where Italians offered resistance before the town. According to unconfirmed reports, the islands of Calino, Stampalia and Nicaria are occupied by British forces.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence there was a submarine 90 miles south-southwest of Feodosiya, one 35 miles west-northwest of Sevastopol and one 40 miles east of Constanta. A destroyer of the FRUNSE class was seen coming from the south-east at 1145 in the area of the central Caucasian coast. The three destroyers sunk on 6 Oct. were the CHARKOW and the destroyers "D" and "E", according to radio intelligence.

Own Situation:

Three of our boats sustained slight damage in the engagement between the 1st PT Boat Flotilla and several enemy gunboats south of the Strait of Kerch. Definite hits were observed on two enemy boats. Our boats carried on their operation after the enemy had withdrawn

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and nothing was sighted at the point where the destroyer went down except a large oil patch.

The operation was then broken off since the weather deteriorated.

Submarine U "24" unsuccessfully attacked a coastal vessel with two torpedoes 18 miles southeast of Tuapse.

Further continuous air attacks were carried out on naval landing craft in patrol line off the north Taman coast, but no appreciable damage was caused. At 1030 the convoy PRODOMOS en route from Sevastopol to Constanta was unsuccessfully attacked by five enemy planes with three aerial torpedoes and two aerial mines east of Capt St. George. At 0850 four enemy planes attacked Yalta, where a small fire was started aboard the tug BAIKAL.

VIII. Situation East Asia

According to Reuter, a strong U. S. Force bombed and shelled the Japanese garrison on Wake Island on 5 Oct. An aircraft carrier took part in this operation. According to an "Exchange" report from McArthur's Headquarters, the Allies have gained complete control of the Gulf of Huron through capture of Finschhafen. They now surround all Japanese bases still left on the Solomons, New Guinea and New Britain, and are attacking these constantly from the air.

Items of Political Importance

According to Swedish press reports, Hull's trip to Moscow is significant in that he wishes to prevent territorial concessions by Eden which have come to Washington's knowledge. Hull will submit for debate a peace plan consisting of three points. He is also said to have been charged by Roosevelt with making endeavors for a separate peace for Finland. The Anglo-American divergencies are quite obvious in regard to territorial concessions. Whereas it is said to be Churchill's intention to re-establish the Baltic States between Russia and Central Europe, Hull is of opinion that Russia does not need the protection of such buffer states, in other words that her territorial expansion to the west is not necessary. As to the program of the forthcoming conference, every question is put forward which might in any way come into consideration either for the continuation of the war or for the organization of the post war period. To some extent they serve to show the difficulties which lie in the Anglo-American differences of opinion alone.

The success or failure of the conference will undoubtedly have far-reaching effects for Germany. Its failure could entail the most favorable conditions for political measures. Our prospects will be decidedly prejudiced if the three Allies should reach complete unanimity. As there is obviously no possibility for us to hamper the course of the negotiations in any way except by unexpected major strategic successes, for instance in submarine warfare, the course of events must be watched and the outcome awaited.

Discussions with Chief, Naval StaffA. Report of the Shipbuilding Commission on Submarine Construction Matters:

The Main Committee of the Shipbuilding Commission has requested that construction of the two submarines type XVIII at the Germania Dockyard in Kiel be canceled, in order that this dockyard may be commissioned with the construction of types XIV, XX and XXI, without a delay in the date fixed for type XX (transport) submarines. The changes planned could be carried out with a delay of five weeks only, if the two submarines type XVIII were dropped, whereas otherwise a delay of eight months would have to be expected. The Shipbuilding Commission is of opinion that most of the trials planned for the two submarines type XVIII can be carried out by the first submarines of

types XXI or XVII, which will be completed earlier. The question as to whether the two submarines must be regarded as type boats for subsequent series is decisive. As this is unlikely in view of the increased torpedo tube equipment planned for serial boats, the Shipbuilding Commission recommends that the two trial boats be dropped as requested by the Main Committee, on condition that any changes for type XVII arising from research while still under construction be taken into consideration.

Submarine Division is opposed to abandoning type XVIII. In the entirely new field which will be embarked on with the new submarines no stages in development should be omitted. The experiences gained with type XVII are quite inadequate. This type too will certainly only represent an experimental stage and will not lead yet to operational vessels.

Operations Division emphasizes the operational importance of transport submarines. Every effort should be made to speed up their construction. It points out that the delay might be avoided if other ways and means are found regarding the contemplated changes in construction work.

Representatives of the Naval (Ship) Construction Division confirm that the plan of the Main Committee to shift construction will be responsible for delays. The Naval (Ship) Construction Division is at present investigating the whole question of dockyard capacity. Furthermore, it will shortly be able to submit a plan which will allow us to forego construction of type XIV.

Chief, Naval Staff decides that the proposals of the Naval (Ship) Construction Division should be awaited and he intends then to discuss the whole matter with Director Merker personally.

B. Situation:

I. Army Situation:

On the eastern front the enemy has succeeded, apparently without any special reinforcements, in breaking through our lines in the area of Veliki Luki on a broad front and in penetrating beyond Nevel. None of our forces are at present available in this area to prevent further serious consequences, but they will be brought up. This situation is extremely tense, especially in view of the effects of the break-through on the rest of the northern front.

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Heavy fighting is reported from the western sector of the front in Italy. The situation in the area of Termoli is still obscure. Obviously new enemy reinforcements have been landed. Mopping-up operations Isthria are progressing according to plan.

Enemy air attacks are being directed systematically against traffic junctions in northern Italy, so that bringing up of our reinforcements to the south is delayed.

II. Leros Operation:

There is now a clear picture of the operation as such, since meanwhile reports have been received from Group South and Admiral, Aegean.

According to the report of Group South, this Group received on the afternoon of 6 Oct. orders from Army Group E to continue the operations in the Dodecanese. This was the first information regarding operation "Leros". The following targets were given: first, the occupation of Leros and subsequently that of Samos after Nicaria had been eliminated. The assault group of Lt. General Mueller was to carry out these tasks with the cooperation of all available air and naval forces. Lt. General Mueller was to arrange details direct with Admiral, Aegean and the 10th Air Corps. The morning of 9 Oct. was fixed as the latest date for landing on Leros.

The code word for the operation against Leros was "Leopard" and for that against Samos "Poseidon".

Assault Divison "Rhodes" had orders at the same time to clear the islands of Symi and Nisiro of agents and to destroy British radio stations. Before informing Naval Staff, Group South wished to await the operational order of Admiral, Aegean stating the times, which was on its way by air courier and had been reported by telephone. The report on the departure of the OLYMPOS convoy for Kos was not taken as an executive signal since the operational order had not been seen. The operational order of Admiral, Aegean was received by Group South at 2030 on 7 Oct. and gave only operational instructions, without laying down any details as to execution. The following was planned: During 6 Oct.: departure of various groups to Kos according to instructions of the local Naval Commander. For 7 Oct.: occupation of Kalymnos as jumping-off point for landing forces. Landing on Leros at 0130 on 9 Oct. Air escort for naval forces while on passage from Piraeus to Kos. on 7 and 8 Oct. continuous fighter patrol in the operational area.

operational area. In his report to Group South, Admiral, Aegean states that he decided to let the OLYMPOS convoy proceed because of the definite order from Commanding General, Army Group E, which was described as his final concession. This order fixed the night of 8 Oct. as the latest date for carrying out the operation against Leros. Admiral, Aegean had rejected the demand that the operation be carried out during the night of 7 Oct. as impossible. As pointed out with special emphasis by Commanding General, Air Force Command, Southeast, a further delay would have meant our air forces becoming weaker by daily losses suffered through systematic enemy attacks on our airfields.

Definite recall of the convoy would have entailed a delay, with further enemy reinforcement on Leros and weakening of our Air Force. Furthermore, only one small patrol vessel was sighted in the operational area. The two destroyers between Cyprus and Rhodes were only detected once at 1530. There were no enemy locations during the night of 5 Oct., in contrast to the preceding night. Moreover, intervention of enemy naval forces was always to be expected. The arrival of the convoy was decisive for the operational date, as the battalion for the occupation of Kos was carried in this convoy. This battalion was to relieve assault forces for the attack against Leros. Naval Landing craft were provided for the occupation of Kalymnos, which had to be carried out prior to the Leros operation. The fact that convoys could go through despite the enemy's attention having been aroused through the Kos operational is proved by the simultaneous successful transfer to Kos of two naval landing craft, one Italian PT boat, and the 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla. Furthermore, the Air Force had promised to provide strong escort for the convoy from dawn, which promise was kept.

Admiral, Aegean has forwarded direct to Naval Staff the same report as to Group South in reply to the inquiry of 7 Oct. In this connection he reports that the order of the Commanding General, Army Group E, referred to above, was received at 1620 on 7 Oct., and the reconnaissance report on the destroyers near Rhodes at 1815 on 6 Oct. and that the order for departure of the convoys was given by Admiral Aegean on 6 Oct.

Group South does not regard the reasons given by Admiral, Aegean for allowing the convoy to proceed as sound. The group is of opinion that the enemy situation should have been taken into account by spreading out the formation, even if this would have delayed the operation by 24 hours. Furthermore, our incomplete reconnaissance did not justify the conclusion that the destroyers proceeding towards Rhodes would not penetrate into the Aegean. Group South also states that it was not advised until the morning of 7 Oct. about sighting of the destroyers and attacks on the convoy OLYMPOS.

Group South comments on the order of Commanding General, Army Group-E as follows:

- "1. Group South is also of the opinion that the operation, as repeatedly emphasized, should be carried out as soon as possible and with all available resources. The Navy will try to assure this with all available means.
2. However, it must be stated that the responsibility for the operations at sea must rest solely with the Navy, consideration being paid to the assistance to be expected from the Air Force as a compensation for the absolutely inadequate fighting strength of our naval forces."

Chief, Naval Staff, as well as Naval Staff, has now gained the impression that, in view of the clear order issued by General Loehr, Admiral, Aegean cannot be blamed for his decision. The risk was to be approved if the operation was worthwhile.

It is still to be regretted that Naval Staff was not sufficiently informed by Group South about the plans against Leros beforehand. The statement by the Group regarding this is unsatisfactory and does not obviate the objections raised. Chief, Naval Staff, if fully informed, would have been in a position at once to give the Fuehrer his views on this matter.

Commanding Admiral, Group South in a telephone conversation with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff, stated that he could not regard the reproaches made in the teletype on 7 Oct. as entirely justified and objected especially to the right claimed by Naval Staff to intervene in the execution of the operation.

Chief, Naval Staff stated that there could be no doubt on this point.

In order to clear this matter up completely, the following teletype was dispatched to Commanding Admirals, Group North, West, South, Naval Commands, Norway, North, Baltic, and Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy:

"I am forced to draw attention to the basic instructions regarding the system of reports in the Navy. It is essential that Naval Staff be advised in the most direct way possible and kept informed of operational plans, current events, special occurrences, measures carried out and future plans. Only in this way will I be in a position to intervene if necessary and to give Supreme Command the required information. Much more

importance must be attached than hitherto to the immediate transmission of important reports to Naval Staff. Whenever circumstances permit, preliminary reports should be made by telephone. Under no circumstances should it occur that important reports on naval warfare reach Naval Staff first through one of the other services here or via the Fuehrer Headquarters. I request that the attention of subordinate offices be drawn repeatedly and emphatically to observance of the above principles. Everything must be done to see that now at last the system of reports in the Navy takes all requirements into account in accordance with the conditions in the new Volume I.b. of the Manual of Naval Warfare."

Admiral, Aegean meanwhile received on the evening of 7 Oct. a definite order from Army Group E to carry out operation "Leopard" on 9 Oct. Admiral, Aegean is to ensure execution of the naval part of the operation, setting aside all objections and avoiding all runs not essential for the success of the operation. The order states that it is necessary to act with the greatest daring and to accept all risks before the British transfer further reinforcements to the island, Admiral, Aegean has reported that he is now carrying out this order.

Chief, Naval Staff order that the following be reported to the Fuehrer at once, by a telephone message to the Naval Adjutant:

1. Context of the order of Army Group E.
2. On the basis of this order Admiral, Aegean has started the operation despite his objections. A report regarding the expediency of its tactical execution will follow after further investigation.
3. Commander in Chief, Navy reports that owing to the lack of any naval supremacy, safe transfer of troops and material in this area cannot be guaranteed. If the occupation of the island of Leros is regarded as a strategic necessity, the risk involved must be taken. Naval Staff is of opinion that the occupation of the island of Leros is necessary, since it is now certain that Crete and Rhodes are to be held for the time being.
4. The operation started again today. Four convoys put out this morning; the fifth convoy will leave today at noon.

Chief, Naval Staff also orders clear instructions to Group South and

South and Admiral, Aegean by the following teletype:

- "1. Commander in Chief, Navy this morning made a preliminary report to the Fuehrer about the OLYMPOS convoy, as follows:

Owing to the lack of any naval supremacy, safe transfer of troops and material to the Aegean islands cannot be guaranteed. The risk must be accepted if the occupation of Leros and other islands is nevertheless necessary for strategic reasons. Naval Staff is of opinion that occupation of Leros is necessary since it is now certain that the islands in our possession are not to be given up.

2. This report of Commander in Chief, Navy to the Fuehrer is to be regarded as a preliminary assessment of the measures of Admiral, Aegean in the case of the OLYMPOS convoy and as a guide for future plans. A detailed evaluation of the operation is reserved."

A further, full report to the Fuehrer was made by Chief, Naval Staff with teletype 1/Skl Ia 3042/43 Gkdos. Chfs. For copy see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV. After fully describing the previous events this report concludes as follows:

"I am of opinion that the tactical and strategic deliberations of Admiral, Aegean should not be contested in view of the strategic situation and the orders issued by the Commanding General, Armed Forces. I have also, therefore, raised no objections to the start of the operation against Leros on 8 Oct. by departure from Andros, Syros and Piraeus of the troop convoys, if the situation is similar to that on 6 and 7 Oct.

The departure of the OLYMPOS convoy, which was not directly destined for Leros, but was to carry troops to Kos for relief was not reported by Group South to Naval Staff as the start of a new operation. Furthermore, Naval Staff was not sufficiently informed of discussions held with Army Group E on the whole plan. It was therefore impossible to inform Armed Forces High Command, as was our duty. In addition, the distress signal of the convoy leader, which was the only message intercepted before the sinking of our ships, was not acted upon by Admiral, Aegean to my satisfaction. I have taken the necessary steps here."

III. Quartermaster General, Naval Staff:

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All formation for the Mediterranean have now been recalled. Transport of the Naval Artillery Battalion destined for the South Adriatic is delayed by the loss of the steamer as reported on 7 Oct.

- b. Formation of the 11th Coast Patrol Flotilla has been ordered.
- c. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has appointed a Deputy General For Albania. For the Navy the office of the Naval Shore Commander suffices.
- d. All PT boats in the west area have now been equipped with cupolas. Equipment of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla in the Black Sea is in progress.
- e. The Todt Organization has plans for PT boat pens in Feodosiya and Ivanbaba. In view of the situation and the extremely large material requirements, investigations will be made as to whether these are still to be constructed.
- f. The 40.6 cm. Battery "Engeloe" in the West Fjord is reported in provisional readiness.
- g. Reich Minister Speer has asked Commander in Chief, Navy for assistance in the evacuation of captured Italian material. A Naval Liaison Officer has been appointed to Staff Leyers, as requested.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

IV. Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division:

- a. According to a report from Naval Attache in Tokoyo the AQUILA submarines will not be ready to put out from Japan for about another two months.
- b. Transfer of the blockade runners from Japanese ports to the southern area has commenced.
- c. A Japanese construction engineer who has been able to triple the underwater speed of submarines will proceed to Germany aboard the TANNE. As desired, this matter is to be kept strictly secret from the Japanese representatives in Berlin.

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Special Items

I. Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilizations Branch has been informed by Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy that Marshal Graziani will arrive at Fuehrer Headquarters on 9 Oct. The Fuehrer has ordered a survey to be submitted on 8 Oct. showing Italy's armed strength and the requirements of the branches of our Armed Forces in connection with the new Italian Armed Forces to be set up.

The detailed requirements of the Navy have been compiled accordingly by the Organization and Mobilization Branch and after approval by Commander in Chief, Navy forwarded to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy. For order on this as per 1/Skl 28254/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

II. The following general assessment is taken from the enemy situation report of Army General Staff, Foreign Armies West No. 15/43 of 5 Oct.,:

"New developments in the Mediterranean are determined by the following events:

1. The enemy has succeeded in practically eliminating Italy as a power.
2. The first defense zone of Europe has been deeply penetrated.
3. The enemy has gained important jumping-off bases for new operations which endanger practically the entire Mediterranean defense.
4. The elimination of the Italian Battle Fleet releases strong enemy naval forces. Their use in the Pacific and Indian area may cause a decisive change in the ratio of forces there.

As a result of these events the enemy has achieved, apart from wider operational facilities, a considerable gain in self-reliance which may lead to bolder action than up to now. The gain in general prestige and the actual gain as regards Russia appear to be at least of equal importance. The latter is based first of all on the fact that the enemy has achieved his considerable successes with a relatively small loss of forces and has thus reached a more favorable ratio of forces with Russia in view of her

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tremendous war losses. At the same time Russian dependence on material supplies from the British and Americans may have increased.

Moreover, the heavy increase in naval forces for the Pacific lessens the importance of Russia in the Anglo-American battle against Japan. On the whole it can therefore be assumed that the Anglo-American Supreme Command has become much more independent of its Russian ally in reaching decisions than up to now. This fact must have repercussions on the problem of the second front and will presumably make Anglo-American plans with regard to the Balkans more independent of Russian opposition.

The military developments on the eastern front are obviously increasing anxiety in Britain and America about an early decision in Russia's favor. This concern demands the establishment of European barriers against the Russian advance as quickly as possible. In this connection the Balkans primarily will play a part.

This concern and the obviously imminent decision on the whole eastern front were probably the reasons for the decision at Quebec to leave the Anglo-American center of operations still in Europe and to try and prevent the bulk of the Continent from being lost to Russia.

Nevertheless, the present Anglo-American increase in strength in all sectors of the Armed Forces, combined with the release of strong naval forces in the Mediterranean, will permit the Anglo-American Supreme Command to divert considerable forces to the Pacific area and thus to intensify the war against Japan as demanded by the American public.

The above considerations make it evident that the enemy's general aims in Europe will be to force an early decision in 1944, using strong forces on all fronts, thus gaining positions against Russia which are as far east as possible.

Immediate enemy plans will be to create the necessary conditions for this by extension of the operational base in Italy, by establishing a bridgehead in the Balkans and perhaps also in the Atlantic area (Channel Coast, Norway?) and by intensification of aerial warfare against Germany and southeast Europe."

Army General Staff has arrived at the following views regarding the individual theaters of war:

In Norway the establishment of a bridgehead, which is possible with forces available, is regarded as rather unlikely in view of the advanced season and the development in Europe on the whole.

Considering the situation in southern England the Anglo-American readiness for an advance in the Atlantic area is regarded as more progressed. This permits the early start of a large-scale landing at any time. If the situation remains the same, however, only minor operations for the purpose of sabotage, testing German defensive readiness or establishment of local bridgeheads are to be expected at present.

A general change in the situation can, however, make the enemy decide at short notice on a large-scale action. Such a change in the situation might be brought about, for instance, by the withdrawal of Major German forces from the Atlantic front or by the dreaded use in the Channel area of a German secret weapon which proves to be highly effective and impervious to operations by the Air Force. In both cases a large-scale enemy operation is possible either to take advantage of or to clear up the situation on the French and Belgian coasts.

The present main target in the Western Mediterranean is to be seen in the occupation of the Italian mainland as a base for further operations, presumably against the Balkans, and as an air base against southeast Germany and southeast Europe. The individual targets in Italy aimed at by the enemy are not yet obvious; it is considered possible that they lie already in the line Spezia-Rimini. Operations so far indicate that the enemy will aim for his target through the use of frontal pressure and outflanking landings by limited forces. It is, however, emphasized that the lack of German air reconnaissance offers the enemy a chance to assemble large transport and naval forces in the African and Sicilian areas unobserved and to put them into operation by surprise in the Tyrrhenian or Adriatic Seas.

In the Balkan area obvious targets are: our most important raw material sources, elimination of our allies and blocking of Russian advance.

Any operations in the Balkans will undoubtedly meet stiff Russian opposition. It is, however, believed that the Anglo-American supreme Command now feels itself to be strong enough to pass over this. This is indicated by a remark from Churchill at a public meeting that advantage will be taken of the situation in the Balkans. The British influence on the insurgent groups in the Balkans, which is increasing by leaps and bounds, is to be similarly evaluated. It includes the dispatch of numerous officers, including recently a General, and the rapid increase in supplies to the Balkans by sea and air. The fact that Yugoslavian King has gone to Egypt is

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also a proclamation from the King's entourage in which his early return to Yugoslavia together with the Allies, is announced.

The British control of the Serbo - Croat insurgent movement is obviously aimed at occupation of the Adriatic ports and their approaches. It must certainly be assumed that, at the same time, political alliances according to the Italian method are being pursued with our allies in the Balkans.

In short, various signs indicate enemy plans against the Balkans. For strategic reasons the coastal sector Scutari-Split is considered to be particularly endangered. Concentrations of forces and other indications of an imminent Anglo-American operation on a large scale are not yet apparent but it is possible that this is not planned until 1944. Attempts to occupy ports and to establish bridgeheads must, however, always be expected and may start soon.

In the Aegean area the enemy will for the time being presumably try to defend and enlarge his naval and air bases, in order gradually to attain naval supremacy. The quick operations by light forces on the Aegean islands following the Italian betrayal and the strong British reaction to our operation against Kos emphasize the great interest in the Aegean taken by the British High Command. The early appearance of enemy naval and air forces and commandos in order to cut off communication with the mainland from Crete and Rhodes must be expected.

Finally the attitude of Turkey will need increased observation and her gradual falling into line with the British and Americans must be taken into account strategically.

The assessment of the situation by Foreign Armies West corresponds in general with the opinion of Naval Staff. (The last sentence added by Chief of Staff, Naval Staff, Tr. N.)

III. Since 0200 on 8 Oct. Portuguese weather stations have discontinued the transmission of weather reports.

Situation 8 Oct.

I. War in Foreign Waters

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area1. Enemy Situation:

Over the Bay of Biscay 49 planes were detected on operation. One British vessel was located at 1850 in AM 1780 and one shortly after midnight in AL 54 - 55.

Our air reconnaissance sighted at 1413 in BF 1936 (100 miles northwest of Brest) two destroyers on southerly course, presumably in connection with a rescue operation. Air Commander, Atlantic Coast reports further:

At 1339 a BV 222 sighted in AL 4138 (600 miles west-north west of Ireland) a convoy of 26 ships on easterly course, proceeding 7 knots. (For further particulars of this long-range reconnaissance report see Submarine Warfare.)

At 1650 3 FW 200's detected in CF 9211 a northbound convoy of 57 ships with 1 cruiser and 6 escort vessels.

In the Channel a tanker (6,000 GRT) was sighted at 1750 southwest of Plymouth on westerly course.

2. Own Situation:Atlantic Coast:

One ELM/J mine was swept off St. Nazaire on 7 Oct. Three submarines were escorted out. The outer Gironde is temporarily closed owing to suspicion of ground mines. Exercises by the 8th Destroyer Flotilla are planned for 8 and 10 Oct.

Channel Coast:

Minelaying operations were carried out by the 2nd, 4th, 6th and 8th PT Boat Flotillas off the southeast coast as planned during the night of 7 Oct.,: wind was north-northeast 4-5 and seaway 3-4. For brief report see teletype 1825.

From 0252 to 0301 an Army Coastal battery shelled targets located off Pt. d'Ailly with 17 cm. Salvoes.

The harbor defense barrages at Dieppe and Le Havre were damaged by our patrol vessels and have been temporarily taken up. Patrol positions were not taken up because of weather conditons. Escort operations were carried out as planned.

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III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters

North Sea:

North of Terschelling and in the Heligoland Bight altogether 17 ground mines were swept. Hook-Elbe convoy "1179" was carried out as planned and without incident.

At 1415 a strong enemy formation approached in three waves via Holland and the Heligoland Bight for an attack on Bremen from a high altitude. For details see Aerial Warfare.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the North Sea 14 planes were detected on operation. On 7 Oct. minor reconnaissance activity was reported in the area of Petsamo and Vardoe. Between 0145 and 0235 on 8 Oct. the Air Force radar station on Flekkeøy located to the southwest what were apparently various shipping targets.

2. Own Situation:

The 56th Minesweeper Flotilla discovered a mine depot northwest of Froeya. The island of Vaages was occupied. Several Norwegians were arrested. At 1905 on 7 Oct. the troop transport OSTLAND ran aground north of Trondheim and is leaking. All leave personnel were rescued. The destroyer IHN put in to Narvik on 8 Oct. for repairs.

Twenty-six ships were escorted north and 28 south. In all 19 ships were left lying in harbor owing to shortage of escorts.

Group North/Fleet advises Naval Staff of its request to the 5th Air Force to investigate again the question of sea reconnaissance and intensified fighter escort, especially in the Bodoe area, in view of the events of 4 Oct. Such surprise attacks and their grave consequences can only be prevented if air reconnaissance of the sea area Spitsbergen/Iceland/Faroes is carried out daily, if possible in the morning and in the evening, so that the approach of the enemy is detected early and defense measures can be taken in time. As the period of darkness becomes longer the only possible way to obtain information on enemy aims will be by daily photographic reconnaissance of the enemy bases. Naval Staff is asked to express its support of this request to Air Force Operations Staff. (See teletype 1240).

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:1. Enemy Situation:

Mandal reported at 0350 three ships, including one large one, proceeding at high speed on course west; a minelaying operation is possible.

In Kronstadt Bay minor air activity and single tugs and a guardboats are reported.

2. Own Situation:

Minelaying operation "Lithium" was carried out during the night of 8 Oct. as planned, despite two ground mine detonations on the course shortly before minelaying started in AN 3923. Four ELM/J mines were also swept off Anholt and Skagen. A considerable number of troop transports and leave ships was escorted according to plan and without incident.

In the area of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic three heavy gun carriers are standing by in the Irben Strait for relay escort. At 0347 minesweeper M "19" reported a brief engagement with two small vessels west of Tyters. Both vessels turned away when fired on.

Naval Command, Baltic has approved the proposal of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic to take up the net "Walross" before the ice period begins. For details see teletype 1730.

V. Merchant Shipping:

1. The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping has provided for the following shipping requirements in Oct.:

| | | | | |
|--|---|---------|---------|-----|
| For Armed Forces supplies and supplies to industry in Norway | - | approx. | 600,000 | GRT |
| for supplies to Finland | - | " | 45,000 | GRT |
| for supplies to the Baltic States | - | " | 98,000 | GRT |
| for German coastal traffic, except coal | - | " | 120,000 | GRT |
| for coastal coal traffic | - | " | 176,000 | GRT |
| Expected in October from Lulea | - | " | 300,000 | GRT |
| and from Oxeloesund | - | " | 200,000 | GRT |

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2. Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Marine Branch gives information in Report No. 8/43 on "Foreign Merchant Shipping" regarding the development in speed of new enemy merchantmen from 1939 to 1944. According to this report out of 38,900,000 GRT of new constructions 17,100,000 GRT are fast ships with a speed of 14 knots and more. About 16,000,000 GRT of these have a speed of 14-17 knots and 1,100,000 GRT a speed of 18 knots and more.

VI. Submarine Warfare

In the North Atlantic there was a west wind in the operational area up to 1800 with good visibility, which then deteriorated considerably. The detection of the eastbound convoy of 26 ships, reported by a BV 222 in AL 4138, did not lead to any success by our submarines. The direction-finder signals of the plane were not heard and the convoy was not sighted. The reconnaissance report was presumably inaccurate navigationally. A total of seven enemy planes was detected by radio intelligence in the convoy area.

Possibly the enemy set our submarine patrol line in motion through a scattered destroyer group and planes, while the convoy passed by further to the south. It is otherwise inexplicable that none of the 20 submarines engaged was able to gain any data on the convoy itself during the operation, which lasted two days. This operation will be broken off on the morning of 9 Oct.

Only one destroyer was reported sunk.

From the Indian Ocean Submarine U "183" reports no traffic for ten days. Off Mombasa only one destroyer and two small patrol vessels were sighted. This submarine is operating at present in LJ 93 against traffic from Aden to Cape.

The Naval Attache in Tokoyo is advised that one of the MONSUN submarines is due to call at Penang in about two weeks for overhaul of torpedoes and for supplies. Transmission of passage route and approach course is requested.

Special Items:

According to a report from Submarine Division, 412 submarines were in commission on 1 Oct. 1943, including 175 operational submarines.

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Of these 135 were in the Atlantic
13 in the Mediterranean
21 in northern waters and
6 in the Black Sea.

In the Atlantic during the September there were 9.5 submarines, on a daily average, in the operational area and 50.5 on outward and return passage at sea. During September 50 submarines left for the Atlantic. The following were lost: in the Atlantic 6, in the Mediterranean and Northern Waters 1 each, in home waters 2 submarines.

VII Aerial Warfare

British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 54 planes out on operation against England, 52 over the Atlantic and 3 over the Mediterranean. nuisance raids against London and Dover were carried out by minor formations. Our fighters shot down 7 enemy planes.

Air Commander, Atlantic Coast reports several engagements with the enemy on 7 Oct. during free-lance fighter operations over the Bay of Biscay; one Liberator was shot down and four of our planes were lost.

During the day 400 four-engined planes with fighter escort attacked Bremen from an altitude of 7,000 - 8,000 m.; 497 of our fighters went up and reported 56 enemy planes shot down, 24 of ours being lost. Another 8 planes were shot down by anti-aircraft guns. During the night Bremen was again attacked, this time by 150 planes; 200 planes attacked Hanover. Single planes flew in as far as Berlin. Our fighters probably shot down 25 planes, themselves losing 10. The damage sustained in Bremen during the two raids is considerable. Damage in Hanover is extremely heavy. For details see Daily Situation.

In western France the airfield at Brest-South was attacked in the afternoon. Out of 21 enemy planes 4 were shot down.

Mediterranean Theater:

Only reconnaissance reports have been received from the 2nd Air Force and Air Force Command, Southeast. According to photographic reconnaissance three PT boats were lying in Castell Rosso at 1600

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in from the west. The enemy attacked the airfield of Eleusis near Athens and the airfield of Castelli on Crete. Two of our planes were destroyed. Both airfields are closed. Twelve enemy planes were shot down while two of ours were lost.

The enemy carried out continuous fighter-bomber attacks over the Army front in Italy.

Eastern Front:

The 5th Air Force reports 33 planes out on operation without special event.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

Out of the convoy of over 40 ships coming from the Atlantic on the afternoon of 7 Oct. 17 merchantmen put into Gibraltar. The part-convoy which went on to the east was joined by 3 tankers and 4 freighters from Gibraltar. The convoy consisting of 34 merchantmen and 7 escort vessels, passed north of Alboran at 0900.

The following were lying in Gibraltar at 1400: 2 KING GEORGE V class, the FORMIDABLE, the INDOMITABLE, the cruiser UGANDA in dock, 13 destroyers, 7 corvettes, 2 transports, 53 freighters, 11 tankers and numerous small vessels.

At 1705 a submarine was sighted 85 miles southeast of Majorca.

During the night of 7 Oct. 20 ships were detected in the Salerno - Sicilian area about 50 miles southeast of Salerno on southwesterly course. Otherwise only single ships were sighted.

The number of freighters in Maddalena has increased. The presence of a submarine at Cagliari is noteworthy.

German Naval Command, Italy is of opinion that demolition of the harbor of Bastia by blowing up the moles and sinking ships will be effective for some time. In addition there are ground mines in the harbor basin and entrance to the harbor. The sinking of a block ship was not entirely successful.

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In the area of Tunis-Sicily-Malta concentration of transport planes has been detected. According to the situation report of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, the NELSON was lying at Malta on 30 Sept, and the RODNEY is also presumed to be there. Radio Intelligence intercepted urgent radio traffic, partly of a tactical nature, between Alexandria and Tobruk and a British radio station in the Aegean area.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Submarines U "371", U "223" and U "431" have been assigned new operational areas. Submarine U "73" is carrying out a special operation for the Intelligence Service (landing of agents on the African coast).

No PT boats were out on operation owing to weather conditions. Coastal traffic was carried out as planned.

On 5 Oct. in an enemy commando raid near Rimini the motor cycle column of the Diplomatic Corps, consisting of ten vehicles, was destroyed.

The closed area south of Bastia has been extended to the east as far as 9 degrees 50' E.

German Naval Command, Italy has advised Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic that orders regarding dockyards may only be given through German offices. Requirements of Italian authorities are to be fulfilled as allowed by dockyard capacity, but our orders have absolute priority.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

The 11th Coast Patrol Flotilla was formed at Trieste. The six steamers which are to be transferred from the Adriatic to the Aegean are to be sent off from Durazzo at the rate of one every night.

b. Aegean Sea:

With regard to the OLYMPOS convoy, Group South reports that submarine chaser "2111" and the steamer OLYMPOS were definitely sunk, the latter by a submarine, before the attack by the surface forces and that five naval landing craft were probably sunk.

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Rescue operations are being carried out by planes, one Italian PT boat and three motor minesweepers. So far about 656 survivors have been picked up, Admiral, Aegean transmits a report of the Commander of submarine chaser "2111". The report states that the convoy was first attacked by two submarines, and later by two cruisers and two destroyers. All vessels of the convoy had been sunk by 0600. Most of the crew were in the water, either swimming or in rubber dinghies, and were fired on with tracer ammunition by cruisers and destroyers which passed them repeatedly a very short distance away. As the enemy force withdrew, it fired its guns on the soldiers floundering in the water. The matter will be pursued. For details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

Admiral, Aegean states, in addition to previous reports:

1. If the convoy, already delayed for three hours, had been held back until receipt of the morning reconnaissance report which does not come in until later, it would have had to pass through the Strait of Kos in darkness and without air escort and naval landing craft, which were already scheduled to go into operation during 7 Oct. against Kalymnos, would not have been available in time. As a matter of fact three enemy PT boats appeared in the evening of 7 Oct. in the Strait of Kos.
2. Up to 7 Oct. the enemy had operated only occasionally in the eastern Aegean, obviously for fear of our Air Force.
3. The loss of the OLYMPOS, aboard which the greater part of the battalion was embarked, was due to a submarine hit. Such a loss could have happened to any other convoy.
4. Our Air Force, apart from achieving no success against the enemy, attacked our own motor minesweepers during the rescue operation, despite the fact that it had been informed of the presence of three German motor minesweepers.
5. The slow speed of the convoy was decisive. In this case the two demands for transfer of troops "as early and as safely as possible" could not be fulfilled at the same time if our own Air Force did not make up for the weakness against superior enemy.

Admiral, Aegean still regards his considerations and measures regarding the OLYMPOS convoy as justified, even on subsequent review.

According to a report from Group South, the landing operation against Leros will start at 0130 on 9 Oct. Five convoys are en route

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for this purpose, namely:

- a. Three motor minesweepers from Milos.
- b. The DRACHE and the BULGARI from Piraeus.
- c. Submarine chaser "2101", naval landing craft F "131" and armed fishing vessel "2" from Syra.
- d. Coast patrol boats GA "41", "44" and "45" from Castron and
- e. as substitute for the OLYMPOS convoy, one comprising ~~the~~ steamer INGEBORG, 2 naval landing craft and 1 armed fishing vessel, led by submarine chaser "2102". This convoy left Pireeus at 1100.

The BULGARIA was sunk by an enemy submarine at 1523 five miles south of Amorgos, after two unsuccessful submarine attacks had already been made on this convoy in the morning. Aboard this vessel were 285 men of the 10th Battalion of the 999th Regiment, besides the crew of 81. Rescue operations are in progress.

At midnight three enemy PT boats machine-gunned a coastal post on Kos without inflicting any damage. Two enemy minefields were discovered five miles west of Kos.

The Italian garrison on the island of Calino has surrendered and was transferred to Kos. The island of Symi was again evacuated after heavy fighting with superior enemy forces. The town of Symi was defended by 300 British in dug-out positions.

The hospital ship GRADISCA was damaged in Patras by two explosions in the stern on the evening of 7 Oct. The cause is still unknown. The ship was destined for the exchange of seriously wounded between Germany and England.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to photographic reconnaissance the following were lying on 7 Oct. at Tuapse: 1 destroyer, 1 torpedo boat, 8 PT boats, 2 minesweepers, 4 gunboats and 8 coastal vessels.

During the night of 7 Oct. a few bombs were dropped on Genichesk. No military damage was sustained. At 0625 naval landing craft in the patrol line were unsuccessfully bombed and machine-gunned in a dive attack. There were also three unsuccessful air attacks on a convoy from Feodosiya to Sevastopol by altogether 15 planes south of Cape Sarich.

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Own Situation:

The last day of the evacuation of the Kuban bridgehead proceeded as planned. Kossa Tuszla as the last position, will be probably evacuated at dawn on 9 Oct. The vessels engaged in the evacuation will be transferred to Sevastopol in three convoys of about 60 vessels each and should pass Cape Takil between 0400 and 0600 on 9 Oct. Barrages "K 13" and "K 14" have been laid according to plan. On 7 Oct. an FZ mine was swept two miles west of Sevastopol.

IX. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

Items of Political Importance

Salazar made a statement at a secret session of the Portuguese Parliament on 8 Oct. It is also announced that Salazar had a long interview with the Japanese envoy. According to "Exchange Telegraph", dramatic developments are expected.

According to information from the Japanese Liaison Officer to Naval Staff, the Japanese Naval Attache in Lisbon has reported that cable communications between Lisbon and Azores are interrupted. Rumors in Lisbon have it that the Azores have been occupied by Americans.

No confirmation could be furnished by the Foreign Office.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval StaffI. Army Situation:

The situation on the eastern front must be regarded on the whole as extremely tense. The strain to which our exhausted formations are put makes itself felt in diminishing powers of attack while the enemy pays no regard to losses and shows surprising mobility. The penetration at Nevel, which on the first day thrust 40 km. into our lines, is a serious sign. Attacks against enemy bridgeheads on the western Dnieper are also not very successful.

The evacuation of the Kuban bridgehead, now completed, was more successful on the whole than expected.

It is estimated that the enemy still has 9,000 - 10,000 armored vehicles of all kinds.

Our losses on the eastern front in August and September amount to 34,000 and 20,000 killed; 134,000 and 86,000 wounded and 13,000 and 20,000 missing respectively. Compared to these figures our losses in the south are extremely small.

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff transmitted a Fuehrer Directive to Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast on 6 Oct. with copy to Group South, regarding future plans for the entire southeastern area. This came to the knowledge of Naval Staff on 9 Oct.

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This Fuehrer Directive reads as follows:

"The order for defense of the entire southeastern area (including the Peloponnesos) remains unchanged, but disposition of forces must take the present situation into account. Major forces should be concentrated where the main enemy assault is to be expected.

The most important islands of the southern Sporades must remain occupied or be re-occupied, as they are essential as a protection of the block Crete-Rhodes."

The Directive then gives the disposition of forces on the Peloponnesos and in the rest of Greece and gives the following further instruction among other things:

"The following must remain occupied or be occupied, apart from Crete and Rhodes: at least the Ionian islands of Corfu, Cephalonia, Zante and the Aegean islands of Scarpanto, Milos, Kos, Leros, Samos, Chios, Mytilene and Lemnos.

In case a large-scale enemy landing should be successful at any point on the extensive coasts, effective demolitions must be prepared so as to restrict enemy operational facilities and gain the necessary time for our countermeasures.

Preparations for such demolitions are to be made in the entire area south of the line Corfu - Metsovon Pass - Olympos and north thereof on the Adriatic coast at a depth which will be laid down by Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast and will differ according to geological conditions.

Preparations for demolition must include all important economic installations (Power stations, port installations, industrial plants, the waterworks at Athens) and also the traffic network (railroads, highways, constructions - such as dams, bridges, viaducts, Tr. N. - communications). It is essential that highways and railroads be rendered useless to the enemy for months. When demolishing military installations, the airfields especially are to be completely destroyed. Airfields on the Peloponnesos and on the Aegean islands, which are not needed, are now already to be rendered unserviceable in agreement with the Air Force."

II. Report by Quartermaster General:

a. Group West is making experiments on two trial mine-fields for use against low-flying planes.

- b. Armed Forces High Command has issued instructions regarding the military oath for members of the Italian Armed Forces.
- c. The following instructions have been received from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff:
- "1. It must be expected that the enemy, just as he did at Termoli, will continue attempts to surround the front of Commanding General, Armed Forces South, by landings in the deep flanks and to bring about its collapse. Such attempts can only be frustrated with the limited forces available if the enemy is destroyed by our coastal defense already before or during landing.
 2. The Fuehrer has ordered that Commanding General, Armed Forces, South expand coastal defense along the Tyrrhenian and Adriatic coasts, concentrating at a depth of about 100 km. behind line "B" and paying special attention to artillery defense.

In this connection Commanding General, Armed Forces, South will report what captured guns suitable for use against naval targets are available (stating caliber, range, rate of salvos and armor-piercing ammunition) and what personnel is required for manning the captured batteries, apart from the 400 coastal gunners already requested, stating destination.
 3. Commander in Chief, Air Force is requested to transfer to Commanding General, Armed Forces, South at once ten to twelve batteries comprising 8.8 cm., if possible 10.5 cm. anti-aircraft guns for coastal defense. A decrease in anti-aircraft defense of industry in northern Italy will be accepted to this extent.
 4. Commander in Chief, Air Force is requested to report what facilities or forces he can provide for this important task",

Naval Staff is investigating all available possibilities. In order to ensure speedy manning of the batteries captured in the Italian area, a 20% withdrawal of personnel from the west area would have to be resorted to. This was formerly rejected with the Fuehrer's permission.

Chief of Staff, Naval Staff remarks that coastal defense in this case should definitely be the responsibility of the Army, especially as the Navy does not have mobile

forces available for this unless weaknesses at other equally important points are to be accepted.

Chief, Naval Staff stresses that it depends where the greater danger lies and order that Armed Forces High Command be informed that naval forces are not available for the required task, unless permission is given for withdrawal of the 1st Naval Artillery Battalion from France. Chief, Naval Staff is of opinion that withdrawal is justifiable at present.

III. Chief, Operations Division reports on Spanish notes regarding the submarines BLUM and BRANDI according to copy in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII. It is to be hoped that the release of Lt. (s.g.) Brandi through the Naval Attache or the Intelligence Service will not be effected.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

IV. Report by Quartermaster General:

The UNDINE might be used as the floating anti-aircraft battery for Peenemuende requested by Commander in Chief, Air Force; she has been fitted up as an anti-aircraft cruiser and is actually scheduled for operation in the Putziger Wik.

Chief, Naval Staff agrees.

V. Chief, Naval Staff brought up for discussion further defense measures for the TIRPITZ. Her immobility will tempt the enemy to further attacks. Considerations by Naval Staff to have the ship moved by tugs will encounter great difficulties. Quartermaster Division, Fleet Branch is of opinion that the TIRPITZ should remain in Alta until she is at least ready to proceed again with two screws. The present condition of the ship still entails many unknown factors. Defense in Alta against attack by heavy units is still inadequate. No heavy batteries are available. The question of transferring torpedo batteries, perhaps with FAT torpedoes, to Alta is under investigation. The ship's own adequate defensive readiness must, of course, be maintained constantly both materially and as regards personnel.

VI. Report by Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division:

a. According to a report by Group South, Admiral, Aegean already replied on 8 Oct. in accordance with the statements meanwhile submitted to Naval Staff, to the direct inquiry from Army Group E of 7 Oct. regarding the Fuehrer's questions

on the loss of the OLYMPOS convoy. Admiral, Agean adds that it appears advisable for further reports to the Supreme Command to be made only through Group South, if possible, in order to avoid reports being submitted to a Supreme Command by offices which are not in a position to judge questions of naval strategy with sufficient knowledge.

Group South agreed with this opinion.

For teletype as per 1/Skl 3043/43 Gkdos. Chefs. see Files 1 Skl I op II, 15.

Group South further reports that operation "Leopard" has been postponed until 0130 on 10 Oct. by order of Lt. General Mueller. The delay will be utilized to increase the number of naval landing craft from five to seven, to bring up the remainder of the 10th Battalion of the 999th Regiment, to restore the airfield on Kos, to check the approach routes, since British minelaying has been ascertained, and to bring up reserves of ammunition.

Group South has promised final views on the execution of operation "Leopard" so far.

Naval Staff agrees in every respect with the view expressed by Commanding Admiral, Group South that responsibility for a combined operation, if it is sea-borne, lies with the Commander of Naval Forces. This, however, does not exclude the possibility that the strategic situation or considerations on the operations as a whole may make it necessary to set aside objections as regards navigation and naval tactics and to accept risks.

In the meantime the basic order of Armed Forces High Command to Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast and to Group South of 6 Oct. has also been received, having taken three days to arrive. This is the same Fuehrer Directive which has already been dealt with under "Army Situation". Concerning the Navy it states:

"Stocks for and supplies to the numerous islands to be occupied must be assured by sea in the same way at least as supplies to the divisions operating in the northern part of the Dalmatian coast.

Agreement is to be reached with Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast on the erection and taking over of further coastal batteries on the newly occupied coastal sectors.

Laying of mine barrages off the newly acquired ports is especially important."

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Naval Staff considers it necessary to report to Armed Forces High Command that carrying out of the tasks demanded of the Navy cannot be guaranteed should the enemy become active.

Chief, Naval Staff agreed.

The delay in learning of the Fuehrer Directive has made a survey of the situation regarding operation "Leopard" much more difficult for Naval Staff.

Naval Staff does not support the opinion expressed by Admiral, Aegean and sponsored by Group South regarding reports to the Supreme Command. There is no objection to reports to and from Armed Forces High Command via Commanding Generals, Armed Forces. However, it is necessary that Naval Staff be informed at the same time.

Here, too, Chief, Naval Staff agreed. Group South and Admiral, Aegean have been given the following instructions:

1. Commander in Chief, Navy has reported to the Fuehrer about the OLYMPOS convoy as follows:

"In my opinion the tactical and operational deliberations of Admiral, Aegean should not be contested in view of the strategic situation and the orders issued by the Commanding General, Armed Forces.

2. Presentation of the promised final views of Group South on the execution of this operation is left to it.

3. Naval Staff confirms that responsibility for carrying out such a combined operation, if it is sea-borne, lies with the Commander of Naval Forces. This does not exclude the possibility that the strategic situation or considerations on the operation as a whole may make it necessary to set aside objections as regards navigation and naval tactics and to accept risks. This was the case here.

4. No objections can be raised to the fact that the Commanding General, Armed Forces, within his responsibility for the entire execution of a combined operation, also reports to the Supreme Command on matters of naval tactics; it is the duty of the Commanding Admirals to ensure that Naval Staff is advised early enough for the views of the Navy to be duly received with those of other commands."

b. According to information from Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, Naval Liaison, the Fuehrer has prohibited long-range night fighter missions. Our air activity over England is to concentrate on attacking cities. This will seriously affect our air activity over England is to concentrate on attacking cities.

This will seriously effect our current minelaying offensive.

c. The new Italian Naval Liaison Officer in Berlin will best be attached to the Naval Attaches Section for the present.

Chief, Naval Staff agreed.

VII. Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean has requested that previous subordination to German Naval Command, Italy be canceled, in view of its different location. Chief, Naval Staff has approved this request, which was put forward on 21 Sept. during his visit to Toulon. Naval Staff recommends direct operational control of Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean by Operations Division.

Chief, Naval Staff approved the proposal which was made in agreement with Submarine Division.

Special Items

I. Foreign Armies West has estimated the situation in the Mediterranean on 7 Oct. as follows:

"The course of the fighting at Termoli again confirms the previous experience that the British only carry out such operations after thorough preparations and with ample forces. The developments further indicate that the enemy attaches much importance to an extension of the areas gained on the Adriatic coast of Italy. This is also indicated by the considerable increase in freighters and landing craft lately observed at the port of Taranto. Enemy air attacks, which have been intensified since 4 Oct. in the entire Greek area against our airfields, probably aim, by eliminating German air forces, at protection of further transports of troops and materiel to Apulian ports and of naval operations in the Aegean. The increased use of light naval forces in the Aegean Sea shows that the enemy is taking advantage of his naval supremacy. The future target and result will be progressive cutting-off first of the German forces in advanced positions on the Dodecanese islands and then of Crete. In the near future attempts to recapture the island of Kos, with its important airfields, and operations against other Aegean islands must be expected. The fact that the British troops operating on Kos were transferred from the Egyptian and Palestinian area is a further indication that the island of Cyprus does not play any decisive part in enemy plans in the eastern Mediterranean."

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II. Operations Division, in view of information received from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy transmitted the following instructions to German Naval Command, Italy on 5 Oct., with copy to Army Group B.:

1. A General Staff Officer sent by Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff into the area of Army Group B, reports on his trip from 26 to 30 Sept., as follows:

"The Army Group requests instructions as to what is to be done with Italian ships lying in ports of northern Italy, which could be useful to the enemy in case of landings. There has also been no order as to whether port entrances are to be closed and, if so, which ones."

2. Instructions on what is to be done with war material captured from the Italian Navy and with ships of all kinds were given 1/Skl. 25995 Gkds. of 16 Sept. (to German Naval Command, Italy by radiogram).
3. Measures planned and prepared for the closing of port entrances are to be reported as soon as possible.
4. Close cooperation with Army Group B. is to be ensured. The Naval Liaison Officer is to be kept continuously informed of all basic instructions issued by Naval Staff and of plans and measures taken in that area as far as they may be of interest to Army Group B.

Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy reported in this connection on 7 Oct.:

"Do not understand teletype. The Naval Liaison Officer brought up enquiries regarding ships in ports of northern Italy with this Command. Transfer to ports in southern France had already started. Regarding the closing of harbors, a full report was made by the Sector Commander of the Deputy Commanding General, Army Group B., which was approved, and measures were already started by order of 10 Sept. in all harbors. Sinking of blockships, net and boom barrages and minelaying were prepared. Army Group B. has been continuously advised of all orders, measures and plans. The General Staff Officer referred to did not report to Naval Offices. The Naval Liaison Officer was also not advised of his trip, so that cooperation of German Naval Command, Italy was impossible. Please ensure that unfounded reports are not made to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff".

Operations Division has informed Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy of this exchange of teletypes. For order 1/Sk1 28095/Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C, Vol XIV.

III. Foreign Affairs/Intelligence Division gives the following report from a Turkish source at the end of September:

"During the next few days an important naval conference will take place in London, which will be attended by representatives of the British Admiralty, the U. S. Fleet Staff and the Navy Department in Washington. According to well-informed circles, the sole item on the agenda of the conference will be a certain regrouping of the British and American Fleet forces. This regrouping has become necessary through the changed situation in the Mediterranean. The increase in power of the Allied Fleets in the Mediterranean through the Italian naval forces makes it possible for part of the U. S. Fleet, which was recently ordered to the Mediterranean, to be recalled and put into operation elsewhere. According to information from an agent, these U. S. Fleet forces have been ordered to ports in England."

IV. Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Navies Branch has drawn up a report on the handling of tank landing craft (LCT's), during landing operations, on the basis of a captured British service manual. For copy as per 1/Sk1 30284/43 geh. see War Diary, Vol. "Evaluation of Intelligence on Foreign Navies."

Situation 9 Oct.

I. War in Foreign Waters:

Obviously on the basis of information obtained from the Italians (the ERTREA, the CAGNI or other sources), the British have announced the border between the Japanese and German operational areas in the Indian Ocean as 70 degrees East. The Japanese Admiralty therefore recommends that point "Tannewald" be moved to 24 degrees S, 81 degrees East, since this point has so far lain in the former supply area of the SCHLIEMANN and on the route of the AQUILA submarines. The fact that the new point is nearer to the Sunda Strait must be accepted under present conditions.

Operations Division has confirmed the new position by cable on 5 Oct. to the Naval Attache in Tokyo.

Otherwise nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the Bay of Biscay 12 planes were detected on operation. One British vessel was located at 0519 in CK 7220, one at 0815 in AL 6130, one at 1521 in AL 5240 and one at 0019 (10 Oct.) in AM 4510.

In the channel targets, presumably PT boats, were continuously located in lurking position from 0015 to 0445 off Fecamp and Le Havre.

2. Own Situation:Atlantic Coast:

Mine-exploding vessel "5" was heavily damaged through striking a mine on the approach route off La Pallice but entered port under her own power. Exercises by the 8th Destroyer Flotilla were postponed because of the mine situation and weather condition.

Channel Coast:

At 0035 Army Batteries fired three salvos on targets located off Fecamp. The motor minesweeper depot ship V.D.LIPPE had engagements with two enemy PT boats during the night of 8 Oct. off Cape de Heve at 0312 and 0407. One enemy boat was probably sunk and another damaged. Our damage and casualties were slight. For brief action report see teletype 0845. PT boats S "142" and S "143" were transferred from the Hook to Boulogne. Four boats of the 5th PT Boat Flotilla proceeded in the evening from Cherbourg to Peterport and started back again at 2400 after taking on torpedoes.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters1. North Sea:

Eight ELM/J mines were swept northwest of Ijmuiden. The steamer SUMATRA and ten boats of the 9th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla left Ijmuiden at 1700 for the Elbe river via the outer route.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Over the North Sea 13 planes were detected on operation. Slight gunfire was reported in the Petsamo area. At 0930 one plane was detected in the Alta area. At 0515 southeast of Sandoy heavy engine noises were heard, presumably from a PT boat. At 1536 on 8 Oct. a northbound convoy was unsuccessfully attacked by two planes south of Stadlandet. One plane was reported south of Egersund. Naval Command, Baltic is of opinion that the locations reported on 8 Oct. off Ekkeroy were possibly connected with a minelaying operation or a channel sweep for blockade runners from Gothenburg. Naval Command, Norway, however, presumes a false location due to fog at sea. According to statements of prisoners, 14 British or American warships participated in the operation on 4 Oct. off Bodoe, including the U. S. Carrier RANGER with 60 planes. The carrier force left Scapa at noon on 2 Oct. and was on the morning of 4 Oct. off Bodoe, including the U. S. carrier RANGER with 60 planes. The carrier force left Scapa at noon on 2 Oct. and was on the morning of 4 Oct. about 300 km. west of Bodoe. The RANGER is said to have been stationed in the Scapa area for at least six months. For particulars see teletype 1100.

Own Situation:

According to a report from Naval Command, Norway only 1 man was killed out of the 835 men aboard the SKRAMSTAD; 27 are missing and 40 wounded. The previous figure of 200 lost is incorrect.

With reference to the objections of Commander, Minesweepers, Norway, the Naval (Ship) Construction Division has requested Quartermaster Division to approve the release of the HUASCARAN for project "Paul" (repairs to the TIRPITZ in Alta), on condition that short, urgent submarine repairs have priority. Otherwise adherence to the repair schedule of the TIRPITZ is doubtful. (See teletype 1330).

No reports on shipping movements have been received.

Special Items:

Naval Command, Norway has submitted to Naval Staff and Group North/Fleet considerations and suggestions regarding operations by Fleet forces in case of enemy operations against Norway. For letter of 6 Oct. as per 1/Skl 3041/43 Gkdos see file 1/Skl I op. VIII, 1.

Naval Command, Norway does not consider that the conditions for previous operational plans still exist:

No more convoy traffic in Northern Waters; intervention in

case of enemy landing can only be effective right at the landing point, in view of our limited forces and the air situation; a landing with a distant objective will probably not be made in northern Norway, but further to the South. The transfer of our Fleet base to the south is therefore necessary. Operational effectiveness and danger from the air must be weighed up against one another. If the enemy operation does not include the Jutland area, operational command must lie with Naval Command, Norway. Direct defense operations against landings must be controlled by the command which has all forces of the entire coastal defense at its disposal and knows how to cooperate direct with the Army and Air Force. Furthermore, it is advisable to increase the number of submarines by operational ones and by boats of the Anti-Submarine School, Finally, the part to be played by Admiral, Northern Waters should be investigated. In order to settle views on these matters it might be useful to carry out a war game based on written plans from a wide circle.

Naval Staff assumes that Group North/Fleet will first of all comment on the above.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

A fire in the Siemens plant at Copenhagen was presumably caused by sabotage. Between 1026 and 100 a large U. S. air formation of 400 -450 planes flew into the Baltic area via Denmark and penetrated as far as Danzig Bay. Amongst other places Gdynia, Danzig and Elbing were attacked. Return flights over the same route began at 1215 and lasted until 1600.

In Kronstadt Bay minor harassing gunfire and normal tug traffic were observed. Over Luga Bay there was lively air activity. In the afternoon a group of 26 small minesweepers penetrated as far as west of Vigrund and then turned away to the North.

2. Own Situation:

In the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic 32 vessels were engaged in check-sweeping. Transports and convoy traffic went through in the whole Baltic Sea area without incident. In the area of Naval Command, Baltic seven enemy planes shot down for certain and four were probably shot down by fighters, five of which were lost. In addition five planes were shot down by naval anti-aircraft guns. With regard to the damage sustained in Gdynia,

sustained in Gdynia, the following is reported: the command office was slightly damaged, the local administration office and the harbor railway station heavily damaged and the billeting and stores huts of the Naval Communications Office totally destroyed. Ship "47" and submarine chaser "1210" sank. The hospital ship STUTTGART was towed out of port on fire and can probably not be saved. The steamer CUXHAVEN sank after a direct hit. The tugs SASPE and REVA and the Finnish Steamer REWJORN sank. The steamer GINHEIM was damaged. The 2,500 ton dock carrying the tug ATLANTIK sustained a direct hit. The Deutsche Werke dockyard was partly destroyed. Ships of the Training Unit, Fleet and two accommodation ships were undamaged.

No reports about our own defense have yet been received. Regarding damage, Gdynia itself seems to have come off comparatively lightly. Above all the submarine base seems to be almost untouched.

Operations in the area of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic were badly hampered by unfavorable weather.

V. Submarine Warfare

In an operation against a convoy in AL submarine U "645" probably sank a steamer (6,500 G.R.T.) on course 90 degrees at 0627 in the mist. None of the submarines of Group "Rossbach" sighted or reported the convoy itself. The operation was discontinued in the morning, as planned. From altogether five boats which participated position reports have not been received.

By day on 21 Sept. submarine U "123" scored two certain and three probably hits on several Liberty ships in convoys EP 44. This submarine assumes that traffic is moving on the 200 m. line between Trinidad and Freetown in a very large circle with constant air patrol.

A further report of success was received from the Mediterranean. According to the estimate of Quartermaster Division, Submarine Branch, our submarine losses in September 1943 amount to 9.8% for the Atlantic, 9.1% for Northern Waters, 25% for the Mediterranean and none for the Black Sea, calculated on a monthly average of submarines on operation. The corresponding figure in August for the Atlantic was 51%.

Losses in relation to the total number of operational submarines (175) amounted in September to 4.9%, on a mean average since the beginning of the war 5.9% and since January 1943 9.9%.

The corresponding figures for August were 19.2% 6% and 10.6%.

VI. Aerial Warfare

British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 16 planes out on operation over England, 2 over the Atlantic and 64 over the Mediterranean.

In free-lance fighter operations over the Bay of Biscay on 8 Oct. 2 Thunderbolts were shot down, 7 BF 110's being lost. During defense against an enemy attack on the airfield at Brest-South 4 Spitfires were shot down, 4 BF 110's being lost. The crews of two of them were saved.

The enemy raided two airfields in the occupied west area.

Heavy formations flew into the eastern part of northern Germany in the morning. A formation which approached Berlin from the north was driven off by our fighters. Targets were Anklam, Gdynia, Danzig and Marienburg. At Anklam and Marienburg the raid centered on the Arado and Focke-Wulf works. Damage was considerable. For particulars see "Daily Situation". The attack on Gdynia is reported under "Situation Baltic". Single planes flew at the same time as far as Mannheim and Strassburg/Alsace with out attacking.

During the night of 9 Oct. only minor enemy flights are reported. Ten fast bombers dropped a few bombs on Berlin from a great altitude.

Our fighters numbering 570 shot down during the day 36 four-engined enemy bombers for certain and probably shot down 37 more. Twelve of our fighters were lost.

Mediterranean Theater:

The 2nd Air Force reports attacks on enemy shipping targets southeast of Fiume and off Krk. One freighter was hit.

The 3rd Air Force had 54 bombers out on an unsuccessful operation against a large convoy which had detected in the early morning west of Cape Tenes. The operation had to be broken off because of weather conditions were deteriorating.

Thirty-nine planes of the Air Force Command, Southeast attacked shipping targets in the harbor of Leros and sank one steamer of 1,500 G.R.T.

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Reconnaissance detected at 0515 a force of 1 or 2 cruisers and 3 or 4 destroyers in the Leros area on easterly course. During an attack in the afternoon on the force, which was withdrawing, one destroyer was sunk and one cruiser heavily damaged in the Scarpanto Strait. Reconnaissance also reported off Cape Sidero (northeast coast of Crete) a large group of vessels on easterly course, so far unidentified.

The enemy carried out lively attacks over the front and against supply routes in Italy. In the Greek area altogether seven airfields were attacked. For damage see "Daily Situation". The enemy also carried out lively reconnaissance over the Aegean Sea.

Eastern Front:

Nothing to report.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

A convoy of 7 loaded freighters and 1 tanker in ballast, together with 9 escort vessels, which left Gibraltar at 1540 for the Mediterranean put in again at 1710 for unknown reasons.

At 0645 on 9 Oct. a convoy of 1 tanker, 8 freighters and 9 escort vessels put out into the Atlantic and joined a convoy of 29 freighters, 3 tankers and 16 escort vessels passing through from the Mediterranean. Ten freighters in ballast and 4 escort vessels put into Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

The eastbound convoy reported on the morning of 8 Oct. off Alboran was detected by planes of the 3rd Air Force at 0720 10 miles north of Arzeu, consisting of 64 merchantmen and 4 escort vessels on course eastnortheast, after it had been joined by further ships, presumably from Oran. For report on unsuccessful air attack see "Aerial Warfare".

At 0310 our air reconnaissance sighted 60 miles north-northwest of Messina 3 vessels, presumably warships, proceeding at high speed on northwesterly course and at 1300 22 miles west-southwest of Salerno 4 transports with escort vessels, no course and speed being stated.

No new reports have been received from Salerno Bay. Increased unloading from landing craft was observed in Naples.

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This part is presumably being used as a submarine base.

German Naval Command, Italy is of opinion that extensive operations from Naples and Salerno, and also from Termoli,, must be expected.

Further troops were landed at Termoli.

A small convoy leaving Apulian ports, presumably bound for Malta; was reported 70 miles east of Catania; no time was stated.

No reconnaissance reports have been received from the eastern Mediterranean.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Around midnight on 9 Oct. a steamer of 4,000 GRT was torpedoed by submarine U "616" in CJ 9443 and left burning. This submarine also sank a destroyer south of Salerno.

Four PT boats left Spezia on a minelaying operation.

The minelayer JUMINDA carried out her minelaying operation on the east coast of Corsica according to plan. The minelayer KEHRWIEDER had to break off her operation because of engine trouble. Check of the coastal route south of San Remo was continued without result.

Transport traffic along the west coast of Italy was carried out as planned and without incident.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

The minelayer LAURANA is scheduled for a minelaying operation from Ancona. Transfer of the ship has been postponed because of weather conditions. The steamer ROSELLI left Durazzo for Corfu in the evening. She was shelled without effect off Valona in spite of the fact that Army offices had been advised. Group South has changed its former views and confirms that the Naval Liaison Staff, Croatia is to be put directly under Group South.

b. Aegean Sea:

In the enemy air attacks on our airfields in Salonika two Ju 88's were destroyed by fire. The landing strip is out of order. Heavy enemy air attacks on other airfields caused, however, only relatively slight damage.

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In view of the enemy forces reported by our air reconnaissance in the early morning in the Leros area, the convoy of submarine chaser "2102" and the INGEBOURG was first ordered to turn away but later to continue to Kos.

The minelayer DRACHE carried out her minelaying operation on the evening of 8 Oct. as planned.

Group South transmits a report from Admiral, Aegean on the intended landing on Leros. The attack is to be carried out in three assault groups and through landing of a parachutist company.

In the evening Group South reports that operation "Leopard" has been postponed for another 24 hours for the following reasons: afternoon reconnaissance sighted strong enemy forces south of Rhodes on northerly course; the airfield at Kos is not ready yet; the convoy of the INCEBOURG with the reserve battalion will arrive late; the Air Force has been put to too much strain by operations during the last few days. Furthermore, the possibility of an enemy operation against Kos is foreseen.

Army Group E has ordered, however, that the most favorable opportunities for attack be utilized if developments in the situation allow.

In view of the afternoon reconnaissance which sighted two cruisers and four destroyers south of Rhodes, proceeding at high speed on northerly course, the convoy of INGEBOURG was ordered to withdraw to the west for the second time. In addition reconnaissance of the shipping concentrations have been ordered in Kos.

So far 1,027 men of the OLYMPOS convoy have been rescued and about 150 are still missing; according to a report from the Naval Liaison Officer to Army Group F.

Survivors aboard the BULGARIA state that further German soldiers were taken aboard by four British submarines.

Our motor minesweepers with further survivors aboard are on their way to Kos.

A new operation against Symi starting from Rhodes was planned for 9 Oct. with a reinforced assault group.

Armed Forces High Command, Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas has ordered that five Siebel ferries, which were transferred to Trieste overland and destined for operations in the Aegean Sea, are to remain

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at Trieste until further notice. Group South has advised that it will raise objection.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence, the destroyers "F" and "E" probably left Tuapse to the south on the evening of 8 Oct.

At 1910 on 9 Oct. a submarine south of Sudak. It was probably this submarine which was unsuccessfully attacked at 2140 by a PT boat 20 miles southwest of Feodosiya. Another submarine was located in the evening 45 miles southwest of Sevastopol on easterly course.

Submarine U "24" reported in the morning one PT boat proceeding on easterly course at high speed at the point where the three Russian destroyers went down.

Own Situation:

Evacuation of Kuban bridgehead has been completed. The last troops were transferred at 0400. The transport formations are on the way from Kerch to Sevastopol. The first unit was attacked at 0700 by seven enemy planes; one Siebel ferry was lost and one plane shot down. There was no fighter cover due to fog at the airfield.

Further air attacks carried out on the convoy unit during the day caused no damage. The remainder of the convoy consisting of 4 naval landing craft and a tug with naval artillery lighter "4" and 6 combined operations boats left Kerch for Feodosiya at 1800.

The 1st PT Boat Flotilla is being sent out from Ivanbaba as remote escort for the large convoys. Further remote escort is being carried out by three German and three Italian submarines.

On the morning of 8 Oct. our convoy from Feodosiya to Sevastopol was unsuccessfully attacked by 18 enemy planes off Cape Aitodor. One plane was shot down by ships' anti-aircraft guns.

VIII. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

Items of Political Importance

According to German agency reports, competent quarters in Lisbon deny that a secret session of Parliament took place on 8 Oct. and that Salazar made a statement.

According to Reuter and other sources, however, there are definite signs that important decisions were made or are imminent. Amongst other things, Lisbon will be blacked out from 10 Oct. The publication of weather reports has been discontinued.

The left-wing newspaper "New Leader" writes on 2 Oct.:

"Europe is fast drifting into an immense political conflagration. The issues do not concern so much the military conflicts between the Allied Nations and Germany as the political conflict between America and England on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other. In all these conflicts, which concern the treatment of the Baltic States, Eastern Poland, the Balkans and above all the treatment of Germany after the war, America and Great Britain stand on one side and Soviet Russia on the other. The chances of clearing up these differences of opinion at the forthcoming Foreign Ministers' Conference are small. In the conflict about the establishment of a "second front" in the West, it is less a matter of helping Russia than of occupying Germany with British and American troops before the Red Army comes in. The "New Leader" takes the view that all these differences can only be solved by establishing United Socialist States of Europe."

It seems appropriate to note these extreme comments as they state in plain language what is actually going on at present.

According to Reuter, American and British Generals and Admirals are now gathering in New Delhi for a large conference, in order to assist Lord Mountbatten in working out details of the Allied plan for attack in the Far East. Chungking's Foreign Minister, Soong, is also participating in these discussions.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval StaffI. Army Situation:

On the eastern front enemy attacks have increased along the whole line. The enemy is moving new forces into the area

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of his break-through near Nevel, but he was only successful in extending it to the north.

The enemy has also started to advance in the sector of Army Group North, in order to carry out reconnaissance on our movements.

Fighting in Italy and in the Balkans has not increased any further.

II. At the recommendation of Operations Division, Chief, Naval Staff orders the following personal teletype to be sent to Admiral, Black Sea with copy to Group South:

"The operational control, organization and readiness of the units and naval forces which participated in the evacuation of the Kuban bridgehead played an important part in making this combined operation a complete success. I express my special appreciation to you, to the Chiefs, Commanders, Staffs and crews of the units, naval forces and offices concerned."

III. Report of Operations Division, International Law and Prizes Section on the proposal of Naval Staff for a reply to Spain regarding the submarines BLUM and BRANDI, as per notes in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

Chief, Naval Staff agrees, but he thinks it advisable to proceed in such a manner that the liberation of Lt. (s.g.) Brandi is not interfered with. Moreover, it is best to make the Spaniards to some extent morally responsible in order to pave the way for future incidents.

IV. Quartermaster General:

a. The objections raised by Group South against the order of Armed Forces High Command, Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas to leave five of the Siebel ferries destined for the Aegean at Trieste have now been received. Group South requests that the necessary arrangements be made for the release of these vessels.

Since the Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas usually complies with the requirements of Naval Staff, it will be possible to support the request of Group South effectively.

Chief, Naval Staff agreed.

b. The request of Naval Command, Norway for permission to

change the destination of the Harbor Defense Flotillas in its area to Patrol Boat Flotillas has been declined by Quartermaster Division for basic reasons of organization.

V. Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division:

a. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has submitted a preliminary report on the discussions with Marshal Graziani on 9 Oct. According to this report, the following has been agreed on:

I. It is important that Italy contribute as much as possible to the future of the War effort and it is, therefore necessary that:

a. those parts of Italy occupied by us are not treated as enemy but as allied territory,

b. the authority and independence of the new Italian Government is established and strengthened.

2. With this in mind, the operational area of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South and of Army Group B will be limited to a suitable area behind the front lines of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South and to certain areas on the northeastern, northern and northwestern boundary of Italy, in order to protect communications to Germany and France. The whole remaining territory will be handed over to the Italian Government for administration. On the coasts, operations zones are planned which, however, will become operational areas only in case of an enemy landing. Until such time the coastal areas will also be under the administration of the Italian Government. In the territory administered by the Italian Government a Military Commander (General Toussaint) will be appointed, who will be under Chief, Armed Forces High Command, His tasks in General will be:

a: to represent and see to execution of the military demands of the German Armed Forces with Italian Government or subordinate Italian authorities,

b: to assist the Italian Government and its authorities not only with regard to its own Government measures, as far as this may be required, but also in dealing with German forces.

3. The intended defense of the line provided for this purpose is of decisive importance for the common fight. With the loss of Rome, Italy would actually cease to be a co-belligerent.

Therefore, every resource of the country must be mobilized immediately in order to help defend the deep flanks and long coastlines and release German forces to a great extent for operations on the main fronts. For this purpose the Army Groups, the Navy and the Air Force are to conscript an unlimited number of Italian volunteers, fit for military service, for the following categories:

- a. Navy and Army coastal gunners
- b. Anti-aircraft gunners
- c. Construction troops
- d. Engineers and railway engineers
- e. Air warning and ground personnel
- f. Communications personnel
- g. Harbor office personnel and crews for harbor defense flotillas.

Military internees do not come into question for these formations. Should the Italian High Command be unable to secure volunteers itself, recruiting is to be carried out by our forces. Each unit of the above-mentioned categories must establish at least a second unit, part of the personnel of which is German. The volunteers will be treated as regards pay and care in the same way as German soldiers. The Italian Government will at the same time ensure a favorable provision for the families and dependents of the volunteers.

4. The new formation of large Italian units is planned at troop training camps outside Italy.

5. Orders for 2) to 4) will follow. For 3), however, preparatory measures in accordance with this preliminary advice are to be taken at once.

1) and 2) of this order might seriously hamper our own freedom of action in the military and especially in the war economy sphere. However, political reasons may have been decisive. As regards 3) executive orders must be awaited in order to see whether and, if at all, to what extent, formation of actual Italian Armed Forces is still complicated. The matter of a flag is also still to be decided.

b. Quartermaster General recommends that for the time being Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy be advised and instructed to begin preparations, as ordered, together with Admiral Legnani. If necessary it may be advisable to create a specific Staff within Naval Staff with the sole task of dealing with questions of organization arising from cooperation with the Italian Navy.

Special Items

I. According to intelligence reports from Portugal, two islands of the Azores, allegedly Fayal and Flores, were occupied by the Americans and British during the night of 9 Oct. In Lisbon there has been no news at all from Ponta Delgada since 8 Oct. According to another report dated 7 Oct., a Brazilian Military Mission has arrived at Ponta Delgada, which is presumably to make preparations for a landing. Exceptionally large quantities of war materiel are at present being landed on the Azores.

According to a report of our Naval Attache in Lisbon, cable communication with Azores is normal, as far as he can ascertain. Current rumors about an occupation of the Azores are so far not confirmed. He does not regard it, however, as out of question that the enemy will intensify diplomatic pressure in order to obtain bases without resort to force. On inquiry the Foreign Office states that it regards also the report concerning the summoning of the Portuguese National Assembly as pure invention and that the German envoy in Lisbon has given a very "Pacifying" tendency to his reports. For details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

II. According to information from Quartermaster Division, the construction of naval landing craft has lately shown ever increasing delays. Compared with the production schedule of 109 naval landing craft from April to August 1943, there is a deficit of 39. Delays continue to assume serious consequences. For instance, not one of the 17 naval landing craft scheduled for September at dockyards at home and in occupied areas has been completed. Naval Staff has drawn the attention of the Main Committee for Shipbuilding to the fact that important war tasks cannot be fulfilled if these delays continue and has learned to its regret that even the allocation of a priority Armed Forces number has shown no result. Naval Staff requests that immediate steps be taken to change this situation and draws attention to the fact that the allocation of a priority number was restricted and expires on 30 Nov. 1943.

Situation 10 Oct.I. War in Foreign Waters

The Naval Attache in Tokyo reports that the BRAKE and the BOGOTA have been supplied with a list of reference points and waiting areas, as ordered, and that all outgoing blockade runners and supply ships have been informed of the new approach points.

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The Naval Attache enquires whether the waiting areas for the BRAKE and the BOGOTA are still in force.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the Bay of Biscay eleven planes were detected on operation. One British vessel was located at 1222 in AM 4110, one at 1444 in AL 63 and one at 1857 in AM 4640.

Continuous radar locations were reported in the Channel on the evening of 9 Oct. in the area between Cape de la Hague and Alderney and from 0500 to 0558 on 10 Oct. in the area north and west of Point de Barfleur.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast :

Five submarines were escorted out of Brest, Lorient and St. Nazaire. One ELM/J mine was swept off the Gironde. Damaged mine-exploding vessel "5" put in to La Pallice. Because of the mine situation and weather conditions no exercises were carried out by the 8th Destroyer Flotilla.

Channel Coast:

Nothing to report.

II. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters

North Sea:

It is now reported for 9 Oct. that one boat was damaged in an enemy air attack on boats of the Rhine Flotilla on 9 and 10 Oct. 14 ground mines were swept in the area between Scheveningen and Heligoland.

The convoy of SUMATRA was carried out as planned.

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near holder the operational cable of the 808th Naval Artillery Battalion was damaged by sabotage. Action readiness is unimpaired. Twenty-nine Dutch workmen were arrested.

Noway, Nothern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the central and northern parts of the North Sea 23 planes were detected on operation.

From the Petsamo area slight gunfire and air reconnaissance are reported. On 9 Oct. off Battery "Hovde", at the entrance to Trondheim Fjord, a small fast vessel proceeding without lights was sighted. A search conducted by four harbor degense vessels has so far proved fruitless. At 0425 on 10 Oct. at the entrance to Nordgulen a loud engine noise was heard..Gulen was searched without result.

2. Own Situation:

In the area of Naval Command, Norway 12 ships were escorted north, and one south. In all 22 ships were left lying in harbor owing to lack of escorts.

Naval Group North/Fleet has decided, at the request of the Task Force, that operation "Paul" be made known to a larger circle, with corresponding security restrictions. Arrangements for leave for the crew depend on the question of transport, which will be settled between Naval "Command, Norway and Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway. Leave Transports by sea from Trondheim to the Skagerrak are entirely out of question. (See teletype 1252.)

Group North/Fleet also advised Naval Staff for information that assumption of the command of Northern Waters by Rear Admiral Bey must take place during the week of 25-30 Oct. (See teletype 1325.)

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

At 1715 heavy detonations were observed on Lavan-saari. Southwest of Vaindlo and east of Rotskaer our vessels had a brief engagement with PT boats which turned away when fired on.

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At 0633 on 9 Oct. bombers unsuccessfully attacked the steamer WINDAU off Lyserort. At 0635 on 10 Oct. probable minelaying southwest of Windau was reported by the steamer HOLLAND. During an air attack on our barrage patrol south of Porkalla one plane was shot down.

2. Own Situation:

In the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic 26 vessels were engaged in check-sweeping. Two ground mines were swept near Shulzgrund and one near Halsbarre. Eight troop transports with 3 defense vessels, 3 steamers and 1 tanker were escorted.

The casualties aboard the hospital ship STUTTGART, which caught fire after being hit by a bomb at Gdynia on 9 Oct. and was sunk by our gunfire, amount to: 2 medical officers, 1 medical cadet, 4 enlisted men, 2 Red Cross nurses, 17 civilian members of the crew and about 12 patients killed and 29 wounded.

The following were also sunk in the harbor: the 2,500 ton dock with the tug ATLANTIK, Ship "47" (fishing vessel), the former minesweeper NORDPOL, the Swedish steamer A. K. FERNSTROEM (863 GRT) with a cargo of 1,200 tons of coal, the submarine depot ship EUPEN, submarine chaser "1210", the Finnish steamer VIPJOERN, the steamer CUXHAVEN (2,500 GRT) and the tugs SASPE and REVA.

Operations to salvage submarine chaser "1210", Ship "47", the NORDPOL, the SASPE and the REVA have been started.

At Neufahrwasser on the same occasion the steamer NEIDENFELS was damaged by a hit on her forecastle. One member of the ship's anti-aircraft crew was killed.

The 1st Motor Minesweeper Flotilla made a search sweep of the area between Tyters and Vikallgrund.

V. Submarine Warfare

The operation of Group "Rossbach" against the enemy convoy must be considered a failure with the probable loss of five of our submarines. Three of these were presumably lost by enemy air attacks near Iceland.

Submarine U "214" carried out a minelaying operation off Colon (Panama Canal).

VI. Aerial WarfareBritish Isles and Vicinity:

No important missions were flown by the 3rd Air Force.

Muenster (Westphalia) was raided from 1410 to 1600 by 200 Fortresses in two waves, with fighter cover up to and on return from the Dutch area. Heavy damage was caused. Further attacks were carried out on Coesfeld, Haltern and Emschede. Our fighters numbering 416 went up and shot down 47 Fortresses and 3 Thunderbolts for certain; 22 further planes were probably shot down. Our losses amount to 26 fighters and 28 men.

Mediterranean Theater:

The 2nd Air Force reports altogether 136 planes, including 98 fighters, out on operation.

Air Force Command, Southeast had 56 bombers, 37 Stukas, 23 fighters, 23 reconnaissance planes and 43 transport planes out on operation, including 33 bombers and 35 Stukas against Leros. No reports on results have been received.

The enemy attacked the harbor of Cattaro and the airfields of Tatoi, Candia and Gadura. Heavy damage was caused at some points. Four Fortresses were shot down.

Eastern Front:

The 5th Air Force had 37 Planes out on close convoy escort.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

On the afternoon of 9 Oct. Ceuta reported a small convoy of four freighters passing through from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean. No reconnaissance reports have been received from the western and eastern Mediterranean.

In the Italian area warships were detected for the first time on the east coast of Sardinia. Thirty miles east of Olbia there were four PT boats making for the Straits of Bonifacio.

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only slight traffic was observed at Naples and in the Gulf of Salerno. German Naval Command, Italy is of opinion that the patrol activity of destroyers and the heavy escort even of small convoys is due to our PT boat and submarine attacks.

According to photographic reconnaissance there was a large number of merchantment, landing boats and destroyers in Bari. At Termoli six landing boats were identified, but no freighters.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Submarine U "81" fired five misses in CN 3342 on landing craft and has started on return passage since all her torpedoes are expended.

The operation which submarine U "73" carried out for the Intelligence Service was to land an agent on the Alerian coast between 1 degree 50' E. and Oran. Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean has submitted the operational order for this. For copy as per 1/Skl 3054/43 Gkdos. Chfs. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean has also submitted the operational order for mining by submarines U "453" of Brindisi roads. For copy as per 1/Skl 3055/43 Gkdos. Chfs. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

The minelaying operation by PT boats on the west coast of Corsica was carried out during the night of 9 Oct. was planned. Minesweeping in the area south of San Remo was still without result. Coastal traffic was carried out as planned. German Naval Command, Italy reports that all captured Italian vessels are in need of extensive repairs. Some of these ships were damaged by Italians, To put these ships into operational readiness at short notice is, therefore, in most cases impossible. German Naval Command, Italy has instructed Submarine Flotilla, Pola at once to take over the test and laboratory equipment of the Naval Optical Institute at Pola.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

On 8 Oct. between 2300 and 2400 enemy naval forces shelled the coast twelve miles north of Durazzo without effect. At 0705 on 10 Oct. enemy planes unsuccessfully attacked ships in Cattaro Bay. The Anti-aircraft guns of the tanker KNUDSEN shot down one plane. The steamer LEOPARDI left Cattaro for Durazzo. Five special naval commands arrived on 6 Oct. at Split.

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A radio station has been set up. Railway communication to the interior is interrupted. The 623rd and 612th Naval Artillery Battalions, except for two batteries, have been on the way from Trieste to Durazzo by land since 8 Oct.

b. Aegean Sea:

During the night of 9 Oct. several enemy reconnaissance planes flew into the southern Aegean and the area between the Peloponnesos and the Ionian islands. At noon on 9 Oct. an enemy reconnaissance plane reported to Alexandria sighting submarine chaser "2101" and the steamer SALVATORE on Kalymnos roads and the minelayer DRACHE west of Kalymnos. The enemy reconnaissance plane, while over Kalymnos, probably spotted all the vessels hidden on the bays. Nothing is known of the whereabouts of the enemy group reported at 1650 on 9 Oct. off Castell Rosso. The enemy force reported at the same time in the area northwest of Rhodes consisted of 1 light cruiser, 2 destroyers and 2 escort boats, according to a new report. Following the air attack on the morning of 9 Oct. the cruiser was sighted lying stationary with her fore-castle burning heavily. One destroyer was missing.

The DRACHE reported at 0430 on 10 Oct. off the east coast of Kalymnos two destroyers which were searching the coast with searchlights and searchlights. At 1249 our air reconnaissance definitely sighted two enemy destroyers of the ALFRIDI Class putting into the Turkish port of Azuen Kalesi. This will be investigated by our Naval Attache in Istanbul.

The destroyers left again a few hours later and were reported at 1920 by the DRACHE once more off Kalymnos. Our Air Force plans to attack these destroyers with bombers.

The DRACHE has received orders to lay the barrages planned for the night of 9 Oct., during the night of 10 Oct.

At 0853 the convoy of the steamer INGEBORG received orders to enter Mykonos temporarily, owing to the uncertain enemy situation and because the Captain and four of the crew of the steamer INGEBORG were wounded in an enemy air attack. The convoy dropped anchor on the west coast of Mykonos at 1430. If it proves impossible to bring this convoy through to Kos, motor minesweepers or even planes may possibly fetch particularly valuable parts of the cargo or small groups of men. Since the weather deteriorated in the course of the afternoon, the scheduled execution of operation "Leopard" became doubtful. A final decision was postponed until the evening.

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The convoy of the steamer INGEBORG received orders to stand by in immediate readiness on the lee side of the island of Delusa from daybreak on 11 Oct. However, this order could not be carried out because of weather conditions. In the evening operation "Leopard" was postponed for another 24 hours.

So far 302 men of the BULGARIA have been reported rescued. Further figures are still awaited.

With regard to the Fuehrer Directive of 6 Oct., Naval Staff has informed Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy, Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters and Group South that the latter will, in accordance with the Fuehrer's order, use all facilities for the task ordered.

"It is known that the Navy can occupy and supply the islands in the Aegean Sea only as allowed by its small facilities and at a great risk in view of the enemy naval and air superiority. Commander in Chief, Navy reported this to the Fuehrer verbally and by teletype of 8 Oct. This fact must be taken into consideration."

Naval Staff furthermore points out that a copy of the Fuehrer's teletype to Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, with copy to Group South, was not received by Naval Staff until 9 Oct. Naval Staff was therefore advised very late of the measures ordered by the Fuehrer.

c. Black Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

No enemy forces were sighted by our air reconnaissance during the day. No shipping was observed off the Caucasian coast.

2. Own Situation:

The transport convoys arrived at Sevastopol in the evening. They were repeatedly attacked by enemy planes from daylight on, but were well covered by our fighter escort. One naval landing craft out of the third convoy was sunk by an enemy submarine at 1325 south of Yalta. In an air attack on Yalta at 1435 one combined operations boat and the tug BAIKAL were damaged.

Submarine U "23" left Constanta for operations. Submarine U "20" is on return passage to Constanta.

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The 1st PT Boat Flotilla left Ivanbaba in the evening for convoy escort.

Barrage "K 15" was laid according to plan.

Admiral, Black Sea has submitted a brief report about the Navy's share in the evacuation of the Kuban bridgehead. Since 7 Sept. the Navy evacuated the following:

97,941 tons of war materiel
12,437 wounded
6,329 soldiers
12,383 civilians
1,195 horses
2,255 head of livestock
260 motor vehicles
770 horse-drawn vehicles
82 guns.

Besides this transport task the Navy's main duty was to protect the sea transports and to prevent enemy landings behind our front. This entailed numerous engagements with the enemy. For copy of brief report see teletype 0400.

VIII. Situation East Asia

The Naval Attache in Tokyo reports:

"Wake attacked on 6 and 7 Oct. by carrier-borne and shore-based planes, which came from Midway. On both days the attacks were carried out by about 300 planes in four waves. Most of the Japanese bombers on the airfield were destroyed right at the beginning of the attack. The remaining ones did not succeed in reaching the enemy aircraft carrier. Fighters and anti-aircraft guns shot down 20 planes on each day. No attempts at landing were made. Damage was mostly on the airfield. Forty killed. No ships in port.

During the night of 6 Oct. a destroyer engagement took place in the waters of the Solomon islands. One Japanese destroyer was heavily damaged and three enemy destroyers probably sunk. Full particulars are still unknown. Japanese troops at Colombagaro and Vella le Vella (northern islands of the New Georgia Group) were evacuated to Choiseul, except for rear guards. Heavy fighting in progress near Fiaschhafen (New Guinea). Enemy submarine activity in September insignificant."

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Items of Political Importance

"DNB" reports in connection with the situation in Portugal that, contrary to the sensational reports in the Allied press, the situation has not changed. Parliament is not expected to meet before 2 Nov.

The Intelligence Service reports, on the other hand, that there has been no communication with Ponta Delgada since 7 Oct. The station has probably been wiped out.

The Intelligence station at Horta reported at 2200:

"All Germans on the island of Fayal have been arrested and brought in to Ponta Delgada by the steamer ALFONZO ALBUQUERQUE. In Horta searches and confiscation of radio sets and transmitters are taking place. All traffic to and communication with the island of Sao Miguel is interrupted. A convoy of 3 freighters with war materiel and provisions, 4 minesweepers, 2 tugs and 4 destroyers arrived at Horta on the morning of 8 Oct. (Agent did not give nationality of the ships. Presumably American vessels.) The destroyers put out again the same afternoon. The minesweepers remained in harbor, hoisted the Portuguese flag and took Portuguese crews on board. Another 6 transports and 100 minesweepers dropped anchor on the roads. Further ships are expected. An allied naval base is probably being established."

The Naval Attache in Lisbon refers Naval Staff to report to the Intelligence Station, with which there is close cooperation on the situation in the Azores.

Following the reference by the Naval Attache to reports wired by the Ambassador in Lisbon on 6 and 9 Oct.. Naval Staff tried in vain to gain an insight from the Foreign Office into these reports. These are obviously the ones whoes "pacifying" tendency was referred to already on 10 Oct.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff

A. Re: Planning of Schedules for delivery of submarines types XVII, XVIII, XIV, and XX.

Chief, Naval (Ship) Construction Division, explained the "prefabrication" (section construction) process planned by the Main Committee for Shipbuilding Order Control Office - and referred to the objection that in the case of the two

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western groups five out of ten sections of the entire monthly output of 25 submarines (the eastern group will take over another 18 submarines) will lie at one and the same dockyard. However, a still greater objection is that the change-over to prefabrication will necessitate the non-completion and breaking-up of altogether 180 submarines under construction.

Naval (Ship) Construction Division proposed that the submarines under construction be continued until the workers are actually required for prefabrication and also that the Emden and the Stuelken dockyards be made use of, besides the Germania Dockyard, for the construction of special submarine types XIV, XVIII, and XX. Director Schuerer doubted whether the schedules of the Main Committee could be adhered to. The steel mills, prefabrication dockyards and assembly dockyard each have only two months for one submarine, including transport. Although Director Merker has accepted sole responsibility for prefabrication, the Naval (Ship) Construction Division feels obliged to recommend that in the case of the first submarines the prefabrication dockyards be omitted. It fears that the prefabrication process will undoubtedly lead to increases in the time required for final work and trials. As an increased output of submarines, as planned by the Main Committee, is to be achieved not by increasing manpower but exclusively through an improvement in production methods, Naval (Ship) Construction Division doubts whether the scheduled date of 1 April 1944 for the first four submarines can be adhered to without, however, being able to give proof of this. The Naval (Ship) Construction Division is in a difficult position since cancellation of current orders depends on the new schedules laid down.

Commander in Chief, Navy orders that the above objections be first discussed thoroughly by Naval (Ship) Construction Division and Director Merker. From an operational point of view, it is only important that the planned output be maintained.

Further to the conference on 8 Oct. the Chairman of the Shipbuilding Commission reported on the submarine program for the Germania Dockyard at Kiel. For copy of notes of the discussion held on 10 Oct. with diagram of the schedules planned see War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

B. Situation:

1. Army Situation:

The fact that there will apparently be no muddy season on the eastern front this year is being exploited by the enemy

for continuation of his attacks. It was possible on the whole to repulse his large-scale attacks between Melitopol and Zaporozhe. At Zaporozhe an attack by more than ten rifle divisions was repelled. Our attacks against the enemy bridgeheads on the southern Dnieper were discontinued. Heavy pressure is being brought by the enemy on the area west of Smolensk. In the area of Nevel we have put the 1st Army Corps of Army Group North into action.

From Italy and Greece only local fighting is reported.

II. The Fuehrer has suggested that the NIELS JUEL be used as a floating anti-aircraft battery. Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters is to be informed that this has already been ordered by Quartermaster Division and that preparations have been made accordingly.

III. A compilation of losses and damage to our own ships or those sailing for us through enemy action in September 1943 is contained in list as per 1/Skl IE 28437/43 Gkdos. Copy in War Diary, Part D, File "Own Shipping Losses 1943". Fifty-three ships totaling 62,644 G.R.T. became total losses and 50 ships totaling 43,357 G.R.T. were damaged, not counting the losses suffered in ports. Total loss: 103 ships totaling 106,001 G.R.T. About 30% of the losses were caused by mines, about 30% by submarines, about 20% by planes, 12% by PT boats and 8% by gunfire.

IV. Quartermaster General reports that the request for a special allocation of one million 2 cm. cartridges monthly, mostly required for submarines, has been rejected by Armed Forces High Command, Commander in Chief, Navy orders that the reasons for this request be submitted once more to Armed Forces High Command.

Special Items

I. Chief, Foreign Affairs/Intelligence Division, Armed Forces High Command has submitted notes on a discussion with Japanese officers at the Fuehrer Headquarters on 29 Sept. 1943. Copy as per 1/Skl 28784/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XV.

The Japanese officers were given information on the situation as a whole and on the individual theaters of war.

II. Since Portuguese weather reports from the Azores area have ceased since 0200 on 8 Oct., Chief, Meteorological Branch, Hydrographic and Meteorological Division requests Chief of Staff, Naval Staff, with copy to Operations

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Division and Submarine Division to see that other reports from this area be passed at once to the Meteorological Service. They are of utmost importance for advising Commanding Admiral, Submarines of the weather in the Atlantic operational areas as well as for advising all branches of the Armed Forces in the Atlantic coastal areas of western and northern Europe.

Possible measures are under investigation.

Situation 11 Oct.

I. War in Foreign Waters

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the Bay of Biscay 25 planes were detected on operation. One British vessel was located at 0810 in AM0150 and 1 at 1021 in BF 1873. Our air reconnaissance reported at 1010 in BF 1989 (120 miles west of Brest) 2 destroyers and 1 steamer (about 3,000 GRT) on course 240 degrees.

2. Own Situation - Atlantic Coast:

Five submarines were escorted in and one out.

Channel Coast:

Mine-exploding vessel "180" was escorted from Cherbourg to Lezardrieux. It is planned to transfer the vessel to Brest during the night of 11 Oct.; escort will be provided by torpedo boats T "22" and T "25".

Otherwise nothing to report.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern WatersNorth Sea:

Altogether seven ground mines were swept north of Terschelling.

Convoy "463" Elbe Hook (2 steamers and mine-exploding vessel "153" with 2 escort vessels and the 1st Minesweeper Flotilla) left the Elbe at 1000.

In Zealand waters six convoys with a total tonnage of 29,597 GRT were carried through.

Otherwise nothing to report.

Norway, Northern Waters:1. Enemy Situation:

Over the North Sea 15 planes were detected on operation. Minor reconnaissance was reported on 10 Oct. in the areas of Nordvaranger, Petsamo, Trondheim and Lister-Egersund.

Reuter reports officially: "British midget submarines damaged the battleship TIRPITZ in Norwegian waters."

From the time and form of this report it is highly probable that:

- a) Return of the submarines has so far been awaited in vain.
- b) Nothing is known of the course of the operation.
- c) The announcement is the first attempt to elicit a comment from us. To this end all means and tricks of journalism will be used.

2. Own Situation:

In the area of Naval Command, Norway 23 ships were escorted north and 22 south. For altogether 14 ships there were not sufficient escort vessels.

Otherwise nothing to report.

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IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

There was a minesweeper formation between Great Tyters and Lavansaari east of the "Seeigel" barrages.

2. Own Situation:

Minelaying unit "Ostmark" put out for laying of Sjagerrek barrage "XIX" (Operation "Natrium"). This is to be carried out during the night of 11 Oct.

The NIELS JUEL has been refloated and it is planned to tow her to Kiel on 12 Oct.

Otherwise nothing to report.

V. Submarine Warfare

In the North Atlantic an operation is planned with twelve submarines against the ONS convoy in the area AK 10, AD 30.

Submarine U "220" carried out a minelaying operation off St. Johns (Newfoundland).

Submarine U "532", operating in the Indian Ocean, reports lively traffic consisting of single vessels and convoys with light escort close to the coast at the southern tip of India. This submarine sank the steamer PORT LONGWELL (presumably 7,000 GRT), the steamer DIPLOMAT (8,000 GRT), one auxiliary warship of 9,000 GRT, which was equipped with anti-torpedo nets, and one steamer (6,000 GRT) out of a convoy; in all about 30,000 GRT.

Further successes have been reported from the Mediterranean.

Naval Staff advised that Naval Attache in Tokyo that the first MONSUN boat, submarine U "188", is coming from the Gulf of Oman and that the second one, submarine U "183", is proceeding from Mombasa to Penang for repairs and will arrive on 28 Oct. Route and course of approach are requested (see teletype 2145).

VI. Aerial WarfareBritish Isles and Vicinity:

No important missions or events to report.

In the air attacks of 9 Oct. on Anklam and Gdynia 63 four-engined enemy planes were shot down. Ten of our planes were lost.

Mediterranean Theater:

The 2nd Air Force reports 15 planes out on reconnaissance. Air Force Command, Southeast reports 56 bombers, 42 Stukas, 20 fighters, 27 reconnaissance and 37 transport planes out on operation. One enemy destroyer or escort boat was driven ashore by continuous attacks in the southern bay of Levitha (Aegean). Continuous attacks were also carried out on Leros.

The enemy carried out lively air activity over the Italian front. In the Greek area 52 enemy planes approached the area 90 km. west of Salonika via Valona in the morning, but were forced to turn back owing to deteriorating weather conditions. The steamer ROSELLI was heavily damaged in an attack by nine planes on the port and the airfield of Corfu. Eight reconnaissance planes were detected over the Aegean Sea and ten planes supplying insurgents over Greece.

Eastern Front;

The 5th Air Force reported 33 planes out on operation without special event.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

The INDOMITABLE with a destroyer escort was out at sea east of Gibraltar for a few hours during the day. A U. S. Cruiser of the HONOLULU class and a destroyer put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

No reconnaissance reports have been received from the western and eastern Mediterranean.

One of our submarines contacted a westbound convoy at 0109 20 miles north of Bougie.

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In the Gulf of Naples a further increase in destroyers and merchantmen was observed on the afternoon of 10 Oct. These had obviously brought up reinforcements for the land front. This might also well be an assembly for a new landing operation in the opinion of German Naval Command, Italy. The number of ships in the Gulf of Salerno has decreased.

During 10 Oct. ten small vessels were sighted on the supply route from Bari to Termoli. Around 0230 on 10 Oct. the coast near Pescara was shelled from the sea, apparently by two destroyers and motor gunboats. Rumors of an enemy landing at this point have not been confirmed. However, the danger to the open coastal flank is clear.

During the night of 9 Oct. PT boats advanced into the area of Piombino and north of Elba. There was an engagement with one of our submarine chasers. Further interference with convoy traffic in the Ligurian Sea must be expected.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Submarine U "116" registered a hit each on two LST's (each 3,000 GRT) with "Zaunkoenig" torpedoes at 0530 in CJ. The vessels probably sank. At 0019 submarine U "371" heard by hydrophone an impact on the leading destroyer of a westbound convoy detected north of Bougie. Further observation was impossible due to anti-submarine measures.

The minelayers JUMINDA and KEHRWIEDER left Spezia on a minelaying operation.

Mine search off San Remo was broken off without result. It has not been proved that the POMMERN sank through striking an enemy mine. A submarine torpedo hit does not appear out of question. It has not been possible to clear this matter up finally.

German Naval Command, Italy reports that Chief, Supply and Transport, Italy is on his way to Trieste with personnel for three complete sea transport offices, in order to set up these offices on the Dalmatian coast in agreement with Admiral, Adriatic.

After conclusion of the Corsica operation the most important task on the west coast of Italy is the evacuation by sea of materiel from the area Gaeta-Leghorn.

In view of strong enemy action by planes, PT boats and submarines, it is impossible to use large vessels.

Traffic, however, has proceeded smoothly despite great difficulties encountered in bringing up and loading during constant air attacks on the ports and approach routes. Supplies to Elba have also been carried out as planned, using Siebel ferries and harbor defense vessels, anti-aircraft protection being afforded by specially armed Siebel ferries. An intensified submarine chase has been started in this area. Evacuation of large quantities of iron from Piombino with large ships is being prepared. Coastal traffic between Leghorn and Genoa is being carried out by small vessels. Traffic between Marseilles and Italy has not been resumed yet. Only naval landing craft are being sent to the Italian area. The large ships which are not required will be distributed among small ports in Italy and southern France.

Traffic along the east coast of Italy is at present being carried out by auxiliary sailing vessels. At first 6-8,000 tons monthly will have to be carried by sea for supplies to our forces, and later on 15,000 tons monthly. The seizure and fitting-up of escort vessels and submarine chasers is being pursued as an urgent necessity.

The Office of the Under State Secretary of the new Italian naval Organization has begun its functions. An Italian Liaison Staff is attached to German Naval Command, Italy at Levice.

German Naval Command, Italy request the 2nd Air Force to lay aerial mines close to shore and in shallow water in Salerno Bay off Salerno and Pesto and in the Bay of Naples off Naples, Castellamare, Torre Annunziata and Pozzuoli-Niside-Miseno. According to information from Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff to Naval Staff, the 2nd Air Force will be ordered to mine the occupied Italian ports from the air. On account of this information German Naval Command, Italy has requested the 2nd Air Force also to carry out extensive minelaying of the harbor entrances and inshore waters of Taranto, Brindisi, Bari, Barletta, Manfredonia and Termoli.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

The minelayer LAURANA is again out of action.

The steamer LEOPARDI arrived at Durazzo and is to proceed to Corfu during the night of 11 Oct. The tanker KNUDSEN is to be transferred on the evening of 11 Oct. from Cattaro to Durazzo; she is to go on from there during the night of 12 Oct. On the morning of 13 Oct. 3 Siebel ferries, 5 infantry landing boats, 1 coastal defense boat and the steamer H.FISSER are to put out from Pola to Zara with 150 men and the staff company of Naval Shore Commander, Dalmatia aboard.

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The steamer ROSELLI is lying damaged at Corfu, the steamer BOCCACIO in Cattero, and the steamers MERANO and POZA RICA in Zara.

Group South has ordered that the five Siebel ferries already assembled at Trieste are to be assigned to Admiral, Aegean Sea as soon as possible.

b. Aegean Sea:

Submarine chaser "2110" and the steamer SALVATORE with 1,200 Italian prisoners aboard left Kos on 10 Oct. This convoy was seven miles west of Samos at 0600 on 11 Oct.

During the night of 10 Oct. the DRACHE again sighted east of Kalymnos the two destroyers reported there on the evening of 10 Oct. The DRACHE destroyed her secret documents. Aparate documents are to be forwarded to her by plane. Coast patrol boat GA "45" reported at 2209 on 11 Oct.:

"DRACHE is in an engagement with destroyers"

No detailed report has yet been received.

Our air reconnaissance sighted at 0630 on 11 Oct. a destroyer or escort boat 20 miles northeast of Levitha on course 240 degrees. Our planes attacked this vessel, damaged thr and drove her ashore. Air attacks are being continued.

Isola Vecchia on Kalymnos was shelled by enemy destroyers around 2250. Submarine chaser "2102" and the steamer INGEBORG were delayed at Mykonos because of weather conditions.

According to a report from Group South the start of operation "Leopard" has again been postponed for 24 hours because of weather conditions, i.e. until 0130 on 13 Oct.

Group South transmits the following views on the situation from High Command, Army Group E.:

"The decision to carry out operation "Leopard" as soon as possible must be adhered to. The task of Assault Group "Mueller" is to start off, disregarding all risks, as soon as seaway allows and a direct intervention by enemy warships is not to be expected. It is impossible to await a favorable phase of the moon. Attacks on enemy warships by the Air Force has been continued unceasingly. Complete elimination is, however, impossible.

Reconnaissance shows that the Aegean Sea will probably be free from surface forces on 11 and 12 Oct. Thus the necessary tactical conditions for operation "Leopard" to start on 12 Oct. are favorable. The possibility of carrying it out from the navigational point of view can be decided on the spot".

The comments by Group South state that the deterioration of the situation regarding operation "Leopard" is due to loss of time owing to weather conditions, the full moon, the bringing up of enemy forces, the weakening of our Air Force and the losses in our shipping.

The Army also has no new forces available, unless such are brought up from Crete. The elimination of Leros is, nevertheless, still the most important operational target. The longer the delay lasts, the more necessary it is to exhaust all possibilities to maintain the assembly of vessels and to protect the operational base of Kos by provision of additional Army forces and strengthening and Air Force. The request for submarines is again urged since other operational vessels are not available. The suggestion made by Admiral, Aegean to occupy the islands of Stampalia and Levitha meanwhile cannot be agreed to. The proposal of Army Group E to allow General Mueller to issue orders himself, in agreement with the local Naval Commander, when weather conditions improve is agreed to.

Armed Forces High Command has issued instructions that, on orders from the Fuehrer, the islands mentioned in the Fuehrer Directive for the defense of the southeastern area, i.e. Crete, Rhodes, Corfu, Cephallonia, Zante, Scarpanto, Milos, Kos, Chios, Mythilene, Lemnos, Leros and Samos are to be provided beforehand with supplies of every kind to last for six months' fighting, in the same way as Crete, if a constant supply is not assured on account of their proximity to the coast.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Our main direction-finder station at Eupatoria detected four submarines in the northwestern part of the Black Sea and in the area of the Crimea. At noon on 10 Oct. a submarine was bombed by one of our reconnaissance planes 20 miles south of Sudak. Another submarine was sighted five miles east of Alushta.

Own Situation:

As soon as our large convoys had arrived at Sevastopol the submarines acting as remote escort returned to the operational area off the Caucasian coast.

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Three Italian midget submarines started on return passage to Sevastopol. Otherwise there was no convoy traffic, minesweeping or PT boat operations because of bad weather.

VIII. Situation East Asia

According to a report from Allied Headquarters, the Japanese base of Vila on the island of Colombangara was occupied without resistance. Japanese bombers escorted by fighters attacked Allied positions in the area of Finschhafen.

According to Reuter, Japanese positions on Wake Island were attacked by naval and air forces. In the course of this 61 Japanese planes were destroyed on 5 and 6 Oct. The attack was carried out by aircraft carriers and Liberator bombers of the Naval Air Force.

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Items of Political Importance

According to a Swedish report, the Three Power Conference in Moscow is to start on 17 Oct. and will last until the end of the month. It is believed in London that it will be possible to solve the Polish problem, but not according to the wishes of the Polish Exile Government. The American press too is now more optimistic about the prospects of the Conference, since concessions may be expected from all sides in order to reach a reasonable compromise. The question as to how Germany is to be treated after the war still remains the most difficult problem.

The waters of the Azores are patrolled by Allied warships according to an "AP" report from Bern.

In Croatia all Ministers have sent in their resignation to Poglavnik, in order to open the way for the formation of a new Government. The political situation inside this country is extremely tense.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff

I. Army Situation

Continued attacks have given the enemy no important gains on the eastern front.

In southern Italy the enemy has apparently completed his assembly at the Volturmo and the attack is now awaited.

Mopping-up of Istria is completed.

Chief, Naval Staff referred to the necessity of checking the smoke screen defense of Gdynia. At the same time he repeated the order that leave for the TIRPITZ crew is to be arranged in such a way that adequate defensive readiness of the ship at her repair berth is still assured.

II. Chief, Naval Staff approved the sequence of priority for batteries in the west area proposed by Quartermaster General.

For the 30.5 cm. battery with all-around range the Petsamo area has priority over the Atlantic Coast.

Chief of Staff, Naval Staff gave as reasons for this recommendation by Quartermaster Division the uncertain political situation in the northern area (Finland), less danger to the battery there from the air without a concrete covering and the probably lack of naval targets for heavy guns on the Atlantic Coast.

Chief, Naval Staff agreed to the proposal.

Special Items

I. Commander in Chief, Navy has decided on the recommendation of the General Naval Administration Bureau that a submarine base should be established at once at Memel, which is at present being built up as a naval port. Furthermore, investigations are to be made as to whether the southern entrance to the merchant harbor can be closed temporarily for the winter months, in order to acquire a protected winter anchorage for submarines at once if possible. Commanding Admiral, Submarines had requested that the southern entrance to the merchant harbor be definitely closed by a mole. The Reich Minister for Waterways and Power and the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping have raised well-founded objections against this project in the interests of merchant shipping.

II. Naval Intelligence Division in brief Report on the Enemy Situation No. 19/43 deals with the following matters regarding submarine warfare, amongst others:

1. Enemy reports about the convoy battle in the North Atlantic in September 1943.
2. War losses of neutral merchant navies,
3. Alleged enemy successes in the Mediterranean; also; operations by aircraft carriers during the enemy landings at Salerno, in which the UNICORN, HUNTER, BATTLER, STALKER, and ATTACKED participated. Fighter cover was provided by the ILLUSTRIOUS and FORMIDABLE.

This brief report also contains the announcement of the British Admiralty regarding the operation of the Home Fleet against our shipping in Bodeo area on 4 Oct. as well as statements on the French and Italian Fleets.

Finally, the report deals with the statement, already mentioned, of a spokesman of the Committee for Mobilization in the Lower House, according to which $2\frac{1}{2}$ million men are expected to be transported overseas from the U. S. before Christmas.

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The Committee estimates the total available shipping of the Allies, including tankers and coastal vessels, as over 50 million tons. The statement then goes on:

"The sharp decrease in the sinkings by enemy submarines in conjunction with the record-breaking construction of new ships give us 3 million tons more than provided for in the military plan for 1943. Three million tons of shipping - which means in a year nine million tons of freight - are sufficient to equip $1\frac{1}{2}$ million more troops for the European theater. The collapse of Italy gives us an additional $\frac{1}{2}$ a million tons, possibly even more.

At the beginning of the year the War Department announced that it planned to ship altogether nearly 5 million men overseas and that by December 1942 1 million U. S. Troops had been sent aboard. The plans provided for a further $1\frac{1}{2}$ million men, fully equipped, to be shipped by December 1943. The targets set for this year will definitely be reached."

Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Marine Branch comments on the above as follows:

"The estimate that the total tonnage available to the Allies, in overseas and coastal shipping including ships under repair, amounts to 50 million tons (these are tons dead-weight) = 35 million GRT, corresponds with the findings of Naval Intelligence Division. According to our findings the surplus of new constructions during the nine months from January to September 1943 amounts to about $4\frac{1}{2}$ million GRT, i.e. an average of $\frac{1}{2}$ a million GRT per month. In June, August and September the surplus of new constructions was considerably above the average and amounted to 0.9, 0.76 and 1 million GRT, respectively. No opinion can be foremed as to how far this result surpassed the expectations of the enemy.

The spokesman reckons with a shipping surplus of 3 million tons dead-weight = 2 million GRT over and above the military plan, with which 9 million tons d.w. of freight can be transported, in order to equip $1\frac{1}{2}$ million further troops for the European theater. This means that the enemy reckons with three round trips in one year (3 x 3 million d.w. = Nine million tons d.w.) and uses 4 GRT per man (3 x 2 million GRT for $1\frac{1}{2}$ million men = 4 GRT per man) for the transportation of gear and equipment.

According to our own experiences, frequently confirmed, it

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must be assumed that 8 GRT per man are necessary for the transportation of equipment and gear and that in one year about 6 round trips can be carried out on an average from the U. S. to the European theater. With these figures the same final result is arrived at. However, this is provided that all gear for 1½ million troops is brought over from the United States and is not drawn from the European area".

For copy of brief report as per 1/Skl 30885/43 geh. see War Diary, File "Data on the Enemy Situation 1943".

Situation 12 Oct.

I. War in Foreign Waters

Naval Staff advises all vessels in foreign waters of enemy shipping movements with Radiogram 1847.

Otherwise nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the Bay of Biscay 43 planes were detected on operation. One British vessel was located at 1606 in AM 0130.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Off Brest two submarines were escorted out and one in.

On 11 Oct. one ground mine was swept off La Pallice. Group West does not plan to carry out the exercises of the 8th Destroyer Flotilla until the foggy weather has cleared.

Channel Coast:

Torpedo boats T "22" and T "25", acting as remote escort for the convoy of mine-exploding vessel "180", sighted two enemy PT boats at 0048 six miles north of Ile de Bas; after

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firing torpedoes which missed, they withdrew from our gunfire behind a smoke screen.

Mine-exploding vessel "180", which swept two mines east of Les Heaux, put in to Brest at 0800 escorted by the 2nd Minesweeper Flotilla. Torpedo boats T "22" and T "25" followed shortly after.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters

North Sea:

In the Elbe-Hook convoy "463" mine-exploding vessel "153" sustained damage through a mine detonation in AN 8326 and is being towed in to Borkum. The rest of the convoy proceeded on to Helder after a temporary stop on Borkum roads.

Minesweeping in the Heligoland Bight was hampered by fog.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the North Sea 10 planes were detected on operation in the morning and 17 in the afternoon. On 11 Oct. a battery on the Ribachi Peninsula unsuccessfully shelled an incoming Petsamo convoy with 110 rounds. Our own battery returned fire with 70 rounds. Minor reconnaissance activity is reported from the areas of Petsamo, Trondheim and Bergen.

2. Own Situation:

The steamer AMMERLAND (5,381, GRT), carrying fodder for Kirkenes, sank at 0748 ten miles west of Nordkyn after striking a mine. The area had been closed. On 11 Oct. a mine, which had drifted ashore at Utsire, exploded killing three men and wounded one of the Mining and Barrage Command.

Thirty-one ships were escorted north and 29 south. Six ships were delayed due to shortage of escorts.

The Task Force reports that the stern of the midget submarine first sighted has been salvaged and beached next to one already raised. Search for the third boat was discontinued without result owing to current, heavy silting-up and water depth.

Destruction seems certain for the following reasons: numerous hits by gunfire observed for certain; a series of depth charges dropped right at the last diving point; the submarine's vulnerability to depth charges; protracted discharge of oil; knocks definitely heard after 24 hours.

Naval Command, Norway reports:

"Four-fold torpedo net barrage completed in the Langfiordbotn. This barrage is situated about one mile west southwest of Vaddekei lighthouse. The barrage was laid in order to provide a provisional substitute for the berth at Sobnes. In the Sobnes net enclosure the anchor-chain for the mooring buoy was broken. The nets from Sobnes were used for the torpedo net barrage at Landfiordbotn. Immediate restoration of the net enclosure at Sobnes with deep-protection has been ordered."

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

A smoke screen was put up at Kronstadt from 1630. In Kronstadt Bay there was lively gunfire on both sides. Seven parachutes were seen to be dropped from a plane near Tyters at 2120, presumably carrying mines. A smoke screen was put up at Lavansaari in the afternoon by guard boats.

2. Own Situation:

Minelaying operation "Natrium" in the Skagerrak was carried out as planned. The NIELS JUEL is being towed to Kiel. A fire broke out in the stern of the transport MAR DE: PLATA of the transport Unit Copenhagen-Oslo; cause unknown. Her crew was taken over by the escort vessel LEDA and the convoy proceeded. The MAR DEL PLATA put in to Frederikshavn after the fire had been extinguished. The considerable transport and convoy traffic in the Baltic was otherwise carried out without incident.

Six Italian soldiers of the smoke screen company at Gdynia have refused to serve, probably because of the employment of Italian Prisoners of war in that area.

The area of Training Unit, Fleet is closed because of the danger of mines.

Nothing to report from the area of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic and Admiral, Baltic States.

V. Submarine Warfare

Lively enemy air activity was observed near the supply position in BD 34, which necessitated transfer.

Submarine U "608" fired two FAT torpedoes, which missed, on a fast motorship proceeding on course 235 degrees in BE 1776.

In CF 6416 two destroyers were reported and in BE 5656 a search group of three vessels.

Submarine U "536" sank a steamer of 9,000 GRT proceeding on course 260 degrees in CC 52 (500 miles south of Newfoundland).

In view of the situation in the Azores area (see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII), submarines U "154" and U "516" received orders by radiogram at 2329 to take up position in the waters off Ponta Delhada and Horta as temporary operational areas. Assignment: Attacks on enemy warships and merchantment but outside territorial waters only. Portuguese ships are to be treated as neutrals, Incidents with the Portuguese are to be avoided.

VI. Aerial WarfareBritish Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had seven Ju 88's out on free-lance fighter operations over the Atlantic without result. Four planes were out on nuisance raids against London.

No enemy air activity worth mentioning.

Mediterranean Theater:

The 2nd Air Force reports 67 planes out on a bombing operation against the harbor and 17 against the airfield of Ajaccio. Good hits were scored. Otherwise only reconnaissance flights.

Air Force Command, Southeast reports only reconnaissance activity. Enemy activity with ground-attack planes was normal over the front in southern Italy. Bombs were dropped on Civitavecchia. In the Aegean air-field at Maritza was unsuccessfully attacked.

Eastern Front:

The 5th Air Force reports the sighting of four submarines

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Olenya Bay and destruction of one submarine in the entrance to Kola Bay by one of our planes.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

In the afternoon a convoy consisting of 1 transport, 37 freighters and 5 tankers entered the Mediterranean from the west. Five freighters and one tanker put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic. Two freighters left Gibraltar, westbound.

Our air reconnaissance sighted at 1440 15 miles southeast of Gaeta two troop transports and also five minesweepers on alternating courses, obviously out sweeping our barrages. No new information has been received from Sardinia and Corsica. In the Bay of Pozzuoli a slight increase in landing craft was detected and in the harbor of Naples a large increase. At 0525 there were two destroyers 35 miles north-northeast of Bari one course northwest. On the east coast of southern Italy continuous convoy traffic with destroyer escort was observed as far as Termoli.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

A minelaying operation by the JUMINDA and the KEHRWIEDER off the mouth of the Tiber was postponed because of weather conditions.

Escort vessel LIDI was commissioned in Venice on 11 Oct. and PT boats MS "75" and MAS "554" on 12 Oct.

German Naval Command, Italy reports plans to return a large number of French steamers from Genoa to ports in southern France and proposes that French shipping circles be informed and three crews for a shuttle service be provided, since Italian ports must be evacuated immediately. The transfer will be carried out in agreement with the Deputy for German Sea Transportation in the Mediterranean, escort being provided by the 6th and 7th Coast Patrol Forces; for large ships a strong air escort will be provided.

Naval Staff approves this plan of German Naval Command, Italy and considers it necessary to carry it out with all possible speed. The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping has been informed accordingly and requested, if he agrees, to make the necessary arrangements with the French regarding supply of the shuttle crews.

German Naval Command, Italy submitted on 11 Oct. views on the situation regarding the Adriatic Sea:

1. Supply routes along the extended, flat west coastline, which is particularly suited for landing operations of all kinds and for shelling from the sea, are so endangered that coastal traffic is essential. This open flank is only occupied by a small number of Army forces. There is artillery defense only at Ancona and Venice. No naval forces are available for defense of coastal waters. An effective coastal defense is, therefore, only possible by minelaying.
2. Operations Division has transferred the responsibility for the Adriatic Sea area to Group South. Italy is now the center of developments, as confirmed by Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch in connection with the transfer of a Naval Artillery Battalion from northern France to Italy. Defense measures on the east coast of Italy in the Adriatic should, therefore, have priority.
3. As long as Admiral, Adriatic is not yet fully equipped, German Naval Command, Italy will assist with the means available.
 - a. Immediate aims: mining of the harbor entrance Ortona - Pescara, coastal defense barrages between Ortona and Ancona. For this only naval landing craft MFP "483" is at present available. The minelayer LAURANA has been withdrawn from operations because she is not seaworthy.
 - b. The torpedo boat AUDACE is being prepared as a minelayer. It is necessary to leave her under German Naval Command, Italy. If ready in time and if the enemy situation permits, she is to lay mines between the coast and Tremiti. It is essential that the minelayer FASAN, now nearing completion at Trieste, be transferred so that the coastal area Ancona-Venice can be mined.
 - c. Group South is asked to carry out operation "Pelagosa" as ordered by Naval Staff, immediately and with all the means available. In addition, attempts should be made to close the Tremiti-Lagosta area completely. This would, at the same time, also protect the Dalmatian coast.
4. Escort of coastal traffic and the minelaying operation planned are essential. Suitable vessels lying in Venice are being equipped for this purpose.

5. Summary: Effective defense of the open flanks on the east coast of Italy is of decisive importance. Provision of the necessary means (minelayers and mines) is essential. A request for German mines will therefore be unavoidable, as the stocks and quality of Italian mines are inadequate. The 2nd Air Force has been asked to mine the enemy-occupied ports in southern Italy, as requested by Commanding General Armed Forces, South and Naval Staff.

Group South agrees in principle that, until Admiral, Adriatic is fully equipped, operational vessels should again be made available temporarily to carry out the task of German Naval Command, Italy and also in future from time to time after these tasks have been synchronized with those of Admiral, Adriatic. Group South has given up the plan to lay the barrage Tremiti-Pelagosa-Lagosta, because of the large quantity of mines needed without corresponding prospects of success, since the barrage will not be patrolled. A new plan will be drawn up.

Operations Division decides as follows:

On 1. Views on the situation are agreed to.

On 2. The order given by Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch on 10 Oct. was misunderstood. Italy is the focal point only as far as the west area is concerned. Security measures on the east coast of the Adriatic Sea are still just as urgent as those on the Italian Coast.

On 3, a and b Naval Staff agrees with the plans submitted. Water depths permit extensive use of ground mines. The AUDACE is temporarily placed at the disposal of German Naval Command, Italy for operations. The FASAN will, as soon as completed, be assigned to Group South, as mining of the coastal area north of Ancona must at present take second place to the operations of Group South.

On 3, c. On the line Tremiti-Lagosta minelaying only is planned.

On 4. Approval for continuation of measures reported has been given separately.

On 5. Request for an allocation of further mines is awaited.

It must be added, with regard to the Fuehrer Directive on further conduct of the war in Italy, that German Naval Command,

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Italy on 7 Oct. drew attention to the fact that the task assigned to the Navy of coastal defense against enemy landings cannot be carried out if Army coastal defense is not available or is inadequate, as in the case west of Genoa and south of Piombino. Small parts of naval artillery battalions are tied down for batteries and Sea fortresses. Naval forces for patrol of coastal waters are inadequate. Absence of Army coastal defense may also jeopardize coastal traffic. German Naval Command, Italy has requested that influence be used with Armed Forces High Command not to withdraw coastal defense but to build it up in the area from Savona to the French border, since the Navy can only support but not take over the tasks of the Army.

Armed Forces High Command already transmitted on 8 Oct. the Fuehrer's decision on this matter, which is dealt with in War Diary of 8 Oct.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

According to report from the Port Commander, Dubrovnik two vessels of unknown nationality passed Dubrovnik on northerly course at a distance of six miles at 0030 on 11 Oct. Because of the danger of a landing a state of readiness was ordered until daybreak.

On the afternoon of 12 Oct. the steamer BOCCACIO left Cattaro for Durazzo, the steamers PROCARICA and MERANO left Zara for Cattaro and the tanker KNUDSEN left Durazzo for Corfu. The steamer LEOPARDI arrived at Corfu. The steamer MARIO ROSELLI sank in Corfu due to the bomb damage sustained. The steamer H. FISSER (5,145 GRT) caught fire in Pola and had to be beached.

b. Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

On 11 Oct. single planes were on reconnaissance over the southern Aegean. At 1042 the harbor and town of Corfu were bombed without damage. On the evening of 11 Oct. strong formations attacked the town of Rhodes and the airfield of Meritza.

At 0105 on 12 Oct. our air reconnaissance sighted 15 miles north-east of Sirina two torpedo boats on course southeast. The boats were not located again after daybreak. In the early afternoon there were 2 cruisers and 2 destroyers south of

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Castell Rosso on course northwest and 1 cruiser and 1 destroyer in the Kasos Strait (east of Crete) on course north-northwest.

During the night of 11 Oct. the battery on the southern point of Leros shelled the Bay of Isola Vecchia (Kalymnos).

Own Situation:

The DRACHE reported at 0153 by radiogram. She was lying camouflaged in Penconda Bay during the night of 11 Oct.

Group South has submitted to Army Group E the following views with regard to operation "Leopard":

- "1. The first task of the Navy, which was to bring up Army forces, landing craft and naval forces to the assembly areas around Kos, has for the most part been carried out. The offensive mine barrage, planned in connection with this landing operation as protection for the landing units which has been partially laid. As far as the Navy is concerned with this landing operation, all available forces are in close proximity and ready to start off.
2. The actual operation upon landing must be carried out by the Army and Air Force in the absence of effective naval forces. The tasks which still fall to the Navy depend, not counting weather conditions, decisively on the strength of our Air Force, which has to make up for the weakness of our naval forces, ensure protection for our landing units by eliminating enemy naval forces and make attacks on enemy shore installations, thus making up for the lack of support by naval guns.
3. Therefore any comment as to the advisability of further adherence to the present operation planned against Leros and estimation of the most promising date depend considerably on information regarding the development in strength of our own Air Force compared with that of the enemy and its effectiveness against enemy naval forces. This will in the long run also decisively influence the continuation of the operation.
4. The importance of effective operations by our Air Force now lies particularly in preventing the smashing of our forces; enemy naval forces must be kept away from the landing unit in the assembly areas during the landing, enemy batteries must be neutralized in the landing area.

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and assistance rendered, by attacks on enemy naval and Air Forces, in assuring reinforcements by sea for the operation going on against Leros and supplies to the assembly area of Kos.

5. If the Air Force can fulfill these expectations with the new forces brought up or those still to be brought up, then the situation and decision accordingly reached to continue the operation against Leros is clear.
6. In this connection it must be emphasized once more that the Dodecanese can only be held with Leros, if at all. For reasons of naval strategy, it is necessary to hold Leros in order to occupy the entire Dodecanese. It is therefore necessary that the Air Force supply itself particularly to carrying out operational tasks at sea in connection with the movements of supplies necessary for holding the islands.
7. The Navy is ready to carry out the landing, though with very scanty forces. These will just suffice for the present operation, if the Air Force supplements them, but they represent all that could be provided at present although losses sustained so far have been slight.
8. No further naval forces can be brought up at present, owing to the situation in the Mediterranean as a whole. The request of the Army Group for additional air forces is also urgent as regards naval operations."

A report of the Coast Patrol Flotilla, Attica to Chief, Naval Communications Division states that one of the six naval landing craft which were lost in the convoy of the OLYMPOS is lying pillaged in a bay of Stampalia. It must therefore be assumed that secret documents have fallen into the hands of the enemy. For details see Radiogram 2241. Chief, Naval Communications Division will take the necessary steps.

Mopping-up of Naxos by three patrol boats of Coast Patrol Flotilla, Attica is planned for 12 Oct. A report on this has not yet been received.

A heavy net barrage has been laid off Ponticonisi (north of Trikerri). The convoy of the steamer SALVATORE with 1,200 prisoners from Kos arrived at Piraeus and the convoy of the steamer TARQUINIA carrying German troops arrived at Patras from Zante. The steamer LEOPARDI with Italian prisoners aboard is being escorted from Corfu to Piraeus by submarine chaser "2101".

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c. Black Sea:

No PT boats were out on operation because of stormy weather. Convoy traffic was canceled. Eight harbor defense boats sank or were smashed in stormy weather at Kerch, while in Feodosiya 1 tug, 1 lighter and 3 fishing smacks sank. The net barrage was heavily damaged. In the Strait of Kerch numerous drifting mines were sighted, some of which drifted ashore.

An anti-torpedo barrage was laid in front of the floating dock and dry dock at Sevastopol.

For request of Group South and Admiral, Black sea with regard to the organization of the naval artillery battalions in the Strait of Kerch and in the sector Ivanbaba/Feodosiya see teletype 1145. This matter will be settled by Quartermaster Division.

VIII. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance.

According to Reuter, Churchill announced in the House of Commons on 12 Oct. that the Portuguese Government, at the request of Great Britain, has agreed to make certain concessions on the Azores in order to ensure better protection for merchant shipping in the Atlantic. Agreements are said to be of a temporary nature. All British forces will be withdrawn from the Azores at the end of hostilities. Great Britain will provide the Portuguese on the Azores with the necessary military and other supplies. The desire of the Portuguese Government to continue its policy of neutrality on the European Continent is not affected.

The Portuguese Government has officially announced in this connection that Portugal had pointed out on each occasion when she defined her neutrality that she was honestly determined to maintain this but that she considered it to be qualified by the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. The Portuguese Government has kept her obligations under the non-aggression pact with Spain and has already notified Spain accordingly. The present concession gives new force to the old alliance between Portugal and England and is a proof that the friendship already existing has become closer.

It is officially announced in London that the United States were kept informed of the negotiations with Portugal and that they approved the signing of this agreement. According to Reuter, Roosevelt has stated that the United States will use the bases on the Azores together with the British. If necessary this will also be done by other nations at war with the Axis powers.

It is stated that Churchill and Roosevelt decided in May at Washington to try to have the bases placed at their disposal.

Franco has announced, also according to Reuter, that Spain will also continue to maintain watchful neutrality.

It is unnecessary to set down further considerations on this event. The fact that the Portuguese can allow themselves now to give way to British pressure without fear of German retaliations is an indication of the evaluation of our situation. The strategic effects of the occupation of the Azores at the expense of our war against merchant shipping and in favor of increased enemy freedom of movement in the central Atlantic are obvious. They actually demand very heavy attacks with every means available on the island bases and would also justify treatment of Portugal herself and all her

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possessions as enemy territory. It would be necessary for this to use adequate naval power; this is at present no more possible than it was in 1940 and 1941, when the question of an occupation of the Atlantic islands as a precautionary measure was considered and had to be rejected by Naval Staff. Further comments on this matter are contained in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff

Army Situation:

The enemy launched new large-scale attacks at various points on the eastern front. In the Zaporozhe area the situation is tense. Before the sectors of the 4th 9th Armies of the Central Army Group a full defensive success was gained. Only in the area of Vitebsk did the enemy gain some ground and reach the Upper Dvina.

An enemy attack on a broad front is expected in Italy.

Otherwise no special conferences and decisions to report.

Special Items

I. Requirements of mines and anti-sweeping devices for all theaters of war will be exceptionally high next spring. Operations Division has requested Naval Ordnance Division, Underwater Obstacles Branch to state what quantities monthly of EMC, EMF, EMR, UMA and UMB mines and cutting floats can be expected for the next six months within current production and when the special program of the Ministry of Armament and Ammunition will commence and what the output will be. It may be necessary to report on this matter again to Commander in Chief, Navy and to request him to petition Minister Speer to speed up the mine program.

II. Group North/Fleet has recommended, at the request of the Commander, Destroyers, that destroyer Z "30" be transferred to the west area instead of destroyer Z "34" for reasons of assignment to different flotillas. Since fulfillment of this request would mean consumption of an additional 1,000 cbm. of furnace oil, Operations Division has not approved the proposal but left open a change in assignment of the destroyers to different flotillas.

Otherwise Naval Staff agrees to the recommended transfers.

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III. Foreign Affairs/Intelligence Division reported in Enemy Situation Report No. 18 of 2 Oct. amongst other things as follows:

1. Owing to the approaching Nordic winter, large-scale landings in northern Scandinavia are hardly to be expected any more this year. The possibility of a restricted landing operation in central and southern Norway, however, still exists.

2. The large number of reports, so far fantastic, on operations which are allegedly imminent on the North Sea and Channel coasts as well as on the French Atlantic coast, indicates a plan to conceal and misconstrue facts. Strategic, but especially political, reasons indicate that the large-scale Allied offensive in the west has been postponed for the time being and that it is hardly likely this year. Operations with restricted objectives are, however, still to be expected.

3. It seems that the Iberian Peninsula is not intended as a base for a thrust into Europe until the final phase of the war. There is talk of the Azores being a demand by the United States to compensate for the weak attitude of Portugal towards Japan on the Timor question.

4. Only commando operations are to be expected at present against the south coast of France and the Ligurian coast. Plans for large scale Anglo-American operations against southern France may have been postponed for the present.

5. The development of the situation in the Balkans is determined by the trend of relations between the Soviet Union and the British and Americans: Since no clarification is expected in the near future and large-scale operations in the Balkan area during the winter can hardly be carried out, the British and Americans will restrict themselves during operations against the east coast of the Adriatic to attempts to build bridgeheads in order to attain their political objective of forcing Hungary and the Balkan States out of the Axis through cooperation with the insurgents and through air attacks. The British interests in the Balkans are very great, while the Americans have only strategic interests there.

6. Turkey will not take any action against Germany as long as the Balkan States are dependent on the Reich. She would probably only join in the war on the side of England in order to defend her position on the Straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles, Tr.N.) against Russian aspirations and in attempt to win the other Balkan States over to an alliance under British leadership.

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7. In the Eastern Mediterranean only operations for the further occupation of single Greek islands and perhaps against Greece are to be expected during the current year.

Foreign Affairs/Intelligence Division has reached the conclusion that no large-scale operations are likely this winter so that the intensification of the war against Japan urged by Roosevelt would naturally follow.

Situation 13 Oct.

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report of 12 Oct. naval and air bases on the Cape Verde Island are also said to have been placed at the disposal of Great Britain. Troop Transports are said to be lying ready in Gibraltar for a landing in Lagos and Lisbon in case of a German declaration of war on Portugal.

2. Own Situation:

No messages have been received from Ship "28" since 15 Sept. On the basis of her fuel supplies, Naval Staff estimates that she is crossing the border of the operational area just now, so that she is expected to arrive in Japan during the first days of November.

Naval Staff has instructed the Naval Attache in Tokyo to notify the Japanese Navy that Ship "28" is returning through the North Pacific and to request freedom of action on return route.

Ship "28" has been advised accordingly by Radiogram 2309 and instructed to refrain from attacks outside the operational area until a reply has been received from the Japanese.

The Japanese Liaison Officer has stated that the TANNE will leave Kure on 13 Oct., dock in Singapore and leave Penang on 12 Nov. Oil will be supplied in the Indian Ocean from German Ships. The passage from Penang to the German sphere of influence will take about two months. Cargo for Germany consists of 100 tons of tin or tungsten. Docking will be necessary for unloading. Besides the new Naval Attache for Berlin, Admiral Hojima, there are fourteen other passengers aboard.

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Submarine Division has been advised accordingly and asked to decide port of destination as soon as possible. For copy of order 1/Skl I opa 3073/43 Gkdos. Chefs. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. IX.

The Naval Attache in Tokyo has been advised by Radiogram 2150 that the waiting areas for the BRAKE and the BOGOTA are to remain in force, since they were not known either to the CAGNI or the ERITREA.

Naval Staff informs all vessels in foregin waters by Radiogram 2121 on the tankers sailing udner the American flag in the Indian or Pacific Ocean and by Radiogram 2219 of the statements made by Russian deserters regarding Russian traffic from the United States to Siberia. This traffic proceeds from Vancouver, Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and along the North American coast, Aleutian Strait, Kuril Strait, La Percuse Strait to Vladivostok; partly also to Anadyr, Nagaevo, Petropavlovsk/Kamchetski, Alexandrovsk/Sachalin; the ships sail singly. Cargo to the Soviet Union consists mostly of foodstuffs. Ships return to the United States generally in ballast. The United States are said to have handed over about 60 ships in the Pacific to the Soviet Union. Armament of the Soviet ships in the Pacific: on the bow one heavy and one normal anti-aircraft machine-gun, on the bridge two twin anti-aircraft cmchine-guns, sometime heavy ones, the same on the boat deck. On the stern one anti-aircraft guns of 76-122 m.m. Armament is of American Manufacture.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the Bay of Biscay 41 planes were detected on operation. One British vessel was located at 2032 in BF 1960, one at 2323 in AM 7720 and one U. S. Vessel at 1349 in BD 3990.

The Intelligence Service transmits the following report from a reliable agent in Romania, which is confirmed at the same time from a reliable Swiss source:

"There are 10,000 (!) landing boats, with a capacity for 200 men each, lying ready for operations in British ports. The Chief of the operation will be Marshall, who is on his way from the United States to Great Britian. It is said that the landing will take place during or shortly after convlusion of the Three Power Conference in Moscow. This conference will be held during the week from eleven to

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18 Oct. The landing places will be in the area between Boulogne, Dieppe and Rotterdam. Should no agreement be reached in Moscow about the Balkans States, landings are to take place in Greece from the Aegean Sea in the direction of Salonika, cutting off the peninsula of Chalkidike."

Armed Forces High Command, Intelligence Division, Secret Intelligence Section, Naval Liaison reports in this connection: "The sources are obscure. It is possible that this is information circulated by the enemy".

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ELM/J mine was swept off La Pallice and two moored mines on the outward route from Brest. Off Brest, St. Nazaire and La Pallice two submarines were escorted out and one in. Exercises by the 8th Destroyer Flotilla are scheduled for 14 and 15 Oct.

The port of Douarnenez has been closed since 6 Oct. as it is suspected that five overdue fishing boats, which had been properly cleared, have fled to England and as further attempts to flee may be planned.

The change of flag of the three Italian blockade runners will take place at 1600 and 15 Oct.

Channel Coast:

Nothing to report.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters

1. North Sea:

Convoy "463" Elbe-Hook was carried out.

Minesweeping in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North was only partially carried out because of fog. The vessels escorting convoy "463" swept three "ELM/J mines and one ETM mine.

The Swedish steamer RIEGEL ran aground off Rotersand.

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2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Over the North Sea 14 planes were detected on operation. At 2100 on 12 Oct. three PT boats were sighted in the skerries north of Stavanger. The steamer (4,500 GRT) which was damaged by our Air Force on 6 Oct. at the landing stage in Toross, sank according to observations by reconnaissance later on. Regarding the destruction of a submarine in Olenya Bay on 14 Oct. see teletype 1135.

Own Situation:

At 1304 an eastbound convoy, consisting of 5 steamers and 4 tankers escorted by 4 minesweepers, 7 patrol boats, 3 submarine chasers, the escort vessel BELI and K"3", apart from fighter cover, was attacked off Vardoe by eight bombers and torpedo bombers. No damage was sustained.

According to a report from Air Force General Staff, 25 out of 60 attacking enemy planes were shot down during convoy escort operations in the Vardoe area. The convoy sustained no damage. This is obviously one and the same operation. Clarification is awaited.

Thirty-one ships were escorted north and 26 south. Eight ships were left lying in harbor due to shortage of escorts.

The Task Force proposes the following as security restriction for those on leave from the TIRPITZ: "Scheduled leave from Alta since overhaul in the northern area is more suitable than in home waters and saves transfer." Since the damage to the TIRPITZ is said to have become known to the enemy, Group North/Fleet recommends that this fact be included in the security restrictions and slight damage admitted (see teletype 1200).

Operations Division will ask Commander in Chief Navy for a decision.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

I. Enemy Situation:

No information worth mentioning has been received.

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2. Own Situation:

Berths for large battleships along the harbor railroad station at Gdynia cannot be used as a result of bomb hits, since the quay installations are gradually dropping down.

The steamer ALMUT was unsuccessfully attacked at 0415 by an enemy plane 20 miles west of Oesel.

Otherwise nothing to report.

V. Submarine Warfare

In the North Atlantic Group "Schlieffen", consisting of 14 submarines, will at midnight on 15 Oct. be disposed in patrol line AK 4877 - AK 6754, where convoy OnS 206 is awaited. This assumption is based on the mention of AK 6516 as the point for stragglers in radio intelligence intercepted.

Naval Staff advises the Naval Attache in Tokyo that the two MONSUN submarines now on passage to Penang have not yet used up all their torpedoes and that they are therefore proceeding via the operational area of the southwestern point of India. The Japanese Navy is to be advised that these submarines will steer a direct course for the rendezvous position from this operational area. For copy of this signal see Radiogram 2150.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 51 planes out on operation in the west and 7 over the Mediterranean. No special reports of success have been received.

There were only minor enemy penetrations during the day and night of 13 Oct.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Our Air Force carried out reconnaissance flights in the Italian area. Twelve fighter-bombers were out on operation against

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shipping targets west of Ischia and scored one hit on the stern of a large ship and one near miss close to the side of a heavy cruiser.

In the afternoon enemy ground-attack planes were again over the Italian front. In Albania the airfield at Tirana was attacked by strong forces. Eighteen of our planes were destroyed on the ground and 12 slightly damaged, altogether 22 of them being Italian planes.

3. Eastern Front:

The convoy escort success is reported under "Situation Northern Waters". Otherwise nothing to report.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

At 1130 2 KING GEORGE V class, the FORMIDABLE, the INDOMITABLE, 1 HONOLULU class and 8 destroyers left Gibraltar, westbound. The cruiser put in again at 1315, while the 4 large vessels passed Tangier at 1330 making for the Atlantic.

At 1215 Tres Forcas sighted 1 battleship proceeding towards the Mediterranean. One transport with 2 destroyers put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic towards noon.

Air reconnaissance sighted at about 0700 northeast of Alboran an eastbound convoy which consisted of 30 Merchantmen. This is presumably the same convoy as the one reported on the afternoon of 21 Oct. to be entering the Mediterranean. The convoy was not detected again later.

At 1140 an eastbound convoy was sighted north of Philippeville. German Naval Command, Italy presumes that this convoy was assembled in African ports. A submarine was reported to have been sighted 60 miles south of San Remo. No new information has been received from Sardinia and Corsica.

According to the situation report of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South the coast near Mondragone (25 miles northwest of Naples) was shelled from the sea. Eight vessels, presumably minesweepers, were forced to turn away from the mouth of the Volturno by our gunfire. Fifteen km. south of the mouth of the Volturno loadings or unloadings were apparently taking

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place under cruiser protection. Shelling of the coast immediately north of the mouth of the Volturno was continued from midnight on 12 Oct. Minor tank and infantry forces were landed on the northern bank in the mouth of the Volturno at noon. Two heavy vessels, seemingly one battleship and one heavy cruiser were standing by as protection off the Volturno. Our Air Force reports hits on a light cruiser and destroyer off the mouth of the Volturno. Minesweeping was extended to six miles south of Gaeta under destroyer escort.

In Naples a heavy increase in the number of ships was observed; 100 - 180 ships of various types were counted. According to photographic evaluation, the shipping withdrawn from Taranto has been moved forward to Bari and Brindisi. At Termoli an increase in landing craft was detected.

No reports have been received from the eastern Mediterranean.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

At 0417 submarine U "371" sank a destroyer of a west bound convoy with a "Zanunkoenig" torpedo 50 miles northwest of Philippeville. The JUMINDA and the KEHRWIEDER have carried out the minelaying operation off the Tiber as planned. Convoy traffic was carried out without incident. The Pontine Marshes are to be swamped again and water dammed in the Ostia area, since encircling enemy landings are expected. Gaeta will be evacuated, the harbor demolished and blocked. The last of our vessels will leave the port on the evening of 13 Oct.

The Operations Staff of German Naval Command, Italy will transfer from Santa Rosa to Levico (Northern Italy) within the next few days, obviously in agreement with Commanding General, Armed Forces, South.

This measure is not absolutely in line with the Fuehrer's instructions to hold the front south of Rome.

Motor minesweepers R "190" and R "191" left Chalons for Marseilles. Anti-aircraft corvette SH "13" has been decommissioned and one Italian motor minesweeper has been commissioned in Genoa as RA "1".

German Naval Command, Italy reports on the status of the Italian Fleet as follows:

"Following the appointment of Admiral Legnani as Under State Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Ferrari resigned as Deputy Chief of the Admiralty.

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Admiral Varoli Piazza and six officers will go with German Naval Command, Italy to Levico as Liaison Staff. Total personnel of the Italian Admiralty with all divisions is about 100 officers and 3,000 assistants. The "Commandanti di Service della Marina Italiana" will be attached to Naval Shore Commanders, Italian Riviera, West Adriatic and North Adriatic as working staffs. They will be under the Naval Shore Commanders, as regards operations and under the Italian Admiralty as regards technical and personnel matters. They will take up their duties at first for harbor services, communications, coastal reporting and lighthouse services, dockyard and arsenal work. They will also assign volunteers for coastal batteries and auxiliary warships and perhaps also assign volunteers for escort vessels. Start of the organization is at present very slow, since there are as yet no clear, uniform directions for control of German and Italian Commands. The Italian officers have therefore not set aims yet and no enthusiasm for their assignment. At present everything here is guided by the principle that no independent Italian naval offices are to be allowed to exist."

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

The fire aboard the steamer H.FISSER in Pola has been put out. Mining and Barrage Command, Pola took up its duties. It is planned to have a convoy of three steamers put out from Pola to Trieste on 14 Oct. Four Siebel ferries and five torpedo boats will be transferred on 13 Oct. from Pola to Zara.

Group South advises Naval Staff for information of the request to German Naval Command, Italy for data on all naval vessels and merchantmen found in harbors of Naval Shore Commander, West Adriatic, so that they can be distributed over the whole Adriatic in accordance with operational considerations. When distributing the ships for the west Adriatic coastal traffic, Group South will give due consideration to the shipping requirements, already reported, for 15,000 tons of supplies. Operations Division (Naval Staff) has also been asked to submit data available. (See teletype 1850.)

b. Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

The harbor and the sea area of Kos were attacked by planes between 1800 and 2000 on 12 Oct. One plane was shot down.

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The two destroyers reported on the afternoon of 12 Oct. south of Castell Rosso are escort vessels of the HUNT class, according to photographic evaluation. At 1900 on 12 Oct. 1 cruiser and 2 destroyers were located in the Scarpanto Strait. One motor boat, 1 barrage vessel and 1 vessel, apparently a motor boat, were lying in Alinda Bay (Leros) at the same time according to photographs.

According to a report from Commander, Submarine Chasers, there were 2 destroyers on alternating courses from 2000 on 12 Oct off Kos, Pserino and Kalymnos. They definitely withdrew to the north into Turkish territorial waters.

At 0145 on 12 Oct. the DRACHE reported two destroyers east of Kalymnos, course not stated, and from 2155 at the same position again two destroyers on southerly course.

Weather conditions made reliable air reconnaissance impossible on 13 Oct.

At 1600 on 12 Oct. there was a submarine south of Kalymnos. Our own decoy vessel registered no further location after two depthcharge runs.

Own Situation:

Group South reports further postponement of operation "Leopard" until 14 Oct. because of wind strength 6 and seaway 5.

The convoy of the steamer INGEBOURG was detected by enemy air reconnaissance and put in to Syra. Since the weather deteriorated, passage to Kos was not continued.

The DRACHE laid two new barrage sections east of Kalymnos.

Commander, Submarine Chasers reported on 12 Oct. that the regular appearance of enemy destroyers shortly after darkness shows that a direct threat to the weak landing flotillas for operation "Leopard" must be expected at any time.

The steamer SANTORINI was attacked by enemy planes while on passage from Kos to Piraeus and returned to Kos. Most of her Greek crew jumped overboard. The unarmed crew of a rubber dinghy, sent ashore on the Turkish peninsula of Akri by armed fishing vessel KFK "2" in order to pick up survivors sighted there, was overpowered by soldiers, apparently Turkish, who

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suddenly appeared. KFK"2" left Turkish territorial waters again after a short stay.

The steamer SALVATORE put in to Piraeus with more than 1,000 British prisoners. The tanker Knudsen arrived at Corfu. So far approximately 1,200 Italians have been evacuated from Scarpanto.

In the enemy air attack on Corfu at noon on 11 Oct. 35 men were killed and 100 wounded in the Italian prisoner of war camp.

Teletype communications between Sofia and Athens will probably be interrupted for a long time.

One inquiry from Naval Staff regarding operations by our submarines in the Aegean, Group South reports:

"1. The plan is to have one submarine each operate east of Leros and Kalymnos, the second submarine to operate, according to the situation, in the sea area west of Leros, Kalymnos and Kos against enemy destroyers and perhaps cruisers which are operating every night in that area and especially from the east out of Turkish territorial waters against the landing which is about to take place.

2. The continuous presence of enemy surface forces in this sea area very much endangers the assembly of units for the landing operation and might lead to the smashing of our forces before the landing operation, at present held up by bad weather, is started.

3. The purpose of our submarine operations is therefore not the sinking of enemy shipping but the warships endangering our operation. These warships are at the same time carrying out reinforcement of defense on enemy-occupied islands.

4. No enemy submarines have so far been discovered in the narrow waters between Leros and Kalymnos. Cessation of submarine chase is not of great importance for our naval and air forces in this area, since already only the most limited forces are available in the entire Aegean area for submarine chase and these are mainly participating in the landing operation.

5. The appearance of our submarines in the areas where landings are planned would, apart from direct prospects of attacking enemy warships, considerably limit the enemy's present unobstructed freedom of movement and thus substantially facilitate our tasks in occupying and holding the Dodecanese."

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Finally Group South submits the following observation:

"The population in Greece has expressed general satisfaction about numerous recent enemy air attacks. In Piraeus the appearance of enemy planes was greeted with jubilant demonstration. This proves that our propaganda has so far been inadequate and requires immediate intensification."

c. Black Sea:

Admiral Black Sea reports:

1. Bad weather continues, so that there has been no resumption of convoys yet; no patrol lines were taken up.
2. The storm and high water have caused the mooring jetty at Genichesk to break away; naval artillery lighter MAL "11" drifted away and ran aground at the bow. An attempt to tow her off was unsuccessful owing to the present weather conditions.
3. The jetty at Eupatoria was heavily damaged. The possibility of loading is considerably restricted.

Submarine U "20" put in to Constanta from the operational area.

Group South reports that the Bulgarian Ministry of War has agreed to further use of the ZAR FERDINAND and the BURGAS in the Balkans for supply traffic if these ships are in future used only:

- a. between Bulgarian and Romanian ports, or
- b. in the area between Salonika and Piraeus.

These ships can therefore only be used for supplies from the Black Sea to the Aegean on transfer passage.

VIII. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance

In the first commentary on the Three Power Conference "Pravda" rejects all conjectures which deal with the problem of Russian borders or the status of the Baltic States. The most urgent problem is the quickest possible concentration of joint war efforts so as to shorten the war. The solution of post-war problems after the collapse of "Hitler Germany" is dictated by the interest of all Allied countries. The Spanish Blue Division has been withdrawn from the eastern front, according to Reuter.

The foreign press represents Portugal's conduct with regard to the Azores as an example for other neutral countries, e.g. Sweden, Ireland and Turkey. A Swiss paper writes that the decision taken by Portugal, who despite her neutrality on the Continent has joined in the war on the side of the Allies, will enable Allied pressure to be increased on Spain and Argentina. It is said in Lisbon, according to Reuter, that the German Ambassador assured Salazar on 12 Oct. that "Germany appreciates Portugal's difficult position. Germany will still regard Portugal as a friendly neutral."

This statement sounds absolutely unreliable.

The Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate has adopted a resolution in which the United States pledge themselves to post-war cooperation for the maintenance of world peace.

The Badoglio Government has announced a declaration of war on Germany. At the same time Badoglio Italy has been recognized by Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union as an ally. This does not affect the armistice terms.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval StaffI. Army Situation

On the eastern front the Russians have pushed into our lines in the Zaporozhe sector.

On the Volturno front it was possible on the whole to repulse the enemy attack.

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II. Quartermaster General reports:

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Division has not approved the withdrawal of a naval artillery battalion from France to Italy. German Naval Command, Italy has meanwhile reported that Commanding General, Army Group B regards the coastal sector Venice-Grando as particularly vulnerable to landings and has requested mining by the Navy and reinforcement of coastal guns, especially by long-range guns. Commanding General, Army Group B has also requested that a basic change in emplacement of the batteries be considered, since they are known to the enemy and not always set up correctly from the tactical point of view. German Naval Command, Italy has replied:

"Investigations regarding the possibilities of setting up further batteries in the area of Naval Shore Commander, West Adriatic are being made.

This depends particularly on the available personnel. The Navy at present has no reserves. Requests have been made repeatedly to High Command, Navy to assign the naval artillery battalion as planned but this is not to be expected before a month from now. In general it will be impossible to move stationary batteries as this would require a long time and much labor. The question of long-range guns is under investigation."

III. Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division:

a. Naval Staff proposes the following security rulings within the Navy with regard to operation "Paul" (repairs to the TIRPITZ):

"The dockyard period of the TIRPITZ, planned already for some time to take place this winter, will be carried out in the northern area since both at Wilhelmshaven and at Kiel the TIRPITZ would be too much exposed to sudden enemy air attacks. There are already so many other ships of the Fleet in Gdynia that this harbor can no longer accommodate the TIRPITZ. Other ports in home waters are out of question for the dockyard period of the TIRPITZ. Furthermore, the serious fuel situation makes it undesirable to transfer her to home waters and later back to the northern area. Damage sustained by the TIRPITZ through British midget submarines is not the cause for carrying out repairs in the northern area."

Chief, Naval Staff agreed. Instructions to this effect will be sent by order 1/Skl I op 28785/43 Gkdos. Copy in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

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A recommendation that slight damage be admitted to the Naval Attaches of foreign navies was not approved by Chief, Naval Staff since the British certainly know nothing definite and are simply beating about the bush with all their assertions so far.

b. Commanding General, Armed Forces, South has advised Naval Staff, for information, of the request from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Division to the effect that at least one operational minelayer from the area of Group South be assigned at once to German Naval Command, Italy for tasks on the west Adriatic coast. Further more, that the shipping, including escort vessels, required on the same coast for supplies of up to 600 tons daily be left with German Naval Command, Italy and not be transferred to Group South.

IV. Chief, Naval Ordnance Division reports that a request has been sent to the Ministry of Armament and Ammunition to place the 15,000 tons of iron seized for the Navy in Italy at the disposal of Commander in Chief, Navy, so that this quantity does not go entirely to shipbuilding. Commander in Chief, Navy is not yet certain whether the entire quantity will be seized for the Navy, as difficulties may have to be expected during collection in Italy.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

V. Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division:

The request of Group South regarding submarine operations in the Aegean is approved in principle by Naval Staff. It is proposed that Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean be instructed to transfer a submarine to the Aegean Sea.

Chief, Naval Staff agreed.

VI. Quartermaster General reports that six war transports built in the Black Sea have already been fitted-up and commissioned as submarine chasers. Another eight are still under construction. The Navy also cannot do without these eight vessels as submarine chasers. It is, therefore, impossible to hand over to the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping these constructions, or iron for eight other constructions from the Navy quota.

Chief, Naval Staff agreed.

VII. A meeting took place on 13 Oct at the office of Commander in Chief, Navy with the Chairman of the Main Committee for Shipbuilding, Director Merker; Chief Naval (Ship) construction Division participated. For notes on this meeting as per OKM K. Stb 2812/Gkdos see War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

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Special Items

I. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has requested Commander in Chief, Navy, Commander in Chief, Air Force and Commanding General, Armed Forces, South and Army Group B to report the number of purely Italian formations which already exist, subdivided as to categories, and which might later be taken over intact into the Italian Armed Forces.

Armed Forces High Command furthermore advises that no change in the boundary between Army Groups B and F is planned and that the area from Fiume to Susak will remain an operational area in its previous form.

Both of these matters will be dealt with further by Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch.

II. Chief, Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command has issued the following instructions to Army General Staff, Ari Focre, Operations Staff and Naval Staff:

"In the interest of authenticity of Armed Forces reports and of military communiques it is imperative that the Branches of the Armed Forces release for publication even reports which are unfavorable for us. Experience has shown that rumors of such events circulate through large sections of the population, assisted by enemy propaganda, and are only enhanced by our silence. Reports can and should be made public when circumstances make it certain that the enemy has full knowledge of the events. Anyhow the Fuehrer will decide in each individual case whether and in what form unfavorable news is to be made public.

However, for this it is necessary that such news be submitted at least in draft and in the desired form and not be hushed up altogether."

III. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff on 13 Oct. established the new tasks of the German Armistice Commission. Copy of order as per 1/Skl 29080/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

IV. Naval Intelligence Division has issued in "Evaluation of Intelligence on Foreign Navies" statements about fast new submarines of the U. S. Navy. The information concerns twelve submarines of the TAMBOR class of 1,475 tons, launched from 1939 to 1941, which are said to have a surface speed of 21 knots. The submerged speed is unfortunately unknown.

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The constructional form above the waterline is striking in that, when the bow is seen from a great distance, it may lead to confusion with destroyers, escort vessels or submarine chasers. The new CATO class of 72 submarines, launched 1941/1942 and having a displacement of 1,525 tons, shows only slight variations. Of this class another 120 boats are said to have been ordered. Attempts are being made to shorten the time required for construction to nine months. Naval Intelligence Division also reports in "Brief Intelligence on the Enemy Situation" No. 20/43 on: the joint declaration made by Churchill and Roosevelt; a statement by the Secretary of the Navy with regard to submarine warfare; new German torpedoes; the attack by British midget submarines; British and Greek shipping losses; the strength of the U.S. Fleet on 1 Oct., etc. For copy of brief report as per 1/Skl 31379/43 gch. see War Diary, Part D, "Data on the Enemy Situation".

V. A summary of enemy intelligence gained by radio deciphering and radio intelligence from 4 to 10 Oct. is contained in Radio Monitoring Report No. 41/43 of Chief, Naval Communications Division. No special comments are necessary.

Situation 14 Oct.

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Radio deciphering now shows that the U.S. Commanding Admiral, Pacific requested "Nortra" on 28 Aug. to report by radiogram whether three of his whaling ships were at approximately 21° 30' S 70° 20' on 27 Aug. On 20 Sept. "Nortra" received a further radiogram from the same command.

Air transfers over the North Atlantic decreased in August; 378 planes were detected on flights to England and 126 on return flights to the west; 84 planes flew from Brazil to Africa to England and 172 in the other direction.

All vessels in foreign waters were advised of the enemy situation by Radiogram 1618.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attache in Tokyo reported at 0810 (received

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at 1639):

"Ship "28" reports: Position large grid square OD 69. Rendezvous arranged."

Contrary to our estimation, therefore, arrival of the auxiliary cruiser at Yokohama is to be expected already on 17/18 Oct. A fuller report as to why the operation was cut short is to be awaited. Instructions given by Naval Staff on 13 Oct. are anyway superseded.

The Naval Attache in Tokyo also reported:

"1. The TANNE left Kure for Singapore on 13 Oct.; plans to leave Penang on 12 Nov. at twelve knots for position "Tannenwald", where she will arrive about 20 Nov.

2. The BOGOTA leaves Singapore on 9 Nov. through the Sunda Strait for position "Tannenwald" via point "D".

3. The KIEFER will leave Japan for Singapore probably on 5 Nov."

Operations Division has drawn up sailing orders for the blockade runners TANNENFELS, DRESDEN, ELSA ESSBERGER, OSTFRIESLAND, HIMALAYA, PIETRO ORSEDLO and FUJIYAMA and sent the orders to Group West or the Naval Office at Bordeaux for temporary delivery to the captains of the vessels. Copy of order 1/Skl I k 2761/43 Gkdos. Chefs, in War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

The ships are to carry goods to Japan. They will be ready to put out from the end of October or end of November.

Permission to depart will be ordered separately by Naval Staff.

Group West, which will control their passage as far as 30 W., will fix the exact dates for departure.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

No reports have been received on air operations over the Bay of Biscay. One British vessel was located at 2017 200 miles southwest of Rockall Bank and one around midnight on 14 Oct. 340 miles southwest of this Bank. Our air reconnai-

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ssance sighted at 1035 in CF3121 (400 miles west of Cape Ortegal) a southbound convoy of 60 merchantmen with 1 cruiser and 12 escort vessels.

2. Own Situation

Atlantic Coast:

The 8th Destroyer Flotilla (destroyers Z "23", Z "24", Z "32", Z "37") with torpedo boat T "14", the FALKE and the KONDOR left Royan at 0800 for torpedo firing exercises in the southern part of the Bay of Biscay. The route from Brest to the Bay of Biscay ("Liebesbank") has been closed because of mining. Four ELM/J mines were swept off St. Nazaire and one off Lorient. Six submarine chasers are on patrol on route "Liebeslaube". One submarine was escorted from Royan to La Pallice.

Channel Coast:

It is planned to transfer three boats of the 5th PT Boat Flotilla from Dieppe to Boulogne during the night of 14 Oct. Patrol positions in the Channel were not taken up because of bright moonlight.

Otherwise nothing special to report.,

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters

North Sea:

North of Terschelling, northwest of Borkum and southwest of Helder altogether five ground mines were swept in front of convoy "463" on 13 Oct. Between 1445 and 1523 an enemy formation of about 30 planes flew to 150 km. north of Terschelling on easterly course, later on southerly course to 70 km. north of Borkum and from there to the west.

The steamer RIEGEL was refloated from Rotensand.

Norway, Northern Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the North Sea 26 planes were detected on operation.

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Our air reconnaissance over the area of the Faroe Islands and of Jan Mayen was without tactical result.

On 12 and 13 Oct, single reconnaissance planes were sighted in the areas of Vardoe, Banak, Stavanger and Utsire. One Airacobra was shot down off Vardoe. Boats of the 30th M.T.B. Flotilla were at sea west of Stavanger during the night of 14 Oct., according to radio intelligence.

2. Own Situation

PT boat chase north of Stavanger was carried out without success on 13 Oct.

The steamer AMMERLAND, lost on 12 Oct, near Nordkyn, was probably sunk by a torpedo hit according to observations of the escorting BV 138.

Naval Command, Norway reports, with reference to the air attack on our eastbound convoy on 13 Oct. off Vardoe:

"Our eastbound convoy, consisting of 5 steamers, 4 tankers and 16 escort vessels, was attacked in AC 8483 at 1255 on 13 Oct. by about 10 IL 2's which approached at a low altitude. They dropped bombs and fired their machine-guns. A light hit was scored on the bow of the steamer ALSTERDAM. There were some casualties through gunfire. Two planes were shot down by an escort vessel. At 1304 there was a high-altitude attack. Three torpedoes were dropped by parachute from an altitude of 2,000 m. After hitting the water the torpedoes ran on the surface with alternating courses. Bombs were also dropped; no damage to the convoy. There was subsequently an attack by three Bostons which approached at a low level and dropped two torpedoes; one detonated in the middle of the convoy and the second sank down. The torpedoes were dropped from a height of 15 m. and a distance of 2,000 m. Two planes were shot down by an escort vessel. Two men were wounded."

Commander in Chief, Air Force Operations Staff replied as follows to the inquiry from Naval Staff (see War Diary 7 Oct.):

1. Further reconnaissance and fighter formations for the 5th Air Force are impossible at present.
2. The 5th Air Force is investigating possibilities of a transfer of fighter forces from the area of Northern Finland to central Norway in order to strengthen convoy escort in this area when the Arctic nights begin.

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3. The air fuel situation will be settled independently of this."

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

At 0022 minesweeper M "30" was unsuccessfully attacked by a submarine south of Tyters (surface runner). Depth charges were dropped. The submarine was not located.

In Kronstadt Bay there was minor gunfire. Slight traffic consisting of tugs and guardboats was observed.

2. Own Situation:

The patrol position in the Skagerrak against blockade-runners was occupied by four boats. At 1830 on 13 Oct. a patrol boat in the Sound captured a Danish motor fishing vessel with three Danish officers and three civilians who were trying to escape. A Swedish bomber, which flew over one of our patrol boats in the Sound, was fired on. In the Baltic Sea entrances 27 vessels were out sweeping channels. In the Samsøe Belt one mine was detonated. At 2120 on 13 Oct. the escort vessel TELDE of the Aalborg-Oslo unit struck a mine in Aalborg at a position which had been passed over 22 times since the last enemy flight.

On the morning of 14 Oct. mine-exploding vessel "131" of the Oslo-Aarhus convoy detonated two more mines south of Anholt. Naval Command, Baltic draws attention to the danger of mines on route "38" because of the shallow water depth and the almost continuous crosscurrent. Escort vessel BATAVIA III was lost in 1942 on the same route. Naval Command, Baltic recommends that convoys from Aalborg to Oslo and vice versa be suspended at once and a transport service from Frederikshavn to Frederikstad be inaugurated instead with fast single vessels. Until this is done it is suggested that convoy traffic from Aalborg to Oslo be transferred to the Aarhus-Oslo route.

On 9 Oct. a torpedo recovery boat of the Air Force sank after striking a mine outside the swept area off Gdynia. On the afternoon of 13 Oct. a mine detonated north of Gdynia roads 300 m. from a steamer. The firing area in the Putzieger Wik has been closed owing to suspicion of mines.

Convoy and transport traffic in the entire area of Naval Command, Baltic was otherwise carried out without incident.

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Naval Command, Baltic submits the following reports:

I. From Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic:

"1. The Russians are taking advantage of any possible weather conditions to sweep the "Seeigel" barrage.

2. It is deduced from press reports that the enemy plans to push forward south of Veliki Luki in a northwesterly direction towards Riga. He is therefore preparing mine-free routes now as far as possible, so that he can then land troops at once in large numbers on the Estonian coast west of Hungerburg. This would make the situation for the northern flank of the eastern front particularly difficult. It is requested that Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic and Admiral, Baltic States be kept informed continuously on the course of the fighting, so that counter-measures can be prepared in good time should the situation become more tense. In this case it is planned to reinforce "Seeigel" barrage 6 A and 7 A as far as Kiskolku Riff with cutting floats and mines with snagline."

Naval Command, Baltic approves this plan.

II. From Admiral, Baltic States:

Z "According to advice received from the 18th Army Command, a large-scale attack from the Leningrad area is to be expected soon against the Pushkin sector as far as the coast. Railway Battery "Bluecher" will, therefore, be withdrawn during the night of 14 Oct. in agreement with the 18th Army Command. This Battery is restricted to the railroad route near the front. The 18th Army Command plans to use it near Krasnoye Selo. Since sea targets cannot be shelled from this position, Admiral, Baltic States will try to have the 18th Army Command set up the Battery elsewhere. The outcome will be reported."

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

The Polish Admiralty has announced the loss of the destroyer ORKAN, according to Reuter. The destroyer was sunk while escorting a convoy which was destined for Russia (presumably via Basra) and was crossing the Atlantic.

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2 0 Own Situation:

Submarines U "455" and U "631" collided in the North Atlantic in Ak 5255. Both submarines sustained damage. Two meeting points for stragglers of the awaited convoy ONS 20 have become known through radio intelligence. A rendezvous in Al 2955 on course 290° has been intercepted for 1300 on 15 Oct. The convoy has obviously been delayed by the continuously heavy westerly winds.

Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff advises Naval Staff, in reply to the request of 5 Oct. (see War Diary 5 Oct.) regarding the use of BV 222's in the Atlantic, that it is planned to use these planes, as long as the air situation permits, even after assignment of the 5th Long-Range Reconnaissance Group (Ju 290's); further expansion of the ground organization at Biscarosse is impossible at present owing to lack of workers. Therefore until further notice not more than two flying boats can be out on operation at the same time.

VI. Aerial WarfareBritish Isles and Vicinity:

No special reports have been received from the west area on daytime activity. Detection of the convoy in the Atlantic has been reported under Situation "West Area".

Shortly after noon a heavy bomber formation of 300 - 350 planes, with heavy fighter escort as far as Holland, flew into Germany. The armament works in Schweinfurt were heavily attacked by about 250 Fortresses and were seriously damaged. The main works, especially the ball bearing plants, are temporarily out of action. Traffic installations also were badly damaged. In all 833 fighters and heavy fighters of Air Force Command, Center were sent up and the enemy was engaged. The 3rd Air Force reports 49 planes on operation but no engagements with the enemy. According to reports received up to now, 121 enemy planes were shot down. Fourteen of our planes were lost and 15 damaged. The enemy only admits the loss of 63 planes in all and claims to have shot down 121 German planes. This proves how unreliable American figures are. In the evening and during the night of 14 Oct. no important operations took place.

Mediterranean Theater:

No bombing operations against naval targets by us in the

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Mediterranean are reported. Reconnaissance was limited to the Italian area and the Southern Aegean. In the morning the enemy attacked the station and railroad installations in Terni (north-east of Rome). Three freight cars with ammunition and nine with heavy bombs exploded. Two of the attacking planes were shot down. Further attacks were carried out on Grosseto, Orbetello and Tarquinia.

In the Aegean, the airfield of Argos was attacked. One of our planes was damaged and one shot down in aerial combat. No planes were shot down by us.

Eastern Front:

Nothing to report.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

Nine freighters and 1 tanker, all in ballast, put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean. A convoy of 20 freighters and 3 tankers left Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

Our air reconnaissance sighted at 0735 20 miles north of Arzeu 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers and 5 fighters on southwesterly course.

At 0955 6 miles from Cape Tropez a submarine fired on one of our convoys consisting of 5 barges, 1 naval landing craft and 2 harbor defense boats. The submarine submerged when our boats returned fire. One barge sustained slight damage. Another submarine position was reported at 2250 110 miles west southwest of Ajaccio.

In the Naples area an increase of cruisers and minesweepers was noted. On the afternoon of 13 Oct. a convoy was observed putting into the Strait of Otranto.

Radio intelligence intercepted at noon on 14 Oct. lively operational and tactical radio traffic in the eastern Mediterranean. A British vessel, presumably the leading ship of light naval forces in the Aegean, transmitted a tactical signal to Alexandria.

The U.S. Navy Department announced that two U.S. destroyers have sunk as a result of underwater explosion off Salerno and at another point in the Mediterranean.

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2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

German Naval Command, Italy will transfer to Levico during the night of 14 Oct.

According to a report from German Naval Command, Italy, Commanding General, Armed Forces, South has made urgent demands for closing of the Leghorn Wall over Elba to Nettunia and also for coastal defense barrages on the east coast of Italy; this is in addition to immediate mining of Gaeta and the coastal stretches as far as Nettunia which are vulnerable to landings.

This demand exceeds the program planned. German Naval Command, Italy has begun the mining of Gaeta, in view of its urgency, and intends to carry out further operations within the next few days. Naval Staff is asked to approve this.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

Enemy Situation:

On 13 Oct. our air reconnaissance sighted a submerging submarine 30 miles southwest of Zara. An enemy plane dropped bombs on Durazzo.

Own Situation:

Traffic from Pola to Fiume is closed. A fuller report has not yet been received. Departure of the steamer BOCCACIO from Durazzo to the south is planned for the evening of 14 Oct. Transfer of the Siebel ferries and infantry landing boats from Pola to Zara has been postponed.

The following former Italian naval batteries are reported ready for action, but are temporarily manned by the Army:

Valona: batteries with three 14.9 cm. and four 12 cm guns;

Sasseno: battery with six 15.2 cm. guns;

Durazzo sector; batteries with four 12 cm. and four 7.6 cm guns.

The 621st Naval Artillery Battalion is manning in Pola two medium batteries and in Fiume and Trieste one light battery each.

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According to a report from Admiral, Adriatic the 623rd Naval Artillery Battalion has arrived at Ljubljana, without the possibility of further transport.

b. Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

On 13 Oct. a single reconnaissance plane was sighted in the southern Aegean. At noon three planes dropped bombs on Gavdos.

During the night of 13 Oct. leaflets were dropped on Kalymnos stating that the British would land on 16 Oct.

During the night of 13 Oct. between 2250 and 0050 two destroyers were repeatedly sighted in the area of Kos. The radar station at Scarpanto located between 0220 and 0340 about 25 miles east of Scarpanto tow shipping targets on southeasterly course. On the evening of 14 Oct. several units were again operating in the area between Kos and Kalymnos as well as off the island of Nisyros south of Kos.

The following were sighted:

At 2230 two naval vessels four miles south of Nisyros and
At 2250 two destroyers south of Kalymnos on northeasterly course.

At 2340 submarine chaser "2101" reported an engagement with two enemy PT boats, presumably off Kalymnos roads.

Shortly after midnight on 14 Oct. two destroyers shelled Kos.

At 0955 an attack was carried out by 76 planes on the airfield of Argos. Most of the bombs fell on the town and some on the runway. Heavy damage was caused to buildings in the town. Seven Germans were killed.

Own Situation:

The steamer MARGUERITA of the convoy from Argostoli to Patras sank at 2140 on 13 Oct. 30 miles west of Patras, apparently through striking a mine. Five German soldiers are missing. Of the 900 Italian prisoners aboard 350 were rescued. The steamer TARQUINIA (748 GRT) caught fire in the harbor of Argostoli and was beached. The origin of the fire is unknown. Most of the crew was rescued.

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The tanker KNUDSEN with 2,000 prisoners aboard and submarine chaser "2105" dropped anchor off Leucas at 0630 on 14 Oct. Further passage to Patras is planned for the evening.

The hospital ship GRADISCA is to leave Patras at 0400 on 15 Oct. for the exchange of wounded. The ship will be escorted by a coast patrol boat as far as eight miles southwest of Argostoli.

In connection with operation "Leopopard" the convoy of the steamers KARI and TRARANI, carrying German troops and escorted by two submarine chasers and one motor minesweeper, left Piraeus for Kos at 1550. The convoy of the INGEBORG will follow 24 hours later. The steamer GERDA TOFT, with German troops aboard, coming from Patras dropped anchor off Istria in the morning.

Admiral, Aegean reported on 13 Oct. to Group South as follows:

"Experiences of the last few weeks in the operational use of freighters as troop transports reveal continuous difficulties between the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, the Mediterranean shipping office and my demands. The civilian office is naturally not in a position to know the requirements and plans of the operational command. It therefore manages shipping as it thinks fit, which is quite out of proportion under present conditions.

As Commanding Admiral I am therefore restricted in my freedom of action in my very own sphere, i.e. in the use of all shipping. At the present moment I must regard all transports as naval war materiel. These conditions cannot be allowed to continue, especially as operations are being intensified. They are caused, however, by the financial basis of the Mediterranean shipping office, which has to cover the costs of its organization from freight charges in free traffic. It is therefore imperative for the future that the Commanding Admiral, Naval Forces have transports at his disposal to a greater extent."

Group South transmits this report to Naval Staff and the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping with the comment that the Group is of the same opinion and, in view of the present naval situation and the operational tasks assigned to the Navy, considers it essential to give Admiral, Aegean the right to decide on the use of all available shipping in the Aegean Sea until further notice. Group South has ordered this as a command ruling.

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c. Black Sea:

Convoys have not yet been resumed because bad weather continues.

Patrol lines have not been taken up.

VIII. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance

The article . in "Pravda" on the Moscow Conference (see War Diary 14 Oct.) has caused a considerable stir in Anglo-American circles, as was to be expected. "United Press" reports on the general opinion, with the comment that the points for discussion between the three parties at the Conference were not cleared up without some trouble.

It can be assumed that England would not have sent her Foreign Minister or political advisers to Moscow had the Russian Government been unwilling to discuss political matters. Attention is also drawn in London to Churchill's statement according to which no subject was to be excluded from the Conference.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff

A. Report by Naval (Ship) Construction Division on the condition of the TIRPITZ

A survey report on the first tubines has been received from Vice Admiral Stiegel: it appears that repairs can be carried out on the spot despite rather serious damage. Damage of a constructional nature and to armament can also be repaired aboard. Naval (Ship) Construction Division estimates that entire repairs will take four months.

This, of course, makes necessary the transfer to Kaafjord of quite a number of auxiliary vessels (two repair ships, power and heat ships, diving tenders, caissons and small vessels). Accommodation for the 600 workers to be assigned from home ports presents the most difficult task and is planned on the very large passenger steamer STAVANGERFJORD.

Commander in Chief, Navy decides that all possible measures must be taken to protect this large assembly of ships from the enemy attacks which are to be expected. In particular the workers must be accommodated on shore and aboard the TIRPITZ in place of the crew, part of which is on leave, in order to spare the large and very conspicuous passenger steamer. He orders Quartermaster Division to make the necessary arrangements.

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B. Situation:

I. Army Situation:

During the heavy defensive battle, which reveals several points of concentration, our lines in the sector of Zaporozhe were penetrated. It may be impossible to hold the bridgehead.

II. Quartermaster General reports on the command ruling of Group South regarding rights over merchant shipping in the Aegean Sea by Admiral, Aegean, as per report in War Diary 14 Oct. Objections have already been raised by the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping. It is suggested for the time being that Admiral, Aegean be asked to state concrete cases of inappropriate control by the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping.

Chief, Naval Staff agrees.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

III. Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division:

a. The Military Attache at Bangkok reported on 8 Oct.:

The Japanese Command is actually making preparations for defense against the enemy outflanking operation against Burma, but expects that this operation will only be on a small scale. It will be impossible for the Japanese to attain air superiority since only about 1,000 planes can be made available for this sector. Lack of shipping hampers the dispatch of troops.

b. The exchange of German and British seriously wounded started today with the departure of the hospital ships provided. For details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

Special Items

I. The telegrams exchanged between the Emperor of Japan and the Fuehrer on the occasion of the presentation of the two German submarines are to be found, as per 1/Skl. 27263/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

II. According to an intelligence report, based on information from the British Ministry of Transport and shipping circles, the Allies will have sufficient shipping available by the end

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end of 1943 to transport 6-7 divisions without having to resort to traffic engaged elsewhere; this is due to present favorable conditions in the war against merchant shipping and the present shipbuilding situation in Great Britain.

Sufficient shipping for 12 - 14 divisions will be available in spring 1944, if present developments continue. Only for a large-scale offensive in the west will it be necessary to make still further large provisions of shipping.

This report is under investigation by Naval Intelligence Division.

III. Lt. Cdr. Becker has made a report on the interviews which Captain Grossi and Commander Borghese had with the Duce, Marshal Graziani and Admiral Legnani. For copy of report see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

Situation 15 Oct.

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

By radiogram 1105 Naval Staff confirms to Ship "28" the report on her position, transmitted by the Naval Attache in Tokyo as being in OD 69, and adds that Radiogram 2309 of 13 Oct. is superseded by this message.

By Radiogram 2318 the following instructions are dispatched to Ship "28" and the Naval Attache in Tokyo:

"1. Contrary to the views expressed in Radiogram 2258 of 15 Sept., Naval Staff presumed that Ship "28" might remain longer in the operational area, since the requested report of arrival was not received. Therefore a new assessment of the situation was dispatched on 13 Oct. by Radiogram 2309.

2. Should there be any difficulties with the Japanese about the delay in reporting the return of Ship "28", you are to assert that fuel shortage forced her to return and that the report on this from Ship "28" was not heard."

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The Naval Attache in Tokyo reports that the waiting areas for the BOGOTA became known to the commanders of the AQUILLA submarines in discussions regarding intermediate supplies. As these waiting areas are the same as for supplies to combat submarines, disclosure is to be assumed. A change will, therefore, be necessary after all.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the Bay of Biscay 46 planes were detected on operation. One British vessel was located 45 miles south of Rockall Bank, one 120 miles southeast of Rockall Bank, one 350 miles west-southwest of Brest and one 270 miles west of Rockall Bank.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Exercises by the 8th Destroyer Flotilla with three torpedo boats have been carried out as planned. The destroyers are putting into the Gironde and the torpedo boats into La-Pallice.

One ELM/J mine was swept off Lorient, one northwest of La-Pallice and one south of Archacon. Six submarines were escorted out and two in.

The 8th Destroyer Flotilla has submitted its report on the torpedo firing exercises. For copy see teletype 1950. It is especially noteworthy that a light gray paint over the entire boat has again proved superior to a camouflage paint of alternating colors. Smoke screens again did not afford sufficient protection.

Channel Coast:

Patrol positions were not taken up. Three boats of the 5th PT Boat Flotilla were transferred from Dieppe to Boulogne as planned. Two of the boats continued their passage to Le Havre, where they arrived at 2230.

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III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters

North Sea:

Convoy "464" Elbe - Hook, consisting of two steamers and three escort boats, left at 1400.

Mine escort operations were partly hampered by fog.

Otherwise nothing to report.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the North Sea 43 planes were detected on operation, presumably flying in the direction of the north Norwegian coast.

Our air reconnaissance sighted at 1020 20 miles northeast of the Faroes (AE 9615) 1 aircraft carrier, 3 cruisers and 2 destroyers on course 240°. Group North/Fleet presumes that an operation against our shipping was broken off owing to the weather. Air reconnaissance has been out again.

According to a report from the reconnaissance plane, the group was again located by radar at 1650 in AE 9869. No observations were possible owing to showers. The plane was fired on by light anti-aircraft guns.

2. Own Situation:

At 0710 on 13 Oct. an enemy submarine unsuccessfully attacked one of our convoys between Bas Fjord and Sylte Fjord. At 1840 on 14 Oct. an incoming Petsamo convoy was unsuccessfully shelled with 62 rounds by a battery on the Ribachi Peninsula.

Naval Command, Norway reports that, in view of the submarine danger close to our prescribed channels off Vardoe, it is planned to lay two deep LMB barrages there across the shipping route, which barrages will be passed over by our ships. Naval Command, Norway plans to draw enemy submarines on to this barrage during attack and mine-laying and requests approval of this plan and provision of the mines. For situation of the barrage see teletype 1600.

Naval Staff has decided as follows:

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"1. Reliable clearance of mined areas is not achieved, as is shown by the loss of the steamer AMMERLAND and the sweeping of three more mines five weeks after the enemy minelaying off Nordkyn was ascertained.

2. Deep barrages on the route prevent effective mine-sweeping and anti-mine escort against the remains of old minelaying and new minelaying expected at this point by Naval Command, Norway.

3. If no time setting has been ascertained, the minelaying must be regarded as a protection against operations by enemy submarines in the same area for about a year.

4. Deep flanking barrages will prevent enemy submarine operations against our convoys only if laid not too far away. Comments on Route "Gruen", which is urged by Coast Patrol Unit, Arctic Coast, are still awaited."

Thirty ships were escorted north and 22 south. In all 18 ships were delayed owing to shortage of escorts.

Group North/Fleet transmits views of the 5th Air Force on a request made by it on 3 Oct. regarding air reconnaissance. The 5th Air Force agrees with the opinion of the Group but is unable to carry out the required reconnaissance because of the order to save aviation fuel. A concentration of fighter forces in Bodoe does not offer any adequate defense for prevention of attacks. Heavy long-range fighter planes would be required but such are not available at present, since every one is being used for home defense. The 5th Air Force has suggested that in this area also single ships be assembled into convoys, so as to strengthen defense. Group North/Fleet again requests Naval Staff to prevail upon Air Force, Operations Staff to ease fuel restrictions. It assumes that Naval Command, Norway will take over responsibility for the request regarding air escort for convoys and will inform the 5th Air Force that in this particular case it was not single ships that were involved but a convoy of four vessels.

Naval Staff cannot do anything further in this matter, since Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff has already replied in the negative to the request made by Naval Staff on 7 Oct. A separate investigation of the fuel question is promised. Group North has been advised of the views of Commander in Chief, Air Force.

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IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

During the night of 13 Oct. three PT boats were sighted 17 miles southeast of Helsinki. On 15 Oct. there was a minesweeping group of 27 vessels off Vigrund.

2. Own Situation:

In the Samsøe Belt one ground mine was swept. The NIELS JUEL arrived at Kiel on the afternoon of 14 Oct.

Otherwise nothing to report.

V. Submarine Warfare

In the North Atlantic a convoy, consisting of more than 30 steamers, was detected at 2140 by submarine U"844" in AL 1822. This is presumably the expected westbound convoy. The submarine lost contact after being dept-charged for three hours. Group "Schlieffen" has been ordered to move at midnight on 16 Oct. 120 miles further north, since the position detected lies about 80 miles north of the ONS route.

Otherwise nothing to report.

VI. Aerial Warfare

British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 43 planes out on operation over the west area and 13 over the Mediterranean.

A convoy of 12 steamers and 4 escorts was detected at 1025 off Start Point on easterly course. At 1300 the unit was again reported, consisting of 20-30 steamers.

Air Commander, Atlantic Coast plans armed reconnaissance on 16 Oct. against the convoy preceeding towards Lisbon and radar reconnaissance against a northbound convoy southwest of the Portuguese coast.

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During the day two enemy formations flew into Air Force area, Holland but did not attack. Fighter formations which flew into western France also carried out no attacks. Only in northern France did single planes attack a transformer plant south of Boulogne. In the evening nine of our bombers started out against London and one plane each against Southend and Harwich.

Only very small enemy air formations were on operation over the Norwegian and Dutch coasts and over Poland; also from the south into the area of Prague via Klagenfurt. The flights to Poland and to Prague were presumably made for landing agents.

Mediterranean Theater:

No bomber operations were carried out by the 2nd Air Force Command, Southeast. In the Italian and Greek areas only reconnaissance was flown.

Enemy air activity was lively over the Italian front. Army anti-aircraft guns reported one plane shot down.

During daylight attacks on the airfields of Sedes and Maga (Salonika) four of our planes were destroyed and nine heavily damaged. Our defense measures were unsuccessful. During the night of 15 Oct. 50 high-explosive bombs were dropped on the airfield of Maritza (Rhodes). No report on damage has been received yet.

From Italy harassing raids on Tarquinia and Chiampino were reported.

Eastern Front:

Over the Army front 50 enemy planes were shot down on 14 Oct. The 4th Air Force carried out photographic reconnaissance over ports in the northern part of the Black Sea.

Reconnaissance evaluations of the 5th Air Force in the North Sea have already been dealt with under "Enemy Situation Norway".

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

No reconnaissance reports have been received from the Gibraltar area or from the Western and Eastern Mediterranean.

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One submarine was sighted off Toulon and one in the Elba Strait. There were two further submarines at 1900 30 miles southwest of Cannes. No shipping movements were observed in Gaeta Bay.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

During the night of 14 Oct. specially armed Siebel ferries three times had engagements with enemy motor gunboats in the Piombino Strait. Shore Battery "Elba" took some part in the engagement. One enemy boat was sunk and another set on fire. One of our Siebel ferries caught fire and sank after return to port. Six men were killed and eleven are missing.

Demolitions in the port of Gaeta were continued. The coastal routes from Spezia to Leghorn were checked, since mines were suspected after a mine barrage was located by echo-ranging eleven miles southeast of Spezia running across the coastal route.

German Naval Command, Italy reports in connection with the order received from Quartermaster Division to prepare for transfer of motor minesweepers R "190" and R "191" from Genoa to the Adriatic via Placencia, that transport is impossible at present since the bridge at Genoa is blown up and investigation of the waterway of the Po River is not yet concluded.

The hospital ship AQUILIA left Spezia at 1900 for Oran.

With regard to the request made by Commanding General, Armed Forces, South (see War Diary 13 Oct.), Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has decided as follows, in accordance with the advice from Naval Staff :

"The Navy has to take the requirements of all parties concerned into consideration when distributing the vessels.

Re 1) The shortage of minelayers in the Aegean Sea and the risk involved prohibits withdrawal of a minelayer from the Aegean. High Command, Navy has placed the Italian torpedo boat AUDACE at the disposal of German Naval Command, Italy for this purpose in the West Adriatic.

Re 2) It is planned to assign to German Naval Command, Italy one third of all naval landing craft becoming available, up to ten, and 50% of Siebel ferries, also up to ten. Furthermore, the formation of harbor defense flotillas has been ordered.

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The measures taken will require some time to come into effect; until then coastal traffic must be carried on provisionally with the vessels in operation."

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

Durazzo reports three minesweepers ready for operation. The steamer OLYMPIA left Trieste for Durazzo. The steamers ITALIA and ARGENTINIA are to proceed in the evening in convoy from Trieste to Durazzo via Pola and Zara. Five Siebel ferries and five infantry landing boats left Pola for Zara.

The steamer H. FISSER sustained only slight damage and is to bring the rest of her cargo of provisions to Zara. The Italian torpedo boat MISSORI supported the advance of the Army from the sea east of Fiume, passed through the Momlacco Channel and carried out reconnaissance of the area around Veglia. She was fired on several times by the enemy. Her crew suffered slight casualties and, in spite of its willingness, proved inefficient for any serious situation. The boat is lying in Trieste out of war readiness.

b. Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Our air reconnaissance sighted at 2120 on 14 Oct. 90 miles east-southeast of Castello Rosso 2 naval vessels of an unidentified type on course 300°. According to a sighting report 1 vessel, presumably a cruiser, and 3 small naval vessels were lying in Castell Rosso at 1520 on 15 Oct.

During the day our radio intelligence intercepted lively air reconnaissance in the Aegean area; our convoys, primarily landing boats, were reported several times.

The DRACHE reported at 1216 sighting a submarine off Pezonda Bay (Kalymnos). This submarine submerged at 1340 after destroying a sailing vessel and withdrew eastward.

A submarine, presumably the same one, shelled Pezonda Bay at 1508 and, after being fired on by a decoy ship, submerged again at 1630 south of Kalymnos. According to a further report from the DRACHE, two destroyers passed westward 10 miles north of Pezonda Bay, one at 1506 and one at 1515. Shore batteries from Leros shelled the northern point of Kalymnos at 1610.

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Own Situation:

The enemy submarine detected south of Kalymnos was probably sunk by coast patrol boat GA "45".

Radar Station Scarpanto was fired on by insurgents on the evening of 14 Oct. Mopping-up operations on Naxos continued; 154 Italians have been transported to Piraeus.

The tanker KNUDSEN put in to Patras from Corfu at noon.

The convoy of the KARI and the TRAPANI, on passage from Piraeus to Kos, was detected by enemy reconnaissance east of Naxos in the morning and turned about at 1325 northeast of Amorgos, as ordered. A submarine chaser escorting this convoy reported at 1702 enemy naval forces in sight from a position four miles southwest of Darusa. Admiral, Aegean plans to have the convoy proceed on from Naxos to Kos on the morning of 16 Oct. The convoy of the INGEBORG is to follow 24 hours later.

The DRACHE received orders in the afternoon to break through northward to Piraeus, taking advantage of the enemy forces withdrawing to the west.

Start of operation "Leopard" has been fixed for 17 Oct. at the earliest.

The hospital ship GRADISCA left Patras at 0515 for Oran.

Convoy traffic in the central and northern Aegean was carried out as planned. Group South suggests, in connection with the order received from Operations Division for one submarine to be transferred immediately for operations in the Aegean, that she be put under the command of Admiral, Aegean.

Chief, Naval Staff will be asked for a decision.

Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean reports, in connection with the same order, that immediate transfer of a submarine is impossible. All submarines in the Eastern Mediterranean are at present at the dockyard in Pola. U "453" will be ready on 23 Oct., and is then to carry out a minelaying operation off Brindisi. U "407" will be ready on 21 Oct., and U "596" and U "81" probably not until the middle of November.

Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean considers a withdrawal of submarines from the Western Mediterranean to be unsuitable.

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Group South reports that, owing to disclosure of the order for closed areas for submarine chase through ransacking of the naval landing craft in Stampalia, these areas in the Aegean have been renamed. For particulars see teletype 1330.

c. Black Sea;Enemy Situation:

According to photographic reconnaissance the following were detected on 15 Oct.: at Gelendzhik 12, at Novorossiisk 4 landing boats; at Primorskoye 100 and at Yeisk 75 boats. Other evaluations are of no great importance.

Between 2025 and 2040 the coast at Cape Opuk was shelled from the sea.

Own Situation

Ship "19" and three armed fishing vessels left Sevastopol for submarine chase in Eupatoria Bay.

Submarine U "24" unsuccessfully attacked a coastal vessel off Suchum with torpedoes.

Convoys on the west coast have been resumed. In order to relieve congestion at Sevastopol a convoy of 48 vessels put out via Ak Mechet for Odessa.

In view of recent losses in naval landing craft and the difficulty of quickly replacing small vessels in the Aegean, Naval Staff will ask the Foreign Office to approach Turkey regarding transfer of naval landing craft from the Black Sea through the Dardanelles. Naval Staff expects, however, that this attempt will only be successful if naval landing craft, to be specially marked, are finally stripped of their character as naval vessels and we undertake not to use them for operational assignments but solely for transportation purposes on certain routes, with civilian crews, civilian captains and flying the merchant flag.

Group South and, for information Admiral, Black Sea, are advised accordingly and the former ordered to cable whether, under these restricted conditions, a withdrawal of naval landing craft from the Black Sea will be acceptable there and if so to report the number.

Return to the Black Sea for use as auxiliary war vessels will be out of question. Group South is also to report for Naval Staff's information numbers, state of readiness and operational

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plans for naval landing craft in the Black Sea.

VIII. Situation East Asia

According to an Allied report, Rabaul was attacked on 13 Oct. by strong British air formations. In this attack 177 Japanese planes are said to have been destroyed, 3 destroyers, 3 merchantmen, 43 small freighters and numerous harbor vessels sunk and 1 submarine and 3 large supply ships damaged.

According to a further report, the entire island group of New Georgia is in the hands of the Allies.

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Items of Political Importance

According to a report from "Domei", the Japanese Ambassador in Lisbon has been instructed to make representations to the Portuguese Government on the occupation of the Azores by British troops and their use as a military base. This action by Portugal, it states, is a violation of her neutrality.

According to Reuer, Willkie intends to run again for President in 1944. He blames the Roosevelt administration for not having armed in time for the unavoidable war with Japan or Germany or with both.

In Argentinian three members of the cabinet, who had agitated for a breaking-off of diplomatic relations with the Axis powers, have resigned under pressure of the military opposition.

Chief, Naval Staff is absent from Berlin for discussions at Fuehrer Headquarters.

Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff

I. Army Situation

On the eastern front hard fighting has broken out along the entire line. Seven centers of attack are apparent:

1. Melitopol/Zaporozhe,
2. Kremenchug,
3. South of Kiev,
4. South of Gomel,
5. Orsha,
6. Smolensk and
7. Veliki Luki/Nevel.

Concentration of exceptional numbers of enemy guns caused heavy losses to our troops at places.

In Italy an offensive has started on the entire Volturno front. Centers of attack are at Campobasso and in the area of Capua.

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II. Naval Situation:

No special conference or decisions.

Special Items

I. The Japanese Liaison Officer transmitted the following report on 16 Oct.:

"The Russian Naval Attache in Stockholm recently paid a visit to the Japanese Naval Attache in Sweden, in order to introduce the newly arrived Russian Assistant Naval Attache. The latter had traveled to Sweden via Vladivostok, the United States and England. In the course of the conversation the Russian repeatedly stressed that it was very fortunate that friendly relations were being maintained between Russia and Japan. The Japanese Naval Attache is of opinion that the emphasis placed on this friendly relationship was not formal but quite genuine.

In reply to the question by the Japanese as to the presumable advance of the British and Americans, the Russian replied that for various reasons it was very probable that the British would penetrate into the Balkans. In reply to the question of the Japanese Naval Attache as to whether this undertaking would not be against Russian interests, the Russian smiled and did not answer. On the question as to how far the Russians plan to advance on the eastern front, he said that he was not informed on this matter, since he was an Attache in Sweden; moreover he seemed to be unwilling to enter into a discussion on the situation on the eastern front."

II. 1. Commander in Chief, Navy has ordered that equipment of submarines with 3.7 cm. anti-aircraft guns be carried out as a priority measure of submarine warfare. For the present single 3.7 cm. guns are entailed.

2. The first four submarines are already being re-equipped.

3. As soon as the 3.7 cm. guns of the serial production can be regarded as ready for operational use, which is expected to be in October 1943, the submarines will be equipped with 3.7 cm. anti-aircraft guns as they become available, in place of the quadruple machine-gun.

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4. Priority of equipment:

- Submarines in Western France,
- Operational submarines from home waters,
- Submarines in Northern Waters and in the Mediterranean,
- Newly constructed submarines.

5. The number of guns available is still small.
 Production will be speeded up.

Situation 16 Oct.

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Radiointelligence reveals the following figures regarding single vessels during the second half of September (first figure - British, second figure - U.S. ships):

| | | | |
|-----------------------------------|----|-----|----|
| South Atlantic as far as Freetown | 11 | and | 1 |
| West coast of South Africa | 10 | " | 5 |
| East coast of South America | 46 | " | 24 |
| Indian Ocean, Northern part | 37 | " | 7 |
| Indian Ocean, Southern part | 6 | " | 13 |
| East coast of South Africa | 5 | " | 0 |
| Pacific, Southern part | 5 | " | 26 |
| Unidentified area | 4 | " | 2 |

This survey is incomplete. All vessels in foreign waters were advised by Radiogram 1813.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attache in Tokyo is given the following instruction by Radiogram 2130:

- 1. Since position "Tannenwald" lies very far to the east, Naval Staff suggests that supply should not be carried out at position "Tannenwald" but only a meeting and agreement on a new rendezvous about 3 - 4 days' run

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further west, depending on weather conditions and traffic.

Give your views.

- 2. No change in waiting areas and points in the sailing orders is intended; they remain in force as reference areas and points. Waiting positions and rendezvous will be ordered specially according to the situation.

The photostat copies forwarded by the Naval Attache in Tokyo of the War Diary of Ship "28", of the UCKERMARK and the copy of "Current Doctrine Cruisers USF 21" are blurred and unreadable. The Naval Attache in Tokyo has been ordered to submit new copies when possible.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the outer part of the Bay of Biscay 37 planes were detected on operation. One British vessel was located 180 miles southeast of Cape Farewell (Greenland) and one 360 miles west-northwest of Belfast.

According to an intelligence report received via Lisbon, the following ships carrying troops and war materiel put in from the United States and Canada during the last two weeks of September:

| | |
|------------------|----|
| at Plymouth | 12 |
| at Cardiff | 70 |
| at Swansea | 18 |
| at Liverpool | 62 |
| at Middlesbrough | 25 |
| at Hull | 35 |

Since the middle of September no transports which had arrived in England have started back to America. Portuguese military circles assume from this plans for invasion on the western front. According to a further intelligence report, leading members of the sabotage organization which has been discovered in France and is directed from England have, upon apprehension, revealed the code word which is to signal the Anglo-American invasion in France. It is a message (for context see teletype 1215) which is to be given out by the British radio in two parts,

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as a warning and as an executive signal. A further intelligence report from Toulouse states that 25 Oct. is the date fixed for the large-scale landing operation on the north coast of France. Simultaneously acts of sabotage are planned in Germany, amongst other things an attempt on the life of the Fuehrer.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Destroyers Z "24" and Z "23" left for Pauillac. Five submarines were escorted in.

Three Italian supply ships have been taken over by the Naval Office in Bordeaux.

Channel Coast:

Patrol positions were not taken up because of bright moonlight. Group West advises Naval Staff for information that three boats of the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla are to be temporarily placed under Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West for combatting enemy PT boats in the Channel. The operation is to be carried out during the coming new-moon period. Subsequently the boats will be transferred back to the west coast. Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West is to transfer the KONDOR, the FALKE and the MOEVE to Le Havre as soon as possible. Torpedo boat T "14", which is to go on to home waters during the coming new-moon period, will join these boats. Group West expects the first operation by the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla to be carried out at the earliest on 21 Oct. from Le Havre. For copy of relevant order see teletype 2355.

III: North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters

North Sea:

Our patrol boats at position "Kairo" repulsed an attack by five enemy PT boats at 0100. One PT boat was probably sunk; no casualties were suffered. For brief report see teletype 1941.

Convoys "1183" Hook - Elbe and "464" Elbe - Hook were carried out as planned. So far no incidents have been reported. The westbound convoy has put in to Helder temporarily.

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Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the North Sea 20 enemy planes were detected on operation.

On 15 Oct. three flights were reported in the Vardoe area and on 16 Oct. and attack by six planes on the Army coastal battery in North Fjord.

2. Own Situation:

Thirty ships were escorted north and 18 south. Fifteen ships were delayed owing to shortage of escorts.

Naval Command, Norway reports the disposition of our forces as on 15 Oct. For copy as per 1/Skl. 28928/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C, Vol IIa.

In connection with the exchange of seriously wounded, the British hospital ships ATLANTIS and EMPRESS OF RUSSIA are on passage to Gothenburg. Positions of both vessels are given regularly and continuously.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

North of Hogland minesweeper M "18" had a brief engagement at 0153 with three PT boats, which put up a smoke screen and withdrew to the northeast. At 1200 a gun carrier leaving Kronstadt Bay was shelled in the channel, so that it was forced to return after putting up a smoke screen.

2. Own Situation:

In Ahlbaek Bay one mine was swept by a plane. Altogether 33 vessels and 3 planes were engaged in minesweeping in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic. Transport and escort operations were carried out as planned. On 15 Oct. one of our steamers observed mines being dropped by a plane north of Pristerort. The area has been closed.

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Finnish PT boats have mined the area west of Lavansaari and laid a barrage south of Aomeri. Minelaying northwest of Schepel could not be carried out by our coastal minelaying, as the boats were driven off by Russian patrol vessels. A naval landing craft is stranded in the harbor of Tyters.

The hospital ship METEOR and RUEGEN are leaving Swinemuende for Gothenburg for the exchange of seriously wounded.

According to a report from Admiral, Baltic States the 18th Army Command has recommended that Battery "Bluecher" be withdrawn at once in view of the enemy situation. As the track was unwisely blown up by the Army when the Battery was brought up, return will not be possible until the track has been repaired. According to the report of Admiral, Baltic States (for copy see teletype 0845) the Army posts are rather strained so that further blunders are expected.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report, there was a convoy of 9 freighters escorted by 3 destroyers and 7 PT boats at 0600 on 13 Oct. off Casablanca on westerly course. On the same day at 1800 19 freighters, 4 destroyers and 5 gunboats left Casablanca, with air escort, to the southwest.

2. Own Situation:

The westbound convoy in the North Atlantic was again detected towards 2000. The shadowing submarine torpedoed a steamer of 6,000 GRT in AK 3739 but was subsequently driven off by a destroyer. The enemy was obviously employing heavy air formations. Four submarines have reported attacks by planes. One was sunk in a bombing attack. The operation is being continued. From the Indian Ocean submarine U "168" reports no targets off Bombay on 29 and 30 Sept. Six freight sailing vessels were sunk by gunfire. On 2 Oct. a freighter of 4,000 GRT was sunk in MH 67.

VI. Aerial Warfare

British Isles and Vicinity:

Forty-six planes of the 3rd Air Force were out on operation

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over the west area (6 of them FW 200's) and 13 over the Mediterranean. During the night of 16 Oct. 3 bombers were sent out on a harassing raid on London and 4 fighter-bombers against Hastings. Minor enemy forces carried out machine-gun attacks on vessels and radar stations on the north coast of France during the day and harassing flights in the west of Germany in the evening.

Mediterranean Theater:

Our Air Force carried out reconnaissance in the Italian sea area and over the southern Aegean. One He 111 unsuccessfully attacked an enemy destroyer off Leros. Eight Ju 88's attacked battery positions on Leros with good results.

In Italy the enemy attacked the railway station at Ankara and the airfields of Chiampini and Marcigliana near Rome. In Greece he attacked our vessels west of Kos and the airfield of Skutari. In the evening and during the night of 16 Oct. ten enemy reconnaissance planes were detected over the Aegean and three supply planes over the Balkans area.

Eastern Front:

The 5th Air Force reports an engagement in the morning between three FW 190's and enemy PT boats 90 miles west-northwest of Bergen. One PT boat was machine-gunned. One FW 190 sustained damage.

The 4th Air Force reports photographic reconnaissance of Primorsko and Yeisk, according to which altogether 25 landing boats and 105 other boats were spotted.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

No reports on shipping have been received from the Gibraltar area and the western Mediterranean.

The two submarines reported at 1900 on 15 Oct. 30 miles southwest of Cannes had unsuccessfully fired their guns on a unit of naval landing craft and five barges the same morning near St. Tropez and had submerged when our vessels returned fire. The submarines were attacked by seven Arado's success is possible. Submarine chasers "2208" and "2211" were probably successful in destroying a submarine on the day west-northwest of Spezia.

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On 16 Oct. there were two PT boats and two patrol vessels off the Strait of Bonifacio; presumably sweeping our barrage. Most of the ships in Salerno Bay have meanwhile been moved to Naples. Supplies from Sicily to the Bay of Naples are carried by single vessels.

Traffic between Malta and Alexandria is increasing heavily, according to radio intelligence.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

No operations were carried out by PT boats owing to weather conditions. Minesweeping south of Spezia was continued.

The minelayer JUMINDA left Spezia southwardbound for a minelaying operation. Minelaying operations by naval landing craft on the west and east coasts were carried out unnoticed and according to plan.

On 15 Oct. submarine U "371" sank a freighter of 6,000 GRT out of a westbound convoy in CH 7729; a further one was probably sunk. The Naval Communications Officer at Toulon is continuously transmitting the positions of the hospital ship AQUILIA from Spezia and the GRADISCA from Patras, both on passage to Oran.

Leghorn is at present without anti-aircraft defense. Request for transfer of a fresh anti-aircraft battery has been dispatched. The harbor of Ortona was demolished by the Army on the evening of 15 Oct., according to plan.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

Enemy Situation:

On air reconnaissance sighted two submarines at 1900 on 15 Oct. south of Hvar. In the morning of the same day 15 planes were observed over Valona.

Own Situation:

At Dubrovnik the steamer SAN GIGI (3,666 GRT) was hit by a bomb and sustained damage. Naval Shore Commander, South Adriatic has taken over his duties at Durazzo.

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Two small passenger steamers, 2 tugs, 3 steam boats, 4 motor boats and one former Austrian torpedo boat of 78 tons are reported in operational readiness at Cattaro.

b. Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

On 15 Oct. at 1600 two vessels were sighted between Kalymnos and Nera; this has given rise to suspicion of mines. In the evening two destroyers, withdrawing to the north at high speed ten miles west of Kalymnos, were attacked by our planes. At 0435 on 16 Oct. the attack was repeated on destroyers proceeding south in the same area. In the early morning four small vessels were lying in Stampalia Bay according to our air reconnaissance.

At 1500 there were 1 cruiser and 4 destroyers making for Rhodes 90 miles southeast of Crete and at 1540 2 destroyers and 2 merchantmen on northwesterly course 70 miles south-southeast of Rhodes. According to radio intelligence, the Italian radio station on Levitha received orders in the afternoon to offer resistance under all circumstances and to destroy code material in case of danger. During the day much tactical radio traffic was intercepted, probably in connection with the Aegean operation.

Own Situation :

It is now reported that on the afternoon of 14 Oct. a short exchange of gunfire took place between two harbor defense boats and a surface submarine in the Kasos Strait east of Crete. No damage was sustained by our vessels.

The convoy of the KARI AND TRAPANI was again detected by enemy air reconnaissance at 0800 and attacked at 1100 by a submarine between Amorgos and Levitha.

The steamer KARI (1,925 GRT) with 500 troops aboard was sunk. No success was observed from depth-charging. The TRAPANI and one submarine chaser continued their passage. One motor minesweeper remained at the point where the steamer sank. Fifty survivors from the KARI are prisoners on Levitha. The INGEBORG convoy was detained as there are no safe berths available in the Kos area in view of the present number of ships there.

The DRACHE is on passage from Kalymnos to Piraeus.

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During the night of 15 Oct. Kos, Kalymnos and the airfield of Maritza on Rhodes were attacked by enemy planes. No damage is reported.

In the Santa Maura Channel west of Levkas aerial mines are presumed.

The tanker KNUDSEN dropped anchor in Corinth. The steamer LEOPARDI took over 1,000 Italians from the KNUDSEN and is now on passage from Patras to Piraeus. The steamer BOCCACIO arrived at Corfu from Durazzo.

For brief report of the 21st Submarine Chaser Flotilla on the destruction of the OLYMPOS convoy on 7 Oct. see teletype 1200.

c. Black Sea:

On 15 Oct. the coast near Cape Opuk was shelled, apparently by PT boats or motor gunboats. During the night of 15 Oct. Feodosya and Cape Ili were bomber and machine-gunned by enemy planes. No damage was sustained.

Ship "19" and two submarine chasers attacked and probably destroyed a submarine located west of Eupatoria in the afternoon.

Four naval artillery lighters left Gelendzhik to shell enemy batteries near Stepanovska and enemy positions on point Lolotshnoye.

The 1st Battery of the 613th Naval Artillery Battalion on Cape Takil has three guns ready for action. Convoy traffic was carried out as planned and without incident.

VIII. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance

According to Reuter, "Isvestia" stated in its leading article of 16 Oct., presumably on official orders, that all matters which might be discussed at the Moscow Conference such as, for instance, the treatment of a conquered Germany, would have to take second place to the question of opening the second front.

According to "DNB", the German Government also handed the Portuguese Government a note of protest on 15 Oct. about the facilities afforded the British Government on the Azores, which are described as a serious violation of Portugal's neutrality. Details in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff

No special conferences or decisions.

Situation 17 Oct.

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report from an official Portuguese source, Great Britain is demanding Lagos as a naval base. The troops which were sent to the Azores as reinforcements are to be brought back to Portugal as available shipping permits. Calling up of reserves who served from 1935 to 1938 with the infantry and engineers is imminent.

2. Own Situation:

The BRAKE has been given orders by Radiogram 1336, superseding previous instructions, to arrange departure in such a way that she reaches KU 27, left lower corner, on 5 Nov. and to be ready to supply three submarines. The individual supply operations will take place at long intervals, with a waiting period of about four weeks between. The waiting area will be grid square KU.

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II. Situation West Area1. Enemy Situation:

Over the Bay of Biscay 49 planes were detected on operation. One British vessel was located at 2122 in AM 4530, one at 2130 in AM 5440 and one at 2142 in AM 4450.

According to intelligence reports, 6 British steamers escorted by 1 destroyer and 2 corvettes left the mouth of the Tagus southward on the afternoon of 16 Oct. Five other steamers are lying in the Tagus ready to sail and are to join a convoy bound for England on 17 Oct.

The operation by six FW 200's against a part-convoy expected in Lisbon on 16 Oct. was without result.

In the Channel targets were located by radar from 0205 to 0420 between Ile des Bas and Les Sept Iles.

A landing exercise was carried out in the Portsmouth - Isle of Wight area, according to radio intelligence.

2. Own Situation:Atlantic Coast:

Two submarines were escorted out and one in. South of the Gironde one ELM/J mine was swept. At 1030 mine-exploding vessel "180" and a patrol boat were attacked by six enemy fighters while on a check sweep for ground mines off Brest. Casualties were sustained. One attacking plane was shot down.

The torpedo boats FALKE, KONDOR and T. "14" are to transfer to Brest and will leave La Pallice at 1900 on 18 Oct.

Channel Coast:

At 1710 Battery "Lindemann" fired ten rounds on three British patrol vessels off South Foreland. One of the vessels was probably damaged. Patrol positions were not taken up because of bright moonlight.

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III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters

North Sea:

One ELM/J mine was swept off Terschelling. Otherwise nothing to report.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the North Sea 18 planes were detected on operation in the afternoon. On 15 and 16 Oct. single planes were reported in the Banak and Vardoe area and over Alta Fjord.

2. Own Situation:

In the area of Naval Command, Norway 18 ships were escorted north and 25 south. Twenty-two ships were left lying in harbor owing to shortage of escorts.

Group North/Fleet submits a request from the 5th Air Force to Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff for an increase in fighters on the Norwegian coast in view of experiences regarding fighters on the Norwegian coast in view of experiences regarding the enemy operation on 4 Oct. in the Bodoe area. For copy of request see teletype 1450. The request states amongst other things:

"Our observations during and after the attack, supplemented by statements of prisoners and numerous enemy radio and press reports, reveal the following facts:

- a) The attack was meant to hit our supply traffic at its weakest point. Strong air defense was not expected.
- b) The German Fleet was to be drawn into battle at the same time. Since it did not put out for defense enemy photographic reconnaissance, which observed an oil trace by the TIRPITZ, is taken as a confirmation that the TIRPITZ was damaged by the midget submarine operation and that the German Fleet is therefore out of action. Enemy reports and comments further show that the Home Fleet, strengthened by U.S. units, has now become free to operate at another point. It must certainly be expected, however, that the obvious lack of bomber and fighter forces will be a strong inducement to the enemy to repeat such operations in central Norway and in the Lofoten area."

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Group North/Fleet quite correctly observes that the statements of the 5th Air Force Command stress its own requests regarding intensification of air reconnaissance and fighter cover.

On 18 Oct. the 5th Air Force plans evening reconnaissance in the western outlet of the Skagerrak as far as 30° E. for mine-laying operation "Kalium".

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

No new information obtained.

2. Own Situation:

The hospital ship METEOR and RUEGEN are proceeding to Gothenburg through Swedish territorial waters under control of the Swedish Navy. The British hospital ships ATLANTIS and EMPRESS OF RUSSIA will be off Lindesnes at 0600 on 18 Oct.

No special reports have been received from the areas of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic and Commander, Minesweepers Baltic. Convoy and escort operations were carried out as planned.

Naval Command, Baltic transmits the following report from Admiral, Baltic States regarding the situation with the 1st Army Corps and the 18th Army Command on the evening of 16 Oct.:

"It may be assumed that preparations for the anticipated large-scale attack on the Leningrad front are generally completed, considering the enemy's inactivity. Start of the attack is to be expected within the next day or two. Preparatory local attacks must be expected at any time. In the remaining area of the 18th Army there is the same tendency, with concentration at the Volchov bridgehead north of Novgorod."

Naval Command, Baltic also advises Naval Staff of the difference of opinion between Admiral, Baltic States and the 18th Army Command as regards changing the position of Battery "Bluecher". Naval Staff has been asked for a decision. For copy see teletype 1453. Naval Staff thereupon despatched the following teletype to the Naval Liaison Officer with Army General Staff;

"1. Naval Command, Baltic cables:

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- a. The 18th Army Command has requested that the plan to change the position of railway Battery "Bluecher" be canceled and that it be used at Krasnoye Selo, since a railway coach is not available on account of the transport situation; the Battery could take part in the heavy ground fighting expected near Krasnoye Selo and could still also be used against sea targets. Naval Command, Baltic has stated in reply that Battery "Bluecher" must be withdrawn at once for the following reasons: it is urgently required for defense of the Estonian coast near Kunda; the situation regarding ammunition of captured Russian 15.2 cm. guns demands economic use; the crew of Battery "Bluecher" is not trained for firing on land targets; its position at Krasnoye Selo is absolutely unsuitable from the naval point of view. Naval Command, Baltic has therefore ordered that the Battery be moved to Kunda.
- b. The transport gear for the parts of Battery "Prinz Heinrich" is on its way to Reval, except for special coaches for firing cradles and barrels. These will only be released by the 18th Army Command for immediate use. A request has been made to make them available within three days. The track for withdrawal passes 1,200 m. behind the main defense line and can already only be used at night.
2. Naval Staff is of opinion that naval batteries in the Leningrad area should not be used up in the land fighting, as they represent the only available coastal artillery for reinforcing the Estonian coast. The matter should therefore be brought to the attention of Army General Staff and views regarding immediate dismantling reported."

V. Submarine Warfare

The operation against the convoy in the North Atlantic was continued. Nine submarines report altogether 14 air attacks. Several losses are to be feared. The enemy has obviously adopted a considerable deviation, presumably west to southwest, so that shifting of our patrol line north will lead to failure. So far only one steamer of 6,000 GRT has been sunk.

The absence of our air reconnaissance sets our submarines an impossible assignment. Search for the enemy by the submarines themselves is not only hopeless but also involves losses, in view of the exceptionally strong enemy air cover. The Naval Attache in Tokyo receives the following instructions by

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Radiogram 1/Skl. I.u.3190/43 Gkdos. Chfs.

- "1. Schneewind will relieve Schaefer as commander of submarine U "183". Schaefer will take over the duties of Schneewind.
2. Submarine DOMMES is to be equipped with six G 7a and nine G 7c torpedoes.
3. Attempt will be made by three MONSUN submarines to call at Penang.
4. The submarines from the operational areas of the Gulf of Aden and off Bombay are now operating in the Gulf of Oman. The one off Bombay reported on 29 and 30 Sept. no targets off and in the harbor. Very heavy traffic consisting of cargo sailing vessels in all directions, especially in the northwest close to shore. Six cargo sailing vessels sunk by gunfire on 2 Oct. northwest of Bombay. One freighter of 4,000 GRT sunk; no naval patrol. On 5 Oct. strong air activity by twin-engine planes during the day."

No further reports of success have been received from the Indian Ocean.

VI. Aerial Warfare

British Isles and Vicinity:

Sixty-eight planes of the 3rd Air Force were out on operation over the west area and 12 over the Mediterranean.

During the night of 17 Oct. 19 planes were out on operation against London. There was only a small number of enemy flights during the day. During the night also only minor formations were on operation in the coastal areas of the west area and over the western part of Germany. Nine high-explosive bombs were dropped on Aachen. For particulars see Daily Situation.

Mediterranean Theater:

No special reports have been received from the Italian area. In the area of Air Force Command, Southeast our formations attacked Castell Rosso and Porto Lago (Ieros). An enemy unit south of Rhodes was also attacked. Two direct hits by SC 250 bombs were scored on a cruiser. One enemy plane was shot down

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Eastern Front:

Nothing to report.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

On the afternoon of 16 Oct. 4 tank landing craft and 2 destroyers and in the morning of 17 Oct. 3 U.S destroyers and 6 gunboats put in to Gibraltar.

A convoy of 10 freighters in ballast, escorted by 2 destroyers, passed through the Straits of Gibraltar at 1715, westbound.

No reports have been received from the western and eastern Mediterranean. On 16 Oct. 10-15 vessels, presumably PT boats, were detected in the harbor of Ajaccio. A submarine was reported off Sestri Levante at 1300

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

No report on minelaying operation "Juminda" has yet been received. There were no PT boat operations because of weather conditions. Minesweeping on the coastal route from Spezia to Leghorn was without result. This route is now open to traffic. The harbor basin of Ortona was mined. Submarine U "73" fired a spread of four torpedoes which missed on a large westbound freighter and a destroyer in CH 8511.

The attention of Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean is drawn by Naval Staff to the fact that the situation demands mining of Brindisi as soon as possible. Thus an advance in the date when submarine U "453" is ready for operations is necessary as far as this possible. Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean reports in this connection that date of departure cannot be scheduled before 21 Oct., in view of the moon.

Naval Staff is of opinion that a few more hours of darkness can already be reckoned with some days before the above date.

The hospital ship DJENNE left Marseilles at 1700 and the hospital ship SINAJA at 2100, both bound for Oran in connection with the exchange of wounded.

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Commanding General, Armed Forces, South reports with regard to the decision of Armed Forces High Command (see War Diary 15 Oct.) that his own request of 13 Oct. crossed with Naval Staff's decision about the same matter to German Naval Command, Italy.

Commanding General, Armed Force, South when despatching his request, did not have in mind a minelayer from the Aegean but the minelayer FASAN, which will be ready shortly and has been promised to Group South he request that this vessel be put under German Naval Command, Italy for a short time. Commanding General, Armed Forces, South reports, with reference to point 2 of the decision, that investigations are being made at present as to whether his transport requirements in the Adriatic Sea can be met with the vessels which are available and those which can be expected in the near future.

Furthermore, Commanding General, Armed Forces, South advises Naval Staff for information of the following report to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff:

"The naval gunners (about 2/3 of the 616th Naval Artillery Battalion) at present available in the area of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South are not sufficient to man those batteries available and ready for action which are absolutely necessary for the defense of Elba and the Piombino Strait. The three 15 cm. and one 9cm. batteries manned so far are already operating with a minimum of personnel and have to be supplemented by Italian volunteers. At least another two 10 cm. batteries will have to be manned. German Naval Command, Italy plans to withdraw the remainder of the 616th Naval Artillery Battalion, now in Leghorn, and to transfer it to Elba or Piombino. The personnel to be withdrawn from Leghorn should be replaced by a corresponding unit from the Naval Artillery Battalion at Spezia. No direct agreement about this transfer has been reached with Army Group B. A decision is therefore requested. Particular reference was made before to the importance of Elba by Armed Forces High Command."

3. Area Naval Group South

a. Adriatic Sea:

On the morning of 16 Oct. an unidentified ship was sunk by our gunfire when entering the Corfu Channel. Admiral, Adriatic fears that it might be the steamer BOCCACIO.

According to an enemy report, two steamers were seized by a British torpedo boat during the night of 15 Oct. in the North

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Adriatic; one of the steamers was scuttled and the other one was brought in. Group South assumes that the steamers involved are the POCARICA and the MERANO which were on their way from Zara to Cattaro. Steamers which have to use the routes west of the Dalmatian islands are being detained for the present.

The steamer POTESTA was damaged by a bomb in an air attack on Cattaro and beached.

The steamer ITALIA put in to Zara from Pola on the afternoon of 16 Oct.; she was unsuccessfully shelled by enemy batteries during her passage.

b. Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Kos was bombed on 16 Oct. At 0037 on 17 Oct. two destroyers attacked the convoy of the steamer TRAPANI and submarine chaser "2109" on the east coast of Kalymnos. The convoy put in to Atti Bay, where submarine chaser "2109" was shot up at 0100 from close quarters. The steamer TRAPANI and naval landing craft MFP "338" were set on fire.

During the same night enemy PT boats were detected in the Kalymnos area.

At 0348 two destroyers shelled the steamer SANTORINI in Vathi Bay (Samos).

At 1445 a naval vessel was sighted 15 miles north of Samos on easterly courses and a cruiser with three torpedo boats 120 miles south-southeast of Scarpanto on course 3400. In the evening two enemy destroyers shelled Calino.

It is now reported from the night of 15 Oct. that light PT boat LS "5" was shot up in an attack by seven enemy planes northwest of Kos and beached on the evening of 16 Oct. on the north coast of Kos.

Own Situation:

The DRACHE and submarine chaser "2110" put in to Piraeus. When submarine chaser "2109" was destroyed in Atti Bay five of the crew were killed.

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Motor minesweeper R "211" was unable to rescue any survivors of the steamer KARI because of heavy seas. Two crash boats despatched from Milos had to return because of bad weather. A Do 24 sea-rescue plane had an accident when taking off and sank. Only submarine chaser "2110" was able to rescue 180 survivors, some of whom were badly wounded. Later, coast patrol boat G "42" searched the scene of the disaster without success. Another 50 survivors are on Levitha. They cannot be taken off the island on account of the unsettled situation and weakness of our naval and air forces. Another 20 survivors have been brought to Kos by a Do 24 plane.

According to a report from coast patrol boat GA "41", the steamer SANTORINI was heavily damaged in Vathi Bay when shelled by two destroyers.

Coast patrol boats sustained no damage.

At 1853 Naval Staff despatched a report by teletype on the above losses to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy and to Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, Naval Liaison. Order 1/Skl. 29108/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

The tanker KNUDSEN is on her way through the Corinth Canal to Piraeus. The steamer LEOPARDI dropped anchor off Corinth on the afternoon of 16 Oct.

c. Black Sea:

On the morning of 16 Oct. Feodosiya and Cape Ili as well as ships on the roads were bombed and machine-gunned. No damage was sustained.

On the morning of 17 Oct. air attacks, also unsuccessful, were reported on the southern point of the Crimea and near Cape Chauda.

The large evacuation convoy from Sevastopol, comprising Army landing boats, was twice attacked on 17 Oct. by enemy planes with torpedoes, bombs and machine-guns off the western point of the Crimea. One naval landing craft was heavily damaged by a torpedo hit; however, it was impossible to tow it into Ak Mechet. The convoy proceeded on to Skadovsk.

Four naval artillery lighters shelled the north coast of the Sea of Asov in the area of Stepanovka with good results. Slight resistance by heavy enemy guns was ineffective. The shelling could not be repeated during the night of 17 Oct. owing to weather conditions.

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PT boat S "47" was transferred from Constanta to Ivanbaba.

At 2131 on 15 Oct. submarine U "23" torpedoed a freighter of 2,000 GRT out of a convoy off Poti. Sinking was not observed.

VIII. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

Items of Political Importance

According to Reuter a report issued by the Naval Committee of the U. S. Senate states that the crisis in submarine warfare is now on the decline. The Battle of the Atlantic is, however, still heavy and subject to hourly changes.

In two reputable English publications, the "Yorkshire Post" and the "Quarterly Review", anxiety is expressed about British merchant shipping. After the war the United States will probably possess two to three times as many freighters as Great Britain. The British merchant Navy has lost its best ships. New ships, which are much inferior, have taken their place. The revival of normal trading is in danger, since Great Britain is still dependent for her whole existence on overseas trade.

Conference with Chief, Naval Staff

A. Notes on discussions held at the Fuehrer Headquarters on 16 and 17 Oct as per 1/Skl 3392/43 Gkdos. Chfs. are contained in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VII.

B. Discussion with Air Commander Atlantic Coast, Lt. General Kessler:

Chief, Naval Staff stated that submarines had during the last weeks searched the North Atlantic unsuccessfully for enemy convoys. No air reconnaissance is carried out in the North Atlantic. It was true that in one case a convoy, which was within the range of the long-distance reconnaissance planes, was contacted, but transmission of beacon signals by the plane did not lead to the target. Obviously also the position was incorrect. Air Commander, Atlantic Coast replied that new navigational aids (Radiosonde: devices for recording weather conditions and wind speed at great altitudes - Tr. N.) had considerably increased the accuracy of fixes by the planes.

Commander in Chief, Navy stated that the purpose of the discussion was to ascertain what assistance the Air Force could give to submarine warfare in the near future, especially by reconnaissance from Norway and Western France.

Air Commander, Atlantic Coast replied:

1. A squadron of He 177's will be available on 23 Oct. Single Ju 88 H2's will probably be on operation from the beginning of November as long-range fighters.

2. On 4 Nov, a squadron of FW 200's equipped with radio-controlled glider bombs and a spare tank, and
3. On 8 Nov. a squadron of Ju 290's will be on operation. Transfer of planes to Norway is possible, if advice is given on the area where reconnaissance is desired about 2-3 days beforehand.

Commander in Chief, Navy considers appointment of a Liaison Officer of Air Commander, Atlantic Coast to Submarine Division in Berlin to be necessary. Air Commander, Atlantic Coast approved this appointment.

Commander in Chief, Navy explained that the transmission of beacon signals is more important at first than the despatch of the reconnaissance report itself.

Commander in Chief, Navy further inquired when action may be expected against the enemy air escort of convoys in the sea area west of Portugal.

Air Commander, Atlantic Coast considers this certainly possible with Ju 88 H2's and perhaps with He 177's. This matter will be investigated.

Air Commander, Atlantic Coast urged that submarines utilize British location transmissions for taking a bearing, as seems possible in the case of planes. What he had in mind was the way in which the British had utilized the radiation of the Metox set.

Commander in Chief, Navy considered this facility impossible for submarines, since the Metox was a continuous transmitter, whereas radar only sends out beams in a certain direction. Air Commander, Atlantic Coast was asked for fuller information, which was promised.

C. Situation:

I. Army Situation:

The enemy offensive continues along the entire eastern front. There is heavy pressure on the area Melitopol/Zaporozhe. The situation has become extremely critical north of Kremenchug. Here the Russians have broken through with exceptionally strong forces and advanced 25 km. Our material losses through gunfire are serious. Our reserves are at present not ready for action. Assignment of the 24th Armored Division from northern Italy and of the 14th Armored Division from France will be too late and is also badly

hampered by traffic difficulties. The break-through at Kremenchug must be regarded as extremely serious in view of the devisive strategic consequences. South of Cherkazy also the enemy succeeded in penetrating at some points. In the area north of Kiev the situation has also developed unfavorably. Here the enemy carried out no less than 23 stubborn attacks by day. Two of our division are cut off and have been ordered to fight their way through. In the area of Gomel our forces have been withdrawn to the "Panther" position. In the area of Orsha enemy attacks have assumed proportions so far unheard of. The attack was preceded by a barrage of gunfire of previously unknown intensity. One thousand ground-attack planes were out on operation. It was possible to hold our position, however, even though losses on our side were heavy.

In the area of Veliki-Luki our forces gained a full-scale defensive success. South of Leningrad the enemy concentration has not yet been completed. Apart from all the above mentioned focal points, the enemy is assembling further strong assault forces in the area east of Toropez and Veliki Luki.

The general situation on the eastern front is, therefore, extremely tense. In Italy two of our divisions from the north arrived at the "Bernhard" position. The enemy is only following our withdrawal movement to this line with hesitation.

In the area of Ljubljana fighting has again become lively.

Bridges on the main traffic lines near Agram were blown up: this hampers our movements considerably. The center of the enemy's concentration is observed in the area of Sarajevo. A large-scale attack on this town is expected.

II. Re: Operation "Paul":

Considerable objections have been raised by Commanding Admiral, Task Force and Naval Command, Norway against the instructions of Quartermaster Division regarding accommodation of 600 Dockyard workers on the STAVANGERFIORD. Billetting these workers on shore, as planned, also meets with difficulties.

Chief, Naval Staff considers it unnecessary for High Command, Navy to deal with all details of this matter. He merely requests that the workers be accommodated in such a way that they are protected against submarine attacks, i.e. that all ships which are brought up for this purpose should be put in net enclosures.

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Commanding Admiral, Group North/Fleet and Chief, Naval (Ship) Construction Division participated in the discussion on this matter. Chief, Naval Staff demands that repairs to the TIRPITZ be speeded up by all available means. Chief, Naval (Ship) Construction Division will be able to report the final date as soon as the investigation commission has returned to Berlin. According to present estimates, four months will be needed from the date when repairs are in full swing. This is provided that all the necessary facilities - tugs etc. - are available for operation "Paul". It is expected that repair work will be started at latest on 15 Nov., and will be completed by the middle of March.

III. Deputy Chief, Naval Communications Division reports that in the "Netzhemd" trials a setback has occurred, since certain necessary conditions could not be observed.

IV. Quartermaster General:

In connection with the ruling of Commanding Admiral, Group South regarding operations by merchantmen in the Aegean Sea, the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping has submitted the following reply:

- "1. The fact that operations and military requirements in the Aegean area have precedence over all others is to me a matter of course. Shipping has so far been put into operation only according to this principle.
2. Supplies to the areas in question have been continuously held up through the lack of escorts and delays in convoys, as can be proved.
3. The Mediterranean Shipping Office is not a commercial undertaking which has shipping at its own disposal. Shipping is managed only by the Deputy for German Sea Transportation in the Aegean, as a political office.
4. I refer to the Fuehrer's order of 30 May 1942, which is still unchanged and in force. I refer further to the order of Commander in Chief, Navy of 22 April 1943. I have not heard of any change in these two orders. Before they are changed the Deputy in the Aegean should in any case be heard and an agreement reached with me on such a change."

Before further measures are taken, concrete data which Admiral, Aegean has been asked to produce must be awaited.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

V. Group South transmits the following teletype of Commanding General, Army Group E to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff. A copy of this teletype was sent to the Naval Group for information:

"On the basis of personal observations of conditions around Kos and of the convoy battle on 15 Oct. I report:

1. The British are not using Leros. Apart from a unit off Castell Rosso there are always two destroyers, which are continuously relieved, standing by in a Turkish bay during the day. They come out to meet our convoys on receipt of an air reconnaissance report. During the night they sail round Kos and Kalymnos, escorted by search planes.
2. I have given orders that the TRAPANI convoy be brought up in such a way that it reaches Kalymnos before dusk on 16 Oct; the troops are to be disembarked at once and the ships concealed individually in bays. Discharging later on according to the situation. Although the destroyers search the bays every night with searchlights they have found no ships so far. Daytime passage of the convoys under air escort may be successful but passage in the Kos area at night will lead to destruction. Nightly ferry traffic from Kos to Kalymnos by single naval landing craft and motor sailing vessels in the periods between two destroyers is proceeding with minor losses despite intense night air reconnaissance. The submarine which has been disturbing our traffic was sunk yesterday.
3. Transfer of the landing troops to Leros with many boats must lead to an encounter with destroyers, since one trip alone from Kos to the landing point on Leros takes five hours. A bridgehead being built up could not be supplied and the irreplaceable naval landing craft would be lost, also troops and equipment. The destruction of the OLYMPOS convoy on 7 Oct. has proved that naval landing craft are absolutely powerless against destroyers. In this engagement not only the steamer, but also her escort of six naval landing craft and one submarine chaser, were sunk within a very short time.
4. My original order to General Mueller for operation "Leopard" contained the condition that there was no direct danger from warships. This, however, is now continuously the case.

Operation "Leopard" has, therefore, been delayed permanently unless Turkey closes her territorial waters or permits us to engage the enemy in battle there.

5. In my opinion only two ways are left to us for the occupation of Leros, which has not lost its importance to us:
 - a. A landing similar to previous plans for operation "Leopard", with the cooperation of powerful naval forces, suddenly brought up. Admiral, Aegean could provide 2 destroyers, 2 torpedo boats, 1 submarine and 3 PT boats for this by 5 Nov.
 - b. An entirely new operation from the north via Chios and Samos for gradual encirclement of Leros. Admiral, Aegean favors this solution, which I do not propose as it would require too much time and too many troops, I recommend the more risky solution a), as it would probably lead to an early success, and request approval, I have, however, not yet altered the present operational order, so that any chances of success which may offer themselves can be made use of."

Group South has commented as follows in this connection:

"1. It is observed that the Air Force has so far neither given a clear picture of enemy naval forces in the Aegean area nor of enemy movements there and southeast of Rhodes. The Air Forces has also been unable to eliminate enemy forces or stop reinforcements.

2. The increase in fighting strength through captured Italian destroyers and torpedo boats should not be overestimated, as they are in no way equal in armament, speed and training to experienced British naval forces.

3. Group South doubts whether the forces of the Army and Air Force are sufficient for the landing on Leros under present conditions, but cannot judge here. Anyhow the Navy is ready to use all its facilities for carrying out the operation. Group South is fully aware of the possibility of heavy losses during and after landing, owing to lack of defenses on our part.

4. Postponement of the operation, regardless of whether it is according to previous plans or via Samos, means a serious loss of time, which offers the enemy the possibility of further reinforcement and weakening of our forces through losses.

withdrawal of our forces until a later date in order to minimize such losses would give the enemy full freedom of action, possibly also for an attack on Kos.

5. The idea of carrying out our attack via Samos is not to be rejected in itself, but will require additional forces and we may expect the same difficulties through enemy naval forces and also, while we are making preparations, reinforcement of his position on Leros until it is impregnable.

6. Group South is therefore of opinion that the landing should be carried out as soon as possible, provided that there is a considerable strengthening of the air forces participating."

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff advises Naval Staff for the information of the following instructions to Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast:

"1. The Fuehrer has decided that present plans for operation "Leopard" are to be adhered to and that the operation is to be carried out according to the situation, either in a surprise attack without awaiting reinforcement or, if this is impossible, after arrival of the additional light naval forces provided.

2. Permission to engage British naval forces in Turkish territorial waters cannot be granted.

3. With regard to the requested reinforcements of the Air Force it can be expected that a bomber group will be transferred to the southeastern area already in October. Transfer of a further bomber group is planned, but the date when it will be in operational readiness cannot yet be definitely assessed.

4. The evacuation of the Italians from Rhodes is to be carried out as quickly as possible, using all available means and even at the risk of losing ships and military internees.

In order to offer an incentive to the Air Force to evacuate the Italians also by air, the Fuehrer has approved that all Italains removed by air are to be at the disposal of the Air Force as workers."

Chief, Naval Staff states that the main point of the operation lies in the strategic value of the islands, Chief of staff, Naval Staff draws attention to the political considerations which are decisive for holding the Aegean islands. The heavy sacrifice of irreplaceable shipping would not be justified from a purely military point of view. "The time will come when we will have no more vessels."

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With regard to the report of Commanding General, Army Group E, Chief, Naval Staff is forced to state that intervention in matters which solely concern naval warfare, without consulting Naval Staff, is not premissable and must be rejected. The following personal teletype from Commander in Chief, Navy is therefore dispatched to Chief, Armed Forces High Command:

"I am responsible to the Fuehrer for naval warfare in all theaters of war. I therefore request that Commanding Generals, Armed Forces be instructed that letters, such as the one from General Loehr (Army Group E) Ia 0227/43 Gkdos. Chfs, of 16 Oct. 1943, be sent to Naval Staff at the same time as to Armed Forces High Command, so as to enable me to express my views in time on the execution of the naval operation."

Group South also reports the following in connection with operation "Leopard":

1. In the Kos area 1 submarine chaser, 4 naval landing craft, 4 motor minesweepers, 3 decoy ships, 1 armed fishing vessel ready. In view of last night's incident, no bay is considered safe any more. Request of Admiral, Aegean for permission to withdraw operational vessels during the night has therefore been approved. The remaining vessels will be assembled for defense, together with Army units, in the ports of Kos and Calino.

2. According to a telephone conversation with Army Group E, it does not wish to cancel this old operational order, so that General Mueller can utilize any favorable opportunity for starting out. According to information received from the Army Group, the Fuehrer has decided that, if such an opportunity does not offer itself before, the solution proposed by Army Group E according to the old plan shall be retained after however, destroyers and torpedo boats have become ready for operation.

3. Admiral, Aegean has therefore been ordered to comply with the request of General Mueller to utilize any favorable opportunity for starting out, but otherwise to effect withdrawal especially of slow vessels in agreement with General Mueller. No favorable opportunity should be missed out, on the other hand, the vessels are, if possible, to be disposed in such a way that not all of them can be found and destroyed by the enemy.

For copies of teletypes as per 1/Skl 3110/43 Gkdos. Chfs, 29128/43 Gkdos. and 3113/43 Gkdos. Chfs, as well as order 1/Skl 29197/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

With regard to control of submarines in the Aegean, Chief, Naval Staff has decided that tactical control should rest with Admiral, Aegean while the transmission of orders by radio should remain in the hands of Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean.

Special Items

I. Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy brought with him a list of Italian warships as of 11 Oct. 1943. For copy as per 1/Skl 29209/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

II. Chief, Naval Ordnance Division, Bureau of Naval Armament, as Naval Representative for War Economy submitted to Commander in Chief, Navy on 12 Oct. a written report on the effects of the raw material assignments during the last quarter of 1943, in order to give an insight into the present situation.

The steel assignments to the Navy during the last quarter of 1943 were, contrary to the agreements between Commander in Chief, Navy and Minister Speer, made for specific purposes and are absolutely inadequate for fulfillment of requirements. The following are figures in tons per month (excluding the warship construction quota):

| | <u>Requirements</u> | <u>Assignments</u> |
|--|---------------------|--------------------|
| Guns | 19,029 | 11,100 |
| Ammunition for guns | 32,440 | 14,000 |
| Torpedoes | 14,634 | 11,495 |
| Mines | 36,564 | 20,344 |
| Other purposes (general requirements) | <u>40,034</u> | <u>19,800</u> |
| TOTAL: | <u>142,701</u> | <u>76,739</u> |

The tasks ordered cannot be carried out as assignments are below requirements. In order to carry out the most important and essential tasks of naval warfare the following additional assignments of steel (and corresponding metal assignments) are necessary for the last quarter of 1943:

| | |
|---------------------|---------------------|
| Guns | |
| Ammunition for guns | 4,155 tons per mo. |
| Torpedoes | 1,200 " " " |
| Mines | 6,000 " " " |
| Other Purposes | <u>10,075 " " "</u> |

Total additional assignment 21,430 tons per mo.

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Warships construction (ship and ships' engines) is not included in the above figures.

These further assignments must be made in addition; if necessary they must be made available from the quota for warship construction at the expense of the Fleet Construction Program. The 15,000 tons per month promised from Italy must be used for the above purposes.

This assignment of raw materiel to the Navy confirms the demand made time and time again that a distribution for specific purposes by offices which are not within the Navy is impossible and that a total quota (including warship construction) must be assigned to the Navy, the distribution of which to individual tasks of the Navy can only be effected according to the decision of Commander in Chief, Navy through High Command, Navy. For copy of the report for Chief of Staff, Naval Staff, with an annex showing the effects of the short assignment in detail, as per 1/Skl 32155/43 geh. see War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

III. Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Navies Branch reports on new information obtained regarding British landing craft. According to this report, the Landing Craft Support (LCS) has been supplemented by a large type of boat which is armed with a strong mortar battery. Probable designation "Landing Craft Support" (Large) = LCS (L). Armament consists of 32 mortars probably of 8.1 cm. caliber, shells weighing 6.9 or 9 kg. and being fired electrically, either singly or in groups. This report also contains particulars of the LCM III and also of "Landing Craft Flak" (LCF) of a heavier type, with a main armament of four 10.2 cm. anti-aircraft guns in twin-mountings and four 2 cm. anti-aircraft guns.

For copy of report as per 1/Skl 31654/43 geh. see War Diary, Part B "Evaluation of Intelligence on Foreign Navies".

Situation 18 Oct.

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

At 1331 the following message was received from the Naval Attache in Tokyo:

"1. The MICHEL torpedoed and sunk at 0230 (Tokyo time) on 17 Oct.

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by an enemy submarine 120 miles south-southeast of Grozaki.

2. At 1145 on 18 Oct. one lifeboat with Lt. (j.g.) 16 non-commissioned officers and 53 men landed at the southern point of the Izu Peninsula.

3. The Japanese Navy is searching the position with planes and ships for further lifeboats.

First of all information must be awaited as to what security measures were taken for the ship, whose loss just before completing a long and successful operation is felt to be especially tragic. The Naval Attache in Tokyo has been requested to report what measures have been taken and already carried out and whether the ship was escorted by naval or air forces.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the Bay of Biscay 33 planes were detected on operation. One British vessel was located at 1814 in CG 4360.

Radio Intelligence observed in the Channel practice radio traffic between Portsmouth and four vessels and eleven other stations, which indicates a tactical exercise being carried out in the Portsmouth area.

At 1042 two PT boats in BF 3323 were shelled with five rounds by our battery at Gris Nez. The boats withdrew at high speed.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Five boats of the 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla are being transferred from Brest to Concarneau for torpedo firing and exercises with the Air Force. Transfer of the FALKE, KONDOR and T "14" has been postponed for 24 hours owing to suspicion of ground mines off La Pallice. The outer Gironde is closed to traffic as ground mines are suspected there. On 16 Oct. a plane swept two ground mines off the Gironde, a mine-exploding vessel swept one off La Pallice and a minesweeper swept another one off La Pallice.

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Channel Coast

The tanker OSTRIEDSLAND was transferred on 16 Oct. from Rouen to Le Havre. Patrol positions were not taken up because of bright moonlight. Convoy traffic was carried out in the Channel Islands area only. The anti-aircraft defense of the radar station at Gris Nez and naval anti-aircraft guns shot down two Spitfires in the Gris Nez area.

At 2315 motor minesweeper RA "1" struck a mine off Ostend; she was underslung and towed into Ostend. Motor Minesweeper RA "2", which was assisting RA "1", also struck a mine at 2358 and capsized, without any casualties being sustained. Both boats probably struck mines with snag lines.

Group West has requested permission to use the "Aphrodite" and "Drachen" decoys for the NORDVAARD and MUENSTERLAND Channel convoys. Submarine Division has raised objections, fearing disclosure of "Aphrodite". Chief, Naval Communications Division considers it doubtful whether use of the "Aphrodite" will be effective. Chief, Naval Staff has therefore decided against its use, since prospects of success, in view of its adaptation for submarines, are too small in comparison to the risk of disclosure.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters

North Sea:

Minor casualties were suffered when seven enemy planes attacked the ferry DINTELSAS and two boats of River Mine-sweeper Flotilla. Otherwise nothing to report.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the North Sea in the morning 18 planes were detected on operation and later on 12 planes. On the evening of 17 Oct. the Air Force radar station on Fedje located a naval target proceeding at a very high speed, possibly a PT boat. Admiral, West Norwegian Coast believes, however, that a false location is likely.

According to a report from submarine U "737", there are submarines off Advent Bay and Ice Fjord. It is possible that the base is being supplied by submarines.

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2. Own Situation:

At 0113 the SCHARNHORST reported noises similar to sonic telegraphy or echo-ranging which were clearly heard first by the SCHARNHORST and subsequently by a barrage patrol vessel. The barrage patrol vessel dropped depth charges, whereupon these suspicious noises ceased; they were also observed by the destroyer RIEDEL apart from the SCHARNHORST and the barrage patrol vessel. The alarm in Lange Fjord has been lifted, but intensified security measures remain in force.

In the area of Naval Command, Norway 23 ships were escorted north and 31 south. Twenty-two ships were delayed owing to shortage of escorts.

Weather observation ship KOBURG reports her position as 75 degrees 20' N 17 degrees 30' W in heavy pack-ice. Alternative camps are planned on the ice and on shore. Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff advises Naval Staff for information of orders to the 5th Air Force that reconnaissance for operation "Bassgeiger" is regarded as unnecessary, but that supplies by air which become necessary are to be carried out.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing new to report from the area of Admiral, Baltic States and Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic.

2. Own Situation:

Minelaying operation "Kalium" in the Skagerrak was carried out by the minelayer ROLAND with four minesweepers and two patrol boats. The hospital ships METEOR and RUEGEN put in to Gothenburg at 1100. The two British hospital ships are expected on 19 Oct.

The Naval Liaison Officer to High Command, Army, Army General Staff reports that Chief, Army General Staff agrees with the view held by Naval Staff regarding withdrawal of Battery "Bluecher" and that Army Group North has been advised. The questions of using the naval batteries in the landing fighting has been settled with Admiral, Baltic States.

Otherwise nothing to report.

V. Submarine Warfare

The operation against the convoy in the North Atlantic was discontinued at noon, as interception seemed unlikely and the submarines are too far apart for further operations.

The convoy was reported at 2000 in AK 0115. The submarine giving this report observed strong night air activity. The complete failure of this operation was undoubtedly due to the strong air escort. The main point of defense of this convoy was obviously the air escort, since sighting of only one destroyer was reported during the entire operation. It must therefore be assumed that the majority of the six submarines missing were lost through air action. Thus the enemy has now adapted his defense to our tactics which led to success in the convoy operation "Leuthen". It will be necessary to strengthen the anti-aircraft defense of submarines by an increase in caliber.

VI. Aerial WarfareBritish Isles and Vicinity:

In the afternoon an enemy formation of about 150 Fortresses with strong fighter escort flew into the area Aachen - Malmedy - Cambrai via the Scheldt estuary and Le Treport; 507 of our fighters went into operation. One Spitfire was shot down and we lost five planes.

Minor formations also flew into the areas of Bremen and Frankfurt on Main, but carried out no attacks. In the evening another concentrated attack was carried out by strong enemy formations on Hanover, which caused considerable damage especially to the outskirts of the city and to industrial installations. Further damage was sustained in Neuss, Duisburg and at the August Thiessen Foundry at Hamborn. Our fighter defense consisting of 256 planes has so far reported 15 enemy planes shot down. During the same night four of our planes were out on operation against London.

Mediterranean Theater:

Our air reconnaissance extended as far as the Oran area.

The enemy attacked the airfields at Viterbo and Siena and, in the Aegean Sea, the airfields of Candia and Antimechia near Kos. Further air attacks are reported from Skolpye, where railroad installations and a German transport train were hit.

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One of our convoys was successfully attacked in the Aegean Sea. (The steamer SINFRA).

Eastern Front:

The 5th Air Force had altogether 43 planes out on operation. No special reports have been received.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

A small amount of shipping, inward and outward bound, is reported from the Gibraltar area. Our air reconnaissance observed heavy westbound traffic between Algiers and Oran. Between 1405 and 1420 northwest of Oran 22 freighters, 2 cruisers and 3 patrol vessels were reported on westerly course, the cruisers and patrol vessels putting in to Oran; also north of Arzeu 13 freighters on southwesterly course and northeast of Arzeu 23 naval vessels on course 240 degrees. Submarine U "73" detected a small westbound convoy 50 miles west of Algiers and probably sank a steamer of 6,000 GRT out of it.

In Oran 22 freighters and 8 LST's were sighted and on the roads 11 freighters, 1 tanker and 1 LST.

In Mers el Kebir there were 11 Liberty ships, 7 freighters, 2 passenger steamers, 2 tankers, 2 heavy cruisers and 6 destroyers.

Increasing ferry traffic was observed in the Strait of Bonifacio. According to our radio Intelligence, the transfer of British submarines to the eastern Mediterranean is to be inferred from radio traffic.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

The minelayer JUMINDA and three motor minesweepers carried out a minelaying operation from Nettunia according to plan. This unit was unsuccessfully attacked in the morning by four enemy fighters south of Ostia, while on return passage. The torpedo boat IMPAVIDO was commissioned as TA "1" and the torpedo boat PAPA as SG "20" at Genoa on 17 Oct.

According to a report from German Naval Command, Italy the

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measures taken by the Liaison Staff of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South in Rome are producing very few Italian volunteers. Recruiting is now being put into Italian hands. In addition, German Naval Command, Italy is trying to recruit volunteers through its own offices in the large naval bases.

German Naval Command, Italy submitted minelaying plans dated 10 Oct. for the west coast of Italy, the Riviera and the Adriatic Sea. A mine barrage for the defense of Spezia and Leghorn, having top priority, has already been laid by the BRANDENBURG and the POMMERN. The following have been carried out or are being carried out off the threatened coast from Civitavecchia to Gaeta:

- Minelaying off Nettunia
- Closing the entrance to the Tiber mouth
- Closing of Gaeta harbor
- Mining of the coastal stretch of Terracina.

Further, reinforcement of mine defense is being prepared through a barrage from Cape Linaro to north of Civitavecchia

It is also planned to lay a mine barrage, taking in the island of Elba, as far as Giglio Orbetello. It is planned to start this in the south.

This will be followed by defense of the Riviera, especially priority laying of a defensive mine barrage off Genoa.

For mine defense of the Adriatic coast it is planned to mine Ortona, to lay a barrage belt between Tremiti and the coast and small flanking barrages on the anticipated coastal route of the enemy. Offensive use of mines is planned by mining of Olbia, Ajaccio, the Strait of Bonifacio and the main ports on both coasts. Naval Staff has approved in principle the plans and priority sequence of the various sectors.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

The steamer BOCCACIO coming from Corfu put in to Patras on 17 Oct. The apprehension felt about her loss is, therefore, unfounded.

The steamer ITALIA with five Siebel ferries and five infantry landing boats arrived at Zara on the afternoon of 16 Oct. from Pola. The 612th and 623rd Naval Artillery Battalions arrived at Trieste on 18 Oct.

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Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic moved on 16 Oct. to Duifo near Trieste.

Group South reported on 15 Oct. details of barrage projects for the Adriatic Sea and mine requirements. Naval Staff has already approved barrages RA "23", "24" and "25" and assigned the required mines. Naval Staff points out, with regard to future barrage projects off Cape Promontore and Cape Ploca, that these areas are especially favorable for enemy submarine operations. Laying of the barrages, which are very desirable, is hindered by shortage of UMB mines; they can therefore only be laid gradually. Of the two barrages planned, the one off Cape Ploca appears to be the more important, since it protects the traffic along the Dalmatian coast.

b. Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

The two destroyers which shelled Calino on the evening of 17 Oct. were reported at 2250 on 17 Oct. ten miles east of Stampalia on course 210 degrees proceeding at high speed. According to a later report, one of them was a cruiser. At 0130 on 18 Oct. destroyers or torpedo boats were sighted off the northwest point of Kalymnos on course 350 degrees and subsequently putting in to Leros. At 0545 there were three vessels, presumably torpedo boats, east of Leros off the Turkish Coast. Remarkably heavy traffic consisting of steamers and sailing vessels has been observed for days off the Turkish coast, according to a report of Commander, 21st Submarine Chaser Flotilla.

At 1446 1 cruiser and 3 destroyers were located 90 miles south of Rhodes on northerly course, At Castell Rosso, according to photographic reconnaissance, there were 9 PT boats, 2 M., G.B.s, 1 L.S.T. and 1 seaplane. According to a sighting report, there were at 0540 2 motor minesweepers or PT boats on easterly course northwest of Castell Rosso.

Own Situation:

Reports so far reveal that of the 500 men aboard the steamer KARI 320 survivors have been rescued, of whom 180 are wounded. Fifty survivors and parts of Parachute Company "Brandenburg" overpowered the British garrison on Levitha. A mopping-up party of Assault Division "Rhodes" occupied the island of Calchi without enemy resistance. On the afternoon of 16 Oct. two naval landing craft probably shot down an enemy bomber on the north coast of Kos.

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According to a report from Group South, the following ships have become total losses in the operations against Kos and Leros so far; The steamers OLYMPOS and KARI, the minelayer BULGARIA, submarine chasers "2109" and "2111" and six naval landing craft.

The steamers SANTORINA and TRAPANI, light PT boat LS "5" and one naval landing craft sustained damage. The TRAPAINI is afloat, according to the latest report. Her engines are undamaged but the fire in her bow has not yet been extinguished. The local Naval Commander on Kos has been authorized by radio to carry out temporary withdrawal of the naval forces and steamers which are endangered to the Cyclades area, in agreement with General Mueller, should operation "Leopard" not be carried out during the night of 17 Oct.

The steamer GERDA TOFT with 2,000 prisoners aboard put in to Piraeus from Cephalonia on the evening of 17 Oct. The steamer SINFRA put in to Suda on the morning of 18 Oct. from Candia and put out for Piraeus in the evening.

c. Black Sea:

A large convoy of Army boats in two groups left Sevastopol in the afternoon for Nikolayev escorted by five naval landing craft. Ship "19" and three submarine chasers were sent out on anti-submarine patrol west of Eupatoria. Three naval artillery lighters and two combined operations boats left Genichesk to take up patrol line off the northwest coast of the Sea of Asov.

Submarine U "24" put in to Sevastopol from operations and is to leave again on the evening of 19 Oct.

VIII. Situation West Asia

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance

Eden and Hull arrived in Moscow on 18 Oct. According to an "Exchange" report, "Krasnaja Swesda", the publication of the Russian High Command, has, on the eve of the Conference, again commented on the problem of the second front and designated this question as decisive for the future conduct of the war. At the same time "Isvestia" attributes the critical state of the war to the hesitant attitude of the Western Democracies.

These statements prior to the opening of the Conference are a clear indication of the Russian plans for discussion.

According to a Swedish press report, well-informed circles in London have affirmed that Moscow intends to demand Allied recognition of the Ribbentrop/Molotov demarcation line of 1939.

It is to be assumed that the above is a ruse. No stone is being left unturned to induce the Russians to discuss political matters. It is, however, obvious that the Russians will not discuss anything until the question of the front in western Europe has been dealt with. The fact that the British and Americans are well aware of this is proved by the really pitiful attitude of "The Times", which attempts repeatedly to put forward political questions and from the start to offer the Russians the boundaries of 1941 as a bait.

Conference on the Situation With Chief, Naval Staff

I. Army Situation

On the eastern front, extension of the enemy breakthrough at Kremenchug is serious. The situation remained more or less stable at the other points of attack.

In Italy our withdrawals to the final defense line were carried out slowly and according to plan.

In a Highly Restricted Circle

II. a) Chief, Naval Staff expressed his deepest regret on the loss of Ship "28". The report on Japanese measures for the safe escort of the raider into ports are to be awaited. It is hoped that these measures were equal to our endeavors for safe escort of the Japanese submarines KIRSCHBLUETE and FLIEDER.

b) The failure of submarine operation "Schlieffen" is to be attributed to enemy air action. A loss of 6 submarines out of 18 on this operation is most serious. Chief, Naval Staff has induced Minister Speer to take the necessary steps at once for equipment of submarines with "Orgel" (improved light, multiple barrel anti aircraft guns ? Tr. N.)

c) Chief of Staff, Naval Staff brought up for discussion the question of intensified submarine operations in the Black Sea. Transfer of submarines overland and long the Danube takes an extremely long time. The question as to whether submarines can be built at Black Sea dockyards should be investigated again.

Special Items

I. A chart showing all naval forces and merchantmen in the Mediterranean as on 15 Oct. 1943, which was drawn up for a report of Chief, Naval Staff to the Fuehrer, is contained in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

II. Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy submitted on 7 Oct. a proposal of the Under Secretary of the Italian Navy to set up again in Berlin a Liaison Staff to High Command, Navy which will assume the tasks of the Naval Attache and of Admiral Bertoldi at the same time. Naval Staff has requested Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff to give its approval that the Lt. Dr. de Mori, who is at present in Berlin, be recognized as Liaison Officer and later, according to developments in the situation and the requirements resulting therefrom, be granted a Liaison Staff as is requested by the Italians. This has been approved and the German Naval Command, Italy advised accordingly.

The Naval Attache's Section has been ordered to advise Lt. Dr. de Mori.

III. High Command, Navy, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division issued the following order on 16 Oct.:

"1. In accordance with the instructions received from Armed Forces High Command, Naval Staff is taking the necessary measures, as far as the Navy is concerned, for utilization of the Italian forces.

2. Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch is obtaining information, in cooperation with the other offices of High Command, Navy and operational Commands, for drawing up demands to the Italian Armed Forces and will issue the necessary instructions regarding organization.

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3. Vice Admiral Weichold, who will remain under Chief of Staff, Naval Staff, will be instructed to submit the demands of Naval Staff to the High Command of the Italian Navy, in close agreement with the Organization and Mobilization Branch, and to come to an agreement regarding execution of the measures necessary for their fulfillment.

Situation 19 Oct.

i. War in Foreign Waters

No new reports have been received regarding Ship "28".

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the Bay of Biscay 29 planes were detected on operation.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Two submarines were escorted out. Destroyer Z "32" was transferred from Le Verdon to Pauillac. Five boats of the 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla carried out exercises off Concarneau.

During the night of 19 Oct. torpedo boats T "14", the FALKE and the KONDOR will be transferred from La Pallice as far as Brest.

Channel Coast:

On 17 Oct. one ELM/J mine was swept off Zeebruegge. Otherwise nothing to report.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters

North Sea:

At 1000 30 Beaufighters attacked patrol and salvage

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near the wreck of the STRASSBURG north of IJmuiden; four planes have so far been reported shot down. The STRASSBURG caught fire. Some of our vessels sustained damage and suffered casualties. At 1130 the HJ "07" (the converted ADRIANA) was attacked by eight planes on the West Scheldt and was heavily damaged. Boats of the River Minesweeper Flotilla shot down two Typhoons.

Four ground mines were swept off Texel.

Convoy "465" Elbe - Hook consisting of two steamers left at 1400.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the North Sea 13 planes were detected on operation. Our submarines off Spitsbergen reported at 1018 1 steamer and 2 destroyers and at 1210 5 destroyers putting in to Ice Fjord. Four available submarines are taking up position off Ice Fjord. In the afternoon 1 light cruiser with a ship's plane and 3 destroyers were sighted in Advent Bay and at 2345 4 vessels leaving Ice Fjord at high speed, westbound. Submarine U "737" was rammed and damaged at 1655 during the attack on destroyers off Barentsburg but is luckily able to submerge and has started on return passage. The cruiser and destroyers from Advent Bay were reported at 2200 withdrawing to the west.

The appearance of such strong forces at Spitsbergen is worthy of note. Economic reasons can hardly be decisive for this. On the other hand, the strategic value of the base seems to be rated very highly by the British now, which is easily understood in view of the Russian interests in this area. From this aspect operation "Zitronella" now gains increased value.

Minor reconnaissance activity was reported in the Petsamo/Vardoe area on 18 Oct.

2. Own Situation:

In the area of Naval Command, Norway 36 ships were escorted north and 26 south. Owing to shortage of escorts 21 ships were left lying in harbor.

Group North/Fleet submits a report from the SCHARNHORST about the noises heard on 17 Oct. For copy see teletype 2333. Neither the Task Force nor Group North/Fleet are able to account for the incident.

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Group North/Fleet has no operational objections to barrages "NW 62" and "63" planned by Naval Command, Norway.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

In the evening our coast on Kronstadt Bay was shelled from the sea, presumably by guardboats. A minesweeper unit southeast of Little Tyters was fired on at noon by minesweepers of our barrage patrol; it put up a smoke screen and withdrew to the north.

The British hospital ships went on at 0715 from the anchorages through Swedish territorial waters to Gothenburg.

2. Own Situation:

Minelaying operation "Kalium" in the Skagerrak was carried out by unit ROLAND according to plan.

One ground mine was swept north of Arknoa and one north of Seelands Rev.

In view of the enemy's minesweeping operations and the expected enemy offensive in the Leningrad area, Naval Command, Baltic has approved the plan of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic to reinforce "Seeigel" barrages "6a" and "7a" at once.

The Finns have laid a shallow minefield at the northern point of Hogland.

Naval Command, Baltic transmits the following report of Admiral, Baltic States on the situation in the area of the 18th Army Command:

"1. Southern Sector:

Following the increased railroad traffic observed lately from the direction of Moscow towards Mal -Vishera, heavy enemy attacks from the Volkob bridgehead must be expected in this area. Since 18 Oct. the enemy has been attacking here in groups up to the strength of a company.

2. Central Sector:"

The second focal point of the expected attacks is on the

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front of the 28th Army Corps in the direction of Lyuban with the object of reaching the highway and thus dividing the Army into two parts.

3. Northern Sector:

Heaviest concentration of attacks in front of the 50th Army Corps; the direction assumed is Gatshina. Out of the 650 enemy planes known to be in the whole area 450 have been assembled, according to latest observations; it is therefore to be expected that the attack will be carried out with strong assistance from ground-attack planes and also tanks. The attack is to start on 20 Oct., according to statements made by deserters. It must be assumed that the enemy has completed all preparations, since everything was quiet in this area yesterday. No reconnaissance could be carried out yesterday, as the enemy did everything to prevent this.

Own preparations:

The sector of the 170th Infantry Division has been made smaller and the 215th Infantry Division has been moved into position between the 170th Infantry Division and the 81st Infantry Division. A further division has been withdrawn from the sector east of Mga and is being held in readiness for the points of concentration to be expected. Anti-tank defense has been reinforced."

V. Submarine Warfare

In view of the experiences in convey battle "Schlieffen" attempts will be made in the next operation, by keeping the submarines closer together, to enable quicker approach or the dispersal of defense. Should too strong enemy air escort be encountered attempts will be made, by breaking off the operation in time, to avoid excessive losses. It is necessary to strengthen the anti-aircraft armament of submarines.

Submarine U "154" was off Ponta Delgada from 14 to 16 Oct., but sighted nothing. The harbor was empty.

Submarine U "648" intercepted on 11 Oct. in BF 57 and 48 a momentary location transmission on the centimeter wave.

Regarding submarine warfare in Northern Waters see Situation Northern Waters,

A pleasing report on successful operations has been received from the Mediterranean.

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VI. Aerial Warfare

British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 58 fighters out on operation in the west and seven planes in the Mediterranean.

During the night of 19 Oct. six bombers were out on operation over London,

During the day the enemy carried out machine-gun attacks in the west area, besides the attack reported on the STRASSBURG. Two dredgers were damaged.

Mediterranean Theater:

Our Air Force carried out reconnaissance over the western Mediterranean and the Italian area. Air Force Command, Souty-east now reports regarding 14 Oct. that a destroyer which was attacked in the Aegean Sea by two He 111's was probably damaged. On 19 Oct. ten Ju 88's attacked the harbor and sea-plane base in Cartani Bay (Leros), One Ju 88 attacked a freighter or in the harbor of Samos.

During the day the enemy attacked the airfields of Tuscania (west of Viterbo), where one Ju 88 was destroyed by fire; one Spitfire was shot down by anti-aircraft guns. Further attacks were carried out on the sea-rescue station of Crete and on Syros. Six reconnaissance planes were detected over the Aegean and nine west and south of Crete.

Eastern Front:

During an attack by 30-35 enemy planes on one of our convoys off Kybert our fighter escort shot down 14 planes. The convoy sustained no damage. No report on this has yet been received from naval offices.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

Three destroyers left Gibraltar for the Mediterranean. At 1600 a convoy of 43 freighters and 1 tanker, all in ballast, passed through the Straits of Gibraltar, westbound. Six freighters and 21 tank landing craft put in to Gibraltar from the east.

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Three U. S. destroyers, 5 gunboats, 9 tank landing craft, 2 freighters and 1 tanker left Gibraltar in the afternoon, westbound.

Cape Spartel reported at 1500 a convoy of about 40 ships heading for the Mediterranean.

Submarine U "431" detected and then successfully attacked a westbound convoy at 0306 in CH 7496. Two freighters of 10,000 and 8,000 G.R.T. were sunk, 1 freighter (10,000 GRT) probably sunk and 1 steamer (12,000 GRT) torpedoed.

According to evaluation of photographic reconnaissance the following were identified on 18 Oct.: freighters amounting to 226,000 GRT and 9 loaded LST's on the roads in the harbor of Oran; freighters amounting to 153,000 GRT and tankers amounting to 16,000 GRT in Mers el Kebir, also 36 L.C.I.s proceeding towards the harbor. According to evaluation of photographic reconnaissance of Algiers, there were 88 merchantmen in port at 1230 on 19 Oct. Reconnaissance sighted at 1305 50 miles northeast of Algiers 7 destroyers on easterly course. Ferry traffic across the Strait of Bonifacio was still lively. It is likely that minesweeping operations are being continued. On the afternoon of 18 Oct. there was a convoy consisting of 7 freighters southeast of Cape Spartivento on northerly course, presumably carrying supplies to Taranto. At 0935 on 19 Oct. two submarines were sighted 20 miles east of Toulon. The steamer AVERSA (3,723 GRT) was sunk at 1212 off Rapallo.

Naval Intelligence Division, Enemy Situation Branch summarizes British submarine operations in the Mediterranean during September 1943 as follows:

The number is assumed to be unchanged at present, being about 50 submarines.

The success of operations against our shipping makes it unlikely that a withdrawal of submarines from the Mediterranean can be expected in the near future. The route between Corsica and the mainland was the main center of operations in September and next to it the Aegean Sea.

Sufficient targets will be offered in future by the traffic between Italy and Greece, along the Dalmatian coast, coastal traffic in southern France and Italy and especially in the Aegean Sea. Furthermore, supplies to the insurgents in the Balkan area may assume an important part.

Enemy submarines in the Mediterranean sank in September altogether 13 of our merchantmen totaling 15,246 GRT, 1 Italian submarine

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Enemy submarines in the Mediterranean sank in September altogether 13 of our merchantmen totaling 15,246 GRT, 1 Italian submarine chaser, the minelayer BRANDENBURG and 3 auxiliary warships, Two merchantmen totaling 11,234 GRT were damaged.

The approximate achievement of the submarines is estimated at 41 GRT per submarine per day. The corresponding figure for July and August were 40 and 49 GRT respectively.

Both we and the enemy reported only the Greek submarine KATSONIS sunk in September.

The First Lord of the Admiralty stated on 16 Sept. that 41 British submarines have been lost in the Mediterranean since the beginning of the war.

According to data available to Naval Intelligence Division, out of the total of 62 British submarine losses so far known, of which 58 are confirmed by the Admiralty, 28 were established to be in the Mediterranean. It has been ascertained that another 12 submarines were sunk outside the Mediterranean. It is quite possible that of the 18 sinkings, the locations of which have not been determined and which we cannot yet account for, 13 took place in the Mediterranean.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Coastal traffic consisting of small vessels was hampered by bad weather. No PT boat operations were carried out for the same reason.

German Naval Command, Italy reports that the JUMINDA carried out her operation on 16 and 17 Oct. with Italian mines, mining strip one mile wide to sea from the 10 m. line between 13 degrees 14' East and 13 degrees 17' E. One naval landing craft each mined Gaeta and Ortona on 15 and 16 Oct.

The hospital ship DJENNE put in to Oran.

Group West has reported, with reference to the return of French steamers to southern France, that no German crews are available in southern France and that French sailors refuse to go to Italy on account of the armistice conditions and losses sustained. Group West has hesitations about French ship owners being involved, since the plan to return the steamers would thus become known to the enemy.

Naval Staff does not consider the last reason to be sound, since our plans would in any case not remain secret to the enemy. German Naval Command, Italy, for information Group West, is therefore ordered to investigate and report how

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high danger of loss is estimated to be, taking risks into consideration, and whether the efforts expended for return will be justified by advantages attainable. The attention of Group West is drawn to the fact that participation of French ship owners does not rest with the Naval Office at Marseilles but is a matter for the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

The Army plans to occupy the islands of Previcci and Zlarin near Sibenik on 19 Oct. The Navy has made five Siebel ferries and four infantry landing boats available.

The steamer E. H. FISSER (5,145 GRT) was sunk by a submarine at 1550 on 18 Oct. six miles off Dubrovnik. The crew was rescued. The steamer MERANO (3,705 GRT) and the tanker POZARICA (7,751 GRT) are overdue en route from Zara to Cattaro. This might confirm the report of 17 Oct. of one steamer being seized by enemy torpedo boats and scuttled.

b. Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

The following were located: on the evening of 18 Oct. two shipping targets passing through the Scarpanto Strait at high speed; during the night of 18 Oct. two other shipping targets proceeding at high speed on southerly course in the Kasos Strait. Air reconnaissance sighted at 0050 ten miles south of Kasos two vessels, apparently destroyers, on course 30 degrees. At 2030 and towards 2400 on 18 Oct. the town and harbor of Kos were shelled by two destroyers. At 0945 on 19 Oct. a cruiser and two destroyers shelled the harbor of Kalymnos. At 0530 a damaged destroyer was seen being towed by another destroyer on southerly course in the southern bay of the Gulf of Medella.

Own Situation:

Unloading of the damaged steamer TRAPANI is being continued. The steamer SINFERA (4,470 GRT) was sunk en route from Suda to Piraeus by enemy bombers at 0237 north of Suda. The ship had 204 German and 2,389 Italian soldiers and also 71 Greek convicts aboard, apart from her cargo. According to reports received so far, 566 men have been rescued, including 163 German Soldiers.

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During rescue operations one Do 24 was sunk by enemy planes and a crash boat and a rescue vessel damaged. At 1030 coast patrol boat GK "51" was sunk by an enemy plane north of Cape Sparta without any casualties being sustained.

Group South requests that reports on submarine sinkings should not be published as a general rule so that, even when the enemy presumes a loss, he is kept in the dark regarding its cause and, for instance, may think it was due to mines.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

The radar station on Cape Takil reported naval forces at 2007 20 miles south of the Strait of Kerch on southerly course and at 2021 in the same area what were presumably heavy forces on westerly course. According to radio intelligence an enemy reconnaissance plane transmitted a report on one of our convoys west of Cape Tarshanskutki to seven submarines in the operational area. The convoy was unsuccessfully attacked at 0748 by two torpedo bombers.

Own Situation:

Shelling of the north coast of the Sea of Asov by naval artillery lighters has been postponed until 20 Oct. at the request of the 44th Army Corps. Barrage "S 71" has been laid as planned.

The steamer THEODERICH ran aground on 18 Oct. ten miles west of Ochakov, while en route from Nikolayev to Odessa. Salvage operations are under way.

Chief, Submarine Branch, Quartermaster Division has made investigations with regard to the possibility of repairing submarines at Salonika and of expanding the base. Group South has submitted a preliminary report. According to this, it will be possible within six months to set up emergency submarine repair facilities for three VII C type submarines and six smaller submarines with the present installations at Salonika. A final solution lies in the construction of a protected base at Tuzla, 20 km. southwest of Salonika. At least two years will be required for its construction. For copy of report see teletype 1050. This matter will be dealt with further by Quartermaster Division in cooperation with the Main Committee for Ship Construction.

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Group South reports that Admiral, Aegean plans to use naval landing craft which are transferred to his area solely for transportation purposes, as further merchantment. In view of the lack of merchant marine personnel, Admiral, Aegean has suggested that naval personnel be given civilian clothes and papers accordingly. Group South does not consider this course practicable and requests that civilian crews be made available. Admiral, Black Sea estimates that at least 90 naval landing craft are required for current tasks. However, Group South is of opinion that in view of the situation in the Aegean Sea eight naval landing craft must be transferred from the Black Sea, as soon as Turkish permission for passage through the Dardanelles has been obtained (see teletype 2135).

Quartermaster Division has advised the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping and Armed Forces High Command, Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas that Army Group A has urgently requested Group South for further sea transports for dispersal of forces from the Crimea; an increase of the previous daily average transport from 500 tons to 1,500 - 2,000 tons is required. Quartermaster Division points out that it is necessary to lay down the tasks on which available shipping in the Black Sea is to be concentrated by the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping.

VIII. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance

A few statements of a speech by Smuts on 19 Oct. are noteworthy. He stated, amongst other things, that all branches of the Armed Forces must be concentrated for the final large-scale assault on the fortress of Europe - and they will be next spring. It is quite possible that American troops will play a decisive part in these operations. A decision is to be forced next year as early as possible. The Allies will first concentrate on Europe, then on Japan. The future organization which will be responsible for security of the nations after the war can only be effective if it carries out its work with steadfast determination.

Commenting on the situation in the various theaters of war, Smuts emphasized that the battles for Stalingrad and El Alamein were the turning points in this war. Referring to the Russian losses, Smuts declared that the maintenance of Russian attacks following their heavy losses was astonishing and British admiration unbounded, but that this should not lead to underestimating one's own achievements. The Allied air offensive has assumed proportions which are equivalent in effect to a large additional front. Plans were laid quietly and much progress had been made. Still greater progress can be expected with confidence, especially in southern and southeastern Europe. The ring around the fortress of Europe will be closed in the coming winter and preparations are being made for the attack next year. The manpower of the United States will be ready for the decisive battles in this attack.

Smuts then outlined conditions in occupied Europe and stated in this connection that there is little time left and that from now on every moment is valuable. The moral and physical conditions, especially in the occupied countries, are indescribable. If Europe is to be rescued from unspeakable misery, endeavors must be made to finish the war as quickly as possible. In conclusion, Smuts declared that the Atlantic Charter already outlines the future security plan.

Smuts' statement about the offensive in Europe are described in Washington as a preliminary clarification for the Moscow Conference.

Reporting on the opening of the Moscow talks, "Exchange Telegraph" states that there is basic agreement with regard to the agenda. The subjects of a purely military nature will be dealt with when discussing each individual theater of war. No communiques on the progress of the discussions will be issued, according to Reuter. Stalin will not participate personally in the discussions.

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"Associated Press" reports that Hull, in contrast to Eden and Molotov, is not authorized to make final resolutions, so that the British and Americans can always evade embarrassing situations which may arise during the proceedings.

According to "DNB", Turkish and neutral circles in Ankara are impressed by fears which the British Ambassador there has expressed about the Russian plans for Europe. The Ambassador is said to have declared that the pro-Soviet tendency of certain British newspapers, which would like to promise large areas of Europe to the Soviets, are in no way shared by official British quarters. The present united war against Germany does not exclude the fact that England will also find it necessary one day to stop the Soviet advance into Europe.

According to a Swedish press report, it is expected in London that the British and Americans will request at Moscow the concession of air bases in Russian territory for attacks on Japan. The fact that Russia is not at war with Japan must at all events be obviated.

According to a radio announcement from London on 19 Oct., a new lend-lease agreement has been signed between Great Britain, the United States, Canada and Russia; this is said to provide for considerable increases of war materiel to Russia.

According to Radio Daventry, the British aircraft carrier DETROIT (23,000 GRT) has been placed at the disposal of the U. S. Navy for operations in the Pacific Ocean.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Army Situation:

Heavy defensive fighting continues at the centers of the Russian offensive. At the critical point of penetration north of Dnepropetrovsk our thin defensive line is being built up. Things were comparatively quiet in front of the 9th and 4th Armies and in the area of Nevel. The enemy attack, expected for days on the northern sector of the eastern front, has not started yet.

The situation on the Italian front is more or less unchanged.

II. The Naval Liaison Officer to High Command, Army, Army General Staff has reported to Chief of Staff, Naval Staff on

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the Crimea. For copy as per l/Skl (space left blank - TR.N) Gkōos. Chefs, see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIVA.

III. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff points out that wear and tear to shipping in the Aegean endangers the supply situation. It is therefore inexcusable that the establishment of building sites for naval landing craft at Salonika, requested by Naval Staff, makes no progress. Chief, Naval Staff orders that Minister Speer be approached direct on this matter.

IV. Quartermaster General reports that taking over of very heavy Italian guns of English manufacture, as urged by Field Marshal Rommel, is being investigated.

In a Highly Restricted Circle"

V. By order of Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division issued on 13 Oct. the following instructions to Commanding Admiral, Task Force and to the TIRPITZ, with copy to Group North/Fleet:

"1. In view of the possibility of further attacks, the nature of which is unknown, sufficient manning of damage control and anti-aircraft guns must be assured when granting leave. Guns for firing at naval targets must also be in defensive readiness should heavy naval forces penetrate into Alta Fjord. Please confirm.

2. The situation may demand that the TIRPITZ be used elsewhere as a floating battery, for instance if a landing in northern Norway is detected in time. State your opinion about possibilities of use for this and of transfer."

Commanding Admiral, Task Force gave detailed views in this connection which were transmitted on 17 Oct. by Group North/Fleet. After dealing in general with the psychological value of leave for the TIRPITZ crew. these give particulars of readiness with regard to personnel and materiel:

I. a) until the dockyard period commences all weapons, with a few exceptions, are ready for action;

b) from the beginning of the dockyard period the following will be ready: 1 heavy turret, 1 medium gun turret, 50% of anti-aircraft guns and corresponding fire control apparatus

c) leave for 100 men per week means 5% reduction in gunnery personnel. The lowest number will be reached on about

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d) with this minimum figure the following can be manned: $1\frac{1}{2}$ heavy gun turrets, $2\frac{1}{2}$ medium gun turrets, 60% of anti-aircraft guns and corresponding fire control. There will, therefore, be sufficient reserves on board in relation to the material facilities during the dockyard period;

e) leave schedules provide that the increasing readiness of guns at the end of the dockyard period is fully met as regards personnel.

2. Engines:

a) The turbines have been out of action since 22 Sept. and will remain so even until the final date for constructional repairs. Readiness of all power installations and, at about the same time, restoration of a "limited" sailing readiness will thus not be possible before the final date owing to dependence on constructional repairs.

b) About 125 bottom valves must be opened and examined or repaired after cover boxes have been fitted. The ship cannot be moved until then.

c) It is planned to repair the rudder with a large caisson (diving chamber). As long as this is out (date and length of time unknown) the ship cannot be moved.

d) Two thirds of the crew will always be aboard and defense of the ship therefore assured.

3. a) Leave has been promised; it is considered necessary and has started. Under the above conditions any interference appears to be undesirable, since only up to the beginning of the dockyard period will personnel fall a little below material readiness; on the other hand, keeping anything more than the weapons named under 1.b in action readiness will prolong the dockyard period. The latter also applies to maintenance of towing readiness owing to the current work by divers on the bottom of the ship.

b) In our opinion transfer with the assistance of tugs during the dockyard period is out of question, especially for the reasons specified under 2. a-c) and in view of the slight degree of readiness of ship's weapons; also owing to the long time required, which might certainly exceed the warning notice to be expected in winter.

c) Should such an operation be ordered only Raftbotn, Leirbotn, Talvik and Aarøysd can be considered as operational points in view of the state of readiness of the ship. It will hardly be possible

to control the ship with tugs in battle. Anchoring will be extremely difficult. The tug situation will be most critical in case of alarm, owing to requirements for the SCHARNHORST, etc.

4. To sum up, Commanding Admiral, Task Force is of opinion that the consequences which were foreseen from the decision to have the dockyard period in the northern area must all be borne and that use of weapons during this period, the duration of which is to be curtailed by all conceivable means of a materiel and personnel nature, will only come into question for the ship's own defense at her anchorage, utilizing smoke screens and with the aid of an advanced gunnery observer, which will be impossible at any other place. All other exceptions are unrealistic and formulated without sufficient consideration of existing conditions.

Group North/Fleet reports in addition:

We fully concur with the comments of Commanding Admiral, Task Force regarding the operational possibilities of the TIRPITZ, as they correspond with the earlier views of this Group which are already known. We request that for the time being, i.e. until the ship is again ready to proceed to a certain degree, the TIRPITZ should still remain at her present anchorage, as this offers the best facilities for defense. If the TIRPITZ, which would be moved with difficulty were towed from this position it might entail operational possibilities for her guns, few of which are anyway in readiness, against surface forces but, on the other hand, would make the immovable ship considerably more vulnerable to enemy bombs, torpedoes and other weapons. Group North/Fleet therefore requests that from now on any transfers be definitely ruled out and that all efforts be concentrated on the defense of the present anchorage and on speeding up the dockyard period.

Naval Staff cannot agree to a definite tying-down of the ship.

Situations may arise which may force use of the battleship's weapons elsewhere. In an emergency, batteries which are ready for action must not lie idle. The accusation of an unrealistic conception must be rejected. This matter will be dealt with further by Quartermaster Division, with Operations Division participating.

Chief, Naval Staff agrees with the views of Naval Staff.

Special Items

I. In order to make preparations in time for further supplies to and possible evacuation of the Crimea by sea, it is absolutely necessary for the Navy to know to what extent supplies or evacuation over land are considered possible and accordingly what demands must be expected for sea transports.

Naval Staff therefore request High Command, Army, Army General Staff, via the Naval Liaison Officer, to see that the Navy is informed on this as soon as possible. Group South and Admiral, Black Sea are being instructed to make preliminary investigations in their areas. Copy as per teletype 1/Skl 29392/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIVa.

II. Army General Staff, Operations Division has urgently requested that for the time being the projected withdrawal to the Adriatic of naval crews from six Army batteries in the Crimea and of 500 seamen from the coastal defense of Genichesk should not be carried out, as the Crimea is now already very sparsely occupied and it is impossible to man batteries with Army personnel. A decision as to whether the Crimea can be held will have to be arrived at within the next few days. Admiral, Black Sea has already, on his own initiative, stopped the evacuations ordered by Group South, at the request of the Army. High Command, Army, Operations Division is advised first of the following views of Operations Division, Naval Staff without prejudice to the decision of Chief, Naval Staff:

"The withdrawal of naval gunners from the Crimea was ordered despite the expected developments, since not all of these men can be employed there at present on the tasks for which they have been trained. However, they are urgently needed for naval tasks elsewhere (it is planned to use them for reinforcing the entirely inadequate Adriatic coastal defense). It is therefore an impossible state of affairs that these men are being detained in the Crimea for Army tasks, just because they were passing through there, while the urgent tasks for which they are required elsewhere are left undone.

Insofar as the men are in action at present, their release will of course not be possible until reliefs can be brought up by the Army."

III. German Naval Command, Italy has drawn attention to the special hydroplane for two torpedoes, speed 40 - 45 knots, range 360 miles, which is being developed in the Italian Navy. Operations Division instructs Quartermaster Division to take up this project if it does not affect the Fleet Construction Program 1943.

IV. A discussion on 18 Oct. between Naval (Ship) Construction Division, Naval Ordnance Division and Naval Staff regarding plans for submarines types XX B and XXIV revealed that the new type XXB (supply and transport submarine) proposed by Naval (Ship) Construction Division is out of question. Submarine Division rejects this type as a supply boat. Endeavors made to arrive at a combination of types XX and XIVA have thus failed.

Type XIV can therefore at present not be abandoned. Whether another type (XXI) can take its place is still to be investigated. The discussion further showed that type XXIVA is approved on the whole.

V. Naval (Ship) Construction Division drew up on 15 Oct. notes on the origin of the joint directive of Commander in Chief, Navy and Minister Speer. This matter is dealt with in War Diary of 5 and 7 July 1943. Copy of notes as per 1/Skl 29566/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

VI. For report of Quartermaster Division regarding evaluation of current war experiences as per 1/Skl. 31927/43 geh. see War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

VII. By order of Quartermaster Division of 11 Oct. 1943 Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean comes directly under Naval Staff (Operations Division) as regards operation.

Situation 20 Oct.

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

For advice to all vessels in foreign waters on the strength of the United States Navy on 1 Oct. 1943 see teletype 1955. The large number of aircraft carriers and auxiliary carriers is noteworthy. It is known that in all 62 such vessels are in service or under construction.

2. Own Situation:

Regarding the loss of Ship "28" the Naval Attache in Tokyo reports that at 0230 on 17 Oct. at 33 degrees 31' N 139 degrees 05' E in bright moonlight the ship was hit by the first torpedo, causing her engines and current to fail, so that no radiogram could be transmitted. The attacking submarine was obviously submerged since she could not be seen

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although starshells were used. Five minutes later a second torpedo glanced off the starboard side aft but shortly afterwards a third one hit her at this point. A fourth torpedo missed and a fifth hit her on the port side, forward end of the bridge. The auxiliary cruiser sank quickly stern first at 0245. At the same time a sixth torpedo missed forward. After the second hit the order was given: "Abandon ship". Heavy smoke lay over the scene owing to explosion of the smoke floats. Following the sinking the submarine was seen surfaced and seems to have taken survivors on board. One cutter and two rubber dinghiss landing on Izu 33 hours later. A search started immediately by the Japanese Navy was without result up to 1925 on 20 Oct.; it is being continued.

According to interrogations so far, the ship was proceeding almost as in peacetime, no zig-zag courses, only one officer on watch (Lt. j. g. Horn), no wartime watch, the order that watertight doors be kept closed not strictly enforced, all personnel not on watch below deck undressed in their bunks.

This report does not give an answer to Naval Staff's enquiry about measures by the Japanese Navy to meet the ship. The information given about the state of readiness of the ship is almost unbelievable. If true, it means that there was extraordinary laxity.

Naval Staff has asked the Naval Attache in Tokyo for information regarding the schedule date of departure of submarine DOMMES and the AQUILA submarines.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the Bay of Biscay 36 planes were detected on operation. One British Vessel was located at 1943 in AM 7920. Aerial reconnaissance sighted at 1200 on 19 Oct. in Plymouth harbor, 1 battleship, 4 destroyers, and 3 minesweepers.

According to an intelligence report via "Ostrov", the RENOWN put out to sea from Pembroke on 25 Sept. Two other large battleships put in to this port, including on 24 Sept. the ANSON with several cruisers.

According to further intelligence reports from sources as yet not proved, an Anglo-American landing near Brest and Morlaix is said to be planned for 20 Oct. For details see teletype 1050. Furthermore Lagos is to be occupied from Gibraltar on 23 Oct. (see teletype 1840).

2. Own Situation:Atlantic Coast:

Two submarines were escorted out from La Pallice. Exercises by the 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla are so far proceeding to plan. Boats will start on their return passage to Brest at 0200 on 21 Oct. Two ELM/J mines were swept off La Pallice and one off the Gironde.

Torpedo boats T "14", the KONDOR and the FALKE put in to Brest at 1130 and proceeded on to Cherbourg at 1830.

Channel Coast:

Nothing to report.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern WatersNorth Sea:

Convoy "465" Elbe - Hook was carried out as planned. Seven ELM/J mines were swept north of Terschelling and one north of Ijmuiden. The report that two Typhoons were shot down on 19 Oct. by the River Minesweeper Flotilla has not been confirmed. Minesweeping activity in the Heligoland Bight was hampered by stormy weather.

Norway, Northern Waters:1. Enemy Situation:

Over the North Sea five planes were observed on operation.

MTB "626" (30th MTB Flotilla) was at sea at 1120, according to radio intelligence.

From Spitsbergen (Ice Fjord) no new information is reported. Light gunfire was reported in the Petsamo area on the afternoon of 18 Oct. At 1616 on 19 Oct. batteries on the Ribachi Peninsula shelled an outgoing Petsamo convoy with 100 rounds, forcing it to return. Fire was returned with 99 rounds.

2. Own Situation:

The success by fighters reported by the 5th Air Force

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On 19 Oct. was achieved at 1435 near Kybert, while escorting our westbound convoy. Besides the fourteen enemy planes shot down by our fighters, one plane was shot down by naval batteries. Around 0200 on 20 Oct. the steamer ZEROD of the transport fleet "Speer" was machine-gunned by two planes west of Askevolt.

Twenty-six ships were escorted north and 25 south. Altogether 15 ships were delayed owing to shortage of escorts.

Group North/Fleet reports the following final plan for the transfer of the destroyers:

- "1. Destroyer Z "27" will be transferred with destroyer ZH 11" during the October new-moon period to the west area
2. The destroyer RICHARD BEITZEN and Z "38" will be transferred on 22 Oct. to the northern area. On their arrival the destroyers FRIEDRICH IHN and THEODOR RIEDEL will return to home waters for dockyard period. The destroyers will stop over at Kristiansand South for three days for operations against blockade-runners, the first 2 on their north and the other 2 on their way home.
3. The destroyers ERICH STEINBRINK and Z "34" with Commander, Destroyers will be transferred on 1 Nov. 1943 to the northern area, without stopping at Kristiansand South. Upon their arrival the destroyers KARL GOLSTER and Z "31" will return to home waters. Whether they are to stop over at Kristiansand South on their way has not yet been decided."

The Task Force Reports:

"1. Investigation of the midget submarine by a technical commission has been concluded.

2. The Task Force proposes that the TIRPITZ be assigned scrapping of the remains of the submarine after the magnetic survey has been effected."

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

The hospital ships METEOR and RUEGEN As well as the British Red Cross Ships EMPRESS OF RUSSIA and ATLANTIS and the DROTTNINGHOLM will leave Gothenburg at 0700 on 21 Oct.

Naval Command, Baltic and Admiral, Baltic States have been informed by Naval Staff as follows:

"1. Army General Staff agrees with the views held by Naval Staff that the naval batteries in the Leningrad area should not be used up in the landin fighting, as they are the only available coastal guns for reinforcement of the Estonian coast. Army General Staff has therefore agreed to withdrawal of Battery "Bluecher". Army General Staff has advised Army Group North accordingly.

2. It is pointed out once more that naval batteries should remain as long as possible in the Leningrad Area for use on the naval front. They will not be withdrawn until the situation demands it. The decision as to when the batteries should be removed will be reached by Admiral, Baltic States according to an estimate of the local situation. Naval Staff is of opinion that dismantling of all batteries which must be transported by rail must now be started, whereas batteries which can be transported by road can remain at the front for the time being."

Otherwise nothing special to report,

V. Submarine Warfare

Nothing to report.

VI. Aerial WarfareBritish Isles and Vicinity :

During the day there were many flights by the enemy into the occupied west areas and the Rhine/Westphalian industrial area. Here a formation of 200 Fortresses with fighter escort attacked various places including Troisdorf and Dueren from Altitudes at times ranging between 9,000 and 10,000 m.; industry sustained heavy damage. Although 453 of our fighters went up only 1 enemy plane was shot down for certain and 6 probably shot down.

In the evening about 300 planes flew into Germany and assembled in the Magdeburg - Stendal area, from where a large-scale raid on Berlin was expected. The bulk of planes, however, flew off the other way. Part-formations dropped bombs over the industrial area of central Germany. Bombs were reported to have been dropped on Emden, Bremen, Berlin, Leipzig, Moelkau, in the district of Leipzig - Torgau and also in the area of Coblenz-Trier. Air Force General Staff assumes that weather conditions prevented the enemy from carrying out a concentrated attack.

Further flights by small enemy formations are reported in the areas of Coblenz, Cologne, Crefeld and via Stolp as far as Warsaw; also, coming from the south, via Klagenfurt into the area of Pilsen.

Thirty-eight planes of the 9th Air Corps carried out a harassing raid on London and 51 attacked the town and harbor of Hull.

Mediterranean Theater:

Our Air Force carried out reconnaissance. In Italy the enemy attacked Ancona, the road at Grosseto and the airfield of Marcigliani north of Rome. In the Balkans Nish was attacked by a strong enemy formation, Furthermore, twelve planes raided Kos. At Marcigliani and at Nish a number of our plans was destroyed or damaged. No defense successes are reported.

Eastern Front:

Nothing to report.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

Of the eastbound convoy which was reported by Cape Spartel on 19 Oct., 10 freighters entered Gibraltar, while 9 freighters, 1 tanker and 1 gunboat joined the convoy from there. At 1735 it was detected consisting of 57 ships 20 miles east of Alboran. At 1550 air reconnaissance sighted 60 miles north of Oran 2 destroyers and 1 merchantmen on easterly course and at 1440 50 vessels leaving Algiers. Reconnaissance of Corsica and Sardinia was incomplete owing to weather conditions. The following were sighted: off Bonifacio 1 transport and 1 destroyer; at Maddalena six PT boats presumably engaged in harassing our coastal traffic, and 3 merchantmen; at Olbia for the first time 2 destriyers. On the supply routes

to the Gulf of Naples only light traffic was observed. For the first time again for days, a large convoy of 14 steamers and 2 escort vessels was sighted on northerly course 20 miles northeast of Ustica, presumably carrying supplies to Naples. There was a large number of ships in the Gulf of Naples but only a few vessels were lying in Salerno Bay. Three PT boats unsuccessfully attacked our convoy of the steamer GIORGIO at Ollo on passage from Piombino to Genoa. No shipping movements were observed on the east coast of Italy and in the eastern mediterranean.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Four PT boats left Civitavecchia in the afternoon for an operation in the area Salerno - Ustica. Coastal traffic was again carried out as planned. Bombs were dropped on the center of Rome during the night of 19 Oct. At noon on 20 Oct. a heavy raid was carried out by 36 four-engined bombers with strong fighter cover on the coastal area nine miles north of Civitavecchia. Enemy landing preparations in this sector must be reckoned with, although landing craft located in Naples at present are sufficient only for the transportation of 0.4 U. S. Divisions.

The hospital ships AQUILEJA, GRADISCA and SINAIA arrived at Oran; they are to sail for Marseilles together with the DJENNE on 21 Oct.

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has decided, with regard to the request of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South of 17 Oct. that the plan of German Naval Command, Italy to transfer the 616th Naval Artillery Battalion further south should be carried out.

3. Area Naval Group South

a. Adriatic Sea:

The steamers MILANO and SANSEGO were unsuccessfully shelled by an insurgent battery on Cherso (east of Pola). Air Commander, Croatia has been asked to bomb this battery. The convoy of the steamer SEBENICO was unsuccessfully shelled by the 10.5 cm. battery at Morto (Northwest of Sibenik). Fire was returned, effectively assisted by our battery. At the barrage gap at Asinello an auxiliary sailing vessel had a brief engagement with an armed auxiliary sailing vessel and was shelled from shore near Selve lighthouse and again attacked by two auxiliary sailing ships near Isto. The vessel put in to Pola with casualties. A seaplane on a flight to Split with part of the staff company of the Naval Shore Commander has been overdue since 0700 on 19 Oct.

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Occupation of islands of Previcci and Zlarin near Sibenik was planned for 20 Oct. Execution of this operation has not yet been reported.

According to a report from the Port Commander at Cattaro, 5 vessels, suitable as minesweepers, 2 floating docks (4,000 and 1,500 tons), 6 launches, 2 tugs, 2 floating cranes and 12 barges have been seized in the Bay.

Admiral, Adriatic has transferred to Belgrade.

Group South emphasizes the necessity of our Air Force operation in the following teletype to Naval Staff and Army Group F:

"1. Supplies to the entire Adriatic coast are only possible by sea. Required in this connection:

- a) The ports must be serviceable;
- b) Repair of the ships requisitioned (warships and merchantmen) and continuation of new constructions.

It is therefore necessary that dockyards, dock installations, etc. continue to function.

2. The large dockyard capacity at the Adriatic ports must, if possible, also be made use of for the Aegean area, since it is impossible to bring up shipping from other areas. It is also planned to build submarines here. Maintenance of capacity is therefore decisive for fighting at sea and on land.

3. Defense of harbors, dockyards, etc. from attack by sea is a matter for the Navy. Such defense will be built up by Admiral, Adriatic.

4. On the other hand, dockyards and ports are defenseless against air attacks. The enemy knows the location and importance of the objectives in the area, especially through Italian betrayal. The dockyards particularly are large and vulnerable targets. Enemy bases are in the immediate vicinity. The formation of Close Combat Unit "Middle East" in Southern Italy indicates such aims.

5. Therefore immediate introduction of strong air defense is very pressing in order to avoid this elimination of facilities for building and repairing vessels for the Adriatic and the Aegean and to avoid crippling of sea traffic and destruction of harbor installations, the consequences of which are incalculable."

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v. Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

At 2300 on 19 Oct. 3 destroyers and 2 fast escort boats were attacked by our Air Force southwest of Kalymnos. The destroyers withdrew to the northwest and the escort boats to the east. At 2336 surface forces attacked Kalymnos Bay. No details have yet been reported. During the night of 19 Oct. light PT boat LS "5" and naval landing craft F "131" were torpedoed and sunk by attacking PT boats on the northern shore of Kos. Naval landing craft F "330" burnt out north of the harbor of Kos - cause still unknown; the ammunition aboard detonated. An enemy plane spotted the convoy of the steamer INGEBORG at Syra. Radio traffic indicates that an attack is imminent. This assumption is strengthened by the sighting of several destroyers and escort boats southeast of Scarpanto on northwesterly course at 1605 on 20 Oct.

According to an intelligence report from a reliable source, the Balkan operation, especially the attack on the islands, was to have been carried out during the second half of September/beginning of October. The operation was postponed for political reasons, in order to await the outcome of the Moscow conference, but is in any case still to be carried out.

Own Situation:

The troops aboard the convoy of the steamer INGEBORG were disembarked in view of the enemy situation. The airfield of Kos is reported unserviceable due to the air attack during the night of 19 Oct. Syra may only be entered on prescribed routes.

Preparations are being made for mopping-up of Stampalia. From Crete and the other islands 21,100 Italians and 270 British are still to be removed.

Group South plans to use transport-submarines for supplying the islands in the Aegean Sea, in order to relieve surface supplies which have now almost come to a standstill and which will later also be very risky. Group South considers that transport-submarines will be required even after the islands have been mopped-up and the enemy bases in the Aegean Sea eliminated. It therefore requests investigations regarding speedy availability of these submarines. Quartermaster Division will deal with this matter further. (See teletype 2020).

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c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

The report regarding heavy enemy forces south of the Strait of Kerch on the evening of 19 Oct. was based on a false location. Our PT boats, sent out to investigate, sighted nothing. At 0050 our night reconnaissance planes sighted six miles south of Anapa 3 boats, presumably motor minesweepers, 2 coastal vessels and 2 PT boats on northerly course. Minor enemy forces are reported to have attempted a landing in the evening towards 2200 near Cape Chauda. Our PT boats which were sent out detected nothing at the landing place. Three gunboats and three PT boats were out to sea on easterly course.

The Intelligence Service has submitted a report on the new composition of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and personnel, based on statements made by naval officers who had deserted. For copy as per 1/Sk1 31709 and 31710/43 geh. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIVA.

Own Situation:

Three naval artillery lighters and three naval landing craft left Genichesk in the afternoon to shell the north coast of the Sea of Asov. Four PT boats were transferred from from Nikolayev to Sevastopol via Feodosiya. Submarine U "24" left Sevastopol for the operational area. Minelaying operation "S72" was carried out as planned.

The Danube Flotilla is making preparations for an operation by five vessels on the Sava against insurgents.

On 17 Oct. the ALEXANDRA assisted our Army patrols by firing for an hour on mountain positions opposite Orsova. The steamer THEODORICH, which ran aground near Ochakov, is being lightened.

Convoy traffic proceeded as planned and without incident.

VIII. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance

In connection with the lend-lease agreement, signed in London on 19 Oct., a Spanish report from New York states that shipments to Russia particularly of fighters and scarce raw materials, such as nickel, tin, copper and aluminum, are planned.

According to a Swedish report from New York, the appointment of General Marshall, at present Chief of the U.S. General Staff, as Supreme Commander for the invasion of Europe is to be announced on 25 Oct. The appointment will be announced from Moscow and it is hoped that this will contribute to realization of at least the limited results of the Conference which Washington has resignedly accepted. These are said to consist of an agreement on military plans and the creation of one or more permanent organizations for inter-allied consultations.

According to a Reuter report from Moscow, England is showing considerable interest in the "Free German Committee" said to have been set up in Russia.

According to a further Reuter report, the speech by General Smuts predicting a large-scale Allied attack on Europe for next year has taken the Allied representatives in Moscow by surprise.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff

I. Army Situation

An enemy attempt to land with minor forces near Feodosiya was repulsed.

The situation is serious in the area of the large break-through in the direction of Krivoi Rog, which the enemy was able to extend.

A further break-through with a depth of 20 km. has occurred south of Orel.

Altogether there are about 256,000 persons in the Crimea, including Rumanian forces, the Todt Organization and all others. Evacuation has not yet been ordered.

Army General Staff, Foreign Armies West believes that an attack on the west coast of France must be considered possible,

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according to fresh news on invasion preparations in the west area.

Fighting in Italy was slight. A new landing behind our lines somewhere in the area of Civitavecchia is considered possible. Our supply lines in Italy and in the Balkans are subjected to constant and intense attacks by enemy air forces.

An attack on Agram by insurgents is expected.

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has issued the following instructions to ensure supplies to the 2nd Tank Army Command:

"Continuous supplies to an accumulation of winter stocks for the units of the 2nd Tank Army Command stationed on the Dalmatian and Albanian coasts is impossible merely overland by rail and trucks.

An additional transport by ships of about 100,000 tons per month, at latest starting on 1 Nov. 1943 will be needed. The following measures are necessary for this:

1. Army Group B is to clear the railroad Ljubljana-Fiume of enemy forces by the end of October and is responsible for continuous and effective defense of this railroad.
2. Chief, Armed Forces, Transportation will see to it that the railroad Ljubljana-Fiume is repaired at once and constantly kept in operation, so that from about 1 Nov. 1943 a daily run of 9 trains of 400 tons each is guaranteed on this line to Fiume.
3. Armed Forces High Command, Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas, through the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, will see that the required shipping for the transportation of 100,000 tons per month is provided.
4. High Command, Navy, Naval Staff, Operations Division is requested to provide the necessary escort forces.
5. Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast is to protect coastal traffic by mopping-up the Dalmatian coast as far as possible, and will clear the islands from which insurgent gunfire harasses our shipping.
6. Commander in Chief, Air Force is requested:
 - a. to ensure, as from 1 Nov., adequate air defense for the supply base of Fiume,

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- b. to assist the supply convoys proceeding along the coast by sea reconnaissance and air escort,
- c. to keep down any insurgent gunfire which might occur while our supply convoys are passing.

7. Army General Staff is requested to ensure the turn-over of 100,000 tons per month in Fiume from 1 Nov. by preparing the storages and providing the necessary manpower and trains."

II. In order to carry out this directive, which Naval Staff has transmitted to Group South, Admiral, Adriatic and, for information, to German Naval Command, Italy, Naval Staff orders:

"1. Fitting-up and commissioning of the three torpedo boats and six escort vessels provided for the 11th Coast Patrol Flotilla is to be speeded up by all available means. Besides this, all vessels in the area of Admiral, Adriatic which are suitable for escort duty are to be requisitioned, fitted-up and commissioned as soon as possible. Admiral, Adriatic is to regard it as his most important task to ensure supplies to the 2nd Tank Army Command by sea and especially to provide the necessary escort forces for this.

2. German Naval Command, Italy will carry out minelaying operations on the east coast of Italy, for which torpedo boat AUDACE (TA " 20") is required, if possible in such a way that TA "20" can be placed at the disposal of Admiral, Adriatic at the beginning of November."

With reference to 4) of the instructions from Armed Forces High Command (provision of the required escort forces by Naval Staff), Naval Staff reports to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Quartermaster Division, with copy to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy, as follows:

"1. The 11th Coastal Patrol Flotilla is being formed under Admiral, Adriatic. Three Italian torpedo boats (one already in service) and six steamers converted into escort vessels have so far been requisitioned for this Flotilla and are being fitted-up. All these vessels are expected that further vessels suitable for escort duty will be taken over. Instructions for speedy requisitioning, fitting-up and commissioning of such vessels have been given.

2. Besides the above, steps have been taken to transfer motor minesweepers and PT boats from the western Mediterranean overland (Genoa-Piacenza-River Po). These vessels are, however, not expected to be in operational readiness in the Adriatic until December.

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3. Naval Staff points out that the weak defense forces which can be made available in the Adriatic will make it possible to assure supplies to the extent requested as soon as the enemy sends out major forces from ports and airfields in southern Italy against this traffic. Considerably less transport and quite serious losses must then be expected."

III. According to a report from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, the Fuehrer has ordered the following with regard to an increase of small shipping in the Aegean Sea:

"1 The development of the war situation in the Aegean Sea requires unusual measures in order to increase small shipping since the present transfers of barges from France via the Danube and Siebel ferries from Holland, as well as the delivery of new constructions and converted vessels, can no longer be awaited.

2. Altogether it will cause a decrease of shipping in the Black Sea which will be hard to bear, 1,500 to 2,000 tons capacity of small shipping are to be transferred as quickly as possible through the Dardanelles to the Aegean Sea, in agreement with Armed Forces High Command, Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas.

3. Since Turkey at present prohibits the passage of warships, including naval landing craft, through the Dardanelles, small vessels purely for supplies, such as Siebel ferries and motor ships, must be made available for these purposes.

4. Army General Staff, Quartermaster General agrees to the transfer of the above tonnage, provided that it is replaced as quickly as possible. Steps must, therefore, be taken to see that either one or two large ships are transferred from the Aegean to the Black Sea or that equivalent shipping which is being converted at the Danube dockyards for the Aegean Sea is withdrawn. In addition investigations should be made as to whether a balance cannot be effected by barges from France, the transfer of which is planned via the Danube.

5. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff and Commanding General, Armed Forces; Southeast are to be kept advised of measures taken."

Quartermaster Division will inform Armed Forces High Command that the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping is responsible for carrying out this Fuehrer directive.

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IV. Group South has now submitted, as requested, concrete examples in connection with its command ruling regarding merchant shipping in the Aegean Sea being at its disposal. Group South reports altogether five cases during the period from 2 to 10 Oct. in which measures taken by the shipping companies are contested. However, these cases in no way affect the basic aspect of this problem. This would only be the case if the requests of Admiral, Aegean for shipping for military or operational tasks had been met inadequately or not at all by the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping. Quartermaster General is therefore of opinion that the command ruling of Group South cannot be upheld unless the basic Fuehrer directive is altered. Group South has itself reported that its ruling does not affect the rights of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping to have at his disposal the supply shipping not required by Admiral, Aegean. The ruling was issued with the sole intention that the demands of the Naval Commander, as opposed to the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping as a civilian authority, might be assured in accordance with the requirements of naval operations and might be speeded up and simplified.

Chief, Naval Staff agrees with the views held by Quartermaster General. Group South and the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping are to be advised accordingly. Quartermaster General will take the opportunity to discuss this matter personally with the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping during the armament meeting at Gdynia.

V. Quartermaster General reports that the teletype (see War Diary 20 Oct.), which it was intended to send to Minister Speer with regard to the erection of building sites for naval landing craft in Salonika, will be held back until the outcome of today's new discussion with the chairman of the Main Committee for Ship Construction is known. If the matter is not arranged according to the wishes of the Navy at this discussion the teletype will be despatched.

Chief, Naval Staff agreed.

VI. Quartermaster Division, Submarine Section reports on the results of the investigations by Chief, Submarine Section on the construction of a submarine base at Salonika.

The recommendations are the same as those contained in the report by Group South, already dealt with on 20 Oct.

Quartermaster General proposes that the recommendation of the Group and Chief, Submarine Section be approved and that a decision be reached to construct at first an emergency, unprotected submarine base in Salonika, the final solution - the construction of a protected submarine base in Tusla - being started at the same time.

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Chief, Naval Staff decided on this.

VII. Naval Command, North has requested that Italian prisoners of war should not be employed at dockyards where free Italian workers and voluntary soldiers are working at the same time, in order to avoid psychological difficulties which arise from different treatment of the Italians.

Commander in Chief, Navy does not agree with the objections raised by Naval Command, North. He believes that, if firmly exercised, such different treatment can be used very effectively to the advantage of labor discipline.

In a Highly Restricted Circle

VIII. Operations Division, Naval Air and Air Force Liaison Section reports on the general aerial warfare situation. For copy of this comprehensive and clear review see files 1/Skl I L 2, Vol. VI.

Special Items:

I. A summary of enemy intelligence obtained by radio deciphering and radio intelligence in the period from 11 to 17 Oct. is contained in Radio Monitoring Report No. 42/43. Noteworthy: For the diversions and delays as intercepted during combat of convoys in the North Atlantic see pages 4 and 5.

II. According to an intelligence report from an agent on the destroyer PINDOS, this vessel has been equipped with the latest depth charges which have rocket propulsion.

Situation 21 Oct.

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report from a diplomatic source in Lisbon, the U.S. Government is said to have asked Portugal to place at its disposal and aircraft base on the Atlantic coast, allegedly for purposes of the Clipper Line. Bolama in Portuguese Guinea is mentioned.

According to a further intelligence report from the same source, a convoy carrying coastal guns, other war material and provisions for the Azores bases sailed on 15 Oct. from ports on the east coast of America. These bases are to be used by the United States with the same rights as England. A U.S. mission is said to be expected in Madrid at the end of the month, in order to take up discussions on the lease of bases on the Balearic Islands and in Northern Spain. Vigo is mentioned.

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According to another unconfirmed report, England, under pressure from the U.S.A., is said to have made a request on the day following the Azores agreement for Lagos Bay. This was, however, definitely rejected by Salazar.

2. Own Situation:

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area1. Enemy Situation:

Over the Bay of Biscay 23 planes were detected on operation. One British vessel was located at 1432 in AM 7610 and one at 1815 in AM 5430; one U.S. vessel was located at 1631 in BE 2610.

2. Own Situation:Atlantic Coast:

The 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla put in to Brest at 0830 after completion of exercises.

Channel Coast:

The KONDOR, FALKE and T "14" of the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla put in to Lezardrieux in the morning and went on at 1800 to Cherbourg.

Otherwise nothing special to report.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern WatersNorth Sea:

North of Schiermonnikoog and north of Terschelling four ELM/J mines were swept. A fishing smack Struck a mine and sank 16 miles west of Neuwerk. At Dordrecht one harbor defense boat sank in the dock, probably owing to sabotage at the quay.

It is now reported that eight planes (not four) were shot down by naval anti-aircraft guns in the enemy attack on the wreck of the STRASSBURG at noon on 19 Oct.

Norway, Northern Waters:

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1. Enemy Situation:

Over the North Sea 14 planes were detected on operation. At 0455 a submarine alarm was given off Vardoe.

According to an intelligence report from the Secret State Police in Oslo, a convoy is said to have sail from Murmansk on 20 Oct. A convoy is said to have left United States ports for Murmansk at the same time.

2. Own Situation:

Thirty-five ships were escorted north and 35 south. Altogether 18 ships were delayed due to shortage of escorts.

Admiral, Northern Waters reports that submarines have been withdrawn from positions off Ice Fjord to northern attack areas in the Bear Strait.

Submarine U "355" has been despatched to the north for weather operation "Kreuzritter."

Reconnaissance of the bays in Ice Fjord by Submarine U "956" revealed nothing new.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea1. Enemy Situation:

There was a group of minesweepers at 0750 four miles south of Lavansaari.

According to an intelligence report from Sweden, the DICTO and the LIONEL have changed their berths and have been located 10 km. west of Uddévalle; fully manned and ready to sail.

2. Own Situation:

One mine was swept 30 miles south-southwest of Anholt.

The hospital ship RUEGEN and METEOR left Gothenburg at the same time as the British hospital ships and proceeded through Swedish territorial waters first to Trelleborg. The three ships proceeding to England anchored at the southern outlet of Oslo Fjord in the evening.

In the area of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic five naval landing craft are lying ready at Kotka for minelaying operation "Seeigel VIIIa".

Naval landing craft MFP "113" was damaged by a mine off Reval outside the channel, but was able to put into port under

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her own power and without casualties. Repairs on the Juminda" net barrage were hampered by bad weather; for the same reason minelaying off Schepel by coastal minelayers had to be discontinued.

Battery "Koenigsberg" was shelled from the sea at 2125, presumably by a guardboat. The battery returned fire and observed one hit.

V. Submarine Warfare

Two anti-aircraft submarines in the Bay of Biscay report having driven off one enemy plane each.

The supply point of submarine-tanker "488" was moved to BD 2819, as the rendezvous was detected by an enemy carrier-borne plane.

In the Indian Ocean submarine U "532" on 20 Oct. attacked a convoy of ten ships including four freighters in MS 8230. One ship of 6,000 G.R.T. was probably sunk. Operational conditions were unfavorable because of strong phosphorescence of the sea and smooth water. The submarine is proceeding to Penang for a brief overhaul.

VI. Aerial Warfare

British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 48 planes out on operation in the west area and 61 in the Mediterranean.

During the night of 21 Oct. four bombers and thirteeen fighter-bombers raided London. Single enemy fighter formations approached the coast of the west area during the day without carrying out any special attacks.

Single reconnaissance planes were reported over Germany. During the night of 21 Oct. a few bombs were dropped in the areas of Dortmund and Duesseldorf.

Mediterranean Theater:

At 1445 an eastbound enemy convoy of about 50 ships was detected 20 miles north of Mostaganem. This convoy was attacked between 1845 and 1905 by 13 Do 217's of the 2nd Group of the 100th Bomber Wing and 28 He 111's and 8 Ju 88's of the 1st and

Groups of the 26th Bomber Wing. The convoy put up a smoke screen. Fifty-four aerial torpedoes and twelve HS 292 bombs were dropped. According to reports received so far, 15 steamers and 1 tanker totaling 108,000 G.R.T. and 1 destroyer were hit and heavily damaged. Only two targets were hit by bombs; the remaining success must be ascribed to the aerial torpedoes.

During the night of 21 Oct. 113 planes of the 2nd Air Force attacked shipping targets in Naples. In Italy strong enemy forces attacked traffic targets in the area Viterbo-Terni and Civitavecchia during the day. Harassing flights were also carried out in the Bolzano area.

Eighteen enemy planes raided Skoplje in the Balkans, where railway cars and locomotives were destroyed. During the night of 21 Oct. the airfield of Maritza on Rhodes was again attacked. Planes were also reported on reconnaissance over the Aegean and supplying insurgents in the Balkans.

Eastern Front:

Over the Black Sea reconnaissance was carried out.

Nothing special to report.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

Seven transports with troops put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic. A large convoy of 49 freighters and 9 tankers with 8 escort vessels entered the Mediterranean in the afternoon. Parts of this convoy put in to Gibraltar. In addition, 1 French battleship of the RICHELIEU class with 2 destroyers passed through the Straits of Gibraltar, bound for the Mediterranean.

It is now reported from 20 Oct. that 13 LCT's put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean. On 21 Oct. further craft of the new U.S.LCT type arrived at Gibraltar.

The withdrawal of alanding craft from the Mediterranean and their assembly in Gibraltar attracts attention. The transfer of merchantmen, which has increased in the last few days, is also noteworthy. Unfortunately there is no knowledge of the extent to which this shipping is destined for the Mediterranean itself and is not passing on through the Suez Canal.

The eastbound convoy reported east of Alboran on the afternoon of 20 Oct. was detected again at 0704 10 miles of Arzeu consist-

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ing of 50 ships, including 42 freighters, on course east-north east.

In the harbors of Corsica and Sardinia there was only a small number of ships. No assembly for new operations is to be seen here. On the supply route from Palermo to Salerno only single vessels were sighted. The number of ships in Apulian harbors was still small.

Enemy air activity over the area of Civitavecchia has increased.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Our PT boats operated unsuccessfully during the night of 20 Oct. in the area of Salerno-Ustica. Six boats will repeat this operation during the night of 21 Oct.

Submarine-chaser "2110" carried out an attack on a submarine north of Porto Ferraio. Destruction of the enemy submarine is probable.

The minelayer JUMINDA left Spezia southbound for a minelaying operation.

The group consisting of naval landing craft MFP "514" and motor minesweepers R "187" and R "201" was attacked by numerous enemy planes while proceeding to the area north of Civitavecchia on a minelaying operation. One plane was shot down and no damaged was sustained by our boats.

The Italian Liaison Staff to German Naval Command, Italy arrived at Levico.

The four hospital ships are on passage from Oran to Merseilles according to plan.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

Our morning air reconnaissance observed numerous small fishing boats near the islands of Mljet, Korcula, Brac and Hvar. The islands of Alupca, Prvici and Tijat have been occupied without any fighting.

The operation against Zlarin has started. In the Farisina Channel northeast of Pola two steamers were again unsuccessfully shelled by insurgents.

A battery with four modern 9.43 cm. anti-aircraft guns has been occupied north of Fiume. There are no range-finders.

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Submarine U "453" left Pola for a minelaying operation off Brindisi.

b. Aegean Sea

Enemy Situation:

Ships' guns shelled the port of Rhodes with 15 rounds at 2350 on 20 Oct. Kos was shelled without effect by 1 cruiser and 2 destroyers at 2148.

According to our air reconnaissance, there were 2 destroyers and 1 freighter escorted by 3 fighters 20 miles south of Castell Rosso on course north-northwest at 1200 on 21 Oct.; at 1520 there were 1 cruiser and 5 destroyers on course 330° 40 miles northwest of Castell Rosso. One of our shadowing planes was shot down by the enemy fighter escort. At 1000 a submarine was attacked by one of our planes east of Cape Sideros (east coast of Crete). The British scouting unit from Leros which landed on Kalymnos on 19 Oct. has been taken prisoner.

Own Situation:

The report on the torpedoing of light PT boat LS "5" off the northern shore of Kos has not been confirmed.

The Corinth Canal was temporarily closed to shipping, as a lighter had sunk due to a landslide caused by engineering work.

The INGEBORG convoy is lying at 24 hours' readiness.

c. Black Sea:

The enemy landing on the Kerch peninsula near Cape Chauda was carried out by 250 men, who embarked again at 0400. During the night of 20 Oct. continuous flights were reported into the areas of Stary Crimea, Sudak and the Yeila Mountains, presumably for landing troops.

An enemy submarine torpedoed and sank a naval landing craft off Yalta on 20 Oct.

The north of the Sea of Asov was shelled by three naval landing craft during the night of 20 Oct.

Three PT boats took up patrol line off Cape Opuk during the night of 21 Oct.

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VIII. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance

No news of special interest has been received.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff

I. Army Situation

The heavy enemy pressure on the eastern front continues unabated, especially in the sector Melitopol-Zaporozhe and in the area of the break-through northwest of Dnepropetrovsk.

II. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has sent the following instructions to Chief, Army Equipment and Commander, Replacement Army, Commanding Generals, Armed Forces, West, South, Southeast, Netherlands, Norway, Baltic States and White Ruthenia, Army Group B, Commander, Armed Forces, Denmark and the 20th Mountain Army Command, with copy to Naval Staff:

"In future all reports submitted direct to Armed Forces High Command which concern naval warfare are also to be sent to Commander in Chief, Navy who is responsible for naval warfare in all theaters, so that he is able to express his views in good time with regard to carrying out naval operations."

The request made by Chief, Naval Staff on 18 Oct. has thus been complied with.

III. Admiral Legnani was fatally injured in a motor accident near Venice on 20 Oct.

Commander in Chief, Navy has sent a telegram of condolence to Marshal Graziani.

Marshal Graziani has mentioned to Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy Admirals, Vaoli, Tur or Falangola as possible successors to Legnani and asked that the views of the German Navy be obtained. For discussion of this question and decision of Chief, Naval Staff see notes by Chief, Operations Branch, dated 22 Oct; and remarks of Naval Intelligence Division as per 1/Skl 3225/43 geh. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIII.

Chief, Naval Staff has left Berlin to attend the armament meeting in Gdynia.

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Special Items

I. In accordance with the decision reached by Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch has despatched the following teletype in connection with the command ruling of Group South regarding merchant shipping in the Aegean Sea (see War Diary 21 Oct.):

I. To Group South and Admiral, Aegean:

"Commander in Chief, Navy orders that:

1. The order issued by Group South that decisions on the use of all available shipping rest with Admiral, Aegean is to be canceled, since placing all shipping at his disposal is in no way intended.

2. Distribution of merchant shipping for operations by Admiral, Aegean is approved, insofar as from time to time the operational situation demands his intervention. In general the basic organization ordered by the Fuehrer, giving the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping control over shipping, must remain in force. Closest cooperation between the Naval Offices and the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping is necessary.

3. The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping has been advised of the incidents reported. He has been asked to remedy these and to prevent their recurrence in view of the serious effect on naval warfare, and, furthermore, to appoint at once a representative of the Reich Commissioner to be attached to Group South with authority over the three Deputies for the three seas, in accordance with your request.

4. The necessity of furnishing crews for merchantmen has again been pointed out to the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping."

II. To the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping:

"1. Group South has been instructed to cancel the order regarding use of all shipping in the Aegean Sea.

2. If the operational situation demands it, the Commanding Admiral must, however, intervene in the disposition of shipping in order to assure the prompt and suitable execution of operations, if this is not guaranteed otherwise. The Fuehrer directive remains effective in principle. As operations have priority, the closest and most understanding cooperation and speedy execution of the tasks assigned by all concerned is necessary. Details of the incidents in this connection are being forwarded to you.

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3. The request of Group South by teletype 2489 Gkdos. of 7 Oct. par. 5, which has not been answered up to now, is most definitely supported. Commanding Admiral, Group South, who is responsible for all operations in the three seas, must be in a position to assure the availability of shipping for operations direct with the representative of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping (who is authorized to give orders to the Deputies for the Adriatic, Aegean and Black Seas) without each Commanding Admiral of an area negotiating again with the Deputy for the sea area, who in turn must ask Rome or Berlin for a decision.

4. According to reports from Commanding Admiral, Group South, the situation with regard to crews for merchantmen in the Aegean Sea is such that even the execution of operational tasks is hampered. An immediate remedy is essential; the Naval Office in Hamburg sent off 28 seamen on 20 Oct. This does not alleviate the difficulties."

The request of Group South of 7 Oct. referred to above, concerns the appointment of a representative of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping to be attached to the Group with authority over the three Deputies in the command area of the Group.

II. Naval Intelligence Division has made the following extract from the "Evaluation on the Enemy Situation of 20 Oct. by Army General Staff, Foreign Armies West:

"1. Area of England:

Besides reports about major troop movements from the United States to England new information has been received from the Atlantic area regarding the gradual preparation of freighters loaded with dupplies (ammunition etc.), which are to be assembled and held in ports of northwest England.

2. Mediterranean:

The sailing of landing craft from the Mediterranean into the Atlantic, reported for the first time, is worthy of special note; also increasing reports about embarkations of troops at ports on the Atlantic coast of Morocco (Casablanca) French vessels being primarily reported. This information is to be connected with the preparations in progress for an attack against the west coast of France. In southern Italy it is possible that the relatively small success gained despite large expenditure of forces and materiel may induce the enemy to abandon bringing-up further forces to the front in favor of outflanking landings.

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Adequate forces for these are available not only in the rear but also on Sicily. The detection of a large number of ships in Naples may be connected with this. Whether the shipping movements in the sea area Sardinia-Corsica indicate that forces from this area are to participate in such an operation, is not yet discernible; certainly, however, it is to be assumed that strong air bases are being built up on these islands for attacks against Italy and Southern France.

In the Eastern Mediterranean a definite increase in enemy naval activity (increased submarine operations, thrusts by light naval forces) is noticeable, directed against our lines of communication with the advanced island bases. The enemy's main target in this area will at first be building up air bases and capturing further ones. Further plans will be then to cut off completely the islands in German hands, followed by intensified operations by naval forces and landings from the air. Heavy air attacks against important traffic junctions on the Belgrade-Salonika line show that the enemy is making endeavors to weaken our defense in the southern part of the Balkans by eliminating our supply routes and they are taken as an indication of plans in this area."

Situation 22 Oct.I. War in Foreign Waters1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

The BRAKE was ordered by Naval Staff with Radiogram 2027 not to put out yet. Supply at earliest on 15 Nov.

The Naval Attache in Tokyo was advised by Radiogram 2355 that the thried MONSUN boat, submarine U "532" (Junker), en route to Penang for repairs and supplies will arrive, as also submarines "Schaefer" and "Luedden", on about 2 Nov, and that the submarines will report their exact dates of arrival when passing 86° E.

The Naval Attache in Tokyo replied to Naval Staff's inquiry about the measures taken by the Japanese Navy for bringing Ship 28" into port (see War Diary 18 Oct.) as follows:

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- "1. The Japanese Navy was advised on 14 Oct. about the position and course of the MICHEL. On the following day Kobe was decided as her port of call and rendezvous agreed on for the afternoon of 17 Oct. off Dashinosaki.
2. Constant naval and air escort of the ship was not requested, as this is not customary for the sea areas around Japan, and also owing to lack of suitable vessels would certainly have been impossible, especially as over 50 miles from the coast. Single Japanese vessels as well as entire convoys, which in most cases are escorted only by one slow escort vessel according to reports from captains of chartered ships, rely on constant air patrol of the adjacent sea areas. This patrol was especially reinforced for the MICHEL, according to information from the Chief of the Operation Division. According to statements by survivors, flying boats were, however, sighted only twice.
3. Captain Gumprich, and especially Lt. Cmdr. Trendtel as former chief of the Yokohama office, were fully aware of the situation owing to the length of time spent in Japan. According to a report from Behrend it was therefore also intended that a light PT boat be sent out for escort at dawn. If this measure was not introduced earlier, it was probably because up to now submarine activity against traffic has been observed close to shore only."

Fuller investigation is required as to how far it was possible to carry out more extensive security measures for the returning ship in the limited time available. For every good reason Naval Staff had ordered that her position be reported in good time. Therefore the fact that this order was not followed is possibly the key to the disastrous end of this auxiliary cruiser.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the Bay of Biscay 44 planes were detected on operation as far as 18° W. Our air reconnaissance reported at 1053 a convoy consisting of 22 merchantmen and five escort vessels in BE 8196 on course 60°. This convoy was detected at 1530 in BE 8292 on course 20°.

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2. Own Situation:Atlantic Coast:

Two submarines were escorted in and one out off Brest and La Pallice. Spanish fishing vessels southwest of the Gironde and north of San Sebastian were searched without result by a group of minesweepers, as they were reported by the Air Force to be suspected of carrying radar. Two ELM/J mines were swept off La Pallice.

The MÜNSTERLAND is to proceed today from Brest to Le Havre on the first stage of her transfer. The Channel is not to be passed until around the end of the new-moon period. Group West plans to transfer the blockade-runner OSTFRIESLAND from Le Havre to Bordeaux on about 24 Oct.

Five boats of the 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla left Brest at 1800 to provide remote escort as far as the Channel Islands for the MÜNSTERLAND, which left the port at 1500 escorted by six minesweepers and two patrol boats.

Channel Coast:

Group West plans to have the convoy of the NORDVAARD start from Le Havre during the night of 22 Oct. or 23 Oct. After a stop at Kieppe and at Boulogne this convoy is to go on from the latter port during the night of 27 Oct., since an eastbound British convoy is expected to pass through the Channel during that night. Departure from Le Havre has been ordered for 2400, with an escort consisting of 3 motor minesweeper depot ships, 7 motor minesweepers and 5 patrol boats.

Torpedo boats T "14", the FALKE and the KONFOR of the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla arrived at Cherbourg at 0330. They will probably resume their passage in two days, after the necessary engine repairs on the FALKE have been completed. Transfer of the 4th and 8th PT Boat Flotillas from the Hook to Amsterdam is planned for the night of 22 Oct.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern WatersNorth Sea:

Minesweeping operations were hampered by bad weather, especially in the western part of the area of Commanding

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Admiral, Defenses, North. One ground mine was swept north of Schiermonnikoog and one west of Heligoland. Convoy "1183" Hook-Elbe consisting of three steamers sailed eastbound at 1830. A convoy of two steamers from Flushing to the Hook was carried out as planned.

At 1504 boats of the Rhine Flotilla shot down three enemy planes over Walcheren. In the evening naval anti-aircraft guns shot down one plane over Ameland.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the North Sea 23 planes were detected on operation. Enemy batteries on the Ribachi Peninsula and our own batteries exchanged fire in the area of Petsamo after one of our Kirkenes convoys had passed through.

2. Own Situation:

Thirty ships were escorted north and 23 south. Altogether 33 ships were delayed owing to shortage of escorts.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

No new information has been received. The 18th Army Command believes that the enemy has not yet completed his preparation for the expected attack.

2. Own Situation:

In order to intercept the DICTO and the ALIONEL single boats will be stationed in the evening in the Skagerrak patrol line from AO 4428 - 4128. During the night the patrol line will be moved closer to the Swedish coast (AO 4438 - 4167).

The hospital ships RUEGEN and METEOR continued their passage east via Trelleborg and anchored off Swinemunde at 1630. The three British ships passed Krinstiansand South at 1520.

East of Neufahrwasser torpedo boat T "157" struck a mine and sank at 1725. The practice area of Training Unit, Fleet in

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Danzig Bay is again closed.

In the area of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic minelaying operation "Seeigel VIIIa" and one off Schepel were not carried out today either, because of unfavorable weather conditions.

Transports and convoys in the entire Baltic Sea area proceeded without incident.

V. Submarine Warfare

Submarine U "516" lay off Horta from 18-21 Oct., but had no opportunity for attack outside territorial waters. Five ships and one destroyer were observed in port. There was one patrol vessel off the northern, and one off the southern entrance and also Portuguese vessels P "1" - P "4" equipped with minesweeping gear. No planes were sighted.

Otherwise nothing special to report from the North Atlantic and the Indian Ocean.

VI Aerial Warfare

British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 180 planes out on operation over the west area and 15 over the Mediterranean. One Martin flying boat was shot down in aerial combat by a BV 222 at 1623 315 miles west-northwest of Cape Finisterre.

During the night of 22 Oct. 18 of our planes were out on operation against London.

During the day strong enemy formations attacked airfields in northern France and Belgium. Five bombers were shot down by anti-aircraft guns. During the night of 22 Oct. strong enemy forces flew over Germany. A very heavy attack was carried out on Cassel and a heavy one on Frankfurt on Main. For detailed report of the considerable damage sustained see Daily Situation. According to reports so far, 300 of our night fighters shot down 30 enemy planes, while anti-aircraft guns shot down another one.

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Mediterranean Theater:

Our Air Force carried out reconnaissance over the western Mediterranean and the Italian area. In the Aegean Sea two enemy destroyers were attacked between 0128-0145 in the area of Calino-Kos, but results were not observed.

For further details of the successful attack on 21 Oct. by formations of the 3rd Air Force on a large convoy see Daily Situation.

In Italy the enemy attacked the railroad and highways in the area of Grosseto. In Greece the airfield of Eleusis was attacked.

Eastern Front:

Over the Army front on 20 and 21 Oct. 190 enemy planes were shot down, six of ours being lost.

No special reports have been received from the 5th Air Force.

The 4th Air Force located the following by photographic reconnaissance at 1400 in Anapa: 11 motor minesweepers, 2 patrol boats, 6 tugs, 41 landing craft; also on the roads 1 PT boat, 7 motor minesweepers, 7 tugs, 3 landing craft, 3 lighters and other small vessels. These may indicate a preparation for landing operations.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

Of the convoy which passed through the Straits of Gibraltar on 21 Oct. eastbound, 3 steamers, 1 tanker and 1 destroyer entered Gibraltar. At 0900 on 22 Oct. 24 U.S. LCT's and 28 further landing craft with 2 escort vessels left Gibraltar for the Atlantic. Our air reconnaissance sighted at 1200 30 miles east of Cape Tenes 1 cruiser and 3 destroyers on westerly course and at 1218 55 miles east of Cape Tenes 2 destroyers on northwesterly course. The large eastbound convoy attacked on the evening of 21 Oct. off Cape Tenes by the 3rd Air Force has not been detected again.

Reconnaissance showed few changes in Sardinia and Corsica. There was still a large number of ships in Naples. No enemy sightings were reported from the Gulf of Gaeta. A submarine position was reported 20 miles southwest of Savona. An intelligence report states that a U.S. Submarine Chaser Flotilla

has arrived at Naples. The boats of this Flotilla are equipped with the most modern anti-submarine devices and underwater acoustic gear. They also carry new radio direction-finder sets and depth charges of a new design with increased explosive effect. The Flotilla is to be used for blockading the areas around Corsica and Sardinia and on the west coast of Italy.

No enemy sightings are reported from the Eastern Mediterranean.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

The PT boat operation during the night of 21 Oct. was again fruitless. The boats put in to Civitavecchia. German Naval Command, Italy is of opinion that, due to decrease in traffic, PT boat operations promise little success without advance reconnaissance and unless guided by shadowing planes.

Enemy air activity in the area of Civitavecchia continued to be very lively. During an attack on motor minesweepers and one of our barge convoys only slight damage and casualties were sustained.

The minelayer JUMINDA was sunk by submarine torpedoes at 0145 two miles west of San Stefano before carrying out her minelaying operation. After the second hit the Italian mines aboard detonated, causing her to sink within a few seconds; only 16 survivors could therefore be rescued.

The hospital ships DJENNE, SINAI, GRADISCA and AQUILEJA are on return passage from Oran to Marseilles, according to plan.

3. Area Naval Group, South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

The Albanian port of Milena was shelled by enemy warships during the night of 21 Oct. Full reports are still outstanding. In an enemy air attack on Split at noon on 21 Oct. one steamer sustained damage. Escort operations in the Adriatic Sea were carried out according to plan. The torpedo boat MISSOURI is out of war readiness until 13 Dec.

Group South reports in connection with the control of submarines:

- "I. The sending out of submarines from the Adriatic area carrying out operational assignments in the Adriatic or Ionian Seas, apart from new distribution of operational areas in the Western and Eastern Mediterranean

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including submarine operations there, raises the question as to control of the passage of submarines through the Adriatic and Ionian operational areas.

2. Operational assignment and passage in these sea areas must be synchorized with other operational tasks of Admiral, Adriatic such as operations by our surface forces, minelaying, anti-submarine measures, control and escort of convoys and commitment of the Air Force for naval operational tasks.
3. Submarines in the Mediterranean, and especially in the aforesaid operational areas as well as in the Aegean Sea, constitute only part of naval warfare as a whole and not the sole means of war against merchant shipping as in other operational areas far from our own coast such as at present the Western Mediterranean and areas outside the Mediterranean; special tactical commitment is required for these there and has been carried out.
4. Considering the present situation and possible developments in the operational areas of the Mediterranean, command having no uniformity will cause difficulties, such as have already arisen with the departure of submarine U "453" which left for an undisclosed operational area and a task of Commander, Submarines. Everything must be done to avoid our shipping being endangered and the Air Force Commands responsible for the entire Adriatic Sea area (Air Force Command, Southeast, Air Commanders, Albania and Croatia), being unable to coordinate their operations in time."

Group South refers in this connection to the extract from its War Diary of 20 Oct., dealing with the question of command in the eastern Mediterranean and requests a decision in accordance therewith. This question will be dealt with by Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch, together with Operations Division.

b. Aegean Sea;

Enemy Situation:

On 21 Oct. at 2056 our planes attacked 2 destroyers west of Kalymnos. At 2150 our air reconnaissance sighted 10 miles northeast of Stampalia 1 cruiser and 4 destroyers on southerly course, and on 22 Oct. at 0128 about 4 miles east of Leros 2 cruisers on course, southsoutheast. At 2310 on 22 Oct. our air reconniassance detected 2 destroyers 5 miles northwest of Leros on southwesterly course and 20 miles south of this position another destroyer on southerly course.

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Own Situation:

It is now reported that in the air raid on the steamer SINFRA on 19 Oct. one plane was shot down for certain and another probably shot down.

Mopping-up of the islands of Paros and Naxos has more or less been completed. The operation against Stampalia has started. At 0700 two radio stations were destroyed by dive-bombers. At 0710 one company of parachutists made a landing and an airborne unit of 100 men landed from six Ju seaplanes.

The first reports state that the operation is progressing according to plan. German prisoners have been liberated.

An enemy PT boat torpedoed naval landing craft F "131" with a surface runner during night repairs on the eastern shore of Kos.

Escort operations in the Aegean Sea proceeded without incident.

c. Black Sea:Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reported an increase in the number of ships in Anapa.

One of our submarines sighted an eastbound convoy consisting of 1 tanker with 3 motor minesweepers and 2 minesweepers 20 miles west of Suchum. Submarine U "23" sank a coastal freighter of 1,000 GRT 20 miles northwest of Poti shortly after midnight on 22 Oct.

Naval Intelligence Division has made a summary of a great deal of intelligence on Russian plans for landing in the Black Sea and the Sea of Asov. Copy of this summary as per 1/Skl 29298/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIVa.

Own Situation:

The 1st PT Boat Flotilla in patrol line southwest of Kerch sighted at 0130 gun flashes from a vessel, apparently a PT boat. Our boats did not succeed in establishing contact. During the night of 22 Oct. four boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla made a torpedo attack on boats assembled on Anapa roads. No details have been received yet. Four Italian PT boats put in to Nikolayev in the afternoon. The steamer THEODERICH, which ran aground near Ochakov, was refloated after lightening and put in to Odessa. While towing off the THEODERICH a tug struck a mine and sank 200 m. northeast of the point where she ran aground.

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On 21 Oct. units of the Danube Flotilla on the Sava were several times fired on by machine-guns and small arms from the Bosnian and Croatian area. One man was badly wounded.

Gun trials of the heavy battery at Cape Khersones will be held on 22 and 23 Oct.

Submarine U "9" is returning to Feodosiya from the operational area. Escort operations were carried out without incident.

Group South and Admiral, Black Sea have been instructed to advise Naval Staff of their views and plans regarding the use of naval forces (including naval landing craft and naval artillery lighters) for the defense of the Crimean coast against enemy attempts at landing.

In accordance with the order received from Naval Staff (see War Diary 20 Oct., Special Items I) Group South reports the following preliminary considerations in agreement with Admiral, Black Sea about preparations for further supplies to and possible evacuation of the Crimea by sea:

"1. If all large freighters which are at present available in the Black Sea, 9 auxiliary sailing vessels, 20 tugs, 5 freight-train ferries, 25 lighters and 85 naval landing craft are used from Rumanian ports to ports in the Crimea or vice versa and if weather and convoy conditions are normal, it will be possible to transport 2,300 tons daily, as required. Losses will, however, reduce the volume accordingly. It must be expected that the quantity transported will fall to 1,500 tons daily in case of bad weather and winter conditions (especially from January to April).

2. The present Black Sea shipping and tankers available will make it possible to supply or evacuate 280 tons of furnace oil and fuel daily. This is based on previous experiences regarding times taken for the round trip.

3. a. Feodosya (capable of handling up to 1,000 tons daily) must be included, since transshipment facilities by rail and truck at Sevastopol are limited to 1,500 - 1,800 tons daily.

b. Yalta, Ak Mechet and Eupatoria are only suitable to a certain extent as further alternative ports owing to lack of rail connections. Priority construction of a breakwater at Eupatoria will be necessary. (It is planned to sink a Russian monitor as part of this breakwater).

4. While the Danube is frozen, Bulgarian ports must also be used as discharging and loading ports; if small ships are used a large

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number of breakdowns must be expected from Constanta on, since lighters and tugs have only been made provisionally seaworthy."

VIII. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance

Considerable progress is said to have been made at the Moscow talks, according to Reuter. The Conference is presided over by Molotov. "The Times" writes that the impression is that the statesmen have already reached a closer agreement than has ever existed between the three Governments before.

The British press shows anxiety about the slow advance made in Italy. Terrain difficulties and bad weather are no longer accepted as a reason.

According to an "Exchange" report regarding Mountbatten's visit to Chiang Kai-Chek, a campaign on land against the Japanese in Burma is not to be expected as much as an amphibious operation which might lead to the conquest of Burma, Indo-China, Siam and Canton.

Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff

I. Army Situation

Further advance by the enemy at the centers of attack in the southern and central sector of the eastern front was halted by very stubborn defense. A strong counter-attack by our troops in the area of Smolensk, however, failed. Our losses were heavy. In the northern sector, where a large-scale enemy attack has been expected for the last ten days, everything was still quiet today.

In southern Italy a large-scale attack was repulsed in our main defense line. Three of our divisions have formed a large pocket in the area of Ljubljana, where mopping-up is in progress.

II. According to a report by Chief, Operations Branch and Army Liaison and Land Warfare Section, Operations Division on the withdrawal of naval personnel from the Crimea for the Adriatic (see War Diary 20 Oct., Special Items II) Chief of Staff, Naval Staff has decided that the men, about 500 in number, now stationed in the area of Genichesk are to remain there for the present. The remainder are, however, to be withdrawn as reinforcement for Adriatic coastal defense, in accordance with the instructions of Group South.

Otherwise no special reports and decisions.

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Special Items

I. In reply to the request by Quartermaster Division regarding withdrawal of a naval artillery battalion from France for Italy, Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has decided as already advised for information, that weakening of our position in Northern France by setting up a naval artillery battalion for Italy cannot be agreed to.

II. Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff requests High Command, Navy to issue an order directing that ships' anti-aircraft guns participate in air defense while ships are in port or on the roads.

This matter will be dealt with further by Quartermaster Division.

III. Naval Staff has issued the following instructions to Group South, Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean, Admiral, Aegean, Admiral, Adriatic and German Naval Command, Italy, with regard to the question raised by Group South regarding control of submarines in the Mediterranean:

"Present control of submarines:

1. Commander, Submarines is responsible for conducting submarine warfare in the Mediterranean.
2. Commander, Submarines will advise all Commanding Admirals whose areas are affected of the movements and operations of submarines.
3. The local Naval Commanders will advise the necessary Air Force Commands.
4. In case of special operations, Naval Staff will order transfer of the tactical control of the submarines assigned for the operation in question to the local Naval Commander, e.g. the intended operation by submarine U "565" in the Aegean Sea.
5. Commander, Submarines will establish and try out communication with Admiral, Adriatic at once with Admiral, Aegean before the start of the operation by submarine U "565" in the Aegean Sea.
6. Commander, Submarines will despatch one of his officers to Admiral, Aegean for the operation by submarine U "565".

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IV. The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping states, in connection with the transfer of barges to the southeast area, that it is planned first to transfer 150 freight barges and 20-25 tank barges from the Belgian and French areas to the Black Sea via Dresden and Ingolstadt. Furthermore, investigations are being made as to whether it will be possible to transfer 30 Seine tankers in parts by rail to Nikolayev. Finally, it is planned to transfer 7 auxiliary coastal sailing vessels to the Black Sea by the route Rhine-Main-Ludwigs Canal-Danube.

No small merchant vessels will be transferred at present from the Western Mediterranean to the Adriatic Sea on the overland route Genoa-Piacenza, since there are sufficient small vessels available in the Adriatic Sea.

V. The deputy of the Naval (Ship) Construction Division for the building of war transports at Nikolayev has asked Operations Division for a decision on whether final work on the completed war transports KT "17" and "23", which will take a week, is to be carried out or whether it is to be postponed for about six weeks until a netlayer is completed, as requested by Admiral, Black Sea. In view of the fact that the final work on the war transports will only take eight days whereas repair of the netlayer will require six weeks, Operations Division has decided that the war transports should be completed first. The order in question, 1/skl 29681/43 Gkdos., is contained in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

VI. Naval Intelligence Division reports in its "Evaluation of Intelligence on Foreign Navies" on serial production of LCA's and on U.S. landing engineers. Copy as per 1/Skl 32609 and 32195/43 geh in War Diary "Evaluation of Intelligence on Foreign Navies".

VII. The Intelligence Service has submitted photostat copies of Portuguese Consular reports of 16, 17 and 18 Sept. from Exeter, Leicester, Brington, Norwich and Bath, which deal with the question of an enemy landing from southern England. All reports describe very forcibly the obvious indications of and observations on preparations for an imminent large-scale operation in the Channel. One of these reports states that there is nothing to show that the plan to attempt an offensive in the Channel and the North Sea has been given up. The movement of troops from the interior into the then prohibited coastal area shows, it is stated, that the plan still exists unless it is an immense bluffintended to necessitate strong German forces being tied down on the French coast while the attack is carried out on another front. The author does not feel inclined to come to this conclusion, since he does not believe that such a large number of personnel and quantity

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of materiel are involved solely for a strategic ruse. It remains to be investigated whether the Consular reports themselves do not represent a very much easier method of tying-down German forces. Naval Intelligence Division has, however, so far no reason to doubt the authenticity of the reports. Armed Forces High Command, Intelligence Division, Naval Liaison is of the same opinion.

VIII. In May 1943 Operations Division drew up considerations on a possible war with Sweden. Copy as per 1/Skl 1568/43 Gkdos Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

In view of the latest developments in the situation it now seems advisable to investigate and decide what measures would arise for the Navy in case Sweden should enter the war on the enemy side and according to what points of view a war against Sweden can and must be waged by us. The above mentioned considerations have therefore been sent to Group North/Fleet with the request to submit a study as soon as possible which takes into consideration that Sweden's entry into the war may also coincide with a British landing in southern Norway, Jutland or western Sweden. Only the most limited investigations and Naval Commands, Baltic and Norway are to participate to the extent necessary.

Situation 23 Oct.

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attache in Tokyo is instructed that submarine DOMMES is to put out via Penang in order to receive codes and for consultations with the commanders of the MONSUN boats on mutual experiences. Naval Staff has agreed to empty torpedo tubes of submarine DOMMES and the MONSUN boats being loaded with rubber.

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II. Situation West Area1. Enemy Situation:

Over the Bay of Biscay 34 planes were detected on operation as far as 18° 30' W. One British vessel each was located

at 0917 in BF 4766
at 1015 in BF 4290
at 1146 in BF 3470
at 1856 in BE 5330
at 1930 in AL 6670
at 2056 in CF 3130
at 2351 in AL 6770

Our air reconnaissance sighted at 0905 in BE 6535 a convoy of seven merchantmen on course 40°.

Targets were several times located between 0027 and 0234 in the Channel about 10-12 miles northeast to north of Les Sept Iles.

2. Own Situation:Atlantic Coast

One submarine was escorted in to Brest. Eight Spanish fishing vessels, suspected of carrying radar on board, were searched without result by two patrol vessels ten miles north of San Sebastian.

Channel Coast:

The 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla, acting as remote escort for the convoy of the MÜNSTERLAND, had a brief but successful engagement with an enemy cruiser and destroyer at 0143 in BF 2916 (north of Les Sept Iles). The cruiser was sunk by torpedo and two destroyers were torpedoed. Sinking of at least one of the two is probable. Our boats suffered no damage or casualties. The convoy arrived safely at Lezardrieux. For brief action report of Commander, 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla see teletype 1405. Chief, Naval Staff has expressed special appreciation to the 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla.

In view of the continuation of this escort operation, the Commander of the Flotilla has proposed that the report on this success should not be announced before 24 Oct. and that participation of the torpedo boats should not be disclosed. Group West, however, considers an immediate publication advisable, contrary to the opinion of Commander, 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla.

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Operations Division has ordered that the request of the Commander be complied with.

The convoy of the steamer NORDVAARD left Dieppe at 1845 for Boulogne. The convoy of the MUENSTERLAND will be transferred during the night of 23 Oct. from Lezardrieux to Cherbourg. Five boats of the 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla left St. Malo at 1830 for remote escort and will subsequently proceed to Brest. Nine boats of the 5th PT Boat Flotilla will provide further remote escort.

The KONDOR, MOEVE, FALKE and T "14" of the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla are to proceed during the same night from Cherbourg to Le Havre.

A torpedo operation from the Hoofden (northeastern entrance to the English Channel, Tr.N.) by the 2nd, 4th, 6th and 8th PT Boat Flotillas was planned against a northbound convoy on the east coast. This operation had to be discontinued because of stormy weather. All PT boats put in to IJmuiden. Patrol line positions were not taken up for the same reason.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters

North Sea:

Convoy "1183" Hook - Elbe was carried out according to plan. Minesweeping activity was hampered by stormy weather.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the North Sea 25 planes were detected on operation. There was only minor gunfire and air activity in the Petsamo and Vardoe areas on 21 and 22 Oct. According to a reconnaissance report of the 5th Air Force, the coal mine on the southeastern slope of Longyearbyen is still burning, while 500 m. north-east of the old breakdown transmitter masts at Tunheim on Bear Island two new masts 10 - 15 m. high with antenna were observed.

2. Own Situation:

Thirty-four ships were escorted north and 23 south. Shortage of escorts delayed 29 ships.

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IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrance, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

The boat IK "32" sank at 0300 in the north harbor dockyard in Copenhagen, obviously owing to sabotage.

Otherwise nothing special to report.

V. Submarine Warfare

Anti-aircraft submarine U "271" reports that she was attacked by a carrier-borne plane and four Catalinas on 21 Oct. at the supply point and sustained slight damage. On 22 Oct. submarine U "214" sank a single vessel (7,000 G.R.T.) in DP 6178. This submarine reports lively traffic near Colon consisting of single vessels, some of which are escorted, and continuous unskilled location from shore and at sea.

VI. Aerial Warfare

British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force reports 12 bombers, 16 heavy fighters 24 reconnaissance planes and 154 fighters out on operation over the west area without special incident.

In connection with the attack on Cassel it is now reported that our defense shot down 57 enemy planes for certain. At 1200 on 23 Oct. two Ju 88's attacked nine fishing boats, apparently Danish, outside the fishing grounds; the effect was not observed.

During an attack on a convoy of seven LST's in BE 6590 four FW 200's probably sank one LST and heavily damaged a second one.

During the night of 23 Oct. 39 of our planes were sent out against Great Yarmouth and nine against London. Three Do 217's were lost.

During the day enemy planes machine-gunned trains in western France. Single bombs were dropped on vessels off the island of Cezembre, but missed the targets. One Typhoon was shot down.

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Mediterranean Theater:

Our Air Force carried out reconnaissance in the Italian area. Towards evening 67 planes started out again for an attack on the harbor of Naples. No report has yet been received. In the attack on the eastbound convoy off Tenes 3 He 111's and 2 Ju 88's were lost; 15 planes were lost during the attack on Naples on 22 Oct.

Air Force Command, Southeast reports altogether 304 planes out on operations. Harbor installations of Leros and Porto Lago were attacked without the effect being observed. West of Kos a bomb was dropped close to an enemy destroyer. No report on the result has yet been received.

Four Spitfires approached Montenegro and 30 Lightnings flew into the Straits of Otranto, of which 6 machine-gunned the airfield of Tirana. All 4 Spitfires and 1 Lightning were shot down in aerial combat.

The enemy was very active over the Italian front and one small airship, among other things, was sent in. Attacks were carried out on railroad installations between Rome and Florence, the area Bologna-Venice-Bolzano and the airfield of Guidonia near Rome.

In the Greek area the airfield of Candia and the island of Syros were raided. Over the Dodecanese a heavy-fighter patrol by 3-5 planes and reconnaissance activity were observed.

Eastern Front:

A Swedish courier plane was shot down at 2300 over the Skagerrak. The Air Force is interested (for intelligence reasons) in the maintenance of courier communications between Sweden and England. If a further intensification of night fighter activity over the Skagerrak should cause Sweden to discontinue her courier service, the Air Force intends to propose that Swedish courier planes make an intermediate landing at Aalborg by day. Commander in Chief, Air Force enquires how the Navy reacts to this proposal in view of our convoy and patrol traffic.

In the Black Sea photographic reconnaissance of ports was carried out. For results see Enemy Situation Black Sea and Daily Situation.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

In the morning 19 LCT's left Gibraltar for the Atlantic

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and 4 transports with troops, 15 freighters and 1 tanker left for the Mediterranean. One AURORA class was reported putting in from the Atlantic. At 1745 a convoy of 21 freighters and 4 tankers with 4 escort vessels and 4 corvettes passed through the Straits of Gibraltar bound for the Atlantic. Of this convoy 10 ships and the 4 corvettes put in to Gibraltar.

No shipping movements were detected in the Western Mediterranean. According to photographic reconnaissance, altogether 54 merchantmen totaling about 300,000 G.R.T. and 2 large and 17 medium-sized landing boats were lying in Naples on 22 Oct. In the Strait of Bonifacio heavy traffic consisting of small vessels was observed and on the west coasts of Sardinia and Corsica on 22 Oct. for the first time heavy supply traffic. In Ajaccio were lying 2 destroyers, 2 boats, apparently escort vessels, and 3 small freighters. There was heavy enemy air patrol over the west coast from the front line as far as Civitavecchia.

No sighting reports have been received from the Eastern Mediterranean.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Naval landing craft MFP "541" was torpedoed by a submarine and sunk on the morning of 22 Oct. near the harbor of Imperia. Thirteen men were killed. Otherwise coastal traffic was carried out without incident. German Naval Command, Italy reported:

"Evacuation from central Italy of captured goods has started at a great pace on the west coast. Commanding General, Armed Forces, South now requires also large supplies by sea because of the increased danger from the air to the overland supply routes. Owing to the great danger from the air by day and lack of protection from our own fighters, ships cannot easily make round trips since only night passage is still possible. Ports are also very open to air attacks during the day. Anti-aircraft guns are not available in general. Siebel ferries and naval landing craft shot down six enemy planes between 11 and 29 Sept."

Sighting of 150 enemy planes near Olbia indicates that there is a large number of planes based on the airfields of Sardinia and Corsica.

German Naval Command, Italy reports with reference to the instructions of Operations Division of 21 Oct.:

- "1. The vessels SALVORE, SAN GIORGIO and F "149" at present lying in Venice are indispensable, if the task arising here in coastal traffic for Commanding General, Armed Forces, South and Army Group B are to be carried out. The SAN GIORGIO is at present

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being equipped as a minelayer so that the most urgent barrages in inshore waters can be laid. With order Op. 861 Gkdos. Chfs. Group South placed these vessels temporarily at our disposal for operations here.

2. The AUDACE will require at least two weeks for trials after her crew is complete, since, for instance, men of Branch II are almost all engineers. The boat will not be ready for minelaying operations until the first half of November.
3. Please confirm that the boats mentioned will remain under German Naval Command, Italy until the tasks here are completed."

Group Sout states in his connection:

- "1. From the vessels allotted to it by Operations Division, Group South agreed to make operational vessels of Admiral, Adriatic from time to time temporarily available to German Naval Command, Italy. Group South must, however, reserve the right to decide whether vessels can be made available.
2. Therefore all vessels, whether still being equipped or already in operational readiness, are solely at the disposal of Admiral, Adriatic until Group South can make a decision on the basis of definite operations, fixed as to time and location, which are submitted by German Naval Command, Italy.
3. Especially with regard to the AUDACE, manning, training and decision as to her operational readiness must rest with Admiral, Adriatic. After Group South has advised German Naval Command, Italy of her operational readiness, the latter can submit a request accordingly."

Naval Staff thereupon despatched the following order to German Naval Command, Italy, with copy to Group South and Admiral, Adriatic:

"German Naval Command, Italy has been advised fully of the extent and great importance of the new tasks assigned to Admiral, Adriatic. The three torpedo boats and six vessels of the 11th Coast Patrol Flotilla will hardly suffice for these tasks. German Naval Command, Italy must therefore try to carry out its operations as far as possible with the means available to it. As regards the torpedo boat AUDACE, directed agreement is to be arrived at with Admiral, Adriatic. Naval Staff agrees to the AUDACE being left at the disposal of German Naval Command, Italy until about the middle of November

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for minelaying operations planned on the east coast of Italy."

The hospital ships DJENNE and SINAI put in to Marseilles at 0800.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to a report from the Naval Attache in Istanbul of 15 Oct. the (Japanese, Tr.N.) Military Attache in Ankara deduces from reports regarding withdrawal of several divisions of the 9th British Army from the Near East to southern Italy that a large-scale Allied attack on the Aegean Sea and Greece has been postponed until further notice and that the transfer to Italy signifies preparations for an operation against the Balkans via the Adriatic Sea.

Our own data confirms the withdrawal of two divisions of the 9th Army to the Italian area. The conclusions drawn by the Japanese are, however, in no way sound. For details see order 1/Skl 31922/43 geh. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

Own Situation:

Our air reconnaissance sighted four small merchantmen at 1124 on 23 Oct. off the island of Vis and at 1150 35 miles northwest of Dubrovnik. Operations for occupation of the islands of Cirje and Murtes (off Sibenik) have started. Cirje-North was occupied at 1500. Guns on Murtes were destroyed.

The steamer BOJANO and ARSIA, en route from Durazzo to Cattaro, have been overdue since the evenings of 20 and 21 Oct. respectively. Apparently the latter was seized by British destroyers on 22 Oct. She was seen in tow at 0800 on 22 Oct. near Cape Rodoni.

Port Commander, Sibenik reports 1 torpedo boat, 1 minelayer, 2 submarine chasers, 2 minesweepers and 3 small tugs in operational readiness, and 1 PT boat, 2 minesweepers and several other small vessels in need of repairs.

b. Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance, at 1445 there were one cruiser and two destroyers about 120 miles southeast of Scarpanto on course 340°. During the day eight reconnaissance planes were detected over the Aegean Sea.

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Own Situation:

The island of Stampalia has been in our hands since noon on 22 Oct. The entire garrison consisted of 670 Italians and 100 British. Forty-eight German survivors were liberated. From the Aegean Islands altogether 29,454 Italian and British prisoners were evacuated to the mainland by sea up to 22 Oct. About 6,000 men were drowned through enemy action from these transports.

Motor tanker MT "3" has been detained by Turkey in the Dardanelles. Investigation is under way. Convoy traffic in the Aegean Sea proceeded according to plan and without incident.

c. Black Sea:Enemy Situation:

Group South reports that, according to photographic reconnaissance, the number of vessels in harbors of the Sea of Asov has increased to about 17 landing vessels and 24 small naval vessels since 10 Oct. Some of these landing vessels were brought to Yeisk by rail. The transport capacity of the landing vessels is estimated to be sufficient for about 2,000 men. About 70 landing vessels and 35 small naval vessels have been detected at Black Sea ports, their disposition within the harbors varying. Transport capacity is estimated to be sufficient for about 2,500 men. Most of these vessels are assembled at Anapa.

Own Situation:

In the operation by the 1st PT Boat Flotilla against Anapa during the night of 22 Oct., in conjunction with night reconnaissance, torpedoes were fired against berths of the vessels located by air reconnaissance. Several torpedoes detonated and fires lasting a short while were subsequently observed.

At 1700 four boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla left again on an operation against shipping targets off Anapa and against supply traffic off the coast. The patrol line positions off Genichesk and south of the Kerch Peninsula were taken up during the nights of 22 and 23 Oct. and during the night of 23 Oct. positions in the Strait of Kerch also.

There were no special incidents during the night of 22 Oct.

A ground mine was swept 25 miles eastnortheast of Odessa.

Convoy traffic was carried out as planned.

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According to a directive from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff to Army Group A, the Fuehrer has, in view of the exceptional importance of the Crimea as a corner-stone of the eastern front, now ordered extension to the entire Crimean fortress of the authority for the coastal areas given to Commanding General, Army Group A through Directive No. 40 as regards the Commands of the branches of the Armed Forces, civilian offices and units and organizations outside the Armed Forces. Commanding General, Army Group A has been authorized to transfer this extended authority to the Commanding General of the 17th Army.

VIII. Situation East Asia

The Naval Attache in Tokyo reports, on the basis of information received from the Japanese Admiralty:

"A submarine-borne plane detected the following on 17 Oct. at Pearl Harbor: 4 battleships, 4 aircraft carriers, 5 cruisers and 17 destroyers. Another submarine-borne plane sighted on 19 Oct. at Suva (Fiji Islands): 8 transports, 1 destroyer and 17 corvettes. Enemy reports about the air attacks on Rabaul are greatly esaggerated. On 12 Oct. only one large ship was sunk and a few damaged; only 19 grounded planes were destroyed. The situation in the area of Finschhafen has improved; there has been continuous and successful support by the Japanese Air Forces."

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Items of Political Importance

"Exchange Telegraph" reports from Moscow that the course of the Conference so far has strengthened the impression that Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt will meet before the end of the year. "Exchange Telegraph" is obviously endeavoring in its reports on the Conference to create the impression that the discussions are proceeding favorably. As a matter of fact nothing is divulged regarding the actual course of affairs.

Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff

No special reports or decisions.

Special Items

I. Naval Intelligence Division in Enemy Situation Report No. 20/43 of 20 Oct. estimates the situation as a whole as follows:

"According to reliable reports, transfers of troops from the United States to Great Britain are continuing. No indication is given by direct observation as to the volume. The concentration of forces in southern England for some time now definitely seems to have been maintained. The assembly of landing craft in the same area is reported from various reliable sources. There are also authentic reports on the assembly of a considerable freighter reserve (allegedly about 400,000 - 500,000 G.R.T.) on the west coast of England. These freighters are loaded with war materiel and ready for immediate use.

Even if the absence of adequate air reconnaissance does not permit a clear picture of the volume of landing craft and large ships assembled in the English area, all information indicates that enemy preparations for a decisive attack against northern and western Europe are making constant progress. No concrete information is available about the date of the attack planned and its direction. It must be emphasized that a continuous hindrance through weather conditions to operations by sea either in the northern area or in western Europe may not be presumed even in the coming winter months.

In the North Atlantic, bases on two Azores islands have been ceded by Portugal to the Western Powers. The gap in the air patrol of the Central North Atlantic, which so far could only be bridged-over provisionally by planes from auxiliary carriers, can now be closed by planes from the Azores. Through the

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newly acquired bases a chain of airfields for land-based planes is formed on the periphery of the North Atlantic, which will shortly be under enemy air control along its whole length.

This offers enemy merchant shipping in the North Atlantic, apart from increased air escort, greater facilities for scattering traffic over the center of the North Atlantic.

In the Mediterranean indications of future enemy planes are very difficult to conclude owing to less frequent insight into landing craft and shipping at the enemy ports. At present no concentrations for new operations are reported.

It is expected that future enemy operations in the Central Mediterranean will be aimed at the Dalmatian-Albanian coast. Therefore the Apulian harbors situated closest to this area require special attention.

In the Western Mediterranean increased movements observed during the last few days in the Corsica area are worthy of note.

Increased and continuous appearance of enemy surface forces in the Aegean Sea indicates that the enemy intends to hold this sea area. It must be expected that the enemy will recapture the islands lost in the Dodecanese and that enemy positions will gradually advance further to the north along the Turkish coast."

With regard to the convoy situation in the Mediterranean, Naval Intelligence Division states:

"Supply traffic to the Mediterranean was carried out as planned. No troops were transferred. Between 1 and 15 Oct. about 1,000,000 G.R.T. of freighters and about 200,000 G.R.T. of tankers were transferred to the Mediterranean, while in the same period about 500,000 G.R.T. of freighters and 80,000 G.R.T. of tankers left the Mediterranean again through the Straits of Gibraltar.

Photographic reconnaissance of West Algerian ports, carried out in the middle of October, confirmed the presumed disposition of large ships in the Western Mediterranean (about 1,000,000 G.R.T.).

Landing craft were withdrawn from the Mediterranean for the first time on 19 Oct. when 21 LCT's left for Gibraltar or the Atlantic (9 for the Atlantic). The significance of this movement, which has so far been limited, cannot yet be ascertained.

No definite information has been received on the extent of traffic through the Mediterranean to and from the Indian Ocean.

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Theoretically it is considered likely that at present about 450,000 G.R.T. monthly of freighters from the former Cape traffic are at present passing through the Mediterranean in both directions. No through-traffic in tankers is assumed."

II. In connection with carrying out the Fleet Construction Program 1943, experiences gained in cooperation with the Main Committee have shown that it is unnecessary to establish special departments within the Naval (Ship) Construction Division. The Ministry of Armament and War Production therefore agrees that the independent departments, subordinated as regards technical matters to the Main Committee, be dissolved and that the tasks again be taken over by the groups of the Division. Effective immediately, the former organization of the Naval (Ship) Construction Division is therefore re-established.

Situation 24 Oct.

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attache in Tokyo reports that the Japanese Navy agrees to the proposal of Naval Staff as per Radiogram 2130 on 16 Oct. (see War Diary 16 Oct.).

The Commander of the TANNE has been instructed to make the necessary arrangements at Singapore with the captain of the BOGOTA.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the Bay of Biscay 51 planes were detected on operation as far as 14° W. One British vessel was located at 1635 in BF 4630 and one at 1902 in BE 3990.

Our air reconnaissance sighted at 1122 in BE 5925 a convoy of 30 merchantmen and 5 escort vessels on course 210°.

Our air reconnaissance sighted at 1515 on 23 Oct. 3 rubber dinghies and 1 large rowing boat, unmanned, at the scene of the engagement of the 4th Tropic Boat Flotilla in BF 1921. The Sea Rescue Service at Brest sighted some further wreckage.

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2. Own Situation:Atlantic Coast:

Off the bases three submarines were escorted out and four in. Five boats of the 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla put in to Brest at 0900. Minesweeper M "4443" ran aground on 23 Oct. at the mouth of the Adour and is probably lost.

Submarine chaser "1403" was lost from sight at 0315 in BF 5512, when returning from anti-submarine escort. A search revealed wreckage. One officer and 49 of the crew were brought ashore at Concarneau by a French fishing smack. No particulars have yet been received

Channel Coast:

Transfer of the NORDVAARD from Dieppe as far as Boulogne was carried out as planned.

The convoy of the MUENSTERLAND put in to Cherbourg at 0430. The torpedo boats KONDOR, MOEVE, FALKE and T "14" of the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla were transferred from Cherbourg to Le Havre.

The 5th PT Boat Flotilla was sent out, without success, against targets located south of Alderney, presumably PT boats in waiting position. The Flotilla put in to Cherbourg. It is planned to transfer it to Boulogne during the night of 24 Oct. Five boats of the 18th Patrol Boat Flotilla were unsuccessfully bombed by an enemy plane at 2205 on 23 Oct. while en route from Boulogne to Dieppe.

A raid was carried out by 24 planes on the harbor of Cherbourg between 1513 and 1531. The steamer Muensterland was set on fire, one patrol boat sunk and the boiler ship in the arsenal destroyed.

During the night of 24 Oct. the 2nd, 4th and 6th and 8th PT Boat Flotillas started a torpedo operation from the Hoofden against a northbound convoy off the east coast of England. The operation begins to appear in radio traffic intercepted.

At the request of Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy, Group West's weather report with regard to the possibility of landing on the Atlantic and Channel coasts will be passed on daily at 1930 to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff until further notice.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern WatersNorth Sea:

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Convoy "466" Elbe Hook consisting of 4 steamers and 13 escort vessels left the Elbe at 1300. Southwest of Heligoland one mine was swept. The 7th Minesweeper Flotilla and the 9th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla have been sent out on minelaying operation "Fasold".

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the North Sea 26 planes were detected on operation. On the evening of 23 Oct. an enemy penetration was reported north of Sogne Fjord.

2. Own Situation:

Twenty-six ships were escorted north and 20 south. Altogether 13 ships were delayed owing to lack of escorts.

Naval Command, Norway has submitted the following new barrage plans:

- "1. Laying of five new flanking barrages in order to reinforce those in the area between the islands of Fugloey, Arnoey and Mageroey.
2. Laying of the anti-sweeping devices already approved but not yet supplied in front of the new flanking barrages or the ones already laid.
3. Reinforcement of the Rognsund barrage "NW 7".
4. Measures during the dockyard period of the TIRPITZ:
 - a. Laying of a barrage in the Vargsund.
 - b. Minelaying of the Stjernsund northeast of Skarvskjaer in case of emergency.
5. In addition, correspondence is being exchanged between Naval Command, Norway and the Task Force about a staircase barrage in Alta Fjord."

Naval Staff has decided with regard to the above request as follows:

- "Re 1. The projected reinforcement of the outer barrages has no direct connection with the defense of Alta Fjord; it cannot prevent surface forces entering by the deep waterway through the Loppa passage, which it must be assumed is known to the enemy. Similarly it will be impossible to prevent the penetration of submarines through by-passing or diving under the barrages. The barrages in question were only reinforced this year and must, therefore, be regarded still as

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effective. The mine situation as a whole prohibits a new reinforcement before the stormy winter weather sets in.

- re. 2. Allocation of EMR mines has started; further supplies of about 200 mines monthly can be expected.
- re. 3. Mine reinforcement of the Rognsund approved.
- re. 4. Group North/Fleet should state its views. Closing of the Vargsund means foregoing the special advantage of second outlet from Alta Fjord; additional mining of the Stjernsund (Naval Command, Norway should report on the exact position of the barrage) will mean complete closing of Alta Fjord for operational vessels.
- re. 5. Proposals are awaited."

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Our patrol at the "Seeigel" barrage had an engagement off Namsi Bank between 1347 and 1415 with an enemy minesweeper group of 24 vessels which, after putting up a smoke screen, withdrew to the north.

2. Own Situation:

In the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic 34 vessels were out sweeping channels in the Baltic Sea entrance and 14 in the Baltic Sea. West of Cape Kullen three ELM/J mines were swept. The destroyers BEITZEN and Z "38" put in to Kristiansand South at 0545. The extensive escort service in the entire Baltic Sea area was carried out without incident.

The 1st Motor Minesweeper Flotilla together with five naval landing craft laid barrage "Seeigel VIIIa" as planned. Motor minesweeper R "120" sustained heavy damage probably through striking a displaced Russian mine (moved from its original position during sweeping, Tr.N.). The chartered Swedish tanker SVEA REUTHER, on which emergency repairs following a torpedo hit were carried out at Riga, will be towed by the tug WOTAN to Stockholm via Kalmar on 26 Oct. Naval Command, Baltic is informed that Naval Staff attaches special importance to safe transfer of the ship, since the damage she sustained already gave rise at the time to difficulties with Sweden.

V. Submarine Warfare

Submarine U "170" reports sinking a freighter (4,500 G.R.T.) in GA 38. Otherwise nothing to report from the Atlantic and

Indian Oceans.

VI. Aerial Warfare

British Isles and Vicinity:

Six bombers of the 3rd Air Force attacked London during the night of 24 Oct. dropping 4.1 tons of high-explosive bombs.

During the day single enemy planes flew into Germany on reconnaissance as far as the areas of Halberstadt and Osnabrueck. In Holland three airfields were attacked and slight damage sustained. Airfields in Belgium and Northern France were also attacked by strong forces. At Montdidier damage was such that the airfield is out of service. Three of the attacking planes were shot down. Strong formations attacked an airfield in Western France and also the arsenal and the harbor railroad station at Cherbourg. Altogether seven planes were shot down. In the evening 100 planes flew into the Heligoland Bight as far as Heligoland itself, probably on a minelaying operation. Thirty enemy planes dropped single bombs over the Rhine-Westphalian industrial area.

Mediterranean Theater:

The 2nd Air Force reports 90 bombers on operation against Naples; 44 planes were over the target. Because of bad weather 32 bombers broke off the operation and landed in southern Germany. Twelve planes have not returned yet. Results of the raid have not yet been received. Strong night fighter activity was encountered over the target area.

Seven bombers of Air Force Command, Southeast attacked shipping target area.

Seven bombers of Air Force Command, Southeast attacked shipping targets near Leros. A small freighter was sunk and another damaged. Close hits were also observed on an auxiliary ship. Seven other bombers successfully attacked the office of the Naval Command at Porto Largo. Fighting on land by our troops on Levitha was supported by 8 bombers and 5 diver-bombers. There was a flight by 100 enemy bombers and 60 fighters from the Italian front via the Adriatic Sea, Lake Balaton, west of Bratislava, Vienna, Leoben and Agram into the area of Wiener-Beustadt.

Several bombs were dropped on small towns in Hungary and 50-80 high-explosive bombs on Ebenfurt. No concentrated attacks could be carried out because of fog. Our fighters scored no success for the same reason.

Several enemy planes were observed in the area of Bologna-Florence. At noon highways, rail installations and bridges in the area south of Florence were raided. The airfield of

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of Tirana was put out of service by the last heavy air attack. Three of our planes were destroyed and four damaged.

Our own as well as enemy planes carried out reconnaissance in the Aegean area.

Eastern front:

Nothing to report.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

Two transports with troops aboard put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic on 23 Oct. One of these, a French transport, left for the Mediterranean after a brief stay, escorted by three destroyers. Altogether about 10,000 men are said to have been aboard four transports which entered the Mediterranean on 23 Oct.

One LCT. and one minelaying cruiser put in to Gibraltar on 24 Oct. from the east. The AURORA class cruiser which arrived at Gibraltar on 23 Oct. went on into the Mediterranean.

According to the situation report of Commanding General Armed Forces, South, altogether 180 LCT's and LCG's are said to have left for the Atlantic in the course of a few days up to noon on 23 Oct. This figure is being checked by Naval Intelligence Division, since it does not correspond with our data.

In the afternoon our air reconnaissance sighted only slight traffic in the coastal area of Oran - Algiers. The number of ships in Olbia and Maddalena showed a slight increase; the number in Apulian harbors was still only slight; only at Bari were there a few more landing craft than previously detected.

At 0752 a submarine was spotted off Genoa in an unsuccessful attack on one of our convoys consisting of two steamers and one war transport.

No reconnaissance reports have been received from the Eastern Mediterranean.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

A minelaying operation was carried out by naval landing craft and motor minesweepers off the west coast of Italy as planned. PT boats made a thrust in the direction of Olbia Bay as flanking defense and intercepted four gunboats, although no engagement took place.

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Submarine U "453" carried out a minelaying operation off Brindidi according to plan.

Coastal traffic was carried out without incident. The hospital ship GRADISCA, without any exchange prisoners of war aboard, put in to Marseilles on the afternoon of 23 Oct. The AQUILEJA arrived at 1030 on 24 Oct.

The DJENNE and AQUILEJA will leave Marseilles for Barcelona at noon on 25 Oct. after taking on British exchange prisoners of war. The GRADISCA, which consumed about 2,000 tons of coal on her empty run, will be ready on 28 Oct. for return trip from Marseilles to Patras.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance a steamer (about 3,000 GRT) was lying stranded 30 miles southeast of Cattaro at 1315 on 23 Oct. Five large ships of unknown nationality and type were sighted at 1920 on 23 Oct. off Mljet (25 miles west of Dubrovnik); recognition signals were not answered and upon subsequent shelling they turned away to the north.

Own Situation:

The island operation off Sibenik has been completed. About 40 small vessels were seized, prisoners brought in and old guns demolished. The Army has acknowledged the good cooperation and support afforded by the Navy.

Minesweeping operations in the Faresina Channel were begun by five motor fishing vessels with German gear. Defense is assured by an armored infantry regiment from shore.

The officers and men for the torpedo boat INSIDIOSO have arrived at Trieste.

In order to reduce shipping losses, orders have been issued that ships are only to put out following reconnaissance and to proceed along the coast in short stages.

A further 15.2 cm. battery is reported ready for action at Ancona. Railroad connection with Pola has been restored since 22 Oct., according to advice received from Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic.

The channel off Orsa, Bado Bay east of Pola and Medolino Bay southeast of Pola may be considered as alternative bases for motor minesweepers and PT boats.

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Group South has ordered:

"The 159 Croatian gunners who have been ready at Genichesk since 34 Sept. to leave for Dalmatia are to be sent to Agram at once. Report to the Croatian Naval Command at Agram."

The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping has advised Naval Staff that the Deputy for German Sea Transportation in the Mediterranean regards as premature the proposal of Army Group B already to put out of service such merchant ships in Adriatic ports as are not being used, as a precaution in order to prevent them possibly falling into enemy hands. Naval Staff advised Group South and German Naval Command, Italy on 7 Oct. of this matter with instructions that a precautionary demolition of shipping not in use is considered premature at present, but that preparations for destruction of the ships, according to the situation and in agreement with the Mediterranean Deputy, are regarded as appropriate. A proposal of Group South submitted on 29 Sept. to dismantle ships not in use has been forwarded by Naval Staff to the Reich Ministry concerned, advocating this for ships over 20,000 GRT.

b. Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

The unit consisting of one cruiser and two destroyers was again detected at 2107 and at 2240 on 23 Oct. The last position was 14 miles north of Scarpiano, course 330°.

Two small ships leaving the Scarpiano Straut were located at 2400. According to a report from coast patrol boat GA "45", the British escort boat HURWORTH L "28" struck a mine and sank at 2230 on 22 Oct. off Kalymnos. Five survivors are aboard the GA "45".

A British commando company landed on Levitha during the night of 23 Oct. The western and eastern parts of the island, as well as the harbor, are in enemy hands. During the same night the airfield of Candia (Crete) and the island of Syros were attacked by enemy planes.

Group South reports that the Turkish Police Radio Station at Guemesluek or Bodrum is transmitting coded situation reports continuously from the Kos area. Deciphering is just as easy for the British as it is for our radio intelligence. Group South has therefore asked our Naval Attache in Istanbul to investigate possibilities of stopping such reports. Naval Staff is asked to take suitable steps to prevent these transmissions, which endanger our operations in the Dodecanese.

For particulars see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

From one of these Turkish reports it was learned on the evening of

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23 Oct. that of 195 men aboard a British torpedo boat none could be saved; other dead were buried in Guemesluk and wounded brought to Bodrum.

This may be a matter of further successes of our mines.

Own Situation:

Liberated German soldiers have been transferred from Stampalia to Phaleron by air. Submarine chaser "2104" was found listing and naval landing craft MFP "496" (of the OLYMPOS convoy), which was still loaded and had been hit in numerous places by gunfire, was found burned out on the beach.

Naval gunners have been transferred to Stampalia by air to man Italian batteries.

Assault Division Rhodes broke off a reconnaissance operation against the island of Sini (north of Rhodes) because of engine trouble.

Mopping-up of Kasos was carried out without resistance.

On the morning of 22 Oct. a combined Army-Navy operation under the Naval Shore Commander was carried out against insurgents, mostly Communists, in the area northwest of Kalamata. About 490 men between the ages of 15 and 60 were arrested.

Due to the shortage of escorts two steamers are unable to leave Piraeus for Crete; one tanker for Salonika and one for the Straits are also unable to leave.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence, there were two submarines in the northwestern part of the Black Sea and east of the Crimea two approaching and one on return passage.

Our submarines reported in the evening a westbound convoy consisting of four vessels 25 miles west of Suchum. At 1342 six planes raided the harbor and town of Yalta. The anti-aircraft gun emplacement aboard the auxiliary sailing vessel GELOJA sustained a direct hit. One plane was probably shot down.

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Own Situation:

One of the guns of the 5th Battery of the 613th Naval Artillery Battalion in the Strait of Kerch was put out of action by enemy gunfire. No damage was sustained in dive-bomber attacks and shelling of the command post at Eltigen.

The 1st PT Boat Flotilla carried out an operation against Anapa during the night of 23 Oct. Our night reconnaissance planes could not start out because of ground fog. Upon reaching the coast our boats at once had an engagement with two gunboats and two patrol vessels. They were detected by coastal searchlights and shelled by 7.6 cm. guns, so that they had to withdraw to the southwest. The rest of the operation proceeded without special incident.

Submarine U "9" left Feodosya on operations.

Convoys were carried out as planned and without incident.

VIII. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance

The statements of the "Washington Post" and the "New York Times" which endeavor to minimize the significance of the Moscow talks are worthy of note. It is said that important decisions are to be left to the heads of the Governments.

The Russians are accompanying the Conference in a remarkably obstinate way with a press campaign which pursues the call for a second front and effective military achievement by the Western Powers.

According to a Swedish agent's report from Ankara, Stalin is said to have appointed the Chief for Political Affairs in the Red Army, General Tschermagow, as Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, thus strengthening the ties between the Army and the Party.

Chief, Naval Staff returned to Berlin from the armament conference at Gdynia.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff

I. Army Situation

Melitopol was lost on 23 Oct. The enemy broke through our lines south of the town. It was still possible to repulse another strong attack near Zaporozhe, but new enemy attacks on 24 Oct. near Dnepropetrovsk were again successful. At Krivoi Rog the workers have assumed a menacing attitude and have been able to arm themselves to some extent. In view of this development the situation in the southern part of the eastern front can only be viewed with the greatest anxiety. After penetration of the Melitopol - Zaporozhe line, which forms the last bulwark for defense of the entrance to the Crimea from the north, there is only between the front and the Dnieper the absolutely flat steppe which is bare of natural obstacles and most unfavorable for defense. It seems very doubtful whether bringing-up of the divisions of the 17th Army withdrawn from the Crimea and a few tanks and infantry divisions from France, northern Italy and the Balkans will be able to master the situation in time. So far no order has yet been given by the Fuehrer to evacuate the Crimea. On the contrary, the peninsula is to be held under all circumstances, according to the latest orders.

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In Italy the enemy's main activity was still concentrated on attacks against our supply lines.

II. In view of the possibility that the Moscow Conference may again make an enemy invasion of France an immediate problem, Chief, Naval Staff orders that our minelaying plans be re-examined and that endeavors be made to speed up the production of time-setting devices. The minelaying operation off Brindisi is to be repeated if possible.

III. Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters reported on 21 Oct. that Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff plans to submit to the Fuehrer the following two directives:

a. "Reinforcements of troops and supplies of material to southern Greece, Crete and the islands in the Ionian and Aegean Seas, which are in great danger, demand the all-out use of seagoing shipping available in this area. In order to ensure the important supplies to this area the following is ordered so as to clarify responsibility and command:

1. Army General Staff, Quartermaster General, Southeast is responsible for bringing up supplies overland. Distribution to the ports of loading is to be effected in closest cooperation with the naval offices in charge of sea transport.

2. The naval offices only are responsible for sea transport in the Aegean and Ionian Seas. Quartermaster General, Army Group E, who receives his instructions from Army General Staff, Quartermaster General, Southeast, is responsible for fixing the order in which shipments are made.

3. The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping will see to provision and management of the necessary shipping and replacement of merchant shipping lost. In order to discharge its responsibility with regard to sea transport, the Navy is authorized to intervene in the plans for replacement of shipping and to demand of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping all information required for estimating the number and operational suitability of ships to be provided.

These instructions refer to the transfer of ships by sea or overland as well as to replacement by new constructions and conversions and applies already to the Fuehrer directive issued with OKW/WFST/Qu 1) (M) No. 006101/43 Gkšos. of 18 Oct.

4. In order to advise the High Command, Admiral, Aegean will report to Armed Forces High Command, Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas, with copy

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to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, on the 1st and 15th of every month the amount of sea transport considered possible during the following 30 days."

b. Supplies to the troops in southern Greece, Crete and on the islands in the Aegean and Ionian Seas are in serious danger through shortage of suitable sea transports. Exceptional measures are necessary to procure the necessary number of small seaworthy ships of adequate fighting strength.

1. High Command, Navy, in cooperation with the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, will make every endeavor to have suitable small vessels from conversions and new constructions put into operation quickly in the Aegean Sea.

2. The Main Committee for Ship Construction is requested to provide the iron quota, stated by the Navy and the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping to be necessary, for erection of the construction site at Salonika and for increasing the construction of small vessels. Reference is made to the request of Chief, Armed Forces High Command to Minister Speer (W.F.St./Qu 1 (M) No. 04754/43 geh. of 6 Oct. 1943) asking that the iron quota for the construction of Siebel fer ferries, stopped by the Main Committee for Ship Construction, be released again and that the Navy is granted the material for the construction of 150 ferries to start with."

Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division proposes that Quartermaster General, Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command be advised that the Navy holds the following views:

"A. High Command, Navy accepts general responsibility for sea transports.

- B. 1. With regard to shipping and as a theater of war, the Adriatic, Aegean and Black Seas must be regarded as one area under Commanding Admiral, Group South. Therefore control of sea transports and distribution of shipping is only possible within the entire area through a uniform command.
2. Supplies to the German economy must be included in the general arrangement.
3. Re-organization in view of the transport crisis already existing can only be effective if the local offices of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping are not dissolved and if the naval offices concerned

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have the right to issue instructions with regard to the use of merchant shipping.

- C. 1. The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping will remain responsible for the management and the loading and unloading of ships, as before.
2. The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping will also remain responsible for provision and replacement of shipping, including small vessels, as up to now. The requirements which arise from the war situation with regard to provision and replacement will be submitted by High Command, Navy to the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping. High Command, Navy must be kept informed of plans.
3. As everything depends on acquisition of the necessary shipping in the southeastern area, the Main Committee for Ship Construction must make available the necessary quotas and facilities.
4. Transport requirements and priority for warfare and economy should be decided by the Armed Forces Offices concerned, and ports of shipment and destination in agreement with the Navy.
5. It is impossible to give information about the probable amount of transport in the manner requested. As proposed, special arrangements must be made between High Command, Navy and the Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas."

Chief, Naval Staff agreed.

IV. Quartermaster General reports that Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has requested the Navy to man two 21 cm. Army batteries (each of four guns) and to set up two medium-heavy batteries (of four guns each), for strengthening the defense of the Channel coast. This matter is under investigation. It may be possible to draw the required personnel from Italian volunteers, with the exception of officers.

V. Chief, Naval Intelligence Division reports:

Ambassador von Papen, on instructions, has tried to find out whether Turkey would consider taking over the Dodecanese, which is now in Italian hands. The answer was that Turkey would only do so with British consent.

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In a Highly Restricted Circle

VI. Report by Chief, Operations Branch Operations Division:

a. According to information from the Bureau of Naval Armament, the monthly requirements of 180 tons of tungsten (from Portugal) are at present short by 40 tons. Until autumn 1944 the required quantities can, however, be met from stocks.

b. Re. New plans for operation "Leopard": Group South transmits the following new directive of Commanding General, Army Group E:

- 1.- Target of operation "Leopard" is still the occupation of Leros by Assault Group Mueller with the Army forces provided so far. More light naval forces and air forces will be employed. Following operation "Leopard" the island of Samos isto be occupied at the earliest possible date.
2. Lieutenant General Mueller is in command of the operation, in which Admiral, Aegean and Commanding General, 10th Air Corps will assist.
3. Start of "Leopard" (X-day) will be ordered by Army Group E on the day previous at the latest at 1800. The earliest X-day is 6 Nov.
4. Irrespective of the above, Lieutenant General Mueller is definitely to utilize any chance of success which may arise to carry out "Leopard" by surprise. Sudden enemy shipping losses, absence of enemy naval forces, fog etc. might create such a favorable situation.
5. Admiral, Aegean is to move the following to the jumping-off area Kos-Caline by 5 Nov.:
 - a. all operational naval landing craft, torpedo boats, PT boats and motor minesweepers,
 - b. nine infantry landing boats from Salonika,
 - c. the sic Siebel ferries due to arrive from the Adriatic Sea by 1 Nov.,
 - d. all other small vessels available and suitable for this operation,

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- e. the convoy of the INGEBORG,
 - f. the battalion of the 11th Air Force Infantry Division, which is assembled at Piraeus.
6. The appearance of newly assembled surface forces must under all circumstances be kept secret from the enemy. They may therefore not be engaged in other operations in the Aegean prior to "Leopard". This, however, does not refer to the operation of submarines against enemy naval forces.
 7. British naval forces in Turkish territorial waters are not to be attacked.
 8. The Air Force, with the strongest formations possible, is to prepare the way for the operation by attacking enemy ships and Leros itself and will closely cooperate with Lieutenant General Mueller in supporting operation "Leopard".
 9. At 1000 on Tuesday, 26 Oct. I will hold a conference at the headquarters of the 68th Army Corps at Athens; the following will be present:

Lieutenant General Mueller, the Commander of the participating naval forces, Admiral, Aegean, Commanding General, 10th Air Corps. Participation of further officers, which is to be limited as far as possible, is left to the commanding officers. At this discussion Lieutenant General Mueller will report in detail on his plans and Admiral, Aegean and Commanding General, 10th Air Corps are requested to state their plans."

Group South reports in this connection:

"The directions given under 5 and 6 of the above, which interfere with the rights of Admiral, Aegean as the party responsible for naval operations, and the obscurities arising therefrom will be clarified during the discussion on 26 Oct."

In addition, Army Group E regards a temporary reinforcement of our weak naval forces in the Aegean Sea through the allocation of four more submarines absolutely necessary for a successful execution of operation "Leopard" and for the subsequent occupation of Samos, and remarks that the sudden appearance of these submarines on and after 5 Nov. offers the best chance of success.

Group South is well aware of the fact that the submarines, also requested by it, are not available at present.

Chief, Naval Staff orders that the outcome of the discussion on 26 Oct. regarding responsibility be reported, so that he can approach Commanding General, Army Group E once more, if necessary.

VII. Group South has reported as follows:

"Preliminary considerations with regard to the evacuation of the Crimea show the necessity of transferring shore units and naval forces to Transnistria, Rumania and Bulgaria. Basic approval of the Rumanian and Bulgarian Governments should be requested now, so as to guarantee a smooth transfer of the offices evacuated if such should be deemed advisable."

This matter will be dealt with further by Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch.

Special Items

1. According to the notes of the discussions held on 28 Sept. by the Sub-Commission "Landing Craft" of the Shipbuilding Commission, views have become evident on various points which require correction. This has been done in a letter from Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff of 16 Oct. addressed to the Main Committee, Shipbuilding Commission, Chief, Army Ordnance Division - High Command Army, Commander, Replacement Army and other Army and Air Force Commands concerned. This letter states, amongst other things:

I. The report on the discussion shows that the Shipbuilding Commission in its discussion "Sub-Commission, Landing Craft and Supply Vessels" on 28 Sept. occupied itself with questions which are not in its sphere. The decision as to whether certain types of ships are to be dropped from the Fleet Construction Program for 1943 rests solely with Naval Staff or Commander in Chief, Navy personally; this has been emphasized on several occasions by the Chairman of the Shipbuilding Commission, Rear Admiral Topp. It is a matter for the Shipbuilding Commission to make recommendations regarding types, in accordance with instructions of 1 Oct. 1943 for this Commission. Only military offices are in the position to decide whether certain types of ships can be dispensed with in the course of these discussions regarding types. This is expressly stipulated in the joint order dated 22 July of Commander in Chief, Navy and the Minister of Armament and Ammunition, reading as follows:

"If the Commission reaches no agreement then the decision, as far as warship construction is concerned, rests with Commander in Chief, Navy, personally."

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Naval Staff considers it imperative to emphasize the above once more.

II. With regard to the construction of small transports the following must be stated: Construction of small transports is so urgent in theaters of war where allocation of transports by sea or land is impossible that any delay may have serious military consequences. From this angle it is therefore irresponsible that the construction of a building site for naval landing craft at Salonika, as demanded by Naval Staff, has been rejected by the Main Committee and that the measures already taken with regard to its construction (despatch of Dr. Bohny for investigation of construction facilities) have been stopped.

Recent losses of such ships show how urgently small transports are required in this sea area. The transport situation there is drifting towards a catastrophe if the measures demanded, i. e. the building or transfer of naval landing craft for this area, are not carried out at once.

In this connection High Command, Navy defines its views with regard to further construction of Siebel ferries as follows:

Formerly the view was held that 200 Siebel ferries, demanded by Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, could be built if this would not hamper construction of our own naval landing craft and naval artillery lighters. This provision still holds good; a reduced allocation of iron and facilities to the Navy to the detriment of the Fleet Construction Program 1943 is impossible and must therefore be rejected. However, considering the demands detailed below Naval Staff considers it necessary, in view of the general construction situation and the requests made still to be expected from the other services, that the construction of Siebel ferries be continued, provided the provision of fuel is guaranteed beforehand from elsewhere. The Navy can also not undertake the arming of the additional new Siebel ferries. The required iron quotas and construction facilities must therefore be made available as an addition.

III.a. With regard to the question of naval landing craft, Naval Staff is of the following opinion:

"Under the Fleet Construction Program 1943 the final figure called for 540 naval landing craft per year. According to the current building program approximately 410 naval landing craft are at present under construction or scheduled. Together with the approximately 340 naval landing craft present in service, (excluding naval landing craft (artillery) which are purely gun carriers and cannot be counted since they are unsuitable as landing or transport vessels) this

total of 750 naval landing craft. This will cover (about 20% in losses per year being taken into account) requirements of naval warfare, including considerable transport tasks for the Armed Forces so far as these can be carried out by the naval landing craft.

In this connection it must be borne in mind that:

"1. Any future operational requirements of the Army (for instance a large-scale landing operation) have not been taken into account, because they are unknown.

2. New demands arising from the developments of naval warfare must be submitted separately. (Naval Staff for instance requests the fitting-up of 24 naval landing craft as river mine-exploding vessels. These, just as the naval landing craft (artillery), are to be subtracted from the total of naval landing craft available as landing and transport vessels.) Under the above conditions Naval Staff can, after the present building program of naval landing craft (410) is completed, make do from about September or October 1944 by maintaining the number of naval landing craft on hand, i. e. the construction of replacements must cover naval landing craft lost by enemy action and those becoming obsolete. A monthly output of 30 naval landing craft is considered necessary for this."

b. As regards naval artillery lighters it is stated:

"An initial series of 12 naval artillery lighters has been built up to now. By order of the Fuehrer they were put into operation at once without awaiting the outcome of trials, owing to the difficult situation in the Sea of Asov. Although a few deficiencies came to light, such as are natural with any new type, the naval artillery lighters have proved excellent in operation. Four Russian gunboats were sunk and the ports and the Mius front were successfully shelled without the boats themselves sustaining any serious damage. The deficiencies that came to light have been given consideration and will be corrected in the second series under construction. In comparison the specially armed Siebel ferries did not come up to expectation in a similar operation on Lake Ladoga in the spring of 1942. Naval Staff cannot, therefore do without naval artillery lighters for certain specific operations, especially since naval construction engineers guarantee that, as regards seaworthiness, their operational possibilities are at least equal to those of Siebel ferries. The question

brought up (see page 13) at the meeting on 28 Sept., as to whether these tasks can be taken over by the Siebel ferry, must therefore be answered in the negative."

c. Quartermaster Division then corrected the false views held with regard to the engine question of naval landing craft and Siebel ferries. The Deutz engine of the naval landing craft gave performances hitherto not thought possible. High gasoline consumption and increased inflammability of this fuel speak against the introduction of the BMW 6 machine. Neither of these engines is the ideal propulsion for this type. They were, however, used because they were available in the required number.

d. The idea of building in future only a vessel of standard type (surface and capacity) is attractive from the point of view of production. Unfortunately this is not feasible operationally, since one cannot do with one type of vessel only in naval warfare even under the most severe restrictions. Although we are today in a much more difficult position than the enemy as regards the production situation, it must be pointed out that he has about 16 different types of landing craft at his disposal. The plan to fit an easily removable superstructure on a flat vessel, so as to combine the advantages of the flat vessel with those of the capacious one, is entirely out of question in any case. Naval Staff must therefore reject such a solution for the following reasons:

1. The already deficient seaworthiness of the flat vessels will be affected to an impossible extent by:
 - a. immediate destruction (of the superstructure) in heavy seas if lightly constructed.
 - b. Creation of a large wind trap on a vessel which already drifts easily.
 - c. Great difficulty in managing the vessel when maneuvering, coming alongside or casting off by abolition of any visibility.
2. Considerable enlargement of the silhouette and thus
3. a larger target for the enemy,
4. considerable overloading and unwieldiness, if the superstructure is heavy. This will eliminate the load capacity.
5. Surface will be considerably decreased, because a gangway must remain on either side for maneuvering, making fast ropes, etc.

6. great risk of fire if constructed of wood in order to lessen the weight (the enemy is lately using phosphorus against ships).

In conclusion Naval Staff emphasized once more the necessity of carrying on the construction of small transports with all available means on the basis of the requirements stated above.

2. Because of the "Duke of Aosta" incident the Foreign Office on 8 Sept. gave instructions to the Ambassadors that the Armed Forces Attaches should address reports, even if of a purely military nature solely via the Foreign Office.

On this matter Naval Staff advised Armed Forces High Command, Foreign Division, with copies to Commander in Chief, Air Force and High Command, Army (Attache Section) on 12 Oct. 1943 as follows:

- "1. Naval Staff can agree if the reports deal with internal matters or those of a purely political nature, i. e. which will have no operational consequences. It may, however, be extremely difficult to judge how far political action in wartime has operational consequences. Should it be a matter of political news which is passed on to the Naval Attache direct by an agent or reports which might give rise to strategic and operational deliberations, the Ambassador and Commander in Chief, Navy (through Naval Attache Section, High Command, Navy) must be advised simultaneously. The Foreign Office is partly responsible.
2. As a line can hardly be drawn between politics and warfare, it must be insisted here that the reports be submitted to Commander in Chief, Navy and to Ambassador simultaneously, namely through direct channels. The Ambassador may thus comment on such reports; there must, however be a guarantee that the reports reach Commander in Chief, Navy or Naval Staff through the Naval Attache Section, High Command, Navy as quickly as possible, i. e. through direct channels, since military decisions, which usually permit no delay, depend on this. The Foreign Office is responsible, in agreement with High Command, Navy.
3. Information of a military nature should at once be submitted direct to Commander in Chief, Navy via the Naval Attache Section, High Command, Navy. The Ambassadors may be informed at the same time, orally, as provided in the Fuehrer's directive to limit knowledge to the most restricted circle. The parties responsible will be Armed Forces High Command or the Service Branches of the Attaches.

The following arguments speak for direct reporting:

1. Directive of the Fuehrer, according to which military reports are to be limited to the most restricted circle, which is not assured if reports are submitted through the Foreign Office. High Command, Navy is ready to submit evidence supporting this allegation.

2. Reports must be despatched direct, since forwarding through the Foreign Office entails a normal delay of 1-3 days in the most favorable circumstances: even delays up to 12 days have already occurred. Here too High Command, Navy is able to submit evidence. It is unbearable that High Command is unable to make the necessary decisions at once because important military reports are delayed. At the same time it is requested that the system of forwarding messages be re-examined, i. e. that the Naval Attache be given the opportunity, if necessary, of sending coded military telegrams via the Foreign Office, which are passed on direct to High Command, Navy. Information from Naval Staff, Operations Division to the Foreign Office is not affected by this.

On account of the above, Armed Forces High Command will raise objection to the Foreign Minister's order, which was issued without previously informing Armed Forces High Command.

3. Report on the incident "Captain von Kamptz" which occurred in connection with the execution of operation "Achse" is contained in files in War Diary, Part C, File Ap A (enclosures of a personal nature).

4. Chief, Naval Communications Division began publication on 14 Oct. of "Reports on tactical naval radar service", which will probably be published every month. These reports are to serve Naval Commands as an aid in operational control. For copy as per l/Skl 28892/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part B, Vol. VI.

5. Naval Intelligence Division reports on the development of the American radar set on the basis of the U. S. Naval Magazine "Our Navy", August 1943 issue, and on the extension of the railway network in Northwest Africa.

For copy of these reports as per ll Skl. 31234/43 geh. and 32854/43 geh. see War Diary, Part D "Evaluation of Intelligence on Foreign Navies".

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Situation 25 Oct.

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report

2. Own Situation:

Another seven survivors of Ship "28" were found on the island of Hachiuoshima, according to a report from the Japanese Navy. Their transfer to Yokohama has been ordered.

Naval Staff does not intend to release the news of the loss of this auxiliary cruiser yet. The Naval Attache in Tokyo will be advised accordingly and will be asked to state his opinion.

Naval Staff advised the Naval Attache in Tokyo by telegram 2359 that submarine "Luedden" is due at the rendezvous one hour past sunrise on 28 Oct.

The Naval Attache in Tokyo reports that all three AQUILA submarines were handing over to him by the Japanese Naval Minister on 22 Oct. and added that a report on their condition and sailing date will follow.

II. Situation West Area

I. Enemy Situation:

Over the Bay of Biscay 31 planes were detected on operation. One British vessel was located at 2028 in AM 7880, one at 1031 in BE 6540 and one at 1558 in BF 1640.

Reuter announced the loss of the cruiser CHARYBDIS and the destroyer LIMBOURNE off the French coast on 23 Oct. The destroyer is said to have been scuttled.

Our own air reconnaissance reported:

At 0845 re-location of the convoy of 30 merchantmen in BE 8464 on southerly course.

At 0945 a convoy of 60 merchantmen escorted by 1 cruiser and 6 escort vessels (presumably SL 138) in DJ 1259 on course 300 degrees.

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At 2040 in CG 8459 20 ships, presumably the landing craft which left Gibraltar on 23 Oct., and 2 escort vessels on course 350 degrees.

At 1145 in BE 6361 8 merchantmen and 4 destroyers on course 240 degrees speed 18 knots.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

The loss of submarine-chaser "1403" on 24 Oct. is to be attributed to a mine. The Commander and six of her complement are missing. Fourteen moored mines of an enemy barrage were swept on coastal route "Liebesbank". At 1400 the airfield of Brest-South was raided by 25 enemy bombers heavily escorted by fighters.

Destroyer Z "23" was transferred from Bassens to Verdun roads.

Channel Coast:

In the air raid on Cherbourg on 24 Oct. altogether eight of the attacking planes were shot down, two of them by forces of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West and two by naval anti-aircraft guns.

The steamer MÜNSTERLAND is disabled and can therefore not be moved further east for the time being.

During a planned torpedo operation by the 2nd, 4th, 6th, and 8th PT Boat Flotillas, led by Commander PT Boats, against a northbound convoy northeast and east of Cromer our boats encountered six enemy destroyers and numerous motor gunboats, which effectively prevented our attack on the convoy. PT boats S "88" and S "63" of the 4th Flotilla were lost. Our own forces rescued 20 men from the S "63" and 3 men from the S "88".

Nineteen men of the Flotilla leader S "88" were captured by the enemy, according to radio intelligence. Lt. Cmdr. Luetzow Commander, is amongst those missing.

PT boat S "116" ran aground off Egmond-op-Zee, but was later on towed into port. For brief report from Commander, PT boats see teletype 1900.

The steamer NORDVAARD left Boulogne at 2015 heavily escorted. Shortly after, enemy targets were located in BF 3356 upper center, BF 3329, BF 3331 center and BF 3359 center right. Three enemy formation leaders received operational radio-grams and were ordered not to acknowledge.

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receipt. Dover reported from 2030 to 2200 continuous locations of the formation, which from 2040 to 2110 approached MTB "235" from 8.6 to 2.2. miles. Furthermore at 2059 long-range shelling commenced and continued until 2236. Nineteen rounds were counted. Patrol boat VP "1506" which was close to the steamer, sustained slight damage. One impact was observed on shore near Calais. Two naval gunners were killed. The convoy was then ordered to proceed to Calais where it put in at 2300. Our batteries returned the fire until 2237 with 22 rounds of the heaviest caliber.

At 2400 the convoy went on from Calais to Dunkirk.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters

North Sea:

Convoy "466" Elbe-Hook was carried out without incident. One ground mines each was swept west and southwest of Heligoldnd and north of Terschelling. Minesweeper M "23" ran aground in the Molengat (Helder).

Salvage operations are under way.

Norway, Northern Waters:

I. Enemy Situation:

Over the North Sea 26 planes were detected on operation. On 23 Oct. one plane was reported in the Banak area and two in the area of the Sylte Fjord. At 0745 on 25 Oct. two PT boats shelled the Norwegian cutter KILSTRAUMEN and drove her on shore at Bessaker (north of Trondheim). The PT boats put up a smoke screen when shelled by harbor defense boat MOEVE and withdrew to the north and later to the west. One of the boats was destroyed by our fighters.

According to a report from submarine U "956" Advent Bay is occupied by the enemy. Two wooden huts, apparently new, and radio masts were sighted. The submarine was also fired on by anti-aircraft guns from shore. Reconnaissance of Barentsburg was carried out without defense being encountered.

2. Own Situation:

Twenty-six ships were escorted north and 35 south.

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Eighteen ships were left lying in harbor owing to shortage of escorts.

Weather ship K. J. BUSCH (operation "Kreuzritter") was met at 0615 on her way in from the operation.

The destroyers BEITZEN and Z "38" proceeded northward from Kristiansand South on the evening of 26 Oct. A stay of 24 hours is planned at Bergen, from whence they are to proceed direct to Narvik.

Naval Command, Norway reported on 24 Oct. with reference to the comments made by Naval Staff on 16 Oct. regarding manelaying projects "NW 62" and "63" as follows:

"1. The Amerland was sunk by torpedo. The mines discovered near Nordkyn seem to have been laid recently and have nothing to do with the loss of the AMERLAND.

2. Depth setting of the anti-submarine barrages requested is minus 17 meters. This will not hamper our own minesweeping operations.

3. The sea area of Vardoe seems particularly promising after further investigation. Approval requested for provision of mines."

Operations Division then decided:

"With a depth setting of minus 17 meters mines will not be effective against submarines at periscope depth and if set shallow they will hamper our own minesweeping operations. In view of the shortage of UMB mines their use is only justified with a depth setting that promises results, Barrages "NW 62" and "63" must therefore be dispensed with".

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

The 18th Army Command considers the situation and assessment of the enemy to be unchanged. A Russian attack by three divisions and about 200 tanks in the area of Uritzka was started on 19 Oct., but was suddenly called off, according to the latest statements by prisoners of war. The enemy now seems to be waiting for our retreat or for frosty weather to set in before starting a new attack.

2. Own Situation:

Our planes sighted seven drifting mines west of our

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Skaggerak declared area. On the evening of 25 Oct. 25-30 planes flew into the Kattegat, obviously on a minelaying mission. Numerous routes were closed and all available boats of the 9th and 10th Coast Patrol Flotillas and of the 29 Minesweeper Flotilla were ordered out as additional forces for sweeping operations.

Convoy traffic in the entire Baltic Sea area was carried out without incident. The Finnish steamer OSMO was unsuccessfully attacked at an enemy plane with one torpedo and two bombs west of Nargoen at 1215. A similar unsuccessful attack was carried out on the tug HAPSAL with a barge in tow near Cape Juminda at 0730 on 24 Oct.

V. Merchant Shipping

1. With regard to the inquiry of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping asking which ports in Southern France are approved as alternatives for the merchantmen transferred back from Italy and how many ships at the most may be laid up at each such port, Operations Division replied, after consultation with Group West, that it is planned to make use primarily of the Etang de Berre where a large number of ships can be laid up. For the purpose of dispersal against air raids a few ships will also be laid up at Marseilles and at Sete.

2. Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Marine Branch deals in Report No. 9/43 with enemy tonnage operating to and from Portugal and with Italian merchant shipping. For copy as per 1/Skl. 32978/43 geh. see war Diary, Part C, Vol. XI.

VI. Submarine Warfare:

Submarine U "566", the fifth submarine proceeding to the Mediterranean, was sunk by an enemy plane 30 miles southwest of Leixoes, according to a report from our Naval Attache in Madrid. Her entire complement was rescued by a Spanish trawler and landed at Vigo. Immediate release can be expected since it is a clear case of shipwreck. The submarines now in the North Atlantic have been assembled into Group "Siegfried".

On account of a bearing of 213 degrees from BC 3348 taken on a convoy radio wave by submarine U "413", this Group has orders to proceed from 2100

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on 25 Oct. on course 220 degrees in order to intercept the convoy quickly and, if possible, still during the night and to block any avoiding U "188" will be at the rendezvous off Penang on 28 Oct. and submarine U "532" on 29 Oct.

No reports of successes have been received from the Indian Ocean or from the Atlantic.

VII. Aerial Warfare.

British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 10 planes out on operation against England, 59 over the Atlantic and 7 over the Mediterranean. No reports of enemy planes having been shot down were received.

During the night of 25 Oct. three heavy fighters flew a mission against London. At 1416 eight FW 200's started out against a convoy in the Atlantic. Twelve Ju 88's returned from unsuccessful free-lance operations over the Atlantic.

There was no enemy air activity over Germany on 25 Oct. and during that night. During the day three single planes were reported over the area Stavanger-Oslo and Stavanger-Bergen. Our fighters were unsuccessful against these planes.

In Western France enemy planes attacked airfields, a power station and a railroad station. For damage sustained at the airfield of Brest-South see "Daily Situation". Anti-aircraft guns shot down two of the attacking planes. Several fighter formations flew into the coastal areas of Belgium and Northern France without attacking. In the evening 25 planes flew into the Kattegat, probably one minelaying. Fifty-four planes, including 22 night fighters, went up on defense, but scored no success.

Mediterranean Theater:

During the day ten fighter-bombers of the 2nd Air Force attacked ground targets west of Termoli. There were no night operations. In Italy the enemy carried out attacks on Tarquinia and on the front; in Greece on Kos, Jania, Pordgorica (north of Durazzo) and Candia. Altogether six enemy planes were shot down.

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Eastern Front:

The 5th Air Force reported 67 planes out on operation. On Ice Fjord (Spitzbergen) unoccupied huts were sighted. It can be assumed that the last remaining troops were evacuated by the destroyer reported by one of our submarines, since no occupation or defense has been observed since the reconnaissance on 20 Oct.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea

I. Enemy Situation Mediterranean

According to latest reports altogether 38 vessels left the Mediterranean or Gibraltar for the Atlantic on the afternoon of 23 Oct. namely 32 freighters, 2 tankers, 3 destroyers, and 1 auxiliary cruiser. Of these, 13 freighters, and 1 tanker came from Gibraltar.

On the evening of 24 Oct. a British transport with troops aboard left Gibraltar for the Atlantic escorted by a destroyer. A DELHI class cruiser passed Cape Spartel at 1520 on 24 Oct. heading for the Mediterranean. On the same afternoon 1 auxiliary cruiser, 1 cable-layer from the Atlantic and two LCT's from the Mediterranean arrived at Gibraltar. At 0100 on 25 Oct. 4 vessels of medium tonnage and 1 large ship passed Ceuta, bound for the Atlantic.

The following were located at Gibraltar at 1900 on 24 Oct., 1 minelaying cruiser, 2 cruisers in dock, 1 auxiliary cruiser, 13 destroyers, 8 corvettes, 12 escort vessels, 5 British and 1 Italian transports, 42 freighters, 12 tankers, and 171 planes. According to agent's report, there are still about 12,000 men aboard freighters and transports in the bay and harbor of Gibraltar, although 10,000 men have already left Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

There is still a large number of ships in Oran and Algiers, according to air reconnaissance.

At Mers el Kebir only warships, but no battleships, were located. Olbia and Maddalena showed a slight increase in freighters, but no supply traffic was observed. No new reports have been received from the areas of Naples, Salerno and Termoli. Increased activity by light naval forces is reported in the area Pescara-Ortona. Commanding General, Armed Forces, South corrected his report of 24 Oct., to the effect that only 80 LCT's left for the Atlantic up to 23 Oct. and not 180 LCT's as reported.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

The hospital ship AQUILEJA left Marseilles for Barcelona at 1430 and the hospital ship DJENNE at 2400.

Submarine U "453", after completing her minelaying operation, returned to Pola from Brindisi to take on a fresh supply of mines in order to repeat this operation. Submarine U "431" has not yet answered the enquires of 23 and 25 Oct. regarding her position.

German Naval Command, Italy reports that the demands for sea transports made by Army Group B and Commanding General, Armed Forces, South are steadily increasing due to the revival of enemy air activity against our land communications. On the west coast of Italy continuous supplies from Genoa and Spezia to Civitavecchia call for 30,000 tons per month and in addition one supply-run with 44,000 tons. For arrears from Piombino and Leghorn 136,000 tons have so far been notified and will probably exceed 300,000 tons. Ports of destination are Genoa or Marseilles. Besides this, Elba must also be supplied. Delay in the transfer of the large ships from Italy to France is caused by the shortage of crews and escort forces.

Mounting losses through enemy PT boats, submarine and fighter-bombers demand heavier escort and intensified submarine chase, especially as the Air Force is more or less unable to assist. The 2nd Air Force has turned down a request owing to lack of adequate and suitable planes, but will try at least to cover the most important operations of the Navy through air reconnaissance. Only three planes are available at present for convoy escorts. Every endeavor is being made to afford anti-submarine defense by increasing ship-borne squadrons and by employment of Italian planes with crews. The defense forces available are insufficient, as many vessels are lying in dock. Motor minesweepers are required at the same time for minesweeping and minelaying operations. The increase through captured ships, especially in submarine-chasers, shows no effect yet. Convoy escort will probably therefore be extremely weak. Naval landing craft will proceed without escort. Further delays will be caused because in the southern part ships can only move at night. German Naval Command, Italy, therefore requests that for the west coast war transports be fitted up as auxiliary submarine chasers, that more freight barges be brought up from Southern France and that the projected German and Italian construction program for naval landing craft be continued.

For the Adriatic Sea, the Army has demanded at once the shipping of 30,000 tons per month from Trieste to ports as far south of Ancona. Since only a limited number of small vessels is available it

is necessary to tranship the cargo in Ancona from steamers to smallships. German Naval Command, Italy regards the number of promised naval landing craft and Siebel ferries as inadequate. Because of the increasing threat from enemy naval and air forces, the question of defense becomes more and more acute. The few escort vessels so far requisitioned and in sailing readiness do not suffice. At least 10-15 fast and well armed boats are required for escort tasks. There would be a serious gap if these escort vessels were transferred to Admiral, Adriatic and fulfillment of the demands made by the Army would become doubtful, especially since these vessels are exceptionally suitable for carrying cargo at the same time. German Naval Command, Italy therefore requests the following for the Adriatic coast: that naval landing craft and Siebel ferries be constructed quickly; the final figure be increased and losses replaced; a sufficient number of escort vessels be left in the West Adriatic; coastal traffic in the West Adriatic be controlled by German Naval Command, Italy. Finally, German Naval Command, Italy points out once more the urgency of mine defense off both Italian coasts, which requires immediate action.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

At noon on 24 Oct. two U. S. bomber formations passed over Split, flying to the north.

An auxiliary sailing vessel on passage to Cattaro is overdue. Two steamers left Dubrovnik for Trieste on 24 Oct. One German steamer and four other ships were seized off the Dalmatian coast, according to an enemy radio report.

Naval Staff has confirmed the views of Group South (see War Diary 23 Oct.), but draws the attention of Group South, German Naval Command, Italy and Admiral, Adriatic to the fact that an exceptional situation exists as regards the AUDACE, inasmuch as Naval Staff already ordered on 12 Oct. that this vessel be placed temporarily under German Naval Command, Italy as regards operations.

b. Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Five Hudsons made a low-level attack with bombs and machine-guns on the harbor of Kos and on naval landing craft P "123". No casualties or damage were sustained. Our air reconnaissance sighted at 1430 50 miles south of Castell Rosso three destroyers.

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course north-northwest, which were joined at 1500 by a cruiser coming from the east. This group was 21 miles southwest of Castell Rosso at 1612.

A submarine was reported north of Suda. On the afternoon of 24 Oct. six planes attacked coast patrol boat GA "54". One plane was heavily damaged. The same boat reported, while on passage from Naxos to Levitha, an engagement with an enemy submarine at 0545 on 25 Oct. five miles east of the northern point of Amorgos. Our boat sustained damage and suffered casualties. Amongst other things, the steering gear was damaged and she was forced to resort to her hand rudder.

It is probable that another vessel, apart from the British escort boat HURWORTH L "28", struck a mine near Kalymnos since detonations were observed on 22 and 23 Oct. at the same position. According to statements of prisoners, the HURWORTH L "28" had a complement of 200 men and was armed with three 12 cm. twin-barreled guns, two 3 cm. anti-aircraft guns and two machine-guns.

The boat was on passage from Alexandria.

Own Situation:

Our troops landed at 0955 on the north coast of Levitha. The island was cleared of the enemy during the day. Thirty-three British were taken prisoner.

Reinforced company "Brandenburg" with Bulgarian assistance carried out reconnaissance of the island of Strati (southwest of Lemnos). No enemy forces were on the island.

The minelayer DRACHE left Piraeus during the night of 24 Oct. for Chalkis in order to carry out a minelaying operation in the area of Pontikonisi during the night of 25 Oct. The minelayer will then proceed to Salonika to take on fresh mines.

c. Black Sea

Enemy Situation:

Nothing special to report.

Own Situation:

Six boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla in two groups are to attack vessels assembled on Anapa roads during the night of 25 Oct.

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The operation is already under way and is assisted by night reconnaissance planes. Otherwise nothing special to report.

The Army and the Air Force plan to transfer a considerable part of their forces also to Old Rumania, i. e. not only to Transistria, according to information received from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy. Both services approached Armed Forces High Com and with requests to this effect and wished to ascertain whether the Navy also plans similar measures and considers them necessary. Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch confirmed the necessity of heavy occupation also of Rumanian territory with naval forces and the necessity thus of bases, supply forces and coastal defense forces. The extent of this will depend on how far the focal point of naval warfare necessarily shifts further west if the front is withdrawn any more.

IX. Situation East Asia

Nothing special to report.

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Items of Political Importance

"Exchange of Telegraph" denies the view, so far generally held, that the present Foreign Ministers' discussion in Moscow are to prepare the way for a conference between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. The negotiations, now concluded, will already lead to far-reaching practical results. Actually in very many individual cases final solutions may have been found and these will then only require the formal approval of the three Governments concerned. These resolutions may then be worked out in detail at a later date. The essential factor is that every single resolution be so clearly and accurately defined as to exclude the possibility of a different interpretation later on. The Russians, especially the man in the street, are mainly interested whether the conference will lead to the second front. It is obvious that this question cannot be answered owing to strict military secrecy. The people are, however, amazingly optimistic and have themselves already answered this question in the affirmative.

With regard to politics, it is stated that all three powers seem to have decided on a common policy towards the satellite states so that once and for all it will be impossible for them to play with the idea of finding protection from the U. S. and Great Britain against the Soviet Union or vice-versa or at any time in the future. The three Foreign Ministers are without doubt endeavoring to fix a uniform policy towards Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland.

According to agency reports from Washington, the predicted appointment of Marshall on 25 Oct. as Supreme Commander of the invasion forces in Western Europe did not materialize. This appointment will probably not take place until Marshall comes to London next spring. The strategic plans, which did not envisage a landing in France and Holland before the spring or summer of 1944, are entirely upset by the course of events on the eastern front. The opinion was held in Washington last winter that another year on the eastern front would result in fulfillment of the aim of the U. S. i.e. exhaustion both of Germany and of Russia, so that the armies of the Western Powers would have an easy target in the course of a landing in Western Europe. AMGOT would then take over in Europe in order to stop the advance of left-wing radicals. The Russian summer offensive has completely upset all these plans and the Americans and British must now act before the war has been decided.

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Confernece on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff

I. Army Situation:

The enemy extended his break-through near Melitopol on the southern sector of the eastern front. A weak defensive front is being built up by our forces. It is still doubtful whether this attempt will succeed in view of constant heavy enemy pressure. The enemy also extended the break-through southwest of Zaporozhe still further. One ropetrovsk fell. The fighting strength of our own forces can be estimated by the fact that only one combat group could be formed from the remnants of five divisions. The enemy started his drive on Krivoi Reg.

The sectors of Army Groups, Center and North were comparatively quiet.

Only minor local fighting is reported from the Italian front.

No orders have been issued so far regarding a possible evacuation of the Crimea. According to information from Armed Forces, High Command, Operations Staff, Navy, the Crimea is to be held at all costs.

II. Report by Quartermaster general:

- a. Torpedo boat T :30" was commissioned at Danzig.
- b. Orders dealing with the new erection of coastal batteries on the Channel coast have been received from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff. This measure is obviously aimed mainly at protection of special weapons. Copy of teletype as per 1/Skl 3202/43 Gkdos. Chefs. see War Diary Part C, Vol. X. According to these orders, the Navy is to furnish the guns and personnel for at least two medium batteries (four 15 cm. guns each) and the personnel for two 21 cm. batteries of four guns each. Part of the personnel is to be drawn from the 2,000 volunteers of the Russian Legion and troops from the east who will be made available by Commanding General, Armed Forces, West. This will not entail a reaaction in the number of volunteers requested by High Command, Navy for other points. Naval batteries on other coastal sectors are not to be de-commissioned on account of these new formations.
- c. A uniform operational command is necessary for aerial defense of Gdynia and Danzig. Measures are being worked out together with the Air Force.

In a Highly Restricted CircleIII. Report of Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division:

a. Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean has voiced objections to new minelaying off Brindisi, since it is not certain that TMB mines will react at the water depths of over 20 meters existing there and because the effect of the first operation will lead to patrol and defense. The water depth off Bari makes minelaying possible, but Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean advises against it, because this harbor is unimportant and since enemy patrol must be expected there. He plans a torpedo operation by submarine U "453" in the area of the southeast coast of Italy and Sicily.

Chief, Naval Staff decides that submarine U "453" should first carry out a minelaying operation off Bari and later on repeat minelaying off Brindisi.

b. The OSORNO sailed from Batavia today. A decision as to whether she should attempt a blockade-break must be reached at the end of November. Plans for putting in are at present under discussion by Group West with an officer from Naval Staff. Chief, Auxiliary Cruiser Section reports that the captains are remarkably confident.

Special Items:

I. On inquiry from Quartermaster Division the Naval Liaison Officer to High Command, Army. Army General Staff, reports:

"1. The flow of supplies to the Crimea is very limited. Requests for shipment of supplies by sea have already been received direct from Quartermaster General.

2. The following figures must be assumed in case the Crimea is to be evacuated:

a) Troops: approximately 200,000 men.

Horses: 60,000

Motor Vehicles: 15,000; in addition all other equipment.

b) Supplies: approximately 500,000 tons. About 120,000 tons of livestock (400,000 head of cattle). Altogether 620,000 tons.

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Should the overland route via the isthmus of Perekop be open, it can be assumed that the bulk of the troops and part of the cattle will be evacuated from the Crimea on foot and supplies by railroad. Daily capacity 16 trains (7,200 tons).

Army General Staff request that everything be prepared in such a way that as much as possible is shipped by sea, should evacuation become necessary at short notice,"

II. Naval Intelligence Division submits the following assessment of the situation regarding enemy landing craft:

1. Another 47 landing craft left the Mediterranean for the Atlantic, making so far altogether 80 LCT's or LCI's. or 18% of the number in the Mediterranean. Transfer to England can be assumed, since the first part of this group was sighted by our air reconnaissance at 0900 on 23 Oct. 300 miles northwest of Cape Ortegal.

2. Amongst the vessels withdrawn were 6 LCF's and 13 LCG's, i.e. about two-thirds of the Mediterranean strength of these classes. The others were probably LCI's. Since LCI's are not built in England but come from the United States, their transfer from the Mediterranean might be due to the difficulties of a transatlantic crossing in winter.

3. In connection with the transfer of landing craft from the United States to England in North Atlantic convoys, observed for the first time on 8 Oct., the following was detected: arrival of 2 LST's on 12 Oct. and of further LST's, number unknown, on 24 Oct. in Londonderry.

4. This movement has not yet substantially changed the operational possibilities in the Mediterranean theater and in the area of England.

Situation 26 Oct.

I. War in Foreign Waters

I. Enemy Situation:

Nothing special to report.

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2. Own Situation:

The planned supply operation by the BRAKE is canceled, since the submarines operating in the Indian Ocean are to call at Penang for supplies. An order to this effect has been sent to the BRAKE with Radiogram 2142. She should, however, hold herself in readiness for further operations.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the Bay of Biscay 38 planes were detected on operation. One British vessel was located at 1400 in CG 7150, one at 1440 in AM 4660, one at 1503 in AM 4570 and one at 1726 in BF 4140. Our air reconnaissance sighted at 0915 in BE 6675 24 merchantmen of up to 3,000 GRT on northerly course. Group West assumes them to be landing craft. At 1210 20 vessels, probably also landing craft were sighted in CG 4277 on a similar course.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

The loss of submarine chaser "1403" on 25 Oct. was apparently not due to mine or torpedo action, since no detonation was heard or any great vibration felt, according to statements made by survivors.

Sabotage is therefore presumed. The boat had docked at Lorient and left the dockyard on 20 Oct.

Two ELM/J mines were swept off St. Nazaire.

Channel Coast:

The convoy of the steamer NORDVAARD left Calais, eastward bound, at midnight and arrived at Dunkirk at 0300. It put out at 2100, but was forced by weather conditions to return to port half an hour later.

Torpedo boat T"14" and seven motor minesweepers left Le Havre at 1800. They will proceed as far as Dunkirk, weather permitting.

Commander, 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla had three boats in immediate readiness at Le Havre for PT boat chase, if such were located.

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For brief action report of patrol boat "v.d. GROEBEN", of convoy escort NORDVAARD, dated 25 Oct. see teletype 0220"

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters

North Sea:

Seven ELM/J mines were swept near the West Frisian Islands. Minesweeper M "23" was refloated in the Molengat.

Norway, Northern Waters:

I. Enemy Situation:

Over the North Sea 21 planes were detected on operation. One British vessel was located at 1440 in AN 4660. A PT boat was sighted off Honningsvaag at 0747 and was attacked.

The areas of two grid squares at the entrance to Porsanger Fjord have been closed owing to suspicion of mines.

At 1050 on 25 Oct. in enemy PT boat encountered a defense cutter in the Buskoesund (north of Sogne Fjord) but withdrew to the north when hand grenades were thrown and submachine-guns fired. At 1500 two PT boats were sighted near Hovden on course northnortheast. At 0702 on 26 Oct. a Hampden fired a torpedo which missed on one of our southbound convoys near Feistein. Numerous single planes were observed approaching the west coast on 25 Oct.

2. Own Situation:

The destroyers BEITZEN and Z "38" left Kristiansand South at 2130, northbound.

Thirty-four ships were escorted north and 17 south. Altogether 19 ships were delayed owing to shortage of escorts.

According to a report from Naval Command, Norway an agent of the Secret Service was told to find out:

"What damage did the TIRPITZ sustain in the submarine attack? Can this be repaired in Norway?"

Group North/Fleet proposes that the agent be given the following information:

"Several double-bottom compartments of the TIRPITZ were damaged, resulting in the loss of oil. In addition several range-

finders and light guns were damaged through vibrations. Repairs will be carried out during present repair in Norway. The ship is apparently going on to Germany for routine dockyard period.

Naval Staff, which centrally controls the passing-on of information to the enemy intelligence service regarding the TIRPITZ, outlines the statements and their tendency as follows:

"Damage sustained by the TIRPITZ in the submarine attack is only slight, since the mines exploded at a considerable distance from the ship. Minor underwater damage to the double-bottom compartments, resulting in the loss of oil. Docking was unnecessary. In addition certain damage to her electrical installations, obviously through vibration, details of extent not known. Repairs possible in Norway. At the same time routine repairs of boilers, engines and weapons will be carried out. The ship will not return to a German port until later, for as short a dockyard period as possible. The reason is allegedly the heavy air raid damage at the dockyards at Hamburg."

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Firing practices by the heavy anti-aircraft guns aboard the MARAT were observed. Two tugs and two large patrol vessels were seen sweeping magnetic mines on the west roads of Kronstadt. Enemy planes over Luga bridge, Lippovo and Kirgoloovo were fired on by our anti-aircraft batteries. North of Hungerburg bombs were dropped south of the 2nd Army Coastal Battery of the 929th Battalion.

2. Own Situation:

In the Baltic Sea entrances 41 boats were out on minesweeping operations and in the Baltic Sea 17. One ELM/J mine was swept off Halsbarre. One mine detonation was reported southeast of Grenaa. Escort service in the areas of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic and Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic was carried out as planned and without incident. Minesweeper M "451" ran aground south of Varisai and sustained heavy damage.

Five coastal minelayers were out on minelaying operations in the area northeast of Schepel.

Naval Command, Baltic reports with reference to the order of Naval Staff (see War Diary 19 Oct.) regarding dismantling of batteries from the area of Admiral, Baltic States that:

I. For the time being the following batteries will be left

at Kronstadt Bay: Battery "Karkuli" (four 15 cm. guns), Battery "Peterhof" (three 10.5 cm. guns), Battery "Koenigsberg" (three 10.5 cm. guns), the 4th Battery of the 239th Naval Anti-aircraft Battalion (four 8.8 cm. anti-aircraft guns) the sixth Battery of the 239th Naval Anti-aircraft Battalion (seven 3.7 cm. anti-aircraft guns), and also 2 cm. guns for battery defense.

2. Complete dismantling gear for Battery "Prinz Heinrich" is available. Order for dismantling this Battery has been given; time required probably three weeks.

V. Submarine Warfare

Submarine Group "Schill" consisting of eight boats, has been given orders to operate against a northbound convoy in the Atlantic. This Group is to be in patrol line from BE 8878 to 8989 at 1000 on 28 Oct. Reconnaissance will be carried out by BV 222's and FW 200's.

Submarines of Group "Siegfried" detected an enemy bearing in BC 3526 and BC 31. In the same area one of our submarines was attacked by a plane. According to radio decoding, stragglers of the awaited convoy received orders not to proceed via BE 9360 but via 9974. Then the convoy was proceeding much further south than assumed. The operation was broken off, since pursuit in a southeasterly direction could not lead to interception in view of the intense enemy air activity which had started in the meantime. Group "Siegfried" was ordered to take up a new disposition in BC, right third, against an expected slow eastbound convoy.

Submarine U "183" reports from the sea area of the Maldives and Ceylon in the Indian Ocean that she fired eight torpedoes which missed on 19, 23 and 24 Oct. and attributes this to electric torpedo failures. This boat is due at Penang on 30 Oct.

VI. Aerial Warfare

British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force reports 2 planes on operation over England, 3 over the Atlantic and 4 over the Mediterranean. For reconnaissance evaluations of the Atlantic see "Enemy Situation West Area".

In the afternoon major enemy formations carried out dive-bomb attacks on the airfield at Brest South. Half of the bombs fell into the sea. The seaplane dockyard and engine workshop as well as the yard for land planes sustained damage but are still in operation. No night operations are reported.

Mediterranean Theater:

Reconnaissance planes and fighter-bombers of the 2nd Air Force supported Army operations on the Italian front by attacking motor vehicles and tanks in the sector of Montenero.

In the Greek area our planes attacked Leros, Samos and insurgents in Northern Croatia and in the area of Joannini. The attack on Leros harbor was carried out by 51 bombers and 17 dive-bombers. Two small warships north of Leros and west of Archi were damaged by direct bomb hits. Two cutters were sunk. In the Italian area enemy fighters attacked Ancona with machine-guns during the day. In the Greek area raids were carried out on the airfields of Salonika-Sedes and Mikra. Damage sustained was slight.

In the Aegean area six enemy planes carried supplies to the insurgents.

Eastern Front:

The 5th Air Force withdraws its assumption of 25 Oct. that Ice Fjord is unoccupied. One of our reconnaissance planes was fired on from Longyearbyen.

Otherwise nothing special to report.

 VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea
I. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

Twelve LCT's of an unknown type arrived at Gibraltar from the Mediterranean. One U. S. cruiser of the HONOLULU Class, probably the PHILADELPHIA, and one destroyer left for the Mediterranean. At 1814 one of our submarines detected and unsuccessfully attacked a westbound convoy 45 miles west of Algiers.

No reports have been received from the area of Sardinia-Corsica. In the Gulf of Salerno there were: on the morning of 25 Oct. a convoy of 6 freighters and 1 destroyer; at noon an outbound convoy of 14 ships. A formation of landing craft was sighted southeast of Capri. No sighting reports received from the Gulf of Gaeta. Only minor supply traffic was observed off the east and south coasts of Italy. Otherwise no reconnaissance reports received.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

During the night of 25 Oct. two boats of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla broke through a double destroyer patrol off the Bay of Naples. A torpedo was fired against a destroyer but it missed.

The boats were forced to turn about $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles off the anchorages in the Bay, since starshells and location made further approach impossible. Six boats of the 11th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla left Spezia in the afternoon of a minelaying operation. Flanking escort was afforded by four boats of the 7th PT Boat Flotilla. Bad Weather is at present hampering coastal traffic with small vessels. Otherwise coastal traffic was normal.

The hospital ship DJENNE arrived at Barcelona in the afternoon and the AQUILEJA in the evening.

Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy reports that the transfer of motor minesweepers and PT boats from the Western Mediterranean to the Adriatic Sea via Genoa-Piacenza will start on 6 Nov. It will be possible to transfer six large and nine small motor minesweepers and all PT boats by the end of November. Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy reports, with reference to the situation report submitted on 25 Oct., that escort, minesweeping and minelaying operations on the west coast can no longer be carried out to the extent required after withdrawal of the PT boats and motor minesweepers; furthermore, that any operational activity will be impossible. He requests that large motor minesweepers and PT boats be left on the west coast of Italy until transfer of further vessels from home waters is assured.

Operations Division is at present investigating the disposition of forces in the Mediterranean. The result of this investigation is to be expected on 27 Oct.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

The enemy air attack with bombs and machine-guns on Janina (northwest of Dubrovnik) on the morning of 25 Oct. caused no damage. According to a Croatian report, the steamer RAD (4,000 GRT) was sunk by enemy air action. Naval Shore Commander, Dalmatia has moved to his emergency headquarters at Klis owing to the enemy situation. Departure of three steamers from Dubrovnik to the north has been postponed because of the enemy situation. The report of 25 Oct. about an auxiliary sailing vessel being overdue has turned out to be incorrect. The vessel did not leave Cattaro northbound until the afternoon of 26 Oct.

Mopping-up operations on the islands off the Dalmatian coast are being continued; next on the list is Korcula.

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b. Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

No damage to speak of was sustained in the air attack on Candia during the night of 25 Oct. On 24 Oct. an enemy bomber was shot down near Gavdos.

The following were disarmed and evacuated:

On Naxos 8 Italian officers and 340 men;
On Paros 2 Officers and 150 men.

The following information has been received about the enemy-occupied islands in the Dodecanese:

Castell Rosso: Occupied by the British. Base for light surface forces. Seaplane base.

Symi: Occupied by the British.

Nisyros: Said to be occupied by the British.

Leros: Total occupation 5-6,000 men (mostly naval personnel). 3-400 British, well armed; reinforcements must be expected. Allegedly strong anti-aircraft defense, one modern 9 cm. battery, one Italian battery.

Pathmos: One Italian battery.

Nicaria: One Italian infantry company, two companies of Black Shirts, said to be pro-German. Island allegedly occupied by the British.

Samos: Staff of Division Cuneo (General Soldarelli). Occupation 6-8,000 Italians, 2-300 British and allegedly 5,000 Greeks. Two airfields under construction.

Own Situation:

The DRACHE returned to Salonika after completion of a minelaying operation. Convoy operations were carried out without incident. Coast patrol boat GA "54" left Levitha for Naxos in the morning, carrying troops.

Group South transmits for information copy which it has received.

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of a teletype from Army Group E to Army Group F regarding surprise occupation of Samos before the execution of operation "Leopard". For copy of teletype as per 1/Sk1 3181/43 Gkdos Chefs. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Enemy submarines were located 20 miles southwest of Sevastopol according to radio monitoring.

An enemy submarine attacked our towed convoy from Sevastopol to Ak Mechet with two torpedoes at noon 25 Oct. A lighter sustained damage and was towed in. Submarine-chase has been started at the point of attack. A Submarine was sighted and attacked by one of our planes eight miles northwest of AK Mechet; no success was observed.

Own Situation:

The sector between the northern and southern breakwaters of Kerch was shelled by 15 cm. guns between 1130 and 1155 on 25 Oct. No damage was done to naval installations. At the same time air attacks were carried out on the town and harbor of Yalta. The tug BAIKAL sustained damage.

The goods train ferry HAINBURG which was damaged some time ago by an aerial torpedo hit sprang a leak while in tow from Sevastopol to Odessa and put in to AK Mechet, where she was beached.

The 1st PT Boat Flotilla carried out the operation against Anapa during the night of 25 Oct. as planned. The southern decoy group had an engagement with patrol vessels, the northern group at the same time attacked the harbor of Anapa with six torpedoes. No detonation was heard. The torpedoes probably passed under the targets and ran ashore or were caught in barrages.

Two naval landing craft are evacuating the garrison of the island of Biryutshi (east of Genichesk).

Two Italian midget submarines left Sevastopol on a submarine chase.

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VIII. Situation East Asia

Nothing Special to report.

Items of Political Importance

According to "Exchange Telegraph" one of the concrete results of the discussions so far in Moscow seems to be the decision to establish immediately a permanent joint Three Power Committee which will have sufficient authority to deal with future problems which arise. The Kremlin attaches great importance to the creation of inter-Allied organizations. The criterion of the success of this conference is, however, still the military aspect. It is said that the Soviet Press has not taken up or commented on Smuts' Speech in which he predicted the opening of the Second front in Spring 1944. This is probably because the Soviet Delegation is still endeavoring to have this date changed.

The conference will last another ten to twelve days.

The leading British Press seems remarkably optimistic about the outcome of the conference. According to Radio London, Eden is said to have presented a photo album showing the extent of the devastation caused in Germany by the Anglo-American air offensive.

A Russian periodical lists four theses with regard to the reparations problem:

1. Germany, Italy, Finland, Rumania and Hungary must pay reparations.
2. Reparations to be paid in kind, not in cash.
3. Actual repair of war damage must be carried out by direct employment of German manpower.
4. The Soviet Union, Poland, Norway and Greece must be given priority in reparations, since their economy has suffered more than that of the U. S. and Great Britain.

The House of Commons passed without a division prolongation of the mandate of the present Parliament for another year.

A Government statement before the Japanese Parliament on 26 Oct. states that the main target is at present complete agreement between the High Command and political leaders. At the same time foreign policy and strengthening of Government authority at home must go hand in hand. The backbone of internal strength lies in a speedy expansion of the armament industry.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval StaffI. Army Situation:

All German combat divisions have been withdrawn from the Crimea, except the 98th Light Infantry Division. There are ten Rumanian divisions on the peninsula besides a very strong German supply base with exceptionally large quantities of material and supplies.

The enemy enlarged his break-through near Melitopol to a depth of 30 kilometers.

In Italy the enemy more or less completed the assembly of his troops in front of our "Barbara" line. He is concentrating his activities on heavy bomber operations, such as have not been observed since Messina.

II. Chief, Naval Intelligence Division states that the British Admiralty reports in detail on the operation of our PT boats off Cromer on 24/25 Oct. According to this report, four German PT boats were destroyed and seven damaged; 19 men were taken prisoner.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:III. Report by Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division

a. The Naval Attache in Tokyo reports the following disposition of Japanese submarines in the Indian Ocean:

- 1 submarine between Mombassa and Diego Suarez
- 3 submarines south and southwest of India
- 1 submarine on passage to Aden
- 1 submarine on return passage from Aden to Penang, at present south of India.

b. According to information received from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy, the said Operations Staff on 25 Oct. drew attention to the danger of an enemy attack on Denmark, which would have very serious consequences if it were to penetrate as far as Sweden and the Baltic Sea. The Fuehrer agreed with this opinion and approved the transfer of a further division to Jutland.

Naval Staff is of opinion that the present assessment of the situation with regard to Jutland needs re-examination.

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Considering the present situation regarding landing craft, bad weather can no longer be regarded as an obstacle to landing operations and the employment of airborne troops would make operations even more independent. Our barrages in the North Sea and the Skagerrak will be no serious obstacle. It is significant that the Swedish naval base at Gothenburg has now been expanded to a Naval Station and that a notoriously pro-British officer has been appointed as its Chief. It is noteworthy that this information comes from the "Folkets Dagblatt", a newspaper with a strong pro-German National Socialist inclination. (The last sentence added by Chief of Staff, Naval Staff - Tr. N.)

Chief, Naval Staff ordered an investigation as to whether, where and to what extent further offensive mine barrages can be laid, despite the shortage of mines. The artillery defense of the Jutland coast could only be reinforced at the expense of the Channel coast.

The following factors speak against an invasion of Jutland: The possibility of our strong defense forces and air formations being brought up quickly and without hindrance from home territory; the fact that the enemy's long supply route is flanked by the German coast and is within reach of our fighters and of small battle units.

An operation against southern Norway/Skagerrak coast would be much more in line with the defense situation, yet in both cases Sweden would be the target.

- c. According to further information received from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy the Fuehrer attaches the utmost importance to all suitable naval forces (PT boats, motor minesweepers, gun carriers, and if necessary also submarines) being used for defense of the Strait of Kerch and the Crimean sea area against enemy landings, since Army forces are inadequate.

At the Fuehrer's request Chief, Naval Staff left here at 1400 for the Fuehrer Headquarters accompanied by Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division.

Special Items

I. In cooperation with the Coastal Light Infantry Battalion in Special Unit "Brandenburg" see War Diary 14 April 1943), an operation by this Battalion is being prepared against the West African and Brazilian coasts (Operation "Reisernte"). Naval Staff has made available two motor fishing vessels for this operation. For details of this plan and preparations see File 1/Skl. I Op. XI, 4 Vol. 1 "Commando operations".

Discussions were held on 22 Oct. between Commander, Coastal Light Infantry Battalion and Operations Division, with the following results:

- "1. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has ordered that the Coastal Light Infantry Battalion is at present to be employed in its full strength in the Aegean Sea. Operation "Reisernte", for which preparations have just been completed, must therefore be postponed for the time being.
2. Operation "Reisernte", however, is not to be given up, since considerable time was spent on conversion, fitting-up and equipment of the two vessels provided for this operation as well as on the training of crews. Commander, Coastal Light Infantry Battalion expects to be able to have the required number of men available for this operation at the latest by next spring. Chances of success will not be any less than they are now.
3. It is not advisable to leave the vessels at the dockyard for the next six months. Instead it will be better for the boats as well as for the crews to be employed elsewhere during this time. The boats and crews should, however, not be worn out in such operations. Special care must be taken that the vessels' ultimate use is not disclosed. They should only participate in operations where the enemy has no opportunity to draw conclusions, from their present use, as to their later assignment and where he cannot obtain an exact description or pictures of these vessels."

Chief, Fleet Branch, Quartermaster Division has been advised accordingly. A telephone conversation with Chief of Staff, Group North revealed the fact that Armed Forces High Command, Intelligence Division, Sabotage Section had offered the boats provided for operation "Reisernte" to Group North as patrol vessels in the Skagerrak for control of the Swedish skerries (Operation "Greif"). Chief of Staff, Group North was there-

upon advised that this offer by Armed Forces High Command, Intelligence Division, Sabotage Section is opposed to the views held by Operations Division. For security reasons these boats can under no circumstances be used for operation "Greif". Group North will therefore assign other vessels to this and will employ the boats provided for operation "Reisernte" only in such a way that security is in no way endangered.

The Sabotage Section was informed by phone of the above instructions given to Group North. The order issued by the Sabotage Section, without first consulting Naval Staff, was due to a misunderstanding.

II. Operations Division has reached the following conclusion and assessment of the situation with regard to division of forces between the Western Mediterranean and the Adriatic Sea:

"I. In the Western Mediterranean naval warfare is at present concentrated on defense.

The tasks are chiefly:

- a. Defense of our convoy traffic along the coasts of Italy and southern France.
- b. Defense of the coast against landings.

Our sea communications along the coast are at present starting up. German Naval Command, Italy states that transport requirements will be 30,000 tons monthly from Genoa and Spezia to Civitavecchia. Besides the above, one single supply shipment of 44,000 tons is necessary.

At present there are 136,000 tons of return cargo at Piombino; this quantity will most likely increase to over 300,000 tons. Sea communications along the coast will probably gain in importance, since the enemy is already trying to wreck and interrupt overland communications in central and northern Italy by air raids on railroads and highways. However, sea communications will not be decisive in holding central Italy because it will be possible to transport a large part of supplies over the comparatively extensive network of roads even if air attacks hamper these operations.

Coastal defense in Italy and Southern France must be borne chiefly by coastal fortifications on the mainland and by Army forces; naval forces are only suitable for patrol of coastal waters at night and are therefore not decisive in the defense of the coast.

Offensive tasks would lie in attacks against enemy supplies to the Naples area and to Sardinia and Corsica, if our own forces were strong enough. PT boats would be the only suitable naval vessels, but but weather conditions during the next six months will restrict their operations.

With his naval bases in the Western Mediterranean the enemy has moved quite close to our shores (Naples, Sardinia, Corsica). In particular he possesses almost unchallenged air supremacy and his Air Force is therefore in a position to endanger our sea traffic considerably. The consequence is already that sea transports in the main areas can only be carried out by small vessels, which must look after their own defense in most cases (for instance: Naval landing craft). Enemy naval activity in this area has so far not had any appreciable effect. It must, however, be expected that stronger enemy naval forces will appear on the coast as the bases on Sardinia and Corsica are built up.

The submarine danger is still considerable.

In view of this situation it is not to be expected that the few German naval forces will play a decisive part in the tasks of the Navy, unless it should be possible to increase their number considerably by transfers from home waters. On the other hand, it is necessary to increase sea transport on small, fast vessels in every way possible.

2. In the Adriatic Sea the main problem at present is the movement of supplies to the Army along the West Adriatic coast as far as Ancona and along the Dalmatian coast to the southeast. The extent of this traffic is given as 30,000 tons monthly from Trieste to Ancona. Part of this cargo must be transhipped at Ancona into small vessels and carried further along the coast on these. What has been said under 1) with regard to the west coast of Italy also refers to this traffic. It will undoubtedly be possible to route the greater part of this traffic overland.

Supplies from Trieste along the Dalmatian coast to Montenegro and Albania, however, play a decisive part in view of the traffic conditions in the Balkans. At least 100,000 tons per month must be transported over this route by sea. Army Group Southeast states that these supplies could never be transferred to overland routes because roads and railways are inadequate, but foremost owing to the partisan activity. Thus the fighting strength of and supplies to the German Forces in the Southern Balkans depend on sea

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traffic which, however, cannot be started yet at all, since most of the islands off the Dalmatian coast are being held by partisans.

Coastal defense is extremely weak in this area. It cannot rely entirely on fortifications on the mainland but must also be effective on the outlying islands. The necessary operations for first of all mopping-up and occupying these islands and then for setting up defense would require quite a few light naval forces, which are not yet available.

The enemy has in the Italian coast as far as Termoli area a favorable jumping-off base for attacks on the opposite coast, which he can now easily reach unobserved in one night, especially during the winter because of the short distance to be covered (on an average 60-80 miles). The excellent airfields in the Foggia area also offer the enemy an opportunity for air operations against our convoy traffic.

3. Our own Air Force will be unable to assist the Navy effectively in the near future.

The few available naval forces must therefore be concentrated so that dispersion will not make it impossible to carry out the required task in at least one area.

The most important task is sea traffic along the Balkan coast. All available forces must be concentrated on this target, even if it should actually be desirable to increase sea traffic also in the other areas and to make forces available for offensive operations.

In conclusion it must be emphasized that there is already such shortage everywhere in transports alone (steamers, war transports, naval landing craft, Siebel ferries and auxiliary sailing vessels) that it is necessary to start building new vessels in as large a number and as quickly as possible. If it is impossible to transfer naval forces from home waters to the Western Mediterranean via the Rhone river, complete withdrawal of our combat forces from this sea area must be accepted.

The enemy may otherwise be able to destroy or cut off our sea communications in the Eastern Adriatic through a relatively small commitment of his naval and air forces, in such a way that our Army in the Balkans will become powerless."

These considerations have led to the despatch of the following.

information to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff Quartermaster Division, Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, Army Group B, Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast, Army Group E, German Naval Command, Italy, Group South, Admirals, Adriatic and Aegean, with copies to Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters, Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, Naval Liaison and High Command, Army, Army General Staff, Naval Liaison:

"I. The following basic considerations have been followed by Naval Staff in the disposition of naval forces in the Mediterranean:

1. Tasks of Naval Forces:

- a. In the Aegean Sea: Most urgent is the mopping-up of the remaining islands, then continuous supplies to the island occupation forces (including constantly required shifting of forces) and, if necessary, evacuations.
- b. In the Adriatic Sea: Supplies for all services to Dalmatian ports, Montenegro and Albania. Mopping-up of the outlying islands is essential for this and at the same time for building up coastal defense.
- c. On the West and East coasts of Italy: Transports of supplies, especially for the Army and the Air Force. Large return shipments, Patrol of coastal waters for coastal defense; operations against enemy supplies to Naples, Sardinia and Corsica.
- d. Off the south coast of France: Convoy escort and patrol of coastal waters.

2. Undoubtedly the most important tasks of those mentioned above are the ones on the Adriatic east coast and in the Aegean Sea. Re-routing of transports to Dalmatian ports, Montenegro and Albania to the overland route is entirely out of question in view of the Balkan traffic conditions and because of partisan activity. Thus the fighting strength of the German forces operating there and their supplies depend entirely on the sea traffic. The same applies to the Aegean Sea.

Tasks in the Western Mediterranean and on the Italian Adriatic coast can and must take second place to these. Supplies to the Italian front can be transported overland even if hampered by air attacks on railways and roads. For offensive operations, which are very desirable, only PT boats are suitable, but weather conditions during the winter months limit their commitment very much.

II. Naval Staff has therefore introduced the following measures:

1. For the time being the two captured Italian destroyers and four Italian torpedo boats will be put into commission in the Aegean Sea.
2. In the Adriatic Sea all available and suitable warships and auxiliary warships will be fitted up and put into commission. Center of operations Adriatic east coast.
3. All German PT boats (4 large, 8 small) and 7 large and 9 small German motor minesweepers will be transferred from the Western Mediterranean to the Adriatic Sea overland.

Further transfer of some of these boats to the Aegean Sea is reserved.

One German motor minesweeper flotilla (11 large boats) will remain in the Western Mediterranean. Transfers will probably start on 6 Nov., one boat will be transferred daily.

4. In the Western Mediterranean as many Italian and French Warships as it will be possible to man will be put into commission (in the Italian area for the time being 5 torpedo boats and at Toulon 4 French fleet tenders). In addition captured vessels will be used to replace losses and in exchange for vessels less suitable."

For copy of teletype I Skl I op 30089/43 Gkdos. see War Diary Part C, Vol. XIV.

III. The decision reached by Chief of Staff, Naval Staff regarding the withdrawal of naval gunners from the area of Admiral, Black Sea for reinforcement of the Adriatic Sea area (see War Diary 23 Oct.) which decision was forwarded to Army General Staff by the Liaison Officer to Naval Staff, reads as follows:

"The withdrawal of naval gunners by Group South from the area of Admiral, Black Seas as reinforcement for the Adriatic Sea, where the number of personnel is inadequate, is in line with the demands of Naval Staff. However, the present situation in the area of the Crimea and the Sea of Asov permits only the withdrawal for the Adriatic coast of part of the naval personnel which has become available through changes in the front. Naval forces at present operating in the area of Genichesk will not be withdrawn for the time being. Naval gunners who have up to now been brought up for manning Army coastal batteries are, however, to be withdrawn; it must be

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assured that equipment is taken over by naval reserve forces and action readiness re-established as far as possible."

For copy of order 1/Sk1 I a 29393/43 Sk1 Qu A II as per I 29883/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

IV. Naval Intelligence Division, Enemy Situation Brancy reports in "Brief Intelligence on the Enemy Situation" No. 21/43, amongst other matters on Anglo-American warship operations during the action in the Gulf of Salerno. Naval Intelligence Division bases its information on a special report from Reuter which reads as follows:

"At the opening of the attack in the Gulf of Salerno on Sept. 9 a strong Anglo-American naval force of more than 500 vessels took part, from a 35,000 ton battleship down to small tugs. During the following days the fleet assisted the landing operations by fire of singular force and concentration.

Admiral Cunningham was in command of the fleet. Vice Admiral H. K. Hewitt of the U. S. Navy commanded the "Western Task Force" operating off the Salerno coast.

The most formidable battle squadron ever to operate in the Mediterranean protected the landing operation in the Tyrrhenian Sea against attacks by surface forces. This force was under command of Sir Algernon Willis and consisted of the battleships RODNEY, WARSPITE, VALIANT, KING GEORGE V and HOWE, the aircraft carriers ILLUSTRIOUS and FORMIDABLE, the cruisers AURORA, PENELOPE, SIRIUS and DIDO and numerous destroyers.

Another Force under the command of Rear Admiral Sir Philip Vian consisted of the small aircraft carriers UNICORN, HUNTER, BATTLER, STALKER, and ATTACKER and was escorted by the cruisers EURYALUS, SCYLIA and CHARYBDIS.

The "Western Task Force", responsible for the protection of the landing operation, was divided in two groups - the southern attack group commanded by the U. S. Rear Admiral J. L. Hall, Jr., and the northern attack group commanded by the British Commodore G. N. Oliver. The southern group consisted of the U. S. cruisers PHILADELPHIA, SACANNAH and BOISE and 18 destroyers; the second group consisted of the British cruisers MAURITIUS, UGANDA and ORION, the monitor ROBERTS and 20 destroyers.

Both groups were escorted by a large number of minesweepers, which did splendid work by sweeping lanes in the heavily mined

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approach waters for landing craft, troop and supply transports. They cleared 135 mines during the first four days of operation.

Following their orders to attack without regard to losses or difficulties, the destroyers proceeded straight to the coast and attacked the coastal batteries at close range. Numerous batteries were put out of action right at the beginning of the operation. In the following days almost every one of the warships fired a large number of shells on the German coastal positions, The UGANDA fired 816 rounds of six-inch shells within 10 days, while the AURORA, PENELOPE, SIRIUS and DIDO fired 5085 rounds in 14 days.

The battleships WARSPITE and VALIANT, which were freed through the capitulation of the Italian Fleet, arrived on 15 Sept. Of 30 15-inch shells which they fired on this day, 19 hit their targets. On the following day 16 direct hits were scored and 8 were within a radius of 100 meters of the target.

The American warships made similar efforts. The PHILADELPHIA fired 2946 6-inch and 1161 5-inch shells during the operation.

The figures give only a slight impression of the intensity of bombardment and the deadly accuracy but there is no question that this bombardment was of immense importance to the success of the operation.

The Allied Fleet sustained losses, but the risk taken is regarded as having been sufficiently justified. This operation was a magnificent example of the complete co-operation of the British and American Fleet in a joint action against the same target."

Naval Intelligence Division comments as follows:

The above statements and other information obtained from a reliable source reveal the following tactical formation of the naval forces engaged in the landing operation at Salerno:

Two groups of heavy naval forces operated under Admiral A. B. Cunningham:

- I. One group of battleships and aircraft carriers under Admiral Sir A. Willis,
2. one aircraft carrier group under Admiral Sir Ph. Vian both with anti-aircraft cruisers and numerous destroyers as outer escort for the landing operation.

The landing itself was carried out by the third group, the "Western

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Task Force", under the U. S. Admiral H. K. Hewitt. The U. S. Aircraft tender BISCAYNE served as flagship of the "Western Task Force". Admiral Hewitt had two groups at his disposal:

1. The northern group under the command of Commodore G. N. Oliver.
2. The southern group under command of the U. S. Admiral J. L. Hall.

The absence of the NELSON indicates that she was lying (damaged?) at some port (Malta?) at the time of the Salerno operation, since her departure from the Mediterranean has not yet been ascertained.

The U. S. naval forces are combined in the 8th Fleet, with Fleet station in Algiers, as has now been ascertained.

As regards the losses mentioned, so far only the loss of the U. S. destroyers BRISTOL and BUCK and of the British destroyer PANTHER have been reported by the enemy.

The BRISTOL and the BUCK were probably lost through striking mines. The British have admitted the loss of the destroyers PANTHER and INTREPID and of the minelayer ABDIEL. The Poles have admitted the loss of the destroyer ORKAN.

Situation 27 Oct.

I. War in Foreign Waters

I. Enemy Situation:

A heavily escorted convoy carrying war materiel and food for Russia is scheduled to leave New York on 7 Nov., according to an intelligence report received via Portugal, Escort forces are said to include two auxiliary aircraft carriers.

On 22 Oct. eleven troop transports left Pensacola for England. The troops will be moved to southeast England by rail from ports of disembarkation on the west coast.

2. Own Situation:

Naval Staff advised the Naval Attache in Tokyo by Radiogram 0100 as follows:

"I. Commanding Admiral, Submarines plans to have all MONSUN

submarines call at Penang. No supply by the BRAKE. This ship is, however, to be kept in readiness for other tasks. New Schedule will follow.

2. Submarines "Luedden", "Schaefer" and "Junker" will arrive together at the rendezvous on 29 Oct. one hour after sunrise, according to the latest reports from these submarines.

3. You may expect submarine U "533" (Henning) and submarine U "168" (Pich) on 5 Nov."

II. Situation West Area

I. Enemy Situation:

Over the Bay of Biscay 31 planes were detected on operation. One British vessel was located at 1158 in AL 6389 and one at 2215 in BE 2740.

Our air reconnaissance sighted at 1255 in CF 9178 a north-bound convoy of 56 merchantmen escorted by 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers and 4 escort vessels, Speed 9 knots. There were 2 destroyers on northwesterly course at 1135 in CF 9673.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One submarine was escorted out from St. Nazaire.

Channel Coast:

During the night of 26 Oct. from 2310 to 0150 unknown enemy targets were continuously located by radar in the area Fecamp to Gris Nez. Between 0235 and 0245 an Army Battery fired three rounds on targets west of Fecamp, which withdrew northwest at high speed. From 1358 to 1710 targets on alternating courses were again located in the sea area between Gris Nex and Calais in heavy fog.

At 2237 an enemy vessel carrying radar was located north of Cherbourg proceeding on northerly course at medium speed.

Torpedo boat T"14" arrived at Calais at 0250. The convoy of the NORDVAARD put in to Dunkirk again at 2132 on 26 Oct. Torpedo boat

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T "14" and the convoy of the NORDVAARD are to go on eastward during the night of 27 Oct.

Six mines with snag lines were swept between Nieuport and Ostend. For brief report of Group West on the torpedo operation by the 2nd, 4th, 6th and 8th PT Boat Flotillas during the night of 24 Oct. see teletype 0336. Group West floses its report with the following estimate:

"After midnight steady decrease of visibility towards the east, which hampered the operation considerable. The operation was entirely based on radio intercept reports; air reconnaissance could not be carried out owing to the enemy situation. Final conclusion arriver at is that the convoy was actually about 12 miles further north than assumed and moved in closer to shore before the attack by the 8th PT Boat Flotilla, or that this Flotilla was successfully driven off by destroyers."

For estimate of landing possibilities during the night of 27 Oct. see teletype 1718.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters

North Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

Our air reconnaissance sighted at 0841 two landing craft in AN 4999/3777 and at 1305 one minelayer proceeding at high speed in AN 3780/90. Group North/Fleet believes that these vessels were probably sweeping a channel for a breakthrough by blockade runners.

2. Own Situation:

No shipping movements on account of heavy fog.

Norway, Northern Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the North Sea 15 planes were detected on operation. Our Air reconnaissance sighted at 1140 in AB 2549 (southwest of Spitsbergen) 1 cruiser and 1 merchantman (5,000 GRT) on course 300 degrees, proceeding at 15 knots. Three of our own submarines have been ordered to take up position against this unit off Ice Fjord.

2. Own Situation:

In the area of Naval Command, Norway 32 ships were escorted north and 15 south. Nineteen ships were delayed owing to shortage of escort.

Submarine U "394" left Hammerfest on 25 Oct. for Hope Island with a weather detachment of the Air Force aboard.

At 0409 the destroyer BEITZEN ran aground in the Karmsund two miles north of Kopervik.

No salvage operations are possible yet owing to heavy south winds. Preparations have been made to bring up tugs, lighters and a floating crane.

Fighter protection has been promised, weather permitting. Destroyer Z "38" is standing by the BEITZEN. For further particulars see teletypes 1750 and 1815. The damage was caused by faulty navigation. Group North/Fleet has submitted an extract from the operational order of Admiral, Northern Waters for minelaying operation "Katharina". This operation is to be carried out by the 4th Destroyer Flotilla with four vessels between 27 Oct. and 3 Nov. The barrage will be laid off Kanin Nos. For teletype regarding this, as per 1/Skl 3182/43 Gkdos. Chfs. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIA.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic SeaI. Enemy Situation:

Shelling of targets in Leningrad by Army guns led to lively counter-fire which caused, however, only minor damage. At 0750 a minesweeper group was sighted south of Lavansaari; this turned about presumably on account of the weather.

There was lively air activity over Tyters. At the front, operations by assault troops repulsed.

From 1018 to 1158 20 bombers and 7 fighters attacked our barrage patrol between Tyters and Hogland in three waves. Casualties were sustained but no damage.

2. Own Situation:

In the Baltic Sea entrances 28 vessels were engaged on

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minesweeping operations and in the Baltic Sea 36 vessels. One ELM/J mine was swept southwest of Laesoe. Escort duty was carried out as planned and without incident. Mining of the area northwest of Schepel with TMB mines was carried out by five coastal minelayers.

Battery "Prinz Heinrich" shelled the naval dockyard at Leningrad. Targets: four submarines and an aircraft carrier under construction. Our fire was shifted to the naval dockyard at Kronstadt when a smoke screen was put up at Leningrad.

Dismantling of Battery "Prinz Heinrich" was started at 1200.

V. Merchant Shipping

Information has been received from the Deputy for German Sea Transportation in the Mediterranean that German crews will be available for six ships weekly which can be moved back from Italian ports to southern France under escort. If these crews can be supplemented by Italians more ships can be transferred. German Naval Command, Italy has been instructed to investigate whether escort can be dispensed with, in order to assure a more speedy transfer, and to submit its plans after consultation with Group West.

VI. Submarine Warfare

Group "Siegfried" has been ordered to have 20 submarines in patrol line from BC 3438 - 3849, 6222 - 6883, 9522 - 1882 at 1000 on 29 Oct.

Otherwise nothing special to report.

VII. Aerial Warfare

British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 24 planes out on operation over the west area and two over the Mediterranean. There was also very little enemy air activity. Nothing special to report.

Mediterranean Theater:

Our own Air Force carried out reconnaissance operations over the Italian area and the Aegean Sea. One enemy reconnaissance plane was shot down over Kos.

Eastern Front:

The 5th Air Force carried out reconnaissance. For evaluations see Situation North Sea and Northern Waters. In both cases contact could only be kept for a short time owing to strong anti-aircraft defense. A bomber mission was unsuccessful since the target was not found again.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black SeaI. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

A light French cruiser passed through the Straits of Gibraltar, westbound, at 0745. Cape Spartel sighted at 1120 a convoy of apparently 10 ships proceeding towards the Mediterranean. The following were lying in Gibraltar at 2000 on 26 Oct.:

1 cruiser in dock, 1 minelaying cruiser, 1 auxiliary cruiser, 14 destroyers, 11 corvettes, 1 hospital ship, 2 transports, including an Italian one, 41 freighters and 8 tankers.

At 1230 there were east of Maddalena 3 torpedo boats and 4 patrol boats obviously on minesweeping of the eastern barrage in the Strait of Bonifacio.

Evaluation of photographic reconnaissance of 26 Oct. over Termoli shows 2 large, 8 medium-sized and 20-30 small landing craft as well as 8 transports leaving port. An outflanking landing is considered possible.

At 1245 there were between Ischia and Naples 3 destroyers on northerly course.

At 1550 Gaeta was shelled from the sea. At 1357 20 miles south of the Straits of Messina 28-30 ships were sighted on course 30 degrees. At noon our air reconnaissance sighted 75 miles north-northwest of Alexandria 1 cruiser and 3 destroyers or torpedo boats on course 160 degrees.

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According to an intelligence report via Portugal, British merchantmarine captains are of opinion that an attack on the Channel coast is not imminent but rather believe that operations in the Mediterranean will be intensified. Strong formations of troops are said to be ready in Syria and, for these, transports and escort vessels are being assembled at various ports in Libya, Egypt and Cyprus.

It is furthermore reported that large quantities of war materiel are being assembled on Corsica, presumably for an operation against Southern France.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

German Naval Command, Italy is of opinion that experiences during the PT Boat thrust into the Gulf of Naples on 26 Oct. indicate excellent prospects of success, so that the withdrawal of PT Boats because of dwindling prospects in the open sea owing to the lack of reconnaissance does not seem justified.

Six motor minesweepers and one naval landing craft carried out minelaying operations "Zange" and "Hornisse" according to plan. PT boats as escorts for operation "Zange" advanced so far as the Strait of Bonfaccio but did not contact the enemy.

Submarine U "565" sank an enemy destroyer with a "Zaunkoenig" torpedo in CJ 8845.

The hospital ships AQUILEJA and DJENNE left Barcelona in the evening for Marseilles.

One submarine was escorted out of Toulon.

The Red Cross steamer PADURA struck a mine, most probably in our barrage, and sank at 0200 ten miles south of La Couronne while en route to Marseilles. The steamer did not follow course instructions.

The convoy route between La Canarque and Marseilles has been closed as a precaution owing to suspicion of mines.

German Naval Command, Italy asks for confirmation that it will be advised in time about the operation by the 10th Italian PT boat Glotilla in connection with intelligence (see teletype 1830). This matter is being dealt with by Quartermaster Division.

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3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

Contrary to the order given, the steamers MAMELLI, BRUNNER and MARKO left Dubrovnik for the north on 25 Oct. They were attacked by enemy planes and shelled from the island of Brac. The MAMELLI and the MARKO arrived at Split on the morning of 26 Oct with 12 dead and 25 wounded. The BRUNNER continued her passage and is said to have entered a port of refuge.

On 24 Oct. the Fascist boat ENARE under the command of an Italian Major left Zara northbound, despite a warning issued by the Port Commander, and was lost.

Minesweeping operations in the Faresina Channel were discontinued after a mine detonation. Two mines were swept.

Port Commands were established at Monfalcone, Pirano, Parenco, Albona, Arsa and Rovigno.

Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic reports the setting up of five batteries of the 621st Naval Artillery Battalion at Pola, Fiume and Trieste. The batteries are only ready for action to a limited extent since there is no fire control and radar gear. The five batteries at the three places mentioned are not manned. For particulars see teletype 0724.

b. Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

A submarine was sighted at 1340 on 26 Oct. 25 miles east of Skiathos.

On the evening of 26 Oct. there were two vessels, presumably destroyers, north of Levitha on westerly course.

At 0920 on 27 Oct. coast patrol boat GA "54" reported a submerging submarine northwest of Naxos. At 1036 GA "01" was unsuccessfully attacked by a submarine. Submarine chase is being carried out. Our air reconnaissance sighted at 1153 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers and 2 vessels, presumably torpedo boats, on course 160 degrees; at 1235 1 small cruiser and 1 destroyer were sighted on northerly course.

Own Situation:

Evacuation of Gavods has been completed. The Naval Artillery Battalion on Stampalia reports one 7.6 cm. battery in action readiness. The tanker CELENO left Chalkis with 501 Italians aboard for Salonika. Other convoy traffic proceeded according to plan.

c. Black Sea:Enemy Situation:

An intelligence report from an untried source dated 16 Oct. states that the Russians are making preparations for a landing in the Crimea. These operations are to start after occupation of all routes leading through the Nogai Steppe. Training of special troops has been going on since February 1943 at Sochi (main base?), Tuapse (fuel and supply base) as well as Gagry, Suchum, Pizunda, Lazarevsk, Kalinovyia (ports of embarkation); the entire Black Sea Fleet is to participate. About 1,200 special landing craft of 5-10 tons, supplied by the United States, are lying in readiness at Batum, Suchum, Sochi, Tuapse and Pizunda. In addition 300 landing craft for tanks and materiel. Four tankers have been converted into patrol vessels. About three landing corps of altogether about 10,000 men are on the west coast of the Caucasus. Start of the operation is planned for the beginning of Oct. 1943.

Naval Intelligence Division has summarized the information obtained on the tactical organization of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. For copy as per 1/Skl 32631/43 geh. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIVA.

Own Situation:

The tug BAIKAL capzized on Yalta roads owing to damage sustained in the air attack on 25 Oct. In the enemy air raids on Feodosiya at noon on 26 Oct. 2 of the 17 attacking planes were shot down. On their return flight these planes attacked our convoy Cape Chauda - Feodosiya without much success.

Submarine chase by Ship "19" and two boats of the 23rd Submarine Chaser Flotilla near Ak Mechet was without result. Two Italian midget submarines also returned to Sevastopol from an unsuccessful submarine chase off the south coast of the Crimea.

Submarine U "18" left Constanta for operations on the afternoon of 27 Oct. Five naval landing craft left Genichesk on the afternoon of 26 Oct. in order to evacuate the last troops from Biryutshi.

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Seven boats of the 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla carried out a mine check in preparation for barrage "S 47". Four motor minesweepers and three naval landing craft left Sevastopol for Feodosiya in connection with barrage operation "S 73".

No enemy vessels were sighted by our patrol lines off Genichesk and the Strait of Kerch during the night of 26 Oct.

The ALBERICH with five river motor minesweepers of the Danube Flotilla was sent back to Belgrade by the Army on the evening of 26 Oct. after completion of the defense operations on the Sava.

On 26 Oct. two towed convoys proceeding up the Danube were fired on from short off Tachtalia.

IC. Situation East Asia

According to an intelligence report, Colonel Mishina has declared from the Japanese Armed Forces Headquarters in China that the reinforcement of the Japanese Air Force in China which is necessary for combatting the U. S. Air Force is impossible, as demands are too great on other fronts.

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Items of Political Importance

Nothing special to report.

Chief, Naval Staff returned from the Fuehrer Headquarters.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff

I. Report on the conference with the Fuehrer on the situation in the Crimea at 1630 on 27 Oct.:

"The Fuehrer ordered this special conference to discuss the situation in the Crimea on account of a letter from Marshall Antonescu, the contents of which General Hansen transmitted in advance by teletype. Marshal Antonescu voiced his apprehension about the threat to the Crimea and recommended immediate evacuation since he places small confidence in his Rumanian troops.

Chief, Army General Staff reported briefly on the situation in the southern sector of the eastern front:

There are prospects of sealing off the enemy's penetration near Melitopol. To do so, additional forces are being brought up from the Crimea.

The situation at Krivoi Rog was only lightly touched on with the remark that there were no vital changes since the last report made at noon today. It was mentioned that eight divisions are being brought up; this will take some time.

The fact that the Army Group A consider an immediate evacuation of the Crimea overland advisable was not clearly expressed. General Zeitzler reported that there is enough ammunition in the Crimea to last about two to four weeks depending on the scale of the fighting to be expected. The forces can live off the land to a large extent.

In response to a question by the Fuehrer, Chief, Naval Staff reported by means of a chart on the strength of our naval forces and shipping available in the Black Sea. It was pointed out that only a part of the naval forces mentioned is always in readiness.

The loading capacity of the naval landing craft for sea trips was given as 200 men with small arms and baggage, i.e. that 50 naval

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landing craft, the number which at present can be assumed as an average in sailing readiness, will be able to transport 10,000 men. A crossing to ports in Rumania requires $1\frac{1}{2}$ days, a round-trip therefore at least four days. In addition to the naval landing craft, steamers are available with a capacity again of approximately 10,000 men.

Russian destroyers have penetrated into the Western Black Sea and submarines are operating there regularly. The enemy Air Force is the main peril to our sea transports. This threat will increase as soon as Russian planes can take off from the area north of the Crimea. Anti-aircraft armament on naval landing craft is to be reinforced, above all with quadruple guns which will become available after submarines are equipped with the 3.7 cm. guns. In reply to the remark by the Reichsmarschall that additional shipping, for instance on the Danube, could be made available further investigations were promised.

The Fuehrer's considerations:

I. Evacuation of the Crimea will have unpredictable political and military significance. The Russians will move 300-400 kilometers nearer to the Rumanian oilfields. Shortening of the front will not entail saving of troops, since expansion of the defense of the Rumanian and Bulgarian coasts will become necessary. The Crimea can anyway be held if the pocket at Krivoi Rog can be eliminated; if not, evacuation overland is uncertain. All considerations must therefore be directed to an evacuation by sea. An order for evacuation will cause the Rumanian troops to lose their power of resistance.

The Fueher's order:

2. All naval forces are to be made ready for defense of the Crimea and shipping for transports (from or to the Crimea according to the situation) and all preparations are to be made. Do not arouse unrest amongst the troops through advance orders.

Receipt of the letter from Marshal Antonescu, which is expected on 28 Oct., is to be awaited. Another reason why any order for evacuation which may become necessary need not be issued today is because the railroads in the Crimea are busy for the next 2-3 days in moving our troops.

In the discussion which followed, the Fuehrer, Commander in Chief, Navy and the Reichsmarschall expressed their views on the importance of the Crimea and the possibility of holding it and bringing up supplies. Chief, Army General Staff concurred. The Reichsmarschall asked how the situation

with the Central Army Group had developed. When General Zeitzler replied that the tension there had decreased, the Reichsmarschall promised the transfer of air forces from this sector to the area of Army Group South for attacks on shipping targets.

Chief, Operations Branch telephoned from Fuehrer Headquarters and advised Chief of Staff, Naval Staff about the above decision. Instructions were then passed on by telephone to Group South by Chief of Staff, Naval Staff.

During the evening situation conference at 2200 the question of the Crimea was discussed further along the same lines.

Following a report by Chief, Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command on a projected directive regarding strengthening of defense on the northwest coast of France, the Fuehrer asked when the heavy battery of Cherbourg is expected to be completed. Commander in Chief, Navy stated in reply that the date set so far was 1 Feb., but that completion will be speeded up. Chief, Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command emphasized that all measures here must be completed by the end of January."

II. The following report was received last night from Group South:

"I. A week ago Army Group A ordered a "study" to be drawn up on the evacuation of the Crimea in two hypothetical cases:

- a. Economic and materiel evacuation;
- b. Evacuation of personnel and its tactical execution.

The 17th Army Command handed the completed study on 24 Oct. to Admiral, Black Sea.

2. In the first case evacuation of materiel is provided within four weeks without any changes in the fronts. In the second case, which may be ordered or become necessary through enemy pressure, the following is planned: 36 hours for the evacuation of the eastern front of the Kerch peninsula. Three days for withdrawal to the Parpatsch line, two days for the evacuation of the southern and southeastern part of the Crimea, including Sevastopol, and three days for withdrawal over the Perekop Isthmus. In all ten days.

In the latter case only troops with equipment and such materiel as they themselves can carry will be withdrawn. Evacuation by sea is limited since Sevastopol will soon no longer be available and the Eupatoria roads and the bay of Ak Mechet, both rather unsuitable for only three days more.

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The Army is therefore not reckoning on evacuation by sea; this will be available only to the Navy.

3. The Navy recommended evacuation by sea instead of via Perekop. This would necessitate a step-by-step withdrawal of the Army to the bridgehead at Sevastopol. Evacuation of 210,000 men with all shipping available in the Black Sea would require five to six weeks. The Army believes it impossible to hold Sevastopol that long with the available two German and seven Rumanian divisions, the latter rather unreliable, and therefore adheres to withdrawal via Perekop.
4. The Navy will make preparations for evacuation along the following lines:
 - a. Transfer of flotillas to ports on the west coast.
 - b. From shore units, the personnel of port commanders and the crews of batteries, after demolishing these will be combined in battle units. They will be made partially mobile with naval vehicles available in the Crimea and will be attached to Army Units. The remainder will be evacuated by sea. Since political and currency questions have not yet been settled, shore units will be withdrawn to inland places in Rumania and Bulgaria or perhaps to home territory; they will then be sent for new operations to the Adriatic and Aegean Seas or to the Rumanian and Bulgarian coasts after the political question has been settled.
 - c. Quartermaster Division, Admiral, Black Sea will be transferred in this case to Constanta in order to control withdrawal movements. The command post of Admiral, Black Sea will also be moved to Constanta, as Nikolayev is unfavorably situated and the remaining naval operations on the west coast can best be controlled from there with the front towards the east.
 - d. The vessels operating in the Sea of Azov can probably not be withdrawn. These are to carry out patrol duty during the evacuation of the Crimea. The crews are then to blow up their vessels and attach themselves to the Army.
 - e. The Reinforced Frontier Guard Control Service (Coastal), the Black Sea Legion and Foreign Volunteers will be transferred to the Adriatic Sea.

5. The present situation is marked by:
 - a. The assembly of landing craft opposite Kerch and moving up by the enemy of heavy guns under cover of smoke.
 - b. The break-through of Melitopol on 25 Oct. The enemy is now 60 kilometers from Genichesk. The Biryutshi Peninsula was evacuated on the night of 26 Oct.
 - c. The enemy spearhead from the break-through at Deepropetrovsk is 120 kilometers from Nikolayev.
 6. Owing to the events at the front Army Group A ordered at noon on 26 Oct. that evacuation according to the second plan be started on 27 or 28 Oct. Admiral, Black Sea therefore ordered the concentration of all shipping at Sevastopol. A telephone conversation with the Naval Liaison Officer to High Command, Army showed that complete evacuation of the Crimea is not yet contemplated according to the situation as estimated there. A report from Admiral, Black Sea received in the evening stated that Army Group A had canceled the order for Plan No. 2 and had ordered preparations for commencement of Plan No. 1. Admiral, Black Sea therefore canceled the orders for the assembly of shipping.
 7. Shipping will be provided for the evacuations from the Crimea which will now become necessary. In addition to this, steamers will be transferred from the Aegean Sea to the Black Sea, Evacuation of naval materiel will start at once.
 8. Clarification is again urgently requested of the political question regarding withdrawal into Rumanian and Bulgarian territory."
- III. In view of the situation arising from the discussion held at the Fuehrer Headquarters, Chief, Naval Staff has ordered that the following clear and definite instructions be despatched to Group South and Admiral, Black Sea with a copy to Armed Forces High Command Operations Staff, Navy:-
- "I. The Crimea is of special political and military importance as a cornerstone of the eastern front and as an advance position off the Balkan coast. Rumania and also the Balkan area is defended on the Crimea. Evacuation of the peninsula will not shorten the front, since Russian pressure will force us to build up defense of the entire Rumanian Coast.

- A Russian advance by a further 300 to 400 kilometers to the Rumanian oilfields, which are essential for warfare in Europe, will be very disadvantageous.
2. The Crimea will not have to be given up if the eastern front can be held in the sector Krovoi Rog - Melitopol. If the Russian break-through cannot be stopped, the possibility of evacuation and the supply by land is doubtful. It seems possible to re-establish the southern sector of the eastern front by bringing up Army and Air Force reinforcements.
 3. According to 20, all considerations with regard to transports from and to the Crimea must be based exclusively on the sea route. Further advice on transport requirements for maintenance of supplies by sea will follow. In this connection it is particularly emphasized that there is no intention of evacuation at present and that no order has as yet been received. Nothing but the usual economic goods are to be evacuated from the Crimea - also in order to avoid the idea of evacuation taking hold of the troops prematurely and causing alarm. On the contrary, commands, naval and shore units must be fully aware of the fact that the Crimea is a vital position for defense of the Balkans and demands of everybody all-out action and devotion in the battle for this strategically important target. Gaining time can also be decisive."

For relevant orders 1/Skl 3200 and 3205/43 Gkdos. Chefs, See War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIVA.

IV. High Command, Army, Army General Staff, Naval Liaison and Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, Naval Liaison have been informed of the above order and the former requested to submit as soon as possible information on the requirements of the Army General Staff for supplies to the Crimea by sea.

Furthermore Chief, Naval Staff ordered that such personnel of the naval artillery battalions as have not yet been withdrawn to the Adriatic Sea are to remain in the Crimea as long as evacuation has not been decided on definitely. Though building-up of coastal defense in the Adriatic Sea is urgent, the Crimean fortress should in no way be weakened just at this moment. Operations Division will communicate at once by phone with Admiral, Black Sea in order to establish the position with regard to withdrawal and transmit new orders.

V. Since Field Marshal Kesselring will remain in command in Italy and Field Marshal Rommel will relinquish command

of Army Group B., it will be necessary for German Naval Command, Italy to move its headquarters back again to the vicinity of Commanding General, Armed Forces South.

VI. Report by Chief, Naval Intelligence Division:

a. The German Legation at Bern reported to the Foreign Office on 23 Oct.:

"A report from the Swiss Legation in London confirms that no Allied landing on the Balkans was carried out because the Soviet Union handed Great Britain and the United States a note stating that an Allied invasion of the Balkans would be regarded by the Soviet Union as an unfriendly act. The United States Government is said to have regarded this note as an unpardonable interference with Allied strategy and shown its annoyance. The U. S. Government is said, however, to have agreed at the request of Great Britain to await the outcome of the Three Power Conference in Moscow before deciding on an invasion.

The above report is of special interest inasmuch as it comes from Eden's private secretary."

b. According to information available to Naval Intelligence Division, the enemy has 40 ships in sailing readiness, with a total tonnage of approximately 88,000 GRT, in the Black Sea; these could transport in landing operations about 40,000 men with light equipment or 9,000 men with heavy equipment.

Special Items:

I. Air Force Command, Center in agreement with Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff, has recommended to Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, that command of all air defense forces in the area of Gdynia - Danzig be made the responsibility of the Navy. This would mean that all air defense forces stationed in Danzig would in every respect be placed under naval command as regards operations. Naval Staff has requested for this purpose the earliest possible use of anti-aircraft searchlights, in order to build up a complete searchlight system in the area of Gdynia - Danzig for night fighter operations.

Air observation Center, Danzig and Gdynia will be combined under operational command of the Naval Air Observation Center, Gdynia. It will be impossible to establish floating observation posts, as personnel and materiel are not available.

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II. Chief, Security Police, Paris reports to Operations Division that the Italian steamers INDUSTRIAL, MARINA and SULBIA, now at Vigo, plan to desert to the enemy. He recommends that efforts be made to induce the captains, who are said to be open to bribery, to proceed to French ports.

Operations Division immediately informed the Naval Attache in Madrid with the order to make use of all facilities to bring these ships into the German sphere of influence or to prevent their desertion to the enemy.

For order 1/Skl 30170/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XI.

III. On 26 Oct. a discussion took place between Chief of Staff, Naval Staff and Vice Admiral Abe, dealing mostly with the situation in the Mediterranean. The Japanese Admiralty is at present especially interested in information on the movements of enemy battleships and requests Naval Staff to use its available facilities for this purpose.

Notes on this discussion as per 1/Skl I K 3193/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XV.

IV. The following radiogram was received on 27 Oct. from the Naval Attache in Madrid:

"The Spanish Foreign Minister has advised our Ambassador of secret information indicating an imminent Anglo-American landing in Southern France and at the same time on the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts. Similar rumors are circulating here. If the British should actually plan this, the speech by Smuts and rumors emanating from various enemy sources, according to which the Allies will be unable to start an invasion before next spring, could be intended merely as a deception."

Situation 28 Oct.

I. War In Foregin Waters

I. Enemy Situation:

Nothing special to report.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attache in Tokyo has received orders for

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submarine "Dommes" to report the nature and weight of the keel ballast.

The following instructions have been despatched to the Naval Attache in Tokyo in connection with the loss of Ship "28":

"I. Procedure by "senior officer only" regarding Ship "28" is canceled. For the time being despatch all communications exclusively to Operations Division.

2. No permission to be granted survivors to send telegrams or to telephone him.

3. What in your opinion are the chances of keeping this incident secret? Is it considered certain that the submarine took prisoners aboard? Are circles other than the Navy concerned in caring for the survivors?

4. What rescue operations did the Japanese Navy carry out? What are the chances of success for a further search, considering weather conditions, sea, etc.?

5. a) From what time was ship "28" supposed to start anti-submarine measures?

b) What Japanese measures were provided and from when? Bringing-in a large Japanese submarine through the Bay of Biscay is regarded as a major operation here, entailing use of all available escort forces. The lack of Japanese escort incomprehensible here.

6. Please cable as soon as possible names of survivors and brief report on her cruise and successes."

II. Situation West Area:

I. Enemy Situation:

Over the Bay of Biscay 27 British planes were observed on operation. The convoy reported on 27 Oct. was again located at 1053 in CF 5368, consisting of 60 merchantmen, 5 escort vessels and 1 cruiser. The following were also sighted: at 0830 in BE 9293 2 landing craft with 2 escort vessels on northerly course; at 1551 in BF 2524 2 cruisers on northerly course; at 1556 in BF 2299 1 cruiser on north-westerly course.

Heavy detonations were repeatedly heard in the afternoon on the English Channel coast.

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Between 1119 and 1219 targets were located off Calais and Boulogne in heavy fog and were shelled by our batteries without the effect being observed. Between 2125 and 2236 targets were located east of Alderney.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Two submarines were escorted in and one out. For estimate of landing possibilities see teletype 1700..

Channel Coast:

Patrol positions were not taken up because of fog.

Between 0353 and 0355 two harbor defense boats off Zeebrugge had a brief engagement with an enemy PT boat which withdrew after hits had been observed (see teletype 1300).

The convoy of the steamer NORDVAARD and torpedo boat T "14" was forced by fog to return to port immediately after departure on the evening of 27 Oct.

Torpedo boat T"14" and six boats of the 4th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla continued their passage east on the evening of 28 Oct. as far as Dunkirk.

PT boats S "100" and S "141" left Cherbourg at 1845 for Boulogne.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters

North Sea:

Off Terschelling and Texel altogether four ground mines were swept.

Fog prevented the convoy of the steamer NORDVARRD proceeding from Dunkirk to Flushing as planned. All minesweeping operations and other convoys as well as patrol operations during the night also had to be canceled because of the fog. Channels were swept during the day as planned and convoys in the Heligoland Bight carried out. The suspicion of sabotage on the harbor defense boat which sank at Dordrecht has not been confirmed. The boat was swamped and sank due to a faulty valve.

With reference to the situation report of Naval Command, Baltic dated 23 Oct. regarding attacks on nine Danish fishing vessels on the Dogger Bank, Naval Command, North points out that the order issued on 25 May 1943 by Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, at the instigation of Naval Staff, is still in force. In this "the attacks originally ordered on Danish fishing vessels encountered in the closed areas in the North Sea are to be discontinued for the time being." (see teletype 1230).

Naval Command, North requests Group North/Fleet, with copy to Naval Command, Baltic, to draw the attention of units under its command again to this order.

In connection with the assumption by Group North/Fleet that the enemy vessels reported on 27 Oct. in the central North Sea might have been engaged in minesweeping on our "West Wall", Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North reports that laying of enemy barrages as an eastern flanking protection for a swept channel is also not out of question.

Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North requests in this connection:

- a. effective air patrol of the "West Wall"
- b. closing of the "West Wall" area to fishing
- c. granting permission to the Air Force to attack all vessels encountered in the declared area
- d. strengthening of the "West Wall" in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North through laying a new barrage "158" north or northwest as an addition to barrages "14 A" or "15 A".

Finally, Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North draws attention to the report of Admiral, Denmark of 23 Oct. concerning the departure of nine fishing smacks from Tyboroen towards AN 6238, in order to search for a missing smack, since this might have some connection with the reported enemy minesweeping activity. (see teletype 1240).

Group North/Fleet comments on the above as follows:

- "I. The assumption of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North that the enemy activity of the "West Wall" observed on 27 Oct. (probably minesweeping) was connected with the laying of enemy barrages as flanking protection for the channels swept by the enemy, is not out of the question. However, the procedure by the enemy, who stayed for at least five hours by daylight in the mined area, rather

indicates minesweeping. This, however does not exclude the possibility that enemy minelaying operations are being carried out at night still further east as far as our sea lanes. Anyway this must also be reckoned with now, after the discovery of the enemy's gap in the barrage. The Group has therefore asked Naval Staff for permission to lay new barrages in order to restore the "West Wall" in this important area. Uncertainty about the situation regarding enemy minelaying will make it necessary for us to search our own minelaying courses first of all.

2. Air patrol of the "West Wall" has not only been requested by Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North but also continuously by all other Commands interested. The lack of planes and the fuel situation, however, do not permit such patrol. Constant observation of the English ports on the east coast in order to recognize plans for landing in good time is also impossible. Group North/Fleet therefore does not believe that enemy plans for landing will be recognized in time. The defensive power of the "West Wall" is also from now on an uncertain factor, unless the position of the enemy's barrage gap can be ascertained, either accidentally through mines which have drifted or through enemy minesweeping activity which may be observed. Since defensive barrages, such as the "West Wall" are only of value as long as they can be patrolled and controlled, it is obvious that we should give up the plan of reinforcing or restoring the "West Wall" at all points where continuous patrol is impossible. At first, however, Group North/Fleet is of opinion that the barrages should be replaced at least where enemy activity has been recognized, especially off the Skagerrak, where enemy minesweeping activity may be closely connected with the sailing of blockade-runners.
3. Group North/Fleet does not believe that systematic Danish minesweeping of German barrages is being carried out, especially as the sweeping of these, which has now been detected, requires special gear and experience. Considering the situation in the North Sea there is no reason for the British to make use of Danish fishing boats, which are without experience and inadequate for such important tasks as the clearing of gaps. Everything considered, Group North is of opinion that it is justifiable to take food economy into consideration.

Norway, Northern Waters

I. Enemy Situation:

Over the North Sea 20 planes were detected on operation. On 27 Oct. three single planes flew into the areas of Stavanger and Bergen without carrying out attacks.

Out air reconnaissance, flown on an increased scale for operation "Katherina" which started today, sighted at 1050 and at 1130 in AC 6786 a unit of 2 cruisers, 9 destroyers and 11 minesweepers on easterly course, speed probably 10 knots. Further reports show that the composition of this unit is not quite certain since later on only 9 destroyers and 5 motor gunboats, but no cruisers, were reported. Another report mentions 9 destroyers and 6 patrol vessels. The unit put up a smoke screen when our planes approached and tried to ward off our contacting planes by heavy anti-aircraft fire and the use of flying boats.

2. Own Situation:

Group North/Fleet gave the following estimate of the situation at 1700:

"The information so far received about the enemy forces reported today in AC 6786 at 1050 and at 1130 does not yet clearly reveal the aim and the destination of the enemy movements. If the unit actually only consisted of 2 cruisers and 9 destroyers (British) on easterly course, it is assumed that it is to bring in a convoy from Russia to England. If it also included patrol vessels or minesweepers, the transfer of a minesweeper unit to Russian waters is possible. The cruising disposition and the fact that no vessels were reported in the vicinity of this unit justify the assumption that this was not a convoy operation. A report about a cruiser and a merchantman in AB 2548 at 1130 on 27 Oct. might perhaps have some connection with today's sighting report. It is possible that this was a supply group for the force located today and was proceeding to a waiting position further away when sighted. It is possible that there will be a similar supply operation on return passage. Considering the present situation, patrol of Ice Fjord is of secondary importance. Our submarines are returning to the Bear Island position. Operation "Katharina" has been called off. The Group attaches special importance to reconnaissance for the force located today and, if possible, also for the small enemy group sighted on 27 Oct. in the vicinity of Spitsbergen and west thereof."

In accordance with instructions received from Group North, Admiral, Northern Waters at 1520 gave orders to the 4th Destroyer Flotilla to discontinue operation "Katharina" and to proceed to Kaa Fjord via AC 7222. The 4th Destroyer Flotilla was at 1100 approximately in AL 4940 about 240 miles west of the reported enemy. Our submarines

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were moved from the entrance of Ice Fjord to the operation area Bear Island - southern point of Spitsbergen. For situation estimate of Admiral, Northern Waters on the calling-off of operation "Katharina" see teletype 2359.

The lack of adequate air reconnaissance, brought to light once more by the above incident, is important for an estimation of the situation in Northern Waters. If an enemy force is only detected when it has come almost within tactical range of our own naval forces, our operations would no longer be justified at all according to the general principles of naval warfare. Actually we know nothing of what is taking place or has taken place in the area between Scotland, Spitsbergen and the Arctic coast, as our air reconnaissance can give us only occasional information obtained by chance.

All attempts to tow the destroyer BEITZEN off have so far failed. It will be necessary to lighten her as much as possible and to assure her buoyance before towing-off operations can be continued. Group North/Fleet advises Naval Staff for information of the instructions issued for the transfer of the destroyer STEINBRINCK, with Commander, Destroyers aboard, and of destroyer Z "34" from Kiel to the northern area. This unit will sail from Kiel at 0500 on 1 Nov.

It is still undecided whether destroyer Z "38" is to join this group from Bergen. For particulars see teletype 1701.

In the area of Naval Command, Norway 44 ships were escorted north and 15 south. Shortage of escorts delayed 21 ships.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

I. Enemy Situation:

A service club for the German Armed Forces in Copenhagen was destroyed at 2000 on 27 Oct. through sabotage. Three Germans were killed and 18 including 2 sailors wounded.

In the areas of Admiral, Baltic States and Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic the situation remains unchanged.

2. Own Situation:

Two ground mines were swept west of Cape Kullen. Submarine chase was carried out northwest of Revalstein without success. Otherwise nothing special to report.

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V. Merchant Shipping

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Quartermaster Division, has approved the plan to return the French merchantmen to the French Government, especially since they are unsuitable. The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping has been asked to arrange the necessary formalities with the French Government and to see that these vessels are safeguarded in such a way, even after they have been handed over to the French Government, that they can be placed at our disposal whenever required.

The Navy has been asked to prevent the possibility of the ships deserting to the enemy while being transferred and while laid up. German Naval Command, Italy reports on inquiry from the Naval Staff that:

- "1. Investigations are being made to ascertain how many merchantmen can be transferred to Southern France and from which ports. Details will follow.
2. Transfer will be greatly hampered through the ~~first~~ withdrawal of technical personnel for the Aegean Sea by the Deputy for German Sea Transportation in the Mediterranean. Approval was not given from here, since it is almost impossible to carry out our own tasks. It is therefore requested that the Deputy be induced not to withdraw technical personnel until the valuable merchantmen have been transferred."

VI. Submarine Warfare

The convoy expected by Group "Schill" was sighted by our air reconnaissance in CF 5368 on northerly course.

Anti-aircraft submarine U "256". escorting submarine-tanker U "220" reported an attack by several carrier-borne planes from BD 4520.

The anti-aircraft carrier station in BD has effectively hampered our supply operations lately. Submarine-tanker UT "488" was attacked four times within two weeks with bombs and once with depth charges. No reports have been received from two of the submarines of the supply group.

No reports on successes have been received.

VII. Aerial WarfareBritish Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 17 planes out on operation over the west area and 8 over the Mediterranean.

A Liberator plane escorting a convoy 450 miles west of Lisbon was attacked four times by a FW 200 and driven off into the clouds.

The enemy raided Cherbourg during the day. Damage was done to buildings in the arsenal. Four of the attacking planes were shot down.

Nothing special to report during the night.

Lively courier traffic by air between England and Sweden continues.

Mediterranean Theater:

The 2nd Air Force carried out reconnaissance over the Italian coastal area. The enemy attacked three airfields in the Viterbo area. Two of the attacking planes were shot down. Our casualties and damages were slight.

Air Force Command, Southeast carried out reconnaissance over the southern part of the Aegean Sea and in the direction of the eastern Mediterranean. In the afternoon a unit of three merchantmen with one escort vessel was sighted east of Castell Rosso. One steamer (4,000 GRT) out of this unit was sunk.

In aerial combat between Scarpanto and Rhodes between 4 Me 109's and 3 Maryland planes all of the latter were shot down.

Four Ju 88's heavily damaged a merchantman near Pathmos.

Eighteen enemy planes machine-gunned Stampalia. In the evening bombs were again dropped on the airfield of Maritza on Rhodes, One Ju 87 was damaged.

Eastern Front:

No special reports were received from the Black Sea area and from the Gulf of Finland.

Missions flown by the 5th Air Force over the Northern Waters are reported under "Enemy Situation, Northern Waters".

VIII. Warefare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

The convoy of 7 freighters and 3 escorts, reported off Cape Spartel at noon on 27 Oct., entered Gibraltar. At 2000 on 27 Oct. 6 ships left Gibraltar for the Atlantic, including presumably 1 destroyer. At 2100 on 27 Oct. a convoy, presumably consisting of 20 ships, passed through the Straits of Gibraltar, eastbound.

At noon on 28 Oct. 6 loaded troop transports, including 1 Italian transport, escorted by 1 auxiliary cruiser and 3 destroyers, left Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

At 0400 a supply convoy of 30 to 40 ships with escort vessels was sighted 40 miles south of Naples, making for this port. The following were sighted:

In Bastia at noon, 2 freighters, 1 tanker, 3 crash boats and 1 motor gunboats;

Olbia 4 freighters:

Naples 3 destroyers, 4 escort boats, 4 patrol boats or minesweepers, 1 submarine, 4 tankers, 49 freighters, 1 LST, 2 LCT's "250" and 5 LCT's.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Convoy traffic on the west coast of Italy was carried out according to plan. Three PT boats were transferred from Via Reggia to Civitavecchia for new operations. At Spezia a 15.2 cm. battery has been repaired and four other guns are ready for action.

Contrary to previous assumptions, the minelayer JUMINDA was not sunk by an enemy submarine but by PT boats on 24 Oct. near San Stefano. It is to be deplored that her distinguished commander, Lt. Cdr. Brill, lost his life in this action.

The hospital ships DJENNE and AQUILEJA arrived at Marseilles from Barcelona.

3. Area Naval Group South:a. Adriatic Sea:

According to an Army report eleven unidentified vessels passed six miles off Valona at 1600 on northerly course.

The steamer BRUMMER entered Sibenik on 26 Oct. The steamers MAMELLI and MARKO, which left Split for Trieste at 0300 on

27 Oct. were fired on in the Drvenic Channel, The MARKO returned to Split because of heavy damage. The whereabouts of the MAMELLI are still unknown. Traffic for large ships between Valona and Dubrovnik is temporarily closed until its safety can be assured. It has now been reported that the steamer MARCELLA (3,081 GRT) was sunk by bombs on 31 Oct. (obviously 13 Oct. - Tr. N.), and that the steamer MERANO (3,704 GRT) and the tanker POCARICA (7,884 GRT) were seized by enemy naval forces during the night of 15 Oct.

In the area of Cattaro four 15 cm., two 8.35 cm. and three 7.6 cm. guns manned by Army Personnel are reported in action readiness.

According to information from Group South, intelligence reports dated 21 and 23 Oct., have been received indicating that a landing in the sector of Split from the island of Brac is planned for the last days of October. On 16 Oct. five British were observed in Trogir. Group South has ordered Admiral, Adriatic to take any defense measures which are possible with the existing limited facilities and has requested Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean to investigate the possibility of operations by submarine "453" for reconnaissance and attacks on the enemy (see teletype 1435).

Furthermore Group South has submitted to the following situation estimate as requested from Admiral, Adriatic:

- "1. Following the loss of several ships during the last few days, it is not advisable at present to continue traffic with large ships in the Albanian area up to and including Dubrovnik. In the future also no large vessels should proceed as long as enemy air and naval forces have our coastal waters under continuous observation, unless constant escort can be given and reconnaissance flown. The enemy has complete freedom of action in this area. An organized reporting service has obviously also been built up already, so that the departure of ships even at night is no longer any secret. The only possible way of keeping traffic moving is to use a sufficient number of small ships. This could be possible in the southern Adriatic as soon as unreliable Italians and Albanians have been replaced by, or at least interspersed with, German personnel who are not available yet. Attempts have been made for weeks to speed this up, but it depends on the transport situation.
2. The area of the Dalmatian islands offers protection from enemy naval forces. However, the insurgent situation here also has led to serious losses. Traffic is only possible at present with small vessels, since nearly all ships are shelled despite

the mopping-up operations so far reported to be in progress. The possibility of large ships operating on the Dalmatian coast is dependent on the islands being mopped-up and enemy batteries silenced. It is doubtful whether transports can proceed without hindrance even if the islands have been cleared, unless the latter are occupied by the Army and under constant control. Experiences show that the insurgents withdraw, but return to the islands if these are left unoccupied. Therefore here too the use of large ships offers little success at least for the present, not to mention the threat from the air. The same refers to sea transport and bauxite shipments, especially since Ploce, the main port for bauxite shipments, has meanwhile again fallen into the hands of the insurgents.

3. No clear picture can be gained here from the Deputy of Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping about personnel and materiel and the operational readiness of small vessels for transport and supply purposes, despite repeated endeavors to obtain this information.
4. Permission for carrying out urgent sea transports from Trieste to the west coast has been granted at the request of German Naval Command, Italy along the coastal route, taking the mine situation into account.
5. Demands by Admiral, Adriatic arising from developments so far and from the present situation will follow."

Group South reports further:

- "a. The Army states that re-occupation by insurgents of mopped-up islands must be expected, since our own forces are not adequate for permanent occupation.
- b. Air Force Command, Southeast advises that the planned convoy escorts cannot be carried out, since the heavy fighter squadron for this purpose has not arrived. Furthermore that, in view of the appearance of enemy fighter forces over the Adriatic Sea and coastal waters, out dive-bomber and harassing bomber formations may not operate south of 44 degrees without fighter escort. Such fighter escort is, however, not available. For the same reason no reconnaissance can be flown at present by Air Commander, Croatia.
- c. This eliminates at present the only escort protection available against enemy operations and insurgent activity on the islands, which means that sea transport will come to a

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standstill. The effects for all branches of the Armed Forces are obvious.

- d. It is requested that Air Force Command, Southeast be supplied with adequate fighter, bomber and reconnaissance forces and that an effective anti-aircraft defense be built up on the Adriatic coast."

Army Group B has requested information From Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic in connection with the planned mopping-up operations on the islands of Krk, Cherso and Lussino on the following points:

- a. Available transports for the transfer of two to three infantry battalions, one light artillery battalion, one assault-gun battery.
- b. The possibility of escort.
- c. Suitable ports of embarkation.
- d. Most suitable landing places.
- e. Enemy batteries known to be on Krk.

(See teletype 1935).

Air Force General Staff requests Naval Staff urgently to instruct German Naval Command, Italy to assign at once to the 2nd Air Force four captured Italian vessels suitable as sea-rescue boats.

(See teletype 1030).

The matter will be dealt with further by Quartermaster Division.

b. Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Our air reconnaissance sighted at 1024 125 miles northwest of Alexandria 4 ships, presumably destroyers, on course 160 degrees and 1325 40 miles southsoutheast of Castell Rosso a convoy consisting of 3 merchantmen on course 300 degrees. A report has already been made about the successful attack carried out on this group. Between 1350 and 1418 an unidentified shipping target was located 12 miles west of Crete on southerly course.

At 2030 on 6 Oct. a submarine sank an auxiliary sailing vessel 23 miles northeast of Andros.

On the morning of 27 Oct. one enemy plane was shot down by anti-aircraft guns over Kos.

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Own Situation:

Submarine chase on 28 Oct. northwest of Naxos was discontinued, as no more locations were made. A small oil trace was still visible. The steamer INGEBOG and one armed fishing vessel were transferred from Syra to Naxos. A customs launch from Piraeus is to join this convoy and it will then sail in the evening for Kalymnos, via Candia and south of Stampalia, in order to disembark troops.

At midnight the steamer GERDA TOFT, with 18 combined operations assault craft on deck, is to sail from Piraeus to Lavrion together with submarine chaser "2102". Naval Artillery lighter MAL "12" will also be sent to Labrion from Chalkis, in order to take troops and equipment for special operation Samos (operation "Zwischenspiel"). Departure is scheduled for 1600 on 29 Oct. from Panormos Bay (Mykonos).

Operation "Zwischenspiel" is to start on 30 or 31 Oct.

The DRACHE carried out a minelaying operation in the Gulf of Salonika during the night of 27 Oct.

Naval landing craft F "370" with 200 survivors from Milos arrived at Piraeus. Motor tanker MT "3", so far held at Istanbul, will sail on 29 Oct. for Mudros.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence, there was a submarine at 1251 off Cape Tarchantskuski and a destroyer off the central Caucasian coast at 1300. In the evening air raids were carried out on Sevastopol and Eupatoria.

Own Situation:

A motor minesweeper group with three naval landing craft on passage from Sevastopol to Feodosiya was forced by bad weather to put in to Balakava. Naval landing craft F "135" ran aground off Feodosiya, while returning from patrol line. Minesweeping and convoy operations off the Crimean coast had to be interrupted owing to weather conditions. Patrol lines were not taken up during the night of 28 Oct.

The moles of Kerch have been demolished. The town is under enemy gunfire.

Group South transmitted in the evening the following report from Admiral, Black Sea:

- "I. Genichesk will be evacuated on 29 Oct.
2. The naval landing craft at Genichesk will leave on 29 Oct. for Kerch and should pass the northern part of the Strait of Kerch during the night of 29 Oct.
 3. The five naval artillery lighters cannot be transferred under present weather conditions owing to unseaworthiness increased by damage to their hulls and condition of engines. These boats were already partially swamped in seaway 2-3 during their last operation. Their 8.8 cm. and 2 cm. guns will be put aboard naval landing craft. The hulls will be blown up."

Naval Staff passed this report on to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy, Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, Naval Liaison and Army General Staff, Naval Liaison.

The measures seem to be premature, in view of the assessment of the situation at the Fuehrer Headquarters. Chief, Naval Staff will be asked to decide whether intervention is considered advisable.

According to a report from Group South, defense of the Crimean coast will be provided by:

1. In the Sea of Asov the 5 naval artillery lighters stationed at Genichesk. Four naval landing craft and harbor defense boats will be in patrol line nightly between Ostrov - Birvutshi and Tchokrak. Furthermore, reconnaissance line off Arabatskaya is planned, depending on the enemy situation.
2. In the Strait of Kerch nightly patrol line with the 4 naval landing craft and harbor defense boats remaining there.
3. In the Black Sea:
 - a. 4 to 6 naval landing craft of the 3rd Landing Flotilla transferred to Feodosiya will nightly take up patrol line from Cape Chauda to Kysaul. It is planned to increase the number of boats. Furthermore, patrol line off the south coast of the Crimea west of Feodosiya.
 - b. The 1st PT Boat Flotilla and the Crimean group of the 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla will take up reconnaissance line against an enemy landing operation only when certain information indicates imminent attacks, in order to carry out offensive operations against enemy naval forces if possible in conjunction with night reconnaissance planes.

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- c. Attacks on enemy forces which are not detected until landing:
 - aa: By naval landing craft in patrol line and lying at Feodosiya.
 - bb: By boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla which will be kept in immediate readiness during darkness in Ivanbaba, unless out on operation against the enemy landing fleet.
- d. The following are at present available for the coast and southern Crimea: 8 naval landing craft at Feodosiya, 5 PT boats at Ivanbaba and, probably from 29 Oct., 3 motor minesweepers.
- e. Furthermore barrage sections "S 71" and "S 72" have been laid in Feodosiya Bay as protection against landings. These will be supplemented probably on 28 Oct. by barrage-section "S 73". Subsequently mining is planned of Koktebel Bay and Baracken Bay (west and east of Ivanbaba) which are suitable for landings. (See teletype 1430).

Furthermore Group South advises Naval Staff, for information, of the following instructions to Admiral, Aegean:

- "1. The steamers SANTA FE, JOH. MAERSK and SONJA are to be transferred as quickly as possible to the Black Sea for a special operation. Ports of destination will follow. Date of sailing readiness to be reported.
- 2. The three Bulgarian steamers intended for the Aegean Sea will be sent as early as possible so that the withdrawal from there of the three steamers of 9,246 GRT will shortly be made up by the Bulgarian vessels and five auxiliary sailing vessels, totaling about 9,500 GRT." (see teletype 1425).

IX. Situation East Asia:

Nothing special to report.

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Items of Political Importance

Nothing special to report.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff

I. Army Situation:

The Fuehrer has issued the following directive to Army Groups A and South:

- "1. I have brought up divisions to the eastern front from the south and west, in order to smash the enemy forces which crossed the Dnieper below Kremenchug by means of a combined counter attack, which will be possible on about 10 Nov. This attack will bring about a decisive turn in the situation for the entire southern sector of the front.
2. The aim of further fighting until 10 Nov. must therefore be to achieve at all costs the necessary conditions for the successful completion of this intended counter-attack. Any crises must be borne until then.
3. The necessary conditions for the attack are:
 - a. The 1st Tank Army must hold its position in the projecting bend of the Dnieper river until the start of the attack and only withdraw only locally and if absolutely necessary. Only thus will it be possible to prevent the enemy extending his breakthrough on the western bank of the Dnieper too much and only this will the forces provided for the counter-attack suffice for a successful completion of their task.
 - b. Army Group A must protect the southern flank of the 1st Tank Army in such a way that any threat to the rear of this Army to the north across the Dnieper is avoided at all costs. The 6th Army must therefore hold as long as possible the positions which it plans to occupy during the night of 28 Oct. Should this, however, no longer be possible a retreat, step by step, to the line Gromovka-east of Berislav-Dnieper-Nikopol bridgehead is permissible

but the northern wing must definitely hold its position at the northern outskirts of Belenkoye. Communications to the Crimea via the Perekop Isthmus must be kept open. The Genichesk and Chongar passes are to be closed. If today's attack of the 40th Tank Corps effects a complete breakthrough, a temporary relief attack by this tank corps from the area of Nikopol is planned.

r. As regards evacuation of the Crimea my former decision remains unchanged."

For copy of this directive as per l/Sk1 3221/43 Gkdos. Chfs. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIVa.

On 28 Oct. fighting became lively in the central sector of the eastern front. The situation is generally under control. In the area of Nevel the enemy seems to be attempting a further advance to the west.

Reports from the Italian front speak of a specially favorable situation as regards our tanks and assault guns.

II. Air Commander, Atlantic Coast has asked that Commander in Chief, Navy request further construction of BV 222 and FW 200 types of planes. Chief, Naval Staff does not intend to intervene in the Air Force construction program. He is, however, willing to intercede for further delivery to Air Commander, Atlantic Coast of any planes of these types which are still available or will become available in the interests of naval warfare.

III. Report by Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division

- a. The enemy situation in Northern Waters proves that our air reconnaissance is inadequate. We are unaware of actual enemy movements. (Compare War Diary 28 Oct.)

Chief, Naval Staff ordered that a report to this effect be submitted to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff. He furthermore ordered consideration as to how the SCHARNHORST and destroyer are to operate should the enemy convoy traffic be resumed. In addition investigations should be made as to whether an increased number of submarines could be supplied to Commander, Submarines, Norway. Chief, Naval Staff stated in this connection that the practical effects of scientific research on

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location have so far been unsatisfactory.

Despite the "Naxos" and "Wanze" sets the submarines are nowadays intercepted by enemy planes at night completely by surprise.

- b. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has issued the following directive with regard to Denmark:

"I. The withdrawal of a considerable number of very seaworthy landing craft from the Mediterranean to England, in conjunction with the political pressure exercised by Moscow on the British and Americans, make the possibility of a landing operation against Western Europe even in winter time, appear much more likely than before. The western theater is in a constant state of defense readiness, because of continuous activity there, whereas our troops in Denmark feel themselves to be more occupation forces than combat troops.

2. Denmark, however, now becomes the foremost of the countries threatened by an enemy landing. The occupation of Jutland by the enemy would have strategic and political consequences of the first magnitude. Norway would then be entirely cut off from supplies, communication with Sweden established and the enemy Air Force would have supremacy in the Baltic and North Seas.

By order of the Fuehrer, Armed Forces High Command will therefore issue detailed instructions in case of an enemy landing operation in Denmark.

3. First of all it is, however, necessary that the shifting forces as ordered or planned by Commander, German Armed Forces, Denmark, be carried out as quickly as possible (assembly of the 20th Air Force Infantry Division, transfer to the coast of the 160th Division). All other measures which are still possible in order to strengthen our defense should be taken at once.

Furthermore, all operations staffs should move to the headquarters from which they will control operations in case of an enemy landing.

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The Fuehrer expects that Denmark will immediately be put into highest action readiness, rigorously eliminating all peace-time conditions and comforts. The measures taken are to be given in the daily reports."

- c. Naval Staff considers the measures taken in Genichesk by Admiral, Black Sea to be premature (See War Diary 28 Oct.) Chief, Naval Staff is of the same opinion. He personally telephoned to Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters and Chief, Army General Staff, advising them of his opinion and asked the latter to postpone the evacuation of Genichesk if possible, until weather conditions permit withdrawal of the five unseaworthy naval artillery lighters. Chief, Army General Staff approved. A telephone inquiry, ordered at the same time, to Admiral, Black Sea later unfortunately disclosed that the boats have already been blown up. Genichesk has not been evacuated yet.

IV. Report by Deputy Chief, Naval Communications Division about the difficulties of obtaining for the Navy a large number of "Hohentwiel" sets from Air Force production, since all fighters will now be equipped with these sets, the Navy will have to be satisfied at present with a smaller allotment than requested.

V. Report by Chief, Naval Ordnance Division: The difficulties of co-ordinating requirements of engineer personnel for "Zaunkoenig" torpedo production and for research on location are further intensified through a relaxation in the reserved occupation regulations for this personnel also, which seems unavoidable in view of the tense manpower situation of the Army.

VI. Report by Quartermaster General:

- a. The Fuehrer has ordered:

The economic situation of our ally Rumania forbids in general any further encroachment on Rumanian territory by German troops, or supply and repair installations. Exceptions are still subject to my approval in each individual case. Where large transfers become necessary in the southern sector in the course of dispersal measures or withdrawals, these are to be directed to Transnistria, the Western Ukraine or Galicia.

Chief of Staff, Naval Staff reports in this connection that it will probably be impossible to carry this out as far as the Navy is concerned. It will be unavoidable to make increased use of Constanta in view of the developments in the Black Sea situation. A report will be made to Armed Forces High Command to this effect.

Chief, Naval Staff concurred.

- b. At least 50 days will be required for the transfer of each PT boat to the Black Sea by land and the Danube. The bottle-neck is in the dockyard at Linz. Possibilities of increasing the dockyard capacity at Linz are under investigation. If necessary, transfer of repair work on Black Sea vessels from Linz to Rumanian and Bulgarian dockyards may be considered. The Danube estuary usually becomes icebound on 3 Jan., but this year will probably freeze up already at the end of December.
- c. Quartermaster General reported on the situation regarding mine-exploding vessels.

VII. Report by Chief, Naval Intelligence Division:

- A. The Moscow conference seems to be progressing smoothly according to information received. It is stated that the Russians asked for a corridor to the Aegean Sea, amongst other demands.
- b. The statement made by the Swedish Prime Minister at closed session of the Swedish Parliament dealt with:
 - aa. Negotiations by the Trade Unions in Stockholm for a Russo-Finnish armistice.
 - bb. Cessation of convoy traffic.
 - cc. Cutting down of ore shipments to Germany.
 - dd. Maintenance of Sweden's neutral policy,

From a secret report of a Swedish diplomat from Moscow it is learned that:

- aa. Russian conciliation towards Germany is out of question.

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- bb. The Russian food situation is tolerable.
- cc. The Russian war economy is organized and run along model lines.

Special Items

I. The tense personnel situation and the inadequate assignments of personnel to the Navy by Armed Forces High Command have made it necessary more than before to recruit for the Navy volunteers from the Germanic countries, the Germanic races in the West and Croatia in order to cover requirements. This recruiting has so far been left to the Reichsfuehrer SS. A Fuehrer decree now gives the Navy in future the same priority rights as the Waffen SS in recruiting volunteers in these countries.

High Command, Navy has therefore come to an agreement with the Reichsfuehrer SS with regard to the recruiting of such volunteers, this agreement also containing the basic regulations on their treatment while serving in the German Navy.

II. The Bureau of Naval Armament, War Economy Branch states in its special war economy report (No. 219/43 of 26 Oct.) regarding the evacuation in the east, amongst other things:

"Evacuation prepared in the southern sector of the eastern front could in the main not be carried out as planned, owing to the unexpectedly rapid development in the situation.

Times allowed for the preparation and evacuation were constantly changed and curtailed, so that the forces used for evacuation and salvage were inadequate or the assembled goods could not be evacuated owing to lack of loading space.

In particular large quantities of food had to be destroyed or left behind, for instance:

grain - about 1.3 million tons
oil seeds about 0.3 - 0.4 million tons.

From livestock amounting to two million head of cattle in the area of War Economy Inspectorate, South only 0.3 million could be moved back in herds.

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On the other hand, removal of agricultural machinery and implements of the MTS (Machine Tractor Station) was successful. More than 300 trains or about 10,000 car loads were removed, which will be a help in considerable intensifying agriculture in the Western Ukraine. In the industrial sector about 5,000 car loads of economic goods have been evacuated, mostly dismantled machinery and equipment from factories provided for the "Ivan" program. Valuable motors and transformers that were ready for shipment had to be demolished owing to lack of loading space.

Demolition of industrial plants has been almost complete and in most cases so extensive that any reconstruction will be more difficult than the building up of new industry. The enemy will therefore be unable to start up industry in the evacuated areas for quite some time. For instance the coal mines in operation in the Donetz area, which produced already 480,000 tons in August, have been rendered useless by dismantling important machinery and through demolition. Moreover it is to be expected that the mines will soon be flooded owing to the lack of electric power. The plants producing and treating iron were also demolished effectively, apart from those in Taganrog. Evacuation of manpower could not be carried out to the extent planned; at the most 400,000 persons crossed the Dnieper, including one third fit for work.

Furthermore, partisan activity increased considerably while evacuation was under way.

Evacuation of economic goods in the area of War Economy Inspectorate, Center was also hampered by a strong partisan movement which is already described as "the beginning of a national rising."

III. Armed Forces High Command, Special Staff for Mercantile and Economic Warfare has submitted copy of a memorandum which vice Admiral Abe has handed the Reichsmarschall regarding the Japanese request that we reconsider the importance of an air communication between Europe and Asia in the interests of joint warfare and that every attempt be made to establish such a service. In this memorandum Vice Admiral Abe pointed out, amongst other things, that Japan is contributing "a part" of her operational submarines for traffic and transport between Asia and Europe.

Naval Staff is of the opinion that very much more could be done in this respect.

Situation 29 Oct.I. War in Foreign WatersI. Enemy Situation:

According to intelligence report of 16 Oct. from Lisbon, the United States and Great Britain are said to have requested that the Cape Verde Islands be occupied by Brazilian troops. The Portuguese Government has agreed. The United States plan to construct naval and air bases on the Cape Verde Islands for the protection of shipping between Brazil and the Congo river.

2. Own Situation:

Nothing special to report.

II. Situation West AreaI. Enemy Situation:

Over the Bay of Biscay during the day and the night of 29 Oct. reconnaissance of remarkably uniform intensity by 62 planes was observed. The large northbound convoy which is estimated to be about 400 miles west of Cape Finisterre was not located again by our air reconnaissance today.

Unidentified targets were located in the Channel between 0905 and 0945 south of Dover, from 0960 (?) to 1006 west of Dunkirk and from 1903 until past midnight between Dunkirk and Boulogne.

On 28 Oct. radar stations on the coast of Brittany located between 2000 and 2200 many unidentified targets in the area where the 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla had an engagement with the enemy on 23 Oct. and north thereof up to the latitude of Alderney. At the same time gunfire at sea was seen and heard. It is quite possible that enemy forces were shell-ing each other, since none of our naval forces were there. The weather observatory considers weather phenomena to be unlikely.

2. Own Situation:Atlantic Coast:

Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West plans to introduce

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some new outer routes in the Bay of Biscay, as it must be assumed that present routes have become known through the CAGNI.

Two ground mines were swept off Brest and one off St. Nazaire. Between 1127 and 1158 eleven Typhoons made a dive attack on the airfield at Brest-North, where slight damage was sustained.

Channel Coast:

PT boat S "100" temporarily ran aground at Cape d'Antifer while en route from Cherbourg to Boulogne. PT boat S "141" arrived at Le Havre at 1015 and PT boat S "100" at 1355. At 1145 fishery patrol boat FBO "23" struck a mine and sank two miles north of Gravelines. The crew of five is missing. Twenty-six mines were swept in the area of Dunkirk and two in the area of Lezardrieux.

Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West hopes to have the mine situation off Dunkirk in hand shortly.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters

North Sea:

Sweeping of routes and minesweeping operations were carried out by strong forces during the day but had to be partially discontinued during the night of 29 Oct. owing to fog. Four mines were swept.

Naval Command, North endorses the views of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North states on 28 Oct. regarding reconnaissance of the Heligoland Bight. Naval Command, North is furthermore of the opinion that continuous air patrol of the "West Wall" barrages should be possible without any extra forces if the area is flown over regularly once by daytime and once by night. Possibilities of carrying out night reconnaissance, which is especially important during the long winter nights, are at present under investigation. Naval Command, North urges similar investigations for the area of the 5th Air Force. (See teletype 1533).

Norway, Northern Waters:I. Enemy Situation:

Over the North Sea 19 planes were detected on operation in the morning and 7 later on. The center of reconnaissance activity was the sea area between Northern Scotland and the Faroes. Our air reconnaissance sighted: at 1130 in AW 2533 (25 miles east of Svatoi Nos) 4 destroyers proceeding in line ahead on course 120 degrees; at 1240 2 destroyers in AW:2237 on course 220 degrees; at 1315 in AC 8981 (20 miles east of Teriberski) a unit of warships; consisting of 1 large, 5 medium-sized and 6 small vessels, on course 330 degrees. The types of these ships were not ascertained as darkness was setting in. Whether this is the same unit as the one on 28 Oct. cannot be said until further evaluation has been made of photographic reconnaissance. On 28 Oct. one enemy plane was reported over the Petsamo area and during the night another one between Sogne and Hardanger Fjords.

2. Own Situation:

In the area of Naval Command, Norway 36 ships were escorted north and 23 south. Altogether 25 ships were delayed owing to shortage of escorts.

Group "Katharina" entered the skerries at 0349 on its homeward passage. Admiral, Northern Waters plans to repeat this operation as soon as:

- a. Evaluation of our air reconnaissance gives us an insight into the enemy situation,
- b. the uncertain weather again becomes favorable.

On 12 Oct. the Naval Command, Norway expressed to the Quartermaster Division its belief that the best solution for strengthening Alta would be to provide some PT boats (even of older type) while the TIRPITZ is out of action readiness. The Task Force supports this recommendation and proposes that a PT Boat Training Flotilla be transferred to Alta. It is pointed out that Alta Fjord offers an ice-free exercise area, long nights and protected firing ranges.

Quartermaster Division fully explained to Operations Division the reasons for rejecting this plan. The task and size of the PT Boat Flotilla require a number of buildings on shore, besides numerous units afloat. Smooth working of the training program does not allow the personnel aboard to be separated from those in training ashore. Naval Staff has therefore sent the following decision to Naval Command, Norway, Commanding Admiral, Task Force and also to Group North/Fleet for information:

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"Transfer of PT boats to Alta Fjord while the TIRPITZ is out of action readiness is impossible. Boats from operational flotillas cannot be made available for this purpose. Transfer of PT Boat Training Flotilla is impossible. Withdrawal to Alta Fjord of PT boats from the area of Admiral, West Norwegian Coast is left to your discretion."

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

I. Enemy Situation:

The Foreign Office submits the following reports received from the Consul General at Gothenburg on 28 Oct.:

- "1. A British PT boat arrived this morning at Lysekil. Great danger of Norwegian ships putting out.
2. According to a reliable report, a British PT boat arrived at Lysekil at 0900 on 28 Oct. She commenced at once with the unloading of about 50 drums of about 50 kg. each, contents unknown. From 1500 loading started of a large quantity of small, heavy and seemingly valuable iron parts. At 2000 the boat was still at Lysekil, loading having ceased. During this month six small cranes that are now being used for the first time were erected in the harbor of Lysekil for no obvious reason. At present there are about 100 police and stevedores at Lysekil. Great danger of Norwegian ships also putting out."

Both reports were immediately passed on by teletype to Group North/Fleet, Naval Command, Norway and Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic.

2. Own Situation:

Patrol in the Skagerrak for blockade-runners is being carried out during the night by six boats in patrol line from Skagen to Valderoebod via Halloey and three minesweepers in AO 4415; during the day by patrol line of six boats from AO 4428 to 4152 and three minesweepers in patrol line from AO 3625 to 3661.

Minesweeping operations in the Baltic Sea entrances were carried out by 13 boats and in the Baltic Sea by 31 boats.

Nothing special to report from the areas of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic and Admiral, Baltic States.

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According to a report from the Mining and Barrage Command, Frederikshavn of 7 Oct. about 45 German EMC mines with antenna firing and 0.5 m. mooring rope have been found cut in the Skagerrak. Operations Division asked for the numbers, which showed that most of the mines belong to barrages "16 c" and "16 d" off the Skagerrak and some to barrages "6 a" and "23". As these mines were not detonated by the enemy, it can be assumed that they were cut during a mine reconnaissance operation at night. Systematic minesweeping operations are not indicated. There may be some connection with a boockade-break from Sweden. Extensive mine reconnaissance in preparation for a landing is, however, also conceivable, this being indicated by two mines: from barrage "6 a" (off List) and one mine from barrage "23" (off Bergen).

"

V. Merchant Shipping

Naval Staff has despatched the following directive to German Naval Command, Italy and Group West:

"Armed Forces High Command has approved the request of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping to return to the French Government the large French Merchantmen which are unsuited for our purposes. The Reich Commissioner will arrange formalities with the French Government and will see to it that these ships are always at our disposal in case we need them. German Naval Command, Italy and Group West should take measures to prevent the ships deserting to the enemy while being transferred and while laid up".

VI. Submarine Warfare

The operation by Group "Schill" against the northbound convoy in BE has so far been without result. One of the submarines only was able to obtain hydrophone bearings on three to four steamers and one destroyer. Long-range reconnaissance of Air Commander, Atlantic Coast will try to find out on 30 Oct. at dawn whether the enemy has made any deviations. Group "Seigfried" reported nothing but a few planes sighted.

Submarine U "218" has carried out the minelaying operation off Trinidad.

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VII. Aerial Warfare

British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 19 planes out on operation over the west area and 21 over the Mediterranean.

Air Commander, Atlantic Coast reported at 1110 a large oil patch at position 420 miles west of Cape Ortegale, otherwise nothing special to report.

Mediterranean Theater:

The 2nd Air Force had 18 fighter-bombers, 35 fighters and 11 reconnaissance planes out on operation and Air Force Command, Southeast 71 bombers, 10 fighters, 17 reconnaissance planes and 18 transport planes.

In the Italian area only reconnaissance missions were carried out. A Unit consisting of 1 light cruiser and 3 destroyers were attacked by eleven of our bombers at 1315 south-southeast of Castell Rosso. No exact observation of the result is reported. At noon the enemy attacked Genoa with 60 - 80 Fortresses and Stirlings and, among other things, caused heavy damage at the tank factory on Ansaldo harbor. One Fortress was shot down by anti-aircraft guns. One out of twelve Spitfires which raided the airfield of Guidonia was shot down by our fighters. No damage was sustained during the raid on the airfield of Grosseto. Over the Army front two planes were shot down by Army anti-aircraft guns. About 30 fighters made a sortie as far as Rome. In the Aegean Sea nine planes attacked the island of Amorgos. One of our patrol vessels was sunk. Naval anti-aircraft guns and fighters each shot down one enemy plane. Twelve planes attacked the airfield of Candia. During the night of 30 Oct. four reconnaissance planes were located over the Aegean Sea.

Eastern Front:

Photographic reconnaissance of the Black Sea established in Tuapse, Gelendzhik and Anapa 64 landing craft and altogether 20 motor minesweepers and 19 PT boats. Minor enemy forces attacked Sevastopol and Yalta during the night of 30 Oct.

The 5th Air Force reconnaissance activity. For evaluations see Enemy Situation Northern Waters.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black SeaI. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

A convoy of 52 merchantmen with 1 destroyer and 2 corvettes passed through the Straits of Gibraltar westbound at 1500 on 28 Oct.; 8 freighters and 1 escort vessel of this convoy entered Gibraltar. The convoy was joined by 2 freighters 2 tankers and 4 escort vessels from this port. At 1800 on 28 Oct. 3 freighters in ballast and 1 French gunboat left Gibraltar for the Mediterranean. During the night of 28 Oct. 1 DIDO class cruiser and 4 auxiliary curisers put in to Gibtaltar and 1 minelaying cruiser out.

The westbound convoy sighted by Cape Tres Forcas at 1530 on 28 Oct. passed Ceuta on 0100 on 29 Oct. It consisted of 22 ships, including several very large transports.

According to an intelligence report, altogether 40,000 men have passed through Gibraltar for Italy since 21 Oct. Alboran reported at 1800 on 28 Oct., at a distance of 35 miles north of the coast 1 battleship, 2 cruisers and other vessels heading for the Atlantic.

No new observations are reported from the Italian sea area.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

The minelaying operation just starting off the Italian east coast had to be postponed owing to weather conditison. Five patrol vessels have been commissioned at Marseilles. Three of these boats developed engine trouble while on transfer to Toulon. Three boats of the 7th PT Boat Flotilla were sent out from Nettunia on a torpedo operation in the Bay of Naples.

For report of German Naval Command, Italy on the loss of the minelayer JUMINDA on 22 Oct. west of San Stefano see teletype 0125. The body of Lt. Cdr. Brill was recovered on 24 Oct. and buried at Snn Stefano on 28 Oct.

Group West reports that the assumption regarding the loss of the PADUA in our own barrage south of Port de Bouc is upheld, although the Captain of the steamer and members of the crew are trying to shift the position of sinking to route "Lowwe". The Captain of this steamer had strict orders not to proceed at night. The occident was solely caused by negligence. The route has again been opened to traffic (see teletype 0030).

The hospital ship AQUILEJA Arrived at Marseilles at 0200.

Submarine U "431" must be regarded as lost. This submarine started on return passage to Toulon on 19 Oct. after her great succes in CH 7496. She was spotted by an enemy plane on 21 Oct. and has not reported although called on twice to do so.

Own submarine situation in the Mediterranean:

| | |
|---|---------------------------|
| Total number | 12 of which |
| at Toulon | 4 |
| at Pola: | 3 out of war readiness |
| in the Western Mediterranean: | 1 |
| on return passage: | 2nd |
| on passage to the Aegean Sea: | 3rd |
| returned to Toulon, owing to damage: | 4th |
| at Pola, ready for minelaying operatbn off Brindisi: | 5th |

The next submarine at Toulon will not be ready to sail before 13 Nov.

The submarines at Pola have no "Zaunkoenig" torpedoes and are therefoer unsuitable for operation in the Aegean Sea.

Owing to this situation only one submarine is available for the Aegean Sea, since at least one must be left in the Western Mediterranean where prospects of suscess are good. A break-through the Sicilian Channel by further boats has started.

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy has been advised accordingly.

German Naval Command, Italy reports that following the new disposition of anti-aircraft guns by Army Group B, only 18 heavy anti-arircraft batteries are left on the Ligurian coast from the border down to Piombino. This is inadequate for protection of the ports. This weakness is also having its effect on the defense against sea targets. This is all the more serious inasmuch as one division of reserves has been withdrawn from the area of Army Group B.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

The steamer MAMELLI arrived at Pola on 28 Oct. with 16 dead and 40 wounded aboard. On 29 Oct. the steamers GIGLIOLA, BRUNNER and FITENGOOT left Sibenik for Zara. Naval Shore Commander, South Adriatic has transferred to Tirana.

b. Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

During the night of 28 Oct. the airfield of Maritza on Rhodes was raided. At 0940 on 29 Oct. our air reconnaissance sighted 90 miles south of Castell Rosso 1 cruiser and 3 destroyers on northerly course and at 1245 4 destroyers 38 miles southwest of Castell Rosso.

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at 0830 eight torpedo bombers attacked a submarine chaser group out on operation south of Amorgos with bombs, torpedoes and machine-guns. At the same time torpedoes fired by the submarine had to be avoided. Two of the attacking planes were shot down. The submarine was detected again by our air reconnaissance at 1105 ten miles south of Amorgos. All Available submarine-chasers have been ordered out.

An intelligence report from the beginning of Oct. states that small sailing vessels flying the Turkish flag, but with British crews, are being used for combatting submarines between Rhodes and Castel Rosso.

Own Situation:

The steamer INGEBORG was torpedoed at 0056 west of Stampalia and sunk. The customs cutter NIOI was torpedoed at 0812 during rescue operations. Armed Fishing vessel KFK "3" arrived at Stampalia with III survivors from the INGEBORG abroad. Further survivors are still adrift on floats at the scene of the disaster.

Nice infantry landing craft, on passage from Salonika to Piraeus, were forced by bad weather to seek shelter off shore.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Our air reconnaissance sighted at 0640 90 miles westsouthwest of Suchum 1 destroyer, 2 guardboats and 1 motor on course 300 degrees. Destroyer "C" was probably in the area of Sochi in the evening, according to radio intelligence.

Own Situation:

NO PT boat operations were carried out during the night of 28 Oct. owing to weather conditions. Patrol lines were not taken up for the same reason.

The five naval artillery lighters lying at Genishesk have been blown up. The motor minesweeper group with three naval landing craft has been transferred from Balaklava to Feodosiya for a minelaying operation.

Convoy Sevastopol - Constanta has been postponed for 24 hours because of weather conditions. Naval landing craft MFP "126" ran aground near Cape Khersonnes while evacuating the field railway. Attempts to tow her off have so far been unsuccessful.

Group South transmits a report from Admiral, Black Sea that the 17th Army Command has withdrawn the order for a short-term evacuation of personnel from the Crimea (code word "Michael 2"). The order for the evacuation of materiel

(Code word "Michael") remains in force.

IX. Situation in East Asia:

Nothing special to report.

Items of Political Importance

According to Allied agency reports it seems as if the Moscow talks have already led to an agreement. Ratification by the Governments concerned will not take long. In a statement to the press Roosevelt said that the aims of the conference were lasting peace and the end of world aggression. It is generally regarded as significant that Russia has become a partner in a the large-scale political plans for a new order in Europe at least in principle. If this is actually the case, a great weight has been taken off the mind of the Western Powers and a political success has been gained, estimation of which depends on the extent of the concessions, probably in military matters, made to the Russians by the Americans and British. Our hopes that political tension between our enemies might improve our situation in a not too distant future may be frustrated if present indications about the results of the conference should prove correct.

Noteworthy is the observation that British propaganda is beginning to pay increased attention to the development of the situation inside Germany. The description of conditions in Germany given by exchanged prisoners of war plays an important part in this.

According to a report from a neutral (Swedish) source in Finland, the Finnish Congress of Trade Unions is said to have demanded in a declaration addressed to the Finnish people that the Government do its utmost to get out of the war as soon as possible. It is high time, it stated, that thing be done in this direction. However, the country must be put in a position to maintain good relations with all her neighbors.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff

I. Army Situation:

The enemy has put up an extensive smoke screen in the Strait of Kerch. It must be assumed that preparations for landing are completed.

Our forces in the Nogai Steppe are at present retreating to a line ten kilometers west of Genichesk - Berislav. An offensive operation by us is underway northwest of Zaporozhe in order to shorten the front.

In the sector of the 9th Army fighting continued with varying success. Attacks carried out with a further intensification of gunfire and repeated fourteen times during the day were repulsed in the area west of Smolensk.

A new enemy attack is expected in the area of Nevel.

In Italy the "Barbara" line is in general occupied by our forces.

The situation on the Dalmatian coast is still extremely unsatisfactory.

II. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff deems it necessary that Group South and Admiral, Black Sea be given specific instructions by Naval Staff regarding the Crimea.

Chief, Naval Staff concurred. The teletype regarding this makes reference to the instructions given by Naval Staff on 28 Oct. and then continues as follows:

"Order for defense of the Crimea is confirmed. Further air forces are being brought up to the southern sector of the eastern front. The order to Army Group A provides that critical situations must be borne until the arrival of reinforcements, now on their way, takes effect. Commanders must see to it that uneasiness felt by the troops, which must be assumed owing to the premature order for evacuation, is removed and that the old fighting spirit is restored wherever it has been affected. Orders issued by the Commanding General, Armed Forces for the evacuation of economic goods from the Crimea are not concerned by this."

III. The German Ambassador at Ankara has, on instructions, attempted to obtain Turkish permission for eight to ten naval landing craft, flying the merchant flag and carrying civilian crews, to proceed from the Black Sea to the Aegean Sea for the purpose of carrying supplies to the islands.

This request was finally rejected on 27 Oct. The Turkish Foreign Minister took the opportunity to point out that the previous passage caused strong protests from London and Moscow and that these countries on their part had requested permission for similar vessels to pass through. He therefore took the German radio announcement that naval landing craft are to be regarded as warships as the basis for a statement to these two Powers that in future the passage of such vessels

will no longer be allowed. This decision is not so unfavorable for us, he stated, inasmuch as he has again rejected the passage of enemy ships of types which are much more troublesome than naval landing craft. In view of Turkey's extremely difficult situation as regards the Straits she can take no risks or make any exceptions to either side. (See also War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII).

IV. Chief, Naval Ordnance Division reported about the effects of the elimination of the Fuehrer's full protection against conscription from the electrical industry. Commander in Chief, Navy cannot comply with the request made by these circles for personal intervention with the Fuehrer, since Minister Speer has already undertaken an unsuccessful attempt in this direction. Should new aspects of the situation arise, he would be willing to approach the Fuehrer once more, together with Minister Speer, in view of the problem of developing electric submarines. Commander in Chief, Navy furthermore ordered an investigation and report on the effects of the 8% withdrawal from naval factories.

V. Quartermaster General reports that the Navy has been requested by Chief, Air Force General Staff to assist air Commander, Atlantic Coast with manpower in the construction of airfields in Western France. Quartermaster Division draws attention to the small contribution that the Navy could at best make to the gignatic airfield construction project of the Air Force. Moreover considerable hesitation is felt on principle to the fulfillment of this wish, as it would create a precedent the consequences of which cannot be foreseen. The utmost that Quartermaster Division could recommend is that the request for further allocation of manpower by Air Force General Staff be endorsed with the Ministry, drawing attention to the Navy's interests in air operations off the Atlantic Coast.

Chief, Naval Staff concurred with the opinion of Quartermaster Division.

In a Highly Restricted Circle

VI. In view of the sinking of the steamer INGEBORG the Fuehrer has urged that more submarines be despatched to the Aegean Sea. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy has meanwhile been informed of the submarine situation in the Mediterranean (see War Diary 29 Oct.)

Chief, Naval Staff ordered that arrangements be made for the despatch of a further submarine.

Special Items

I. The Fuehrer was indignant about the report that the five naval artillery lighters at Genichesk were blown up, according to information received from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy.

The Army has been ordered to make investigations regarding the premature order, now canceled, for evacuation of the Crimea and regarding the evacuation of Genichesk. The Commander responsible has been called to the Fuehrer Headquarters in order to vindicate himself.

Admiral, Black Sea was requested at 2045 by telephone to submit a full report on the events and circumstances leading to the blowing-up of the boats.

II. In departmental discussions at the Naval (Ship) Construction Division on 18 Oct. 1943 the question was raised by Naval (Ship) Construction Division, regarding submarine type XX B, whether Naval Staff could accept a reduction of the submarine's radius of action from 20,000 to 12,000 miles in favor of a gain in cruising speed by two knots (from 10 to 12 knots). Operations Division then advised Naval (Ship) Construction Division that a cruising speed above ten knots would be very welcome but that reduction of the action radius is impossible. A radius of 12,000 miles is actually equal to the shortest route between Bordeaux and Singapore, but includes no reserve and permits neither a deviation from the shortest route, which must be possible to a great extent, nor a long patrol off one of the two ports of destination, which must also be reckoned with. The possibility that the Atlantic ports as well as Singapore might be closed to the submarine and that she may have to proceed to a Norwegian port through the North Atlantic or to some other Japanese base through the Sunda Strait must not be lost sight of when considering the action radius. A radius of 20,000 miles is therefore indispensable.

III. Brief Report on the Enemy Situation No. 22/43 of Naval Intelligence Division deals, amongst other things, with the rights, referred to as "Facilities", accorded by Portugal to our enemy:

- I. Great Britain receives the right to use the airfield on the island of Terceira which has been occupied by British troops.
2. For use of the port of Horta of Fayal the restrictions of the Hague Covenant of 1907 have been waived for Great Britain and her Allies, i. e. enemy warships and merchantmen may use the port of Horta as in peacetime.

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Supplies for enemy forces on the Azores will be carried exclusively by enemy ships.

Portugal retains full sovereign rights over the Azores except for the airfield of Terceira.

The report furthermore deals with Italian submarine losses, said to amount to 84 boats, and with the laying down of two of the three projected 45,000 ton U. S. aircraft carriers which are to be completed in little more than a year.

Copy as per 1/Skl 33184/43 geh. in War Diary, Part D "Data on the Enemy Situation".

Naval Intelligence Division also submits a statement, compiled from captured orders, of individual evaluations on the operations by naval forces and the landing fleet during the landing at Algiers on 8 Nov. 1942. As the documents captured are incomplete a survey of the whole plan is impossible.

Copy as per 1/Skl 33136/43 geh. in War Diary, Part D, "Evaluation of Intelligence on Foreign Navies".

IV. A summary of enemy intelligence gained by radio deciphering and radio intelligence from 18 to 24 Oct, is contained in Radio Monitoring Report No. 43/43.

See especially pages 4 and 5 regarding the convoy battle of ONS 20, with diagram, and page 8 regarding the caution shown by the enemy Air Force over the inner Bay of Biscay owing to the danger from our own fighters.

Situation 30 Oct.

I. War in Foreign Waters

I. Enemy Situation:

Nothing special to report.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attache in Tokyo reports that there are no objections to the announcement within the Navy of the loss of Ship

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"28". It was impossible to avoid the loss becoming known to the Japanese public and the German community through the landing of survivors at different points, their accommodation in hotels and transfer to the "Hakoke" Naval Camp. It must therefore be assumed that the enemy will soon receive information through neutrals and Russians. The survivors are moreover certain that they saw the submarine take prisoners aboard.

Furthermore, the Naval Attache in Tokyo gave the names of survivors of Ship "28" - 5 officer, 2 senior noncommissioned officer, 45 noncommissioned officer and 59 seaman, altogether 111 men. One officer, 4 noncommissioned officers and 1 seaman were picked up dead or died of exhaustion. On departure the raider's complement consisted of 379 men.

II. Situation West Area:

I. Enemy Situation:

Over the Bay of Biscay 34 planes were detected on operation. One British vessel was located at 1758 in BE 7390 and one at 1831 in AL 0960.

Our air reconnaissance sighted at 0930 in BE 6580 one merchantman of 3,000 GRT, nationality unknown, on course 140 degrees; at 1130 it contacted the Sampford convoy, reported for the first time on 27 Oct. , in BE 8447 on northerly course and consisting of 50 merchantmen escorted by 1 cruiser, 5 escort vessels and 1 plane.

In the Channel targets were located in the area north of Griz Nez between 0841 and 0947 and between 1256 and 1309.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Nothing special to report.

Channel Coast:

One mine was swept near Calais, one near St. Malo and three off Nieuport. The number of mines reported swept off Nieuport on 29 Oct. has increased from 24 to 27.

At 0922 Battery Gris Nez fired two rounds on a target which had been located. Cherbourg was raided by enemy air formations between 1515 and 1520. Hits were scored on the arsenal and a railway battery position.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters

North Sea:

Altogether five ELM mines were swept near Vlieland and Terschelling. There were no minesweeping operations owing to fog.

Group North/Fleet deems it necessary soon to reinforce the "West Wall" in the sea area of the Great Fisher Bank because of the deterioration of barrages "16 C" and "16 D" through enemy minesweeping operations. It is planned to have the OST-MARK, ELSASS and BRUMMER carry this out at the end of November and beginning of December in two operations, each time with 360 EMC II mines and 220 cutting floats, under designation "N4" and "N5".

Air reconnaissance also has recently confirmed enemy minesweeping in the area of the Great Fisher Bank. Naval Staff too considers reinforcement necessary and minelaying within the former "West Wall" boundaries appropriate in order at the same time to offer protection against enemy attacks on Northern Norway, the Skagerrak or Northern Jutland. It is impossible to lay new barrages near the coast as the quantity of mines available is insufficient, especially since only mines with time setting could be used in order to retain our own freedom of operation. Mines with chain connection and an ample use of cutting floats will hamper minesweeping very much.

Group North/Fleet will therefore be advised that Naval Staff agrees in principle. Allocation of the required mines will be arranged.

Norway, Northern Waters:

I. Enemy Situation:

Over the North Sea 27 planes were detected on operation in the morning and fewer later on. Admiral, Northern Waters reports to Group North/Fleet, with copy to Naval Staff, that the following were detected by air reconnaissance on 29 Oct.:

- a. at 1130 3 Russian destroyers and 1 escort vessel in AW 2298 on course 120 degrees.

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- b. at 1240 1 small destroyer in AW 2237 on course 220 degrees.
- c. at 1315 1 destroyer, 5 small destroyers and 6 motor gunboats in AC 8982 on course 330 degrees.

Admiral, Northern Waters concludes that the enemy unit detected on 28 Oct. at noon divided and met the Russian unit and he assumes that the part-group under a) will enter Archangel, that under b) Svatsi Nos and that under c) Murmansk.

Admiral, Northern Waters concludes from the transfer of motor gunboats that raids, perhaps together with Russian PT boats, may be expected against our convoy traffic while British destroyers are to provide escort back to the west, since it is through unlikely that they will remain in Russian waters.

Operation "Katharina" will be carried out as soon as thorough reconnaissance of the sea area and the ports shows that the situation is favorable. (See teletype 1605).

2. Own Situation:

In the area of Naval Command, Norway 32 ships were escorted north and 29 south. There was the usual delay owing to shortage of escort vessels, which affected 18 ships. Patrol of the barrage gaps at Kristiansand South was temporarily reinforced by four boats. The 4th Destroyer Flotilla entered Kaa Fjord at 0930 on 29 Oct.

Group North/Fleet advises Naval Staff, for information, of its order to Admiral, Northern Waters canceling previous instructions regarding combing of the sea area in connection with operations "Katharina" and "Feodora"; in view of recent evaluation of the enemy situation. The barrages should be laid unobserved and the boats should then return on a route some distance from the coast. It may be necessary to provide an escort group and to dispose it in advanced positions. Group North/Fleet has stated its views at the request of Operations Division (see War Diary 25 Oct.) on the barrages proposed by Naval Command, Norway for the protection of the anchorage of the TIRPITZ. Group North/Fleet holds that barrages "NW 64-68 are unnecessary, but agrees to mine reinforcement of the Rognsund and approves the laying of barrages "NW 70" and "71" only as alarm barrages with a patrolled gap, in agreement with Group North/Fleet and Admiral, Northern Waters, Naval Staff approves the barrages in the Vargsund and She Stjernesund only with a patrolled gap and orders that plans and final mine requirements be submitted.

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IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

I. Enemy Situation:

Sea Rescue Station, Skagen reported at 0430 in AO 4199 three ships on northwesterly course, of which two were taken for the DICTO and the LIONEL. It was ascertained later that sighting by the defense cutter NYMPHE was due to confusion with one of our own convoys.

The 3rd Minesweeper Flotilla had an engagement with an enemy minesweeper group southeast of Tyters at 1102, which lasted until 1153. Two PT boats and a vessel with a silhouette like a submarine were sunk and others damaged. One vessel was towed out of reach of our guns. This enemy unit passed at 1230 for a short time within range of our guns on Tyters, but avoided our gunfire by putting up a smoke screen and sheering off. Two Russian patrol boats and three small vessels which followed the unit fired on our battery. A detonation was heard at 1243 near a salvage group in the area of the "Seeigel 2a" barrage. No damage was sustained by us.

A gunboat of the MOSKWA class was shelled by Battery "Peterhof" and put up a smoke screen. West of Kronstadt a tug with a barge was observed on minesweeping operations.

2. Own Situation:

Minesweeping in the Baltic Sea entrances was carried out by 29 boats, in the Baltic Sea by 22 boats. Transport and convoy traffic was carried out as planned and without incident.

Chief, Naval Salvage and Sea Rescue Command, Center reports that the following Danish vessels have so far been salvaged: Torpedo boat VALROSSEN, minelayer NOSSEN, minesweeper SOEULVEN, minelayers SIXTUS and KVINTUS. All these boats can be used again after repair.

Furthermore, submarine depot ship HENRIK GERNER has been raised, but it is doubtful whether she can be reconditioned because of the heavy damage sustained by fire and demolition charges. Altogether 16 out of 35 vessels have been salvaged so far.

V. Merchant Shipping:

I. According to advice received from the Foreign office

the three Danish ships, NEEZY, SKANNE and EGHOLM, laid up in Lisbon, plan to sail to Gibraltar under pressure from the British. Crews for these ships will be brought from England. The EGHOLM will be ready to sail already within the next few days. The other two ships still have to dock. The German Representative for Denmark has made the owners of these ships cable instructions that they are to remain at Lisbon. The German Legation has been instructed to make every effort to see to it that these instructions are followed.

2. Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Marine Branch deals in brief Report No. 12/43, amongst other things, with the decrease in shipping at Argentine ports between 1939 and 1943 from about 9.5 million NRT to about 2 million NRT.

It is expected that the new harbor of Ceara (northeast coast of Brazil), construction on which was started in 1938, will be put into operation in December. Final completion is expected in May 1944.

The United States have brought about 100 vessels from Canada. (Liberty ships and small vessels).

VI. Submarine Warfare

Submarine U "415", on outward passage in the Bay of Biscay, shot down an attacking plane but the damage she sustained forced her to start on return passage.

Submarine U "405" scored two "FAT" torpedo hits on a group of 3 steamers and 2 destroyers in BD 1647.

Submarine U "586" reported from AK 58 a carrier-borne plane.

The convoy awaited by Group "Schill" was detected at 1130 in BE 4247 and was thus considerably behind the time fixed by dead-reckoning. It is regrettable that our air reconnaissance did not locate this convoy the day before, since the group lost 24 valuable hours in the attack operation. The convoy was not contacted again on this day although the submarines operation against it proceeded at maximum speed.

It is expected that the awaited HX convoy will be diverted, since enemy air reconnaissance detected our submarine group "Siegfried" disposed from BC 3560 to 9340. Therefore twelve boats, as Group "Koerner", will be transferred from AJ 9519 to BC 3297 and ten boats, as Group "John", from BC 9343

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to CD 2325. Besides this, one boat will be disposed in BC 3785 and one in BC 6722. Interception of a westbound convoy is possible in the area of Group "Koereer". Of the submarines lately despatched to the Mediterranean two have been reported by enemy planes or vessels in CG 97 and one in CG 9821. There is a growing suspicion that the enemy is operating on a location frequency not detectable by us or that he detects our submarines during dark nights in a way unknown to us. The situation has recently taken a turn for the worse in this connection. This is also proved by the loss of submarine U "566" which was accurately approached and sunk off the Spanish coast by night without any location being detected.

Sailing orders for submarine "Dommes" have been despatched to the Commander of the German naval base in Penang via the Naval Attache in Tokyo. When the submarine is in operational readiness and has been advised of the latest war experiences, she is to be equipped with 15 torpedoes and will be put out in accordance with instructions of the Japanese naval authorities, taking up naval grid squares LC and MS as operational area. The presence of Japanese submarines in the entire area must be reckoned with.

Furthermore the Commander of the German naval base in Penang has been instructed to report the probable dates of operational readiness of submarines which have put in, restriction of operational readiness and special experiences gained. The order with regard to the distribution of the remaining torpedoes of the submarines which have put in will be given as soon as dates of readiness are known. It is planned to send submarines "Luedden", "Schaefer", "Junker" and "Pich" to their former operational areas and then have them start on return passage to home waters as soon as their torpedoes are used up, supplies to be given by the BRAKE or the SCHLIEMANN.

Arrival of new torpedoes and spare parts as well as 2 cm. ammunition can be expected at the earliest from the middle of February, and from then on continuously.

VII. Aerial Warfare

British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 25 planes out on operation over the west area and 22 over the Mediterranean.

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During the day minor enemy forces attacked the harbor and arsenal in Cherbourg as well as the airfield at Thebille. Furthermore, seven reconnaissance planes were reported in the morning over Germany. These planes penetrated as far as Frankfurt on Main, Hanover and Emden but did not attack.

Between 2014 and 2017 5 of our bombers and 7 heavy fighters carried out a nuisance raid on London.

Air Commander, Atlantic Coast and Submarine Division have unanimously observed that BV 222 plane, contrary to expectation, is eminently suited for reconnaissance also in sea areas where so far it was not planned to use it. The third BV plane will be available on 20 Nov. so that it will then be possible to operate continuously with two planes of this type from Biscarosse. Operations Division has once more recommended Air Force, Operations Staff to enlarge the air base at Biscarosse so that at least two planes can be accommodated.

Since only six FW 200's are produced monthly, the supply of this type of plane to Air Commander, Atlantic Coast is inadequate. Air Force, Operations Staff has been asked to state how the FW 200's are divided between Air Commander, Atlantic Coast and the 5th Air Force.

From 10 Nov. the reconnaissance situation of Air Commander, Atlantic Coast will be considerably alleviated by the projected allocation of ten Ju 290's, which have the same range as the BV 222's and are faster.

Mediterranean Theater:

In Italy reconnaissance was carried out. At the front the enemy attacked our anti-aircraft gun positions and roads. At noon strong enemy formations attacked Genoa and in the evening the airfield at Perugia, where two Ju 88's were destroyed.

In the area of Air Force Command, Southeast a unit of 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers and 2 merchantmen was attacked 30 miles south-southeast of Castell Rosso by 14 dive-bombers and 21 bombers. Two direct hits were scored on the cruiser, which forced her to stop. A direct hit was also scored on each of the two destroyers. At 0920 five of our bombers sank a steamer of 1,500 GRT off Samos. Seven enemy planes made a low-level attack on the island of Kos.

Eastern Front"

Photographic reconnaissance was carried out of the ports of

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Poti, Gelendzhik, Novorossiisk, Anapa, Taman, Sennaya and Temriuk. For evaluations see Enemy Situation, Black Sea.

In the afternoon 18 enemy planes raided Feodosiya. A patrol vessel sank.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea

I. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

At noon Alboran sighted about 25 miles to the south 2 battleships, presumably of the NELSON class, and 6 destroyers escorted by fighters on westerly course. At 1730 2 Italian cruisers presumably the LUIGI CADORNA and the ALBERTO DI GUISSANO, and 2 destroyers coming from the Mediterranean entered Gibraltar.

On the afternoon of 28 Oct. two Italian destroyers with British troops aboard were sighted 45 miles east of Malaga on easterly course by a Spanish steamer.

Reconnaissance of Sardinia and Corsica revealed nothing new. Four torpedo boats were lying in Olbia on 28 Oct. On the morning of 30 Oct. three patrol vessels were sighted off the harbor.

The convoy reported on 29 Oct. south of Naples, which was possibly escorted by an auxiliary aircraft carrier, presumably entered Naples. On the morning of 30 Oct. a heavily escorted southbound convoy was observed 20 miles south of Naples. German Naval Command, Italy assumes that supply traffic to Naples enters or leaves around midnight. Photographic reconnaissance carried out in the morning over this harbor showed a slight increase in warships and freighters. Three submarines and one light cruiser were identified as additions. All lights are on at night in Naples as well as Bari and Barletta.

At 0255 three boats, presumably MGB's, were sighted off Viareggio on southerly course. In the morning there were three minesweepers, presumably returning from an exploratory sweep, between Ponza and Ventotene.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Three of our PT boats made a thrust into Naples Bay during the night of 29 Oct., but without result. Minelaying operations by the SAN GIORGIO on the east coast and by the

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Kehrwieder on the west coast were carried out as planned.

Engineers carried out important demolitions in Gaeta.

The hospital ship GRADISCA left Marseilles for Patras at 0600.

The Ansaldo dockyard was hit several times in the enemy air attack on Genoa on 29 Oct. The supply depot for war transports and naval landing craft was burned out. Two planes were shot down, ships' anti-aircraft guns participating. On 30 Oct. Savona and Albisola were attacked by enemy planes. The berths of the 7th PT Boat Flotilla received a direct hit which damaged the torpedo maintenance unit.

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff submitted on 21 Oct. the following priority schedule for allocation and use of anti-aircraft weapons in Italy, as ordered by the Fuehrer:

1. Villa Perosa
2. Important airfields of the Bomber Command
3. Coastal defense on the west and east coasts of Italy up to the line Piombino - Ancona
4. The Brenner route, especially Bolzano
5. Further airfields of Bomber Command
6. Coastal defense on the Ligurian coast, especially at Leghorn, Spezia and Genoa
7. All objectives of military and war economy importance (supply base Fiume).

The defense under 3) - 6) is to be maintained until Commanding General, Armed Forces, South or Army Group B are in a position to bring into action for coastal defense the captured Italian anti-aircraft guns made available by the Air Force, which will be manned by Italian personnel together with a small number of Germans. Naval Staff has advised German Naval Command, Italy accordingly. The latter has reported in this connection that anti-aircraft defense on the east coast, especially that of Venice, has not been taken into consideration. Naval Staff states that the northwest coast of the Adriatic, including Venice, rightly falls under 7) of the priority schedule, since defense of the Ligurian coast is at present more urgent than that of the northwestern Adriatic area.

Submarine U "73" put in to Toulon and submarine U "380" put out. Submarine U "565" has reported her position in CO 4131 after passing through the Sicilian Channel.

Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean has been ordered to report to the

dates of operational readiness of submarines and any changes in these in time for Naval Staff to be able to give prompt operational orders if necessary.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

The order prohibiting ships to leave Sibenik to the north has been canceled. Routes south of that port still remain closed, except for Siebel ferries. The steamers SEBENIC, BRUMMER and GIGLIOLA arrived at Zara on 29 Oct. and went on to Trieste on 30 Oct.

b. Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

At 0950 on 29 Oct. a vessel, presumably an Italian minelayer, and a small warship were sighted 10 miles north of Kos. On 30 Oct. our air reconnaissance sighted at 0910 140 miles north-northwest of Alexandria 1 cruiser and 2 destroyers on course south-southeast; at 1229 30 miles south-east of Castell Rosso 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers and 2 merchantmen on course north-northeast. This group was successfully attacked by our Air Force.

On the afternoon of 29 Oct. an enemy submarine repeatedly fired torpedoes on the steamer GERDA TOFT lying in Ponormos Bay. Submarine chase was started. At 0800 on 30 Oct, a submarine was detected southeast of Kos. On 29 Oct. continuous low-level attacks were carried out on the harbor and battery of Stampalia. One plane was probably shot down. On the evening of 29 Oct. the airfield at Candia was raided by twelve planes on the town and harbor of Kos and noon on 30 Oct. was also ineffective.

During the night of 29 Oct. four planes attacked two boats of the Coast Patrol Flotilla, Attica. Two planes were shot down. We suffered casualties. Amongst others the Flotilla Commander was badly wounded. These two boats have therefore shot down four enemy bombers within 24 hours.

Own Situation:

On 28 Oct. torpedo boats TA"14" and TA"18" (formerly the Italian destroyer TURBINE and the torpedo boat San Martino) were commissioned. On 29 Oct. a Do 24 sea-rescue plane sank in the harbor

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Of Naxos, Nine men are missing. It seems that another Do 24 sank west of Antiparos while making an emergency landing on the after. The passengers were brought to Paros by Greek vessels.

In the morning of the same day 267 police were landed on Amorgos as planned.

The DRACHE put in to Salonika after completing a further minelaying operation in Salonika Bay.

On 30 Oct. 35 soldiers, 1 officer and 3 men from the steamer INGEBORG arrived in Kos by flying boat.

Nine infantry landing boats, en route from Salonika to Piraeus entered Chalkis.

Operation "Zwischenspiel" has been postponed for 24 hours.

It has now been ascertained that the 439 men of the German garrison force on Corfu were taken to Brindisi on 22 Sept. They included 4 officers and 350 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men of the 617th Naval Artillery Battalion.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Three submarines were detected at sea west of the Crimea, one in the central Black Sea and one, position unknown.

Poti: 1 battleship, 2 heavy cruisers, 3 destroyers, 1 torpedo boat, 1 minesweeper, 8 submarines, 9 motor minesweepers, 9 PT boats, 1 passenger steamer 8,500 GRT) 1 tanker, (7,000 GRT), 13 steamers (32,500 GRT), 15 coastal freighters, 21 lighters and 15 boats;

Gelendzhik: 10 PT boats, 9 motor minesweepers, 5 guardboats, 21 landing craft, 1 tug, 15 foastal vessels, 1 lighter, 35 boats; off the Bay 1 motor minesweeper;

Novorossiisk: 2 guardboats, 4 landing craft, 3 tugs, 6 boats;

Anapa: 14 motor minesweepers, 4 PT boats, 6 guardboats, 35 landing craft, 11 tugs, 18 boats;

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Taman: 8 PT boats, 5 coastal ccessels, 28 landing craft, 4 tugs, 10 boats;

Sennaya: 10 PT boats, 2 minesweepers and 3 coast patrol boats;

Temriuk: 7 PT boats, 6 guardboats, 29 gunboats, 17 pontoon ferries, 1 coastal vessel, 1 tug and 16 boats.

Own Situation:

Genichesk has been evacuated. Besides the five naval artillery lighters, four naval landing craft and harbor defense boats were also blown up.

Personnel of the Port Commander and of the 614th Naval Artillery Battalion have been placed at the disposal of the Army for land defense of the Crimea.

One harbor defense boat was beached during the enemy air raid at noon in the harbor and town of Feodosiya. One tanker sustained heavy damage, but remained afloat. Casualties were sustained on a naval landing craft and a motor minesweeper.

Three boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla left Ivanbaba for an operation off the Causasian coast. Bad weather forced the boats to turn about at 1730.

Minesweeping operations west of Sevastopol for barrage S "47" had to be abandoned owing to heavy seas.

Naval landing craft F "135" which ran aground near Feodosiya was refloated.

Submarine U "9" probably sank a tanker of 3,000 GRT at 2130 on 29 Oct. in CL 9312. Submarine U "18" left Feodosiya for the operational area.

IX. Situation East Asia

The U. S. Navy Department reported on 30 Oct.:

Pacific and Far East: American submarines have reported sinking 10 enemy ships and damaging 4 further ships in operations against the enemy. The following were sunk: 1 large merchantman, 1 large tanker, 1 large transport, 5 medium-sized and 2 small merchant

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men, damaged were: 1 large merchantman, 2 medium-sized and 1 small merchantmen. These actions have not been announced in any earlier report.

According to information from the Japanese Ministry of Transportation, the Japanese steamers KAMO MARU (7,955 tons) and FUJI MARU were torpedoed by an enemy submarine in the east China Seas at dawn on 27 Oct. The KAMO MARU sustained damage; the FUJI MARU was sunk.

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Items of Political Importance

Nothing special to report.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff

I. Army Situation:

The situation on the eastern front remained more or less unchanged.

In the south our air activity was especially lively with 1,200 sorties compared to only about 500 of the enemy. The enemy is still bringing up reinforcements to the area of Nevel.

Army General Staff estimates that the enemy has put 318 divisions into the fighting lines on the eastern front and has altogether about 108 reserve divisions available in the rear.

At 1402 the Naval Liaison Officer to High Command, Army, Army General Staff telephoned to advise that the enemy had broken through as far as Perekop, but is stopped at the Tartar Trench. Commanding General, 17th Army Command is today at the Fuehrer Headquarters.

II. Report from Admiral, Black Sea with regard to Genichesk has meanwhile been received:

- "I. On 25 Oct. Admiral, Black Sea issued a precautionary order to naval artillery lighters in case of the evacuation of Genichesk. According to these instructions the naval artillery lighters were to take on an extra supply of fuel and ammunition and remain at sea as long as possible for defense of the Asov coast of the Crimea against enemy landings. They were to proceed to the Black Sea through the Strait of Kerch when their fuel or ammunition was used up.
2. On 28 Oct. a report was received from Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine that Genichesk would be evacuated at 1700 on 29 Oct.

Weather conditions on 29 Oct.: Northeast wind, up to strength 8. Weather forecast: Bad weather continuing.

3. It was therefore doubtful whether the naval artillery lighters would be able to leave owing to their slight seaworthiness accentuated by constructional damage. Admiral, Black Sea, therefore instructed Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine to blow up the naval artillery lighters when evacuating Genichesk, if putting out to sea was impossible.
4. The lighters were blown up shortly before the hour set for evacuation, simultaneously with blasting of supplies carried out by the Army. However, evacuation was postponed after demolition had been carried out.
5. Evacuation has now been carried out but even today, 30 Oct., the weather is still such that it would have been impossible for the naval artillery lighters to proceed from Genichesk to the Strait of Kerch along the coast open to northeasterly gales. In their last operations these naval artillery lighters were already partly swamped during seaway 2 - 3 since the pontoons were leaky. The engines were badly run down. Cruising speed was not above five knots. The boats were hardly seaworthy any more. Repairs, if such would have been possible at all, would have required a long dockyard period."

The report does not indicate that Admiral, Black Sea tried to have the blowing-up postponed by 12 hours. As soon as this point has been cleared up, a supplementary report will be sent to the Fuehrer Headquarters for submission to the Fuehrer.

Chief, Naval Staff is leaving to for Angers for discussions with Air Commander, Atlantic Coast and for inspection of the submarine flotillas in Western France.

Situation 31 Oct. 1943

I. War in Foreign Waters:

I. Enemy Situation:

Nothing special to report.

2. Own Situation:

Operations Division despatched the following instructions to the Naval Attache in Tokoyo:

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"Captain Hartmann writes in his War Diary about supplies from the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN:

1. Supplying six submarines simultaneously is impracticable; four boats suffice, of which one will take on heavy Diesel oil, lubricating oil and water, two will take on provisions and the remaining one will afford protection or stand by for supplies.
2. The supply ship herself must control the operation more closely. For this better signal equipment and more personnel are needed, amongst other things the submarines being supplied must make personnel available.
3. The equipment of the supply ship with boats left much to be desired. She must have one suitable, seaworthy motorboat.
4. The weather was favorable; on one day only was the wind above strength 3, the swell was high but very long. Provisions were safely brought aboard in the large rubber dinghies.
5. Meeting with the other commanders, brief exchanges of experiences and the "get together" in general was stimulating and therefore valuable.
6. The crew of the supply ship was in good spirits despite the fact that most of them had not been home for more than four years.

Remarks by Naval Staff:

- re 1: to be attended to by Commanding Admiral, Submarines.
- 2: the necessary steps in this respect must be taken by the senior submarine commander.
- 3: must be arranged over there."

Naval Staff advised Armed Forces High Command, Foreign Affairs - Intelligence Division, Section III and the Naval Attache's Section, with copy to Group West, that for the time being the embarkation of passengers on blockade runners cannot be permitted. No one except the crew is allowed on board.

II. Situation West Area

I. Enemy Situation:

Only one plane was detected on operation over the Bay

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Of Biscay. One British vessel was located at noon in BD 9910 and one in BE 4969.

Our own air reconnaissance sighted at 1737 in BE 3942 one destroyer on course 210 degrees, speed 20 knots.

In the Channel a convoy was located at 0505 on northeasterly course in BF 3147 left edge, center.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One submarine was escorted out of Brest.

Acts of sabotage were carried out in Rouen at 2000 on a transformer station and at 2200 on a cinema for the Armed Forces.

Channel Coast:

One ground mine was swept west of Nieuport and one north of Lezardrieux.

At 1138 two boats of the 46th Minesweeper Flotilla were machine-gunned in Lezardrieux Bay by two enemy planes, of which one was shot down. Out boats had two seriously wounded and six slightly wounded.

PT boats S "100" and S "141" left Le Havre at 2200 for Boulogne.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters

North Sea:

Three ground mines were swept north of Juist. Patrol positions were only partly taken up owing to fog.

Convoy "1185" Hook-Elbe consisting of 6 steamers and 5 patrol vessels, escorted by the 21st Minesweeper Flotilla and PT boats, sailed at 1800.

The convoy of the steamer NORDVAARD and torpedo boat T "14" will go on eastward during the night of 31 Oct.

At 1900 a few bombs were dropped on and near Emden. No report damage has yet been received.

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Naval Command, North submitted to Operations Division, for information, an extract of instructions issued by the 3rd Air Force regarding reconnaissance over the sea area of the western Heligoland Bight and Denmark. For copy see teletype 1255. According to these instructions, reconnaissance is to be carried out daily of the area between 5 degrees 30' E, three degrees 30' E and 53 degrees 30' N, or the border of the area of the 5th Air Force. This is to be done by a single plane at irregular periods, also at night, but especially at dusk.

Norway, Northern Waters:

I. Enemy Situation:

Over the North Sea five planes were detected on operation.

2. Own Situation:

In the area of Naval Command, Norway 26 ships were escorted north and 15 south. Shortage of escorts delayed 23 ships.

Naval Command, Norway reports that 750 meters of the horizontal net barrage in the Farnsund were laid on 26 Oct.

Naval Command, Norway also reports, as regards protecting the anchorage of the TIRPITZ, that the proposed staircase' barrage between Kvalneset and Indresskjaer will not be laid, since the Task Force fears restriction of its freedom of movement during the winter months. Naval Command, Norway has rejected the counter-proposal made by the Task Force to lay a staircase barrage near Auskarneset as it would entail considerable danger to our shipping in view of the prevailing current and the proximity to the net barrage. (See teletype 1315.)

Attempts to tow the BEITZEN off have so far been fruitless. It is planned to lighten her when the leak has been stopped and then raise her with the assistance of pontoons. Mine-sweeper MRS "25", submarine chaser "1702", minesweeper M "5208" and AF "34" are to afford protection for the damaged vessel. On the BEITZEN one 3.7 cm. anti-aircraft gun and one 2 cm. anti-aircraft quadruple gun are ready for firing.

Destroyer Z "38" has been given orders by Group North/Fleet to transfer on 1 Nov. to Narvik without escort. For details see Radiogram 1202.

Submarine U "354" landed the weather detachment on Hope Island according to plan and then proceeded to the operational area of Bear Island

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in order to relieve submarine U "956".

A copy of the directive from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff to Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway, regarding measures against the signs of slackness amongst our forces in Norway as per l/Skl 33610/43 geh. is contained in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

I. Enemy Situation:

The Naval Attache in Stockholm reports that a PT boat flying the British merchant flag into Lysekil harbor at 0900 on 28 Oct. The boat carried one gun forward and one aft. Torpedo tubes were not seen. The boat unloaded about 50 drums of 50 kg. each. contents unknown, and at 1500 commenced loading a large quantity of small but heavy, obviously valuable iron parts. The Naval Attache in Stockholm does not believe that the boat has been in Swedish territorial waters for any length of time.

In the land front in the area of Admiral, Baltic States about 200 enemy assault troops carried out an operation near Peterhof from the Oranienbaum pocket after heavy preparatory gunfire. The outcome is not yet known.

2. Own Situation:

In the Baltic Sea entrances four ELM mines were swept. Minelaying in the sea area northeast of Schepel by Coastal minelayers had to be broken off owing to fog.

Transport and escort service in the entire Baltic Sea area was carried out as planned.

V. Submarine Warfare

In the North Atlantic boats of Group "Schill" were prevented from reaching the enemy by heavy depth charge and air defense. One destroyer was sunk for certain and a second one probably sunk by "Zaunkoenig" torpedoes. There are no indications as yet as regards our own losses.

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Submarine U "448" which is damaged and is on return passage, reported that in BE 65 she probably sank two destroyers out of a chaser group on the evening of 26 Oct. with T5 torpedoes.

On 22 Oct. in Mid-Atlantic (EU 47) submarine U "68" sank a tanker of 3,000 G.R.T. and a corvette by gunfire, after misfiring seven torpedoes. On 31 Oct. she sank the steamer TROILUS (7,422 G. R. T.) in EW 7199. According to radio intelligence two of the submarines assigned to the Mediterranean were sunk by enemy patrol forces in the Straits of Gibraltar. Submarine U "450" reported from CH 72 that she succeeded in breaking through. According to an intelligence report from T ngier, patrol vessels were seen in the afternoon to attack a submarine with depth charges and gunfire.

VI. Aerial Warfare

British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 26 planes out on operation over the west area and 17 over the Mediterranean.

In the evening 4 of our bombers and 9 heavy fighters carried out harassing raid on London,

During the day minor enemy fighter bomber forces carried out single attacks on two airfields in the west area. Two typhoons were shot down.

At noon about 40 Fortresses coming from the south attacked the railway viaduct at Antheor near Toulon. Four hits were scored which will probably interrupt traffic on this important supply line to Italy for ten days.

In the evening a group of 15 Mosquitoes flew into the area of Oberhausen and another group of five Mosquitoes into the area of Borkum - Emden. The Air Force and naval anti-aircraft guns shot down one Mosquito near Mecherich.

Mediterranean Theater:

In the Italian area our planes carried out reconnaissance. In the area of Air Force Command, Southeast, 41 bombers, 32 divebombers, 40 fighters, 27 reconnaissance planes and 37 transport planes were out on operation. Activity was concentrated on assisting the Army in the area of Agram-Ljubljana.

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At noon heavy enemy forces attacked the ports of Anzio, Nettuno and Civitavecchia as well as the airfield at Tirana. At Civitavecchia two ships of the harbor barrage patrol were sunk and one naval landing craft damaged. At Tirana four of our planes were destroyed and four others slightly damaged. Three enemy fighters were shot down.

Eastern Front:

Nothing special to report.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea

I. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

In the Gibraltar a cruiser of the UGANDA class left dock. At 1130 a DELHI class cruiser left for the Atlantic. At 1115 a convoy of 5 freighters, 1 tanker and 2 auxiliary warships passed Gibraltar heading for the Straits. A further convoy, which was reported at 1315 off Cape Spartel, passed Tarifa at 1645; it consisted of 59 freighters and 11 escort vessels. This convoy was joined by 17 freighters, 1 tanker, 2 destroyers and 5 escort vessels from Gibraltar.

The battleships reported on 30 Oct. south of Alboran have not been detected again. This observation was presumably a mistake.

Four warships of unknown type entered Ajaccio at noon. In the morning and afternoon of 30 Oct. destroyers shelled Gaeta and the coast east thereof. The destroyers withdrew when the fire was returned. On the same day, no time given, a convoy of 20 freighters was reported steaming off east of Crotona.

According to an intelligence report, the Duke of Aosta has been appointed Commander in Chief of the Royal Italian Navy.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

On 30 Oct. the island of Pianosa was reoccupied from Elba. There were no PT boat operations during the night of 30 Oct. At noon on 31 Oct. three PT boats in sailing readiness at Nettunia were hit by numerous splinters in an enemy air attack. Two boats were still in operational readiness. In the enemy air attack on 30 Oct. on the Ansaldo dockyard in Genoa one Italian PT boat was sunk. The coastal

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area of Tescare was almost incessantly under heavy air attacks from the morning to the afternoon of 30 Oct.

Four harbor defense boats were commissioned at Spezia.

Coastal traffic on the west coast was carried out as planned.

Submarine U "380" has been assigned the area east of CJ 8685 for operations.

One inquiry from Operations Division, German Naval Command, Italy has reported on the transfer of the large French ships back from Italian ports to France as follows:

- a. Seventeen ships totaling 91,570 GRT are ready for transfer at Genoa. Two part-crews available.
- b. Another nine ships totaling 42,235 GRT will shortly be ready at Genoa after a minor engine overhaul, No crews available.
- c. Another fifteen ships will be ready after a repair lasting two weeks.
- d. Thirty ships will be ready after lengthy repairs.
- e. About fifteen ships are useless.

Blockships and ships engaged in the supply service are not included. Changes must be expected.

A final report is not yet available on the possibilities of transferring motor minesweepers and PT boats on the waterway Genoa - Piacenza - Adriatic Sea (see teletype 1615),

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

The 611th Naval Artillery Battalion reports twelve 7.6 cm. anti-aircraft guns and five light field guns near Sibenik manned and ready for action. Port Commander, Trogir, Port Commander and Port Captain, Split, and the Motor Transport Company of the Naval Shore Commander, Dalmatia arrived at Dubrovnik. Shipping and Transport Office, Valona started its functions on 28 Oct. The 612th Naval Artillery Battalion arrived at Cattaro and the Staff company at Durezzo.

The 15th Landing Flotilla, carrying nine Italian torpedoes for Admiral, Aegean, left Dubrovnik on 30 Oct. Bad weather forces some of the boats to return to port. The steamers MAMELLI, CAGLIARI, SEBENIC and ITALIA left Pola for Trieste. Our steamers were shelled from the islands of Brvenik and Lussin. The steamer SKARPANTOS entered Zara on 30 Oct. with damage to her rudder. NA "2" and NA "31", en route to Sibenik, were attacked by four low flying enemy planes. Damage sustained was insignificant. Fourteen men were wounded.

Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, Foreign Affairs Section has reported about enemy supplies to communist insurgents in former Yugoslavian territory:

"1. Two partisan ships loaded with anti-tank guns, gasoline explosives, arms, ammunition, clothing and provisions have been lying at Brindisi in sailing readiness since the end of Oct.

2. These ships are two-masted sailing vessels called the SLOBODA and the DEMOKRATIA. They are at present flying a Yugoslav partisan flag. Air and sea recognition signals with Allied units have not been ascertained so far.

3. Berthing facilities have been reported ready at:

- a. Senj up to 2,000 tons
- b. Karlobag up to 500 tons,
- c. Novi up to 600 tons,
- d. Jablanica and Sv. Juraj up to 300 tons."

Group South has sent the following request to German Naval Command, Italy:

"1. There are numerous most urgent tasks to be carried out on the Dalmatian coast for which ships are needed. Group South is nevertheless willing to place vessels from time to time at the disposal of German Naval Command, Italy for important tasks, as already promised.

2. In order to assess priority it is necessary to be fully advised as to present and future plans of German Naval Command, Italy. Advice is once more requested.

3. Admiral, Adriatic will communicate direct with German Naval Command, Italy in order at once to obtain the required vessels for mopping-up islands.

4. For the movements of our own vessels it will be necessary

to know exactly the location of mines on the Adriatic Sea. German Naval Command, Italy is requested to submit this information as soon as possible in each case."

b. Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Our air reconnaissance sighted five vessels in the early morning near Castell Rosso. Boats of the Coast Patrol Flotilla, Attica sighted and attacked one submarine near Amorgos and another near Naxos between 1025 and 1531. In both cases hits by gunfire were scored. The body of a man who was drowned from the submarine attacked near Naxos was recovered from the sea.

Interception of the Turkish Police radio confirms the loss of three enemy torpedo boats in the area of Kos - Leros by striking mines. One of these boats (formerly Greek) was beached on the Turkish coast and abandoned. The loss of these boats can be regarded as a major success of the barrage laid by the minelayer DRACHE east of Leros.

Own Situation:

The two boats of the Coast Patrol Flotilla, Attica attacked by enemy planes during the night of 29 Oct. are en route to Piraeus. The Commander of the Flotilla died of his wounds.

The former Italian destroyer FRANCESCO CRISPI was commissioned as torpedo boat TA "17" on 30 Oct.; she is in sailing readiness but not yet in operational readiness.

Attempts to tow off light PT boat SS "5" have so far been unsuccessful. Naval landing craft MFP "123" cannot be repaired in Kos and will therefore be moved to Piraeus. This leaves only three naval landing craft still at Kos.

Regarding our air attack on 30 Oct. on an enemy unit, a further bomb hit is reported on the cruiser lying damaged and stopped. Three Ju 88's were lost in this attack.

So far 305 survivors of the INGEBORG convoy has been rescued.

Battery Stampalia-East reported on 30 Oct. four guns in action readiness.

The tanker BACCHUS and the steamer JOH. MERSK left Piraeus for Constanta. They are due off the Bosphorus on 3 Nov.

No further convoys were carried out owing to bad weather.

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According to information received from Army Group E, operation "Zwischenspiel" has been given up for the present because of the loss of the naval artillery lighters.

Group South urgently requests that the landing company formed by Admiral, Landing Craft and Bases be made available as it is needed for the present mopping-up operations on the unoccupied Aegean islands. Group South requests at the same time that further such units, if available, be despatched to the area of Group South for employment by Admiral, Adriatic or Admiral, Aegean. According to a report from the Quartermaster, Admiral, Aegean no agreement to suit Naval Staff has so far been reached with the Army on the question of infantry protection for naval coastal batteries on the Peloponnesos. Group South has been instructed to report how this matter stands.

c. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to evaluation of photographic reconnaissance the following were lying at Tuapse: 1 torpedo boat, 3 minesweepers, 1 tanker (7,000 G.R.T.), 2 small freighters, 5 coastal vessels and 8 motor minesweepers. One of our submarines reported sighting a tanker convoy 40 miles west to north of Suchum on southerly course, This convoy was unsuccessfully attacked by submarine U "24" at 0150. One of the escort vessels was probably torpedoed.

Own Situation:

Submarine U "24" is on return passage and submarine U "23" on outward passage from Feodosiya to the operational area.

The tanker PRODRAMOS, escorted by two motor minesweepers and the XANTEN, was unsuccessfully attacked at 1234 while on passage from Sevastopol to Constanta by two torpedo bombers.

Otherwise convoys were carried out without incident.

For the night of 31 Oct. an operation by three boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla is planned against enemy shipping in the sea area of Idokopas; two boats will be kept in immediate readiness at Ivanbaba.

Six naval landing craft are in patrol line east of Feodosia.

Naval Shore Commander, Crimea transferred to Sevastopol on 30 Oct.

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Group South reports that blowing-up of the naval artillery lighters in Genishesk is approved. Admira, Black Sea has not yet answered the question as to why the naval landing craft were blown up.

The Naval Liaison Officer to High Command, Army, Army General Staff submits an air reconnaissance evaluation of ports in the Black Sea and the Sea of Asov from 26 Oct. to 29 Oct. It is assumed that the majority of the landing craft has been transferred from Taman and Anapa through the Strait of Kerch to Temriuk and Yeisk. In the area of Tuapse-Yeisk altogether 118 landing craft were detected on 26 Oct., while only 88 were reported on 29 Oct. The remaining 30 are not accounted for. While on 26 Oct. 33 motor gunboats, mostly at Temriuk and Yeisk, were detected in the Sea of Asov, only 15 are reported on 29 Oct. Army General Staff assumes that the enemy plans operations by the small vessels from Temriuk and Yeisk against the northern or northeastern part of the Kerch peninsula and that the freighters located at Tuapse and Gelendzhik are being used less for landing than for carrying supplies. Naval Liaison Officer requests confirmation of this assessment and also views as to where enemy landings are to be expected on the Crimea and what strength of landing forces is assumed on the basis of the ships and landing craft available. Naval Liaison Officer is of opinion that the agent's reports, according to which Foreign Armies East assesses the probable strength of landing forces, are exaggerated (see teletype 1450).

IX. Situation East Asia

Nothing special to report.

"Achse" (operation):

Measures to be taken in the event of Italy declaring a separate armistice.

"Aquila" submarines

Italian submarines used for transport between Bordeaux and the East.

"D" (point)

Reference point in the Indian Ocean (17 degrees S 97 degrees E.).

East Wall

Rear defense positions running as follows:
in the north: Lake Peipus - Narva;
in the south: east of Berdiansk - Dnieper bend at Zaporozhe and behind this rear position Molotshnaya sector.

ELM

British aerial mine.

ELM/A

British aerial mine with acoustic firing mechanism.

ELM/J

British aerial mine with induction firing mechanism.

EMC

Standard mine, Type C. A contact mine against surface vessels.

EMF

A German moored influence mine.

EMR

Anti-sweeping buoy with plummet sinker and chain.

FZ

Non-contact mine

HS

Remote-controlled bombs.

"Leopard" (operation)

Planned operation against Leros.

"Liebesbank", "Liebeslaube", "Loewe"

Outer routes through the Bay of Biscay.

LMB German aerial mine, type B. Weight 975 kg.

OMA Surface mine for coastal defense in tidal waters.

SC Thin-shell high explosive bombs.

"Tannewald" (point)

Reference point in the Indian Ocean (24 degrees S 81 degrees E).

TMB Torpedo-tube mine, type B.

UMA Anti-submarine mine, Type A.

UMB Anti-submarine mine, Type B.

West Wall

A system of mine barrages in the North Sea and off the coast of Norway. Geographically it constituted an extension of the West Wall fortifications on land.

"Zaunkoenig" torpedo

Anti-destroyer, acoustic homing torpedo.

"Zitronella" (operation)

Attack on British base at Spitsbergen.

"Zwischenspiel" (operation)

Planned operation against Samos.

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